Holding

Presentation of an election petition to the Stamp Reporter of the Gauhati High Court is a valid presentation under Section 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

Summary

The petitioners challenged the election of the respondent to the Assam Legislative Assembly, alleging that the election petition was invalidly presented to the Stamp Reporter of the Gauhati High Court. The respondents argued that the presentation complied with Chapter VIII‑A of the Gauhati High Court Rules and was therefore valid. The Supreme Court examined whether Section 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 permits presentation to a court officer, whether the High Court can frame rules for such presentation in the absence of Central Government rules, and whether the act of presentation is a ministerial function that can be delegated. It held that the term “High Court” in Section 81 denotes the institution, allowing presentation to its authorized officer, and that the High Court’s authorization of the Stamp Reporter is a valid ministerial act. Consequently, the election petitions were properly presented, the preliminary objections were dismissed, and the appeals were dismissed with costs.

Issues considered

Whether presentation of an election petition to the Stamp Reporter of a High Court is a valid mode of presentation under Section 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
Whether the High Court has authority to frame rules (Chapter VIII‑A) for receiving election petitions in the absence of Central Government rules under Section 169 of the Act.
Whether the term “High Court” in Section 81 refers to the whole institution, permitting presentation to an officer rather than to the Chief Justice or a bench.
Whether the act of receiving an election petition is a ministerial function that can be delegated and does not constitute a judicial function.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 214, s. Article 216, s. Article 329
Representation of the People Act, 1951s. 169, s. 80, s. 80A, s. 81, s. 86

Subjects

election petitionrepresentation of the people acthigh court presentationministerial functionstatutory interpretationdelegation of authorityprocedural law

Judgment

JAMAL UDDIN AHMAD A
v.
ABU SALEH NAJMUDDIN AND ANR.

FEBRUARY 28, 2003

[R.C. LAHOTI AND BRIJESH KUMAR, JJ.] B

Election Law:

Representation ofPeople Act, 1951-Sections 80, BOA, 81, 86 and 16! -
Constitution of India, 1950-Articles 329, 214 and 216-Election Petition- C
Presentation of before Stamp Reporter-Validity of-High Court Rules
authorising such presentation-No law by Central Government or Parliament
regarding the presentation-Held: Presentation of the petition to High Court
would mean delivery of the petition to High Court through its .authorized
officer-High Court having been conferred with the substantive jurisdiction to D
hear and try an election petition, it is competent to make provision for all
incidental and ancillary matters-Even in the absence of the P·tles High Court
could have authorised its officer to receive the petition-The term "High
Court" in Section 81 does not mean as constituted within the meaning of
Article 216 -Hence, presentation of election petition to the Stamp Reporter
is a valid presentation-Gauhati High Court Rules-Chapter VIII-A. E
Judiciary-Ministerial function and Judicial function-Distinction
between-Discussed.

Interpretation of Statutes-Principle of interpretation-Irrationality
perversity and hyper-technically are out ofplace while interpreting the Statutes F
or testing the vires of legislation.

Legal Maxim- 'Cursus Curia/ est lex Curiae '-Explained-Practice and
Procedure.

Respondent challenged the election of appellant to the legislative G
assembly of Assam. The election petition under Section 80/81 of the
Representation of People Act, 1951 was presented before Stamp Reporter
of the High Court of Assam. Thereafter, the petition was put up before
Designated Election Judge. Appellant filed an application raising
preliminary objection as to maintainability of the petition on the ground
473 H
474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 2 S.C.R.

A that the presentation before the Stamp Reporter was invalid under Section
81 of the Act. Designated Election Judge, relying on Chapter VIII-A of
Gauhati High Court Rules, held that the election petition was properly
presented.

In appeal to this Court, respondents contended that presentation
B having been made in conformity with the High Court Rules, no exception
could be taken to its validity.

Appellants contended that since Constitution of India as well as the
Act do not provide for or specify the person to whom an election petition
C can be presented, the petition should be presented either to the High Court
as defined by Articles 214 and 216 of the Constitution or at least to the
Chief Justice or to the Judge designated as the Election Judge; that High
Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain and decide on merits of
petition presented to a Stamp Reporter, the presentation itself being a
nullity; and that the only provision which empowers the Rules being
D framed under the Act is contained in Section 169 which contemplates the
Rules being made by the Central Government and in as much as the
Central Government has not framed any Rules, ihe Rules framed by the
High Court are invalid and cannot be given effect to for saving the validity
of its presentation.

E Dismissing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1.1. Presentation of an election petition to the Stamp
Reporter of the High Court of Gauhati is a valid presentation. The
Designated Election Judge has rightly overruled the preliminary objection
preferred by the respondent. [494-B)
F
Abdul Jabbar v. Syeda Anwara Tajmur and Ors., (1986) 1 GLR 257;
Shri Melhupra Vero v. Shri Vamuzo, (1990) 1 GLR 290; Shri Saingura v.
Shri F. Sapa and Ors., (1990) 2 GLR (NOC) 48 and Nawab Khan v.
Vishwanath Shastri, AIR (1993) Allahabad 104, approved.

