Holding

Section 9(1) of MCOCA must be read harmoniously with Section 23, requiring prior sanction from a police officer of rank not below Additional Director General before the Special Court can take cognizance, even on a private complaint.

Summary

The case arose from a private complaint filed under Section 9(1) of the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act (MCOCA) alleging organised crime offences by senior police officials. The Special Court ordered an investigation, but the Bombay High Court Full Bench was split on whether such a complaint could be entertained without prior sanction under Section 23(2) of MCOCA. The Supreme Court examined the interplay between Sections 9 and 23 and the applicability of Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code. It held that Section 9(1) cannot be read independently of Section 23 and that a sanction from a police officer of rank not below Additional Director General is a prerequisite for the Special Court to take cognizance, even on a private complaint. Consequently, the majority judgment of the High Court was set aside, the minority view endorsed, and the State's appeal allowed while other related appeals were disposed of.

Issues considered

Whether a Special Court under MCOCA can take cognizance of an offence on a private complaint under Section 9(1) without prior sanction under Section 23(2).
Whether Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code can be invoked by the Special Court to order an investigation in lieu of the sanction requirement of Section 23.
Whether the provisions of Section 25 of MCOCA override the procedural provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 156(3)
Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999s. 23(1), s. 23(2), s. 25, s. 9(1)
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987

Subjects

MCOCASection 9Section 23private complaintspecial courtsanctioninvestigationcognizanceorganized crimeCriminal Procedure Code

Judgment

[2009] 7 S.C.R. 759

JAMIRUDDIN ANSARI A
v
CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION & ANR.
Criminal Appeal No. 958 of 2009
MAY 6, 2009
B
(ALTAMAS KABIR AND CYRIAC JOSEPH, JJ.)
... Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999:
.Sections 9(1), 23(1), 25 - Special Court constituted
·under the Act - Whether could order investigation save and c
except in accordance with Section 23(1) and interplay, if any,
qetween Sections 9(1) and Section 23- Held: Special Judge
cannot take cognizance of any offence under the Act unless
sanction has been previously given by the Police Officer -
Provisions of Section 9(1) will have to be read in harmony with
0
the provisions of Section 23(2) as far as private complaints
are concerned - Hence the majority view of the Full Bench of
the Bombay High Court holding otherwise is negated - Its
conclusions and directions are also set aside - Minority view
approved since it correctly interprets the interplay between E
Sections 9, 23 and 25 of the Act- Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 - Section 156(3).
In thes~ appeals against the judgment of the Full
Bench of the Bombay High Court, the question that arose
for consideration was as to whether an investigation F
could be ordered by the Special Court constituted under
the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999
(MCOCA), save and except in accordance with Section
23(1) of MCOCA, and interplay, if any, between Section
9(1) and Section 23 of MCOCA. G
~ ~ Disposing of.the appeals, the Court-
HELD: 1. Section 9 of MCOCA cannot be read or
invoked independent of Section 23. Section 9(1)
759 H
760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S.C.R.

A contemplates filing of complaints both by the investigating
authorities and also by private parties and the Special
Judge is, therefore, entitled to take cognizance of offences
under MCOCA even on a private complaint, but after due
compliance with Section 23(2) thereof. In view of the
B stringent provisions of MCOCA, the Legislature included
certain safeguards for invoking the provisions thereof.
The same is manifest from the provisions of Section 23
as a whole. [Para 35] [779-F-H; 780-A]
State of Orissa Vs. Ganesh Chandra Jew (2004) 8 SCC
C 40; K. Kalimuthu Vs. State by DSP (2005) 4 SCC 512; State
. of Himachal Pradesh Vs. M.P Gupta (2004) 2 SCC 349;
Sankaran Moitra Vs. Sadhna Oas and another (2006) 4 SC
584; N.K. Ogle Vs. Sanwaldas (1999) 3 SCC 284; Harpal Singh
Vs. State of Punjab (2007) 13 SCALE 728; Rambhai
D Nathabhai Gadhvi and others Vs. State of Gujarat (1997) 4
SCC 744; Nelson Matis Vs. Union of India & Anr (1992) 4
SCC 711; Nazir Ahmad Vs. King Emperor AIR 1936 PC 253;
UC Vs. Escorts Ltd. & Ors. ( 1986) 1 SCC 264; Mansukhlal
Vs. State of Gujarat (1997) 7 SCC 622; State of Maharashtra
E & Ors. Vs. La/it Somdatta Nagpal & Anr (2007) 4 SCC 171; A.R.
Antulay Vs. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak & Anr (1984) 2 SCC 500
and Moti Lal Vs. CBI & Anr (2002) 4 SCC 713 - referred to.
· 2. The expression used in Section 9(1) rndicates that
the Special Court may take cognizance of any offence
F without the accused being committed to it for trial, either
on receiving a complaint of facts or upon a police report
of su&h facts, which clearly indicates that the Special
Court is also empowered to take cognizance of an offence
under MCOCA even on a private complaint. The said
l..:i power vested in the Special Judge is, however, controlled
by the provisions of Section 23(2) of the Act, which
provides that no Special Court shall take cognizance of
any offence under the Act without the previous sanction
of a Police Officer not below the rank of Additional Director
. H Gener~I of Police. [Para 36] [780-E-G] ·
JAMIRUDDIN ANSARI V. 761
CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION & ANR
._, ~
3. The wording of Sub-Section (2) of Section 23 A
leaves no room for doubt that the Special Judge cannot
take cognizance of any offence under MCOCA unless
sanction has been previously given by the police officer.
-< In such a situation, even as far as a private complaint is
concerned, sanction has to be obtained from the Police B
Officer not below the rcmk of Additional Director General
" of Police, before the Special Judge can take cognizance
~· of such complaint. Accordingly, the provisions of Section
9(1) will have to be read in harmony with the provisions
of Section 23(2) as far as private complaints are c
concerned, and this Court has no hesitation in negating
the majority view of the Full Bench of the Bombay High
Court in the impugned judgment, holding otherwise. [Para
38] [781-D-F]

-I
'
~'~ 4. In view of the provisions of Section 25 of MCOCA, D
the provisions of the said Act would have an overriding
effect over the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code
and the Special Judge would not, therefore, be entitled to
invoke the provisions of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. for
ordering a special inquiry on a private complaint and E
taking cognizance thereupon, without traversing the
route indicated in Section 23 of MqOCA. The provisions
" .. of Section 23 are the safeguards provided against the
invocation of the provisions of the Act which are extremely
stringent and far removed from the provisions of the F
general criminal law. If, as submitted on behalf of some of
the respond~nts, it is accepted that a private complaint
under Section 9(1) is not subject to the rigours of Section
23, then the very purpose of introducing such safeguards
\.~~\ lose their very raison d'etre. At the same time, since the G
t'' -~
... ·~ .,_ filing of a private complaint is also contemplated under
Section 9(1) of MCOCA, for it to be entertained it has also
to be subject to the rigours of Section 23. Accordingly, in
view of the bar imposed under Sub-Section (2) of Section
23 of the Act, the Special Judge is precluded from taking
H
762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S.C.R.

