Holding

Candidates selected for appointment have no vested right to the post, and the State Government retains inherent authority to withdraw or amend special recruitment notifications, rendering the appeal untenable.

Summary

The appellants, members of the Haryana Civil Service, sought appointment through a special recruitment process initiated under Rule 5 of the Punjab Civil Services (Executive Branch) Rules, 1930. The State Government first issued notifications on 20 December 1990 and 25 January 1991 specifying eligibility criteria, but a new government later withdrew these notifications by a decree dated 30 December 1991 and issued fresh criteria on 9 March 1992. The appellants contended that the withdrawal violated their right to appointment, that the selection process was already underway, and that Section 19 of the Punjab General Clauses Act, 1898, barred such rescission without prior consultation with the Public Service Commission. The Supreme Court held that candidates selected for appointment have no vested right to the post and that the government may at any time revise or cancel recruitment criteria, even after the selection process has begun, provided it acts in good faith. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the appeal and dismissed it, affirming the State’s inherent power to alter its recruitment notifications.

Issues considered

Whether the State Government can withdraw or amend notifications for special recruitment after the selection process has commenced.
Whether candidates have a vested right to appointment once they are part of the selection process.
Whether Section 19 of the Punjab General Clauses Act, 1898 applies to the withdrawal of the notifications.
Whether the power to specify the method of recruitment under Rule 5 includes an inherent power to revise or rescind that method.

Legislation cited

Punjab General Clauses Act, 1898s. 19

Subjects

special recruitmentselection processvested rightwithdrawal of notificationSection 19 Punjab General Clauses ActArticle 14Article 16Haryana Civil ServiceRule 5public service commissionadministrative law

Judgment

A JAI SINGH DALAL AND ORS.
v.
STATE OF HARYANA AND ANR.

DECEMBER 18, 1992

B [A.M. AHMADI, M.M. PUNCHHI AND YOGESHWAR DAYAL, JJ.)

Civil Services: Punjab Civil Services (Executive Branch) Rules, 1930:
Rule 5-Haryana Civil Services (Executive Branch)-Selection for appoint-
ment by Special Recruitment-Notificatioin issued-Change in Govem-
C ment-Subsequent withdrawal and issue offresh notification revising selection
criteritt-Whether could be challenged-Whether employee could claim ap-
pointment as of right-whether selection process once started must be com-
pleted-Whether the authority, having power to specify the method of
recruitment could· be deemed to have power to revise and substitute the same
in the same manner. ·
D
Punjab General Clauses Act, 1898: Section 19-Applicability of-Selec-
tion /or appointment by .Special Recruitment-Notification issued-Sub-
sequent withdrawal and issue of fresh notification fixing revised eligibility
criteritt-Validity of
E The appellants were members of the Haryana State Services and
were working in different capacities in the year 1990. In that year there
were 45 vacancies in the Services. The State Government look a decision
to resort to special recruitment under Rule S of the Punjab Civil Services
(Executive Branch) Rules, 1930 which were in force then, and in exercise
F of the power conferred by the proviso to Rule 5, 21 posts belonging to the
State Civil Service were taken out from the purview of the State Public
Service Commission and were decided to be filled up by special recruit-
ment. The State Government issued a Circular dated July 17, 1990, to all
Heads of Departments of tile State Government calling upon them to
G recommend eligible and suitable officers as per the criteria indicated
therein for being considered for appointment by special recruitment. By a
subsequent notification dated January 25, 1991, the State Government in
consultation with the Public Service Commission made a slight modifica-
tion in the eligibility requirement.

H The Circular and the subsequent Notifications issued by the State
816

\
JAI SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA 817

" Government were challenged in a Writ Petition filed by certain State A
employees wherein the validity of Rule 5 was also put in issue. Another set
of Writ Petitions was also filed by officers of various departments who
were not eligible for special recruitment under the Circular and Notitica·
tions. The Writ Petitions were ultimately dismissed by the High Court.

""
~
Against the said order of dismissal of the Writ Petitions, two appeals were
filed in this Court by special leave. This Court dh-ected that six posts B
should be kept available for the appellants in case they succeeded in the
appeals.

