Holding

The conviction under Section 302 IPC and the death sentence are affirmed; the defence under Section 84 IPC is unavailable and no delay justifies commutation.

Summary

Jagdish was convicted of murdering his wife and five minor children after his brother and neighbours saw him with a blood‑stained knife and the bodies. The trial court relied on circumstantial evidence, medical post‑mortems and the appellant’s self‑inflicted injuries, and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the circumstantial evidence was sufficient, whether the appellant could claim the defence of unsound mind under Section 84 IPC, and whether the three‑year lapse between sentencing and the hearing justified commuting the death sentence. The Court held that the chain of circumstances was stronger than any eyewitness testimony, that no plea of unsound mind had been raised in the lower courts and the material presented was insufficient, and that there was no unlawful delay in the execution of the sentence. Consequently, the conviction and death sentence were upheld and the appeal dismissed.

Issues considered

The adequacy of circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction under Section 302 IPC.
Whether the appellant is entitled to the benefit of Section 84 IPC (unsound mind) on the facts.
Whether the lapse of over three years between the death sentence and its execution warrants commutation to life imprisonment.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 313, s. 366
Constitution of Indias. Article 161, s. Article 21, s. Article 72
Explosive Substances Act, 1908s. 5
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 148, s. 302, s. 84

Subjects

multiple murdercircumstantial evidencedeath penaltySection 84 IPCmental unsoundnessdelay in executionrarest of rarecapital punishmentconstitutional law

Judgment

[2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 727

JAG DISH A
---+ v.
STATE OF M.P.
(Criminal Appeal No. 338 of 2007)
SEPTEMBER 18, 2009
B
[HARJIT SINGH BEDI AND J.M. PANCHAL, JJ.]

Penal Code, 1860:

s. 302 - Multiple murders - Accused-husband found in c
his house with a blood stained knife besides the dead bodies
of his wife and minor children - Conviction under s.302 on
the basis of circumstantial evidence and death sentence
awarded - Justification of- Held: Justified - Medical evidence
supported the prosecution case in its entirety- Circumstances D
-.., forming a chain even stronger than an eye-witness account.

s. 84 - Benefit under, entitlement - Held: The benefit of ,
s. 84 is available to a person who at the time when the act was
done was incapable of knowing the nature of his act or that
what he was doing was wrong or contrary to law - On facts, E
benefit not available as plea with regard to appellant's mental
condition was not taken before the courts below.
•
'( Sentence/Sentencing:
_,.. F
Death sentence - Commutation of death sentence to life
imprisonment - Delay in execution of death sentence - Effect
of - Observations made - On facts, murders took place in
2005 - Conviction order passed in April 2006 and judgment
confirmed by High Court in June 2006 "'- Matter first came up
in Supreme Court in September 2006 and adjourned G
repeatedly on the request of counsel of accused - Leave
granted in March 2007, limited to the question of sentence
only - The matter being finally disposed of in September,

727 H
728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A 2009, there is no delay whatsoever - Constitution of India, .Ir--
1950 - Articles 72, 161 - Administration of justice.

Prosecution case was that on the day of incident,
pw..1, brother of appellant was informed by PW-4.that he
had heard lot of noise from the appellant's house. PW-1
B
rushed to the house of appellant and when he peeped
through the window, he saw appellant sitting in the room
with a blood stained knife in his hand and his cloths were
drenched in blood. The dead bodi~s of his wife, four ·
daughters and son were lying besides him. PW-1 asked
c appellant as to what he had done. In response, appellant
threatened him with dire consequences. PW-1 locked the
room from outside to prevent escape of appellant. He
rushed to police station and returned with police party. .
Appellant was arrested on the spot and on interrogation
D a blood-stained -pyjama and knife hldden in a cloth were >-
seized. The trial court convicted him under s.302 IPC on
the basis of circumstantial evidence and awarded him
death sentence. On reference, High Court held that matter
fell within the category of rarest of rare cases.
E
In appeal to this court, it was contended for the
appellant that there was no eyewitness to the incident; •
that mere circumstance that the murders happened in the , )'
family was. insufficient to prove case beyond reasonable
F doubt; that appellant was suffering from mental
disturbance and incapable of understanding the nature
of his actions and entitled to benefit of Section 84 IPC;
and that the murders took place in 2005 and death
sentence was hanging over appellant's head for more .
than three years which. itself was punishment and so
G
death sentence ought to be commuted to life sentence.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

H
JAGDISH v. STATE OF M.P. 729

,---1 HELD: 1. The case against the appellant was proved A
by the evidence of his brother and neighbours, who had
all seen the dead bodies with the appellant sitting beside
them armed with a knife and he had in fact threatened
that anyone else interfering would meet the same fate. It
is also significant that PW-1 locked the door from outside a
and it was in that condition that the appellant was arrested
and his bloodstained clothes and knife were recovered.
It is true that in case of circumstantial evidence, motive
has extreme significance but to say that in the absence
of motive, the conviction based on circumstantial c
evidence cannot, in principle, be made is not correct. The
appellant and the deceased family members were the
only occupants of the room and it was therefore
.'" incumbent on the appellant to have tendered some
explanation in order to avoid any suspicion as to his guilt.
__._ D
The story that a thief was present in the room introduced
by PW-1 at the stage of the trial was doubtless an attempt
to help the appellant who was his brother. The medical
evidence also supported the prosecution story in its·
entirety. The two doctors who conducted the post-
E
mortem examination on the dead bodies, concluded that
the knife recovered at the instance of the appellant could
• have been used to commit the murders. There was
~ another extremely relevant circumstance pointing
towards the appellant's involvement. The appellant, after
arrest, was found with injuries on his person and was F
subjected to a medical examination. The doctor reported
six superficial incised injuries on his person, some on the
neck and the others on the fingers, and opined that they
could all. be self suffered. This statement was further
corroborated by the unrebutted testimony of PW3 who G
~

• testified that the appellant had told him that after killing
his family he attempted to commit suicide. All these
factors were undoubtedly circumstances, but they were
so evidently categoric, that they constitute a chain even
H
~ ·:: :~'·.

