Holding

The appellant was an unauthorised occupant and the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, being a later special law, overrides both the Delhi Rent Control Act and the Slum Areas Act, giving the Estate Officer jurisdiction.

Summary

The Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) bought a building at auction and the appellant, Jain Ink Manufacturing Co., was a tenant under the previous owner. LIC served notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act to terminate the tenancy, but the appellant remained in possession. LIC then invoked the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 and the Estate Officer issued a show‑cause notice. The appellant challenged the Estate Officer’s jurisdiction, arguing that he was not an "unauthorised occupant" because he had taken possession before the premises became public, and contending that the Delhi Rent Control Act and the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act should override the Premises Act. The Supreme Court held that the appellant was indeed in unauthorised occupation under s.2(2)(g) of the Premises Act, that the Premises Act, being a later special statute, prevails over the Rent Act and the Slums Act, and that the Estate Officer had jurisdiction. The appeal was dismissed and the matter was disposed without remand.

Issues considered

Whether the appellant qualifies as an 'unauthorised occupant' under s.2(2)(g) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 despite having taken possession before the premises became public.
Whether the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 overrides the provisions of the Premises Act, considering the alleged retrospective effect.
Whether the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 overrides the Premises Act.
Whether the Estate Officer has jurisdiction to entertain the eviction proceeding under the Premises Act.

Legislation cited

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958s. 14, s. 25B, s. 3(a)
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971s. 2(2)(g), s. 4(1)
Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956s. 19
Transfer of Property Acts. 106

Subjects

unauthorised occupationpublic premisesevictionRent Control Actspecial legislationjurisdictionretrospective effectlease determinationTransfer of Property Act

Judgment

498

A JAIN INK MANUFACTURING COMPANY
v.
LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA & ANR.
August 22, 1980
D
[Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI
AND A. D. KoSHAL, JJ.)·

Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971; S. 2(2)(g)-
Unauthorised occupation of public premises--Tenant in possession before the-
pre'mises became public premises--Eviction whether can be ordered under the
c Act.

Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, Delhi
Rent Control Act, 1958 (59 of 1958) & Slum Areas (Improvement and Clear-
ance) Act 1956-0ver-riding effect of Acts--No conflict as scope and objects of
Acts are di!Je.rent-Premises Act whe'ther prevails over Rent Act.
D
The L.l.C. (respondent No. 1) purchased a building at a court auction.
The appellant was inducted as a tenant by the prior owner of the premises.
The L.I.C. gave notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act
directing the appellant to vacate the premises. As the appellant did not vacate
the premises the L.l.C. filed a complaint with the Estate Officer, L.T.C. (respon-
dent No. 2) under the provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unautho-
E rised Occupants) Act, 1971, who issued a notice to the appellant under section
4(1) of the Act to show cause why the appellant be not evicted. Before the
Estate Officer the appellant raised preliminary objections which related to the
question of jurisdiction of the Estate Officer to proceed under the Premises
Act. The Estate Officer decided the question against him and the High Court
confirmed the order.

F In appeal to this Court on behalf of the appellant it was contended: (1)
The appellant could not be described as an 'unauthorised occupant' within the
meaning of section 2(2)(g) of the 1971 Act because he had entered into posses-
sion of the premises long before they were purchased by the L.I.C. ; (2)1i). The
Premises Act of 1971 whi~h had been given retrospective effect f~om the 16th
September, 1958 should be construed as a law having been passed in 1958
and so construed the Rent Act <The Delhi Rent Control Act) passed in 1959
G over-rides the Premises Act ; (ii) The Rent Act whi.ch is a special law would
override the Premises Ac~ and (iii) The intention of the Legislature in passing the·
Rent Act as seen from section 3(a) was merely to exclude from its operation.
only premises belonging to the Government and if the intention was to exclude
other premises belonging to corporate bodies or Corporations then section 3(a)
would have been differently worded.

H Apart from the Rent Act section, Section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improve-
ment and Clearance) Act, 1956 which is also a Special Act applying only to
such places which are declared to be slums under the Act, would overrid~
the provisions of· both the Rent Act and the Premises Act.
~AIN INK MFG. CO. V. LIFE INSURANCE CORPN. 499

Dismissing the Appeal: A
HELD: (l)(a) The appellant was undoubtedly in unauthorised occupation
of the premises. [503 DJ
(b) Section 2(2)(g) does not use the word 'possession' or the words 'entry
into possession' at any point of time at all. The section merely requires occu·
pation of any public premises. Entry into possession connotes one single ter- B
minus, viz., the point of time when a. person enters into possession or occupies
the property whereas occupation is a continuous process which starts right from
the point of time when the person enters into possession or occupies the pre-
mises. and continues until he leaves the premises. [502 G,H]

In the instant case the lease was determined by the landlord by a notice
under section l 06 of the Transfer of Property Act. Therefore, there can be
no doubt that the appellant was in unauthorised occupation of the premises
once the lease was determined. [503 C}
Raj Kumar Devendm Singh & A nr. v. State o{ Punjab and Ors. [1973] 2
SCR 166 distinguished.