G 1.2. The·functions discharged by a High Court can be divided
broadly into judicial and administrative functions. The judicial functions .
are to be discharged essentially by the Judges as per the rules of the Court
and cannot be delegated. However, administrative functions need not
necessarily be discharged by the Judges by themselves, whether
H individually or collectively or in a group of two or more, and may be ·
I '
J.U. AHMAD v. ABU SALEH NAJMUDDIN 475

delegated or entrusted by authorization to subordinates unless there be A
some rule of !aw restraining such delegation or authorization. There can
be 'delegation' as also there can be 'authorization' in favour of the
Registry and the officials therein by empowering or entrusting them with
authority or by permitting a few things to be done by them for and on
behalf of the Court so' as to aid the judges in discharge of their judicial B
functioning. [486-G, H; 487-A, BJ

1.3. Judicial function is exercised under legal authority to decide on
the disputes, after hearing the parties, may be after making an enquiry,
and the decision affects the rights and o_bligations of the parties, there is
duty to act judicially. The judge may construe the law and apply it to a C
particular state of facts presented for the determination of controversy.
A ministerial act, on the other hand, may be defined to be one which a
person performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to, or the
exercise of, his own judgment upon the propriety of the act done. In
ministerial duty nothing is left to discretion; it is a simple, definite duty. D
[488-C-El

1.4. Presentation of election petition to the High Court within the
meaning of Section 81 of the Act without anything more would mean
delivery of election petition to the High Court through one of its officers
competent or authorized to rec~ive the same on behalf of and for the High E
Court. Receiving an election petition presented under Section 81 of the
Act is certainly not a judicial function which needs to be performed by a
judge alone. There is no discretion in receiving an election petition. An
election petition, when presented, has to be received. It is a simple, definite
duty. It is a ministerial function simplicitor. It can safely be left to be p
performed by one of the administrative or ministerial staff of the High
Court which is as much a part of the High Court. It may he delegated or
be performed through someone authorized. The manner of authorization
is not prescribed. [488-E-G)

1.5. High Court, in authorizing an official to receive an election G
petition either by collective decision of all the Judges or under the
directions of the Chief Justice of the High Court, does not 'delegate' any
of its functions, much less a judicial function; it merely 'authorizes' an
official to do an act incidental to the main judicial function of trial of an
election petition which is entrusted to the High Court exercisable H
''
~
476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 2 S.C.R.

A ordinarily by a Single judge of the High Court assigned by the Chief
Justice for that purpose. Such authorization whether made by rules of the
High Court or by decision of the Court or by an order of the Chief justice
shall hold goo~ unless there be a provision to the contrary in the Act or
in the rules·framed by the Central Government in exercise of the powen
B conferred by Section 169 of the Act, which there is none. 1488-H; 489, A, Bl

1.6. Article 329(b) of the Con~titution speaks of an election petition
being presented to such authority and in such manner as may be provided
for by or under any law made by the appropriate legislature. The
Representation of the People Act, 1951 is such law made by the Parliament.
C By no stretch of imagination it can be said that the " presentation" of an
election petition is part of the "trial" of an election petition. The term
"High Court" in Section 81 has been used to denote an institution and
not literally the High Court as constituted within the meaning of Article
216 of the Constitution. It would be an absurdity to assume that even
D though the election petition can be tried by a Single Judge of the High
Court in so far as presentation is concerned it must be presented to the
Chief Justice and all the Judges sitting together as contemplated by Article
216. It is equally absurd to assume that a Single Judge assigned or to be
assigned with the trial of an election petition must himself receive the
election petition. A Judge of the High Court may be designated as an
E Election Judge and assigned the trial of an election petition subsequent
to its being received in the High Court.· u may be that the Chief Justice
has not designated an. Election Judge under Section 80A (2) of the Act
until an election petition was actually received in the High Court. In such
a situation, the Constitution and the Act cannot expect the Chief Justice
F himself to discharge the ministerial act of receiving an election petition
presented to the High Court. [486-B-GJ

2.1. A power c;onferred by a statute often contains express conditions
for its exercise and in the absence of or in addition to the express conditions
there are also implied conditions for exercise of the power. An affirmative
G statute introductive of a new law directing a thing to be done in a certain
way mandates, even if there be no negative words, that the thing shall not
be done in any other way. This. rule of implied prohibition is subservient
to the basic principle that the Court must, as far as possible, attach a
construction which effectuates the legislative intent and purpose. Further,
H the rule of implied prohibition does not negative the principle that an
express grant of statutory power carries with it by necessary implication
J.U. AHMAO v. ABU SALEH NAJMUDDIN 477
the authority to use all reasonable means to make such grant effective. A
1484-G, H; 485-A, BJ

Income Tax Officer, Cannanore v. MK Mohammed Kunhi, 11969) 2
SCR 65; and Chief Executive Officer and Vice-Chairman, Gujarat Maritime
Board v. Haji Daud Haji Harun Abu and Ors., 11996) l l SCC 23, referred
to. B

Wiseman v. Boardman, (1971) AC 297, referred to

Principles of Statutory Interpretation by G.P. Singh (Eighth Edition);
Craies on Statute Law, Seventh Edition; Maxwell on Interpretation ofStatutes,
Eleventh Edition and Sutherland's Statutory Construction and Domat's Civil C
Law , referred to.

2.2. The jurisdiction to try an election petition has been conferred
by the Parliament on the High Court so as to carry out the mandate of
Article 329 of the Constitution. Neither the Parliament nor the Central D
Government h"ave exercised their power by designating an authority to
whom the election petition can be presented. There is a void left open by
legislation. The gap is not to be found in the jurisdiction created nor in
the substantive provision; the gap is in the field of procedural law, for
failure to specifically enact an incidental or ancillary provision which
would enable the statutory right of an <.'lection petitioner being exercised E
so as to enable the election petition, in the hands of the election petitioner
reaching the High Court - the competent jurisdiction, for being subjected
to hearing and trial. An intention is to be attributed to the Parliament
that the High Court having been conferred with the substantive
jurisdiction to hear and try an election petition, the making of provision
for all incidental and ancillary matters was left to the High Court which F
can either continue with the existing practice of receiving petitions and
documents, just as in other civil jurisdictions exercised by it, or could make
. or devise convenient and workable procedure of receiving election petitions
and other documents presented to it in exercise of ·the jurisdiction
conferred by the Act. [492-F-H; 493-A, B) G
High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. P.P. Singh and Anr., JT
(2'1103) l SC 403; All India Judges' Association v. Union of India and Ors.
11992) l SCC 119; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Batuk Dea Pati Tripathi and
Anr. [1978) 2 SCC 102 and Utpal Dutta v. Indira Gogoi decided by Gauhati
High Court on 29.8.2002 in Misc. Case No. 13/ 2001 in E.P. No. 7/2001, H
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 2 S.C.R.

