JAIN EXPORTS (P) LTD. & ANR.versusUNION OF INDIA & ORS.
- Citation
- 1988 INSC 143
- Decided
- 5 May 1988
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- R S PATHAK
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the Import Policy 1980‑81 applies and that "coconut oil" in Appendix 9 para 5 includes all varieties, rendering the import of industrial coconut oil a prohibited, canalised item; the Collector’s order stands and there is no breach of natural justice.
Summary
Jain Exports (P) Ltd. and its managing director imported two consignments of refined industrial coconut oil in September 1982. The Customs Collector issued show‑cause notices alleging that industrial coconut oil was a canalised item under Appendix 9 para 5 of the Import Policy 1980‑81 and ordered confiscation under section 111(d) of the Customs Act with a redemption fine under section 112. The appellants challenged the order in writ petitions; the Delhi High Court was divided, with a majority dismissing the petitions and one judge allowing them. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the licences issued in 1980‑81 made the Import Policy 1980‑81 applicable, and that the term “coconut oil” in Appendix 9 para 5 covered all varieties, including industrial oil, making the import prohibited. The Court found no breach of natural‑justice principles and held that the Collector’s order was valid. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.
Issues considered
- The applicable import policy year – whether the 1980‑81 policy or a later policy governs the licences.
- Whether "coconut oil" in Appendix 9 para 5 of the Import Policy 1980‑81 is limited to edible oil or includes industrial (non‑edible) oil.
- Whether a lower authority (Customs Collector) can take a view contrary to the decisions of the Board and Central Government in its quasi‑judicial function.
- Whether the Collector’s order violated the rules of natural justice (bias, hearing).
- Whether the quantum of the redemption fine should be determined by the Customs Appellate Tribunal.
Legislation cited
- Customs Act, 1962s. 111(d), s. 112
- Imports (Control) Order, 1955s. Rule 3
Subjects
Judgment
JAIN EXPORTS (P) LTD. & ANR.
A
v.
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
MAY 5, 1988.
B [R.S. PATHAK, CJ AND RANGANATH MISRA, J.)
~
Customs Act 1962: Sections 111 and 112 & Import and Export
Policy 1980-81 Appendix 9 Para 5 Entry I-Coconut oi/--'Edible' and
'non edible' i.e. commercial or industrial-Classification of-Canalised
goods-Determination of-Whether Customs Collector entitled to take
view contrary to that of Board and Central Government.
c
Administrative Law: Quasi judicial tribunals-Lower authorities
bound by decisions of higher authorities.
·Natura/justice-Extent of opportunity of hearing to be given-
D Not referable to the quantum of the stake but relatable to the demands of
the situation.
· The appellants ar.e a Company and its Managing Director. The
Company imported two consignments of refined industrial Coconut oil.
~
The ships carrying the aforesaid cargo arrived at the port of destination
E on JOth September, 1982 and 22nd September, 1982. The appellant
No. 1 filed the bills of entry for release of the said cargo in the office of
the Assistant Collector of Customs. Instead of release of the cargo,
notices to show cause were received by the appellant on the allegation
that the import of industrial coconut oil was not legal as it was a
F
canalised item. The appellant No. 1 was also called upon to show cause
as to why the cargo should not be confiscated under section 11 I (d) of the y
Customs Act and also as to why he should be not penalised under
Section 112 thereof.
The appellant showed cause and took the stand that import of
industrial coconut oil was not. banned under the import policy of the
G Government for the relevant period. When personal hearing was alTor-
ded, it was also pointed out that the notices issued hy Respondent No. 3
were the outcome of bias, and that the Joint Chief Controller of Imports >
and Exports had taken undue interest in the matter.
By the adjudication orders dated 17th December, 1982 and 20th
H December, 1982, the respondent No. 3 came to the conclusion that
952
JAIN EXPORTS v. U.0.1. 953
"coconut oil", whether edible or not, were canalised items and fell
A
within the ambit of Appendix 9 Para 5(1) of the Import Policy of 1980·
81, and that It was also.not an Item under the O.G.L. of 1980·81 Policy.
