Holding

The termination order was stigmatic and punitive, and because the probation could not be lawfully extended beyond the statutory maximum, the appellant was deemed to have been confirmed, rendering the discharge invalid.

Summary

Jaswantsingh Pratapsingh Jadeja was appointed as a Vigilance Officer of the Rajkot Municipal Corporation on a temporary basis with a six‑month probation under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949. His probation was repeatedly extended beyond the statutory limit, and after a period of unauthorized leave he was shown cause for misconduct (absence without leave). Although his explanation was rejected, no full departmental enquiry was completed, yet his probation was again extended and he was discharged on the basis of both misconduct and unsuitability. The Gujarat High Court dismissed his writ petition and upheld the discharge. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the termination order was stigmatic and punitive, and that the extensions of probation were unlawful because the maximum period allowed under the Act and the Bombay Civil Services Rules is two years; consequently, the appellant was deemed to have been confirmed and the discharge set aside.

Issues considered

The legality of extending probation beyond the period prescribed under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 and the Bombay Civil Services Rules.
Whether a termination order based on alleged misconduct and unsuitability, without a completed departmental enquiry, is stigmatic and punitive requiring compliance with principles of natural justice.
Whether the appropriate authority had the power to discharge the employee without a regular inquiry after the probation period had lawfully expired.

Legislation cited

Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949s. 53(3) second proviso, s. 56(2)

Subjects

service terminationprobation extensiondisciplinary enquirystigmatic orderpunitive terminationmunicipal corporationnatural justiceBombay Provincial Municipal Corporation ActBombay Civil Services Rules

Judgment

--\!

A JASWANTSINGH PRATAPSINGH JADEJA
v.
RAJK OT MUNICIPAL CORPORATION AND ANR.

OCTOBER 11, 2007
B
[S.B. SINHA AND H.S. BEDI, JJ.]

-.;
Service Law-Termination of service-By order ofdischarge-
AppQintment-Jnitial period ofprobation for six months-Extended
c from time to time-Despite further non-extention of probation,
employee continuing on the post-Initiation of disciplinary
proceeding-On account of misconduct-Departmental enquiry
initiated but not brought to its logical end-Termination ofservice by
Appropriate Authority .finding him guilty of the misconduct-By
D extending the probation upto -the date of the order of termination- ).,
Order upheld by High Court-On appeal, held: Termination order by
Appropriate Authority is not sustainable-The order beingfounded ncJr
on the basis of unsuitability for the job alone but also on the basis of
misconduct, was stigmatic and punitive in nature-Extention of
E probation being in contravention ofthe prevailing law, the employee
would be deemed lo have been confirmed after expiry ofinitial period
ofprobation-Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, I 949-
s. 56-Bombay Civil Services Rules-rr. 17.2 and 17.3.
-4.
Appellant was appointed on temporary basis by the respondent-
F
Municipal Corporation. He was put on probation for a period of six
months. His probation was extended from time to time, although no
statutory provision existed in that regard. Despite further non-
extention of the probation, he continued to work. Disciplinary
proceedings were initiated against the respondent on account of
G misconduct of absence from duty without prior leave. His explanation y
on this behalf was rejected. Departmental enquiry was conducted
but the same was not brought to its logical end. He was discharged
on the ground of the misconduct by the Appropriate Authority, by

H 1124
j- -
JASWANTSINGHPRATAPSINGHJADEJA V. RAJKOT 1125
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION

'( further extending the probation. Respondent's Writ Petition against A
the same was dismissed by Single Judge of High Court. Intra-court
appeal was also dismissed by Division Bench of High Court. Hence
the present appeal.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
B
HELD: 1. When a disciplinary enquiry is initiated on the premise
that there are serious allegations of misconduct on the part of the
delinquent officer; his explanation thereupon had been rejected
pursuant whereto a full scale formal enquiry has been initiated
culminating in a finding of guilt, the order terminating the service C
would be held to be stigmatic. There may also be cases where the
:allegations involved moral turpitude on the part of the delinquent
officer. The language used in the order of termination of service may
ex facie be stigmatic. The language used therein may also show that
there was something over and above the assertion that the officer D
was found unsuitable for the job. [Para 9] [1130-D-F]
2. Termination of services of the appellant purporting to
discharge him simplicitor cannot be accepted, being stigmatic in
nature. The form of the order terminating the services coupled with
the background facts clearly leads to the conclusion that the order E
impugned in the writ petition by the appellant was punitive. It is
evident that it was not the unsatisfactory nature and character of
performance of the appellant only which was taken into consideration
but series of his acts as well, misconduct on his part had also been
taken into consideration therefor. It is one thing to say that he was F
found unsuitable for a job but it is another thing to say that he was
said to have committed some misconduct. When a report in a
disciplinary proceeding form the foundation for the order, it would
be stigmatic in nature. It would have civil consequences.
y [Paras 27, 16 and 24] (1132-B, C; 1135-C; 1137-F] G
Dipti Prakash Bane1jee v. Satyendra Nath Bose National
Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta and Ors., (1999] 3 SCC
60 and VP. Ahuja v. State of Punjab and Ors., (2000] 3 SCC
239, relied on.
H
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1126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R. !