While the process of selection was in progress there was a change of
~
the Government and the new Government decided to review the earlier c
Government's decision in regard to special recruitment. Thereupon
...... another notification was issued on December 30, 1991, withdrawing the
earlier notifications. The new Government took a decision to reframe its
policy in regard to making of special recruitment in consultation with the
~
P.S.C. under the proviso to Rule 5 of the ·Rules.
D
Thereupon, the appellants filed a Writ Petition before the High
Court, challenging the decision of the new Government to cancel the
notifications dated December 20, 1990 and January 25, 1991, by the
notification dated December 30, 1991 under challenge.
E
The respondents filed a counter explaining the reasons for its sub-
sequent action. The Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the writ
petition. Aggrieved, the appellants tiled the appeal, by special leave, before
this Court.
F
It was contended that even the newly formed Government saw the

-
need for special recruitment to meet the exigencies of service but instead
--f of permitting the P.S.C. to complete the selection process it decided to set
at naught the entire process by issuing the notification dated December
30, 1991, even though the selection process was at an advanced stage and
only the names of candidates from the aforesaid two departments were G
required to be forwarded, the entire process was scuttled by the State
~ Government's refusal to forward the names of the candidates belonging to
the said two departments. They further contended that this exercise was
undertaken by the newly formed Government in total disregard of the
decision of the High Court rendered in an earlier Writ Petition. H
818 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A The appellants also contended that the notification of March 9,
1992, was unsustainable as it was neither just nor fair, and, therefore, the
High Court was in error in dismissing their writ petition in limine, that
the State Government had no power to withdraw or rescined the earlier

-
notifications of December 20, 1990 and January 25, 1991, and that since
the notifications were issued under the Rules and not any statute, section \
B 19 of the Punjab General Clauses Act, 1898 would not be applicable, that
the power, even if exercisable, could be exercised 'in t~e like manner and
subject to like sanction and conditions' which necessitated consultation
with the P.S.C. before the issuauce of the notification dated December 30,
1991, by which the earlier two notifications were cancelled or withdrawn.
c
The respondent-State Government contended that it formulated the
new policy to ensure that a more healthy criteria was laid down for the
purpose of selection of candidates to the State Civil Service (Executive
Branch) by way of special recruitment; that the State Government, in
consultation with P.S.C., issued notification providing for special recruit-
D ment for filling up 30 vacancies during 1992, the new notification laid
down revised eligibility criteria.

It was also contended that the appellants had no right to be ap-
pointed to the posts in question and it was open to the Government, if the
E circumstances so demanded, to revise the criteria for selection, and there-
fore, the High Court was justified in summarily rejecting the writ petition
as no right of the. appellants had been violated on· the State Government
withdrawing the earlier notifications by the subsequent notification of
December 30., 1991 and that the State Government had inherent power to
withdraw, rescind or cancel the notifications it had issued on the principle
F that the authority in whom the power to create is vested has the power to
destroy or mould its creation. Reliance was placed on section 19 of the
Punjab General Clauses Act, 1898.

Dismissing the appeal, this Court

HELD : 1.1. It is settled law that even candidates selected for
appointment have no right to appointment and it is open to the State
Government at a subsequent date not to fill up the posts or to resort to ·
fresh selection and appointment on revised criteria. [828-H, 829-A]

H Sltankarsan Dash ·v. Union of India, [1991) 3 S.C.C. 47, followed.
JAi SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA · 819

State of Haryana v. Subhash Chander Marwaha & Ors., [1974) 1 A
S.C.R. 165, relied on.

Rameshwar Nath Moudgil v. State of Punjab & Ors., (1978) 6 SW 258,
overruled.

1.2. In the instant case, the selection was yet to be made by the
B
P.S.C. Therefore, the appellants cannot even claim that they were selected
for appointment by the P.S.C. The selection process had not been
completed and before it could be completed, the State Government
reviewed its earlier decision and decided to revise the eligibility criteria
for appointment. Therefore, the appelh•nts had no right to claim that C
the selection process once started must be completed and ·the Govern~
ment cannot refuse to make appointments or candidates duly selected .
by the P.S.C. Merely because the selection process bad travelled a certain
length it cannot be said that it was not open to the Government to
interfere with the selection process by revising the criteria for appoint· D
ment and that the Government was under an obligation to make an
appointment on selection. The appellants had not yet been selected for
appointment by special recruitment. [829-8)

