Holding

Section 121A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act confers a wider revisional jurisdiction on the High Court than Section 115 of the CPC, permitting it to set aside the tribunals' findings of fact where material evidence was ignored, and the High Court’s order is upheld.

Summary

The appellants, Jagadeesh and others, claimed tenancy and occupancy rights over a scheduled agricultural land and filed Form‑7 before the Karnataka Land Tribunal. The Tribunal and the Appellate Authority granted occupancy rights, but the High Court, exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 121A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1974, set aside those findings, holding that the appellants failed to prove tenancy, particularly the payment of rent. The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the High Court could not interfere with the tribunals' concurrent findings of fact and that Section 121A did not confer a power broader than Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court held that Section 121A gives the High Court a wider revisional power, allowing it to re‑appreciate evidence and set aside findings where material evidence was ignored or conclusions were perverse. Consequently, the Court upheld the High Court’s order and dismissed the appeal, finding no ground for interference under Article 136 of the Constitution.

Issues considered

Whether the High Court, under Section 121A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1974, can interfere with and set aside the concurrent findings of fact of the Land Tribunal and the Appellate Authority.
Whether the revisional power conferred by Section 121A is broader than the power under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
Whether the appellants proved tenancy/occupancy rights over the scheduled land as required under the Act.
Whether the Supreme Court should entertain a special leave petition and interfere with the High Court’s order under Article 136 of the Constitution.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 115
Constitution of Indias. 136
Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1974s. 121A, s. 4

Subjects

revisional jurisdictionKarnataka Land Reforms ActSection 121Atenancyoccupancy rightshigh court powerArticle 136scheduled landevidence appraisalconcurrent findings of fact

Judgment

[2008] 2 S.C.R. 737

JAGADEESH & ANR. A
.....
~. II.
STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 3377 of 2001)
FEBRUARY 12, 2008
B
(TARUN CHATTERJEE AND AFTAB ALAM, JJ.)

Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1974:
,.. ~
s. 121 A - Revisional Power of High Court- Held: Is wider
uls 121 A of the Act than the one uls 115 CPC - Under s. 121 A c
High Court is empowered to look into legality of orders of
Tribunals below or irregularity of proceedings and to consider
evidence and material on record in the circumstances
explained in the judgment - On facts, in view of the findings of
High Court, it cannot be said that High Court, in exercise of its D
jurisdiction u/s 121A of the Act was notjustified in setting aside
... concurrent findings of fact of Tribunals below - Evidence and
material on record clearly established that applicants filing
Form-7 could not prove that they were tenants of Scheduled
land - High Court rightly held that entries in RTC record relied E
on by Tribunals below did not show scheduled land to have
been cultivated by claimants nor nature of cultivation shown
as of tenants - Even otherwise, the findings recorded by the
High Court being well merited, it is not a fit case for interference
under Article 136 of the Constitution - Code of Civil Procedure, F
1908- S.115 - Constitution oflndia, 1950-Article 136.
""' ....
The father of the appellants filed Form No.7 before
the Land Tribunal praying for a declaration that he had
acquired occupancy rights in respect of the scheduled
land. Relying on the entries in the RTC record he claimed G
that he had been cultivating the said land since 1968 till
the notified date on 'wara' basis giving 113rd of the share
-..+
in the produce to respondent No.4. The application was
opposed by respondent No.4 stating that the land was
737 H
738 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R. ~

A mortgaged to respondent No.3 and after expiry of the said
mortgage the mortgagee was liable to deliver back its
possession; that since the mortgagee later settled in
another State, with his consent the land was given to the
father of the appellants for cultivation from 1968; but not
B as a tenant. The Land Tribunal, relying, inter a/ia, on the
entries in the RTC record granted occupancy rights in
favour of the appellants. The appeal of respondent No.4
was dismissed by the Appellate Tribunal. But, the High
Court in the revision petition rejected the claim of the
c appellants holding, inter alia, that the appellants or their
father had failed to prove the tenancy in respect of the
scheduled land.
In the instant appeals, it was contended for the
appellants that it was not open to the High Court in revi-
D sional jurisdiction u/s 121 A of the Karnataka Land Reforms
Act,1974 to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact
arrived at by the Land Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
E HELD: 1.1 Revisional power of the High Court under
Section 121A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1974 is
wider than the one exercised by the High Court under
Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Under
Section 121A of the Act, the High Court is empowered to
F look into the legality of the orders of the tribunals below
or regularity of the proceedings. In exercise of revisional
jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code, the High Court ~ ""'
is entitled to interfere with the orders of the Tribunals or
the courts below only in cases of jurisdictional error, when
G it finds that they have: a) exercised a jurisdiction not
vested in them by law, orb) failed to exercise a jurisdiction
so vested, or c) acted in the exercise of their jurisdiction
illegally or with material irregularity. [para 9,] [747-D-H; .,_.
748-A]
H 1.2 Under section 121 A of the Act it would be open to
JAGADEESH & ANR. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 739
..... & ORS .
....\

