JAIPUR VIDYUT VITRAN NIGAM LTD. AND ORS.versusNATHU RAM
- Citation
- 2009 INSC 1254
- Decided
- 23 November 2009
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- TARUN CHATTERJEE
Holding
The employee is entitled to full pay and allowances for the period between dismissal and acquittal under the 1975 circular and Regulation 41(2), and the delay issue cannot be entertained as it was raised for the first time in the Special Leave Petition.
Summary
Nathu Ram, a former employee of the Rajasthan State Electricity Board (later Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd.), was suspended in 1979 after being caught accepting a bribe and was convicted in 1982, leading to his dismissal. The High Court acquitted him in 1997 and reinstated him, granting full pay for the suspension periods before dismissal and after acquittal. After retirement, he filed a writ petition seeking back wages for the period between his dismissal (December 1982) and acquittal (December 1997). The High Court ordered the corporation to pay these back wages, relying on a 1975 circular issued by the predecessor Board and Regulation 41 of the Employees Service Regulations, 1964. The corporation appealed, arguing the writ was filed after an inordinate delay and that the employee was not entitled to remuneration for the dismissed period, citing two earlier Supreme Court decisions. The Supreme Court held that the delay issue could not be raised for the first time in the Special Leave Petition and that, under the 1975 circular and Regulation 41(2), the employee was entitled to full pay and allowances for the dismissed period. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.
Issues considered
- The propriety of raising the question of delay in filing the writ petition at the stage of a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court.
- Whether the employee is entitled to back wages and allowances for the period between his dismissal and subsequent acquittal, pursuant to the 1975 circular and Regulation 41 of the Employees Service Regulations, 1964.
- The applicability of the precedents Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board (1996) and Union of India & Ors. v. Jaipal Singh (2004) to the present facts.
Legislation cited
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. Section 161
- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947s. Section 5(1)(d), s. Section 5(2)
Subjects
Judgment
,,
[2009] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 1083
JAIPURVIDYUTVITRAN NIGAM LTD. AND ORS. A
~
v.
NATHU RAM
(Civil-Appeal No. 7721 of 2009)
NOVEMBER 23, 2009
B-
[TARUN CHATTERJEE AND R.M. LODHA, JJ.]
Service Law:
Rajasthan State Electricity Board Employees Service
Regulations, 1964 - Regulation 41 - Employee allegedly
caught accepting bribe an<;J suspended from service --Criminal c
case - Conviction by trial court - In view thereof, termination
of employee - Acquittal by High Court - Re-instatement of
employee by vittue of the acquittal - Employee granted full pay
and allowances from date of suspension to date of termination
and again from date of acquittal to date of re-instatement - D
./ Entitlement of employee-respondent to receive pay and
allowances for period between date of termination and date of
acquittal - Held: Entitled, in view of circular dated 3rd
September, 1975 (adopted by appellant-employer) read with
Regulation 41.
E
Constitution of India, 1950-Article 136 - New plea - Plea
raised for first time in S~preme Court - Cannot be entertained.
Appellant-Corporation had adopted the Rules,
Regulations and directions issued by its predecessor, the
erstwhile Rajasthan State Electricity Board. F
Respondent, an employee of Appellant-Corporation,
was allegedly caught accepting br.ibe by the Anti-
Corruption Bureau and suspended from service on 30th
November, 1979. In 1982, he was convicted by the Special
Judge, Anti-Corruption Cases and sentenced to one year G
rigorous imprisonment. Respondent filed appeal before
l High Court. Meanwhile, in view of the conviction, appellant
terminated the service of respondent by order dated 28th
1083 H
1084 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A December, 1982.
Subsequently by order dated 15th December, 1997,
the High Court acquitted the respondent and by virtue of
the acquittal order, the appellant, by order dated 2nd June,
1998, reinstated respondent in service w.e.f. 15th
B December, 1997 and granted him full pay and allowances
for the period of suspension i.e. from 30th November, 1979
to 28th December, 1982 and from 15th December, 1997 till
his joining of duty. Respondent joined duty on 3rd June,
1998 and retired on 31st May, 2003.