1.3. Even assuming that the withdrawal of the earlier notifications
by the subsequent notification dated December 30, 1991 does not, stricto E
sensu, attract the provision of section 19 of the General Clauses Act,·
since the appellants have no legal right to insist on their selection and
appointment to the vacant posts in question, the mode of arresting the
process recedes in the background as the State Go-verment could have
informed the P.S.C. not to proceed with the selection process as it F
desired to revise the nol'IO for appointment. Once it is realised that
merely because the State ~overnment had sent a requisition to the P.S.C.
to select candidates for appointment did not create any vested right in
the candidates called for interviews, regardless of the fact that the
selection process had reached an advanced stage, it does not matter
whether the selection pro~ess is· arrested by cancelling the earlier G
notifications by another notification or by a mere communication ad·
dressed to the P.S.C. Even if the P.S.C. were to complete the process
and select candidates, such selection by itself would not confer a right
to appointment and the Government may refuse to msie the appoint·
ment for valid reasons. At best, the Government may be required to H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A justify its action on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution.
[831-C,E]

1.4. Besides, the proviso to Rule 5 requires the method for recruitment
to be specified by notification after consultation with the P.S.C. The consult·
ation with the P.S.C. has to be in regard to the positive act of specifying the
B method for recruitment and not in regard to the decision whether or not to
resort to special recruitment. The proviso enables the making of special
recruitment, but the method of such recruitment has to be specified by
notification. It is, therefore, obvious that evtn after the State Government
has decided to resort to special recruitment, it may for valid reasons change
C its mind and one of the reasons could be that it desires to revise the extant
eligibility criteria or substitute the same. This can be communicated to the
P.S.C. for arresting the selection process which need not be done by a
notification nor does it require consultation with the P.S.C. Prior consult·
ation with tl\.e P.S.C. is required before the issuance of a notification specify•
. ing the method of recruitment which was done when the notification of
D March 9, 1992, was issued. Therefore, even if Section 19 of the Punjab
General Clauses Act is applied the notification of December 30, 1991 would
not be rendered invalid for want of prior consultation on the thrust of the
words 'in the like manner' employed therein. [831-G,H; 832-A,B]

1.S. There is no reason to hold that a State Government which bas
E the power to specify the method of special recruitment by notification has
no inherent power to revise the same if it for good reasons considers the
same necessary. To so hold, would mean that even if the State Government
has committed a mistake it has no power to rectify or correct the same.
The authority which has power to specify the method of recruitment must
F be deemed to have the power to revise and substitute the same in the same
manner. On the anology of section 19 of the Punjab General Clauses Act,
such an inherent power always exists in the aut~ority to alter, vary, change
or replace its creation. (832-C,D]

G CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal no. 5428 of
1992.

From the Judgment and Order dated 7.2.1992 of the Punjab and
Haryana High Gourt in C.W.P. No. 565 of 1992.

H P.P. Rao, R.K. Gupta and P.C. Kapur for the Appellants.
JAi SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA [AHMADI, J.] 821

Harish N. Salve, Ayesha Khatri and Ms. Indu Malhotra for the A
Respondents.

Ms. Madhu Tewatia and Vishnu Mathur ior the impleading party.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B
AHMADI, J. Special leave granted.

The appellants were:members of the Haryana State Services and
were working in different capacities in the State of Haryana in the year
1990. In that year the total strength of the Haryana Civil Service (Executive
Branch) was 200 against which only 155 officers were in position; there c
being 45 vacancies. The Government of Haryana took a decision to resort
to special recruitment under Rule 5 of the Punjab Civil Services (Executive
Branch) Rules, 1930 (hereinafter called 'the Rules') which were admittedly
in force then. Special recruitment to service could be made under Rule 5
which rule may be reproduced at this stage:
D
"5. Members to be appointed by the Governor of Haryana
from amongst accepted candidates - Members of the ser-
vice shall be appointed by the Governor of Haryana from
time to time as required from among accepted candidates
whose names have been duly entered in accordance with E
these rules in one or other of the registers of accepted
candidates to be maintained under these rules:

Provided that if in the opinion of the State Government
the exigencies of the service so require, the State Govern-
ment may make special recruitment to the service by such F
methods as it may by notification specify, after consult-
. ation with the Public Service Commission."

