JAI SINGH AND ORS.versusMUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI AND ANR.

                     [2010] 12 S.C.R. 358


A                      JAi SINGH AND ORS.
                                   v.
        MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI AND ANR.
               (Civil Appeal No. 8233 of 2010)

                       SEPTEMBER 23, 2010
B
       [B. SUDERSHAN REDDY AND SURINDER SINGH
                      NIJJAR, JJ.]

          Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 227 - Scope and
C   ambit of - Discussed - Eviction petition, on the ground of sub-
    letting without written consent - Allowed by Rent Controller -
    Order upheld by Tribunal - Writ petition under Article 227 by
    MCD - High Court set aside the concurrent findings recorded
    by the Rent Controller and the Tribunal and quashed the
D   orders passed by them - Justification of - Held: Not justified
    - The writ petition filed by MCD was liable to be dismissed
    on the ground of delay and /aches alone - Even otherwise,
    exercise of power under Article 227 by th.e High Court, in the
    peculiar facts of this case was improper - The entire
E   proceedings adopted by MCD were a subterfuge to avoid the
    execution proceedings in a decree which had become final
    between the parties - The High Court erroneously undertook
    investigation into issues which did not even arise in the /is -
    It traveled beyond the well defined contours of its jurisdiction
F   under Article 227 - Rent Control - Delhi Rent Control Act,
     1958 - ss.14(1)(b) and 39(1) - Delayllaches.

       The appellants claiming themselves to be the
  landlords in respect of premises in question filed eviction
  petition under Section 14(1)(b) of Delhi Rent Control Act,
G 1958. They alleged that the premises were let out to
  respondent No.2 (OTC); that OTC sublet/assigned the
  premises in favour of respondent No.1 (MCO) and parted
  with possession in favour of MCD without the written
  consent of the appellants and, therefore, both OTC and
H                            358
JAi SINGH AND ORS. v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 359
             OF DELHI AND ANR.
MCD were liable for eviction. The Assistant Rent Controller   A
(ARC) allowed the eviction petition holding that OTC had
sublet the premises to MCD. OTC lost in appeal before
the Additional Rent Control Tribunal (ARCT) as also in
appeal before the High Court.
                                                              B
    Meanwhile, MCD too had appealed against the order
of ARC before ARCT and then before the High Court.
Following the order passed by the High Court in the
appeal filed by OTC, the appeal filed by MCD was also
dismissed by a co-ordinate Bench of the High Court, but       C
then the said order was recalled, whereafter\MCD moved
an application with a prayer that its appeal be treated as
a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. The said
application was disposed off by the High Court,
whereafter MCD filed a petition under Article 227 of the
Constitution, on which the High Court quashed the             D
orders passed by the ARC and ARCT.

    Disposing ofthe appeals, the Court
     HELD:1.1. Under Article 227 of the Constitution, the
High Court has the jurisdiction to ensure that all            E
subordinate courts as well as statutory or quasi judicial
tribunals, exercise the powers vested in them, within the
bounds of their authority. The High Court has the power
and the jurisdiction to ensure that they act in accordance
with well established principles of law. The High Court is    F
vested with the powers of superintendence and/or
judicial revision, even in matters where no revision or
appeal lies to 'the High Court. The jurisdiction under this
Article is, in some ways, wider than the power and
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.           G
However, greater the power, greater the care and caution
in exercise thereof. The High Court is, therefore, expected
to exercise such wide powe.rs with great care, caution
and circumspection. The exercise of jurisdiction must be
                                                              H
   360      SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2010] 12 S.C.R.


A within the well recognized constraints. It can not be
  exercised like a 'bull in a china shop', to correct all errors
  of judgment of a court, or tribunal, acting within the limits
  of its jurisdiction. Tliis correctional jurisdiction can be
  exercised in cases where orders have been passed in
B grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of
  fundamental principles of law or justice. The High Court
  cannot lightly or liberally act as an appellate court and re-
  appreciate the evidence. Generally, it can not substitute
  its own conclusions for the c.Jnclusions reached by the
C courts below or the statutory/quasi judicial tribunals. The
  power to re-appreciate evidence would only be justified
  in rare and exceptional situations where grave injustice
  would be done unless the High Court interferes. The
  exercise of such discretionary power would depend on
o the peculiar facts of each case, with the sole objective of
  ensuring that there is no miscarriage of justice. [Para 13]
  [370-8-G]
         1.2. In the instant case, the High Court traveled
   beyond the limits of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of
E the Constitution. Both ARC and ARCT had acted within
   the limits of the jurisdiction vested in them. The
   conclusions reached cannot be said to be based on no
   evidence. All relevant material has been taken into
   consideration. Therefore, there was hardly any
F justification for the High Court to undertake an
   investigation into issues which did not even arise in the
 . /is. (Para 14] (370-H] [371-A]

      1.3. Reference to the orders of ARC and ARCT only
G demonstrate that the High Court was not justified in
  observingthat there has been 'serious dereliction of duty'
  or that there has been 'blatant violation of the
  fundamental principles of law and justice' by the ARC and
  ARCT. It cannot be said that both ARC and ARCT
H considered the facts in a very mechanical way, or that the
JAi SINGH AND ORS. v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 361
             OF DELHI AND ANR.
orders passed by ARC and ARCT exhibited any patent             A
illegality writ large on the face of the orders or that ARC
and ARCT ignored the sequence of events in the facts
and circumstances of the case. [Para 21] [377-D-F]