A cognizance on a private complaint upon a separate inquiry
. ,.
under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. The bar of Section 23(2)
continues to remain in respect of complaints, either of a
private nature or on a police report. In order to give a
harmonious construction to the provisions of Section 9(1)
B and Section 23 of MCOCA, upon receipt of such private
complaint the Special Judge has to forward the same to
the officer indicated in Clause (a) of Sub-Section (1) of ,,.
Section 23 to have an inquiry conducted into the complaint
'i
by a police officer indicated in clause (b) of Sub-Section
c (1) and only thereafter take cognizance of the offence
complained of, if sanction is accorded to the Special Court
to take cognizance of such offence under Sub-Section
(2) of Section 23. [Paras 39, 40] [782-A-G; 781-G-H]
5. C.riminal Appeal No.1089 of 2006 filed by the State
D of Maharashtra is allowed and the majority decision of the
.1
Full Bench in the judgment impugned, together with the
directions issued thereupon are set aside. Instead, the
minority vie~ of the acting Chief Justice together with the
conclusions arrived at and the directions given thereupon
E are endorsed.[Para 42] [783-A-B]
6. As far as the appeal preferred by Jamiruddin Ansari
is concerned, the trial has not progressed on account of
the stay orders passed by this Court on the appeals filed
by the State of Maharashtra against the decision of the
F Full Bench on the reference made on the conflicting views
expressed by different Benches of the High Court with
regard to the interpretations of Sections 9 and 23 of
MCOCA. Except for the fact that the appellant has
undergone a further period in custody, there is really no
G change in the circumstances under which his initial bail
application was rejected. Therefore, there is no reason to
entertain the appeal filed by him. [Para 43] [783-B-D]
7. Criminal Appeal No.1085 of 2006 filed by Ashok son
of Gyanchand Vohra and Criminal Appeal No.1088 of 2006
H
JAMIRUDDIN ANSARI V 763
CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION & ANR.

filed by Shabbir Noormohamed Patel will also stand A
'\ --1
disposed of along with the appeals filed by the State of
Maharashtra in the same vein. [Para 44] [783-D-E]
8. The appeals filed by the State of Maharashtra in
respect of the writ petitions filed by Shri Rasiklal
Manikchand Dhariwal and G.M. Joshi a_re delinked from B
the other appeals and disposed of with a direction to the
.. High Court to dispose of their writ petitions expeditiously.
Let the lowet court records in respect of their matters be
.. sent back to the High Court forthwith. [Para 45] [783-E-F]
c
Case Law Reference
(2004) 8 sec 40 referred to Para 15
(2005) 4 sec 512 referred to Para 15
(2004) 2 sec 349 referred to Para 16 D
--r (2006) 4 SC 584 referred to Para 16
(1999) 3 sec 284 referred to Para 17
(2007) 13 SCALE 728 referred to Para 21
E
~
(1997) 4 sec 744 referred to Para 21
(1992) 4 sec 111 referred to Para 22
AIR 1936 PC 253 referred to Para 23
.. (1986) 1 sec 264 referred to Para 23 F
(1997) 1 sec 622 referred to Para 23
(2007) 4 sec 111 referred to Para 24
(1984) 2 sec 500 referred to Para 25
G
(2002) 4 sec 113 referred to Para 32

"" " CIMtNALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 958 of 2009
From the Judgement and Order dated 16.04.2007 passed H
764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S.C.R.

A by the High Court of Judicature at Mumbai in Criminal 1-- ""
Application No. 288 of 2007

WITH .....
Criminal Appeal Nos.1085 of 2006
B Criminal Appeal Nos. 1088 of 2006

Criminal Appeal Nos, 1089 of 2006
y

Sushil Kumar, R.F. Nariman, R.S. Sodhi, Uday U. Lalit,
~
Sameeer Parekh, Lalit Chauhan, Hitesh Jai, Ranjeta Rohtagi,
c Aditya Kumar, C.D. Mehta, E.C. Aggarwala, Manishabhan- ......
dandari, Omkar, Srivastav, Madhu Moolchandani, Rishi
Agrawala, Gaurav, Goel, Amit Kumar Sharma, Vijay Kumar,
Sangeeta Kumar, Ashwani Garg, Ravindra Keshavarao Adsure,
with them for the Appellant.
D A. Sharan, ASG, Ranjana Narayan, Amit Anand Tiwari,
Sandhya Goswami, B. Krishna Prasad, Amit Sharma, Arpit
Gupta, Anupam Lal Das, M.S. Ganesh K. Gole, K. Seshachary,
R. A. Perumal, Sameer Parekh, Lait Chauhan, Ranjeet Rohtagi,
t
--
E.R. Kumar, S. Jadhay (for M/s. Parekh & Co.), Dr. Rajeev 8.
E Masodkar, Anil Kumar Jha, Aishwarya Bhati, S. Rani, for the
Respondent(s).
The Judgement of the Court was delivered by
ALTAMAS KABIR, J.
F 1. Leave grar.ted in SLP(Crl.)No.5677/2007.
•
2. Criminal Appeal Nos.1085, 1088 and 1089 of 2006 have
been taken up for final disposal along with SLP(Crl.)No.5677
of 2007, inasmuch as, they arise out of the same set of facts
and common questions of law are involved. SLP(Crl.)No.5677
G of 2007 has been filed by Jamiruddin Ansari, challenging the
order passed by the Bombay High Court on 16th April, 2007, ,.
t
rejecting his prayer for bail, although, he was in custody since
his arrest on 10th October, 2004, without trial, till he was released
on bail by this court in the pending special leave petition on
H 19th December, 2008. Criminal Appeal No.1085/06 has been
-J.'
4
JAMIRUDDIN ANSARI V. CENTRAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION & ANR. [ALTAMAS KABIR, J.]
765