The appellants contend that in exercise of the power conferred by the saiq
proviso, 21 posts belonging to the Haryana Civil Service (Executive
Branch) were taken out from the purview of the Haryana Public Service G
Commission (hereinafter called 'the HPSC') and were decided to be filled
up by special recruitment. The State Government issued a Circular dated
J\lly 17, 1990, to all Heads of Departments of the State Government calling
upon them to recommend eligible and suit~ble officers as per the criteria
indicated therein for being considered for appointment by special recruit- H
822 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A ment. The Circular inter alia provided tbat special recruitment would be
made from amongst Class-II officers, excepting those woo have a channel
of promotion to the Haryana Civil Service (Executive Branch) and except-
ing those belonging to technical services, who fulfil the eligibility conditions
set out therein. The eligibility criteria indicated in the Circular read as
under:
B
"(i) should· at least be a graduate of recognised university.

(ii) should not have attained the age of more than 48 years.

(iii) should have rendered at least five years /continuous
c Government service in regular capacity in Haryana.

(iv) should have overall record of 'very good' category or
better than that during the last 5 years (i.e. from
1985-86 to 1989-90)."
D The date of reckoning .for the purpose of age, educational qualifications
and length of service was fixed as 1st January, 1990. The Heads of Depart-
ments were also informed that uptodate confidential reports, integrity
certificates, information regarding pendency of any complaints/departmen-
tal proceedings, service book, etc., should also be forwarded to the Govern-
ment. It will be seen from the above Circular that the Government initially
E decided not to consider those officers having a promotional channel for
special recruitment but it was later felt that the exclusion was not warranted
and consequently by a notification dated December 20, 1990, they too were
included for consideration provided they satisfied the eligibility criteria set
out he~einabove. By a subsequent notification dated January 25, 1991, the
F Government of Haryana in consultation with the HPSC made a slight
modification in the eligibility requirement by substituting it as under:

"should have overall record of 'Very Good' category, i.e. at
least 3 'Very Good' or better reports and 2 reports of not
less than 'Good' category, during the last five years (i.e.
G from 1985-86 to 1989-90)."

The .above Circular and the subsequent Notifications issued by the Haryana
Government were challenged in a Writ Petition, C.W.P. No. 1201of1991,
filed by certain State employees wherein the validity of Rule 5 was also put
H in issue. Another set of Writ Petitions was also filed by officers of various
.JAI SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA [AHMADI, J.] 823

departments who were not eligible for special recruitment under the A
aforesaid circular and notifications. The said Writ Petitions were ultimately
·dismissed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana on April 2, 1991.
Against the said order of dismissal of the Writ Petitions, two appeals have
been filed ·in this Court by special leave and they are numbered Civil
Appeal Nos. 2481 and 2482 of 1991. In those appeals this Court has
ordered that 1 plus 5 i.e. 6 posts of Haryana Civil Service (Executive B
Branch) be kept available for the appellants should they succeed in the
appeals.

Out of 90 candidates whose names were recommended for con-
sideration by different HeadS of Departments the State Government, after C
taking into consideration their inter se merit, suitability and eligibility,
recommended the names of 75 candidates to the HPSC for selection. While
the HPSC was in the process of selecting candidates on the basis _of their
past record and the interviews, it appears that pursuant to an undertaking
given by the Advocate-General of Haryana at the hearing of C.W.P. No. D
1201 of 1991 to send the eligible candidates from the education and local
self-departments of the State Government, the cases of eligible candidates
from these two departments had to be considered and forwarded to the
HPSC to enable it to complete the selection process. However, before this
could be done the. scenario on the political front underwent a change. A E
new Government headed by Shri Bhajan Lal came to power. ltdecided to
review the decision of the earlier Government in regard to special recruit-
ment and, therefore, the names of candidates from the education and local
self-department were not forwarded to the HPSC. The petitioners contend
that even though the selection process was at an advanced stage and only
the names of candidates from the aforesaid two departments were required F
to be forwarded the entire process was scuttled by the State Government's
refusal to forward the names of the candidates belonging to the said two
departments. They further contend that this exercise was undertaken by
the newly formed Government in total disregard of the decision of the High
Court rendered on April 2, 1991, in C.W.P. No. 1201 of 1991. It may here G
be mentioned that the newly formed Government called a meeting of the
Council of Ministers to review the decision in regard to special recruit-
ment taken by the earlier Government and decided io withdraw the
notifications dated December 20, 1990 and January 25, 1991. It was also
noticed that there was nothing on. Government record to show that the H
824 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Advocate-General was authorised to give such an undertaking on behalf of
the Government. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the administrative
department of the State Government decided to withdraw the aforesaid
two notifications and the matter was placed before the Council of Ministers
for approval as required by the Rules of Business (1977) of the State
Government. Thereupon, on December 30, 1991, the following notification
B
was issued:

''The Governor of Haryana hereby withdraws Haryana
Government, General Adillinistration (Services) Depart-
ment, Notification No. 41/2/90-SII, dated 20th December,
c 1990 and No. 41/2/90-SII, dated 25th January, 1991."