     1.4. The HigJ Court ought not to have exercised the       8
extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution in the peculiar circumstances of this case.
A perusal of the order passed by the High Court (on the
application filed by MCD praying that its appeal be treated
as a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution) clearly   C
shows that the application was disposed of on the
statement made by the counsel for MCD that MCD should
file a fresh petition under Article 227 of the Constitution
if the same is permissible under law. Therefore, the
aforesaid order cannot be treated as an order passed by
the High Court permitting MCD to file a petition under         D
Article 227 of the Constitution. However using the
aforesaid order of the High Court as an excuse, MCD filed
the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution
challenging the orders passed by the ARC and the ARCT.
The High Court failed to bestow proper attention to the        E
objections taken by the appellants to the maintainability
of the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches.
Proceedings under Article 227 can be initiated in the
absence of the availability of an alternative efficacious
remedy. In the present case, MCD had consciously               F
withdrawn RCSA which had been filed under Section
39(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The appeal had been
filed against the order of the ARCT. The High Court
committed a patent error of jurisdiction in entertaining the
writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution which      G
was unconscionably belated. The objection raised by the
appellants to the entertainment of the writ petition under
Article 227, on the ground of delay and laches was
brushed aside· by the High Court on two wholly untenable
grounds, i.e:- (i) the orders passed by the ARC and ARCT       H
    362    SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2010] 12 S.C.R.


A suffered from patent illegality on the face of the orders
  and ii) the MCD was bonafide prosecuting a case in the
  wrong court, due to mistake of law. Both reasons stated
  by the High Court in support of its conclusions, are
  contrary to the facts on the record. [Paras 22, 23] [377-
B G] [379-F-H] [380-A-F]

      1.5. It is apparent that the entire proceedings adopted
  by MCD after the dismissal of the RCSA filed by OTC
  were a subterfuge to avoid the execution proceedings in
  a decree which had become final between the parties. In
C the application seeking conversion of RCSA to a petition
  under Article 227 of the Constitution, it was categorically
  stated by MCD that the aforesaid RCSA was not
  maintainable. The aforesaid statement is a clear
  admission that the appeal filed by the MCD did not
D involve a substantial question of law. [Para 24] [381-B-D]

         1.6. Having made an admission that no substantial
    question of law was raised in the RCSA, withdrawal of
    the same could not possibly have been used as a
E   justification for filing a petition under Article 227 of the
    Constitution. If the RCSA was devoid of any substantial
    question of law, the petition under Article 227, based on
    the same facts, would be equally devoid of any
    substantial question of law. This categoric admission of
F   the MCD was ignored by the High Court whilst recording
    the finding that the orders of ARC and ARCT were passed
    "in blatant violation of fundamental principles of law and
    justice." This apart in the peculiar facts of this case, it
    could not be held that MCD had been bona fide
G   prosecuting a case in the wrong court. It was seeking a
    remedy provided under Section 39(1) of DRC Act. Even
    this appeal was filed beyond limitation. It was delayed by
    431 days. In the meantime possession of a part of the
    premises had already been taken by the appellants.
H   lnspite of the objections having been raised to the
 JAi SINGH AND ORS. v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 363
              OF DELHI AND ANR.

 maintainability of a writ petition under Article 227 of the       A
 Constitution, they were rejected by the High Court. In
 such circumstances, it was wholly inappropriate for the
 High Court to entertain the writ petition under Article 227
 of the Constitution. [Para 24] [381-E-H] [382-A-B]
                                                                   B
        1.7. The High Court has the power to· reach injustice
   whenever and wherever found. However, the High Court
   committed a serious error· of jurisdiction in entertaining
   the writ petition filed by MCD under Article 227 of the
   Constitution in the peculiar circumstances of this case.        C
   The decision to exercise jurisdiction had to be taken in
   accordance with the accepted norms of care, caution,
   circumspection. The issue herein only related to a
   tenancy and subletting. There was no lis relating to the
   ownership of the land <!>n which the superstructure or the      D
   demised premises had been constructed. The whole
   i~sue .of ownership of plot is the subject matter of a civil
I' suit in the High Court. The High Court, therefore, ought
   not to have given any opinion on the question of
   ownership. The High Court traveled beyond the well
   defined contours of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of       E
   the Constitution. [Paras 25, 26] [383-B-E]

       Estral/a Rubber v. Dass Estates (P) Ltd. 2001 (8) SCC
 97, relied on.
                                                                   F
       Madras Bangalore Transport Co. [West] v. lnder Singh
  & Ors. AIR 1986 SC 1564; Resham Singh v. Raghbir Singh
. & Anr. 1999 (7) SCC 263 and Bharat Sales Ltd. v. Life
  Insurance Coropration of India 1998 (3) SCC 1,, rE1feirred to.

                      Case Law Reference:                          G

      AIR 1986 SC 1564         refarred to           Para 7
      1999 (7) sec 263         referred to           Para 10
      ~ 998 (3)   sec 1        referred to           Para 10       H
    364       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010) 12 S.C.R.


A         2001 (8) sec 97           relied on              Para 10

        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
    8233 of 2010.

      From the Judgment & Order dated 23.3.2009 of the High
B Court of Delhi at New Delhi in CM (M) No. 516 of 2007.

                                  WITH

    C.A. No. 8234 of 2010.

C       Altaf Ahmed, Ranjit Kumar, Bhargava V. Desai, Rahul
    Gupta, Nikhil Sharma for the Appellants.

       Madhu Tewatia, Sidhi Arora, P. Parmeswaran, Dr. Monika
  Gusain, Hariom Yaduvanshi, Hemant Malhotra, Manish Pitale,
D Wasi Haider, C.S. Ashri, Vishnu B. Saharya (for Saharya &
  Co.) for the Respondent.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

        SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J. 1. In this special leave
E petition, the petitioners have challenged the judgment of tile
  Delhi High Court in a Writ petition under Article 227 qf/ the
  Constitution of India, CM (M) No.516 of 2007, dated 23rd
  March, 2009, whereby the High Court has quashed and set
  aside the order passed by the Additional Rent Control Tribunal
F ["ARCT" for short] dated 12th March, 2001, upholding the order
  passed by the Additional Rent Controller ["ARC" for brevity].

