Holding

Clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) can be invoked only when the authority’s satisfaction is founded on objective material showing that holding an enquiry is not reasonably practicable; otherwise the dismissal order is invalid.

Summary

Jaswant Singh, a police constable, was dismissed by the Assistant Inspector‑General of Police under Punjab Police Rules on the ground that he threatened to obstruct any departmental enquiry and to harm witnesses. The authority invoked clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution, claiming it was not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry. Singh challenged the dismissal, alleging the reasons were fictitious, that he was in hospital at the time, and that the authority’s satisfaction was based on no independent material. The Supreme Court held that the authority must be satisfied on objective facts that an enquiry is not reasonably practicable, and that mere subjective satisfaction or ipse‑dixit cannot justify dispensing with the enquiry. Finding no independent evidence to support the dismissal, the Court set aside the order, reinstated Singh with full back‑pay, and allowed the appeal.

Issues considered

Whether clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution can be invoked when the authority’s satisfaction is based solely on subjective belief without independent material.
Whether the dismissal order, dispensed with a departmental enquiry, is subject to judicial review for arbitrariness or mala‑fide motive.
Whether the authority satisfied the requirement of "reasonable practicability" to forego a departmental enquiry.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 310, s. Article 311(2) clause (b)
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. Section 309
Punjab Police Ruless. Rule 16.2

Subjects

Article 311departmental enquirysubjective satisfactionreasonable practicabilitycivil service dismissaljudicial reviewpolice serviceIPC 309Punjab Police Rules

Judgment

JASW ANT SINGH
A v.
STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.

NOVEMBER 27, 1990

B [K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY AND A.M. AHMADI, JJ.]

Constitution of India, 1950: Article 311 (2) Second Proviso clause
(b )-Dismissal under-Dispensing with departmental enquiry-Re-
asoning-subjective satisfaction of the authority-Whether open to Judi- •
cial Review.

C Service Law: Civil Services: Punjab Police Rules-Rule 16.2-
Dismissal from service-Dispensing with departmental enquiry contem-
plated under Article 311(2) of the Constitution-Reasonable Practica-
bility of holding an enquiry-Absence vf independent materials justify-
ing the dispensation-Consequent dismissal order-Sustainability of.
D
The appellant, a Policeman, was dismissed from service on the
basis of certain allegations that he was instigating his fellow police
officials to cause indiscipline, insubordination and disloyalty. The
Assistant Inspector-General of Police who passed the dismissal order,
dispensed with the departmental enquiry contemplated by Article
E 311(2) of the Constitution on the ground that it was not feasible to hold
an enquiry in view of the appellant's threats that he with the help of
other police employees, would not allow holding of any departmental
enquiry against him and that he and his associates would not hesitate
to cause physical injury to the withnesses and the enquiry officer.

F Against the said dismissal order, the appellant preferred an
appeal to the authorities which was of no avail. He, therefore, filed a
writ petition before the High Court challenging the dismissal order. The
writ petition was dismissed in limine. Aggrieved by the summary dis-
missal of his writ petition, the appellant preferred this appeal by special
leave.
G
On behalf of the appellant it was contended that the action taken
against him was clearly ma/a fide and actuated by ulterior motives. It
was also stated that on some earlier occasions the appellant was placed
under suspension but was reinstated later. Also a case under Section
309 IPC for attempt to commit suicide was registered against him and
H he was convicted. However, the appeal preferred by the appellant was

354
,_,_
JASWANT SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 355

allowed and he was acquitted. It was further contended that there was
no justification for dispensing with the enquiry contemplated by Article A
311(2) of the Constitution and the reason given therefore was wholly
imaginary.

Allowing the appeal, this Court,
B
HELD: 1. Clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the
Constitution can be invoked only when the authority is satisfied from
the material placed before him that it is not reasonably practicable to
hold a departmental enquiry. [363C]
•
Union of India & Anr. v. Tutsi Ram Patel & Ors., [1985)] Suppl.
2SCR131, relied on. c

Divisional Personnel Officer v. T.R. Chellappan, [1976] l SCR
783, referred to.