. ."" ._.. filed by Ashok, son of Gyanchand Vohra, against the judgment A
of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Writ Petition No.127 of
2005, which had been heard by a Bench of three Judges on a
reference being made to resolve two conflicting views which
ha_d been taken by two Division Benches of the Bombay High
Court relating to the interpretation of Section 9(1) vis-a-vis B
Section 23 of the Maharashtra Control of Organized Crime Act,
1999 (hereinafter referred to as 'MCOCA'). Criminal Appeal
-t I • No.1088 of 2006 has been filed by one Shabbir Noormohamed
~ Patel, raising the same questions as those raised in Criminal
Appeal No.1085/06. Criminal Appeal No.1089 of 2006 has
__,, been filed by the State of Maharashtrad challenging the judgment
c
of the Bombay High Court dated 22" December, 2005, on the
question as to whether the Special Court could take cognizance
of an offence on a private complaint under Section 9(1) of
.' MCOCA and order investigation in respect thereof under
Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr. P.C.). D
)i-

_.j
3. The common thread running through these appeals is
the question as to whether an investigation could be ordered by
the Special Court constituted under MCOCA, save and except
in accordance with Section 23(1) of MCOCA, and interplay, if
~
' E
any, between Section 9(1) and Section 23 of MCOCA. In order
to understand the context in which these questions have arisen,
it is necessary to briefly set out the facts of the case.
--"-
~
4. On 5th September, 2003, one 'Himmat Nanda was
~
alleged to have been caught red-handed accepting a bribe of F
Rs.3 lakhs, for and on behalf of one Nitindra Singh, in a trap set
up by the Anti- Corruption Bureau, Mumbai. Pursuant to his
arrest, an offence was registered by the Anti-Corruption Bureau,
Mumbai, under Sections 7, 8, 9, 12, 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, being C.R. No.3071 of2003,
against the said Nitindra Singh and severaJ others .. It was alleged
G
.- ~
that the said Himmat Nanda was, in fact, the conduit for the
said respondent, Nitindra Singh.
1
5. On 19 h August, 2004, Nitindra Singh, who was an
Assistant Police Inspector, filed a private complaint, being H
766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S.C.R.
-
A Special Case No.243 of 2004, under the penal sections of ~ ~
MCOCA before the Special Judge, MCOCA Court, Mumbai,
against 14 accused, 8 of whom were senior police and
government officials and members of the Anti-Corruption Bureau
and some other government officials who were members of the
B raiding party in the above-mentioned trap case. After recording
the statements of six witnesses on 21st August, 2004, the learned
Special Judge passed an order under Section 202 Cr.P.C.
directing the Commissioner of Police, Mumbai, to form a Special
.. ..
Investigation Team (hereinafter referred to as 'SIT') to raid the ...
premises bf all the accused named in the complaint filed by the
c said Nitindra Singh, who were none other than the complainants
against Nitindra Singh and witnesses of the trap case along
with all police officers of the Anti-Corruption Bureau, who had
conducted the raid in the trap case. On 30th August, 2004, the
Special Judge, MCOCA Court, appointed Smt. Meera
D
Borvankar, Joint Commissioner of Police (Crime), Mumbai, to
head the SIT. On 2"d September, 2004, acting on the instructions
.,
of the State of Maharashtra, Smt. Meera Borvankar filed Criminal •
Writ Petition No.1772 of 2004 before the Bombay High Court
on behalf of the State Government, praying for quashing of the
E order dated 24th August, 2004, passed by the learned Special
Judge ordering the formation of a SIT to raid the premises of all ,__
the accused named in the complaint; the order dated 26th August,
2004, direct[ng urgent investigation and the order dated 30th (

Augusf'2004, appointing the writ petitioner to head the SIT. In •
F her Writ Petition, Smt. Meera Borvankar categorically stated
that none of the accused in the private complaint filed by Nitindra
Singh was a member of any criminal gang and that the said
complaint filed by Nitindra Singh was false, frivolous and liable
to be quashed.
G th
6. Apart from the above, on 7 September, 2004, Ashok,
son of Gyanchand Vohra, the appellant in Criminal Appeal
No.1085 of 2006 and the proposed accused No.6 in the said
i- --
private complaint, filed Criminal Writ Petition No.1801 of 2004
in the Bombay High Court for quashing the above-mentioned
H
JAMIRUDDIN ANSARI V. CENTRAL BUREAU OF. · 767
INVESTIGATION & ANR. [ALTAMAS KABIR, J.]

orders passed by the MCOCA Court, Mumbai, along .with the A
complaint itself. · ·
v·
7. A similar writ petition, being Criminal Writ Petition
No.1802 of 2004, was filed by Sandeep Singh, the proposed
accused No.2 in the private complaint and the compl<;iinantin
the trap case, praying for the self-same reliefs as prayed for by B
Ashok, son of Gyanchand Vohra.
51
8. On 21 December, 2004 in another case, a Division
Bench oftheBombay High.Court held that a private complaint
under Section 9 of MCOCA could not be entertained without . c
compliance with Section 23 of the said Act. However, on the
yery next date, on 22"d December, 2004, another Division Bench.
of the Bombay High Court, while considering the Writ Petition
filed by Smt. Meera Borvankar (Criminal Writ Petition No.1772
of 2004), quashed !he three orders ~assed by the learneg D
Special Judge on 24 August, 2004, 26 August, 2004 and 30
August, 2004, on the private complaint filed by Nitindra Singh,
but held that while entertaining a private complaint under Section
9 of MCOCA, the Special Court could take recourse to the
provisions of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and order investigation of E
such private complaint. The matter was sent back to the Special
Judge with the aforesaid finding.
th' .
9. Soon thereafter, on 10 January, 2005, on an application
filed by Nitindra Sti)gh, the Special Judge, passed an order-under
Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and ordered the Commissioner of F
Police, Mumbai, to investigate into the complaint filed by Nitindra
Singh. The said order was challenged by Ashok, son of
Gyanchand Vohra, in Criminal Writ Petition No.127 of 2005.
When the same was taken up for consideration on 23rd March,
2005, the learned Single Judge, noticed the divergence of G
opinion in the judgments delivered by the two Division Benches
and referred the issue for decision to a larger Bench. On 22"d
December, 2005, the Full Bench of the High Court gave a split
verdict with the majority view being that a private complaint filed
under Section 9 of MCOCA was independent of Section 23 H
768 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 7 S.C.R.
,....
A and compliance with the provisions of Section 23 was not a >-
pre-condition for the learned Special Judge to take cognizance
of an offence under MCOCA. The learned Special Judge was
directed to consider afresh the private complaint filed by Nitindra
Singh.
B 10. It is against the said judgment and order of the Full
Bench that these appeals have been filed. ..
11. Of the four appeals indicated hereinbefore, Criminal
Appeal No.1089 of 2006 filed by the State of Maharashtra was
c taken up first for consideration. On behalf of the State of
Maharashtra it was emphasized that a special procedure had
to be prescribed under MCOCA to deal with the rising graph of
organized crime within the State of Maharashtra which could
not be controlled under the existing laws. It was pointed out that
MCOCA made provisions for dealing with offences under the
D "'(
<P