A State of Punjab and Ors. v. Sukhwinder Singh, (2005] 5 SCC }--
569; Abhijit Gupta v. S.N.B. National Centre, Basic Sciences
and Ors., (2006) 4 SCC 469; State of Punjab and Ors. v.
Bhagwan Singh, [2002) 9 SCC 636; Kunwar Arun Kumar v.
UP. Hill Electronics Corporation Ltd and Ors., [1997] 2 SCC
B 191 and Radhey Shyam Gupta v. UP. State Agro Industries
Corporation Ltd and Anr., [1999) 2 SCC 21, referred to.

3. It has not been shown as to under what provisions oflaw the
period of probation was extended from time to time. Applicability of
the provisions of Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act,
C 1949 is not in dispute. If under the statute, the period of probation
could not have been extended, he will be deemed to have been
confirmed on expiry of the period of probation.
[Para 11] (1131-B-C]
D 4. Rules 17.2 and 17.3 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules
which are said to be applicable in the case of the appellant, show
that the maximum period of probation provided for there, is two years.
Such a jurisdictional fact had not been taken into consideration by
the appropriate authority. Presumably, keeping in view the
E aforementioned provision, his probation period had not been
extended after 31.2.2003. The nature and character of the order,
therefore, must be considered having regard to the aforementioned
statutory provision. [Paras 13, 14 and 15) (1131-D, G; 1132;.A]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4812 of
F 2007.

From the final Judgment and Order dated 12.8.2005 of the High
Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in LP.A. No. 616 of20os:

Rutwik Panda for the Appellant.
G
Sunil Gupta, Jatin Zaveri, Hemantika Wahi and Pinky for the
Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S.B. SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted.
H
JASWANTSINGH PRA TAPSINGH JADEJA v. RAJK OT 1127
MUNICIPALCORPORATION[SINHA,J.]
2. Appellant was a major in the Army. He joined the Respondent A
Municipal Corporation (the Corporation) as a Vigilance Officer on or
about 21.12.1999. He was put on probation for a period of six months.
The power to appoint on a temporary basis is conferred on the Municipal
Commissioner under the 2nd proviso appended to Section 53(3) of the
Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 (BPMC Act). The B
period of probation provided for therein is six months. It reads as under:
"Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the power of appointing
municipal officers and servants whether permanent or temporary
vests in the Commissioner;
c
Provided that such power in respect of permanent appointments
shall be subject to the statement for the time being in force prepared
and sanctioned under Section 51:
Provided further that no temporary appointment shall be made by
the Commissioner for any period exceeding six months and no such D
appointment carrying a monthly salary exceeding such amount as
may be fixed in this behalf: by a general or special order, from time
to time by the State Government in the case of each Corporation
shall be renewed by the Commissioner on the expiry of the said
period of six months without the previous sanction of the Standing E
Committee."
3. Although there does not exist any statutory provision in this behal~
the probation period was extended from time to time. At the first instance,
it was extended by an order dated 4.7.2000 upto 31.12.2000 and yet F
again upto 31.12.2001 by an order dated 07.01.2001. The period of
probation was yet again extended till 31.12.2002 by an order dated
31.02.2002. No further order of extension of probation was passed.
Appellant continued to function as a Vigilance Officer. He, however,
allegedly informed his superior officer that he had been suffering from some G
y illness. He applied for leave. He proceeded on leave on and from
3.2.2003. The period of leave, however, expired. He did not join as
allegedly he continued to suffer from the ailments. He telephonically
informed his officer for extension of leave. He was, however, served with
a show cause notice on or about 22.03.2003 asking him to show cause H
1128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A as to why his services should not be terminated for alleged misconduct
of remaining absent from duty without prior leave. The show cause notice
reads as under :
"You were assigned various duties of importance requiring
expeditious attention. It is the prenary responsibility of a vigilance
B officer to keep vigil and investigate and report however in your
case you have gone on long leave and your absence has created
stagnation and when such stagnation cannot be tolerated in public
utility services when work has to be completed in a particular time
fran1e.
c
You had been on leave from 3.2.2003 to 6.2.2003 for a period
of 4 days and you ought to have reported on 7.2.2003, however
till date you have not reported for duty. You have not given any
oral o~ written intimation till date you are absent from 7.2.2003 till
D today. Such long absence in such an important assignment cannot
be confessed.
There is also breach of condition No.4/6 of the appointment order
dated 22.12.1999. Also there has been negligence, carelessness
in discharge of your duties and on evaluation it is found that you
E have shown absolute disregards towards your duties.
Therefore, why should you not be discharged from service in
accordance with Section 56(2) of BPMC Act, 1949 after office
hours on 31.3.2003. This final notice is given to you as and the
F reply within 7 days from require thereof. If it is not so that it will
be presumed that you do not want to submit any reply."
4. Cause was shown by him. The same having been found to be
unsatisfactory was rejected. No departmental enquiry was conducted. A
finding of fact was arrived at to the effect that the enquiry proceedings
G which were pending ag_ainst him were not brought to its logical end. His
period of probation was extended upto 30.4.2003 without assigning any
reason. There was no such power in the appointing authority. His services,
however, were discharged stating:
"Major J.P. Jadeja was appointed as Vigilance Officer (General)
H
}---
JASWANTSINGH PRATAPSINGH JADEJA v. RAJKOT 1129
MUNICIPALCORPORATION[SINHA,J.]
in the Vigilance Department of the Rajkot Municipal Corporation. A
Thereafter Shri Jadeja was on leave from 3.2.2003 to 6.2.2003
and was to have reported for duty on 7.2.2003. However, as he
remained absent till 22.3.2003 without any intimation a final notice
referred to at Serial No.2 above was issued to which a fax report
for additional leave was received as referred. B
A reply was received to the final notice as above. The reply after
consideration requires to be rejected. As a Vigilance Officer, it is
expected of him to complete inquiries within a fixed time frame
and as a result of long absence from such important duties could C
result in stagnation which cannot be tolerated and is in breach of
condition 4/6 of the appointment order.
Looking to the assessment of work as referred to hereinabove,
the period of probation is extended from 1.1.2003 to 30.4.2003.
Thereafter the period is not extended and it is directed that services D
be thereafter discharged after payment of one month's notice pay."
5. He filed a writ petition which was dismissed by a learned Single
Judge of the Gujarat High Court by an order dated 9.12.2004. He
preferred an intra-court appeal thereagainst. The said appeal has also been E
dismissed by reason of the impugned order.
6. Mr. Gaurav Agrawal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant, would, in support of the appeal, raise the following contentions:
(i) The order of termination is stigmatic. F
(ii) Being punitive in nature, the impugned order is founded upon
a misconduct for absence from duty without prior leave.
(iii) As a show cause notice was issued by taking recourse to the
provisions for initiation of the disciplinary proceedings in terms G
of Section 56 of the BPMC Act, the impugned order cannot
be sustained.
7. Mr. Sunil Gupta, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of
the respondents, on the other hand, contended that :
H
_,
1130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A (i) as the order discharging the petitioner from service did not
result in a finding of guilt on moral turpitude and only because
the explanation of the appellant had not been accepted and
extension has not been granted, the same by itself cannot be
held to be punitive in nature;
B
(ii) The impugned order being not an order of termination of
service, it is sustainable;
(iii) It was a case where the employer had merely recorded its
satisfaction while passing the order of discharge which is not
C stigmatic.in nature.
8. A disciplinary proceeding on allegations of serious misconduct on
the part of the appellant was initiated. His explanation in this behalf was
rejected.
D 9. The tests governing termination of probation .is no longer res
integra. When a disciplinary enquiry is initiated on the premise that there
are serious allegations of misconduct on the part of the delinquent officer;
his explanation thereupon had been rejected pursuant whereto a full scale
formal enquiry has been initiated culminating in a finding of guilt, the order
E terminating the service would be held to be stigmatic. There may also be
cases where the allegations involved moral turpitude on the part of the
delinquent officer. The language used in the order of termination of service
may ex facie be stigmatic. The language used therein may also show that
there was something over and above the assertion that the officer was
F found unsuitable for the job. The aforementioned tests, however, are not
exhaustive.
10. We may apply the said tests in the instant case. In the instant
case, the language used in the impugned order is ex facie stigmatic. It
G referred to the earlier orders containing allegations of misconduct on the
part of the appellant and the fact that he had been found guilty thereof.
Appellant was said to have been absented from duties. He had been found
guilty of negligence, carelessness and showing absolute disregard towards
his duties. A disciplinary proceeding was initiated therefor. His explanation
H to the show cause notice was rejected. He was, therefore, found guilty
JASWANTSINGH PRATAPSINGH JADEJA v. RAJKOT 1131
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION [SINHA,J.]