2. Although clause (3) of Article 311 makes the decision of the D
disciplinary authority in this behalf rmal, such finality can certainly be
tested in a court of law and interfered with if the action is found to be
arbitrary or ma/a fide or motivated by extraneous considerations or
merely a ruse to dispense with the enquiry. [361G]

Satyavir Singh & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [1985] 4 SCC E
252; Shivaji Atmaji Sawant v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., [1986] 2
SCC 112; Ikramuddin Ahmed Borah v. Superintendent of Police,
Darrang & Ors., [1988] Suppl. SCC 663, relied on.

3. The decision to dispense with the departmental enquiry cannot
be rested solely on the ipse dixit of the concerned authority. When the F
satisfaction of the concerned authority is questioned in a court of law. it
is incumbent on those who support the order to show that the satisfac-
tion is based on certain objective facts and is not the outcome of the
whim or caprice of the concerned officer. [363E]

4.1. In the instant case, satisfaction was based on the ground that G
the appellant was instigating his colleagues and was holding meetings
with other police officials with a view to spreading hatred and dis-
satisfaction towards his superiors. This allegation is based on his
alleged activities on April 3, 1981 reported by SHO. That report is not
forthcoming. It is no one's contention that the said SHO was threa-
tened. The third respondent's counter also does not reveal if he had H
356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

verified the correctness of the information. To put it tersely, the subjec-
A
tive satisfaction recorded in paragraph 3 of the order is not fortified by
any independent material to justify the dispensing with of the inquiry
envisaged by Article 311(2) of the Constitution. On this short ground
alone the impugned order cannot be sustained. [363G-H; 364A-B]

B 4.2. Moreover, the earlier departmental enquiries were duly con-
ducted against the appellant and there was no allegation that the
department had found any difficulty in examining the witnesses in the
said enquiries. It was incumbent on the department lo disciose lo the
Court, the material in existence on the dale of passing the order, but the

c
department could not disclose any such material. Besides it is difficult
to understand how the appellant could have given the threats when he
was hospitaUsed. [363F, Fl
-
[This Court directed that the appellant should be reinstated in
service forthwith, with all monetary benefits like pay, allowances etc.
available to him from the date of dismisslal.]
D
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 10587
of 1983.

From the Judgment and Order dated 11.8.1982 of the Punjab
and Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 932 of 1982.
E
'R.K, Garg, and P.N. Gupta him for the Appellant.

M.S. Gttjral, C.M. Nayyar, Arun Madan and H.S. Munjral for
the Respondents.

F The Judgment of the Court delivered by

AHMADI, J.Invoking clause (b) of the second proviso to Arti-
cle 311(2) of the Constitution oflndia and Rule 16.1(2) of the Punjab
Police Rules, the Assistant Inspector General, Government Railway
Police, Patiala, passed the impugned order dated April 7, 1981 dismis-
G sing the petitioner from service with immediate effect. The reasons
assigned for dispensing with the departmental enquiry contemplated
by Article 311(2) of the Constitution are set out in paragraph 3 of the
impugned order, which reads as under:

"And whereas it has been reported that he has thrown
H threats that he with the help of other police employees will
JASWANT SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [AHMADI, J.] 357

not allow holding of any department enquiry against him
and he and his associates will not hesitate to cause physical A
injury to the witnesses as well as the enquiry officer."

The dismissal order is based on the allegation that the appellant
was instigating his fellow police officials to cause indiscipline, show
insubordination and exhibit disloyalty; that he was meeting other B
police officials and inducing them to stand against the senior officers
and was thus spreading discontentment, hatred and dissatisfaction
amongst his fellow policemen towards the superiors and that he
betrayed lack of sense of discipline which was highly unbecoming of a
, member of the police force expected to maintain law and order. The
appellant, feeling aggrieved by this order, preferred an appeal but of
no avail. He, therefore, filed a Writ Petition No. 932 of 1982 in the c
High Court of Punjab & Haryana challenging the impugned order on
diverse grounds. The said Writ Petition was dismissed in limine on
August 11, 1982. Feeling aggrieved by the summary dismissal of his
Writ Perition he has preferred the present appeal by special leave. In
order to understant his grievance it may be necessary to notice a few D
facts.