A referred to.

3.1. Section 81(1) before amendment by Act 47 of 1966 required
the election petition being presented to the Election Commission. Sub-
section (2) provided for the election petition bei"ng delivered to the
Secretary to the Commission or to such other officer as may be appointed
B by the Election Commission or even being sent by registered post and
delivered tO the Secretary to the Commission or to such other officer as
"!ay be appointed by the Election Commission so as to be deemed to have
been presented to the Election Commission. While "High Court" has been
substituted in place of Election Commission in sub-Section (1), sub-Section
C (2) of the erstwhile Section 81 has been deleted without re-enacting a
corresponding provision. So far as the }Iigh Court is concerned, such a
provision was not required to be enacted into the Act. Jurisdiction to try
an election petition has been conferred on the High Court in place of the
Election Tribunal. The High Court is a constitutional Court which was
pre-existing. It is a Court of record and exercises plenary powers. The
D High Court being a pre-existing judicial institution also had rules,
directions and practice already existing and prevalent and governing the
reception of documents presented to it; the same would apply to election
petitions. 1490-C-F]

3.2. Cursus curia/ est lex curiae - The practice of the Court is the
E law of the Court. Every Court is the guardian of its own records and the
master of its own practice; and where a practice has existed, it is
convenient, except in cases of extreme urgency and necessity, to adhere
to it, because it is the practice, even though no reason can be assigned for
it; for an inveterate practice in law generally stands upon principles that
F are founded in justice and convenience. [490-F, G]

Broom's Legal Maxims, Tenth Edition, referred to.

3.3. Even in the absence of rules or directions if there is any practice
prevailing under which the administrative or ministerial functions of the
G High Court are being performed, unless there be something inherently
objectionable or impermissible a_bout it the same should be allowed to
prevail if it satisfies the test of being incidental and essential to the
performance of the main judicial functions of the High Court. The rules
may not be referable to the provision of the Act as the source of power of
the High Court, the fact remains that such rules manifest the
H administrative decision of the High Court to which the Chief Justice is a
.1.U. AHMAD v. ABU SALEH NAJMUDD!N 479
party. Inasmuch as such decision does not run counter to any rule of law A
it is binding and must be upheld. 1490-HI

3.4. Even in the absence of Chapter VIII-A in the Gauhati High
Court Rules there would have been nothing wrong in the High Court or
the Chief Justice authorizing any of its officers to receive the election
petition presented to it so as to enable exercise of the jurisdiction conferred B
on the High Court by Chapter II of the Act. The Gauhati High Court
thought it proper to incorporate Chapter VIII-A in its Rules in view of
the amendment made in Chapter II of the Act. 1490-H; 491-AI

4. The fundamentals or the first principles of law often articulated C
as the maxims are manifestly founded in reason, public convenience and
necessity. Modern trend of introducing subtleties and distinctions, both
in legal reasoning and in the application of legal principles, formerly
unknown, have rendered an accurate acquaintance with the first principles
more necessary rather than diminishing the values of simple fundamental
rules. The fundamental rules are the basis of the law; may be either D
directly applied, or qualified or limited, according to the exigencies of the
particular case and the novelty of the circumstances which present
themselves. 1491-G, H; 492-A]

Dhannala/ v. Kalawatibai and Ors., 12002] 6 SCC 16, referred to.
E
5. Irrationality perversity and hyper-technicality are out of place
while interpreting the Statutes or testing the vires of legislation. 1494-A]

The State ofPunjab and Anr. v. Sham/a/ Murari and Anr., [197611 SCC
719, referred to.
F
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: C!vil Appeal No. 1860 of2003.

From the Judgment and Order dated 21.12.200 I of the Gauhati High
Court at Assam in Misc. Case No. 26/2001 in E.P. No. 16 of200L

WITH G
C.A. Nos. 1861 and 1862 .of 2003.

R.K. Jain, Gopal Subramanium, Dr. A.M. Singhvi (NP), S.B. Sanyal,
Shakil Ahmed Syed, Manoj Goel, Shuvodeep Roy, Pankaj Kalra, Brij Bhushan,
Chinmoy, A. Khaladkar, S.K. Nandy, B. Aggarwalla, Rajiv Mehta, Ms. Krishna H
480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] 2 S.C.R.

A Sarma, Ms. Asha G. Nair, V.K. Sidatharan, N.G.J.R. Luwang, Nitin S.
Tambwekar and V.N. Raghupathy, for the appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

R.C. LAHOTI, J. Leave granted in all the SLPs.
B
A common question of law arises for decision in all the three appeals.
It would suffice to state the facts of one of the cases to have a glimpse of the
backdrop events in which the question has emerged for decision. In Civil
Appeal No. 1860/2003 arising out of SLP (C) No. 6098/2002 the appellant
contested the last election to legislative assembly from 'No.5 Badarpur
C Legislative Assembly Constituency of Assam' held on I 0.5.200 I. TI1e appellant
was declared duly elected. On 27 .6.200 I the contesting respondent filed an
Election Petition under Section 80/81 of the Representation of the People
Act, 1951 (hereinafter RPA, for short), laying challenge to the appellant's
election.· The Election Petition was presented before Stamp Reporter-cum-
D Oath Commissioner of the High Court of Assam. The Stamp Reporter received
the election petition, conducted the preliminary scrutiny thereof, and, along
with his note, put up the same before the Designated Election Judge. The
appellant respondent before the High Court) on being noticed and having
been served with a copy of the election petition, filed an application raising
preliminary objection to the maintainability of the petition, seeking its dismissal
E in limine under Section 86 of the Act for non-compliance with Section 81 of
the Act. The gist of the plea raised by the appellant is that the Election
Petition should have been presented either before the Designated Election
Judge or the Chief Justice of the High Court; and that the presentation before
the Stamp Reporter is invalid under Section 81 of the Act; and therefore, the
F petition is liable to be dismissed without trial. The learned Designated Election
Judge has overruled the objection preferred by the appellant and held that the
election petition was properly presented. In forming this opinion the learned
Designated Election Judge has relied on Chapter VlllA of the High Court
Rules which will be noticed hereafter at an appropriate place.