730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] .14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A stronger than an eye-witness account. Therefore,
conviction of the appellant on the charge of multiple
murders was fully justified. The assail~nt was in a
dominant position and a position of trust as. well as he
was the head of the family, the crime was enormous in
B its proportions as the entire family was done away, the
hapless victims being the wife and the minot children of
the assailant, the youngest being the only son, just one
year old. [Paras 8 and 10] [739-E-H; 740-A-E; 744'."B-C]
~
2. The benefit of section 84 IPC is available to a
c person who at the time when the act was done was
incapable of knowing the nature of his act or that what
he was doing was wrong or contrary to law. The
implication of this provision is that the offender must be
of this mental condition at the time when the act was
D committed and the fact that he was of unsound mind
)-
earlier or later are relevant only to the extent that they,
alongwith other evidence, may be circumstances in
determining the mental condition of an accused on the
day of incident. It is significant that before the trial court
.E as well as in appeal in the High Court, no plea with
regard to the appellant's mental condition was taken.
[Para 7] [739-A-D]

Mohan Singh v. State of Delhi AIR 1977 SC 949; .,.
F Rajendra Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1979 SC 916;
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1980 SC 898; Mahesh
& Ors. v. State of M.P. AIR 1987 SC 1346; Darshan Singh v.
State of Punjab AIR 1988 SC 747; Dhananjay Chatterji v.
State of West Bengal 1994 JT 33 SC; Nirmal Singh v. State
of Haryana AIR 1999 SC 1221; Nathu Garam v. State of Uttar
G
Pradesh AIR 1979 SC 716; Ravji v. State of Rajasthan
1996(2) SCC 175, Umashankar Panda v. State of M.P. 1996 ~
(8) SCC 110, Dayanidhi Bisoi v. State of Orissa JT 2003 (5)
SC 590; State of Rajasthan v. Kheraj Ram JT 2003(7) SC
H
JAGDISH v. STATE OF M.P. 731

419; Sushi/ Mumu v. State of Jharkhand JT 2003(10) SC A
340; Union of India & Ors. v. Devendra Nath Rai 2006 (2)
SCC 243; Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC
684; Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) 3 SCC 470;
Devender Pal Singh v. State of NCT of Delhi (2002) 5 SCC
234, referred to. B

3.1. No hard and fast rule can be laid down with
respect to the delay which could result as a mitigating
circumstance, and each case must depend on its own
facts. The death sentence has two underlying
philosophies: that it should be retributive and it should C
act as a deterrent and as the delay has the effect of
obliterating both these factors, there can be no
justification for the execution of a prisoner after much
delay. The underlying principles of the Eighth
Amendment with regard to the infliction of a cruel and D
unusual punishment has its echo in Article 21 of
Constitution of India as well and it would, therefore, be
open to a condemned prisoner, who has been under a
sentence of death over a long period of time, for reasons
not attributable to him, to contend that the death E
sentence should be commuted to one of life. The power
• of the President a·nd the Governor to grant pardon etc .
under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution though
couched in imperative terms, has nevertheless to be
exercised on the advice of the executive authority. In this F
background, it is the Government which, in effect,
exercises that power. The condemned prisoner and his
suffering relatives have, therefore, a very pertinent right
in insisting that a decision in the matter be taken within
a reasonable time, failing which the power should be G
exercised in favour of the prisoner. Human beings are
not chattels and should not be used as pawns in
furthering some larger political or government policy.
[Paras 11, 12 and 13] [744-G; 751-A-B; 751-H; 725-A-E]
H
732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of
'r-
Maharashtra (2009) 6 SCC 498; T. V. Vatheeswaran v. State
of Tamil Nadu (1983) 2 SCC 68; Ediga Anamma v.· State of
Andhra Pradesh (1974) 4 SCC 443; Bhagwan Bux Singh &
Anr. v. The State of U.P. (1978) 1 SCC 214; State of U.P. v.
.,
B Sahai & Ors. (1982) 1 SCC 352; Sher Singh v. State of
Punjab (1983) 2 SCC 344; Sadhu Singh v. State of U.P.
(1978) 4 SCC 428; Vivian Rodrick v. The State of West
Bengal (1971) 1 SCC 468, referred to.