          2. Heard counsel. Leave granted.

       The facts, as noticed by the High Court, are that the
G appellants are claiming themselves to be the landlords in
  respect of premises constructed on the plot of land No.2, Block
  B, transport area of Jhandewalan Estate, Desh Bandhu Gupta
  Road, Karol Bagh; New Delhi.

H         3. In the eviction petition, it was stated that the premises
 JAi SINGH AND ORS. v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 365
 OF DELHI AND ANR. [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
were let out to respondent No.2, Delhi Transport Corporation            A
[for short "OTC"], on a monthly rental of Rs.3500/-. OTC has
sublet/assigned the premises in favour of respondent No.1,
Municipal Corporation of Delhi [for short "MCD"] and parted with
possession in favour of MCD without the written consent of the
appellants. Therefore, both OTC and MCD were liable for                 B
eviction. The High Court has noticed the sequence of events
since the transport services were being run by Gwalior Northern
India Transport Company (for short "GNIT") to the time when
OTC stepped into its shoes. The appellants claimed that the
tenancy of the premises was with OTC. MCD had, however,                 c
claimed that the legal possession was retained by MCD; rent
was being paid by MCD.to OTC.

    4. The ARC by an order dated 11th November, 1989, upon
consideration of the rival contentions, held:
                                                                        D
     "19. Admittedly it is respondent No.2 (MCD) who is in
   · possession of the premises in question. It is also admitted
     that respondent No.2 (MCD) pays a sum of Rs.3500/- as
     rent to respondent No.1 (OTC) by way of cheques. It is not
     the case of the respondent that any written consent of the         E
     petitioners was obtained in this regard. Therefore, it has
     to be held that respondent no.1 (OTC) has either sublet,
     assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of the
     tenanted premises illegally to respondent No.2 (MCD). It
     is well settled that in voluntarily (sic) transfers are also       F
     included with the meaning of sub-letting etc. in Section
     14(1)(b) DRC Act.".

     5. The order passed by the ARC was upheld by the ARCT
with the following observations:                        ·
                                                                        G
     "15. After having heard up the matter in all its possible
     aspects I do not find any infirmity or illegality in the finding
     of the learned trial aourt by holding that there exists
     relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and
     since th$ exclusive possessi<m of the premises was                 H
    366      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010] 12 S.C.R.


A         handed over by the erstwhile tenant to the Municipal
          Corporation of Delhi, i.e., respondent No.2 which is itself
          a separate and independent legal entity, it amounts to sub-
          letting."

B        6. The High Court set aside the concurrent findings
    recorded by the ARC and ARCT with the following observations:

          "The orders passed by learned ARC and the learned
          ARCT categorically show that neither the learned ARC nor
          learned ARCT has devolved upon the facts of the case
c         and nor had even considered the concept of tenancy and
          sub tenancy in this case in the peculiar circumstances of
          this case."

         7. The High Court held that this is not a case of sub-letting
o  as Delhi Transport Services (for short "DTS"), Delhi Transport
   Undertaking (for short "DTU"), MCD and OTC were the creation
   of statute. The premises had come to them after it was acquired
  .by Union of India (UOI) from GNIT on nationalization of the
   business. There was no parting with possession by OTC to
E MCD, therefore, it was not sub-letting. The OTC was
   incorporated in lieu of DTU as a separate company to facilitate
   running of transport business. Mere payment of Rs.3500/- per
   month by MCD to OTC does not show sub-letting or parting with
   possession. Relying on a judgment of this Court in Madras
F Bangalore Transport Co. [West] Vs. lnder Singh & Ors. [AIR
   1986 SC 1564], the High Court has held that:

          "In the case in hand, the situation, is much better. The
          alleged original tenant GNIT stood acquired by a
          Legislative Act and the premises went to DTS. DTS was
G         converted to DTU and DTU was further converted into
          OTC. The premises remained in occupation of the same
          entity which changed its form from one to another. Thus it
          cannot be said that it was a case of sub-letting under any
          circumstances. The orders passed by learned ARC and
H         learned ARTC are liable to be set aside for non application
JAi SINGH AND ORS. v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 367
OF DELHI AND ANR. [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
    of law and non consideration of facts at all."               A

     8. The objection raised by the appellants to the
entertainment of the petition under Article 227, on the ground
of !aches, has been rejected with the following observations:

    "The respondent in this case has strongly objected to B
    entertaining the petition on the ground of limitation. The
    petitioner has filed this petition under Article 227 of the
    Constitution of India. In exercise of this power, interfering
    with the orders of the Court of Tribunal has to be done
    where this Court finds that there was a serious dereliction C
    of duty and blatant violation of the fundamental principles
    of law and justice and where, the order caused grave
    injustice and needs to be corrected. Although the petitioner
    herein had not been vigilant in prosecuting the appeal
    below but that cannot prevent his Court from correcting the D
    patent illegality writ large on the face of the orders of the
    ARC and Tribunal below. Both the ARC and ARCT passed ·
    orders without considering the facts of the case in a very
    mechanicai manner. Neither the learned ARC nor learned
    ARCT had taken into account the sequence of facts E
    brought before them regarding acquisition of the entire
    assets of GNIT and conversion of DTS to DTU and then
    to DTC by the Legislative Act and the order has been
    passed merely on the ground that amount of Rs.3500/-
    was being remitted by the MCD to OTC. The Courts below F
    did not even consider the issue as to who was the tenant
    and how MCD became the sub-tenant of respondent once
    the premises was owned by Union of India and the
    leasehold rights of the entire land vested in Union of India.
    This Court can set aside the findings and the orders of the G
    Tribunal below if there was no evidence at all to justify the
    findings and the findings were perverse. The order can .
    also be set aside if no reasonable or prudent person can
    possibly come to such a conclusion despite the fact that
    the petition was not brought before this Court by the
                                                                  H
    petitioner soon after the passing of the order. In Badlu and
    368 '        SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2010) 12 S.C.R.