2(i) The Premises Act was passed in 1971 and came info force on 23rd
August, 1971 that is Jong after the Rent Act was passed in 1959. The mere D
fact that by virtue of a fiction the Premises Act was given refrospective effect
from 1958 will not alter the date when the Premises Act was actually passed,
that is August 23, 1971. The Premises Act being subsequent to the Rent Act
would naturally prevail over and override the provisions of the Rent Act.
~m .
(ii) The scope and the object of the Premises Act' is quite different from. E
that of the Rent Act. The Rent Act is of much wider ·application, inasmt,ch
as it applies to all private premises, which do not fall within the limited excep-
tions indicated in section 2 of the Premises Act. The object of the Rent Act
is to· afford special protection to all the tenants or private landlords who are
neither a Corporation nor Government or Corporate Bodies. · Even under the
Rent Act, a special category has been carved out by section 25B which pro-
vides for special procedure for eviction to landlords who require premises for F
their personal necessity. Section 25B, therefore, becomes a special law within
the Rent Act. Therefore, the ·Premises Act as compared to the Rent Act, is
a Special Act and overrides the provisions of the Rent Act, [505 B·C]

Sarwan Singh & Anr. v. Kasturi Lal [1977] 2 SCR 421 & Shri Ram Narain
v. The Simla Banking &.Jndu~trial Co. Ltd. [1956] SCR 603 referred to.
G
(iii) Once the Premises Act becomes a Special Act dealing with the pre-
mises belonging to the Central Government, Corporations and other statutory
bodies, the Rent Act stands superseded. [505 FJ

3. Section 19 of the Slums Act shows that it is in direct conflict with the
Premises Act which expressly provides for the foru~ for evicting persons in
unauthorised occupation of premises which fe!J in section 2 of the Premises H
Act. The Premises Act, being subsequent to the Slums Act, as amended in
1964, and again being a special Act having a very limited sphere, must neces·
sarily override the Slums Act, [506 DJ
500 . SUPREME COURT REPORTS [198ll 1 S.C.R.

A C!VJL APPELLATE JURISDICTION; Civil Aweal No. 224 of 1979.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
6·12-1978 of the Delhi High Court in C. W. No. 1361/78.
P. Parameswara Rao and R. Nagarathnam for the Appellant.

B K. Parasaran, Sol. Genl., V. Gauri Shanker, K. L. Hathi anc! Mrs.
Hemantika Wahi for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

FAzAL Au, J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against
c a Division Bench judgment dated December 6, 1978 of the High Court
of Delhi and arises under the following circumstances.

The appellant was inducte<J, as a tenant by one Mithanlal ~ho
was the owner of the premises in question and the rent payable at the
time of the tenancy was Rs. 55 per month. The premises were, how-
D ever, purchased by the hife Insurance Corporation of India (for short,
LIC) at a court auction on July 19, 1958 and the appellant in view
of the same attornr-0 to the new landlord, namely, the LIC. The Delhi
Rent Control Act of 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Rent Act')
came into force on February 9, 1959 and on July 24, 1969 the new
landlord gave a notice under s. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act to
the appellant determining the tenancy. This notice, however, was
subsequently withdrawn and after some correspondence with the appel-
lant the rent was increased by the LIC from Rs. 55 to Rs. 125 per
month. Sometime towards the end of July 1966, the LIC gave a fresh
notice under s. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act purporting to deter-
mine the tenancy. Thereafter, there were some parleys between the
F LIC and the appellant and ultimately the LIC agreed to accept the
enhanced rent of Rs. 300 per month from the appellant with effect tram
December 1, 1976. On April 23; 1977 the LIC gave another notice
under s. 10'6 superseding the previous notice and directing the appel-
lant to vacate the premises on or before May 31, 1977. As the
appellant did not vacate the premises, the LIC filed a complaint with
G respondent No. 2, the Estate Officer, LIC under the provisions of the
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (here-
inafter referred to as the 'Premises Act'). Thereafter, the second res-
pondent issued a notice to the appellant under s. 4(1} of the Premises
Act to show cause why the appellant be not evicted. The appellant
appeared before the Estate Officer and raised· certain preliminary
H objections which having been decided against him, the appellant filed
a writ petition in the Delhi High Court against the order of the Estate
Officer and reiterated the preliminary objections taken by him before
. 'JAIN INK MFG. co; v. LIFE INSURANCE CORPN. (Fazal Ali, J.) 501