3.2. The incident happened on the 20th August 2005.
.,;
c The Additional Sessions Judge rendered his judgment on
24th April 2006 and the judgment was confirmed by the
High Court on 27th June 2006. This matter first came up
in this Court on 1st September 2006 and was adjourned

b
repeatedly on the request of the appellant's counsel so
as to find out if some material could b~ collected to
substantiate his claim that he was unsound mind and it
_.
was on 12th March 2007 that leave was granted limited
to the question of sentence only. The matter is now
disposed of in September, 2009. Thus, there is no delay
E whatsoever in Ulese circumstances. [Para 16] [753-G-H;
754-A-B]

Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U~S. 949, 952 (1981); Gregg ..
v. Georgia 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia 408 U.S. y

F 238, 288-289 (1972), referred to. ,..
Case Law Reference
AIR 1977 SC 949 referred to Para 2
AIR 1979 SC 916 referred to Para 2
G
AIR 1979 SC 716 referred to Para 2 -
-~

AIR 1980 SC 898 referred to Para 2

AIR 1987 SC 1346 referred to Para 2
H
JAGDISH v. STATE OF M.P. 733

AIR 1988 SC 747 referred to Para 2 A
-"
----J
1994 JT 33 SC referred to Para 2

1996(2) sec 115 referred to Para 2

1996 (8) sec 110 referred to Para 2 B
AIR 1999 SC 1221 referred to Para 2

JT 2003 (5) SC 590 referred to Para 2
-~
JT 2003(7) SC 419 referred to Para 2
c
JT 2003(10) SC 340 referred to Para 2

2006 (2) sec 243 referred to Para 2

) (1980) 2 sec 684 referred to Para 9
(1983) 3 sec 470 referred to Para 9 D
-t.
(2002) 5 sec 234 referred to Para 9
(2009) 6 sec 498 referred to Para 10
(1971) 1 sec 468 referred to Para 11 E
(1974) 4 sec 443 referred to Para 11
...
(1978) 1 sec 214 referred to Para 11
...,
(1978) 4 sec 428 referred to Para 11
F
(1982) 1 sec 352 referred to Para 11

(1983) 2 sec 68 referred to Para 11

(1983) 2 sec 344 referred to - Para 11
G
408 U.S. 238, (1972) referred to Para 12

428 U.S. 153 (1976) referred to Para 12

451 U.S. 949 (1981) referred to Para 12
H
734 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 338 of 2007.

From the Judgment & Order dated 27.6.2006 of the High
~
...
Court of Madhya Pradesh Bench at Indore in Death Reference
Case No. 1 of 2006 and Criminal Appeal No. 530 of 2006.
B
Sudhir Kulshreshtha for the Appellant.

Dr. N.M. Ghatate, C.D. Singh, Sunny Chaudhary, Vairagya
Vardhan, Aditya Singh and Upasana for the Respondent.
c The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J. 1. The appellant was convicted
under Section 302 of the IPC for having murdered his wife, four
minor daughters and a minor son all between 1 and 16 years
D of age and was sentenced to death by the Additional Sessions
...
Judge, Manasa by judgment dated 24th Apru, 2006. On an )r

appeal and reference to the High Court, the conviction and
sentence has been maintained leading to the present appeal.
The prosecution story is as follows:
E
2. At about mid night of the 19th August, 2005 PW1
Ramprasad, the brother of the appellant, on being informed by
PW-4 Balchand that he had heard a huge commotion from the ...
appellant's house, rushed that side and looking through the
't
window saw the appellant sitting in the room with a
F
bloodstained knife in his hand and his clothes soiled in blood
and the dead bodies of his wife Amribai, and daughters
Karibai, Vidhyabai, Rajubai and Rachna ::iged 16 years, 12
years, 8 years and 6 years respectively and his son Dilkhush
aged 1 year lyirig besides him. Ramprasad asked the appellant
G as to what he had done but he threatened him with dire
consequences and told him that he would kill him as well. ~
Ramprasad thereupon retreated and raised an alarm which
attracted the occupants of the neighbouring houses, and also
locked the room from the outside to prevent the appellant's
H
JAGD!SH v. STATE OF M.P. [HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.] 735

_, escape. He also rushed to Police Station, Manasa A
accompanied by Sarpanch Devilal (PW3) and recorded the
El.R. He then returned to the village with a police party, headed
by PW15 SI Karulal Patel. The appellant was arrested on the
spot and on interrogation a bloodstained pajama and knife
hidden in a quilt were seized. On the completion of the B
investigation, he was brought to trial on six counts of murders.
He pleaded innocence and claimed trial. The trial court
observed that the case rested almost exclusively on
-~ circumstantial evidence and then went on to ex.amine the
various circumstances. The court found that the evidence of c
PW1 Ramprasad that the dead bodies were lying in the room
was supported by the evidence of PW3 Devilal, PW11 Vinod
as aiso tJVV1ti SI Karulal. The court also observed that the
medical evidence of PW-8 Dr. R.K. Joshi and PW-9 Dr. Dinesh
Bansal, who, Jetween themselves, had carried out the post-
~
D
mortem exam nations on the dead bodies to the effect that the
murders had been committed with a knife and that the knife
which had been recovered at the instance of the appellant from
inside the room could be the murder weapon, corroborated the
ocular account. The court further held that though in a case of
circumstantial evidence motive wa_s of great significance, it E
could not be said as a matter of principle that the absence of
... motive would render the prosecution story weak and in the light
l'
of the fact that the murders had been committed in the family
home which was locked from the inside, with no other person
present at that time, it was to some extent obligatory on the F
appellant to have given some explanation as to the murders.
The court then observed that the explanation in the statement
under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. was unacceptable as it had
been simply pleaded that he had been sleeping in the room
and had woken up on hearing a noise outside and the police G
. -' had entered the room and caught hold of him and 'had
immediately arrested him. The appellant also undertook to
produce evidence in defence, but ultimately did not do so. PW-
1 Ram Prasad's statement at the trial that some thief had been
present in the room on the date and time in question was H
736 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.)S.C.R

