Holding

The High Court was not justified in completely setting aside the appellate court’s order; the writ petition must be restored and the appellate court directed to consider the effect of subsequent developments on bonafide need and comparative hardship, on further evidence.

Summary

The appellant, the son of a deceased landlord, sought release of a shop under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972, claiming bonafide need to set up an office for his chartered‑accountancy practice. The Prescribed Authority rejected the application, but the appellate authority allowed it. The tenant filed a writ petition; during its pendency the original landlord and both parties' parents died, and the tenant claimed he now had alternative premises, while the appellant asserted his need had increased because his two sons and a daughter had grown up. The High Court set aside the appellate court’s order and remanded the matter to it to reconsider the effect of these subsequent developments on bonafide need and comparative hardship. The Supreme Court held that although subsequent developments are relevant, the High Court was not justified in completely overturning the appellate court’s order; instead, the writ petition should be restored and the High Court should direct the appellate court to consider the new facts on further evidence, possibly after amendment of the release application. The appeal was partly allowed.

Issues considered

The High Court was justified in setting aside the appellate court’s order and remanding the case for fresh consideration based solely on subsequent developments.
Whether subsequent developments can be taken into account at the appellate stage without fresh evidence.
Whether a limited remand directing the appellate court to consider the effect of subsequent developments is the appropriate remedy.
Whether the landlord may amend his release application to include the need of his grown‑up children.

Legislation cited

U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972s. 21(1)(a), s. 22

Subjects

bonafide needsubsequent developmentslease releasecomparative hardshipU.P. Urban Buildings Actwrit petitionremandamendment of pleadingslandlord‑tenant

Judgment

[2009] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 525

JAi PRAKASH GUPTA (D) THR. LRS. A
v.
RIYAZ AHAMAD & ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 7207 of 2009)

OCTOBER 28, 2009
B
[TARUN CHATTERJEE AND AFTAB ALAM, JJ.]

-~
U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent &
Eviction) Act, 1972 (Act No. 13 of 1972) - s. 21(1)(a) -
Application for release of shop by landlord on the ground of c
bonafide need of his son - Allowed by appellate court -
During pendency of writ petition by te'nant, subsequent
development of facts - High Court remanding the case to
appellate court for fresh consideration - Justification of- Held:
~ Not justified - Writ court could not consider the effect of the D
subsequent developments on the bonafide need of landlord
'f as well as comparative hardship of parties on material facts,
without proper evidence on record - Application for
amendment of release application to be filed - In view of long
pendency, writ petition restored - High Court to decide the E
matter on the basis of the evidence and the findings by
appellate court on the limited issue - Subsequent events.
1 Subsequent events - When relevant - Held: Subsequent
~
developments of fact or law which have a material bearing on
the entitlement of the parties to relief are relevant, at any stage
F
of the proceeding.

The original landlord-father of the appellant filed
application for release of the shop on the ground that he
required the shop to use it as an office space to establlsh G
,.., the appellant; and that the tenant would not suffer
hardship. The Prescribed Authority rejected the
application. However, the appellate authority allowed the
same. Tenant filed writ petition. During the pendency, the
525 H
526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A original landlord died and legal representatives were
substituted. The original landlord's wife and the father of lt. ..._l

the tenant also expired. Tenant filed a supplementary •
'-
affidavit that after the death of the original landlord, the
appellant inherited all his residential and commercial
B property, thus, the need of the landlord became fully
satisfied. The appellant filed counter affidavit that In 15
years of litigation his bonafide requirement increased;
and that after the death of the father of the tenant, the
tenant inherited a house. High Court set aside the
,,..-
c judgment of the appellate court in view of the subsequent
developments and remanded the case back for disposal
to the appellate court to consider the effect of such
subsequent developments on the bonafide need of the
appellant and also on the question of comparative ~

D
hardship of the parties. Hence the present appeal. f

Partly allowing the appeal, the Court
-1'"
HELD: 1.1. A suit or an original proceeding is to be
tried in all its stages on the cause of action as it existed
E on the date of its commencement. The only exception to
this rule is that a Court may take notice of events, which
have happened since the institution of the suit or the
original proceeding and grant relief to the parties on the
~
basis of the altered conditions, is applied in cases where -?-