It was held that the Items that were Imported were liable to be con·
flscated under 11ection lll(d) of the CU1toms Act, but an option was
given to redeem the goods on payment or Rs.3 crores and Rs.2 crores
respectively as redemption fines. B
The appellants filed two Writ Petitions challenging the action of
the Collector. The Writ Petitions were heard by a Full Bench of the
' High Court. Two Judges held that the writ petitions were liable to be
J
dismissed, while the third Judge took the view that the action of the
Collector was totally untenable and that the writ petitions should be
allowed and the order of the Collector should be set aside. The majority C
of the Judges were also of the view that the quantum of redemption fine
should be considered by the Customs Appellate Tribunal.
In the appeals ·to this Court it was con.tended on behalf of the
appellants: (I)' The import policy of which year would be applicable- . D
the period during which the licences were issued or the time when
import actually took place. (2) Whether "coconut oil" appearing in
para 5 of Appendix 9 of the Import Policy of 1980-81 was confined to the
\. edible variety or covered the industrial variety. (3) Whether in the face
r of the decision of the Board and Central Government as the statutory
appellate and revisional authorities, it was open to the Collector func- E
tioning in lower tier to take a contrary view of the matter in exercise of
quasi judicial jurisdiction, and (4) Whether the orders of the Collector
• were vitiated for breach of rules of natural justice, and collateral con-
siderations in the making of the order.
Dismissing the Appeals, F
HELD: I. The High Court has come to the correct conclusion
that the terms of the Import Policy of 1980-81 would apply to the facts
of these cases. [957F]
In the instant case, the licences were either of 1980 or 1981 and G
-..4. were revalidated froin time to time subject to the condition that items
which do not appear in Appendices 26, 5 and 7 of the Import Policy of
1982•83 will not be imported. [957D]
2(a) Whatever may have been the reason for specifying 'edible
and non-edible' classification in 1981-82, if 'coconnt oil' takes within its H
954 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 3 S.C.R.
fold all varieties, it must follow that in 1980-81, all varieties of coconut
A
oil were included in paragraph 5 of Appendix 9. [958H; 959A]
(b) If 'coconut oil' of the industrial variety was covered by
paragraph 5 of Appendix 9 then it would not have been included
in Appendix l 0 and, therefore, could not have been imported under
B OGL. [958C]
(c) In Appendix 9, no classification of coqmut oil is given and,
therefore, all varieties of coconut oil should be taken as covered by the
term. [9580]
(d) When a customer goes to the market and asks for coconut oil
c to buy, he is not necessarily supplied the edible variety. Coconut oil is
put to less of edible use than non-edible. [958E]
(e) The S.T.C. was not competent to bind the customs authorities
in respect of their statutory functioning, and if on actual interpretation
D it turns out that 'coconut oil' covered what the appellants have impor-
ted, the fact situation cannot take a different turn on account of the
letter of the S.T.C. At the most, it may have some relevancy when the
quantum of redemption fine is considered by the Tribunal. [959C-D]
3. In a tier system, undoubtedly decisions of higher authorities ~
E are binding on lower authorities and quasi-judicial Tribunals are also
bound by this discipline. However, what the Court is now concerned
with is not disciplining the Collector in his quasi-judich{l conduct, but
to ascertain what the correct position in the matter is. [959H; 960A-B[
4. The observance of Rules of Natural Justice is not referable to ·
the fatness of the stake but is essentially related to the demands of a ..J'
F given situation. The position here is covered by statutory provisions and·;
it is well settled that Rules of Natural Justice do not supplant but
supplement the law. [9600-E]
Broome v. Cassell & Co., [1972] I AER 801 referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 2705
G & 5383 of !985.
From the Judgment and Order dated 20.12.1984 of the Delhi >
High Court in Writ Petitio.n No 4037 and 4038 of 1982.
L.M. Singhvi, Kailash Vasdev, G.L. Rawal, Mi. Neerja, San-
H deep Narain, R. Narsimha. Abhishek Manu Singhvi and C. Mukh.o-
padhya for the Appellants.