A rejected, as being an after thought as he was the appellant's
brother, and was making a belated attempt to save him. The
court finally found that the extra judicial confession made before
Ramprasad PW1 and Devilal PW3 and the fact that he had
been arrested from the spot, clearly proved his involvement. On
s a cumulative assessment of the circumstances, the ·court
concluded that the appellant was involved in the multiple
murders. The question as to the sentence to be imposed was
then examined in depth and relying on various judgments of this
Court and in particular on Mohan Singh vs. State of Delhi AIR
c 1977 SC 949, Rajendra Prasad vs. State of Uttar Pradesh AiR
1979 SC 916, Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab AIR 1980
SC 898, Mahesh & Ors. vs. State of M.P. AIR 1987 SC 1346,
Darshan Singh vs. State of Punjab AIR 1988 SC 747,
Dhananjay Chatterji vs. State of West Bengal 1994 JT 33 SC,
and Nirmal Singh vs. State of Haryana AIR 1999 SC 1221
D held that the offence which the appellant had committed was
reprehensible and truly diabolical and that the only sentence
appropriate to the gravity of the crime was a sentence of death.
The plea on behalf of the appellant's counsel based on the
judgment of this Court in Nathu Garam vs. State of Uttar
E Pradesh AIR 1979 SC 716 that a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence should not ordinarily invite a death
penalty, was rejected. A Reference was thereafter made by the-
Sessions Judge to the High Court as postulated by Section: ''
366 of the Cr.P.C. and the accused too challenged the judgmenf-:'-
1
F in appeal. The High Court first examined the appeal and :- ,
concluded that the evidence against the appellant was _,
conclusive as to his involvement and though there was no ·
apparent motive, the other circumstances were sufficient to
bring home the charge_. The merits of the murder reference
G were then examined and after days consideration it was held
that the matter fell within the category of the rarest of rare cases
and relying on the judgments of this Court in Ravji vs. State of
Rajasthan 1996(2) SCC 175, Umashankar Panda vs. State
of M.P. 1996 (8) SCC 110, Dayanidhi Bisoi vs. State of Orissa
H
JAGDISH v. STATE OF M.P. [HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.] 737

JT 2003 (5) SC 590, State of Rajasthan vs. Kheraj Ram JT A
~...,

2003(7) SC 419, Sushi/ Mumu vs. State of Jharkhand JT
2003(10) SC 340, and Union of India & Ors. vs. Devendra
Nath Rai 2006 (2) sec 243 observed that as the murders were
particularly foul, vile and senseless, the death penalty was the
only appropriate sentence in such a situation. The High Court, B
accordingly, dismissed the appeal and confirmed the
Reference. The matter is before us by way of special leave in
this backdrop.
--+ 3. This Special Leave Petition first came up before this
Court on the 1st September, 2006 and was adjourned to call
c
for the records. On 25th September, 2006, when the case was
again taken up, it appears that an argument was raised that
i.i1t: appei1aot had been suffering from some mental ailment at
the time of the murders and the counsel sought time to go
through some documents pertaining to his treatment. On 8th D
-"I
January, 2007, this Court made an order that the counsel should
ima out, n possible, the date and place where the petitioner
may have been treated. On 12th February, 2007, the counsel
made a statement that the appellant's family members had
been able to collect some documents which would be received E
by him shortly. On 12th March, 2007 leave was granted, limited
..., however, to the question of sentence only. During the pendency
of this appeal, and on the direction of this Court, yet another
..... enquiry was made to find out if the appellant had any mental
disorder and had been undergoing any treatment to this effect. F
Consequent to the enquiry, a report has been tendered to this
Court supported by an affidavit of Shri Vineet Kumar, Additional
Superintendent of Police, District Neemuch, Madhya Pradesh
to the effect that no medical record which could establish that
the appellant had undergone treatment for a mental or G
psychological problem had been found but statements of his
family members and 9thers including Mohan Lal, his elder
brother and his parents Mohan Lal and Sita Devi and the
Secretary of the Gram Panchayat, Achalpur which were to the
effect that the appellant had been addicted to drugs, particularly H
738 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R

A to Ganja, and had become mentally disturbed and had been
under treatment, and it was on account of this mental illness ~-,

that he had killed his family, had been received, were being put '
on record.

4. Relying on these statements, the learned counsel for the
B
appellant has pointed out that as the appellant appeared to be
of unsound mind and incapable of understanding the nature of
his actions he was absolved of any liability under Section 84
of the IPC. On merits, it has been urged that in the light of the
fact that there was no eye witness to the incident, the mere
c circumstance that the murders had happened in the family
home, was insufficient to prove the case beyond reasonable
doubt, and reliance has finally been placed on Nathu Rar:n's
case (supra) to contend that a sentence of death based on.
circumstantial evidence was a risky proposition, and was thus
D not called for.
y-
5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and
gone through the record very carefully. The sheer enormity of
the crime, the diabolical manner of the murders, and the feeling
E of abhorrence which would undoubtedly be raised in the mind
of the court, are factors which have persuaded us to examine
the entire story with even greater care and notwithstanding that
a . notice limited to the question of sentence only had been ,.
issued, we have, in the backdrop of the new issue that has been ...,,
F raised, and the horrific consequences for the appellant,
permitted his counsel to argue the entire appeal.