A       another Vs. Shiv Charan and Others [(1980) 4 SCC 4011,
        Supreme Court observed that the delay caused in
        prosecuting the case in bona fide and good faith in wrong
        court due to mistake of law or facts can be condoned, I,
        therefore, consider that petition is not liable to be
        dismissed on the ground of delay, nor learned ARCT was
        justified in dismissing the application. Learned ARCT went
        wrong in dismissing the application of the petitioner for
        condonation of delay. The order of learned ARCT on this
        count also is liable to set aside. It is ordered accordingly."
c        9. Mr. Altaf Ahmad, learned senior counsel appearing for
    the appellants submits :

            1.    The exercise of power under Article 227 of the
                  Constitution of India, by the High Court, in the
P                 peculiar facts of this case was improper.

          2.      The petition was liable to be dismissed on th.e
                  ground of delay and laches alone.

          3.      Even otherwise, the High Court exceeded its
E                 jurisdiction by acting as an appellate court.

          4.      The High Court erroneously decided the question
                  of ownership of the premises which was not even
                  an issue in the proceedings, under Article 227 of
                  the Constitution of India.

          5.      Even on facts, the findings are contrary to the
                  material on record.

       10. On the other hand, Ms. Madhu Tewatia, learned
G counsel appearing for the respondents submits that the High
  Court was fully justified in exercising its jurisdiction under Article
  227 of the Constitution to correct the patent, factual and legal
  errors committed by ARC and ARCT. She has emphasised the
  entire history ~ftransformation of GNIT into OTC. According to
H the learned counsel, there was no landlord and tenant
 JAi SINGH AND ORS. v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 369
 OF DELHI AND ANR. [SURINOER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
 relationship between the predecessor of the appellants and           A
 GNIT. The payment of Rs.3500/- per month was a misnomer.
 The plot vested in the Government under the agreement dated
 23rd April, 1948, therefore, GNIT was incompetent to transfer
.any perpetual lease to Bharat Singh. The amount of Rs.3500/
 - was being paid to Bharat Singh as compensation for the             B
 amount spent by him on behalf of GNIT for construction of the
 depot. She further submits that the land vested in DOA, i.e.,
 Government. Therefore, Rent Controller had no jurisdiction. In
 any case, the appellants have failed to prove that there has
 been any parting with possession, without the written consent        c
 of the landlord. The ARC and ARCT ignored vital documents
 in concluding that there has been subletting by OTC to MCO.
 In fact, MCO has retained the legal possession all along. The
 payment of Rs.3500/- was only being routed through OTC, as
 a matter of convenience. On the question of delay and laches,
                                                                      0
 it is submitted that the High Court had converted the RCSA to
 a petition under Article 227. The delay has been condoned as
 the MCO had been bona fide pursuing the wrong legal remedy.
 The High Court in a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution
 of India had the jurisdiction to undo the injustice caused to the    E
 MCO by the orders of ARC and ARCT. In support of her
 submissions, learned counsel relied on a number of judgments
 of this Court, viz. , on subletting: Resham Singh Vs. Raghbir
  Singh & Anr. [1999 (7) SCC 263]; Bharat Sales Ltd. Vs. Life
 Insurance Coropration of India [1998 (3) SCC 1] and on
 jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the              F
 Constitution of India, Estral/a Rubber Vs. Dass Estates (P) Ltd.
 2001 (8) sec 97.

      11. Mr. Ahmad, in reply submits that the sub-tenant OTC,
 cannot be permitted to plead a case which even the tenant            G
 could not have pleaded.

      12. We have anxiously considered the submissions of the
 learned counsel.

      13. Before we consider the factual and legal issues             H
    370      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 12 S.C.R.


A involved herein, we may notice certain well recognized principles
  governing the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under
  Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Undoubtedly the High
  Court, under this Article, has the jurisdiction to ensure that all
  subordinate courts as well as statutory or quasi judicial tribunals,
B exercise the powers vested in them, within the bounds of their
  authority. The High Court has the power and the jurisdiction to
  ensure that they act in accordance with well established
  principles of law. The High Court is vested with the powers of
  superintendence and/or judicial revision, even in matters where
c no revision or appeal lies to the High Court. The jurisdiction
  under this Article is, in some ways, wider than the power and
  jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is,
  however, well to remember the well known adage that greater
  the power, greater the care and caution in exercise thereof. The
  High Court is, therefore, expected to exercise such wide
0
  powers with great care, caution and circumspection. The
  exercise of jurisdiction must be wi.thin the well recognized
  constraints. It can not be exercised like a 'bull in a china shop',
  to correct all errors of judgment of a court, or tribunal, acting
  within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction
E can be exercised in cases where orders have been passed in
  grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental
  principles of law or justice. The High Court cannot lightly or
   liberally act as an appellate court and re-appreciate the
  evidence. Generally, it can not substitute its own conclusions
F for the conclusions reached by the courts below or the statutory/
  quasi judicial tribunals. The power to re~appreciate evidence
  would only be justified in rare and exceptional situations where
  grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes.
  The exercise of such discretionary power would depend on the
G peculiar facts of each case, with the sole objective of ensuring
  that there is no miscarriage of justice.

