Holding

A tenant obtains the benefit of Section 14(2) only when an order for possession is not passed because he has complied with the order under Section 15; a withdrawn proceeding does not confer that benefit, so the proviso does not bar the tenant from invoking Section 14(2) again.

Summary

The landlord filed three ejectment applications against the tenant for possession of a room in Kamla Nagar, Delhi. In the first proceeding (1967) the Rent Controller ordered the tenant to pay arrears under s.14(2) read with s.15 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958; the tenant complied and the landlord withdrew the petition. In a later proceeding (1971) the landlord sought possession again on the ground of rent arrears, but the Additional Rent Controller refused to pass an order under s.15, invoking the proviso to s.14(2) that a tenant who has already obtained its benefit cannot claim it again. The Rent Control Tribunal held that no benefit was obtained in the withdrawn case and allowed the tenant, but the Delhi High Court set aside that decision. The Supreme Court held that the benefit under s.14(2) is the avoidance of a decree for possession, which arises only when an order for possession is not passed because the tenant complied with s.15; a withdrawn proceeding does not confer such a benefit. Consequently, the proviso does not apply and the tenant may avail the protection of s.14(2) again. The appeal was allowed, the High Court judgment set aside, and the Tribunal's order restored with a modified deadline for payment of arrears.

Issues considered

The applicability of the proviso to sub‑section (2) of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 when the earlier ejectment proceeding was withdrawn after the tenant complied with the order under Section 15.
Whether the tenant had obtained the benefit contemplated in Section 14(2) in the first proceeding, thereby disqualifying him from invoking the same protection in a subsequent proceeding.

Legislation cited

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958s. 14(1), s. 14(2), s. 15(1)
Transfer of Property Acts. 106

Subjects

Delhi Rent Control ActSection 14(2) provisoevictionrent arrearstenant benefitpossession orderlandlord‑tenant disputewithdrawn proceeding

Judgment

388
A

JAGAN NATH

v.

B RAM KISHAN DASS AND ANR.

December 12, 1984

[Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, CJ. AND R:S PATHAK J.)

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958-S. 14(1) proviso scope of.
c
The respondentsJ Landlord, filed three ejectment applications on
March 9, 1967, May 13, 1968 and March 9, 1971 respectively against the '
appellants, a tenant for possession of one room situate at Kamla Nagar,
New Delhi. The first application was on the ground of non.payment arrears
of rent and bona fide requirement, the second on the ground of bona fide
D requirement of the landlord and the third one again on the ground of non ..
payment of arrears of rent. Tb" first application, where the appellant
complied with an order passed by tbe Rent Controller u/s 14(2) r/w s. IS(!)
of the Delhi Rent Control Act; 1958 calling upon the appeHant to deposit
arrears of rent, was with~raw~ by the respondents subsequently on the
ground that they had not given to the appellant a notice to quit. The
second application was dismissed on merits. In the third application out of
E which the present appeal arises, the Additional Rent Controller passed atl
order of eviction against the appellant holding that no order u/s. 15(1), of
the Act could be passed on the ground that such a benefit was given to the
appellant in the first eviction petition and that by reason of the proviso to
sub-s. 2 of s. 14 of the Act, the appellant could not claim that benefit
once again. The appeal of the appellant against the c rder of eviction was
allowed by the Rent Control Tribunal. which took the view th at the
appellant was entitled to the benefit of the provision contained in section
F
14 (2) of the Act and that, the proviso to that sub-section bad no appJi-
oation because, the benefit of the provision contained in section 14 (2) was
being availed of by the appellant for the first time in the present proceed-
ings. But the High Court in second apf'cal set aside the judgment of the
Rent Control Tribunal and restored that of the Rent Controller.