~
of the charges leveled against him. Only thereafter, he was discharged A
from service by reason of the impugned order dated 29.4.2003.
11. Before, however, we embark upon the legal questions, we must
notice that the appellant had not been confirmed in his services from 1999
to 2003. The power of Commissioner of Municipality to appoint a person
B
on temporary basis is governed by the statutory rules. It has not been
shown before the High Court or before us as to under what provisions
of law the period of probation was extended from time to time.
Applicability of the provisions of the Act is not in dispute. It may be true
that such a contention was not raised before the High Court, but if under
the statute, the period of probation could not have been extended, he c
will be deemed to have been confirmed on expiry of the period of
probation.
12. We may notice that the respondent had taken into consideration
while passing the impugned order the fact that the appellant did not have D
> the correct mindset to serve as a Vigilance Officer who, although took
long leave for serving the territorial army, did not join the said post.
13. Respondents themselves relied upon Rules 17.2 and 17.3 of the
Bombay Civil Services Rules which are said to be applicable in the case
of the appellant which read as under : E

"17.2 In the case of direct recruitment, the period of probation for
the posts of Class III should be for one year and for the posts
of Class I or Class II the period of probation should be for
two years. If the Appointing Officer deems proper, the period
F
may be extended for one year in case of Class III employees
and for two years in case of Class I or Class II employees
during the period of probation.
17.3. lfthe performance of the employee is not up to the expected
'(
level during the period of probation, then such an officer/ G
employee shall be discharged upon the expiry of the period
of probation."
14. A bare perusal of the aforementioned provisions clearly shows
that the maximum period of probation provided for there is two years.
H
1132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A 15. Such a jurisdictional fact had not been taken into consideration
by the appropriate authority. Presumably, keeping in view the
aforementioned provision, his probation period had not been extended
after 31.2.2003. The nature and character of the order, therefore, must
be considered having regard to the aforementioned statutory provision.
B
16. If the satisfaction of the employer rested on the unsatisfactory
performance on the part of the appellant, the matter might have been
different, but in that case, from the impugned order it is evident that it
was not the unsatisfactory-nature and character of his performance only
which was taken into consideration but series of his acts as well,
C misconduct on his part had also beeri taken into consideration therefor. It
is one thing to say that he was found unsuitable for a job but it is another
thing to say that he was said to have committed some misconduct
17. Mr. Gupta has placed strong reliance on State of Punjab &
D Ors. v. Sukhwinder Singh, [2005] 5 SCC 569 wherein a three Judge
Bench of this Court was considering a case where the appellant, who was
a Constable, before completion of his probation period of three years,
absented from duties without seeking permission. The order of discharge
in that case read as under :
E "Constable Sukhwinder Singh No.644/ASR of this District is
discharged from service w.e.f. 16.3.1990 under the Punjab Police
Rules 12.21 as he is not likely to become an efficient police officer."
18. The Rule which was operating in that case being Rule 12.21 of
F the Punjab Police Rules reads as under :
"A constable who is found unlikely to prove an efficient police
officer may be discharged by the Superintendent at any time within
three years of enrolment. There shall be no appeal against an order
of discharge under this Rule."
G
In a situation of that nature, this Court held :
"In the present case neither any formal departmental inquiry nor
any preliminary fact finding inquiry had been held and a simple order
of discharge had been passed. The High Court has built an edifice
H
i---
JASWANTSINGHPRATAPSINGHJADEJAv. RAJKOT 1133
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION [SINHA, J.]
on the basis of a statement made in the written statement that the A
respondent was habitual absentee during his short period of service
and has concluded therefrom that it was his absence from duty that
weighed in the mind of Senior Superintendent of Police as absence
from duty is a misconduct. The High Court has further gone on to
hold that there is direct nexus between the order of discharge of B
the respondent from service and his absence from duty and,
therefore, the order discharging him from service will be viewed
as punitive in nature calling for a regular inquiry under Rule 16.24
of the Rules. We are of the opinion that the High Court has gone
completely wrong in drawing the inference that the order of c
discharge dated 16.3 .1990 was, in fact, based upon the misconduct
and was, therefore, punitive in nature, which should have been
preceded by a regular departmental inquiry. There cannot be any
doubt that the respondent was on probation having been appointed
about eight months back. As observed in Ajit Singh and Ors. etc. D
v. State ofPunjab and Anr. (supra) the period of probation gives
time and opportunity to the employer to watch the work ability,
efficiency, sincerity and competence of the servant and if he is found
not suitable for the post, the master reserves a right to dispense
with his service without anything more during or at the end of the
E
prescribed period, which is styled as pe1iod of probation. The mere
holding of preliminary inquiry where explanation is called from an
employee would not make an otherwise innocuous order of
discharge or termination of service punitive in nature. Therefore,
the High Court was clearly in error in holding that the respondent's F
absence from duty was the foundation of the order, which
necessitated an inquiry as envisaged under Rule 16.24(ix) of the
Rules."