F it is shown that the original relief claimed has, by reason ....
of subsequent change of circumstances, become
inappropriate or that it is necessary to base the decision
of the Court on the altered circumstances in order to
)-
shorten litigation or to do complete justice between the
parties. [Para 16] [536-H; 537-A]
G
1.2. Subsequent developments of fact or law which
have a material bearing on the entitlement of the parties
to relief or on aspects which bear on the moulding of the
relief occur, the Court, even at any stage of the
H
....
JAi PRAKASH GUPTA (D) THR. LRS. v. RIYAZ 527
AHAMAD & ANR.
proceeding, is not precluded from taking a cautious A
cognizance of the subsequent developments of fact and
law to mould the relief. Keeping these principles in mind
and considering the nature of subsequent developments
as brought out by the parties during the pendency of the
writ petition, a solutio.n within the scope of this exception s
is to be found out. Therefore, the test Is whether the
subsequent events of fact have a material bearing dn the
entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which
bear on the moulding of the relief awarded before
consideration of such subsequent events. [Para 21][538· c
F-H; 539-A]

Rai Chand Manda/ and Anr. vs. Biswa Nath Manda/ and
Ors. XX CLJ 107; Nuri Mian vs. Ambica Singh and Anr. 24
CLJ 140; Pratap Rai Tanwani vs. Uttam Chand 2004 (8) SCC
490; Ramesh Kumar vs. Kesho Ram 1992 Supp. (2) SCC D
.
< 623; Chote Khan vs. Mohammad Obedal/a Khan AIR 1953
'f Nagpur 361, referred to
2.1. In the instant case, the death of the father of the
appellant is taken as a valid excuse by the tenant to argue E
that since the appellant had other option$ for
accommodation and for starting an office as a Chartered
Accountant, he could, without any hardship, forgo his
• claim to the shop in dispute. If it is an admitted position
~ that the appellant acquired a house behind the shop in F
dispute, then he has to prove by evidence that the said
house available is not suitable for starting an office space
for his Chartered Accountancy firm. The findings of the
appellate court are insufficient to decide the matter in the

., ;
.

(
light of the subsequent developments. The occurrence
of the subsequent developments has not been denied
upon by the appellant, in fac~, has been accepted by him.
G,,.

~. But the landlord/appellant has also, by his counter
affidavit, pleaded that in view of the long pendency of the
proceeding for release, his requirement has increased as
H
528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R. i
~
t

A the two sons and a daughter have grown up and, l
therefore, 'the requirement of the landlord/appellant has je -
to be adju,dged in the light of the statements made by him
in the c~)unter affidavit. [Para 22] [539-8-E]

2:2. It is to be seen whether there is any change in
8
the nature of the claim of the appellant consequent upon
the occu'pation of a house in vacant condition behind the
suit building and also consequent upon the death of the
father of the original landlord, who was running a ;i(~

C business in the suit building which had fallen vacant
because of the death of the father of the appellant and
also the accommodation that was available to the parents
of the appellant would also be taken into consideration
for the purpose of coming to a finding as to whether the
.appellant still requires the shop in dispute or not. That
D apart, the tenant submitted, the occupation of house,
>
which was used for running the printing business of his >
deceased father has come to the use of the landlord/
appellant, and therefore, the requirement of the landlord
has already been fulfilled. Moreover, in the light of the fact
E that the tenant now has alternative space for his
business, it has to be seen whether such alternative
space is suitable enough for the tenant and whether he
can shift there without substantial loss. [Para 22] (539-F-
H; 540-A]
F
2.3. High Court was fully justified in setting aside the
order of the appellate court in view of the fact that all the
facts stated need to be gone into after taking evidence
on such facts. The effect of the subsequent ,,
J
developments on the bonafide need of the instant
G landlord as well as the comparative hardship of the
parties on material facts could not be taken into
consideration by the writ court without ·proper evidence
on record. However, considering the age of the litigation
i.e. 15 years and if the matter is sent back to the appellate
H
JAi PRAKASH GUPTA (D) THR. LRS. v. RIYAZ 529
AHAMAD & ANR.

court, the proceeding may continue for another 15 years, A
~

-"' that the High Court was not jus_tified in sending the case
back to the Appellate Court for fresh decision in the light
of the subsequent developments. [Para 22] [540-B-D]