The appellant contended that the proviso to sub·s. (2) of s. 14 can
G have no application to the instant case because, in the first ejectment pro~
ceedings the appel1ant had not obtained any benefit under that sub-section.
The respondent contended that if a tenant avails of the benefit of an order
passed u/s. IS (I); he must be regarded as having obtained the benefit of
the provision contained ins. 14 (2) and that the final result of tho eviction
petition in which an order was passed under section 15 (1) for the first time,
or the form of the final order passed in that proceeding, has no relevance on
the question whether the tenant bad obtained benefit of the provision con·
H tained in section 14 (2).
1AGAN NATH v. RAM KISHAN 389

Allowing the appeal, A

HELD : (!)Section 14 (2) of the Act provides that oo order for the
recovery of possession of any premises can be made on the ground that the
tenaat bas committed default in the payment of rent, if he pays or deposits
the rent in accordance with the prov is ions of section 15. The benefit which

- '
the tenant obtains under section 14 (2) is the avoidance of the decree for Pas .
session. ThoD;gh he bad committed default in the payment of rent, no decree
for possession can be passed again<;t him. This benefit accrues to the terant by
reason cf the fact that he bas complied with the order passed by the Control-
ler under section JS of the Act. The passing of an order under section lS is
B.

• not a benefit which accrues to the tenant under section 14(2). It is obligatory
upon' the Controller to pass an order under section 15(1) in every proceeding
for the recovery of possession on the ground specified in section 14 (1) (a),
that isJ on the ground.that the tenant has committed default in the payment c
of rent. That is a facility which the law obliges the Controller to give to
• the tenant uodcr section 15. It is through the medium of that facility that
the tenant obtains the benefit under section 14(2), And that benefit consists
in the acquisition of an immunity against the passing of an order of posses~
sion on the ground of default in the payment of rent. It must follow that, it
is only if an order for possession is not passed against the tenant by reason
of the provision contained in sec.tioo 14(2), that it can be said tbat 111 has D
obtained a benefit under that section. [394C-G]

(2) If the earlier proceeding was withdrawn by the landlord, it cannot
be said that the tenant obtained the benefit of not having 11ad an order of
possession· passed against him. It is self-evident that if a proceeding ends in
an order granting permission for its withdrawal, it cannot possibly be said
tba t ''no order for the recol'ery of possession was passed therein for the E
reason that the tenant had made payment or deposit as required by section
15". That is the gist of section 14(2). The stage or occasion for passing an
order to the effect that 'no order for possession can be passed because of the
fact that the tanant has comi)lied with the order passed. under section 15
does not arise in the very nature of thingsJ in a case wherein the landlord is
permitted to withdraw the application for ejectmeot of the tenant.
[394H; 395A-B]
(3) In the instant case, the reason leading to the termination of the F
earlier ejectment application was that the respondents wanted to cure the
formal defect from which the application suffered and not that no order for
possession could be passed against the appellant for he reason that the had
complied with the order passed under section 15. 111 other words, there was
no nexus between the fina I order which was passed in the earlier eject meat
application and the fact that the appellant had complied with the order
passed under section 15. The earlier ejeictment application was founded on G
two groundsJ namely, that the appellant had committed default in the paya
meat of rent and that respondents wanted the prermises for their personal
need. The fact that the first of these grounds was no longer available to the
' ..... respondents sioce the appellant had complied with the order passed under
section 15 could not have resulted in the dismissal of the ejectment appli ..
cation because, the other ground on which eviction of the appellant was
sought by the respondents bad yet to be considered by the Rent Coatroller.
This is an additional reason why it cannot be said on the facts, of this case H
390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] !2 s.c.R.

A that the appellant obtained a benefit under section 14(2). But, the two
circumitances, just mentioned will not make any difference to the funda~
mental legal position explained above that the proviso to si;:ction 14(2) can
be attracted only if it is shown that the tenant had obtained the benefit of
the provision contained in that section and not otherwise. [395D-H]

B
(4) The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High
Court and resto.red that of the Rent Control Tribunal with the modification
that the period of one month for depositing the arrears of rent shall be
computed from the date of this judgment. [397C]
' -
Rama Gupta v. Rai Singn Kain 1972 All Iodia Rent Control Journal
712, Ashok Kumar v. Ram Gopai 1982 (2) Rent Contral Journal 29 approved.
c
Kahan Chand Makan v. B.S. Bhambrl, AIR 1977 Delhi 27 referred to.
•
CIVIL APPELLATE JURisDICTiON: Civil Appeal No. 653 of 1979.
Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated
D
the 14th August, 1978 of the Delhi High Court in S. A. 0. No.
166/73.