Act by the Special Court to be constituted under Section 5 of
the Act. It was also submitted that Section 9 of MCOCA provides
the procedure to be followed by the Special Court in taking
cognizance of an offence and the powers vested in it for holding
a trial into such offences. Mr. U.U. La lit, learned Senior Counsel,
E appearing for the State of Maharpshtra, further submitted that
under the MCOCA, the Special Judge discharged dual functions.
At the stage of Section 9, the Special Court discharged ,(
magisterial duties and functions as prescribed under the Code ~

of Criminal Procedure for the purpose of taking cognizance,
F but at the same time, under sub-Section (4) for the purpose of
trial of any offence under the Act, it is vested with the powers
exercised by the Court of Session and is to try such offence as
if it were a Court of Session, in accordance with the procedure
prescribed in the Code for conducting trials before a Court of
G Session. Learned counsel submitted that under the provisions
\-
.....
of the Act, as indicated in Section 9, the Special Judge
combined the functions of a Magistrate, as also a Court of
Session, for the purpose of taking cognizance, and, thereafter,
conducting the trial.
H
JAMIRUDDIN ANSARI V. CENTRAL BUREAU OF 769
-1,
INVESTIGATION & ANR. [ALTAMAS KABIR, J.]
"'"-I
... 12. A further submission was made that although Section A
9(1) of MCOCA does not debar a private complaint from being
entertained by the Special Judge, any subsequent action upon
-¥
such complaint would be subject to the provisions of Section
23(2) of the said Act. It was urged that on account of the
provisions of sub-Section (2) of Section 23 of MCOCA, the B
Special Court was prevented from taking cognizance of any
offence under the Act without the previous sanction of a police
• officer, not below the rank of Additional Director General of

' Police. It was submitted that the said provision did not
contemplate an independent inquiry by the Special Judge under c
Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. for the purpose of taking cognizance,
since no cognizance could be taken nor could an investigation
be made or directed de hors the provisions of Section 23. Mr.
La lit submitted that Section 9(1) would have to be read
harmoniously with Section 23(2) of MCOCA in order to give a
.,. D
\.- meaningful effect to the provisions of both the Sections, having
particular regard to the fact that under Section 25 of the Act, the
provisions of MCOCA or any Rule made thereunder or any Order
made under any such Rule has an overriding effect over any
other law for the time being in force or any instrument having the
force of law. E

13. Mr. La lit submitted that the decision of the Full Bench
of the Bombay High Court was erroneous and that the Hon'ble
~ Judges who were in the majority had erred in holding that on a
plain reading of Section 9(1) of MCOCA, it would be apparent F
that it is not controlled by any other provision of the law, much
less Section 23 thereof. It was also submitted that the Hon'ble
Judges had erroneously held that Section 9(1) and Section 23
of MCOCA were independent of each other and worked in totally
different spheres. The learned counsel contended that the
G
Hon'ble Judges taking the majority view had misconstrued the
..,#
...; intention of the legislature in enacting MCOCA in arriving at a
conclusion that Section 23(2) of MCOCA was not a sine qua ·
non for taking cognizance of a complaint under Section 9(1) of
MCOCA.
H
770 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S.C.R.
r
/.. 14. It was then submitted that the comparison made by
the Hon'ble Judges with regard to the sanction required under
... -
Section 197 Cr.P.C. and under Section 23(2) of MCOCA was
~
misconceived, and since the safeguards provided in Section
23 of MCOCA had been put in place against possible misuse,
B the powers of the Special Court to take cognizance on ~a private
complaint under Section 9(1) would be controlled by Section
23. It was urged that the Hon'ble Judges had possibly overlooked
. the provisions of Section 23(2) of MCOCA, which, in fact, was
..
the safeguard against prosecution under the provisions of the -I