the Estate Officer. After considering the preliminary objections which A
mainly related to the question of jurisdiction of the Estate Officer to
f)l"Oceed under the Premises Act, the High Court overruled all the
-Objections and dismissed the writ petition in limine, though by a
-reasoned order. Hence, this appeal to the Supreme Court.
Before dealing with the contention raised by counsel for the res- B
pondent we might mention that the proceedings before the Estate
Officer under the ·Premises Act have only been stayed and not yet
·decided on merits because the appellant wanted the Estate Officer to
-clecide the queiition of jurisdiction as a preliminary issue.

In support of the appeal, Mr. Parmeshwar Rao submitted three
main contentions before .us. In the first place, he submitted that the
c
.>- -provisions of the Premises Act would have no application to the
present premises because the appellant could not be described as an
.unauthorised occupant as he had entered into possession of the pre•
.mises long before they were purchased by the LIC. It was argued
·.that the condition precedent for the assumption of jurisdiction by the D
.Estate Officer was that the appellant.must be an unauthorised occupant,
and if the possession of the appellant was lawful, though the property
·-changed hands subsequently, the appellant could not be dubbed as an
.unauthorised occupant. In this connection, reliance was placed on a
-<lecision of this Court in Rajkumar Devindera Singh & Anr. v. StaJe
·.Of Punjab & Ors.(1) We have gone through the decision cited before E
·US and we find that the provisions of the Punjab Act, which was the
~ ' subject matter of interpretation by this Court in that case, were sub·
stantially and materially different from s. 2(2)(g) of the Premises Act
which defines unauthorised occupation. Mr. Rao·, however, strongly
·relied on the following observations made by this Court in the case
.supra:- F
"If the appellants were in possession before the date of the
sale of the property to the Government, it could not be said that
the appellants entered into possession of public premises, for, at
the time when they were in occupation of the property, the pro·
perty was not public premises. Then it was either the joint
family property or the property of the Maharaja, namely, Yada· G.
vindra Singh. The property was not public premises before it
was sold to the Government."
If these observations of this Court are torn from the context they may
·presumably support the argument of the appellant but we have to
:read these observations in the light of the specific provisions of the H
~Punjab, Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act,
(1) [1973] 2 SCR 166.
502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19811 1 S.C.R.

·A 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Punjab Act'). Relevant portion of
~· 3 of that Act may be extracted thus:
"For purposes of this Act, a person shall be deemed to be in
unauthorised occupation of any public premises.:- _...
(a) where he has whether before or after the commencement
of this Act, entered into possession thereof otherwise than
under and fu pursuance of any allotment, lease or grant."
[Emphasis Ours]
It would be seen that before a person could be said to be in an
unauthorised occupation, the Act required the following conditions : -
(I) that the occupant had entered into possession before or after
the commencement of the Act,
\.._../
(2) that he had entered into such possession otherwise than under
and in pursuance of any allotment, lease or grant.
....
That Act, therefore, lays special stress on only one point, namely, the·
entry into possession. Thus, if the entry into possession had taken
D place prior to the passing of the Act, then obviously the occupant con-
cerned would not be an unauthorised1 occupant. What made the occu- ·
pancy unauthorised was his entry into possession at a particular point
of time. It was in construing these provisions that this Court held
that if the appellants in that case were in possession before the sale·
of the property to the Government, their entry into possession could
not be said to be unauthorised. These observations, however, would
have absolutely no application to the instant case where s. 2(2)(g)
defines unauthorised occupation thus: -
" 'unauthorised occupation', in relation to any public pre- ·
mises, means the occupation by any person of the public premises ~
without authority for such occupation, and includes the continu- ·
F ance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the•
authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) ·
under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired
or has been determined for any reason whatsoever."
To begin with, it is manifest that s. 2(2)(g) does not use the word
G 'possession' or the words 'entry into possession' aJt any point of time·
at all. The section merely requires occupation of any public premises.
Entry into possession connotes one single terminus, viz., the point of · )-
time when a person enters into possession or occupies the property
whereas occupation is a continuous process which starts right from the·
point of time when the person enters into possessiQIJl or occupies the
H premises and continues until he leaves the premises. What is german.e
for the purpose of interpretation of s. 2(2)(g) is whether or not the
person concerned was in occupation of the public premises when the•
JAIN INK MFG. co. v. LIFE INSURANCE CORPN. (Fazal Ali, I.) 503