J>\IN EXPORTS v. U.0.1. [MISRA, J.J 95];
t T.S.K.M. Iyer, R.P. Srivastava and C.V.S. Rao for the Res-
A
pondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
RANGANATH MISRA, J. These appeals by certificate are
directed against the common judgment of a full Bench of the Delhi B
>- High Court dated December 20, 1984, in two writ petitions under
Article 226 of the Constitution. The appellants are respectively a Com-
pany and its Managing Director. The Company was the holder of
Letter of Authority in respect of three licences for import of coconut
oil in one case and of two licences in the other and was appointed
• Letter of Authority Holder in respect of the said licences. It imported
two consignments of 5342.369 Mts. and 3002.557 Mts. of refined c
·.industrial coconut oil from Sri Lanka and the delivery port was
Kandla. The respective ships carrying the aforesaid cargo arrived at
the port of destination on 22nd September, 1982, and 10th September,
1982, and appellant No. 1 filed the bills of entry for release of the said
cargo in the office of the Assistant Collector of Customs at Kandla. D
Instead of release of the cargo on the basis of steps taken by appellant
No. 1, notices to show cause were received by appellant No. 1 on the
allegation that import of industrial coconut oil was not legal as it was a
canalised item. The appellant No. 1 was called upon to show cause as
~ to why the cargo may not be confiscated under section lll(d) of the
Customs Act as also why the appellants may not be penalised under E
section 112 thereof. The appellants showed cause and took the stand
__, that import of industrial coconut oil was not banned under the Import
<
Policy of the Government for the relevant period and the premises
upon which the authorities had proceeded to direct issue of show cause
was factually untenable. When personal hearing was afforded, on
~\ behalf of the appellant No. 1 it was pointed out that the notices by F
respondent No. 3 were the outcome of bias ar..d the said statutory
authority had not applied his own mind 'to the matter in controversy. It
was also pointed out that Shri Takhat Ram, Joint Chief Controller of
Imports and Exports had taken undue interest in the matter to the
prejudice of the appellants and had brought to bear upop the statutory
authority pressure to act against the interests of the appellants. By the G
adjudication orders dated 17th December, 1982 and 20th December,
...... 1982, the respondent No. 3 came to the conclusion that "coconut oil,
whether edible or not, were canalised items and fell within the ambit
of Appendix 9 para 5(1) of the Import Policy of 1980-81. It was not an
item under the O.G.L. of 1980-81 Policy". Respondent No. 3 further
held that either of the consignments was covered by the import H
956 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11988) 3 S.C,R.
A licences produced by the appellants and was, therefore, liable to be
confiscated under section 111(d) of the Act but gave an option to
appellant No. 1 to redeem the goods on payment of Rs.3 crores and
Rs.2 crores respectively as redemption fines. On 27.12.1982 two writ
petitions were filed in the High Court of Delhi challenging the action
B of the Collector. The said writ petitions were finally placed before a
Bench of three-Judges of the High Court; two of them being Sachar
and Khanna, JJ., came to hold that the writ petitions were liable to be
dismissed while the other Judge being Wad, J. took the view that the
action of the Collector was totally untenable and that the writ petition
should be allowed and the order of the Collector should be set aside.
c
The majority of the learned Judges were of the further view that the
quantum of redemption fine should be considered by the Appellate
Tribunal. Sachar, J. with whom Khanna J. concurred, directed: l
"I would in the circumstances remit the matter to the
Appellate Tribunal but only on the question of considera-
tion of the question of quantum of redemption fine. The
D
Appellate Tribunal could hear and dispose of this matter as
if it was hearing an appeal filed by the petitioners but, only
on the question of quantum of redemption fine."
In the absence of any challenge, this part of the order of the High
Court has become final and has to operate irrespective of the fate of
E
the two appeals.
The following common contentions have been advanced by
learned counsel for the appellants:
( 1) The import policy of which year would be applicable to .""'
F
the facts of the present case-the period during which the Ii- /
cences were issued or the time when import actually took place.