U. R. La/it and B. P. Maheshwari, for the Appellant.
A. K. Goel for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
E
CHANDRACHUD, CJ. The appellant is a tenant of the respon·
dents in respect of one room in a house at Kamla Nagar, New
Delhi. The rent of the 1·oom is Rs.10/·per month. On March 19,
1967 the respondents filed an application for possession of the room
on two grounds : one, that the appellant was in arrears of rent and,
two, that they required the room bona fide for their own use and
II
occupation. An order was passed by the Rent Controller iu that
proceeding under section 14 (2) read with section 15 (!) of the
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter called "the Act"), calling
upon the appellant to pay or deposit the arrears of rent within one
month;.. The appellant complied with that order, whereupon, on
April I, 1968 respondents withdrew the ejectment application, with
liberty to file a fresh application. The reason stated by the respon-
G
dents.for withdrawing the application was that they had not given
to the appellant a notice to quit under section 106 of the Transfer of
Property Act and that, therefore, the application was liable to fail
for a formal defect.

Immediately thereafter, on April 7, 1968 respondents gave1
H notice to quit to the appellant, terminating his tenancy with effect
JAGAN NATH v. RAM ICISl!AN (Chandrachud, C.J.) 391

from May 9, 1968. On May 13, 1968, respondents filed a fresh A
application for possession against the appellant on the ground that
they required the room bona fide for their pernonal use. That appli ·
cation was dismissed on February 14, 1969.
On March 9, 1971 respondents filed the instant application
aga!nst the appellant for possession of the room on the ground that B
the appellant was in arrears of rent from ApFil 1968 until March
1'71. In this proceeding, the learned Additional Rent Controller,
Delhi, refused to pass an order under section 15 (I) of the Act on
the ground that such a benefit was given to the appellant in the
first eviction petition and that, by reason of the proviso to sub-
section (2) of section 14 of the Act, the appellant could not claim c
that benefit once again. In that view of the matter, the Rent Cont-
troller passed an order of eviction against the appellant.

The appeal filed by the appellant against the order of eviction
was allowed by the Rent Control Tribunal, which took the view
that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of the provision con- D
tained in section 14 (2J of the Act and that the proviso to that sub-
section had no application because, the benefit of the provision
contained in section 14 (2) was being availed of by the appellant
for the first time in the present proceedings. According to the
Tribunal, the first ejectment application filed by the respondents
against the appellant was dismissed because, respondents asked for E
leave to withdraw that application with liberty to file a fresh appli-
cation on the ground that they had not served a notice to quit on
the appellant, and not on the ground that the appellant had complied
with the order passed under section 15 ( 1) of the Act.

The judgment of the Rent Control Tribunal was set aside in F
Second Appeal by the High Court of Delhi. The High Court took
the view that though' the first ejectment application was withdrawn
by the respondents on the ground that they had not given a notice
to quit to the appellant, that cannot alter the position that the
appellant had availed of the benefit of the provision contained in
section 14 (2) of the Act. Therefore, according to,the High Court, G
by reason of the proviso to section 14 (2), the appellant was not
entitled to invoke the provisions of section 15 (I) of the Act. By
this appeal, the tenant challenges the correctness of the judgment of
the High Court.