G The facts in the other two appeals are similar and it would suffice to
state that similar objections that were preferred by the respondents in the
High Court (appellants before us) disputing the validity of the presentation
of the respective election petitions, which had been presented before the
Stamp Reporter, have been overruled.

H We have heard the learned counsel for the parties led by the learned
.l.U. AHMAD v. ABU SALEH NAJMUDDIN (R.C. LAHOTL J.) 481

Senior Advocates on both the sides. We are satisfied that there is no merit A
in these appeals and the same are liable to be dismissed.

The submissions made on behalf of the appellants led by Shri R.K.
Jain, Senior Advocate, may briefly be noticed. It was submitted that under
Article 329 of the Constitution no election to either House of Parliament or
to the Houses of the Legislature of the State shall be called in question except B
by an election petition presented to st;ch authority and in such manner as may
be provided for by or under any law made by an appropriate Legislature. The
RPA, provides for the conduct of elections to the Houses of Parliament and
to the Houses of the Legislature of each State, and for the decision of disputes
arising out of or in connection with such elections, amongst other things. C
Chapter II deals with presentation of election petitions to High Court. Under
Section 80, no election shall be called in question except by an election
petition presented in accordance with the provisions of this Part. Under Section
80-A the Court having jurisdiction to try an election petition shall be the
\ High Court. Such jurisdiction shall be exercised ordinarily by a Single Judge
-1 of the High Court and the Chief Justice, shall, from time to time, assign one D
or more judges for that purpose. Section 81 provides for presentation of
petitions, Section 86 deals with the consequences of non-compliance. These
provisions are reproduced hereunder:-

"81 Presentation of petitions.-{ I) An election petition calling in
question any election may be presented on one or more of the grounds E
specified in [sub-section (I) of section· JOO and section IOI to the
High Court by any candidates at such election or any elector within
forty-five days from, but not earlier than the date of election of the
returned candidates or if there are more than one returned candidate
at the election and dates of their election are different, the later of p
those two dates].

Explanation.- In this sub-section, "elector" means a person who was
entitled to vote at the election to which the election petition relates,
whether he has voted at such election or not."

86. Trial of election petitions.- (I) The High Court shall dismiss an G
election petition which does not comply with the provisions of section
81 or section 82 or section 117.

Explanation.- An order of the High Court dismissing an election
petition under this sub-section shall be deemed to be an order made H
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] 2 S.C.R.

A under clause (a) of section 98.

(2) As soon as may be after an election petition has been presented
to the High Court, it shall be referred to the Judge or one of the
Judges who has or have been assigned by the Chief Justice for the
trial of election petitions under sub-section (2) of section 80A.
B
xxx xxx xxx xxx"

Developing their submissions further, the learned counsel appearing for
the appellants submitted that an election petition has to be presented to the
High Court. Under Artie les 2 I4 and 2 I 6 of the Constitution, there shall be
C a High Court for each State and every High Court shall consist of a Chief
Justice and such other judges as the President may from time to time deem
it necessary to appoint. The Constitution and the Act do not provide for or
specify the person to whom an election petition can be presented, and therefore,
an election petition should be presented either to the High Court as defined
by Articles 2 I 4 and 2 I 6 of the Constitution or at least to the Chief Justice
D or to the Judge designated by the Chief Justice as the Election Judge. In any
case, the presentation of an election petition to the Stamp Reporter is wholly
unwarranted and unsupportable in law. The High Court does not have
jurisdiction to entertain and decide on merits a petition which has been
presented to a Stamp Reporter, the presentation itself being a nullity.
E On behalf of the private respondents, the learned counsel led by Mr.
S.B. Sanyal, learned Sr. Advocate placed reliance on the following rules
framed by Gauhati High Court contained in Chapter VIIIA.

"Chapter VIII-A
F Special provisions relating to procedure
in election petitions under the
Representation of People Act, 1951 as
amended by Act No. XLVII of 1966

I. An election petition under S. 80-A of the Representation of
G
Peoples Act may be presented duly verified in the fonn prescribed
under Ss.82 and 83 of the said Act, before the stamp reporter of this
Court with a Court-fee of Rs.6 affixed thereon, within 45 days from
the date of election of the returned candidate, or if there are more
than one returned candidate at the election and the dates of their
H election are different, the latter of those two dates. Every such petition
J.U. AHMAD v. ABU SALEH NAJMUDDIN [R.C. LAHOTI, J.] 483,
shall be accompanied by- A·
(a) as many copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the
petition together with one extra copy, all the copies being fully
attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true
copy of the petition and as many envelopes as there are
respondents bearing requisite postage stamp to enable service to B
be effected by registered pos' with acknowledgement due;

(b) as many printed forms of notices, duly filled in, as there are
respondents;

(c) an affidavit in support of the contents of the petitions as prescribed
in R.83 (c) of the aforesaid Act where necessary, and C
(d) a chalan showing the deposit of Rs. 2,000 (Rupees two thousand)
into the State Bank of India Gauhati Branch in favour of the
Registrar of this Court, as security for the costs of the petition:

Provided that such deposit in respect of petition to be filed in the D
Benches at Kohima, Imphal and Agartala may be made in the State
Bank of Kohima, Imphal and Agartala, as the case may be in favour
of the Deputy Registrar of the Bench concerned.

Note (I). The petition shall be legibly type-written or printed in
the English language on durable foolscap paper or other paper similar E
to it in size and quality, book-wise, on one side of the paper, with not
more than 20 or less than 18 lines, of about 10 words in each line on
each page and with an inner margin of about an inch and a quarter
wide.

Note (11). Any petition which is presented out of time and without F
any of the above mentioned requisites duly satisfied shall forthwith
be returned by the stamp reporter for refiling."