        14. In our opinion, the High Court in this case, has traveled
    beyond the limits of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
H   Constitution. Both ARC and ARCT had acted within the limits
   JAi SINGH AND ORS. v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 371
   OF DELHI AND ANR. [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
     of the jurisdiction vested in them. The conclusions reached       A
     cannot be said to be based on no evidence. All relevant
---- [llaterial has been taken into consideration. Therefore, there
     was hardly any justification for the High Court to undertake an
     investigation into issues which did not even arise in the lis.
                                                                       B
        15. The appellants had filed a simple eviction petition
___b_efore the ARC, under Section 14(1 )(b) of Delhi Rent Control
   Act, 1958 (in short "DRC Act"). They had stated that OTC was
   their tenants in premises as the entire plot No.2 with the
   construction thereon at Jhandewalan known as Karol Bagh             C
   Depot, as per plan attached. Monthly rent was stated to be
   Rs.3500/-. It was claimed that OTC has sublet the premises to
   MCD, without permission of the landlord. Therefore, both OTC
   and MCD were liable for eviction.

       16. Both OTC and MCD took identical pleas. Their D
  defence was that the appellants are neither the owners nor the
  landlords of the demised premises. They claimed that Late
  Bharat Singh (LBS) had agreed to construct the depoUor and
  on behalf of GNIT. He was receiving Rs.3500/- p.m. for the
  money spent on construction. Therefore, the term rent is a E
  misnomer. Allegations of subletting were denied. The business
  of GNIT was nationalized and taken over by the government
  vide agreement dated 23rd April, 1948. The plot was mutated
  in the name of Government of India. Thereafter, Delhi Road
  Transport Corporation Act, 1950, "Yas enforced. Under this Act, F
  Delhi Transport Services (DTS) was established. From then the
  onward DTS was in occupation and started paying the rent of
  Rs.3500/- till the enactment of DMC Act, 1957. Under this Act,
  the transport service in Delhi was given to Delhi Transport
  Undertaking (DTU), which was made a wing of MCD. Since then G
  MCD started releasing Rs.3500/- to LBS through its wing, DTU.
  After the death of LBS, the amount has been paid to the
  appellants, without any objection. On passing of Delhi Road
  Transport Laws (Amendment) Act, 1971, Delhi Transport
  Corporation, came into existence as a statutory body. But the
                                                                  H
    372           SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2010] 12 S.C.R.


A   possession of the demised premises remained with MCD. As
    OTC had taken the place of DTU, the rent amount, thereafter,
    was routed through OTC. Therefore, there was no subletting.
    In any event, since the property vests in Government of India,
    Delhi Rent Control-Act would not be applicable.
B
         17. Taking into consideration the aforesaid claims of the
    parties, the ARC concluded that there is no dispute with regard
    to construction and ownership of the depot by LBS. The
    appellants are successors ot LBS. The issues as crystallized
    by the ARC are as follows:-
C
          "(i)     The tenant has sublet, assigned or otherwise parted
                   with possession.

          (ii)     It may be in respect of the whole or any part of the
0                  premises.

          (iii)    Such subletting etc has taken place on or after the
                   9th day of June, 1952.

          (iv)     Such subletting etc has taken place without
E                  obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord.

          (v)      The first and the foremost ground that requires to
                   be seen is whether relationship of landlord and
                   tenant exist between the petitioners and respondent
                   No.1 or not."
F
                   Thereafter in Para 9 ARC observes :-

                   "Whether relationship of landlord and tenant was
                   contemplated or not is the most important fact
G                  which has to be seen."

         18. Thereafter, ARC proceeds to consider the implications
    of the agreement dated 10th November, 1944, wherein LBS
    agreed to develop the plot of land. He is referred to as the
    prospective purchaser. The lease with GNIT was provided for,
H
JAi SINGH AND ORS. v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 373
OF DELHI AND ANR. [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
LBS was to pay all taxes. GNIT had to pay 10% p.a. of the entire      A
cost of the building. GNIT were to execute a ten year lease. Rent
of Rs.3500/- was regularly paid. The ARC noticed that
Government of India had moved the Rent Controller, New Delhi
for fixation of fair rent in June, 1950. The Rent Controller, after
conducting an enquiry had fixed the agreed rent as the fair rent.     B
An appeal against the order of Rent Controller, New Delhi
dated 26th December, 1950 was dismissed by the learned
District Judge at Delhi by an order dated 3.5.1951. Not only
this, ARC notices that during the course of present
proceedings, rent was deposited in court for the period 1.4.93        c
to 30.11.93, by OTC. Therefore, they can not now be permitted
to say that MCD is the tenant, in possession. In such
circumstances, the ARC held that OTC has sublet the,premises
to MCD.

       19. Thereafter, MCD challenged the aforesaid order             q
before the ARCT in RCA No.9 of 2001. The aforesaid appe~I
was beyond limitation by 431 days. It appears that even though
the ARCT did not find any substance in the reasons given by
the MCD for seeking condonation of delay, the appeal was still
considered on merits. ARCT discussed at length the. negligent         E
attitude of the MCD in pursuing the proceedings in the court of
ARG. Ultimately, the ARC was left with no alternative but to
proceed against the MCD ex-parte on 25th of August, 1999. It
was observed by the ARCT that the delay was wholly unjustified
as well as wholly unexplained. We may notice the observations         F
made by the ARCT which are as follows:

     "Now, looking to the appellant's stand through another
     angle, I find that the appellant and respondenVDTC are
     both governmental organization and it does .not stand to         G
     mind that respondenVDTC or its representative would not
     intimate the appellant/MCD about its not being
     represented to some advocate or about its having been
     proceeded ex-parte. The case was admittedly on last state
     and it appears that the appellant took chance and stayed
                                                                      H
    374      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010] 12 S.C.R.