the High Court to consider the material evidence on A
record, when it finds that such evidence was not at all
considered by the tribunals below or when the conclusion
arrived at by the tribunals below run contrary to the
materials on record or when it finds that there is no
evidence to support the conclusion of the tribunals below B
or that the reasons given by the tribunals below are
..., ......
absolutely perverse or a finding was such that no court
would come to such a conclusion or that the decisions of
the tribunals below were manifestly unjust. Therefore,
under section 121A of the Act, in the presence of any of c
these circumstances, the High Court was empowered to
look into the legality of the orders impugned in deciding
the question whether the appellants could be held to
be the tenants under respondent No. 3 or 4. [para 9]
[748-8, C, D, E] D
Dahya Lal & Ors. vs. Rasul Mohammed Abdul Rahim
(1963} 3 SCR 1; Mohan Balaku Patil & Ors. vs. Krishnoji
Bhaurao Hundre (Dead) By Lrs. (2000} 1 SCC 518 and
Krishtappa Ye/Jappa Pujar & Ors. vs. Ram Samsthan
Beladhadi (1999} 1 SCC 74 - held inapplicable. E
2.1 On a careful examination of the findings of the
High Court, which were based on consideration of the
material evidence on record, it cannot be said that the High
~ ... Court was not justified in setting aside the concurrent
findings of fact of the tribunals below in exercise of its F
jurisdiction under Section 121A of the Act. The High Court
was justified in coming to the conclusion that the evidence
and material on record would clearly establish that the
appellants were not able to prove that they were the
tenants in respect of the scheduled land under the G
""' respondents. One of the main criteria for deciding whether
a particular person is a tenant or not is to see whether
there was payment of rent, either in cash or in kind. In the
instant case, the High Court considered that the
appellants failed to satisfy the court that any payment of H
740. SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R.
.,... ~

A rent had been made either by the father of the appellants
or by the appellants themselves. [para 11] [748-G, H;
749-A, 8, C]
2.2 The tribunals below relied on the entries made in
the RTC record in respect of certain period. While
B considering such entries, the High Court rightly held that
from the entries in the RTC record for the years 1968 to )..
'..;
1974, the appellants or their father was not shown as the
person in cultivation of the land in dispute; and also the
nature of cultivation of the scheduled land was not shown
c as that of the tenants in the said RTC record. That being
the position, the High Court came to a proper conclusion
that the entries in the RTC extracts produced by the
appellants could not support their claim that they were
cultivating the land in dispute as tenants. [para 12]
D [749-C, D, E] A
2.3 The High Court was fully justified in drawing an
adverse inference against the appellants for not
producing any Geni receipts or any lease agreement to
show that respondent No. 3 had, in fact, leased out the
E scheduled land in favour of the appellants or their father,
on crop share basis anc;t that the appellants had paid th~
Geni to respondent No.3. Such being the findings arrived
at by the High Court, it cannot be held that the tenancy
claimed by the appellants in respect of the scheduled land .,.,..
~·
F could be established. [para 12] [749-E, F, G]
3. Even assuming that the High Court was not
justified in setting aside the concurrent findings of fact in
exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 121A
of· the Act, it is not a fit case where this Court should
G interfere with the impugned judgment of the High Court \..-
in the exercise of power under Article 136 of the
Constitution. Considering the orders of the appellate
authority and the land tribunal and the impugned order
of the High Court, the view taken by the High Court was
H plausible The findings arrived at by the High Court while
¥
JAGADEESH & ANR. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 741
& ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
.. ~
setting aside the orders of the tribunals below appear to A
be well merited and in accordance with the evidence and
the material on record. Therefore, this is not a fit case to
interfere under Article 136 of the Constitution with the
order of the High Court passed under section 121A of the
Act. [para 15-18] [751-D, E, F, G; 752-B, E] B
Union of India & Ors. vs. Gangadhar Narsingdas
.. ..... Aggarwal & Anr. (1997) 10 SCC 305; Jai Mangat Oraon vs.
Mira Nayak (Smt.) & Ors. (2000) 5 sec 141 and
Taherakhatoon (DJ By Lrs. Vs. Salambin Mohammad (1992)
2 sec 635 - relied on. c
CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3377
of 2001.
From the Judgment and Order dated 20.7.2000 of the High
;._
Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in L.R.R.P. No. 2420of1990. D
N.D.B. Raju, Bharathe Raju and Guntur Prabhakar for the
Appellants.
S.N. Bhat, Sanjay R. Hegde, Vikrant Yadav and Amit Kr.
Chawla for the Respondents. E
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
TARUN CHATTERJEE, J. 1. In our view, although the
High Court had set aside the concurrent findings of fact arrived
......... at by the Tribunals below under the Karnataka Land Reforms F
Act, 1974 (in short 'the Act') in the exercise of its revisional
jurisdiction under Section 121AoftheAct, even then, this is not
a fit case where this Court, in the exercise of its power under
Article 136 of the Constitution would interfere with such an order
of the High Court.
G
~~
2. The appellants in this appeal, claiming to be the tenants
of agricultural land, bearing Survey No. 125/1, measuring 3
acres 11 Gunthas (hereinafter c~lled as the 'scheduled land')
situated in Lingabahalli Village, Madhugiri Taluk in the State of
Karnataka, filed Form No.7 before the Land Tribunal praying H
y
742 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R. )