Thus, the newly formed Government took a decision to reframe its policy
in regard to making of special recruitment in consultation with the HPSC
under the proviso to Rule 5 of the Rules as is evident from the Agenda of
D the meeting of Council of Ministers to be held on December 11, 1991. The
appellants contend that even the newly formed Government saw the need
for special recruitment to meet the exigencies of service but instead of
permitting the HPSC to complete the selection process it decided to set at
naught the entire process by issuing the notification dated December 30,
1991. The present appellants thereupon filed a Writ Petition, C.W.P. No.
E 565 of 1992, impugning the decision of the new Government to cancel the
notifications dated December 20, 1990 and January 25, 1991, by the im-
pugned notification dated .December 30, 1991. Notice was issued by the
High Court at the preliminary hearing of the Writ Petition whereupon the
respondents filed a counter explaining the reasons for its subsequent
F action. The Division Bench of the High Court after taking into considera-
tion the submissions made at the Bar dismissed the Writ Petition on
February 7, 1992, by the following order :

"No ground to interfere. Dismissed."

G It is this decision of the Division Bench of the High Court which is sought
to be assailed before us.

In the counter filed by the State Government in the High Court as
well as in this Court, it has indicated the reasons for the formation of the
H new policy for special recruitment as under:
JAI SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA [AHMADI, J.J 825

"(i) There have been changes twice in the previous policy A
for making special recruitment to the HCS (Ex.
Branch), during 1990. The first notification dated
20.12.90 (Annex. P-2) provided that the candidates
should not have attained the age of more than 48 years,
should have rendered at least 5 years' continuous ser-
vice in regular capacity in Haryana and should have
B
overall record of 'Very Good' category or better than
that during the last five years. Thereafter another
notification dated 25.1.91 which was about a month
after the first notification was issued when the inter-
views on the basis of the first notification were being c
conducted by Haryana Public Service Commission
which provided that the candiates should have overall
record of Very Good category i.e. Ll.t least 3 'Very
Good' or better reports and 2 reports of not less than
'Good' category during the last five years. As a result
D
of these changes in the policy framed previously, there
has been considerable litigation against the State
Government.

(ii) When the present Government took over, it noticed
E
that some persons who even did not fulfil the eligibility
criteria specified in notifications dated 20.12.90 and
25.1.91 were recommended by the Government to the
Haryana Public Service Commission for special
recruitment to the HCS (Ex. Branch). It was also
observed by the Government that as a result thereof F
some more people might challenge these recruitments
when these facts are known to them and there would
be more delay in finalising the special recruitment and
a large number of posts in the HCS (Ex. Branch) will
remain vacant. G

(iii) As the HCS (Ex. Branch) service is a premier Class-
1 service of the State, it is expected that special recruit-
ment should be so made that really competent and
experienced officers are recruited." H
-
826 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A The State Government, therefore, contends that it formulated the
new policy to ensure that a more healthy criteria was laid down for the
purpose of selection of candidates to the Haryana Civil Service (Executive
Branch) by way of special recruitment. This was the stage at which the Writ
Petition was disposed of by the High Court. Thereafter, on March 9, 1992,
the State Government in consultation with HPSC issued notification
B providing for special recruitment for filling up 30 vacancies during 1992.
The revised eligibility criteria provided in the said notification requires that
the candidate should not be more than 45 years of age, he should have
rendered at least seven years continuous service in regular capacity and
should have an overall record of 'Very Good' i.e. at least five 'Very Good'
c or better reports and two of not less than 'Good' category during the last
seven years. Conceding that there had been an acute shortage of officers
belonging to the Haryana Civil Service (Executive Branch) cadre, with a
sanctioned strength of 240 only 127 officers being in position and five
officers likely to retire during the year, the State Government was anxious
D to ensure speedy recruitment and with that in view it had formulated a new
criteria in consultation with HPSC to enable the latter to complete the
selection process at an early date. The various other allegations made by
the pet.itioners in their petition have been formally denied both by the State
Government as well as by the HPSC. The State Government contends that
the petitioners had no right to be appointed to the posts in question and
E it was open to the Government, if the circumstances so demanded, to revise
the criteria for selection. They, therefore, contend that the High Court was
justified in summarily rejecting the Writ Petition as no right of the
petitioners had been violated on the State Government withdrawing the
earlier notifications by the subsequent notification of December 30, 1991.
It is also denied that the subsequent notification was issued to over-reach
F
the decision of the High Court in C.W.P. No. 1201 <?f 1991 rendered on
April 2, 1991.