A         out of the scene and has now come up with this hopelessly
          delayed appeal with a cock and bull story which does not
          seem to be any way bonafide, reasonable and acceptable
          to mind. Strangely enough, the appellant even did not
          disclose in the application as to on which date or month,
B         the court bailiff had gone to the demises premises, and
          this lengthy delay of about 431 days (or 393 days after
          excluding the time taken in obtaining the certified copies)
          has remained completely unexplained. The application for
          seeking condonation of delay, thus, is found to be without
c         any sufficient or reasonable ground and needs to be
          dismissed. Order as such with the dismissal of the
          appellant is application for condonation of delay - this
          appeal meets the same fate."

       Having observed as such, the ARCT considered the appeal
D on merits on the assumption that the application of MCD for
  condonation of delay has been allowed, though it had not been
  allowed. The ARCT thereafter considered the entire gamut of
  facts and circumstances in detail. The ARCT noticed the
  submissions made by the learned counsel for the MCD and
E considered each submission in detail.

         20. It was submitted that ARC had failed to distinguish the
    three expressions: sublet, assigned and otherwise
    parted with possession. This was answered as follows:
F         "I feel that the submissions made by learned counsel
          Sh.Chachra do not gather any support from the records
          because the learned ARC has dealt with insufficient details
          of the needed requirements and it was only thereafter that
          he came to a conclusion of the respondenUDTC having
G         sublet, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession
          of the demised premises in favour of this appellant. For
          attracting the applicability of a ground of eviction u/s
          14(1)(b) of the Act, it has either to be direct circumstance
          of subletting which ordinarily may not be possible to be
H         detected since it is, in most cases, a secret deal between
JAi SINGH AND ORS. v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 375
OF DELHI AND ANR. [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
    the tenant and the alleged sub-tenant or it is the assignment A
    where under the tenant has to divest himself of all the rights
    that he had as a tenant or parting with possession which
    circumstances postulates the parting with legal possession
    also i.e. the tenant surrenders his. legal right of are-entry
    to the premises. This mischief of Section 14(1)(b) ofthe B
    Act is complete if any of the three expressions gets
    established. It is certainly no necessary and nor has it been
    so held by any of the pronouncements of any superior
    courts that pleadings on this aspect must state in specific
    terms that it either sublet or assignment or parting with    c
    possession. In case a party succeeds in establishing the
    first expression sublet the to my mind. It goes to establish
    that even the other two expressions assignment and
    parting with possession stand proved because the
    moment a tenant indulge a third person as his tenant (sub-
                                                                   0
    tenant) qua the demised premises-he (tenant) squarely
  . assigns and also parts with possession. in both ways as
     he divests himself of all the rights as he had as a tenant
    and part with possession to delivering· and only physical
    possession but also fully surrendering his legal possession
                                                                   E
    over the tenanted premises. The impugned judgment did
     discuss evidence with a clear angle that the appellant had
    been parting rent of Rs.3,500/- per month to respondent I
     OTC every month. The respondent OTC was admittedly not
     in possession any way of the demised premises as the
     appellant's own stand on this point is admittedly th~ same. F
     In case, the first expression sublet has been established,
     almost in an admitted style, through various acts admitted
     documents and stands taken in various court proceedings,
     the other two expressions would also go hand in hand and
     the Ld. ARC was not any way required to state as to under G
     which of the three expressions, parties case felt Evidence
     or specific admissions through deeds and conduct find
     duly discussed through various admitted or proved
     documents and these negates the plea of the appellant that
          1
     the evidence had not been discussed by the Ld. Trial H
     376       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2010] 12 S.C.R.


 A         Court. I feel the impugned judgment carries all these
           necessary details and these need not be repeated here
           any further."

         ARCT thereafter considered in detail the relationship of
  B landlord and tenant between LBS and various statutory entities,
    in succession. The transformation of GNIT, through OTS to OTC
    was duly noticed, and dilated upon. It was noticed that OTC
    which was a government undertaking, was a successor in
    interest of a private transport comnany. It was further noticed
    that the "land underneath the superstructure I the demised
· C premises might or might not belong to the government and the
    superstructure was built around May, 1948 by predecessor-in-
    interest of respondents 1 to 3 and an amount of Rs.3,500/- per
    month was agreed to be paid being a fair return against the
    investment made towards construction of superstructure". The
  0 submission that Rs.3,500/- per month was paid as
    compensation for construction of the superstructure was
    considered and rejected with the observations :-

           "The submission of appellant's Ld. Counsel that the amount
 E         was agreed to be paid only with a vie to compensate the
           predecessor-in-interest of respondents 1 to 3 and was not
           the rental of the super-structure does not seem to be
           carrying any weight and to my mind this submission cannot
           stand because the moment, we speak of compensation
 F         - it indicates to some specific amount of a specific period
           by which the liability would be deemed to have been
           discharged. It never means a flowing steam of payments
           to continue till infinity. It has got to be the rental only and it
           was also to understand, taken and acted upon by the
           parties as is clearly and unambiguously indicated from the
 G
           admitted stand of respondent/OTC. The respondent I OTC
           had in its written statement admitted this amount as rent
           though at other point it denied it being so. Really,
           respondent I OTC could not suppress the truth and at
           times, it honestly leaned towards it and described this sum
 H
 JAi SINGH AND ORS. v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 377
 OF DELHI AND ANR. [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
     of Rs.3,500/- as-monthly rental. Paras( a), (f) and (k) of brief . A
     facts of the written statement of respondent/OTC clearly
     reflect the above stand. In para {e), the words used are
     and would give it on rental basis to GNIT. The words used
   . in para (f) are that Sh. Bharat Singh constructed a depot
     on plot No. 2 and rented out the same structure to GNIT 8
     at a monthly rental of Rs.3,500/-. Para (k) states ... and the
     GNIT company continued paying a rent of Rs.3,500/- per
     month to Sh. Bharat Singh for the amount he had invested
     on.the super-structure and also for the amount he had
     financed to GNIT company. These terms are no misnomers C
     and actually they pump out the real intent of the parties
     under which respondent I OTC started making payments
     of monthly rentals to respondents 1 to 3 their predecessor-
     in-interest".                                  1