...
A for a declaration that they had acquired occupancy rights in ""
respect of the scheduled land. They alleged that they were
cultivating the scheduled land from 1968 till the notified date
under the Act on Wara basis giving 113rd of the share in the
foodgrains to respondent No.4. Accordingly, the appellants
B prayed for an order of occupancy right in respect of the
scheduled land alleging that they and their father were cultivating >--
the scheduled land as occupancy right holders relying, inter alia, ~

on the entries under the RTC record.
3. The case of the appellants, as made out, was disputed
c by the respondent No. 4. The case of respondent No.4 was that
the scheduled land was mortgaged to the 3rd respondent,
Rajashankar, in the year 1968 and after the expiry of the said
mortgage, the mortgagee was liable to deliver possession of
the same. The case of tenancy as made out by the appellants
D or their father was denied. It was alleged by the respondent No.4 ).
that since the respondent No.3 was a film actor and had settled
in Madras (now Chennai), with the consent of the respondent
No. 3, the scheduled land was given to the father of the appellants
and the father of the appellants was cultivating the same from
E the year 1968 but not as a tenant. Accordingly, they prayed for
rejection of the application filed by the father of the appellants
claiming occupancy rights under the Act. Initially, the Land
Tribunal allowed the application of the father of the appellants
and feeling aggrieved, a writ petition was filed against the said
~-
,,,,,
F order. The High Court had set aside the order of the Land
Tribunal and remanded the case back to the Tribunal for a fresh
decision. The Land Tribunal, after remand, relying on the entries
in the RTC record and some other materials on record, granted
occupancy ri.ghts in favour of the appellants. t

G 4. Feeling aggrieved, the respondent No. 4 filed an appeal
~~
before the Appellate Authority, which was also dismissed. A
revision petition, thereafter, was moved before the High Court
and the High Court, by the impugned judgment, had set aside
•
the concurrent findings of fact and rejected the application filed \
H by the father, since deceased, of the appellants holding, inter
JAGADEESH & ANR. v.. STATE OF KARNATAKA 743
, & ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
~
~ alia, that the appellants or their father had failed to prove the A
tenancy in respect of the scheduled land. A special leave petition
was filed against the judgment of the High Court, setting aside
the concurrent orders allowing the application, in respect of which
leave has already been granted.
B.
5. We have heard Mr. Raju, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellants and Mr. S. N. Bhat, learned counsel
.., appearing on behalf of the respondents. We have examined
t
the impugned judgment of the High Court as well as the orders
of the Tribunals below. It is true that the High Court, while
exercising its revisional power under Section 121A of the Act, c
had set aside the concurrent findings offact of the Land Tribunal
as well as of the appellate authority, even then, examining the
findings of the High Court and considering the power conferred
on it in the revisional jurisdiction under Section 121 A of the Act,
we do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned order D
of the High Court in the exercise of our power under Article 136
of the Constitution. While setting aside the findings of the
Tribunal, the High Court, at paragraph 7 of the impugned
judgment made the following findings :-
"It is an undisputed fact that the revision petitioner has E
mortgaged. the land in dispute in favour of the 5th
respondent, Rajashankar in the year 1968 and after the
expiry of the mortgage period, since the 5th respondent
failed to deliver back the possession of the land in dispute .
__..,' ~ to him, he filed the suit for redemption and obtained a F
decree for redemption. When the matter stood thus, the
father of the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 Gondappa, who is
th~ uncle of the 5th respondent, Rajashankar, filed Form
No. 7 before the Land Tribunal claiming occupancy rights
in respect of the land in dispute contending that he is the G
.....j tenant of the said land, under the 5th responpent from the
year 1968, i.e. subsequent to. the date of mortgage. To
prove this fact, he relied upon the entri~s in the R.T.C .
. extract for the years 1968 to 1974 wherein his name i$
shown as the person in cultivation of the land in dispute. H-·
744 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R.