c Act which are highly stringent and could not be jettisoned for the
purpose of taking cognizance under Section 9(1) on a private
complaint. It was contended that in enacting the provisions of
Section 23(2) of MCOCA, the legislature had clearly intended
that cognizance of any offence under the Act was not to be taken
by the Special Court without the previous sanction of a senior
D
police officer, not below the rank of Additional Director General -.; ',
. of Police and that it was also the intention of the legislature that
Section 23(2) should serve as a check against any malafide
private ·complaint under the Act made with the intention of
misusing the provisions of the Act.
E
15. Supporting the minority view taken in the case, Mr. Lalit
urged that if the majority view was to be accepted, it would cause
violence to the provisions of the other Act, particularly, Sub-
Section (1) of Section 23 which were also checks intended.by
...
the legislature to prevent misuse of the provisions of the Act. In
•
F
this regard, reliance was placed on the decision. of this Court in
State of Orissa Vs. Ganesh Chandra Jew [(2004) 8 SCC 40),
wherein while considering the bar under Section 197 Cr.P.C., it
was observed that even ifthe public servant acted in excess of
his duty, if a reasonable connection exists between the act
G
complained of and his official duty, the excess committed by
._
him would not deprive him of the protection of Section 197.
Reference was also made to the decision of this Court in K. "
Kalimuthu Vs. State by DSP [(2005) 4 SCC 512), where the
provisions of Section 197 Cr.P.C. were also considered and in
H
JAMIRUDDIN ANSARI V. CENTRAL BUREAU OF 771 .
INVESTIGATION & ANR [ALTAMAS KABIR, J]
4
addition to what had been stated in earlier decisions, it was A
,,. explained that the protection given under Section 197 Cr.P.C.,
which is similar to the provisions of Section 23(2) of MCOCA,
is to preven.t the institution of possible vexatious criminal
proceedings in respect of offences alleged to have been
committed by such public servants while they were acting as B
public servants. It was observed that the intention of the
• legislature is to afford adequate protection to public servants to
I ensure that they are not prosecuted for anything done by them
in the discharge of their official duties, witho.ut reasonable cause.
16. The same views, though in stronger terms, were c
expressed by this Court in State ofHimacha/ Pradesh Vs. M.P
Gupta [(2004) 2 SCC 349] and in Sankaran Moitra Vs. Sadhna
Das and another ((2006) 4 SC 584], wherein a Thr~e-Judge
Bench was of the view that it was a condition precedent to obtain
sanction under Section 197 Cr.P,C. when the offence was triable D
by a Court of Session.
17. Mr. Lalit lastly referred to the decision of this Court in
N.K. Ogle Vs. Sanwaldas [(1999) 3 SCC 284], where it was
clearly observed that before coming to a conclu~ion regarding
the application of Section 197, the Court would hav~ to come to E
a conclusion that there was a reasonable connection between
~ the act complained of and the discharge of official duties, and'
4 that the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused
could lay a reasonable claim that he did it in the course of
performance of such duty. F
'
18. In conclusion, Mr. Lalit submitted that similar to the
control of Section 197 Cr.P.C. over Section 190 Cr.P.C., Section
9 and Section 23 of MCOCA are so worded that Section 9 is
controlled by Section 23, inasmuch as, if Section'9 were to b~
G
~ treated as being independent of Section 23, then'. in that event,
" Section 23 could be applied only when a complaint .emanated
from the police, which was not contemplated under the Act._
Consequently, the majority view of the High Court was erroneous
since Section 9 could not be treated in isolation of Section 23,
H
772 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 7 S.C.R.

A as otherwise Section 23(2) would be rendered inconsequential ~

in relation to taking of cognizance under Section 9(1) of the Act.
19. Learned Additional Solicitor General, Mr. Amrendra
Sharan, appearing for the Central Bureau of Investigation
(hereinafter referred to as 'CBI') supported the submissions
B made on behalf of the State of Maharashtra that the provisions
of Section 9(1) and Section 23(2) of MCOCA had to be
construed harmoniously in the case of private complaints. It was •
submitted that the bar of taking cognizance without the previous
••
sanction of a Police Officer not below the rank of Additional
c Director General of Police, as contained in Sub-Section (2) of
Section 23, prohibited the learned Special Judge from taking
cognizance of any offence under the Act without such sanction.
20. Apart from the above, the learned Additional Solicitor
General submitted that the CBI had filed an application in
D
Criminal Appeal No.1089/06, filed by the State of Maharashtra, '1
1
for modification of the order passed on 19 h September, 2006,
staying all proceedings in the Trial Courts and the matters before
the Bombay High Court. He submitted that such stay should be
vacated as far as Shri R.M. Dhariwal and Shri J.M. Joshi were
E concerned, since in their case, prior approval under Section
1
23(1)(a) of MCOCA had been given on 21• October, 2004 for
investigation of Cr.No.122/04. The learned ASG further
submitted that on the basis of material collected during the ...
investigation, the Special Court had passed an order on 26th •
F July, 2005 under Section 319 Cr.P.C. summoning the said two
persons in connection with the said case. The said order was
challenged in Crl.W.P.Nos.1956 of 2005 and 2016 of 2005,
which were transferred to the Full Bench on a representation
being made that the issues involved in the writ petitions were
G similar to those which were considered by the Full Bench. Upon
holding that sanction under Section 23(2) was not required for .....
~
taking cognizance on a private complaint, the Full Bench on
22"d December, 2005, remitted the two writ petitions filed by
Shri Dhariwal and Shri Joshi to the Division Bench for hearing.
1
H It was also submitted that the Competent Authority had, on 21•
JAMIRUDDIN ANSARI V. CENTRAL BUREAU OF 773
INVESTIGATION & ANR [ALTAMAS KABIR, J]

~ February, 2006, granted sanction under Section 23(2) of A
MCOCA in respect of the said two writ petitions. The learned
ASG submitted that since sanction under the provisions of
Section 23 of MCOCA had been given by the Competent
Authorities, as far as the two writ petitioners are concerned,
their cases were required to be delinked from the other appeals B
so that the records could be sent back to the Trial Court to
proceed with the trial, as far as they were concerned .
..
2'1. Mr. Sushi! Kumar, learned Senior counsel who
• appeared for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No.1088/2006,
submitted that the appeal had arisen out of a private complaint c
made by one Abd:.il Razzak Zariwala under Section 9(1) of
MCOCA. He submitted that instead of taking cognizance on
the said complaint, the Special Judge, had, by his order dated
1
4 h May, 2005, directed the Commissioner of Police, Mumbai,
to have the matter inquired into by a competent Police Officer, D
- who could investigate the accusations made against the
"" accused and submit a report pursuant to the investigation/ inquiry
in keeping with the provisions of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
accompanied by the statutory sanction, as contemplated under
Section 23(2) of MCOCA. According to Mr. Sushi! Kumar, if the E
minority view of the Full Bench of the 'High Court regarding
dependence of Section 9(1) of MCOCA on Section 23 was to
be accepted, then the exercise of jurisdiction by the learned
Special Judge was bad in law and was liable to be quashed .
• Referring to the decision of this Court in Harpal Singh Vs. State F
of Punjab [(2007) 13 SCALE 728], learned counsel submitted
that this Court, while considering the provisions of the Terrorist
and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (hereinafter
referred to as 'TADA'), in regard to grant of sanction, confirmed
the earlier view expressed in Rambhai Nathabhai Gadhvi and
G
others Vs. State of Gujarat [(1997) 4 SCC 744], wherein, it was
,.>
-1 observed that taking cognizance is the act which the Designated
Court has to perform and granting sanction is an act which the
sanctioning authority has to perform. In fact, taking of cognizance
by the Court was subject to the grant of sanction not for the
H
774 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S.C.R.