The appellant was placed under suspension on April 19, 1978 on
the ground that he had absented himself from duty to attend the
Annual Nirankari Samagam held on April 13, 1978. The allegation was
enquired into through the concerned Assistant Superintendent of E
Police. As nothing objectionable was found he was exonerated and
was ordered to be taken back in service with effect from the date of his
suspension. Thereafter, two departmental enquiries were initiated.
against him. The outcome of the first inquiry was his reversion to the
lower post of Constable: the second inquiry resulted in his dismissal
from service. Both these orders of April 27, 1979 and October 12, F
1979 respectively, passed by ASP/GRP, Patiala were challenged by
two separate appeals. Both these appeals were dismissed by the third
respondent by his orders dated March 18 and 19, 1980. The appellant
preferred two separate Revision Applications to the Inspector General
of Police. Punjab which were allowed on October 13, 1980 and both
the cases were remanded with a direction to re-consider the inquiry G
report and pass fresh orders. The ASP/GRP was directed to reinstate
the appellant and then issue fresh show cause notices. After the above
orders were passed the appellant re-joined duties as Head Constable
on March 5, 1981. The third respondent. however, placed him under
suspension forthwith. Thereafter, the appellant sought an interview
with the Director General/Inspector General of Police, Punjab by hi' H
358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

A two letters dated March 23 and 27, 1981 addressed to respondent No.
3. Since respondent No. 3 refused permission the appellant claims to
have written a letter d~ted March 24, 1981 to the DG/IGP informing
him about the objectionable activities of respondent No. 3. the receipt
of this letter by the office of DG/IGP is, however, disputed although
the appellant has produced an acknowledgement.dated March 27, 1981
B evidencing the receipt thereof. B.e that as it may, the fact remains that
after the remand orders were passed in the appellant's two Revision
Applications, the third respondent issued two separate notice, both
dated April 4, 1981, calling upon the appellant to show cause within 10
days from receipt thereof why he should not be dismissed from service.
Before the service of these show cause notices an incident occurred at
about 11.00 a.m. on April 6, 1981 in GRP Lines, Patiala, where the
c appellant resided. The allegation is that on that date at the said time
and place S.l., Niranjan Singh, A.S.l., Harmel Singh and A.S.l., Ram
Prakash were in the verandah of barrack No. 8. In their full view the
appellant appeared in the verandah with a knife in his left hand and
tried to plunge the same into his chest with a view to committing
D suicide. S.l., Niranjan Singh, acting on impulse, gave a push to the
appellant's left but in the process the blade of the knife caused an
injury to the appellant on his right arm and his shirt was blood stained.
The appellant was charge-sheeted under section 309 l.P.C. and was
sent to the hospital for treatment. It is alleged that while he was in
hospital the two show cause notices were served on him on April 6,
E 1981 at about 10.00 p.m. Even though 10 days time was allowed to him
to show cause, the third respondent who was biased against him passed
the impugned order of dismissal on April 7, 1981. The appellant con-
tends that the third respondent's action was clearly ma/a fide and
actuated by ulterior motives. The appellant further contends that there
was no justification for dispensing with the enquiry contemplated by
F Article 311(2) and the ground given in paragraph 3 of the impugned
order is wholly imaginary. He further contends that the impugned
order of April 7, 1981 was not actually served on him but his signature
was obtained on some piece of paper while he was in hospital. Accord-
ing to him, after he was discharged from the hospital he applied for a
copy of the impugned order but the third respondent failed to furnish
G the same to him. Similar applications were also addressed to the DG/
I GP from time to time but he did not receive any reply to his letters
and reminders. Since the period of limitation for filing an appeal was
likely to expire he preferred his appeal wiihout being aware of the
contents of the impugned order. This appeal was dismissed by the
DG/IGP by his order dated January 29, 1982. He then filed a Civil Suit
H in the Court of the learned Senior Sub-Judge, Patiala, wherein he
JASWANT SINGH v. STAIE OF PUNJAB [AHMADI, J.I 359

applied for production of documents and secured an order for the
A
production of a copy of the impugned dismissal order dated April 7,
198 l. After a copy of the impugned order was produced he preferred
another departmental appeal hut that too was dismissed on February
5, 1982. After he failed to pursuade the Appellate Authority to look
into his grievances he filed the Writ Petition which has given rise to
this appeal. 'The department's case found in the counter is that on the B
night of April 5/6, 1981. The Lines Officer had gone to check the
presence of the appellant in his quarter when the latter bolted the door
from inside and threatened the Lines Officer and then filed a false case
that the Lines Officer had broken his window panes and had thrown