C After retirement, respondent filed writ petition inter a/ia
claiming that the period from 29th December, 1982 to 14th
December, 1997 be also treated as period spent on duty
for all purposes with full pay and allowances.
The High Court placed reliance upon a circular dated
D 3rd September, 1975 issued by the appellant's
predecessor (the erstwhile 17<.ajasthan State Electricity
Board), and directed the appellant to pay backwages from
29th December, 1982 to 14th December, 1997 in form of
salaries and allowances to the extent of what would have
E been payable to the respcmdent had he remained under
suspension from the date of termination to the date of
acquittal.
In appeal to this Court, it was contended (1) that the
High Court could not have entertained the writ petition
F filed by respondent since he filed the same after long delay
without any explanation and (2) that the respondent was
not entitled to any remuneration for the period 29th
December, 1982 to 14th December, 1997.
Dismissing the appeal, th~ Co~~( ·
• ,.i. •('- J
G HELD: 1. The question of delay in filing the writ petition
was raised for the first time in the Special;Leave Petition
before this Court, hence, it cannot be entertained at this
stage. [Para 8) [1090-A]
2.1. The Circular dated 3rd September, 1975
H
JAIPUR VIDYUT VITRAN NIGA.M LTD. AND ORS. v. 1085
NATHU RAM
specifically provides that the period between the date of A
dismissal and the date on which the employee resumed
his duty should be dealt with under Regulation 41(2) of the
Employees Services Regulations, 1964. At the\ same time,
Regulation 41 also clearly says that when an employee
who has been dismissed and thereafter reinstated, the 8
authority competent to make the order of reinstatement
shall consider the pay and allowances to be paid to the
employee for the period of his absence from duty. This
Circular along with Regulation 41, then~fore, makes it clear
that the authority is bound to take into c-onsideration
regarding pay and allowances to be paid to the empioyee C
for the period of his absence from duty. The Circular also
clearly says that in doing so, the employee should be
deemed to be entitled to full pay and allowances for the
period from the date of his acquittal to the date of his
reinstatement. It is clear that the case of the respondent o
j
was fully covered by the Circular of the erstwhile Board
dated 3rd of September, 1975. [Para 10] [1092-D-H; 1093-
A]
2.2. The appellant-Corporation have themselves given
full pay to the respondent from the date of suspension i.e. E
30th November, 1979 to the date of dismissal i.e. 28th
December, 1982 and from the date of acquittal i.e. 15th
December, 1997 to the date of reinstatement i.e. 3rd June,
1998. Such being the state of affairs, there was no reason
for the Corporation not to give the suspension allowances
for the period between the date of termination i.e. 28th F
December, 1982 and the date of acquittal i.e. 15th of
December, 1997 in terms of the circular dated 3rd of
September, 1975. This circular also says that for the period
from the date of dismissal to the date of acquittal, the
employee should not be aiiowed pay and allowances less G
than what would have been admissible to him had he
remained under suspension. Therefore, from a reading of
the Circular, it would be evident that the respondent may
be paid the pay and allowances admissible to him had he
remained under suspension. In view of the circular dated H
1086 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A 3rd of September, 1975, the respondent is en-titled to back
wages as directed by the High Court in the writ petition.
..
[Paras 10 and 11) [1093-D-G; 1094-E-F]
Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Superintendent Engineer,
Gujarat Electricity Board, Himmatnagar, Gujarat and another
8 1996 (11) SCC 603 and Union of India & Ors. v. Jaipa/ Singh
2004 (1) sec 121, held inapplicable.
Case Law Reference :
1996 (11) sec so3 held inapplicable Para 9
c 2004 (1) sec 121 held inapplicable Para 9
CIVIL AP PELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 7721
of 2009.
From the Judgment & Order dated 19.11.2007 of the High
Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench, Jaipur in D.S.
D Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 1085 of 2007 in S.B. Civil Writ
Petition No. 6440 of 2003.
Sushil Kumar Jain, Puneet Jain. for the Appellants.
Devashish Bharuka, Anuj Bhyandari, Ruchi Kohli, for the
Respondent.
E
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
TARUN CHATTERJEE, J. 1. Leave granted:
2. This appeal by way of a special leave petition at the
instance of Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd has been filed from '(
F a judgment and order dated 19th of November, 2007 in DB Civil .,
Special Appeal (Writ) No.1085 of 2007 arising out of a writ
petition filed by Nathu Ram (the respondent herein) for payment
of back wages from 29th of December, 1982 to 14th of
December, 1997 after he was reinstated in service by the
G appellants ..
3. Before we proceed further, we may say at this stage that
while this Special Leave Petition was posted for hearing before
a Bench of this Court, the following order was passed:-
"Issue notice limited to the question of payment of amount
H
JAIPUR VIDYUT VITRAN NIGAM LTD. AND ORS. v. 1087
NATHU RAM [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
which is to be paid from 28.12.1982 to 15.12.1997." A
• -+
4. The facts leading to the filing of this appeal may be
narrated as follows:
Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as
'the Corporation') has come into existence as a result of
dissolution of Rajasthan State Electricity Board to form separate B
companies. The Corporation adopted the Rules, Regulations
and directions issued by the predecessor of the Corporation until
they framed their own rules. A Circular dated 3rd of September,
1975, which relates to action to be taken in cases where
·employees of the Rajasthan State Electricity Board were c
convicted on criminal charges by a competent court of law, was
issued by the Rajasthan State Electricity Board.
5. Nathu Ram, the respondent, was appointed as a casual
labour in the erstwhile Rajasthan State Electricity Board and was
subsequently regularized on the post of Helper Grade II. On 19th D
of September, 1979, the Respondent was allegedlycaught
)
accepting bribe by the Anti Corruption Bureau, as a result of
which he was suspended from service by an order dated 30th
of November, 1979. On 22nd of December, 1982, the learned
Special Judge, Anti-Corruption cases, Jaipur held thatthe
E
respondent was guilty of offences under Section 161 of The
Indian Penal Code and under Section 5(1 )(d) read with Section
5(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and sentenced him
to one year rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs.300/- for each
of tlie said offence. An appeal was carried by the respondent to
- )'
the High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur challenging the aforesaid F
conviction passed against him. In view of the conviction passed
against him, the Corporation terminated his service by an order
dated 28th of December, 1982. By an order dated 15th of
December, 1997, the High Court acquitted the respondent of the
charges leveled against him. The Corporation, by virtue of this
G
order of acquittal, reinstated the respondent in service w.e.f. 15th
of December, 1997, i.e. the date of the acquittal and posted him
;'w in the office of Assistant Engineer (Rural), Rajasthan State
Electricity Board, Kunda Ki Dhani by an order dated 2nd of June,
1998. The respondent was given full pay and allowances for the
H
1088 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A period of suspension, i.e. from 30th of November 1979 to 28th +- •
of December, 1982 and from 15th of December, 1997 till his
joining the duty. From the above, it is clear that there was a break
of 15 years in his service. On 3rd of June, 1998, the Respondent
joined the service in the Corporation. He, however, retired on
31st of May, 2003. After retirement, he filed a writ petition being
B
SB CWP No. 6440 of 2003 in the High Court of Rajasthan at
Jaipur in which, inter alia, the following reliefs were claimed by
the respondent:-
I
( 1) amendment of the order dated 2nd of June, 1998
reinstating the respondent rn service to the effect that
c the period from 29th of December, 1982 to 14th of
December, 1997 may also be treated as period
spent on duty for all purposes vvith full pay and
allowances.