19. Even in Abhijit Gupta v. S.N.B. National Centre, Basic
Sciences & Ors., [2006] 4 SCC 469, the order of termination, on which G
decision also reliance was placed by Mr. Gupta, reads as under :
"Your perfom1ance, ability and capability during the period of
probation has been examined and your service during the period
of probation is found to be unsatisfactory and hence you are H
1134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A considered unsuitable for the post you have to. The governing body
is of the view that your perfonnance was unsatisfactory and you
are not suitable for confinnation."
20. Yet again, in State of Punjab & Ors. v. Bhagwan Singh,
B [2002] 9 SCC 636, whereupon also Mr. Gupta relied, the order of
tennination read as under :
"It has been reported to me by In-charge of PTC, Ladha Kofthi,
Sangrur, Inspector Joginder Singh, RI Police Lines, Faridkot and
Inspector Sadhu Ram, PS City Kot Kapura that the act and
c conduct of Const. Bhagwan Singh, No.1819/Fdkt. On the whole
is not satisfactory and he is unlikely to become a good police officer.
I am also satisfied with their reports. I, Jasminder Singh, IPS, SSP/
Faridkot being competent authority do hereby discharge Const.
Bhagwan Singh,No.1819/Fdk. From service w.e.f. today i.e. 4-
D 9-1992 A.N. under PPR 12.21 as he is found to be unlikely to
prove a good police officer."
21. This line of cases amongst others clearly goes to show that taking
into consideration the factor as to whether the employee had satisfactorily
perfonned his duties during the period of probation is a relevant factor
E and the same can fonn foundation for passing an order of discharge.
22. In Kunwar Arun Kumar v. UP. Hill Electronics Corporation
Ltd & Ors., [ 1997] 2 SCC 191, the order of discharge was as under :
"You will be on probation for a period of 12 months :from the date
F of your joining, which period may be extended from time to time
at the discretion of the Management. During the period of
probation, your services may be terminated without assigning any
reason therefor.

G During the period of probation your work perfonnance was found
l_:!!l~tisfactory: Therefore, your services are hereby terminated with
~ ... ·'. effect from 16 Jan. 91 as per Cl~use (2) of your appointment letter
referred to above."
23. In this case, however, the period of probation as provided for
H
JASWANTSINGH PRATAPSINGHJADEJA v. RAJKOT 1135
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION [SINHA,J.]
under the statute had expired and his misconduct had been taken note A
of. Such misconduct was not founded only upon absence from duty, but
also upon carelessness, negligence on the part of the appellant and lack
of devotion amongst others.
24. In Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra Nath Bose National B
Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta & Ors., [1999] 3 SCC 60,
Jagannadha Rao, J (as His Lordship then was) opined that material which
amounts to stigma need not be contained in termination order but may
also be contained in an order or proceeding referred to in termination
order or in an annexure thereto. We have noticed various orders passed
by the respondent heretobefore. When a report in a disciplinary proceeding C
form the foundation for the order, it would be stigmatic in nature. It would
have civil consequences.
25. VP. Ahuja v. State of Punjab & Ors., [2000] 3 SCC 239 is
a case where the order impugned in the writ petition was as under : D
"Shri V.P. Ahuja, s/o late Shri H.N. Ahuja was appointed on
probation for 2 years as Chief Executive of the Coop. Spg. Mills
Ltd., vide orders Endst. No. Spinfed/CCA/7844-45 dated
29.9.1998 and posted at Bacospin. However, he failed in the
performance of his duties administratively and technically. E
Therefore, as per clause I of the said appointment order, the
services ofShri V.P. Ahuja are hereby terminated with immediate
effect."