A But, it is significant to note that the nature of cultivation of ,,,.... ""\
the land is not shown as that of a tenant in the said R.T.C.
extracts. In one year, the nature of cultivation is described
as "Swantha" and in the years, the column is left blank.
Thus the R.T.C. extracts produced by him do not support
B his contention that he was cultivating the land in dispute
as a tenant. He has not produced any Geni receipts or any
Lease Agreement to show that the 5th respondent has
~
leased out the land in dispute in his favour on crop share
basis and that he paid the Geni to the 5th respondent. '
c Thus, he has no documentary evidence in respect of his
claim that he came in possession of the land in disputQ as
a tenant under the 5th respondent and that he was cultivating
the land in dispute as a tenant. It is further significant to
note that in the evidence given by the respondent No. 3
before the Land Tribunal, he claimed that his father has
D
taken the land in dispute on lease in the year 1962, from
: the father of the petitioners, Gundu Rao. Even in respect .....
of the said claim, he failed to produce any documentary
evidence evidencing the said lease of land in dispute from
Gundu Rao. On the other hand, in Form No. 7 filed by
E Gondappa, the father of the respondents 3 and 4, he
alleged that he was the tenant under. the 5th respondent in
respect of the land in dispute from the year 1968. Thus,
there is no consistent stand regarding the year of
commencement of tenancy or under whom, Gondappa,
F the father of the respondents 3 and 4 became the tenant. ). ...__
So, the only question which arises for consideration is -,
whether the said cultivation of the land in dispute by the '
father of the respondents 3 and 4 during the years 1968
to 1974 can be presumc.d to be that of a tenant under tile
G provisions of Section 4 of the Karnataka Land Reforms
Act. Section 4 of the Act makes it clear that a member of
I;-
the owner's family cannot be considered. as a deemed
tenant, even if he is lawfully cultivating the land belonging
to owner. In the present case, since the father of the
H respondents 3 and 4, is the uncle of the respondent No.
JAGADEESH & ANR. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 745.
& ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
I
5, it cannot be said that he is not a member of the family A
of the respondent No. 5. Though there is no evidence on
record to show that there are any joint family properties
belonging to the joint family of respondent No. 5. and his
uncle, there is nothing on record to show that they are not
living as members of the joint family. So, it is not possible B
to presume that the father of the respondent Nos: 3 and 4
Gondappa, who is the uncl.e of respondent No. 5 was not
the member of the family of ·the mortgagee, respondent
No. 5."
6. Again, the High Court, while setting aside the findings C
of fact also made the foliowing findings :-
"But in the instant case, since the respondents 3 and 4
failed to produce any evidence to show that t~eir father
was cultivating the land in dispute as a tenant under the
0
5th respondent mortgagee and even when the ·entries in
the R. TC. extract produced do not support Jhe claim of
tenancy set up by the father of the respondents 3 and 4,
the question of drawing presumption of deemed tenancy
in his favour under Section 4 of the Act does ·not arise.
The father of the respondents 3 and 4, being the uncle E
of respondent No. ·5-Mortgagee, it is also quite possible
that he might have been allowed to cultivate the land in
dispute under the personal supervision of respondent
No. 5 by assisting him in cultivation of the said land.
F
* * * * * * * * *
In the present case also, the respondents 3 and 4 failed
to prove that their father was cultivating the land in dispute
from the year 1968 as a tenant under the respondent
No. 5 and that after the death of their father, they continued G
as tenants in respect of the land in dispute ........... It is
also significant to note that the respondent No. 5, who
was alive when the enquiry was pending before the Land
Tribunal has not given evidence in favour of the
respondents 3 and 4 stating that he has leased out the H
-¥\
,. -
746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ~
[2})08]
. 2 S.C.R.
.