2.4. It would have been appropriate and proper and B
./
in the interest of justice for the High Court to keep the writ
petition pending before it and send back the issue on the
effect of subsequent developments and supplementary
->-- affidavit and counter affidavit on bonafide requirement
and comparative hardship to the appellate court and after
the appellate court taking evidence, it shall send back to
c
the High Court, the evidence that would be taken and also
the findings arrived at thereon. In the event, the appellate
court finds it difficult to take evidence on its own, it will
be open to it to frame the issue and send the same to take
D
' evidence to the Prescribed Authority who, in turn, will
take the evidence of the parties and send the same to the
.. 1" appellate court for the purpose of considering the issue
of bonafide requirement of the landlord/appellant and
comparative hardship of the parties. [Para 22] [540-E-G]
E
2.5. In view of the statements made in the counter
affidavit filed by the appellant to the extent that he has
got two grown up sons and a daughter and that being
•
~ the position, the requirement of the appellant has
-(
increased and, therefore, the tenant/respondent is liable F
to be evicted, it would be open to the landlord/appellant
to file an application for amendment of the original
release application for the purpose of incorporating the
fact of the requirement of two sons and a daughter by
amending the same to which it would be open to the G
respondent/tenant to file written objection. [Para 22] [540-
_.( G-H; 541-A]
~
2.6. For the purpose of coming to a positive
conclusion on the bonafide need of the appellant and the
comparative hardship of the parties on the basis of the H
-f.

-1
530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A subsequent developments, the matter is to be examined
on further evidence after restoring the writ petition before -"'-
the High Court with a direction in the manner indicated
in view of the fact that the justice has already been
delayed for a long time. The judgment of the High Court
B is set aside. [Paras 23 and 24] [541-C, D]
Case Law Reference:
XX CLJ 107 Referred to Para 16
~~

24 CLJ 140 Referred to Para 17
c
2004 (B) sec 490 Referred to Para 18
1992 Supp.(2) sec 623 Referred to Para 19
AIR 1953 Nagpur 361 Referred to Para 20
D
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. '
7207 of 2009.
i'
,
From the Judgment & Order dated 11.12.2007 of the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.
E 1112 of 2001.

Mona Rajvanshi, Anurag Kashyap, Bishwajit Kumar Shahi,
B.P. Gupta for the Appellant.
•
__,
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
F
TARUN CHATTERJEE, J. 1. In spite of repeated
opportunities having been granted to the respondents to contest
this appeal, the respondents had failed to appear at the time
of hearing.
G
2. Leave granted.
~
3. This appeal by way of Special Leave arises from the
Judgment and final order of the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.1112 of 2001 dated
H 11th of December, 2007, whereby the High Court had set aside '
•
~
JAi PRAKASH GUPTA (D) THR. LRS. v. RIYAZ 531
AHAMAD & ANR. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
the Judgment and order of the Additional District Judge, Meerut A
• fa and remanded the same to it to consider the effect of
subsequent developments which had occurred, on the question
of bonafide requirement of the landlord and also on the
comparative hardship of the parties.
B
4. The brief facts, which are necessary for decision of this
appeal are as follows :-

On 17th of December, 1992, the father of the present
-¥
landlord, viz. Late Sri Jai Prakash Gupta had filed an
application under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of c
1972 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") before the
Prescribed Authority at Meerut for the release of the Shop No.
51, situated at the Ground Floor in House No. 64, Banshipura,
Suraj Kund Road, Meerut (hereinafter referred to as "the shop
in dispute"). It was pleaded in the application for release that D
• the landlord required the shop in dispute for his bonafide need
1- to use the same as an office space to establish his son in the
profession of Chartered Accountancy. It was alleged that the
tenant was running a big business of 'Verk' job in Khairnagar
in Meerut City and that he would suffer no hardship since he E
had kept the shop in dispute unutilized. The tenant not having
vacated the shop in dispute which would be required for the
bonafide requirement of the landlord, the landlord was
l
constrained to file the application for release.
~
5. The tenant entered appearance and contested the F
application for release by filing a written objection denying the
material allegations made in the application for release. It was

.. specifically denied that the landlord required the shop in dispute
for the above mentioned purpose and, therefore, the tenant
sought for dismissal of the application for release filed by the G
landlord.
~

6. Parties adduced evidence and issues were framed by
the Prescribed Authority in which one of the issues was whether
the landlord required the shop in dispute for his bonafide H
532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A requirement for starting an office for his Chartered Accountant
son. After framing issues and after the parties had led evidence
in support of their respective claims, the Prescribed Authority
rejected the application for release, inter alia, holding that since
_\,.,
-
the landlord was in occupation of a space available in the first
B floor, where he along with family members are residing, he
could very well use the same as the office of his Chartered
Accountant son and such space, being available to the landlord,
shall be sufficient for their requirement. It was further held by
the Prescribed Authority that there was no need to consider the ¥-
c case of comparative hardship of the parties when bonafide
requirement of the landlord was not proved.