- stones in his room. On inquiry the complaint was found to be baseless.
Thereafter, on April 6, 1981, at about 11.00 a.m. the appellant
attempted to commit suicide
c
Before we deal with the challenge to the impugned order of
dismissal it may be stated that the appellant was convicted under
section 309 I.P.C. by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class,
Patiala, by his order dated March 15, 1985. The appellant preferred an D
appeal, being Criminal Appeal No. 27 of 1985, in the Court of the
learned Sessions Judge, Patiala, which was allowed. The learned
Sessions Judge found several flaws in the prosecution version regard-
ing the incident and opined that the two eye-witnesses S.I., Niranjan
Singh and A.S.I., Harmel Singh had betrayed special bias against the
appellant whose relations with his superiors were strained. The E
learned Sessions Judge also felt that evidence regarding his radiologi-
cal examination was suppressed ,,,;d no effort was made to measure the
depth of his injury which would have thrown considerable light. While
dealing with the prosecution evidence against the appellant, the
learned Sessions Judge observed as under:
F
"Against this background, I find no difficulty to deduce the
inference that the accused was considered by him (respon-
dent No. 3) a thorn in flesh. S. I. Niranjan Singh was also
inimically deposed towards the accused. In these circums-
tances evidence of the eye-witnesses has to be approached
with a pinch of salt." G

He reached the conclusion of acquittal in paragraph 8 of his judgment
in the following words:

"In the light of the above discussion, it is permissible to
conclude that for certain reasons not disclosed on the file, H
360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

the accused had incurred wrath of his superiors including
A Shri S.S. Mann (respondent No. 3), the appointing and
dismissing authority of the accused. Before the present
occurrence, the authorities had passed very drastic orders
against the accused. Against this back ground, in the
absence of any independent and reliable evidence, the pos-
B sibility of the accused having been falsely implicated in this
case cannot be ruled out."

It will thus be seen from the learned Sessions Judge's order that the

-
appellant's defence was that he was wrongly framed at the behest of
respondent No. 3 by S.I., Niranjan Singh and A.S.l., Harmel Singh
who had posed as eye-witnesses io the incident. According to him
c there was actually an attempt to take his life. The prosecution admit-
tedly did not pursue the matter any further and allowed the order of
acquittal to become final. From the judgment of learned Sessions
Judge two things become abundantly clear, namely, (i) that the inci-
dent had taken place on the morning of April 6, 1981 at the GRP
D Lines, Patiala in which the appellant had sustained a knife injury on
his right upper arm; and (ii) that he was in hospital on April 6 and 7,
1981 when the two show cause notices and the impugned order of
dismissal were served upon him. The story that an attempt was made
to serve the notices on April 6, 1981 early in the morning cannot be
believed. It is in the backdrop of these facts that we must consider the
E appellant's allegation that the dismissal order was passed in hot haste
by the third respondent who was inimical towards him as he had be-
come a threat to his prejudicial activities.

Article 310 of our Constitution which engrafts the pleasure
doctrine of the English common law is, however, qualified by the
F opening words 'except as expressly provided by this Constitution'.
Article 311 is one such express provision. According to clause (1)
thereof, a person who is a member of a civil service cannot be dismis-
sed or removed from service by an authority subordinate to that by
which he was appointed. Clause (2) next provides that no such person
shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an
G inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and
given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those
charges. Then comes the first proviso with which we are not con-
cerned. The second proviso has three clauses but we are concerned
with clause (b) only. Clause (b) of that second proviso reads as under:

1-1 "Provided further that this clause shall not apply-
JASWANT S!NGP. v. STATE OF PUNJAB [AHMADI, J.I 361

**"" *** '** ***

(b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a
person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some
reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not
reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry."
B
Thus the English doctrine incorporated in Article 310 which is
qualified by the opening words "except as expressly provided by this
Constitution" is subject to Article 311(1) and (2) which contains safe-
guards against termination from service. However, the second proviso
to Article 311(2) is again in the nature of an ·exception and lays down
that in cases catalogued in clauses (a), {b) and (c) thereof the require- C
ment of an inquiry can be dispensed with. The scope ·of Articles 310
and 311 of the Constitution was examined by this Court in Union of
India & Anr. v. Tutsi Ram Patel & Ors., [1985] Suppl. 2 SCR 131
wherein by majority this Court held that once the requirements of the
televant clause of the· second proviso are satisfied, the services of a
civil servant can be terminated without following the audi alteram D
parrem rule. It was held that since the requirement of Article 311(2)
was expressly excluded by the second proviso, there was no question of
introducing the same by the back door. On this line of reasoning, the
majority held that Challapan's case [1976} 1 SCR 783 was not correctly
decided. It, therefore, took the view that it is not necessary to offer a
hearing to the civil servant even on the limited question of punish- E
ment. ·Insofar as clause (b) is concerned this Court pointed out that
two conditions must be satisfied to sustain any action taken there-
under. These are (i) there must exist a situation which renders holding
of any inquiry "not reasonably practicable" and (ii) the -disciplinary
authority must record in writing its reasons in support of its satisfac-
tion. Of course the question of practicability would depend on the F
existing fact-situation and other surrounding circumstances, that is to
say, that the question of reasonable practicability must be judged in
the light of the circumstances prevailing at the date of the passing of
the order. Although clause (3) of that Article makes the decision of
the disciplinary authority in this behalf final such finality can certainly
be tested in a court of law and interfered with if the action is found to G
be arbitrary or ma/a fide or motivated by extraneous considerations or
merely a ruse to dispense with the inquity. Also see: Satyavir Singh &
Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., 1[1985} 4 SCC 252; Shivaji Atmaji
Sawantv. State of Maharashtra & Ors., [1986} 2 SCC 112and1kramud-
din Ahmed Borah v. Superintendentof Police, i/Jarrang & Ors., [1988}
Suppl. SCC663. H
362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

The impug>.ed order of April 7, 1981 itself contains the reasons
A for dispensing with the inquiry contemplated by Article 311(2) of the
Constitution. Paragraph 3 of the said order, which we have extracted
earlier, gives two reasons in support of the satisfaction that it was not
reasonably practicable to hold a departmental enquiry against the
appellant. These are (i) the appellant has thrown threats that he with
B the help of other police employees will not allow holding of any
departmental enquiry against him and (ii) he and his associates will not
hesitate to cause physical injury to the witnesses as well as the enquiry
officer. Now as stated earlier after the two Revision Applications were
allowed on October 13, 1980, the appellant had re-joined service as
Head Constable on March 5, 1981 but he was immediately placed
under suspension. Thereafter, two show cause notices dated April 4,
c 1981 were issued against him calling upon him to reply thereto within
10 days after the receipt thereof. Before the service of these notices
the incident of alleged attempt to commit suicide took place on the
morning of April 6, 1981 at about 11.00 a.m. In that incident the
appellant sustained an injury on his right arm with a knife. He was,
D therefore, hospitalised and while he was in hospital the two show cause
notices were served on him at about 10.00 p.m. on April 6, 1981.
Before the appellant could reply to the said show cause notices the
third respondent passed the impugned order on the very next day i.e.
April 7, 1981. Now the earlier departmental enquiries were duly con-
ducted against the appellant and there is no allegation that the depart-
E ment had found any difficulty in examining witnesses in the said
inquiries. After the Revision Applications were allowed the show
cause notices were issued and 10 days time was given to the appellant
to put in his replies thereto. We, therefore, enquired from the learned
co.unsel for the respondents to point out what impelled respondent No.
3 to take a decision that it was necessary to forthwith terminate the
F services of the appellant without holding an inquiry as required by
Article 3J1(2). The learned counsel for the respondents 50ould only
point out clause (iv)(a) of sub-para 29(A) of the counter which reads
as under: '

"The order dated 7.4.81 was passed as the petitioner's
G activities were objectionable. He was instigating his fellow
police officials to cause indiscipline, show insubordination
and exhibit disloyalty, spreading discontentment and
hatred, etc. and his retention in service was adjudged
harmful."