     21. We have been constrained to make elaborate                    D
reference to the orders of ARC and ARCT only to demonstrate
that High Court was not justified in observing that there has
been 'serious dereliction of duty' or that there has been 'blatant
violation of the fundamental principles of law and justice' by the
ARC and ARCT. We also cannot accept the observations of                E
the High Court that both ARC and ARCT have considered the
facts in a very mechanical way, or that the orders passed by
ARC and ARCT exhibited any patent illegality writ large on the
face of the orders. We also do not agree that the ARC and
ARCT ignored the sequence of events through which GNIT was             F
substituted by OTC. The entire sequence of metamorphosis of
GNIT into OTC have been elaborately explained and dilated
upon.

     22. We are of the considered opinion that the High Court
ought not to have exercised the extra ordinary jurisdiction under      G
Article 227 of the Constitution in the peculiar circumstances of
this case. We may briefly indicate the reasons for saying so:-

      (i)   Initially the appellants filed a petition for eviction
            against OTC and MCD. They had clarified that               H
    378           SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2010] 12 S.C.R.


A                   MCD has been impleaded only to avoid multiplicity
                    of proceedings.

           (ii}     Decree of eviction was passed. OTC lost in appeal,
                    lost in RCSA in the High Court. However, the High
                    Court clarified it shall have no bearing on the appeal
B                   filed by MCD. The order dated 31/01/2001, passed
                    by the High Court in CM (M) No.31 of 2001 reads
                    as under:-

          "There is a concurrent findings of facts and law against the
C         petitioner. It is not for this Court to substantiate for
          judgment over the judgment of the Court below through the
          proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

          Dismissed.

D         I am informed that the MCD has challenged the impugned
          order before the Rent Control Tribunal. Dismissal of this
          petition shail have no bearing on the determination of the
          Appeal filed by the MCD. "

E       Following the aforesaid order, RCSA No: 17/2001 & CMs
    74-75/2001 filed by the MCD was also dismissed vide order
    dated 03/09/2004, with the following observations:-

          "It appears that the order of the Additional Rent Controller
          was challenged before the Tribunal, which order has been
F         adjudicated upon by other bench of this court which uphold
          the order of the Additional Rent Controller. In view of the
          matter, I see no reason to entertain this appeal. SAO 17/
          2001 is accordingly dismissed."

G      In our opinion the aforesaid order was unexceptional since
  the pleas taken by the OTC and MCD before the Additional
  Rent Controller were identical. Therefore, it was in fitness of
  things that the subsequent coordinate bench also dismissed the
  appeal filed by MCD. The aforesaid order was however
H recalled without any justification with the following observations:-
JAi SINGH AND ORS. v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 379
OF DELHI AND ANR. [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
    "Heard counsel for the parties and have gone through the A
    order dated September 03, 2004 as also January 30,
    2001. It appears to me that while disposing of RCSA 17/
    2001 reference has been made purely CM(M) 31/2001.
    What escaped notice was that the order dated January 30,
    2001 in CM(M) would have no bearing on the determination B
    of the appeal by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi."

     Thereafter MCD, moved CM 4639/2007 with the prayer that
the appeal be treated as a petition under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India as the appeal is not maintainable. The C
application was disposed off by the following order dated 30/
3/2007:-

    "Counsel for the appellant has moved CM No: 4639/2007
    praying that this appeal be treated as a petition under
    Article 227 of the Constitution of India as the appeal is not D
    maintainable. He further submits that the appellant should
    file a fresh petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of
    India or under any other law if the same is permissible under
    law. On instruction from the respondent who is present in
    Court, counsel will not proceed with the execution petition E
    for a period of 15 days from today. Subject to this condition
    as prayed by counsel for the appellant RCSA 17/01 is
    dismissed as withdrawn.

          CM 4639/07 also stands disposed off."
                                                                    F
     A perusal of the aforesaid order clearly shows that the
application was disposed off on the statement made by the
learned counsel for MCD thatthe appellant (MCD) should file
a fresh petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India if
the same is permissible under law. (emphasis supplied)             G

     Therefore, the aforesaid order cannot be treated as an
order passed by the High Court permitting MCD to file a petition
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. However using the
aforesaid order of the High Court as an excuse, MCD filed the       H
    380          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010] 12 S.C.R.


A   petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India on 091041
    2007, being CM (Main) No. 57/2007, challenging the order
    which was passed by the ARC dated 11/11/1989 and the order
    passed by ARCT dated 12/3/2001. At this stage, in our opinion,
    the High Court failed to bestow proper attention to the objections
B   taken by the appellants to the maintainability of the writ petition
    on the ground of delay and !aches. Proceedings under Article
    227 can be initiated in the absence of the availability of an
    alternative efficacious remedy. In the present case, MCD had
    consciously withdrawn RCSA which had been filed under
c   Section 39(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The appeal had
    been filed against the order of the ARCT dated 12.3.2001.
    However, the objection on the ground of delay and laches was
    brushed aside by the High Court on two wholly untenable
    grounds, i.e:-
D         (i)     The orders passed by the ARC and ARCT suffered
                  from patent illegality on the face of the orders.