(2) consequential benefits of service from the date of his
D
suspension i.e. from 30th of November, 1979 to 2nd :._
of June, 1998, which was the date of his
reinstatement, including pay and allowances, annual
grade increment, bonus, liveries along with interest
@ 12 % per annum from 2nd cf June, 1998 to the
E date of payment, fixation benefits in revised pay
scales for the years 1981, 1986, 1989 and 1996,
selection scales as per Order dated 25ih of January,
1992, arrears of pay and ailowance with interest @
12 % per annum from 2nd of June, 1998 to the date '(
F of payment.
(3) Pensionary benefits including pension, gratuity, and
leave encashment after fixing his pay in revised pay
scales and selection scale along with interest @ 12
% per annum from 1st of.June, 2003 to the date of
G payment.
6. After the Corporation appeared and contested the writ
-:
application by filing an affidavit to the writ petition, a learned
Single Judge of the High Court of Rajasthan p~s.sed a final order
on the writ application directing the Corp·&ation to pay back
... l
H wages from 29th of December, 1982 to 14th of December, 1997
JAIPUR VIDYUT VITRAN NIGAM LTD. AND ORS. v. 1089
NATHU RAM [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
when he was acquitted. While doing so, the learned Single A
Judge directed that the respondent shall be paid salaries and
allowances to the extent of what would have been payable to him
had he remained under suspension from the date of termination
to the date of acquittal. According to the learned Single Judge,
this period ought to have been treated as spent on duty without
8
any break. The Corporation was also directed to fix his pay in
the revised Pay Scales, as claimed, and to consider his case
for selection scale. Thus, the vyrit petition of the respondent was
partly allowed. While directing so, the learned Single Judge had
relied on a Circular of the erstwhile Rajasthan State Electricity
Board issued on 3rd of September, 1975 as noted herein earlier. C
From the order of the learned Single Judge, it also appears that
the learned Judge had relied on para (iii) of the circular dated
3rd of September, 1975. As regards regularization of the period
from the date of dismissal i.e. 28th of December, 1982 to the
date of reinstatement i.e. 14th of December, 1997, it was held D
that the respondent was entitled to the payment of subsistence
)
allowance in terms of the Circular dated 3rd of September, 1975,
which in fact, clearly states that the period between the date of
dismissal etc. and the date on which the employee resumes duty
should be dealt with under Regulation 41 of the Employees
Services Regulations 1964 (in short the 'Regulations'). E
7. Feeling aggrieved by the order of the learned Single
Judge, an appeal was carried to the Division Bench of the High
Court, which affirmed the order of the learned Single Judge and
accordingly, this Special Leave Petition has been filed by the
Corporation against the order of the Division Bench, which on F
grant of leave, was heard in presence of the learned counsel for
the parties.
8. Before us, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Corporation at the first instance submitted that since a Writ
petition was filed by the respondent after along delay and even G
after joining the service, without explaining why such delay was
caused, the High Court could not have entertained the writ
petition. We are not in a position to accept this submission of
the learned counsel for the Corporation on the question of delay
·. only because the question of delay in fili: .~ the writ petition was H
1090 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A not even taken by the Corporation either before the learned
Single Judge or even before the Division Bench of the High + ...
Court. This question was only raised for the first time in
theSpecial Leave Petition before this Court. The question of
delay not having been raised before the High Court, we are
unable to entertain this quest~on at this stage. Accordingly, this
B
submission of the learned counsel for the Corporation stands
rejected.
9: Secondly, it was contended that since the respondent had
not worked during the period of dismissal, he was~ot entitled to
any remuneration for the period mentioned he ein earlier. In
c support of this submission, the learned counsel for the
Corporation had drawn our attention to two decisions of this
Court in the case of Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore vs.
Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board,
Himmatnagar, Gujarat and another [1996 (11) sec 603] and
D Union of India & Ors. Vs. Jaipal Singh [2004 (1) SCC 121].