Section 14 of the Act contains provisions which are more or
less similar to the provisions contained in various other Rent Acts.. H
392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985) 2 S.C.R,

Sub-section (!) of that section contains the prohibitory provision
that, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any
other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of posses-
sion of any premises shall be made by any court or Controller in
favour of the landlord against a tenant. !he proviso to that sub·

B
section enables or entitles a landlord to obtain possession of the
premises let out to a tenant on one or more of the grounds only,
which are mentioned in clauses (a) to (I) of the sub-section. Clause
-
(a) of the proviso enables a landlord to obtain possession if the
tenant has neither paid nor tendered the arrears of rent within two
months from the date on which the notice of demand for the arrears
of rent has been served on him by the landlord in the manner
c prescribed by section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Under
clause (e) of the proviso, the landlord can obtain possession of the
residential premises let out to the tenant, on the ground, broadly,
that the premises are required by him for a personal need. Sub- • I/
section (2) of section 14 reads thus:

D ' "14 (2)-No order for the recovery of possession of
any premises shall be made on the ground sp~cified in cla-
use (a) of the proviso to sub-section (1), if the tenan makes
payment or deposit as required by section 15 :

Provided that no tenant ;hall be be entitled to the
E benefit under this sub-section, if, having obtained such
benefit once in respect of any premises, he again makes a
default in the payment of rent of those premises for three
consecutive months."

Section 15 (!) of the Act reads thus :
-'
F "15 O) In every proceeding for the recovery of posses- ,
sion of any premines on the ground specified in clause (a}
of the proviso to sub-section (!) of Section I 4, the Control-
ler shall, aftet giving the parties an opportunity of being
· heard, make an order directing the tenant to pay to the
landlord or deposit with the Controller within one month of
G
the date of the order, an amount calculated at the rate of
rent at which it was last paid for the period for which the
arrears of the rent were legally recoverable from the tenant
including the period subsequent thereto up to the end of
the month previous to that in which payment or deposit is
H made and to continue to pay or deposit, month by month,
1/\GAN NATH v. RAM KISH/\N (Chandrachud, C.J.r 393'

by the fifteenth of each succeeding month, a sum equivalent A
to the rent at that rate."

Sub-section (6) of section JS provides that if a tenant makes
payment or deposit as required by sub-section () ), no order shall be
made for the recovery of possession against him on the ground of
default in the payment of rent by him. On the other hand, if a B
tenant fails to make payment or deposit as required by section 15
(I), the Controller may order the defence of the tenant to be struck
off under sub-section (7) and proceed with the hearing of the
ejectnient application.