Premises Act was passed. In the instant case, it is not disputed that A
the appellant continued to occupy the property even after the Pre·
mises Act came into force and in fact accepted the UC as his land-
lord. In these circumstances, therefore, the case of the appellant
squarely falls within the ambit of the definition of 'unauthorised occu-
pation' as contemplated by s. 2(2)(g). There is yet another aspect of
the matter which distinguishes the present case from the language em- B
ployed in the Punjab Act. Section 2(2)Qg) is an inclusive definition
and consists of two separate limbs-(1) where a person is in occupation
in relation to any public premises without authority for such occupa-
tion, and (2) even if the possession or occupation of the tenant con-
tinues after the lease is determined. In the insl<\nt case, the lease was
doubtless determined by the landlord by a notice under s. 106 of the c
.Transfer of Property Act whose. validity for purpeses of deciding the
question of law has not been questioned by the learned counsel for the
appellant. Therefore, there can be no doubt that the appellant was in
unauthorised occupation of the premises once the lease was determined.
The seqmd limb mentioned in s. 2(2)(g) is conspicuously absent from
D
the provisions of the punjab Act. For these reasons, we overrule the
first contention raised by the counsel for the appellant and we hold,
agreeing with the High Court, that the appellant was undoubtedly in
unauthorised occupation of the premises.

The second contention put forward by Mr. Rao was that in view E
of the provisions of the Rent Act which override the provisions of
the Premises Act, s. 14 of the Rent Act completely bars recovery of

, __
possession of any premises except in accordance with the procedure
laid down in the Rent Act. It was contended by Mr. Rao that although
the Premises Act was passed in 1971, it has been given retrospective
effect from 16th September 1958 and, therefore, should be construed
as a law having been passed in 1958 and as the Rent Act was passed
in 1951} it overrides the Premises Act. We are, however, unable to.
agree with this argument. In , the first place, the Premises Act was
passed in 1971 and came into force on the 23rd of August 1971, that
is to say, long after the Rent Act was passed in 1959. The mere fact
that by virtue of a fiction the Premises Act was given retrospective G
effect from 1958 will not alter the date when the Premises Act was
, actually passed, that is to say August 23, 1971. In these circum-
stances, therefore, the Premises Act being subsequent to the Rent Act
would naturally prevail over and override the provisions of the Rent
Act. It was further contended by Mr. Rao that the Rent Act being
a special law as compared to the Premises Act, it wi~k override the H
Premises Act without going into the question as to which of the two
Acts were prior in point of time. In support of bis contention the
1
I

504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS - (1981) 1 S.C.R.

A counsel relied on a decision of this Court in Sarwan Singh & Anr. v.
Kwturi Lal(!) where 1this Court observed as follows.:
"When two or more laws operate in the same field and each
contains a non-obstante clause stating that its pr9visions will over-
ride those of any other law, stimulating and incisive problems of
interpretation arise. Since statutory interpretation has no conven-
tional protocol, cases of such conflict have to be decided in refer-
ence~ the object and purpose of the laws under consideration."
(emphasis supplied)
It is true that in· both the Acts there is a non-obstante clause but
the question to be determined is whether the non-obstante clauses
operate in the sa_me field or have two different spheres though there
may be some amount of overlapping. The observations cited above
clearly lay down that in such cases the conflict should be resolved by
reference to the object and purpose of the laws in consideration. In
Shri Ram Narain v. The Simla Banking & Industrial Co. Ltd.,(2) this
Court made the following observations: -
"It is, therefore, desirable to determ.ine the overriding effect
of one or the other of the relevant provisions in these two Acts,
in a given case, on much broader considerations of the purpose
and policy underlying the two Acts· and the clear intendment con-
veyed by the language of the relevant provisions therein."
In the light of the principles laid down in the aforesaid cases we
would test the position in the present case. So far as the Premises
Act is concerned it operates in a vecy limited field in that it applies •
only to a limited nature of premises belonging only to particular sets
of individuals, a. particular set of juristic persons like companies, cor- -~
pbrations or the: G;entral Government. Thus, the Premises Act has a
very limited application. Secondly, the object of the Premises Act
is to provide for eviction of unauthorised occupants from public pre-
mises by a summary procedure so that the premises may be available
to the authorities mentioned in the Premises Act which constitute a
class by themselves. That the authorities to which the Premises Act
·G applies are a class by themselves is, not disputed by the counsel for
the appellant as even in the case of Northern India Caterers Pvt. Ltd. &
Anr. v. State of Punjab & Anr(l). such authorities were held to form )'
a class and, therefore, immune from challenge on Art. 14 of the Conr-
stitution. Similarly, the summary procedure prescribed by the Pre-
mises Act is also not violative of Art. 14 as held by this Court in
iH
(i) [1977} 2 SCR 421.
(2) [19561 SCR 603.
(3) [1967] 3 SCR 399.
JAIN INK MFG. CO. V. LIFE INSURANCE CORPN. (Fazal Ali, J.) 505