A Designated Court to take cognizance of an offence, but, for the •
prosecuting agency to approach the Court concerned to enable
it to take cognizance of the offence and to proceed to trial against .
the persons indicated in the report. In other words, a valid
sanction is the sine qua non for enabling the prosecuting agency
B to approach the Court in order to enable it to take cognizance
of the offence as disclosed.
22. Appearing for Rasiklal Manikchand Dhariwal, Mr. R.F.
•
Nariman, learned Senior counsel, submitted that the provisions
of MCOCA had to be read as a whole since it was the intention •
c of the legislature to minimise the application of the Code in
respect of matters covered by MCOCA. He, however, disputed
the submissions made both on behalf of the appellant as also
the respondents that the Special Judge combined magisterial
functions with that of the Court of Session. According to him,
D Section 9(1) of the Act merely eliminates the committal process -</
.
and allows the Special Judge to take cognizance of the offence
complained of directly. Mr. Nariman, however, adopted the
submissions advanced by Mr. Sushi! Kumar as to the control of
Section 23(2) of MCOCA over Section 9(1) where cognizance
E was required to be taken either on a private complaint or on a
police report. Drawing a parallel with provisions in the Prevention
of Terrorism Activities Act, 2002 (POTA), the Terrorist and
Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA) and the
provisions of MCOCA, Mr. Nariman submitted that the
,
F provisions of Sections 29 and 50 of POTA were in pari materia
with Sections 9 and 23 of MCOCA and Section 14(1) of TADA
was the same as Section 9(1) of MCOCA and none of the said
provisions contemplated the invocation of the provisions of
Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. by the learned Special Judge. Learned
counsel submitted that the majority view of the Full Bench that
G
Sections 9 and 23 of MCOCA were completely independent of ~
~

each other suffered from the cardinal error of failure to read the
statute as a whole before applying the provisions of MCOCA to
the facts of this case. He submitted that the majority view of the
Full Bench that Section 9(1) of MCOCA was not controlled by
H
JAMIRUDDIN ANSARI V. CENTRAL BUREAU OF 775
INVESTIGATION & ANR. [ALTAMAS KABIR, J]

... any provision of the said Act, much less Section 23, was not A
acceptable as otherwise by taking recourse to Section 9(1) of
MCOCA, any private individual could circumvent the rigours
~.
imposed under Sections 23(1) and (2) of MCOCA, which would
completely defeat the object of the said Act. Reference was
made by Mr. Nariman to the decisions of this Court in (1) Nelson B
Matis Vs. Union of India & Anr. [(1992) 4 sec 711] and several
other decisions in support of his submission regarding
" Harmonious Construction and ·urged that in construing the
provisions of the several enactments dealing with terrorist and
disruptive activities, a purposeful construction has to be adopted c
_, in order to promote the object of the Act and to prevent po·ssible
abuse thereof.
23. Mr. M.S. Ganesh, learned Senior counsel, who has
appeared for Shri J.M. Joshi, who had been summon~d by the
court under section 319 of the code of Criminal Procedure, D
\;- contended that it would not be correct to.say that the provisions
of the Act would not apply in proceedings under MCOCA. He,
however, submitted that the provisions of Section 23(1) requiring
prior approval for recording an information and the provisions
of Section 23(2) of MCOCA requiring previous sanc-tion for E
prosecution clearly indicates that the said provisions are
mandatory and if not complied with, the investigation and/or

' . prosecution would be rendered invalid. Mr. Ganesh urged that
Section 23(2) is a threshold provision having a direct bearing
to the jurisdiction of the Special Court to take cognizance under F
Section 9(1) of MCOCA. Referring to the celebrated decision
. of the Privy Council in Nazir Ahmad Vs. King Emperor [AIR .
- 1936 PC 253], Mr. Ganesh submitted that when a power had
been given to do a certain thing in a certain way, it would have
to be done in that way or not at all. _Submitting that there was a
G
difference between the expression "permission" and "prior
.... ~ permission", Mr. Ganesh contended that while the former did
not prevent ex facto sanction for investigation or. taking
cognizance, the latter was mandatory in nature arid without such
prior permission, no cognizance could be taken of any offence
H
776 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 7 S.C.R.

A under MCOCA. In this regard, reference was made to the •
decision of this Court in (i) L/C Vs. Escorts Ltd. & Ors. ((1986)
1 SCC 264]; and (ii) Mansukhlal Vs. State of Gujarat [1997) 7
SCC 622], which were both on the same lines.
24. Mr. Ravindra Srivastava, learned senior counsel,
B appearing for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No.1085 of 2005,
while accepting the submissions advanced by Mr. Sushil Kumar,
Mr. R.F. Nariman and Mr. M.S. Ganesh and holding that private •
complaints were maintainable under Section 9 of MCOCA,
submitted further that the said provision was an enabling
c provision, which was controlled by Section 23 which is a
repository of the safeguards against false and malicious
prosecution. Referring to the stringent nature of MCOCA and
-
the existing safeguards introduced in Section 23 thereof, Mr.
Srivastava referred to the decision of this Court in State of
D Maharashtra & Ors. Vs. La/it Somdatta Nagpal & Anr. [(2007)
4 SCC 171 ], where the importance Of the requirement for grant
of sanction had been considered and it was observed that in
taking recourse to the provisions of MCOCA which has the effect
of curtailing the liberty of an individual, a great responsibility
E had been cast on the authorities to ensure that the provisions of
the Act are strictly adhered to and followed.
25. Mr. Srivastava also referred to the decision in AR.
Antulay Vs. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak & Anr. [(1984) 2 SCC
500], wherein the safeguards with regard to taking cognizance
F on private complaints under Section 8 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1947, i~ respect of offences under Section 6
introduced by way of Section 5A by the Criminal Law
Amendment Act, 1952, was considered and it was observed
that the said amendment was necessary to prevent any abuse
G by way of private complaints. Mr. Srivastava urged that there is
no conflict between Sections 9 and 23 of MCOCA ·and both l> >-
have to be read in a holistic manner and in the context of the
Special Act to allow both of them to have play in the joints.
26. Gn behalf of the Respondent No.2, Nitindra Singh, in
H
JAMIRUDDIN ANSARI V. CENTRAL BUREAU OF 777
INVESTIGATION & ANR. [ALTAMAS KABIR, J.]
-4
Criminal Appeal No.1089 of 2006, Mr. Amit Sharma. learned A
counsel, submitted that the questions which were required to
be decided in this case were mainly confined to the following
two questions ~
(i) Does the Special Court have original jurisdiction of
magisterial powers under MCOCA?
B
. (ii) Whether Section 23 of MCOCA is a condition
• precedent for the Special Judge to invoke the
provisions of Section 9(1) of the said Act, both with
regard to private complaints as well as police c
reports? In other words, the question is whether
sanction is required to be taken under Section 23(2)
before a private complaint could be filed under
MCOCA?
lo- 27. Answering the first question in the affirmative, Mr. D
1, Sharma submitted that the Special Court combines in itself both
magisterial functions as well as Session Court, but at different
stages. He submitted that while at the stage of cognizance the
Special Judge exercises magisterial powers. at the stage of
trial he exercises all the powers of a Court of Session as provided E
under Section 9(4) of the Act.
28. Regarding the second question. Mr. Sharma submitted
that Section 23 of MCOCA governed Section 9(1) only with
regard to police reports, but not in respect of private complaints
and consequently the provisions of the Code would become F
operative in respect of a private complaint and Section 9(1) of
MCOCA would, therefore, be independent of Section 23(2) when
a private complaint was made. He also pointed out that Section
24 of MCOCA was an additional safeguard as it provides for
.. . punishment of a public servant who fails or abstains from taking G
lawful measures under the Act.
29. In support of his aforesaid submissions, Mr. Sharma,
while referring to the decision in AR. Antulay's case (supra)
referred to various other decisions of this Court which only have
H
778 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S.C.R.