~ ~
A land in dispute in favour of the respondents 3 and 4,_
Except the interested testimony of respondents 3 and 4,
there is nothing else on record to show that their father
was inducted as a tenant to cu/tiva~he land in dispute
br the 5th respondent after the land is dispute was taken
B on mortgage by him. So, it is not possible to presume
that the father of the respondents 3 and 4 was inducted
as a tenant by the mortgagee, the 5th respondent, in >-
•l
respect of the land in dispute...... Since the respondents
3 and- 4 failed to produce any documentary evidence to
c show that their father was put in possession of the land
in dispute by the 5th respondent, mortgagee as a 'tenant'
· and that they are continuing as tenants in respect of the
said land after the death of their father, I find that they are
not entitled· to grant of occupational rights ............ The
earlier decision of this Court reported in /LR 1996 KAF?
D
page 2340 that when a person fails to prove that he is ,4-
cultivating the land as tenant, he cannot be granted
occupational right notwithstanding the fact that he· might
be in possession of the land and cultivating the same, is
applicable to the facts of the present case on all fours".
E
· 6. From a careful examination of the findings given by the
High Court, as quoted hereinabove, in upsetting the concurrent ·
findings of fact arrived at by the Tribunals below, we are not in a
position to hold that the High Court was not justified in setting
F aside the concurrent orders of the Tribunals below in the exercise ~- .,,
. of its revisional power under Section 121 A of the Act. The power
conferred on the High Court to revise the orders of the tribunals
below has been provided in Section 121AoftheAct, which runs
as under:-
G "The,High Court may at any time call for the records·of
any order or proceeding recorded by the Appellate \.--
au(hority under this Act or any other law for the purpose l!,
of sa_ljsfying itself as to the legality of such order or as to
the regularity of such propeeding · and may pass such
H. order with respect thereto as it thinks fit''.
JAGAL>EESH & ANR. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 747
& ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]

8. From a plain reading of Section 121A of the Act, under A
which revisional jurisdiction can be exercised, it would be clear
that the High Court, while exercising such power is entitled to
re-appreciate the evidence when it finds that the conclusion
arrived at by the appellate authority.runs contrary to the materials
on record and when it finds that there is no evidence to support B
the conclusion.of the appellate authority or when it finds that the
reasons given by the appellate authority are absolutely perverse
and cannot be supported by the evidence on record. It would '
also be clear from a plain reading of Section.121A of the Act
that the High Court is also entitled to interfere with the orders of c
the Tribunals below when the material evidence on record was
ignored or a finding was such that no court would come to such
conclusion or that the decision of the Tribunals below was
manifestly unjust.
9. We have carefully examined the provisions· under D
Section 121AoftheAct, which is the revisional power under the
Act, and also the provisions under Section 115 of the Code of
Civil Procedure (for short 'the Code'). So far as Section 115 of
the Code is concerned, it has been made clear that it is only in
case of a jurisdictional error or when the courts below had acted E
with material irregularity in the exercise of their jurisdiction that
th·e question of interfering· with such an order can arise,
otherwise, the High Court is not entitled to interfere with any
other order which does not satisfy the conditions laid dQw}\ fo.f
interference under Section 115 of the Ct>de. On the other han~ F
in our view, under Section 121A of the Act, it would be ¢pen to
the High Court to interfere with the orders of the tribunalS-below
as the High Court is empowered to look into the iegality of the
order or regularity of the proceedings although, in the exercise
of revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code, the High
Court is not entitled to look into the legality of the order or the ~
regularity of the proceedings but only entitled to interfere with
the orders of the Tribunals or the courts below when it finds that
they have a) exercised a jurisdiction not vested in them by law,
orb) failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or c) acted in
H
748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R.