7. Aggrieved by the said decision of the Prescribed
Authority, the landlord filed an appeal under Section 22 of the
Act and on 14th of December, 2000, the Additional District
D Judge, 11th Court at Meerut, allowed the appeal filed by the
•
landlord and set aside the order of the Prescribed Authority
inter alia holding that the landlord required the shop in dispute .:r
for the use as mentioned above, as he was of the view that it
was an appropriate place for the son to start his office as a
E Chartered Accountant. It was further held on consideration of
the materials on record that the tenant would not f~ce much
hardship if the shop in dispute was released in favour of the
landlord since the father of the tenant had sufficient space for
I
'lathe work' in an alternative place. Keeping in view the --,
F professional requirement of the son of the landlord to start his
office of chartered accountancy for which the landlord needed
more space, the order of the Prescribed Authority was set aside
and the application for release was allowed by the Appellate
Court. ....
G
8. Aggrieved by this order of the Appellate Court, the
tenant filed a writ petition, which came to be registered as Civil
).
Misc. Writ Petition No. 1112 of 2001 before the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad. During the pendency of the writ
petition, the original applicant for release of the shop in dispute
H
JAi PRAKASH GUPTA (D) THR. LRS. v. RIYAZ 533
AHAMAD & ANR. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]

i.e. the father of the present appellant died and in his place, A
::i the heirs and legal representatives of the original appellant were
substituted by the High Court by an order dated 25th of August,
2005. During the pendency of the writ petition, it was brought
on record that the mother of the appellant and the father of the
tenant had also expired. On 23rd of May, 2007, the tenant, by B
a Supplementary Affidavit, alleged that after the death of the
original appellant, the present appellant, Mr. Manoj Kumar
Gupta, the only son of the original appellant (since deceased),
--¥ has inherited all his residential and commercial property and,
therefore, the alleged need of the landlord had become fully c
satisfied, rendering the release proceeding infructuous. The
tenant, in the said Supplementary Affidavit, further alleged that
the printing business conducted by the deceased father of the
present landlord had ceased to exist and consequent
thereupon, one big hall and two rooms came in possession of D
~
the present landlord.
'i
9. Replying to this supplementary affidavit, the present
landlord, by a counter affidavit, however, claimed that in 15
years of litigation, his bonafide need had become more
pressing and genuine as he now has two sons aged about 17 E
and 16 years and one daughter aged about 13 years.
Moreover, it was alleged in the col.inter affidavit that his wife
f was running an Education Centre on the first floor of the shop
+ in dispute. It was further alleged in the counter affidavit filed by
the present landlord that after the death of the father of the F
tenant, the tenant had inherited a house at Khairanagar, Meerut,
in which the tenant and his family members are now residing
and also carrying on the workshop of 'lathe machine'. Therefore,
the present landlord alleged that the subsequent developments
brought in by the tenant and the counter affidavit filed by the G
present landlord, were not at all material so as to nullify the need
of the landlord.

10. The writ petition thereafter came up for hearing before
the High Court of Allahabad on 11th of December, 2007 and
H
534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A the High Court had set aside the Judgment of the Appellate
.~
Court dated 14th of December, 2000 in view of the subsequent
developments as noted in the suppiementary affidavit filed by
the tenant and the counter affidavit filed by the appellant and
remanded the case back to the Appellate Court to consider the
B effect of such subsequent developments on the bonafide need
of the present landlord and also on the question of comparative
hardship of the parties.

11. Feeling aggrieved, the present landlord has preferred ::.;..-
this instant Special Leave Petition, which on grant of leave, was
c heard in presence of the learned counsel for the parties.