~
A repetitive value. Mr. Sharma submitted that the view taken by
the Full Bench was correct and did not require any interference.
30. Mr. E.C. Agrawala, who appeared for Abdul Razzak
Zariwala, a respondent in Criminal Appeal No.1088 of 2006,
adopted the submissions made by Mr. Amit Sharma.
B
31. Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, learned counsel appearing for
the sole respondent, Ketan Pirodkar, in Criminal Appeal No.1089 .,
of 2006, who was also one of the complainants, while generally ·I
agreeing with the submissions made by Mr. Lalit, Mr. Sushil
~
c Kumar and Mr. Srivastava, contended that the provisions of
Section 23 of MCOCA have to be given a harmonious
construction in relation to Section 9(1) in order to avoid a
collusion between the apparently contrary provisions. She urged
that if sanction under Section 23(2) is held to be a sine qua non
, ...
for a private complaint, it would render Section 9(1) redundant
D "i
and completely frustrate the remedy of a private complaint before
the Special Court. She urged further that since a private ;.
complaint could be filed directly under Section 9(1 ), the
legislature intended that in such case the provisions of Section
23(2) will not be applicable. However, if further investigation was
E required into such private complaint, the Special Judge could
order such an investigation, subject to the safeguards provided
in Section 23(1) of MCOCA.
32. Ms. Bhati then referred to Section 4 Cr.P.C. and
F submitted that all offences under the Indian Penal Code have to
be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with
according to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code
and all offences under any other law are to be dealt with
according to the same provision, but subject to any enactment
for the time being in force regulating the place of investigation
G ...
and trial. In this regard, Ms. Bhati referred to the decisions of ~
this Court in Moti Lal Vs. CBI & Anr. [(2002) 4 SCC 713], where
the question involved was whether the CBI was authorized to
investigate an offence punishable under the Wild Life (Protection)
Act, 1972, in view of the argument that the said enactment was
H
JAMIRUDDIN ANSARI V. CENTRAL BUREAU OF 779
INVESTIGATION & ANR. [ALTAMAS KABIR, J.]

- _.. a self-contained Code. Answering the said question, this Court A
held that the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code would
apply in respect of investigation and trial even in respect of such
mt enactments, but would b~ subject to any provision regulating
the manner of such investigation and trial. Ms. Bhati urged that
consequently, the provisions of the Cr. P.C. would apply with full B
force in all aspects of investigation, enquiry and trial, except
where there is a specific provision to the contrary in the Special
• Act, such as MCOCA.
+ 33. Ms. Bhati submitted that if sanction under Section 23(2)
was held to be a sine qua non for private complaint also, the c
object of Section 9 would be completely frustrated and would
lead to startling results and that complaint of a private party
would become the subject of police investigation.
34. Mr. Harish Salve, learned senior counsel, appearing
D
for the Union of India, added a new dimension to the submissions
~
made on behalf of the respective parties by contending that, in
fact, no private complaint would lie under Section 9(1) of
MCOCA and that such private complaints will have to be made
under Section 190 Cr.P.C. He urged that since Section 9(1)
was subject to compliance with the provisions of Section 23(2), E
the said provisions did not contemplate the filing of a private

-
complaint and the provisions of Section 190(1 )(c) Cr.P.C. stood
excluded.
... 35. We have carefully considered the submissions made F
on behalf of the respective parties_...and we are' convinced that
Section 9 of MCOCA cannot be read or invoked independent
of Section 23. In our view, Section 9(1) contemplates filing of
complaints both by the investigating authorities and also by
private parties and the learned Special Judge is, therefore,
G
entitled to take cognizance of offences under MCOCA even on
,_,. .., a private complaint, but after due compliance with Section 23(2)
thereof. In view of the stringent provisions of MCOCA, the
Legislature included certain safeguards for invoking the
provisions thereof. The same is manifest from the provisions of
H
780 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S.C.R.