A the exercise of their jurisdiction illegally or with material
irregularity. Reading the aforesaid provisions viz., Section 121A
of the Act and Section 115 of the Code, we have no hesitation .
-
in our mind to hold that the revisional power exercised by the
High Court under section 121 A of the Act is wider than the one
B exercised by the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction under
Section 115 of the Code. As noted herein earlier, since section
121A of the Act clearly empowers the High Court to look into
the legality of the orders impugned, therefore, it would be open
tot~ High Court to consider the material evidence on record,
c wl'ien it finds that such evidence was not at all considered by
the tribunals below or when the conclusion arrived at by the
tribunals below run contrary to the materials on record or when
it finds that there is no evidence to support the conclusion of the
tribunals below or that the reasons given by the tribunals below
are absolutely perverse or a finding was such that no court would
D come to such a conclusion or that the decisions of the tribunals
below were manifestly unjust. Therefore, under section 121 A of
the Act, in the presence of any of the abovementioned
circumstances, the High Court is empowered to look into the
E legality of the orders impugned in deciding the question whether
the appellants could be held to be the tenants under the
respondent Nos. 3 or 4.
10. Keeping the aforesaid principles in mind as to when
the High Court would be justified, in the exercise of its power
F under Section 121A of the Act, to examine the legality of the
orders of the tribunals below in an appropriate case, let us now
examine the findings of the High Court, while setting aside the
concurrent findings of fact of the Tribunals below. In our view, on
a careful examination of the findings of the High Court, which
G were based on consideration of the material evidence on record,
it is difficult for us to hold that the High Court was not justified in
setting aside the concurrent findings of fact of the tribunals below
in the exercise of its jurisdiction und_er Section 121 A of the Act.
~-·. .

i 1. We have already noted the findings made by the High
H Court in the impugned judgment Qn the question whether the
~

JAGADEESH & ANR. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 749
& ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
~
...... appellants could be held to be the tenants on the evidence and A
materials on record. While doing so, in our view, the High Court
was justified in coming to the conclusion that the evidence and
material on record would clearly establish that the appellants
were not able to prove that they were the tenants in respect of
the scheduled land under the respondents. One of the main B
criteria for deciding whether a particular person is a tenant or
.... not is to see whether there was payment of rent, either in cash
or in kind. In this case, while rejecting the claim of the appellants,
the High Court had considered that the appellants had failed to
satisfy the court that any payment of rent was made either by c
the father of the appellants or by the appellants themselves.
12. The tribunals below, while accepting the case of the
..,,,
' appellants, had relied on the entries made in the RTC record in
respect of certain period. While considering such entries, the
High Court had rightly held' that from the entries in the RTC D
record for the years 1968 to 1974, the name of the appellants
was not shown as the person in cultivation of the land in dispute
and also the nature of cultivation of the scheduled land was not
shown as that of the tenants in the said RTC record. That being
the position, the High Court had come to a proper conclusion E
that the entries in the RTC extracts produced by the appellants
could not support the contention that they were cultivating the

• .. ....
land in dispute as the tenants. In our view also, the High Court
was fully justified in drawing an adverse inference against the
appellants for not producing any Geni receipts or any lease F
agreement to show that the 5th respondent before the High Court
(respondent No. 3 herein) had, in fact, leased outthescheduled
land in favour of the appellants or their father, since deceased,
on crop share basis and that the appellants had paid the Geni
to the 5th respondent. Such being the findings arrived at by the
G
High Court with which we are in concurrence, it is difficult to
--' hold that the tenancy claimed by the appellants in respect of the
scheduled land could be established.

13. Considering the above aspect of the matter and after
\ considering the scope of Section 121 A of the Act, we are, H
750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008]2 S.C.R.

A therefore, unable to agree with the learned counsel' for the · ;.. ~

appellants that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under
Secti9n .121A of the Act, the High Court was not entitled to set
aside the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the appellate
authority and the land tribunal. Such being the position, we do
B not find any reason to interfere with the judgment of the High
Court, although the High Court, in the exercise of its power under
Section 121 A of the Act, had set aside the concurrent orders of
~
the appellate authority as well as the land tribunal.
"
14. Mr.Raju, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
c the appellants, however, contended before us that it was not
qpen to the High Court, in the exercise of its revisional
jurisdiction under Section 121 A of the Act, to interfere with the
concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the appellate authority ,,.
"--
and the Land Tribunal. In support of his contention, he had relied
D on a decision of this Court in the case of Dahya Lal & Ors. vs.
Rasul Mohammed Abdul Rahim [1963 (3) SCR 1]. He also
relied on a decision of this Court in the case of Mohan Balaku
Patil & Ors. vs. Krishnoji Bhaurao Hundre (Dead) By Lrs.
[(2000) 1 SCC 518] and Krishtappa Ye/Jappa Pujar & Ors.
E vs. Ram Samsthan Beladhadi[(1999) 1SCC74]. In our view,
so far as the decision in the case of Mohan Balaku Patil &