6. We first examine the argument of the appellant's
counsel based on Section 84 of the l.P.C .. Section 84 reads
as under:
G
"Act of a person of unsound mind. - Nothing is an offence
which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by
reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing
the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either
H wrong or contrary to law."
JAGDISH v. STATE OF M.P. [HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.] 739

7. The benefit of this provision is available to a person who A
at the time when the act was done was incapable of knowing
the nature of his act or that what he was doing was wrong or
contrary to law. The implication of this provision is that the
offender must be of this mental condition at the time when the
act was committed and the fact that he was of unsound mind B
earlier or later are relevant only to the extent that they, alongwith
other evidence, may be circumstances in determining the
mental condition of an accused on the day of incident. We have
gone through the status report filed by Shri V.K.Jain, Additional
--+
S.P. and find it based exclusively on the statements made by
close family members of the appellant. It is significant that
c
before the trial court as well as in appeal in the High Court, no
plea with regard to the appellant's mental condition had been
taken and it was only in this Court at the SLP stage when,
shaken by the sheer brutality of the crime, this Court perhaps
felt that only a person of unsound mind could commit such a D
--..(
horrendous crime, and it had thus been thought prudent to have
the matter re-examined. We are of the opinion however, that
the statements in the status report and the affidavit do not
advance the appellant's case whatsoever.
E
8. We find that the case against the appellant has been
proved by the evidence of PW1 Ramprasad, his brother, PW3
~
Devilal and PW11 Vined his neighbours, who had all seen the
dead bodies with the appellant sitting beside them armed with
"' a knife and he had in fact threatened that anyone else F
;.
interfering would meet the same fate. It is also significant that
Ramprasad had locked the door from the outside and it was
in that condition that the appellant had been arrested by SI
Karulal and his bloodstained clothes and knife had been
recovered. It is true that in a case of circumstantial evidence
G
motive does have extreme significance out to say that in the
~ absence of motive, the conviction based on circumstantial
evidence cannot, in principle, be made is not correct. It bears
repetition that the appellant and the deceased family members
were the only occupants of the room and it was therefore
H
740 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R. ·

A incumbent on the appellant to have tendered some explanation .,...
in order to avoid any suspicion as to his guilt. The story that a
thief was present in the room introduced by Ramprasad at the
stage of the trial was doubtless an attempt to help the appellant
who was his brother. The medical evidence also supports the
B prosecution story in its entirety. The two doctors, R.K.Joshi and
Dinesh Bansal who had conducted the post-mortem
examination on the dead bodies, concluded that' the knife,
recovered at the instance of the appellant could have been. used
to commit the murders. There is another extremely relevant t--
circumstance pointing towards the appellant's involvement. The
c appellant, after arrest, was found with injuries on his person and
was subjected to a medical examination by PW5 Dr.
KC.Kothari. The doctor reported six superficial incised injuries
on his person 1 some on the neck and the others on the fingers,
and opined that they could all be self suffered. This statement
D was further corroborated by the unrebutted testimony of PW3
y-
Devi Lal who testified that the appellant had told him that after
killing his family he had attempted to commit suicide. All the
factors referred to above are undoubtedly circt!mstances, but
they are so evidently categoric, that they constitute a chain even
E stronger than an eye-witness account, and do remind us of the
cliche that men often lie, circumstances do not. We are,
therefore, of the opinion that the conviction of the appellant on ~

the charge of multiple murders is fully justified.
'f

F 9. The crucial question, and the question on which the
...
learned counse.1 for the appellant has argued with some
emphasis, is the question of sentence. It has been submitted
that the death sentence in a case of circumstantial evidence
was not called for and as there appeared to be some evidence
that the appellant was of unsound mind and the sheer enormity
G
and senselessness of the killings also pointed in that direction,
).
and also. indicated that something unusual had happened on
that day were all factors which required consideration. He has
also submitted that as the murders had been committed in the

H
JAGDISH v. STATE OF M.P. [HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.] 741

year 2006 and as the death sentence had been hanging over A
the appellant's head for more than three years was itself a
punishment, the death sentence ought to be commuted to life.
He has also referred us to some of the judgments
abovementioned. The learned State counsel has submitted with
equal emphasis that the enormity of the crime, the brutality with B .
which had been executed, the helpless state of the victims vis-
a-vis the assailant who was a husband and father were all ~
factors which brought the matter within the category of the rarest
of the rare cases. He too has relied on Ravji vs. State of
Rajasthan 1996(2) SCC 175, Umashankar Panda· and c
Devendra Nath Rai cases (supra). In Ravji's case (supra),
which pertained to the inexplicable murder of a wife and 5
others (including three minor children) this Court, after
examining several earlier cases, observed that the killing of a
wife in an advanced stage of pregnancy and three minor 0
-.y children for no reason whatsoever "was one of the most heinous
crimes" and that the appellant being the head of the family had
a solemn duty to protect them but he had on the contrary
"betrayed the trust reposed in him in a very cruel and calculated
manner without any provocation whatsoever'' and that the court
"would be failing in its duty in not imposing an adequate E
punishment for a crime which had been committed not only
against the individual victim but also against the society to which
the criminal and victim belonged," and that the "enormity of the
crime requires that the society's cry for justice against such a
criminal should be heard." Umashankar Panda's case again F
pertained to the murder of a wife and two children and grievous
injuries to 3 children during an attempt to kill them and it was
observed as under:

"We have already given the injuries inflicted on the G
deceased persons as well as on the children who escaped
death. We find that the accused had caused in all 64 sword
injuries to all the six persons including the three deceased
persons and those injuries speak for themselves about the
gruesome nature of the crime committed by the accused. H

" .
742 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C,R

A Be it noted that there was no provocation and there is ~
nothing to suggest that there was any quarrel between the
accused and his wife or among any one of the family
members. The way in which the crime was executed clearly
shows that it was a premeditated one and not on account
B of sudden provocation or any "mental derangement". The
motive suggested in the course of cross-examination ofthe
prosecution witnesses is also not helpful to the accused
inasmuch as he has pleaded alibi in his statement (under
Section 313 CrPC) and that has also been taken note of
c by the trial court as well as by the High Court. As pointed
out earlier, both the Sessions Judge and the High Court
have given special reasons for awarding death sentence
and we are also of the opinion that the crime indulged by
the accused is undoubtedly gruesome, cold-blooded,
heinous, atrocious and cruel. We are also satisfied that on ~
D y;-
the facts established on the record, there appears to be
no mitigating circumstances whatsoever, but only
aggravating circumstances which justify the imposition of
death sentence. If we look into the manner in which the
crime was committed, ihe weapon used, the brutality of the
E crime, number of persons murdered, the helplessness of ..,.
the victims, we cannot come to any other conclusion
except the one, the Sessions Judge and the High Court ...
arrived at to award the capital sentence to the appellant." y

F In Devendra Nath Rai's case (supra) this Court after examining
Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684, Machhi
Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) 3 SCC 470 and and Devender
-
Pal Singh vs. State of NCT of Delhi (2002) 5 sec 234 culled
out the broad principles with regard to the infliction of the death
G penalty in the following terms:
"The community may entertain such sentiment in the
following circumstances:

(1) When the murder is committed in an extremely
H
JAGDISH v. STATE OF M.P. [HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.] 743

,,,,.. ..., brutal, grotesque, diabolical, revolting, or dastardly manner A
so as to arouse intense and extreme indignation of the
community.

(2) When the murder is committed for a motive which
evinces total depravity and meanness; e.g. murder by
B
hired assassin for money or reward; or cold-blooded
murder for gains of a person vis-a-vis whom the murderer
is in a dominating position or in a position of trust; or
murder is committed in the course for betrayal of the
~
mother land.
c
(3) When murder of a member of a Scheduled Caste
or minority community, etc. is committed not for personal
reasons but in circumstances which arouse social wrath;
or in cases of 'bride burning' or 'dowry deaths' or when
murder is committed in order to remarry for the sake of D
-¥ extracting dowry once again or to marry another woman
on account of infatuation.
'· (4) When the crime is enormous in proportion. For
instance when multiple murders, say of all or almost all the
members of a family or a large number of persons of a E
particular caste, community, or locality, are committed .
....
·• (5) When the victim of murder i~ an innocent child,
lf"
or a helpless woman or old or infirm person or a person
vis-a-vis whom the murderer is in dominating position, or F
3 public figure generally loved and respected by· the
community.

- If upon taking an overall global view of all the
circumstances in the light of the aforesaid· proposttions and
taking into account the answers to the questions posed by
G
way of the test for the rarest of rare cases, the
circumstances of the case are such that death sentence
is warranted, the court would proceed to do so."

H
744 SUPREME COURT REPORTS r2009l 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A These aggravating circumstances have been reiterated in ~
Dhananjay Chatterjee's case (supra).

10. A bare perusal of the aforesaid judgments would bring
this matter within principles 1, 4 and 5. We find the case in hand
that the murders were particularly horrifying, as the assailant was
B in a dominant positi.on and a position to trust as well as he was
the head of the family, the crime was enormous i~ its proportions
as the entire family had been done away, the hapless victims
being the wife and the minor children of the assailant, the
youngest being the only son, just one year old. We have also
c examined the mitigating circumstances referred to in Bachan
Singh's case (supra) and in Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan
Bariyar vs. State of Maharashtra (2009) 6 SCC 498. We find
that the balance sheet is heavily weighted against the appellant.

D 11. The appellant's counsel has also referred to the lapse y..~

of about three years between the sentence of death awarded
by the Sessions Judge and the hearing of this appeal and has
submitted that as a delay in the execution of the death sentence '
was itself a dehumanizing and an unreasonable procedure, the
death sentence ought to be converted to one for life. We have
E
examined this matter very carefully. In T. V. Vatheeswaran vs.
State of Tamil Nadu (1983) 2 SCC 68 and Ediga Anamma ,..
vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (1974) 4 SCC 443 it has been .t
held that a delay of two years was permissible beyond which ..,
the sentence ought to be converted to life. In Bhagwan Bux
·F
Singh & Anr. vs. The State of U.P. (1978) 1 SCC 214 similar
observations were made with respect to a delay of two and a
half years and in Sadhu Singh vs. State of U.P. (1978) 4 sec
428 to a delay of three and a half years. We find, however, that
as per the latest position in law, no hard and fast rules can be
G laid down with respect to the delay which could result as a
mitigating circumstance, and each case musfdepend on its own
facts. We have in this. connection gone through the judgment
in Vivian Rodrick vs. The State of West Bengal (1971) 1 SCC
468 and this is what the Court had to say:
H
JAGDISH v. STATE OF M.P. [HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.] 745