Before we deal with the aforesaid two decisions as relied on by .....
the learned counsel for the Corporation, we may consider the
Circular dated 3rd of September, 1975, issued by the erstwhile
Rajasthan State Electricity Board, on which strong reliance was
placed by the courts below, needs to be looked into. It cannot
E
be disputed that the said circular itself was binding on the
Corporation. Therefore, at this stage, we may reproduce the said
Circular dated 3rd of September, 1975 as well as Regulation
41 of the Regulations which are as follows :
"Sub: Action to be taken in cases where Board's employees
F "(
are convicted on a criminal charge by a competent court of
law.
The following procedure should be adopted in a case of
conviction of a Board's employee by a Court of Law on a
criminal charge:
G
(i) ...
(ii) ...
(iii) If an appeal/revision against the conviction succeeds
and Board's employee is acquitted, the order of dismissal,
H
JAIPUR VIDYUT VITRAN NIGAM LTD. AND ORS. v. 1091
NATHU RAM [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
removal or compulsory retirement based on his conviction A
which no longer stands, becomes liable to be set aside. A
copy of the judgment of the appellate Court should be
immediately procured and got examined with a view to
decide whether despite the acquittal, the facts and
circumstances of the case are such as to call for the
B
departmental enquiry against the Board's employee on the
basis of the allegation on which he was previously convicted.
If it is decided that a departmental enquiry should be held,
formal orders should be made: (1) setting aside the order
or dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, and
c
(2) ordering such a departmental enquiry. fo
Such an order should also state that under Regulation No.
9 of the RSEB (CC & A) Regulations 1962, the Board's
employee is deemed to be under suspension with effect
from the date of the dismissa1/remova1/compulsory D
retirement (A Standard Form-II is enclosed).
In case where neither of the aforesaid course is allowed, a
formal order should be made setting aside the previous .
orders of dismissal, removal and compulsory retirement and
reinstating him in service (A Standard Form No. Ill for such E
an order is enclosed).
The__ period between the date of dismissal etc. and the date
on ~ich he resumes duty should be dealt with under
Regu ~tion No. 41 of the Rajasthan State Electricity Board
Emplo~~es Service Regulations and in doing so he should F
be deemed to be entitled to full pay and allowances for the
period from the date of his acquittal to the date of his
reinstatement, such period being counted for duty for all
purposes and for the period from the date of dismissal to
the date of acquittal, he should not be allowed pay and
allowances less than what would have been admissible to G
him had be remained under suspension.
While issuing orders for dismissal, it should be borne in mind
that the order is issued by the authority competent to inflict
major penalty against that person."
H
1092 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A Regulation p41 :-
,
"Re-instatement after suspension, removal or dismissal: .... t
When an employee who has been dismissed, removed or
suspended is reinstated, the authority competent to order
the reinstatement shall consider and make a specified order )
B
1. (a) Regarding the pay and allowance to be paid to the
employee for the period of his absence from duty, and
(b) Whether or not the said period shall be treated as a ...
period spent on duty.
c
(c) Whether or not the suspension, removal or dismissal was j..-
)
wholly unjustifiable.
2. Where such competent authority holds that the employee
has been fully exonerated or in the case of su~pension that ..
D it was wholly unjustified, the employee shall be given the full
pay and dearness allowance to which he would have been )-
entitled had he not been dismissed, removed or suspended,
as the case may be."
'
10. On a close examination of the Circular dated 3rd of
E September, 1975 and Regulation 41 (2) of the Regulations, as
noted hereinabove, it would be clear that the Circular of the
Corporation specifically provides that the period between the
date of dismissal and the date on which the respondent resumed
his duty should be dealt with under Regulation 41 (2) of the said
Regulations. At the same time, Regulation 41 also clearly says
F that when an employee who has been dismissed and thereafter
reinstated, the authority competent to make the order of.
reinstatement shall consider the pay and allowances to be paid
to the employee for the period of his a.bsence from duty. This
Circular along with Regulation 41, therefore, makes it clear that
G the authority is bound to take into consideration regarding pay
and allowances to be paid to the employee for the period of his
absence from duty. The Circular also clearly says that in doing
so, the employee should be deemed to be entitled to full pay and
allowances for the period from the date of his acquittal to the date "
H
of his reinstatement. From the above discussions, it is clear that
,.