          (ii)    The MCD was bona fide prosecuting a case in the
                  wrong court, due to mistake of law.
E
         23. We are of the opinion that the High Court committed
    a patent error of jurisdiction in entertaining the writ petition under
    Article 227 of the Constitution which was unconscionably
    belated. Both reasons stated by the High Court in support of
F   its conclusions, are contrary to the facts on the record.

         It must be remembered that in these proceedings, the
    pleas raised by the OTC and MCD before the ARC as well as
    the ARCT were identical. The order passed by the ARCT has
    been upheld by a coordinate bench of the High Court. The
G   RCSA No: 17/2001 filed by MCD on identical grounds was thus
    dismissed by a subsequent coordinate bench. That was indeed
    in conformity with the high traditions, procedures and practices
    established by the courts to maintain judicial discipline and
    decorum. The underlying principle being, to avoid conflicting
H   views taken by coordinate benches of the same court. Except
 JAi SINGH AND ORS. v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 381
 OF DELHI AND ANR. [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]

in compelling circumstances, such as where the order of the            A
earlier bench can be said to be per incurium, in that it is passed
in ignorance of an earlier binding precedent/ statutory or
constitutional provision, the subsequent bench would follow the
earlier coordinate bench.
                                                                       B
     24. It appears that the entire proceedings adopted by MCD
after the dismissal of the RCSA..,. CM(M) No.31 of 2001, on
31.1.2001 were a subterfuge to avoid the execution
proceedings in a decree which had become final between the
parties. In the application seeking conversion of RCSA No: 17/         C
2001 to a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India,
it was categorically stated by MCD that the aforesaid RCSA
was not maintainable. The aforesaid statement is a clear
admission that the appeal filed by the MCD did not involve a
substantial question of law. It is apparent from the fact that under
Section 39(1) of the DRC Act subject to the provisions of sub-         D
section (2), an appeal lies to the High Court from an order
made by the ARCT. Sub-section (2) provides as Linder :-

     "No appeal shall lie under sub-section (1 ), unless the
     appeal involves some substantial question of law."                E

      Having made an admission that no substantial question of
law was raised in the RCSA, withdrawal of the same could not
possibly have been used as a justification for filing a petition
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. If the RCSA was
                                                                       F
devoid of any substantial question of law, the petition under
Article 227, based on the same facts, would be equally devoid
of any substantial question of law. This categoric admission of
the MCD was ignored by the High Court whilst recording the
finding that the orders of ARC and ARCT were passed "in
blatant violation of fundamental principles of law and justice."       G
This apart in the peculiar facts of this case, noticed above, it
could not be held that MCD had been bona fide prosecuting a
case in the wrong court. It was seeking a remedy provided
under Section 39(1) of DRC Act. Even this appeal was filed
beyond limitation. It was delayed by 431 days. In the meantime         H
    382       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 12 S.C.R.


A possession of a part of the premises had already been taken
  by the appellants. lnspite of the objections having been raised
  to the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 227 of the
  Constitution of India, they were rejected by the High Court with
  the observations noticed in the earlier part of the judgment. In
B such circumstances, in our opinion, it was wholly inappropriate
  for the High Court to entertain the writ petition under Article 227
  of the Constitution of India.

       25. Undoubtedly, the High Court has the power to reach
  injustice whenever, wherever found. The scope and ambit of
C Article 227 of the Constitution of India had been discussed in
  the case of The Estral/a Rubber Vs. Dass Estate (P) Ltd.,
  [(2001) 8 sec 97] wherein it was observed as follows:

           ''The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction
D          by a High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of
           India is examined and explained in a number of decisions
           of this Court. The exercise of power under this article
          .involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts
           and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see
E         that they do the duty expected or required of them in a legal
           manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited
           prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong
          decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the
           subordinate courts or tribunals. Exercise of this power and
F          interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunals is
           restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and
          flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice,
          where if the High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice
           remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High
           Court while acting under this article cannot exercise its
G
           power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment
           in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error,
          which is not apparent on the face of the record. The High
          Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of an
           inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to
H
JAi SINGH AND ORS. v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 383
OF DELHI AND ANR. [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
     justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable         A
     person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the
     court or tribunal has come to."

      In our opinion, the High Court committed a serious error
of jurisdiction in entertaining the writ petition filed by MCD under
                                                                       8
Article 227 of the Constitution of India in the peculiar
circumstances of this case. The decision to exercise
jurisdiction had to be taken in accordance with the accepted
norms of care, caution, circumspection. The issue herein only
related to a tenancy and subletting. There was no lis relating
to the ownership of the land on which the superstructure or the
                                                                       0
demised premises had been constructed. The whole issue of
ownership of plot of land No:2, Block-B, transport area of
Jhandewalan Estate, Desh Sandhu Gupta Road, Karol Bagh,
New Delhi is the subject matter of a civil suit being Suit No:
361 of 1980 in the High Court of Delhi. The High Court,                D
therefore, ought not to have given any opinion on the question
of ownership.               ·

     26. We are of the opinion the High Court traveled beyond
the well defined contours of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of     E
the Constitution of India.

    27. We; therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the
impugned judgment and order.

    Civil Appeal No. 8234 of 2010 @ Special Leave Petition             F
(C) No.1925 of 2008 :

     1. Leave granted.

     2. In view of the judgment in Civil Appeal No. 8233 of 2010       G
@ SLP (C) No. 16995 of 2009, this appeal becomes
infructuous and is dismissed as such.

B.B.B.                                     Appeals disposed of.