The rent of the suit premises is small, only Rs. IO/ per month. c
The tenant, of course, is much too small as would appear from the
fact that he committed default in the pwment of rent at that rate
for a long time. But, quite often, small tenants have small land-
. lords who are entitled to expect that the tenants will pay at least the
small rent regularly and not drive .them to a court proceeding which
is bound to cost more than the amount of arrears of rent which is D
at stake. This seemingly insignificant case raises a question of some
public importance, which is partly evidenced by the fact that the
learned Judges of the Deihi High Court have taken conflicting views
upon the q t1estion. Those views were explained carefully and those
judgments were read out to us by Shri A. K. Goel who appears on
E
behalf of the respondents. We do not propose to embark upon an
analysis of those judgm,nts since, that exercise is not likely to prove
fruitfuL The reason is that the facts of the various cases which
were before the High Court differed from case to case, which partly
accounts for the divergent views expressed by different learned
Judges of the High ~ourt. With respect, some of the judgments
cited before us overlook that previous decisions turned on their own F
peculiar facts,
•
It is contended by Shri Lalit, · who appears on behalf of the
appellant, that the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 14 can have
no application to the instant case because, in the first ejectment
proceed,ing which was filed by the respondents against the appellaot, G
the latter had not obtained any benefit under that sub-section. On
the other hand, it is contended by Shri Goel that if a tenant avails
of the benefit of an order passed under section 15 (! ), he must be
regarded as having obtained the benefit of the provision contained
in section 14 (2). According to the learned counsel, the object of
the proviso to section 14 (2) is to ensure that an order under section H
394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] 2 s.c.R.
A 15 (l) is not passed in favour of a tenant more than once. There-
fore, it is contended, the final result of the eviction petition in which
an order was passed under section 15 (!) for the first time, or the
form of the final order, passed in that proceeding, has no relevance
on the question whether the tenant had obtained benefit of the provi.
sion contained in section 14 (2).
n
We are of the opinion that the appellant's contention is pre-
ferable to that of the respondents, having regard to the language of
section 14 (2) of the Act and of the proviso to that section .. Putting
it biiefly, that section provides that no order for the recovery of
c possession of any premises can be made on the ground that the ten-
ant has committed default in the payment of rent, if he pays or
deposits the rent in accordance with the provisions of section 15.
I
The benefit which the tenant obtains under section 14 (2) is the
avoidance of the decree for possession. Though he had committed
default in the payment of rent, no decree for possession can be
D passed against him. This benefit accrues· to the tenant by reason of
the fact that he has complied with the order passed by the Controller
under section 15 of the Act. The passing of an order under section
15 is not a benefit which accrues to the tenant under section 14 (2).
It is obligatory upon the Controller to pass an order under section
15 (!) in every proceeding for the recovery of possession on the
E ground specified in section 14 (!)(a), that is, on the ground that the
tenant has committed default in the payment of rent. That is a
facility which the law obliges the Controller to give to the tenant
under section 15. It is through the medium of that facility that the
tenant obtains the benefit under section 14 (2). And, that benefit
consists in the acquisition of an immunity against the passing of an
F order of possession on the ground of default in the payment of rent.
It must follow that, it is only if an. order for possession is not passed
against the tenant by reason of the provision contained in section
14 (;:), that it can be said that he has obtained a benefit under that
•
section. The Key words of the proviso to sub-section (2) of section
14 are: "Provided that no tenant shall be entitled to the benefit
G under this sub-section."

That brings out the relevance of the nature of the order which
was passed in the earlier proceeding in which the tena~t had com-
plied with the order passed by the Controller under ~ect10n 15. It t~e
earlier proceeding was withdrawn by the landlord, 1t cannot be said
that the tenant obtained the benefit of not having had an order of
H possession passed against him. It is self-evident that if a proceeding
JAGAN NATH v. RAM KJSHAN (Chandrachud, C.J.) 395

ends in an order granting permission for its withdrawal, it cannot A
possibly be said that "no order for the recovery of possession was
passed therein for the reason that the tenant had made payment or
deposit as re9uired by section 15". That is the gist of section 14 (2).
The stage or occasion for passing an order to the effect that 'no order
for possession can be paBsed because of the fact that the tenant has
complied with the order passed under section 15' does not arise in B
the very natnre of things, in a case wherein the landlord is permitted
t 9 withdraw the application for ejectment of the tenant.

There are two circumstances which must be borne in mind in
this case though, we must add, they will not make any difference to
the legal position which is stated above: The first circumstance is·
c
that the respondents asked for leave to withdraw the earlier ejectment
application, in which the appellant had duly comlied with the order
passed by the Contro lier under section I 5, on the ground that the
application was liable to fail for a formal ·defect since they had not
given a notice to quit to the.appellant under section 106ofthe Trans· D
fer of Property Act. Thus, the reason leading to the termination of
the earlier ejectment application was that the respondents wanted to
cure the formal defect from which the application suffered and not
that no order for possession could be passed against the appellant for
the reason that he had complied with the order passed under section
J5. In other words, there was no nexus between the final order E
which was passed in the earlier ejectment application and the fact
that the appellant had complied with the order passed under section
15. The second cireumst_ance which must be mentioned is that the
earlier ejectme?t application was founded on two grounds, namely,
that the appellant had committed default· in the payment of rent
and that respondents wanted the premises for their personal need. F
The fact that the first of these grounds was no longer available to the
respondents since the appellant had complied with the order passed
under section 15, could not have resulted in the dismissal of the
ejectment application because, the other ground on which eviction of
the appellant was sought by the respondents had yet to be considered
G
by the Rent Controller. This is an additional reason why it cannot
be said on the facts of this case that the appellant obtained a benefit
nnder section 14 (2). At the cost of repetition, we must clarify that
the two circumstances which we have just mentioned will not make
any difference to the fundamental legal position which we have
explained above that the proviso to section 14 (2) can be attracted
only if it is shown that the tenant had obtained the benefit of the
provision contained in that section and not otherwise.
396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] 2 S.C.R.