JAIPUR VIDYUT VITRAN NIGAM LTD. AND ORS. v. 1093
NATHU RAM [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
the case of the respondent was full covered by the Circular of A
the erstwhile Board dated 3rd of September, 1975. The period
in question, as noted herein earlier, for payment of allowance is
from the date of dismissal i.e. 28.12.1982 to the date of acquittal
i.e. 15.12.1997. As noted herein earlier, last paragraph of the
Circular dated 3rd of September, 1975 which is important for
8
our purpose may be reproduced as follows :
"The period between the date of dismissal etc. and the date
on which he resumes duty should be dealt with under
Regulation No.41 of Rajasthan State Electricity Board
Employee Service Regulation and in doing so he should be C
deemed to be entitled to full pay and allowances for the
period from the date of his acquittal to the date of his
reinstatement, such period being counted for duty for all
purpose and for the period from the date of dismissal to the
date of acquittal he should not be allowed pay and
allowances less than what have been admissible to him had D
he remained under suspension."
It is not in dispute that the appellant-Corporation have
themselves given full pay to the respondent from the date of
suspension i.e. 30th of November, 1979 to the date of dismissal
i.e. 28th of December, 1982 and from the date of acquittal i.e. E
15th of December, 1997 to the date of reinstatement i.e. 3rd of
June, 1998. Such being the state of affairs, it is not acceptable
that there was any reason for the Corporation not to give the
suspension allowances for the period of termination i.e. 28th of
December, 1982 to the date of acquittal i.e. 15th of December,
F
1997 in terms of the circular dated 3rd of September, 1975. This
circular also says that the period from the date of dismissal to
the date of acquittal, the employee should not be allowed pay
and allowances less than what would have been admissible to ·
him had he remained under suspension. Therefore, from a
reading of the Circular, it would be evident that the respondent G
may be paid the pay and allowances admissib!e to him had he
) remained under suspension. This was the view expressed by the
learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High
Court. Further, as noted herein earlier, the learned counsel for
the Corporation had drawn our attention to two decisions of this H
1094 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A Court. So far as the decision in Ranchhodji's case (supra) is
concerned, we are of the view that the principle laid down in the ~
said decision is not applicable to the facts and circumstances
of the present case. The facts of the present case are quite
different from that of the said decision. Apart from that, in that
decision, a disciplinary proceeding was initiated and
B
subsequently, it was decided that back wages should be paid if
the employer had taken action by way of disciplinary proceeding
and the action was found to be unsustainable in law. So far as
the present case is concerned, no disciplinary proceeding was ....
initiated. Only the termination order was passed by the
c Corporation as a result of his conviction in a criminal case.
Accordingly, this decision in Ranchhodji's case (supra) is of no
help to the Corporation.
11. So far as the other decision on which strong reliance
was also placed by the learned counsel for the Corporation,
D namely, Union of India & Ors. Vs. Jaipal Singh [2004 (1) SCC
121] is concerned, similarly this decision of this Court, in our view, \,.
is also equally not applicable in the facts and circumstances of
the present case. It is true that in that decision this Court has held
that an employee is not entitled to pay back wages for the period
E of absence i.e. from the date of dismissal to reinstatement, which
would otherwise be counted towards his service, but in view of
the circular dated 3rd of September, 1975 particularly the last
paragraph of the said circular as noted herein earlier, it cannot
now be said that the respondent is not entitled to pay back wages
as directed by the Division Bench of the High Court in the writ
F petition.
"
12. lri view of our discussions made hereinabove :::.nd
considering the Circular dated 3rd of September, 1975. we do.
not find any merit in this appeal. No other point was ui·~ed by the
learned counsel for the Corporation before L:s. Accordingly, this
G appeal fails and aismissed. There will be no mder as to costs.
B.B.B. Appeal dismissed.
.. ~
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