It was submitted on behalf of the respondents that the presentation
having been made in conformity with the Rules, no exception can be taken
to its validity. To this the learned counsel for the appellants replied by G
submitting that the only provision which empowers the rules being framed
under the Act is contained in Section 169, which contemplates the rules for
carrying out the purposes of the Act being made by the C~ntral Government
after consulting the Election Commission and by notification in the official
gazette. Inasmuch as the Central Government has not framed any rules H
484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) 2 S.C.R.

A governing the presentation of election petition the rules framed by the High
Court are invalid and cannot be given effect to or looked into for saving the
validity of its presentation. It was also submitted that the right to contest for
and hold an elective office is not a common law right but a right conferred
by the Statute and so also the resolution of election disputes is not a common
B law remedy governed by ordinary law of the land; it is a special siatutor;
remedy provided for by a special enactment, and therefore, any departure
from the provisions of the Constitution or the Act cannot be countenanced.
The Court would always be slow to interfere with the success of a winning
candidate at the election and an election petition which does not strictly
comply with the requirements as to its presentation shall be liable to be
C dismissed and thrown out by strictly interpreting the law.
The questic,n which arises for decision is whether the High Court is at
all competent to frame rules making provision for receiving the election
petitions presented to the High Court under Section 81 of the RPA; and if the
High Court is not competent to frame the rules, then whether in the absence
D of any provision in the Act or rules framed by the Central Government
specifying the person who is competent to receive election petitions presented
to the High Court, no petition can be presented; or, so ltmg as there is no
specific provision can it be inferred by reading Article 329 with Articles 214
and 216 of the Constitution that the election petition can be presented only
E to the High Court in the sense of the Chief Justice and other judges constituting
the High Court for the time being sitting together to receive the election
petition?

Jn our opinion, the controversy which has been raised is devoid of any
merit. It is pertinent to note that in the RPA as originally enacted an election
p petition could be presented to the Election Commission and thereafter it was
to be tried by an Election Tribunal. Act No.47 of 1966 has drastically
amended chapter JI of RPA and with effect from 14.12.1966 the jurisdiction
to try election petitions has been conferred on the High Cou1t. High Court is
a Court which was pre-existing on the date of amendment brought into being
by Act No.47of1966. It is a constitution Court and a Court of record having
G plenary jurisdiction.
Dealing with "Statutes conferring power; implied conditions, judicial
review", Justice G.P. Singh states in the Principles of Statutory Interpretation
(Eighth Edition 2001, at pp. 333,334) that a power conferred by a statute
H often contains express conditions for its exercise and in the absence of or in
J.U. AHMAD v. ABU SALEH NA.IMUDDIN [R.C. LAHOTL J.) 485
addition to the express condition there are also implied conditions for exercise A
of the power. An affirmative statute introductive of a new law directing a
thing to be done in a certain way mandates, even if there be no negative
words, that the thing shall not be done in any other way . This rule of implied
prohibition is subservient to the basic principle that the Court must, as far as
possible , attach a construction which effectuates the legislative intend and
purpose. Further, the rule of implied prohibition does not negative the principle B
that an express grant of statutory power carries with it by necessary implication
the authority to use all reasonable means to make such grant effective. To
illustrate, an Act of Parliament conferring jurisdiction over an offence implies
a power in that jurisdiction to make out a warrant and secure production of
the person charged with the offence; power conferred on Magistrate to grant C
maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal procedure 1973 to
prevent vagrancy implies a power to allow interim maintenance; power
conferred on a local authority to issue licences for holding 'hats' or fairs
implies incidental power to fix days therefor; power conferred to compel
cane growers to supply cane to sugar factories implies an incidental power
to ensure payment of price. In short, conferment of a power implies authority D
to do everything which could be fairly and reasonably regarded as incidental
consequential to the power conferred.

"For a long time the courts have, without objection from Parliament,
supplemented procedure laid down in legislation where they have found that E
to be necessary for th is purpose. But before this unusual kind of power is
exercised it must be clear that the statutory procedure is insufficient to achieve
justice and that to require additional steps would not frustrate the apparent
purpose of the legislation", said Lord Reid in Wiseman v. Boardman, (1971)
., AC 297, 308. "If a statute is passed for the purpose of enabling something
to be done, but omits to mention in terms some detail which is of great F
importance (if not actually essential) to the proper and effectual/performance
of the work which the statute has in contemplation, the courts are at liberty
to infer that the statute by implication empowers that detail to be carried out.'
(Craies on Statute LAW, Seventh Edition, p. LI I). Cui jurisdictio data est,
ea quoque concessa esse videntur, sine quibus jurisdictio exp/icari non potuit- G
"Where an act confers jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of
doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to
its execution." (See, Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, Eleventh Edition,
'p. 350). Referring to Maxwell (ibid), Sutherlands's Statutory Construction
and Domat's Civil Law, the law was thus stated, as a "firmly established
rule", by this Court in Income Tax Officer, Cannanore v. M.K. Mohammed H
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 2 S.C.R.

A Kunhi, (1969] 2 SCR 65. that an express grant of statutory power carries with
it by necessary implication the authority to use all reasonable means to make
such grant effective. In Chief Executive Officer and Vice-Chairman, Gujarat
Maritime Board v. Haji Daud Haji Harun Abu and Ors., [1966] 11 SCC 23,
this Court held that the conferral of incidental and ancillary powers necessarily
B flown from the conferral of the substantive power. "It is well settled that
where a substantive power is conferred upon a court or tribunal, all incidental
and ancillary powers necessary for an effective exercise of the substantive
power have to be inferred''.