H This is no more than a mere reproduction of paragraph 3 of the
JASWANT SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB (AHMADI, J.I 363

impugned order. Our attention was not drawn to any material existing
A
on the date of the impugned order in support of the allegation con-
tained in paragraph 3 thereof that the appellant had thrown threats
that he and his companions will not allow holding of any departmental
enquiry against him and that they would not hesitate to cause physical
in jury to .the witnesses as well as the enquiry officer if any such attempt
was made. It was incumbent on the respondents to disclose to the B
Court the material in existence at the date of the passing of the
impugned order in support of the subjective satisfaction recorded by
respondent No. 3 in the impugned order. Clause (b) of the second
proviso to Article 311(2) can be invoked only when the authority is
-. satisfied from the material placed before him that it is not reasonably
practicable to hold a departmental enquiry. This is clear from the
c
following observation at p. 270 of Tulsi Ram's case:

"A disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a •
disciplinary authority lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior
motives or merely in order to avoid the holding of an
inquiry or because the Department's case against the I>
government servant is weak and must fail."

The decision to dispense with the departmental enquiry cannot, there-
fore, be rested solely on the ipse dixit of the concerned authority.
When the satisfaction of the concerned authority is questioned in a
court of law, it is incumbent on those who support the order to show E
that the satisfaction is based on certain objective facts and is no! the
outcome of the whim or caprice of the concerned officer. In the
counter filed by the third respondent it is contended that the appellant,
instead of replying to the show cause notices, instigated his fellow
police officials to disobey the superiors. It is also said that he threw
threats to beat up the witnesses and the Inqury Officer if any depart- F
mental inquiry was held against him. No particulars are given. Besides
it is difficult to understand how he could have given threats, etc., when
he was in hospital. It is not shown on what material the third respon-
dent came to the conclusion that the appellant had thrown threats as
alleged in paragraph 3 of the impugned order. On a close scrutiny of
the impugned order it seems the satisfaction was based on the ground G
that he was instigating his colleagues and was holding meetings with
other police officials with a view to spreading hatred and dissatisfac-
tion towards his superiors. This allegation is based on his alleged
activities at Jullundur on April 3, 1981 reported by SHO/GRP, Jul-
lundur. That report is not forthcoming. It is no one's contention that
the said SHO was threatened. The third respondent's counter also H
364 SUJl!{EME COURT REPORTS [1990] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

A does not reveal if he had verified the correctness of the information.
To put it tersely the subjective satisfaction recorded in paragraph 3
tlf tile impugned order Is not fortified by any independent material to
ju5!ify the disj:lensihg with of the Inquiry envisaged by Article 311(2) of
the Constitution. We are, therefore, of the opinion that on this short
ground alone the impugned order cannot be sustained.
B
It was then submitted by learhed counsel for the respondents
that since the High Court had dismissed the appellant's Writ Petition
in limine we may remit the matter to the High Court for disposal on
merits. We do 11ot think that we would be justified in doing so after a
lapse of almost 7 to 8 years. As we do not consider it necessary to go
into the factual aspect bearing 011 the question of ma/a /ides and rest
our judgment on the legal aspect only, we do not think it necessary to
• remit the matter to the High Court and vex the appellant further by
another round of litigation.

In the result we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High
t) Court and quash the impugned order of dismissal dated April 7, 1981
and direct that the appellant shall be re-instated in service forthwith
with all monetary benefits as to pay, allowances, etc., available to him
from the date of his dismissal. Needless to say that it would be open to
the departme11t, if it is so advised notwithstanding the lapse of time, to
proceed with the two show cause notices dated April 4, 1981. The
respondents will pay the cost of this appeal.

G.N. Appeal allowed.