Magan/al Chhagganla/, (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater A
Bombay & Ors.(1).
Thus, it would appear that both the scope and the object of the
Premises Act is quite different from that of the Rent Act. The Rent
Act is of much wider application than the Premises Act inasmuch as
it applies to all private premises which do not fall within the limited
~ exceptions indicated in s. 2 of the Premises Act. The object of the
Rent Act is to afford special protection to all the tenants or private
landlords or landlords who are neither a Corporation nor Government
or Corporate B-Odies. It would be seen tbat even under the Rent Act,
by virtue of an amendment a special category has been carved out
under s. 25B which provides for special procedure for eviction to
)- landlords who require premises for their persona! necessity. Thus, s.
25B itself becomes a special law within the Rent Act. On a parity
of reasoning, therefore, there can be no doubt that the Premises Act
as compared to the Rent Act, which has a very broad spectrum, is a
Special Act and overrides the provisions of the Rent Act.
It was also suggested by Mr. Rao that in view of s. 3(a) of the
Rent Act, which is extracted below, it would appear that the intention
of the legislature in passing the Rent Act was merely to exclude from
its operation only premises belonging to the Government and if the
intention was to exclude other premises belonging to corporate Bodies
or Corpor;ations, then s. 3(a) should have been differently worded: E
"3. Nothing in this Act shall apply:-
(a) to any premises belonging to the Government."
This, in our opinion, does not advance the case of the appellant any
~- further because once the Premises Act becomes a special Act dealing
with premises belonging to Central Government, Corporations and F
· other statutory Bodies, the Rent Act stands superseded. We have to
consider the provisions Of the two Acts, they haying been passed by
' the same legislature, viz., Parliament, and the rule of harmonious con-
struction would have to apply in such cases.

For these reasons, we overrule the second preliminary objection G /
~ taken by the appellant.
Lastly, it was argued that apart from the Rent Act, s. 19 of the
Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 (hereinafter re-
ferred t6 as the 'Slums Act'), which also would have to be construod
as a Special Act applying only to such places which are declared to H
be slums under the Act. would override the provisions of both the
(1) (1975] 1 SCR 1.
506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS U981J 1 S.C.R.

A Rent Act and the Premises Act. This argument appears to us to be
without substance. The Slums Act was passed as far back as 1956
and the :Premises Act was subsequent to the Slums Act and would,
therefore, prevail over the Slums Act. Relevant portion of s. 19 of
the Slums Act may be extracted thus:

B "19. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other
law for the time being in force, no person shall, except with the
previous permission in writing of the competent authority,-
(a) institute, after the commencement of the Slum Areas
(Improvement and Clearance} Amendment Act, 1964 any suit or
proceeding foc obraining any decree or order for the eviction of
c a tenant from any building or land in a slum area ;"
A perusal of s. 19 of the Slums Act clearly shows that it is in
direct conflict with the Premises Act which expressly provides for the
forum for evicting persons in unauthorised occupation of premises
which fell in s. 2 of the Premises Act. The Premises Act being sub-
D sequent to the Slums Act, as amended in 1964, and again being a
special Act having a very limited sphere, must necessarily override the
Slums Act on the same lines of reasoning as we have indicated in the
case of the Rent Act. For these reasons, therefore, the last contention
put forward by . the counsel for the appellant is also overruled. The
High Court had also overruled all these preliminary objections more
E or less on the same reasons as given by us though not in such details.

It is, however, not necessary for us to remand the matter to the
trial court for decision of the case on merits because the Solicitor-
G,eneral having agreed to give two years' time to the appellant to
vacate the premises on filing the usual undevtaking, the appellant does
F not want to contest the proceedings before the Estate Officer, LIC and
has undertaken to give vacant and peaceful possession to the respon-
dent on August 1, 1982. Meanwhile, the appellant shall keep on pay·
ing the usual rent. The appellant shall also file an undertaking accom-
panied by an affidavit to the effect that it shall hand over vacant and
peaceful possession to the respondent on or before August 1, 1982
and-shall not induct any tenant on the premises. The undertaking
shall be filed within three weeks ftom today. The subject matter of
the ap17eal is accordingly disposed of finally.
Appeal dismissed.
N.V.K.
H