Undoubtedly clause (b) of Article 329 of the Constitution speaks of an
C election petition being prese11ted to such authority and in such manner as
may be provided for by or under any law made by the appropriate legislature.
The Representation of the People Act, 1951 is such law made by the
Parliament. Section 80A of the Act confers jurisdiction to try an election
petition upon the High Court. By no stretch of imagination it can be said that
the "presentation" of an election petition is part of the "trial" of an election
D petition. Section 81 of the Act prescribes limitation, the manner and
requirements of presentation and that the election petition may be presented
to the High Court. The term "High Court" in Section 81 has been used to
denote an institution and not literally the High Court as constituted within the
meaning of Article 216 of the Constitution. It would be an absurdity to
E assume that even though the election petition can be tried by a single Judge
of the High Court in so far as presentation is concerned it must be to the
"High Court" in the sense of the High Court consisting of a Chief Justice and
other Judges appointed to the High Court (as contemplated by Article 216),
i.e. presented to the Chief Justice and all the Judges sitting together. It is

F
equally absurd to assume that a single Judge assigned or to be assigned with
the trial of an election petition must himself receive the election petition. A
,,
;

Judge of the High Court may be designated as an Election Judge and assigned
the trial of an election petition subsequent to its being received in the High
Court. It may be that the Chief Justice has not designated an Election Judge
under sub-Section (2) of Section 80A of the Act until an election petition was
actually received in the High Court. Who then would receive the election
G petition? Do the Constitution and the RPA expect the Chief Justice himself
to discharge the ministerial act of receiving an election petition presented to
the High Court? Our answer is an emphatic 'no'.

The functions discharged by a High Court can be divided broadly into
H judicial and administrative functions. The judicial functions are to be
.J.U. AHMAD v. ABU SALEH NAJMUDDIN IR.C LAHOTI, .l.] 487

discharged essentialiy by the judges as per the rules of the Court and cannot A
be delegated. However, administrative functions need not necessarily be
discharged by the judges by themselves, whether individually or collectively
or in a group of two or more, and may be delegated or entrusted by
authorization to subordinates unless there be som~ rule of law restraining
such delegation or authorisation. Every High Court consists of some
administrative and ministerial staff which is as much a part of the High Court B
as an institution and is meant to be entrusted with the responsibility of
discharging administrative and ministerial functions. There can be 'delegation'
as also there can be 'authorization' in favour of the Registry and the officials
therein by empowering or entrusting them with authority or by permitting a
few things to be done by them for and or behalf of the Court so as to aid the C
judges in discharge of the judicial functioning. Authorization may take the
form of formal conferral or sanction or may be by way of approval or
countenance. Such delegation or authorization is not a matter of mere
convenience but a necessity at times. The Judges are already overburdened
with the task of performing judicial functions and the constraints on their
time and energy are so demanding that it is in public interest to allow them D
to devote time and energy as much as possible in discharging their judicial
functions, relieving them of the need for diverting their limited resources of
time and energy to such administrative or ministerial functions, which, on
any principle of propriety, logic, or necessity are not required necessarily to
be performed by the Judges. Receiving a cause or a document and making E
_, it presentable to a Judge for the purpose of hearing or trial and many a
functions post-decision, which functions are administrative and ministerial in
nature, can be and are generally entrusted or made over to be discharged by
.- the staff of the High Court, often by making a provision in the rules or under
the orders of the Chief Justice or by issuing practice directions, and at times,
in the absence of rules, by sheer practice. The practice gathers the strength F
of law and the older the practice the greater is the strength. The Judges rarely
receive personally any document required to be presented to the Court. Plaints,
petitions, memoranda or other document required to be presented to the
Court are invariably received by the administrative or ministerial staff, who
would also carry out preliminary scrutiny of such documents so as to find G
that they are in order and then make the documents presentable to the judge,
so that the valuable time of the Judge is not wasted over such matters as do
not need to be dealt with personally by the Judge.

The judicial function entrusted to a Judge is inalienable and differs
from an administrative or ministerial function which can be delegated or H
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) 2 S.C.R.

A perfonnance whereof may be secured through authorization. "The judicial
function consists in the interpretation of the law and its application by rule .
or discretion to the facts of particular cases. This involves the ascertainment
of facts in dispute according to the law of evidence. The organs which the
state sets up to exercise the judicial function are called courts of law or courts
B of justice. Administration consists of the operations, whatever their intrinsic
nature may be, which are performed by administrators; and administrators
are all state officials who are neither legislators nor judges" (See Constitutional
and Administrative Law, Philips and Jackson, Sixth Edition, p. I3). P. Ramnath
Aiyer's Law Lexicon defines Judicial Function as the doing of something in
the nature or in the course of an action in court. (p. JO I 5). The distinction
C between "Judicial" and "Ministerial Acts" is : "if a judge dealing with a
particular matter has to exercise his discretion in arriving at a decision, he is
acting judicially; if on the other hand, he is merely required to do a particular
act and is precluded from entering into the merits of the matter, he is said to
be acting ministerially." (p. 1013-14). Judicial function is exercised under
legal authority to decide on the disputes, after hearing the parties, may be
D after making an enquiry, and the decision affects the rights and obligations
of the parties. There is duty to act judicially. The judge may construe the law
and apply it to a particular state of facts presented for the determination of
controversy. A ministerial act, on the other hand, may be defined to be one
which a person performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
E obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to, or the
exercise of, his own judgment upon the propriety of the act done (Law
Lexicon, Ibid., p. 1234). In ministerial duty nothing is left to discretion; it is
a simple, definite duty. Presentation of election petition to the High Comt
within the meaning of Section 8 I of the Act without anything more would
mean delivery of election petition to the High Court through one of its officers
F competent or authorized to receive the same on behalf of and for the High
Court. Receiving an election petition presented under Section 81 of the Act
is certainly not a judicial function which needs to be performed by a judge
alone. There is no discretion in receiving an election petition. An election .
petition, when presented, has to be received. It is a simple, definite duty. The
G date and time of presentation and the name of person who presented (with
such other particulars as may be prescribed) are to be endorsed truly and
mechanically on the document presented. It is a ministerial function simplicitor.
It can safely be left to be perfonned by one of the administrative or ministerial
staff of the High Court which is as much a part of the High Court. It may
be delegated or be performed through someone authorized. The manner of
H authorization is not prescribed.
J.U. AHMAD v. ABU SALEH NA.JMUDDIN [R.C. LAHOTI, J.) 489

The High Court, in authorizing an official to receive an election petition A
either by collective decision of all the Judges or under the directions of the
Chief Justice of the High Court, does not 'delegate' any of its functions much
less a judicial function; it merely 'authorizes' an official to do an act incidental
to the main judicial functional of trial of an election petition which is entrusted
to the High Court exercisable ordinarily by a single Judge of the High Court B
assigned by the Chief Justice for that purpose. Such authorization whether
made by rules of the High Court or by decision of the Court or by an order
of the Chief Justice shall hold good unless there be a provision to the contrary
in the Act or in the rules framed by the Central Government in exercise of
the powers conferred by Section 169 of the Act, which there is none.