12. Before us, the learned counsel appearing for the
present landlord contended that the subsequent developments,
as stated in the supplementary affidavit as well as in the counter
D affidavit, were not at all material enough to negate the need of
the shop in dispute of the present landlord and, therefore, there
was no reason for the High Court in the exercise of its Writ 'r
Jurisdiction to remand the matter back to the Appellate Court,
which in no way, can help the cause of justice, rather it will
E aggravate the hardship of the landlord by delaying the matter
for another 15 years. The learned counsel for the landlord also
submitted that the High Court, while setting aside the Judgment
of the Additional District Judge, Meerut and remanding the
matter to it, had failed to record any reason as to why an order i-•
F of remand was necessary and the findings already arrived at
by the Appellate Court were perverse, apart from relying on the
sole subsequent event of the death of the parents of the
appellant and .also the father of the tenant along with the fact
that the present landlord had acquired house behind the shop
in dispute in a vacant condition.
G
13. As noted earlier, no one has entered appearance on )i..
behalf of the tenant at the time of hearing of this appeal to
controvert the submissions made by the learned counsel for the
present landlord.
H
JAi ,PRAKASH GUPTA (D) THR. LRS. v. RIYAZ 535
AHAMAD & ANR. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]

14. Having carefully examined the submission of the A
~ ,:Jc, learned counsel for the landlord/appellant and after going
through the impugned Judgment of the High Court as well as
of the Appellate Court and also the supplementary affidavit and
counter affidavit filed by the parties and other materials on
record, we are of the view that the only question that needs to B
be decided is, whether the High Court was justified in
remanding the case back for disposal to the Appellate Court
on the sole reasoning of subsequent developments, without
-~- looking at the findings of the Appellate Court and secondly, that
even assuming the order of remand was necessary in the facts c
and circumstances of the case and in view of the subsequent
developments that had taken place in the meantime, an order
of limited remand was required only to decide the question of
bonafide requirement on the subsequent developments that had
taken place in respect of which supplementary affidavit and
) D
counter affidavit were filed by the parties before the High Court.
From the impugned Judgment, the High Court had noticed that
,- 1 since the parents of the present appellant were dead, more
accommodation would be available to the landlord not only from
the inherited property but also from the accommodation, in
which the parents used to reside. It was also pointed out by the E
High Court in the impugned order that the present landlord had
acquired a house behind the shop in dispute in a vacant
~
condition during the pendency of the proceedings. From the
-+ counter affidavit filed by the landlord/appellant, it appears that
at the present moment, two sons and a daughter had grown F
up and, therefore, the requirement had also increased.
Accordingly, the landlord/appellant sought to contend that even
if his parents had died and the accommodation that was
available to his parents would now be available to the landlord/
appellant, but still then in view of his growing sons and daughter, G
the need of the shop in dispute would still remain. Therefore,
' "" now the question remains to be seen is whether the facts as
'
stated hereinearlier, would be relevant to decide the bonafide
need of the landlord/appellant and comparative hardship under
the Act after amending the pleadings in the original release H
536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A application to bring on record the requirement of the two sons
-and-one daughter. It is true that on the death of the parents of /~.
...
the landlord/appellant, more space for accommodation would
become available to the landlord/appe!lant, the question would
still be there to consider whether such space available now on
8 the death of the parents of the landlord/appellant would be
reasonable and suitable for the purpose of starting an office
for him. It was brought to the notice of the High Court that the
two sons and the daughter have grown up, therefore, the
requirement of the landlord/appellant, at the present moment,
c would also increase. It is a fact which may be gone into by the
Court if the landlord/appellant is permitted to amend his
pleading bringing the fact namely, the requirement of his two
sons and a daughter.

15. In our view, there cannot be any argument that the facts
D brought in by way of subsequent developments are relevant and (

it certainly needs to be gone into on evidence. But since the
litigation is pending for the last 15 years, that is to say, from y
-,
1992, we are of the view that instead of setting aside the entire
order of the Appellate Court and sending the case back to the
E same for fresh decision on subsequent developments which
were brought before the High Court, only an order of limited
remand to the Appellate Court ought to have been passed by
the High Court, keeping the file pending before it and after.
~
receiving the evidence on the effect of subsequent ·-;-
F developments on the question of bonafide need and
comparative hardship from the Appellate Court and the finding
of the Appellate Court on such question, considering the entire
evidence and also the supplementary affidavit and counter-
affidavit filed by the parties and other materials on record, the
G Writ Petition can be decided afresh.