F
Ors. vs. Krishnoji Bhaurao Hundre (Dead) By Lrs. [(2000)
1 sec 518] is concerned, it is difficult to conceive how this
decis'ion could.be of any help to the appellants. In that case, the
findings recorded by the appellate authority as affirmed by the
High Court by placing reliance on the entries made in the record Jo..
..
'
.I

""
~

,-

of rights to the effect that the appellants were not in possession
of the land on the relevant date nor were they cultivating the
same, were not accepted by this court. In any view of the matter,
G· in that decision, relying on the aforesaid findings, this Court also
had set aside the. order made by the appellate authority as
affirmed by the High Court in revision and restored the order
made by the land tribunal.· 1.f that case is of any help to the facts
of the present case, it would be in favour of the respondents. So
far as Krishtappa Yellapa Pujar & Ors~ vs. Ram Samsthan
H
'~
JAGADEESH & ANR. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 751
& ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
.... ...._ Beladhadi [(1999) 1 sec 74] is concerned, we again fail to A
understand that how this could be of any help to the appellants.
In that decision, it has been made clear that the High Court was
entitled to interfere with the orders of the appellate authority only
on question of law or irregularity in procedure and on 'no other
aspect. In our view, we have already held that the High Court B
was entitled to interfere with the concurrent orders of the tribunals
below as material evidence on record was not considered at all
,. ~
and non consideration of the material evidence on record is a
question of law and, therefore, the High Court was entitle.~ to
interfere. Accordingly, this decision is of no help to the appellants. c
Lastly, in our view, in view of the discussion made herein above,
the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant
in the case of Dahya Lal & Ors. vs. Rasul Mohammed Abdul
Rahim [1963 (3) SCR 1] need not be discussed.
15. There is another aspect of this matter. Even assuming D
that the High Court was not justified in setting aside the concurrent
findings of fact in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under
Section 121 A of the Act, then also, we are of the view that it is
not a fit case where this Court should interfere with the impugned
judgment of the High Court in the exercise of our power under E
Article 136 of the Constitution.
16. In Union of India & Ors. vs. GangadharNarsingdas
Aggarwal & Anr. [(1997) 10 SCC 305], this Court, while
declining to interfere with the order of the High Court in the
_...._ exercise of its power under Article 136 of the Constitution, held F
~
that even if two views are possible, the view taken by the High
Court being a plausible one, it would not call for intervention by
this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. Considering the
concurrent orders of the appellate authority and the land tribunal
and the impugned order of the High Court, we are in agreement G
with the High Court because the view taken by it was plausible
-I
and therefore, the question of interference by us under Article
136 of the Constitution is not warranted.
17. Again in. Jai Mangat Oraon vs. Mira Nayak (Smt.) &
H
752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R.

;..
Ors. [(2000) 5 SCC 141], this Court had laid down that when ;.-
A
there was nothing illegal and wrong in the reasoning and
conclusions arrived at by the High Court and the same appeared
to be well merited and in accordance with the interpretation of
statutory provisions, this Court would not interfere with the order
B of the High Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. We have
already considered the findings made by the High Court while
setting aside the concurrent orders of the tribunals below arid j.._
~
found that the same appear to be well merited and in
accordance with the material evidence on record, therefore, this
c Court would not interfere with the order of the High Court under
Article 136 of the Constitution. Finally in Taherakhatoon (D)
By Lrs. Vs. Sa/ambin Mohammad [(1992) 2 SCC 635], this
Court at paragraph 20 has observed as follows :
"In view of the above decisions, even though we are now
D dealing with the appeal after grant of special leave, we are not
bound to go into merits and even if we do so and declare the
law or point out the error-still we may not interfere if the justice
of the case on facts does not require interference or if we feel
that the relief could be moulded in a different fashion ......... "
E 18. In view of the aforesaid, we are, therefore, of the view
that this is not a fit case where this Court shall interfere with the
order passed by the High Court under Section 121 A of the Act.
19. For the reasons aforesaid, this appeal fails and is
F dismissed without any order as to costs. .,,,.
>-
R.P. Appeal dismissed.