"It seems to us that the extremely excessive delay in A
--Ji
the disposal of the case of the appellant would by itself be
sufficient for imposing a lesser sentence of imprisonment
for life under Section 302. Section 302, IPC prescribes two .
alternate sentences, namely, death sentence or
imprisonment for life, and when there has been inordinate 8
delay in the disposal of the appeal by the High Court it
seems to us that it is a relevant factor for the High Court
to take into consideration for imposing the lesser
·~ sentence. In this particular case, as pointed out above, the
appellant was committed to trial by the Presidency c
Magistrate as early as July 31, 1963, and he was
convicted by the Trial Judge on September 4, 1964. It is
now January 1971, and the appellant has been for more
than six years under the fear of sentence of death. This
must have caused him unimaginable mental agony. In our
- _.., D
opinion, it would be inhuman to make him suffer till the
Government decides the matter on a mercy petition. We
consider that this now a fit case for awarding the sentence
of imprisonment for life. Accordingly, we accept the appeal,
set aside the order of the High Court awarding death
E
sentence and award a sentence of imprisonment for life.
The sentences under Section 148, IPC and Section 5 of
~ the Explosive Substances Act and under Section 302, IPC,
~
shall run concurrently."

Likewise in State of U.P. vs. Sahai & Ors. (1982) 1 SCC F
352 which pertained to a murder of four persons in a particular
ghastly manner, it observed as under :

"The next question that remains is as to the
sentences to be imposed on the respondents. Although the
G
Sessions Judge had given all the respondents, excepting
Sahai, sentences of life imprisonment under Section 302
read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, he had
passed the sentence of death on Sahai because he alone
had shot dead three of the deceased persons. The
H
746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R

A occurrence took place sometime in December 1972, and 1- '
more than eight years have elapsed since. The accused
had been convicted by the Sessions Court but acquitted
by the High Court. The present appeal has been pending
for five years. Having regard to the reasons given above,
B therefore, we fee/ that although the murders committed
by Sahai were extremely gruesome, brutal and dastardly,
yet the extreme penalty of death is not called for in the
circumstances of this particular case. "
'!---·
c delayItbeyond
is true that in some of the cases referred to above, a
two or three years has been said to be excessive
but in Sher Singh vs. State of Punjab (1983) 2 SCC 344, this
Court while agreeing with the broad proposition with regard to
the delay in death penalty cases, declined to accept the outer
time limit of two years for the execution of a death sentence,
D failing which it would be incumbent on the court to commute it
'f--
to life but at the same time had some very pertinent
observations to make. We reproduce some of Uiem herein
below:

E "But we must hasten to add that this Court has not taken
the narrow view that the jurisdiction to interfere with a death
sentence can be exercised only in an appeal against the
judgment of conviction and sentence. The question which
arises in such appeals is whether the extreme penalty
provided by law .is called for in the circumstances of the
"'
F
case~ The question which arises in proceedings such as
those before us is whether, even if the death sentence was
the only appropriate sentence to impose in the case and
was therefore imposed. It will be harsh and unjust to
execute that sentence by reason of supervening events. In
G
very recent times, the sentence of death has been
· commuted to life imprisonment by this Court in quite a few
cases for the reason, inter alia, that the prisoner was under
the spectre of the sentence of death for an unduly long time
after the final confirmation of that sentence, consequence
H
JAGDISH v. STATE OF M.P. [HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.] 747

- ~ upon the dismissal of the prisoner's special leave petition A
or appeal by this Court."

~ and further
... "The prolonged anguish of alternating hope and
despair, the agony of uncertainty, the consequences of B
such suffering on the mental, emotional, and physical
~

. -.(
integrity and health of the individual can render the decision
to execute the sentence of death an inhuman and
degrading punishment in the circumstances of a given
case." c
"Death sentence is constitutionally valid and
permissible within the constraints of the rule in Bachan
Singh. This has to be accepted as the law of the land. We
-~ do not, all of us, share the views of every one of us. And D
that is natural because, every one of us has his own
philosophy of law and life, moulded and conditioned by his
-i
own assessment of the performance and potentials of law
and the garnered experiences of life. But the decisions
rendered by this Court after a full debate have to be
E
accepted without mental reservations until they are set
aside."
"""'
• The Bench also relied on a sociological study "Condemned
to Die, Life Under Sentence of Death" by Robert Johnson
which we too have found appropriate to quote to complete the F
narrative:

"Death row is barren and uninviting. The death row
inmate must contend with a segregated environment
marked by immobility, reduced stimulation, and the G
prospect of harassment by staff. There is also the risk that
visits from loved ones will become increasingly rate, for
the man who is "civilly dead" is often abandoned by the
living. The condemned prisoner's ordeal is usually a lonely
one and must be met largely through his own resources.
H
>-
748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

l
A The uncertainties of his case - ~ending appeals, I _;
unanswered bids for commutation, possible changes in
the law - may aggravate adjustment problems. A
continuing and pressing concern is whether one will join
the substantial minority who obtain a reprieve or will be f-
B counted among the tO-:be-dead. Uncertainty may make the ' -

dilemma of the death row inmate more complicated than
simply choosing between maintaining hope or surrendering
to despair. The condemned can afford neither alternative,
)-~
.
but must nurture both a desire to life and an acceptance
c of imminent death. As revealed in the suffering of terminally
ill patients, this is an extremely difficult task, one in which
resources afforded by family or those within the institutional
context may prove critical to the persons's adjustment. The
death row inmate must achieve equilibrium with few coping
supports. In the process, he must somehow maintain his _,_.
D
dignity and integrity.