In the rejoinder affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioners while
,., reiterating their objections in regard to the withdrawal of the earlier
u notifications by the notification of December 30, 1991, the appellants
contend that the notification of March 9, 1992, is unsustainable as it is
neither just nor fair. On this line of reasoning, they contend that the High
Court was in error in dismissing their Writ Petition in limine.

It is clew- from the above pleacli\s that in 1990 the State Govern-
JAi SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA [AHMADI, J.) 827

ment resolved to resort to special recruitment to the Haryana Civil Service A
(Executive Branch) invoking the proviso to Rule 5 of the Rules. Pursuant
thereto, it issued the notifications dated December 20, 1990 and January
25, 1991. The names of the candidates were fo~arded by the State
Government to the HPSC for selection. The HPSC commenced the selec-
tion process and interviewed certain candidates. In the meantime, on B
account of an undertaking given by the Advocate-General to the High
Court at the hearing of C.W.P. No. 1201of1991 and allied Writ Petitions,
the State Government was required to forward the names of the candidates
belonging to two other departments of the State Go"'.ernment. Before it
could do so, the new Government came into power and it reviewed the
decision of the earlier Government and found the criteria evolved by the C
earlier Government unacceptable and also noticed certain infirmities in the
matter of "forwarding the names of eligible candidates. It, therefore,
resolved to rescined the earlier notifications of December 20, 1990 and
January 25, 1991. It will thus be seen that at the time when the Writ Petition
which has given rise to the present proceeedings was filed, the State
Government had withdrawn the aforesaid two notificaticfns by the notifica- D
tion dated December 30, 1991. The stage at which the last mentioned
notification came to be issued was the stage when the HPSC was still in
the process of selecting candidates for appointment by special recruitment.
During the pendency of the present proceedings the State Government
finalised the criteria for special recruitment by the notification of March 9, E
1992. Thus, the HPSC was still in the process of selecting candidates and
had yet not completed and finalised the select list nor had it forwarded the
same to the State Government for implementation. The candidates, there-
fore, did not have any right to appointment. There was, therefore, no
question of the High Court granting a mandamus or any other writ of the F
type sought by the appellants. The law in this behalf appears to be well-
settled. In the State of Haryana v. Subhash Chander Marwaha & Ors. {1974]
1 SCR 165, this Court held that the mere fact that certain candidates were
selected for appointment to vacancies pursuant to an advertisement did not
confer any right to be appointed to the post in question to entitle the
selectees to a writ of mandamus or any other writ compelling the authority G
to make the appointment. In that case, an advertisement""'as issued stating
that there were 50 vacancies in the Haryana Civil Service (Judicial Branch).
An examination was held by the HPSC and 40 candidates passed the said
examination with the required minimum 45% marks. Their names were
H
I
828 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
'
A published in the Government Gazette. The State Government, the appoint-
ing authority, made seven appointments out of the said list in the order of
merit. Respondents, who r.anked 8, 9. and 13 respectively in that list, did
not get an appointment although there were vacancies. The reason for not
appointing the respondents was that in the view of the State Government,
which was incidently identical to that of the High Court, candidates getting
B less than 55% marks in the examination should not be appointed as
SubordinateJudges in the interest of maintaining high standards of com-
1