A As we have stated earlier, several conflicting decisions of the
High Court of Delhi were read out to us. It is both needless and
difficult to consider them individually. We will only indicate, that
on facts similar to those before us, the view taken by D. K. Kapur,
J , in Raona Gupta v. Rai Singh Kain,(') is the correct view to
take. The learned Judge held in that c2se that since the landlord
B had withdrawn the earlier eviction petition, it could not be said
that the tenant had derived a benefit under section 14 (2) of the Act.
Jn Kahan Chand Makan v. B. S. Bhambri, <2J a Division Bench of the
Delhi High Court noticed the conflicting judgments rendered by
the different Benches of the High Court, including the judgment of
D. K. Kapur, J., in Rama Gupta v. Rai Singh Kain. It is not possible
c to say with certainty whether the view taken by D. K. Kapur, J.,
was approved because, the judment of the Division Bench refers
to various decisions of the High Court without stating which of those
is correct and which n0t. In any case, the conclusion recorded by
the Division Bench in paragraph 13 of its judgment seems too broad
D to apply to varying situations. Besides, the learned Judges, with
respect, have apparently confused the availing of the facility under
section 'l5 by the tenant with the benefit which accrues to him tinder
section ! 4 (2). They say :

"We, therefore, hold that where a deposit of arrears
of rent has been made by the tenant in compliance with an
order specifically passed under section 15 (I) of the Act in
"' -
E
the course of proceedings initiated for his ejectment under
section 14 (1) (a), the benefit cannot be availed of in a
subsequent proceeding for his ejectment on the same
ground. The existence and proof of such an order in an
earlier proceeding covered by section 14 (1) (a) is essential
F in order to deprive the tenant of the protection which
section (14 (2) gives him."

The benefit which the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 14
speaks of is : "the benefit under this sub-section., and not the
benefit under section 15. ·

A recent decision of a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High
· Court is reported in Ashok Kumar v. Ram Gopa/. <'> That was a
typical case which attracted the proviso to section 14(2). The landlord

(I) 1972 All India Rent Control Journal 712.
(2). AIR 1977 Deihl 247.
JI (3) 1982 2 Rent Control Journal 29.
JAGAN NAm •• RAM KISHAN (Chandrachud, C.J.) 397

therein had filed an application under section 14(1)(a) in 1973 for the A
eviction of the tenant on the ground of non-payment of rent. The
Rent Controller passed an order under section 15 (I) which was duly
complied with by the tenant. Thereupon, the landlord's application
was dismissed by the Controller. In May 1979, the landlord filed
another petition for possession against the tenant on the ground that
he b.ld committed default in the payment of rent. It was held by E
Kirpal J, and rightly, that since the tenant had obtained the benefit
of section 14 (2) in the previous ejectrnent application, he was not
entitled to the benefit of that section once again.

For these reasons, we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment
of the High Court and restore that of the Rent Control Tribunal C
with the modification that the period of one month for depositing
the arrears of rent sh~ll be computed from the date of this judgment.
If the appellant deposits the arrears of rent due until December 31,
1984 on or 'before January 12, 1985 the respondent' application for
possession. will stand dismissed. On the other hand, if the appellant
0
fails to deposit the arrears of rent as directed above, there shall be
an order for possession in favour of the respondents which they will
be entitled to execute. The amount of arrears will be deposited in
the Court of the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi, in which the
ejectment application was filed against the appellant.
•. ~
There will be no order as to costs throughout.

M. L.A. Appeal allowed.

•