It was held to be stigmatic in nature stating : F
"7. A probationer, like a temporary servant, is also entitled to
certain protection and his services cannot be terminated arbitrarily,
nor can those services be terminated in a punitive manner without
complying with the principles of natural justice.
G
8. The affidavits filed by the parties before the High Court as also
in this Court indicate the background in which order, terminating
the services of the appellant, came to be passed. Such an order
which, on the face of it, is stigmatic, could not have been passed
without holding a regular inquiry and giving an opportunity of H
--4
1136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R. :

A hearing to the appellant."

26. Yet again, in Radhey Shyam Gupla v. UP. State Agro
Industries Corporation Ltd & Anr., [ 1999] 2 SCC 21, a case on which
counsel for both the parties relied upon, this Court held :
B "The theory of'object of the inquiry' was further emphasised by
the Constitution Bench in Jagdish Mitter v. Union ofIndia, That
was a case of a temporary employee. The discharge from service
was by way of an order 'simpliciter'. But there, an inquiry was held
and the termination order was based on it as it stated on its face
c that it was 'found undesirable' to retain the employee and hence
his services were being terminated. The order was held to be
punitive on its face and was quashed. Gajendragadkar, J. (as he
then was) discussed the earlier cases and held that in every case
the purpose of the inquiry was crucial. If the inquiry was held 'only
D for the purpose of deciding whether the temporary servant should
be continued or not', it could not be treated as punitive and that
the motive operating in the mind of the authority was not relevant.
But "the form in which the order terminating the service is expressed
Will not be decisive." It was held
E "what the Court will have to examine in each case would be,
having regard to the material facts existing upto the time of
discharge, is the order of discharge in substance one of dismissal?"
Therefore, the 'form' was not of in1portance but the 'substance' was."
F It was further held :
"We shall now refer to a different type of cases where a
departmental inquiry was started, then dropped and a simple order
of termination was passed. In State of Punjab v. Sukh Raj
G Bahadur, the charge memo was served, reply given and at that
stage itself, the proceedings were dropped and a termination order
was passed. The High Court felt that the object of departmental
inquiry, being to punish the employee, the order of termination must
he treated as punitive. This was not accepted by a three Judge
H Bench consisting of Justice Shah (as he then was) who had laid
JASW ANTSINGH PRATAPSINGH JADEJA v. RAJK OT 1137
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION [SINHA, J.]
down in Madan Gopal's case the principle of'object of the inquiry'. A
This Court reversed the High Court judgment and held that neither
Madan Gopal's case nor Jagdish Milter's case applied. This was
because in the case before them the inquiry did not go beyond the
stage of the explanation. No findings were given and no inquiry
report was submitted as in the above two cases. In that case (i.e. B
Sukh Raj Bahadur) this Court felt that the decision in A.G.
Benjamin v. Union of India (Civil Appeal No. 1341 of 1966
dated 13-12-1966) (SC) Reported in (1967) 1 Lab LJ 718 was
more direct. In Benjamin's case, a charge memo was issued,
explanation was received and an Enquiry Officer was also c
appointed but before the inquiry could he completed, the
proceedings were dropped stating that : 'departmental proceedings
will take a much longer time and we are not sure whether after
going through all the fom1alities, we will be able to deal with the
accused in the way he deserves.' There also the order was held D
> not to be punitive. Following the above case, this Cornt in Sukh
Raj Bahadur's case stated that the position before them was sin1ilar
to what happened in Benjamin's case and concluded as follows :
'the departmental inquiry did not proceed beyond the stage of
submission of a charge-sheet followed by the respondent's E
explanation thereto. The inquiry was not preceded with, there were
no sittings of any inquiry officer, no evidence recorded and no
conclusion arrived at in the inquiry'."

27. From the discussions made hereinbefore, it is evident that F
termination of services of the appellant purporting to discharge him
simplicitor cannot be accepted, being stigmatic in nature. The foim of the
order tenninating the services coupled with the background facts clearly
leads to the conclusion that the order impugned in the writ petition by the
appellant was punitive.
G
28. For reasons aforementioned, the impugned order is set aside.
The appeal is allowed. There shall, however, be no orders as to costs.
K.K.T. Appeal allowed.
H