petence in judicial service. Responde~ts 1 to 3 challenged this decision on
the ground that the State Government was not entitled to pick and choose
only seven out of them for appointment, because to do so tantamounted to
C prescribing a standard which was not <;:ontemplated. The State Government
on the other hand contended that the rules did not oblige them to fill in
all the vacancies and it was open to them to appoint the first seven
candidates in the interest of m':lintalfilng high standards. It was further
contended that there was no question of picking and choosing and since
D the rules did not preclude it from seldcting from the list the candidates for
appointment to set a higher standard1 the State Gover.nment could not be
said to have infringed any legal right of the selectees for appointment. In
the background of these facts this Court came to the conclusion that the
mere fact that the candidates were cqosen for appointment in response to
the advertisement did not entitle them to appointment. To put it differently,
IE no right had vested in the candidates' on their names having been entered
on the select list and it was open to the Government for good reason not
I
to make the appointments therefrom and fill in the vacancies. In a recent
decision in Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India, [1991] 3 SCC 47, the
Constitution Bench of this Court reiterated that even if a number of
F vacancies are notified for appointmen~
/
and adequate number of candidates
are found fit, the successful candidates do not acquire any indefeasible
right to appointment against the existing vacancies. It was pointed out that
ordinarily the notification merely atiiounts to a~ invitation to qualified
candidates to apply for recruitment and on their selection they do not
1

acquire any right to the post. The State is under no legal duty to fill up all
1
G or any of the vacancies by appointing candidates selected for that purpose.
Albeit, the State must act in good faith and must not exercis'e its power
mala fide or in an arbitrary manner. The Constitution Bench referred with
approval the earlier decision of this Court in Subash Chander's case.
Therefore, the law is settled that even candidates selected for appointment
IH
JAI SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA [AHMADI, J.] 829

have no right to appointment and it is open to the State Government at a A
subsequent date not to fill up th.e posts or to resort to fresh selection and
appointment on revised criteria. In the present case, the selection was yet
to be made by the HPSC. Therefore, the petitioners cannot even claim that
they were selected for appointment by the HPSC. The selection process
had not been completed and before it could be completed the State
Government reviewed its earlier decision and decided to revise the E
eligibility criteria for appointment. It is, therefore, clear from the settled
legal position that the petitioners had no right to claim that the selection
process once started must be completed and the Government cannot refuse
to :nake appointments of candidates duly selected by the HPSC.
c
Strong reliance was, however, placed on a decision of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court reported in Rameshwar Nath MoudgU v. State of
Punjab & Ors. (1978) 6 SU 258. In that case the petitioner fulfilled all the
requirements of the advertisement and answered the eligibility criteria for
appointment under the extant rules. He was permitted to appear at the [
examination and stood first among the candidates belonging to the category
of released Indian Armed Forces Personnel. Since the process of selection
had commenced he thought he would in ordinary course get the appoint-
ment. At that stage a rule was made which jeopardised his selection for
appointment since it rendered him ineligible. The candidate challenged the
rule which was given retrospective .operation and the High Court invoking
Article 16(1) came to the conclusion that his right to be considered for
appointment was jeopardised since it violated the guarantee of the said
article. In that case the main question was whether a rule giving retrospec-
tive operation could be validly enacted. The High Court came to the
conclusion that the rule was aimed at excluding the petitioner and perhaps
another candidate belonging to the same category and hence it was not
bona fide. Learned counsel, however, placed emphasis on the following
observations in paragraph 7 of the judgment :

"We are of the opinion that exclusion from consideration
by the retrospective operation of a rule, when considerati'6n
was crystallising into selection was, in the circumstances of
the present case, a denial of the Fundamental Right
guaranteed by Article 16 (1)."

These observations have to be read in the context of the facts of the
830 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A case. The facts revealed that the Court was inclined to take the view that
the events which had preceded the making of the rule led to an irresistible
reference that the rule was aimed at excluding the petitioner and perhaps
his companion from being considered for appointment. The explanation
offered for the making of the rule was also found to be unsatisfactory. It
was in that context that the Court came to the conclusion that when the
B process of selection had gone to a certain length and was crystalling into
selection, it was not open to the Government to amend the rule retrospec-
tively with a view to excluding the petitioner and perhaps his companion
from being considered for appointment. If the obseryations of the High
Court were to be read to convey that merely because the selection process
c had travelled a certain length it was not open to the Government to
interfere with the selection process by revising the criteria for appointment
and that the Government was under an obligation to make an appointment
on selection, such an interpretation would run counter to the ratio laid
down by the Constitution Bench of this Court iri the case of Shankarsan
D Dash and would, therefore, not be good law. We are, therefore, of the
opinion that the case bf the appellants is weak in the sense that they had
not yet been selected for appointment by special recruitment.