16. It is true that a suit or an original proceeding is to be )..
· tried in all its stages on the cause of action as it existed on the
date of its commencement. The only exception to this rule is
that a Court may take notice of events, which have happened
H
JAi PRAKASH GUPTA (D) THR. LRS. v. RIYAZ 537
AHAMAD & ANR. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
since the institution of the suit or the original proceeding and A
grant relief to the parties on the basis of the altered conditions,
is applied in cases where it is shown that the original relief
claimed has, by reason of subsequent change of
circumstances, become inappropriate or that it is necessary to
base the decision of the Court on the altered circumstances in B
order to shorten litigation or to do complete justice between the
parties. [See Rai Chand Manda/ and another vs. Biswa Nath
Manda/ and others; XX CLJ 107]. This was the view expressed
by Sir Ashutosh Mukherjee, J. (as His Lordship then was) on
this question when subsequent developments should be taken c
into consideration by the Court during the pendency of a
proceeding or of a suit or even at the appellate stage.

17. The same view has been expressed yet in a later
.. decision of the Calcutta High Court to the effect that where it
is shown that the original relief claimed by reason of subsequent D
change of circumstances become inappropriate or that it is ·
necessary to base the decision of the Court on the altered
circumstances in order to shorten litigation or to do complete
justice between the parties. [See Nuri Mian vs. Ambica Singh
and another 24 CLJ 140] E

18. Again in Pratap Rai Tanwani vs. Uttam Chand (2004
(8) SCC 490), this Court also held that subsequent
developments can be taken into consideration to afford relief
to the parties, provided only when such developments had a F
material impact on those rights and obligations.

19. Similar was the view expressed in Ramesh Kumar vs.

I
. Kesho Ram [1992 Supp. (2) SCC 623 where this Court
observed as follows : -
G
( ~.
"6. The normal rule is that in any litigation the rights and
obligations of the parties are adjudicated upon as they
obtain at the commencement of the lis. But this is subject
to an exception. Wherever subsequent events of fact or
law which have a material bearing on the entitlement of H
538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 15 (ADDL.} S.C.R.

A the parties to relief or on aspects which bear on the
~
~

moulding of the relief occur, the court is not precluded
from taking a 'cautious cognizance' of the subsequent
changes of fact and law to mould the relief." (Emphasis
supplied).
B
20. It also reminds us of a celebrated Judgment of a Full
Ben.ch decision of the Nagpur High Court in Chote Khan vs.
Mohammad Obedalla Khan [AIR 1953 Nagpur 361], in which
the view of the Court to take note of the subsequent ...-
developments specially at the appellate stage was taken up for
c consideration. Hidayatulla, J (as His Lordship then was) held
as under:

"on a review of judicial opinion, that an action must be tried
in all its stages on the cause of action as it existed at the
commencement of an action. No doubt, Courts 'can' and
"
D ~

sometimes 'must' take notice of subsequent events, but
that is done merely 'inter partes' to shorten litigation but y
not to give to a defendant an advantage because a third
party has acquired the right of the plaintiff. (Emphasis
E supplied)"

21. In view of the discussions made hereinabove, it is
therefore, a settled proposition of law that subsequent
developments of fact or law which have a material bearing on •
~t
the entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which bear
F on the moulding of the relief occur, the Court, even at any stage
of the proceeding, is not precluded from taking a cautious
cognizance of the subsequent developments of fact and law to
mould the relief. Keeping these principles in mind and
considering the nature of subsequent developments as brought
!G out by the parties during the pendency of the writ petition, we
are of the view that we will have to find out a solution within the
>--
scope of this exception. Therefore, the test is whether the
subsequent events of fact have a material bearing on the
entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which bear on
H
JAi PRAKASH GUPTA (D) THR. LRS. v. RIYAZ 539
AHAMAD & ANR. [TARUN CHATIERJEE, J.]
the moulding of the relief awarded before consideration of such A
subsequent events.