It is not disputed that the Stamp Reporter is an official in the Gauhati
c
High Court and a necessary part of the administrative staff performing
functions of utility and responsibility in the administrative set up.

It will be useful to notice how Section 81 read prior to its amendment
by Act No. 4 7 of 1966. The provision as originally contained in the D
Representation of Peoples Act, 1951 read as under:-

"81. Presentation of petitions.-(!) An election petition calling
question any election may be presented on one or more of the grounds
specified in sub-section (I) of Section I 00 and section I 0 I to the
Election Commission by any candidate at such election or any elector E
within forty-five days from, but not earlier than, the date of election
of the returned candidate, or if there are more than one returned
candidate at the election and the dates of their election are different,
the later of those two dates.

Explanation.-ln this sub-section, "elector" means a person who F
was entitled to vote at the election to which the election petition
relates, whether he has voted at such election or not.

(2) An election petition shall be deemed to have been presented to the
Election Commission-
G
(a) when it is delivered to the Secretary to the Commission or to
such officer as may be appointed by the Election Commission in
this behalf-
(i) by the person making the petition, or

(ii) by a person authorized in writing in this behalf by the person H
490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) 2 S.C.R.

A making the petition; or

(b) when it is sent by registered post and is delivered to the Secretary
to tlie Commission or the officer so appointed.

(3) Every election petition shall be accompanied by as many copies
thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the petition and one
B more copy for the use of the Election Commission, and every such
copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be
a true copy of the petition."

Sub-Section (I) of the above said provision required the election petition
C being presented to the Election Commission. Sub-Section (2) provided for
the election petition being delivered to the Secretary to the Commission or
to such other officer as may be appointed by the Election Commission or
even being sent by registered post and delivered to the Secretary to the
Commission or the officer appointed so as to be deemed to have been presented
to the Election Commissioner. While "High Court" has been substituted in
D place of Election Commis~ion in sub-Section ( 1), sub-Section (2) of the
erstwhile Section 81 has been deleted without re-enacting a corresponding
provision. The reason is more that obvious. The Parliament knew that so far
as the Election Commissioner is concerned, it was considered necessary to
trust only' the Secretary to the Commission or such other officer as may be
E appointed by the Election Commission entrusted with the responsibility of
receiving the election petition presented to the Election Commission. So far
as the High Court is concerned, such a provision was not required to be
enacted into the Act. Jurisdiction to try an election petition has been conferred
on the High Court in place of the Election Tribunal. The High Court is a
constitutional Court which was pre-existing. It is a Court of record and
F exercises plenary powers. The High Court being a pre-existi.ng judicial
institution also had rules, directions and practice already existing and prevalent
and governing the reception of documents presented to it; the same would
apply to election petitions. CURSUS CURIAF EST LEX CURlAE.-The
practice of the Court is the law of the Court. Every Court is the guardian of
its own records and the master of its own practice; and where a practice has
G existed, it is convenient, except in cases of extreme urgency and necessity,
to adhere to it, because it is the practice, even though no reason can be
assigned for it; for an inveterate practice in law generally stands upon principles
that are founded in justice and convenience. (See Broom's Legal Maxims,
Tenth Edition, p. 82). Even in the absence of Chapter VIII-A In the Gauhati
H High Court Rules there would have been nothing wrong in the High Court
·~.

LU. AHMAD v. ABU SALEH NAJMUDDIN [R.C. LAHOTL J.] 491

or the Chief Justice authorizing any of its officers to receive the election A
petition presented to it so as to enable exercise of the jurisdiction conferred
on the High Court by Chapter II of the Act The Gauhati High Court thought
it proper to incorporate Chapter Yl!l-A in its Rules in view of the amendment
made in Chapter II of the Act

We are therefore of the opinion that presentation of an election petition B
to the Stamp Reporter of the High Court of Gauhati is a valid presentation.
Such has been the view taken by the High Couri of Gauhati consistently. At
least three decisions can be referred to immediately : Abdul Jabbar v. Syeda
Anwara Taimur and Ors., (1986) I GLR 257, Shri Melhupra Vero v. Shri
Vamuzo, (1990) 1 GLR 290 and Shri Saingura v. Shri F. Sapa and Ors., C
(1990) 2 GLR (NOC) 48. So is the view taken by the High Court of Allahabad
in Nawab Khan v. Vishwanath Shastri, AIR (1993) Allahabad 104. We find
ourselves in agreement with the view so taken by the learned single judges
of Gauhati and Allahabad High Courts.

During the course of hearing a recent decision by a learned single D
Judge of Gauhati High Court in Utpal Dutta v. Indra Gogoi, (Misc. Case
No.13/2001 in E.P.No.7/2001 decided on 29.8.2002) was brou(1t to our
notice wherein Rule I of Chapter VIJIA of Gauhati High Court Rules has
been struck down as ultra vires of Sections 80, 80A, 81 of the RPA read with
Article 329 (b) of the Constitution. It was forcefully submitted by the learned
counsel for the appellants that the rule having been struck down as ultra E
vires, it would be deemed to be non-existent and therefore all the election
petitions presented to the Stamp Reporter of Gauhati High Court would be
non est and such election petition cannot be set down for hearing and be
tried. The question of the vires of the abovesaid rule does not directly arise
for decision before us as the same was not put in issue in any of the three p
cases the orders passed wherein are the subject matter in these appeals. It
would suffice for us to observe that going into the vires of the rules is an
intellectual exercise in futility, for, it would lead us nowhere.