It was then argued that the State Government had no power to
withdraw or rescind the earlier notifications of December 20, 1990 and
~ January 25, 1991. On behalf .of the State Government counsel submitted
that the State Government had inherent power to withdraw, rescind or
cancel the notifications it had issued on the principle that the authority in
whom the power to create is veste9 has that power to destroy or mould its
creation. Reliance was also placed on section 19 of the Punjab General
Clauses Act, 1898, which reads as under:

"19. Power to make to include power to add to, amend,
vary, or rescind orders, rules or bye-laws-Where, by any
Punjab Act, a power to issue notifications or make. orders,
rules or bye- laws is conferred, then that power includes a
power exercisable in the like manner and subject to like
sanction and conditions (if any) to add, to amend, vary or
rescind any notifications, order, rules or bye-laws so issued
or made."

Counsel for the appellants argued that since the notifications were
. JAI SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA [AHMADI, J.] 831

issued under the Rules and not any statute the said provision would not be A
applicable. It was further submitted that the power, even if exercisable,
could be exercised 'in the like manner and subject to like sanction and
conditions', which necessitated consultation with the HPSC before thP
issuance of the notification dated December 30, 1991, by which the earlier
two notifications were cancelled or withdrawn. We see no merit in these
submissions. B

Assuming (without deciding) that the withdrawal of the earlier
notifications by the subsequent notification dated December 30, 1991 does
not, stricto sensu, attract the provision of section 19 extracted above,
counsel for the appellants overlooks the fact that since the appellants have C
no legal right to insist on their selection and appointment to the vacant
posts in question, the mode of ar~esting the process recedes in the back-
ground as the State Government could have informed the HPSC not to
proceed with the selection process as it desired to revise the norm for
appointment. Once it is realised that merely because the State Government D
had sent a requisition· to the HPSC to select candidates for appointment
did not creat any vested right in the candidates called for interviews,
regardless of the fact that the selection process had reached an advanced
stage, it does not matter whether the selection process is arrested by
cancelling the earlier notifications by another notification or by a mere
communication addressed to the HPSC. Even if the HPSC were to com- E
plete the process and select candidates, such selection by itself would not
confer a right to appointment and the government may refuse to make the
appointment for valid reasons. At best the government may be required to
justify its action on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. In the
present case the pleadings do not show that the subsequent notification p
dated December 30, 1991 is specifically put in issue in the memo of appeal
nor is there material placed on record to so hold. Besides, the proviso to
rule 5 requires the method for recruitment to be specified by notification
after consultation with the HPSC. The consultation with the HPSC has to
be in regard to the positive act of specifying the method for recruitment
and not in regard to the decision whether or not to resort to special G
recruitment. The proviso enables the making ofspecial recruitment but the
method of such recruitment has to be specified by .notification. It is,
therefore, obvious that even after the State Government has decided to
resort to special recruitment, it may for valid reasons change its mind and
one of the reasons could be that it desires to revise the extant eligibility H
832 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A criteria or substitute the same. This can be communicated to the HPSC for
arresting the selection process which need not be done by a notification.
nor does it require consultation with the HPSC. Prior consultation with the
HPSC is required before the issuance of a notification specifying the
method of recruitment which was done when the notification of March 9,
1992, was issued. Therefore, counsel's submission that if section 19 applied,
B the notification of December 30, 1991 would be rendered invalid for want
of prior consultation on the thurst of the words 'in the like manner'
employed therein, is clearly misconceived. Even if section 19 does not
apply, stricto sensu, we see no reason to hold that a State Government
which has the power to specify the method of· special recruitment by
c notification has no inherent power to revise the same if it for good reasons
considers the same necessary. To so hold would mean that even if the State
Government has committed a mistake it has no power to rectify or correct
the same. The authority which has power to specify the method of recruit-
ment must be deemed to have the power to revise and substitute the same
in the same manner. On the anology of section 19 such an inherent power
D always exists in the authority to alter, vary, change or replace its creation.

For the above reasons we see no merit in this appeal and dismiss the
same with costs.

N.P.V. Appeal dismissed.