A Section 23 as a whole. In order to understand and appreciate ...
the provisions of Sections 9 and 23 and the inter-play between

B
them, Sub-Sections (1) and (4) of Section 9, which are relevant
to the submissions made in these appeals, are reproduced
hereinbelow :-
-
"9. Procedure and powers of Special Court :-
(1) A Special Court may take congnizance of any offence
without the accused being committed to it for trial
upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute
c such offence or upon a police report of such facts.
(2) xxx xxx xxx
(3) xxx xxx xxx
(4) Subject to other provisions of this Act, a Special Court
D shall, for the purpose of trial of any offence, have all
the powers of a Court of Session and shall try such
offence as if it were a Court of Session, so far as
may be, in accordance with the procedure prescribed
in the Code for the trial before a Court of Session."
E
36. The expression used in Section 9(1) indicates that the
Special Court may take cognizance of any offence without the
accused being committed to it for trial, either on receiving a
complaint of facts or upon a police report of such facts, which
clearly indicates that the Special Court is also empowered to
F take cognizance of an offence under MCOCA even on a private
-
complaint. The said power vested in the learned Special Judge
is, however, controlled by the provisions of Section 23(2) of the
Act, which provides that no Special Court shall take cognizance
of any offence under the Act without the previous sanction of a
G Police Officer not below the rank of Additional Director General
of Police.
37. For the sake of reference, the provisions of Section
23 are extracted hereinbelow.
H "23. Cognizance of, and investigation into, an
-
'
'
JAMIRUDDIN ANSARI V. CENTRAL BUREAU ·oF 781
INVESTIGATION & ANR. [AlTAMAS KABIR, J]

offence.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the A
Code,-
(a) ·no information about the commission of an offence
of organised crime under this Act, shall be recorded
by a police officer without the prior approval of the
police officer not below the rank of the Deputy B
Inspector General of-Police;
,
(b) no investigation of an offence under the provisions
of this Act shall be carried out by a police officer
below the rarik of the Deputy Superintendent of c
Police.
(2) No Special Court shall take cognizance of any offence
under this Act without the precious.. sanction of the police
officer not below the rank of Additional Director General
of Police." D
38. The wording of Sub-Section ,(2) of Section 23 leaves
no room for doubt that the learned Special Judge cannot take
cognizance of any offence under MCOCA unless sanction has
been previously given by the police officer mentioned E
hereinabove. In such a situation, even as far as a private
complaint is concerned, sanction has to be obtained from the
Police Officer not below the rank of Additional Director General
• of Police, before the Special Judge .can take cognizance of such
complaint. Accordingly, the provisions of Section.9(1) will have
to be read in harmony with the provisions of Section 23(2) as ·. F
far as private complaints are concerned, and we have no
hesitation in negating the majority view of the Full Bench holding
otherwise.
39. We are also inclined to hold that in view of the G
provisions of Section 25 of MCOCA, the provisions of the said
Act would have an overriding effect over the provisions of the
Criminal Procedure Code and the learned Special Judge would
not, therefore, be entitled to invoke the provisions of Section
156(3) Cr.P.C. for ordering a ,special inquiry on a p_rivate H
782 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 7 S.C.R.
' -
A complaint and taking ~ognizance thereupon, without trave~sing
... - -,.
the route indicated in Section 23 of MCOCA. In other words,
even on a private complaint about the commission of an offence ~
of organized crime under MCOCA cognizance cannot be taken
by the Special Judge without due compliance with Sub-Section
B (1) of Section 23, which starts with a non-obstante clause. As
indicated hereinabove, the provisions of Section 23 are the
safeguards provided against the invocation of the provisions of f

the Act which are extremely stringent and far removed from the
provisions of the general criminal law. If, as submitted on behalf •
c of some of the respondents, it is accepted that a private ~
· complaint under Section 9(1) is not subject to the rigours of
Section 23, then the very purpose of introducing such safeguards
lose their very raison d'etre. At the same time, since the filing of ..
'
a private complaint is also contemplated under Section 9(1) of
MCOCA, for it to be entertained it has also to be subject to the
D ~
rigours qf Section 23.
40. Accordingly, in view of the bar imposed under Sub-
Section (2) of Section 23 of the Act, the learned Special Judge
is precluded from taking cognizance on a private complaint upon
E a separate inquiry under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. The bar of
Section 23(2) continues to remain in respect of complaints,
either of a private nature or on a police report. ln order to give a
harmonious construction to the provisions of Section 9(1) and
Section 23 of MCOCA, upon receipt of such private complaint
F the learned Special Judge has to forward the same to the officer
indicated in Clause (a) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 23 to have
an inquiry conducted into the complaint by a police officer
indicated in clause (b) of Sub-Section (1) and only thereafter
take cognizance of the offence complained of, if sanction is
accorded to the Special Court to take cognizance of such offence
G
under Sub-Section (2) of Section 23. ;
...__
41. ~n substance, we agree with the minority view of the
Full Bench, which, in our opinion, correctly interprets the inter-
play between Sections 9, 23 and 25 of MCOCA.
H
JAMIRUDDIN ANSARI V. CENTRAL BUREAU OF 783
INVESTIGATION & ANR. [ALTAMAS KABIR, J.]

~ 42. We, therefore, allow Criminal Appeal No.1089 of 2006 A
filed by the State of Maharashtra and set aside the majority·
decision of the Full Bench in the judgment impugned, together
with the directions issued thereupon. Instead, we endorse the·
minority view of the acting Chief Justice and accept the
conclusions arrived at by His Lordship and the directions given B
thereupon.

• 43. As far as the appeal preferred by Jamiruddi.n Ansari is
~ concerned, the trial has not progressed on account of the stay
orders passed by this Court on the appeals filed by the State of
Maharashtra against the decision of the Full Bench on the c
reference made on the conflicting views expressed by different
Benches of the High Court with regard to the interpretations of
Sections 9 and 23 of MCOCA. Except for the fact that the
appellant had undergone a further period in custody, the only

- .. change in the circumstances is that he was granted bail by this
court on 19/12/2008. We, therefore, see no reason to entertain
the appeal filed by him and the same is dismissed.
D

44. Criminal Appeal No.1085 of 2006 filed by Ashok son
of Gyanchand Vohra and Criminal Appeal No.1088 of 2006 filed
by Shabbir Noormohamed Patel will also stand disposed of . E
along with the appeals filed by the State of Maharashtra in the
same vein.

J 45. The appeals filed by the State of Maharashtra in
respect of the writ petitions filed by Shri Rasiklal Manikchand F
Dhariwal and J.M. Joshi are delinked from the other appeals
and disposed of with a direction to the High Court to dispose of
their writ petitions expeditiously. Let the lower court records in
respect oftheir matters be sent back to the High Court forthwith.

GN . Appeals disposed of.
. ~
+
'
~/