Herbert Broom states in the preface to his celebrated work on Legal
Maxims - "In the Legal Science, perhaps more frequently than in any other, G
reference must be made to first principles." The fundamentals or the first
principles of law often articulated as the maxims are manifestly founded in
reason, public convenience and necessity. Modern trend of introducing
subtleties and distinctions, both in legal reasoning and in the application of
legal principles, formerly unknown, have rendered an accurate acquaintance H
492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) 2 S.C.R.

A with the first principles more necessary rather than diminishing the values of
simple fundamental rules. The fundamental rules are the basi.s of the law;
may be either directly applied, or qualified or limited, according to the
exigencies of the particular case and the novelty of the circumstance which
present themselves. In Dhannala/ v. Kalawatibai and Ors., (2002] 6 SCC 16,
this Court has held, "when the statute does not provide the path and the
B precedents abstain to lead, then sound logic, rational rea~oning, common
sense and urge for public good play as guides of those who decide."

Whether the High Court has the power to frame the rules under the
provision of the RPA, or not, is a question which need not be gone into. As
C we have already held, the High Court and the Chief Justice, as the case may
be, have the power to frame rules and issue directions regulating the own
affairs and conduct of business in the High Court. Even in the absence of
rules or directions if there is any practice prevailing under which the
administrative or ministerial functions of the High Court are being performed,
unless there be something inherently objectionable or impem1issible about it
D the same should be allowed to prevail if it satisfies the test of being incidental
and essential to the performance of the main judicial functions of the High
Court. The rules may not be referable to the provision of the RPA as the
source of power of the High Court - on which we express no opinion as the
same is not necessary- the fact remains ihat such rules manifest the
E administrative decision of the High Court to which the Chief Justice is a
party. Inasmuch as such decision does not run counter to any rule of law it
is binding and must be upheld.

Strange consequences would follow if the submission made on behalf
of the appellants and the reasoning which has prevailed with the learned
F single Judge of Gauhati High Court in Utpa/ Dutta v. Indra Gogoi, (supra)
was to be accepted. The jurisdiction to try an election petition has been
conferred by the Parliament on the High Court so as to carry out the mandate
of Article 329 of the Constitution. Neither the Parliament nor the Central
Government have exercised their power by designating an authority to whom
the election petition can be presented. There is a void left open by legislation.
G The gap is not to be found in the jurisdiction created nor in the substantive
provision; the gap is in the field of procedural law, for failure to specifically
enact an incidental or ancillary provision which would enable the statutory
right of an election petitioner being exercised so as to enable the election
petition, in the hands of the election petitioner reaching the High Court-the
H competent jurisdiction, for being subjected to hearing and trial. We have to
J.U. AHMAD v. ABU SALEH NAJMUDDIN [R.C. LAHOTI, J.] 493
··- attribute an intention to the Parliament that the High Court having been A
conferred with the substantive jurisdiction to hear and try an election petition,
the making of provision for all incidencal and ancillary matters was left to the
High Court which can either continue with the existing practice of receiving
petitions and documents just as in other civil jurisdiction exercised by it, or
could make or devise convenient and workable procedure of rec.eiving election B
petitions and other documents presented to it in exercise of the jurisdiction
conferred by the Act.

Re.-:ently in High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan v. P.P. Singh and
Anr., JT (2003) I SC 403, a question arose as to power and propriety of the
High Court and the Chief Justice delegating or referring administrative matters C
of the High Court for the opinion of a Committee of Judges and acting
thereon. A few observations made by this Court in this context are apposite
to the case on hand. "Whereas control over the subordinate Courts vests in
the High Court as a whole, the control over the High Co"rt vests in the Chief
Justice. [See All India Judges' Association v. Union ofIndia and Ors., [1992)
I SCC 119). In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi and Anr., D
[1978) 2 sec 102, keeping in view the nature of the power conferred by the
Constitution on the High Court, this Court held that it is wrong to characterize
as "delegation" the process whereby the entire High Court authorizes a Judge
or some of the Judges of the Court to act on behalf of the whole Court.
Delegation has to be distinguished from authorization. Authorisation effectuates E
the purpose of Article 235 and indeed without it the control vested in the
High Court over the subordinate Courts will tend gradually to become lax
and ineffective. Administrative functions are only a part, though an important
part, of the High Court's constitutional functions. Judici&I functions ought to
occupy and do in fact consume the best part of i1 Judges's time. For balancing
these two-fold functions it is inevitable that the administrative duties should F
be left to be discharged by some on behalf of all the Judges. Judicial functions
brook no such sharing of responsibilities by any instrumentality.

In The State of Punjab and Anr. v. Sham/al Murari and Anr., [1976]
I SCC 719 at page 722, this Court held "Procedural law is not to be a tyrant
but a servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice. Procedural prescriptions G
are the hand maid and not the mistress, a lubricant not a resistant, in the
administration of justice. Where the non-compliance, though procedural, will
thwart fair hearing or prejudice the doing of justice to parties, the rule is
mandatory. But, grammar apart, if the breach can be corrected without injury
to a just disposal of the case, the court should not enthrone a regulatory H
494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 2 S.C.R.

A requirement into a dominant desideratum. After all, courts are to do justice,
not to wreck this end product on technicalities." Irrationality, perversity and
hyper-technicality are out of place while interpreting the Statutes or testing
the vires of legislation.

We do not find any fault with the election petitions having been presented
B to and received by the Stamp Reporter of the High Court of Gauhati. The
learned Designated Election Judge has rightly overruled the preliminary
objection preferred by the respondents. All the appeals are held devoid of
any merit and liable to be dismissed. They are dismissed accordingly and
with costs. Counsel fee Rs. 5000.
c K.K.T. Appeals dismissed.