22. In the present case, the death of the father of the
appellant is taken as a valid excuse by the tenant to argue that
- since the present landlord had other options for accommodation
and for starting an office as a Chartered Accountant, he could,
8
without any hardship, forgo his claim to the shop in dispute.
Again, if it is an admitted position that the present landlord has
acquired a house behind the shop in dispute, then he has to
prove by evidence that the said house available is not suitable C
for starting an office space for his Chartered Accountancy firm.
In this connection, we have examined the factual findings of the
Appellate Court and concluded that the recorded findings are
insufficient to decide the matter in the light of the subsequent
developments. The occurrence of the subsequent
developments has not been denied upon by the appellant, in D
fact, has been accepted by him. But the landlord/appellant has
also, by his counter affidavit, pleaded that in view of the long
pendency of the proceeding for release, his requirement has
increased as the two sons and a daughter have grown up and,
therefore, the requirement of the landlord/appellant has to be E
adjudged in the light of the statements made by him in the
counter affidavit. Thus, the issue that needs to be examined now
is whether there is any change in the nature of the claim of the
present appellant consequent upon the occupation of a house
in vacant condition behind the suit building and also consequent F
upon the death of the father of the original landlord, who was
running a business in the suit building which had fallen vacant
because of the death of the father of the appellant and also the
accommodation that was available to the parents of the
appellant would also be taken into consideration for the purpose G
of coming to a finding as to whether the appellant still requires
the shop in dispute or not. That apart, the tenant submitted, the
occupation of house, which was used for running the printing
business of his deceased father has come to the use of the
landlord/appellant, and therefore, the requirement of the landlord H
540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A has already been fulfilled. Moreover, in the light of the fact that
the tenant now has alternative space for his business, it has to ~
.....
,

be seen whether such alternative space is suitable enough for
the tenant and whether he can shift there without substantial
loss. Therefore, we are of the view that the High Court was fully
B justified in setting aside the order of the Appellate Court in view
of the fact that all the facts stated herein need to be gone into
after taking evidence on such facts. The effect of the
subsequent developments on the bonafide need of the present
landlord as well as the comparative hardship of the parties on '·r
c material facts could not be taken into consideration by the Writ
Court without proper evidence on record. However, considering
the age of the litigation i.e. 15 years and if the matter is sent
back to the Appellate Court, the proceeding may continue for
another 15 years, we are of the view that the High Court was
not justified in sending the case back to the Appellate Court '"'
D "
for fresh decision in the light of the subsequent developments
as noted hereinabove. In our view, it would have been y-
appropriate and proper and in the interest of justice for the High
Court to keep the Writ Petition pending before it and sent back
the issue on the effect of subsequent developments and
E supplementary affidavit and counter affidavit on bonafide
requirement and comparative hardship to the Appellate Court
and after the Appellate Court taking evidence, it shall send back
to the High Court, the evidence that would be taken and also ~

the findings arrived at thereon. In the event, the Appellate Court --+-
F finds it difficult to take evidence on its own, it will be open to it
to frame the issue and send the same to take evidence to the
Prescribed Authority who, in turn, will take the evidence of the
parties and send the same to the Appellate Court for the
purpose of considering the issue of bonafide requirement of
G the landlord/appellant and comparative hardship of the parties.
In view of the statements made in the counter affidavit filed by
the landlord/appellant to the extent that he has got two grown
up sons and a daughter and that being the position, the
requirement of the present landlord has increased and,
H therefore, the tenant/respondent is liable to be evicted. That
JAi PRAKASH GUPTA (D) THR. LRS. v. RIYAZ 541
AHAMAD & ANR. [TARUN CHATIERJEE, J.]
being the position, we are, therefore, of the view that it would A
___._ be open to the landlord/appellant to file an application for
amendment of the original release application for the purpose
of incorporating the fact of the requirement of two sons and a
daughter by amending the same to which it would be open to
the respondent/tenant to file written objection. B

23. For the reasons aforesaid, we are, therefore, of the
opinion that for the purpose of coming to a positive conclusion
on the bonafide need of the present landlord and the
comparative hardship of the parties on the basis of the
subsequent developments, as noted hereinearlier, the matter
c
needs to be examined on further evidence after restoring Jhe
Writ Petition before the High Court with a direction in the
manner indicated above in view of the fact that the justice has
already been delayed for a long time.
D
24. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the Judgment
y of the High Court and restore the Writ Petition and direct the -
High Court to decide the same in the manner indicated above.

25. Accordingly, the High Court is requested to decide the E
writ petition within 6 months from the date of the supply of a
copy of this order to it without granting any unnecessary
adjournments to either of the parties in the light of the directions
• made hereinabove.
t
26. The appeal is thus allowed to the extent indicated F
above. There will be no order as to costs.

N.J. Appeal partly allowed.

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