(2) Whether "coconut oil" appearing in para 5 of
Appendix 9 of the Import Policy of 1980-81 was confined to the
edible variety or covered the individual variety.
G
(3)GWhether in the fhace of the decisiolln of thedBo~d and _.._.
Central overnment as t e statutory appe ate an rev1s10na1
authorities, it was open to the Collector functioning in lower ties
to take a contrary view of the matter in exercise of quasi judicial
jurisdiction; and
H
r JAIN EXPORTS v. U.0.1. [MISRA, J.[ 957
(4) Whether the order of the Collector was vitiated for
A
breach of rules of natural justice, and collateral considerations in
the making of the orders.
It is not in dispute that the relevarit import policy to be referred to is of
the year 1980-81 as all the licences were issued during that period. The
'y Collector found and the High Court has not recorded a different find- R
ing that when the licence was first revalidated on 18.1.1982, such
revalidation was subject to paragraph 215 of the lmport Policy of
1981-82. Again while revalidating some of the licences on 25.9.1982, it
was stipulated that during the extended period, items which do not
J appear in Appendix 5 and 7 of lmport Policy of 1982-83 could not be
allowed to be imported and items which appear in Appendix 26 of the
Import Policy of 1982-83 will also not be allowed to be imported. The
Collector turned down the plea thai the licences allowed the import of
c
items appearing in Appendix 5 and 7 of 1979-80 policy and 1982-83
policy in addition to the items appearing in the OGL and Industrial
coconut oil. In the instant case, the licences were of either of 1980 or
1981 and were revalidated from time to time. For convenience we may D
refer to a sample order of revalidation dated 28.6.1982. Revalidation
was subject to the following conditions:
"This licence is revalidated for a further period of six
~
months from the, date of revalidation with the condition
that during the extended period of validity the items which E
do not appear in Appendix 5 and 7 of the lmport Policy of
.,,- 1982-83 will not be imported. This licence will also not be
valid for the import of items appearing in Appendix 26 of
the lmport Policy of 1982-83 during the extended period of
~ validity."
' F
The High Court has come to the correct conclusion that the
terms of the import policy of 1980-81 would apply to the facts of these
cases.
The basic question is whether at the relevant time, import of
coconut oil had become canalised through the State Trading Corpora- G
A_ tion ('STC' for short). Rule 3 of the lmports (Control) Order, 1955
made under the lmports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 provides:
"3(1) Save as otherwise provided in this order, no person
shall import in case of the descriptions specified in
Schedule I except un.der and in accordance .with the licence fj
958 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 3 S.C.R. ~
or a custom's clearance permitting grant by the Central
A
Government or by any officer specified in Schedule II."
Para 5 of Appendix 9 ran thus:
"In the case of the various items mentioned therein, import
B will be made only by the State Trading Corporation of
India on the basis of foreign exchange released by the Gov-
ernment in its favour. The items mentioned therein are."
It is thus clear that if 'coconut oil' of the industrial variety was
covered by paragraph 5 of Appendix 9, then it would not have been
included in Appendix 10 and, therefore, could not have been imported
c underOGL.
In Appendix 9, no classification of coconut oil is given and;
therefore, all varieties of coconut oil should be taken as covered
by the term. There is no warrant for the assumptions that item 1
D of paragraph 5 of Appendix 9 covered only the edible variety when
'coconut oil' as such has been mentioned. It is not disputed that
'coconut oil' without anything more could cover both the edible as also
the non-edible (commercial or industrial) varieties. When a customer
goes to the market and asks for coconut oil to buy, he is not necessarily 1
supplied the edible variety. Coconut oil is put to less of edible use than
E non-edible. Reliance has been placed on the entry in the Import Policy
of 1981-82 where in paragraph 5 of Appendix 9 it has been said thus:
"In the case of the following items, whether edible of non-
edible, import will be made only by the S.T.C ........... .
F (1) Coconut oil ............................... "
"All other oils/seeds, whether edible or non-edible, not
specifically mentioned above or elsewhere in this policy,
will also be imported only by S.T.C. under these pro-
visions."
G
In our view no support can be had for the contention advanced )..
by appellants' learned counsel from the change in the language of
paragraph 5 in the Import Policy of the subsequent year. Whatever
may have been the reason for specifying 'edible and non-edible' clas-
sification in 1981-82, if 'coconut oil' takes within its fold all varieties of
H it, it must follow that in 1980-81, all varieties of coconut oil were
JAIN EXPORTS v. U.0.1. [MISRA, J.[ 959
~
included in paragraph 5 of Appendix 9. It is, in our opinion, unneces-
A
sary to refer to authorities and precedents to support such an obvious
conclusion.
Similarly no support is available from the communication by way
of reply received by the appellants from the S.T.C. to the effect that
)--· import of edible coconut oil alone was canalised through it. When the B
question before us is as to what exactly was the ambit of the entry No.
1 in paragraph 5 of appendix 9, the letter of the S.T.C. has no light to
• throw and the matter has to be ressolved with reference to broader
' aspects than the letter of the Corporation. Nor can that letter or the
representation contained therein be used to build up a plea of estop-
pel. The S.T.C. was not competent to bind the customs authorities in
' respect of their statutory functioning and if on actual interpretation it c
turns out that 'coconut oil' covered what the appellants have imported,
the fact situation cannot take a different tum on account of the letter
of the S.T.C. At the most, it may have some relevant when the
quantum of redemption fine is considered by the Tribunal in terms of
the direction of the High Court. D
Massive arguments were built up by learned counsel for the
appellants on the basis that the decision of the Central Board and the
Central Government rendered in similar matters were binding on the
~ collector and he could not have acted to the contrary. Several prece-
dents have been cited during the hearing. In a tier system, undoub- E
tedly decisions of higher authorities are binding on lower authorities
and quasi-judicial Tribunals are also bound by this discipline .
•
In Broome v. Cassell and Co., [1972) 1 AER 801, the Lord
Chancellor delivering the opinion of the House observed:
~I F
"I hope it will never be necessary to say so again that in the
herichical system of courts which exists in this country, it is
necessary for each lower tier, including the Court of Ap-
peal, to accept loyally the decisions of the higher tiers."
This Court in Kaushalya Devi Bogra v. Land Acquisition Officer, G
l 1984 J 2 sec 324 has clearly approved this position. There is aubund-
~ ance of authority that quasi-judicial tribunals too are bound by this
rule.
That, however' does not assist the appellants at all. It may be
that the Collector of Customs should have felt bound by the decision of H
960 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 3 S.C.R.
A the Board or-the Central Government but the matter has passed that """
stage. What we are now concerned with is not disciplining the Col-
lector in his quasi-judicial conduct but to ascertain what the correct
position in the matter is. Very appropriately, appellants' learned
counsel has not found fault with the High Court for not following the
quasi-judicial opinion of the Board or the Central Government nor has
B
he pleaded for acceptance of that by us as a precedent. Once on ·-(_
analysis we reach the conclusion that 'coconut oil' of every description
was covered in paragraph 5 of appendix 9, the quasi-judicial decision
ceases to be relevant. We propose to say no more on this aspect of the
submission.
c What survives for consideration is the argument relating to the
vice of breach of natrual justice and the vice of collateral pressure of
the Import Authorities in the making of the order. We must frankly
state that this aspect of the argument has not at all impressed us. It has
not been disputed that show cause notices were issued, cause was
shown and considered by the statutory authorities. It may be that more
-
D
of opportunities than extended were expected by the appellants in
view of the fact that large stakes. were in issue. The observance of the
Rules of Natural Justice is not referable to the fatness of the stake but
is essentially related to the demands of a given situation. The position
here is covered by statutory provisions and it is well settled that Rules
of Natural Justice do not supplant but supplement the law. ~
E
We have not been able to find any breach in the compliance of
the statutory procedure. We are not inclined to agree that the role
played by Sri Takht Ram vitiated the order of the Collector.
•
All the contentions fail and these appeals are, therefore, dismis-
F sed. The respondents are entitled to their costs throughout. t''
S.L. Appeals dismissed.
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