Death row is a prison within a prison, physically and
~
socially isolated from the prison community and the outside
· world. Condemned prisoners life twenty-three and one-half
E hours alone in their cells ..... "

The Court concluded with the following significant r,
observations :
>I

"A prisoner who has experienced liying death for
F years on end is therefore entitled to invoke the jurisdiction
of this Court for examining the question whether, after all
the agony and torment he has been subjected to, it is just
and fair to allow the sentence of death to be executed. That
_is the true implication of Article 21 of the Constitution and
G · to that extent, we express our broad and respectful
).
agreement with our learned Brethren in their visualisation
of the meaning of that Article. The horizons of Article 21
are ever widening and the final word on its conspectus shall
never have been said: So long as life lasts, so long shall
H
~

•
JAGDISH v. STATE OF M.P. [HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.] 749

it be the duty and endeavour of this Court to give to the A
- oti
provisions of our Constitution a meaning which will prevent
human suffering and degradation. Therefore, Article 21 is
as much relevant at the stage of execution of the death
sentence as it is in the interregnum between the imposition
of that sentence and its execution. The essence of the 8
matter is that all procedure, no matter what the stage, must
be fair, just and reasonable."

The judgments rendered aforesaid have thrown
lo.~
model underlying philosophy of the aforesaid judgments
has already indicated above stem out not only from Article
c
21 of the Constitution but from the judgments rendered by
the 8th Amendment in the US Constitution ratifying way
back in 1791 which provide that no cruel and unusual
punishment shall be inflicted. While construing this
provision, the Court of the Magistrates while observing that 0
-y
the Eight Amendment does not prohibit capital punishment
did indicate that as pending execution had it. dehumanizing
effect and lengthy imprisonment prior to execution and the
judicial and administrative procedures essential to the due
process of law are carried out. Penologists and medical E
experts agreed that the process of carrying out a verdict
of death is often so degrading and brutalizing to the human
~

spirit as to constitute psychological torture. Relying on
"' Coleman vs. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 952 (1981)
observed that "the deterrent value of incarceration during F
that period of uncertainty may well be comparable to the
consequences of the ultimate step itself' and when the
death penalty "ceases realistically to further these
purposes, ... ;.its imposition would then be the pointless
and needless extinction of life with only marginal G
contributions to any discernible social or public purposes.
A penalty with such negligible returns to the State would
be patently excessive and cruel and unusual punishment
violative of the Eighth Amendment." The Courts have,
however, drawn a distinction whereby the accused himself H
750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 14 (ADDL.) s.c.R:l..

A has been responsible for the delay by misuse of the judicial ·~ ....
process but the time taken by the accused in pursuing legal
and constitutional remedies cannot be taken against him.
The Court nevertheless cautious which we have
reproduced as under:
B
"We must take this opportunity to impress upon the
Government of India and the State Governments that
petitions filed under Article 72 and 161 of the Constitution
or under Sections 432 and 433 of the Criminal )-.c
Procedure Code must be disposed of expeditiously. A
c self-imposed rule should be followed by the executive
authorities rigorously, that every such petition shall be
disposed of within a period of three months from the date
on which it is received. Long and interminable delays in
· the disposal of these petitions are a serious hurdle in the
D dispensation of justice and indeed, such delays tend to '1---
shake the confidence of the people in the very system of
justice. Several instances can be cited, to which the record
of this Court will bear testimony, in which petitions are
pending before the State Governments and the
E Government of India for an inexplicably long period. The
latest instance is to be found in Criminal Writ Petition Nos.
345-348 of 1983, from which it would appear that petitions ,,...i
~·
filed under Article 161 of the Constitution are pending_· .
before the Governor of Jammu & Kashmir for anything_ *
F between five to eight years. A pernicious impression '. ·
1
seems to be growing that whatever the courts may decide; · .
one can always turn to the executive for defeating the
verdict of the court by resorting to delaying tactics.
Undoubted_ly, the executi\~e has the pow~r. in appropriate
G cases, to act under the aforesaid provisions but, if we may
remind, all exercise of power is pre-conditioned by the duty
to be fair and quick. Delay defeats justice." "'-

12. We have also examined the case law on this aspect
with respect to other jurisdictions. We may refer to a few such
H
JAGDISH v. STATE OF M.P. [HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.] 751

decisions. It has been repeatedly emphasized that the death A
sentence has two underlying philosophies ;

(1) that it should be retributive, and

(2) it should act as a deterrent
B
and as the delay has the effect of obliterating both the above
factors, there can be no justification for the execution of a
prisoner after much delay. Some extremely relevant
~ -.f observations have been quoted above from Coleman v.
Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 952 (1981). While examining the c
matter in the background of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution which provides that : ·

"exc~ssive bail should not be required, nor excessive
fine impo~ed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted"
0

it has observed that though the death penalty was permissible,
its effect was lost in case of delay (Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153 (1976). The Court also has repeatedly examined the
consequences on a prisoner who was under the spectre of E
death over a period of time and has emphasised "when a
prisoner sentenced by a Court to death is confined in the
penitentiary awaiting the execution of the sentence, one of the
~ most horrible feelings to which he can be subjected during that
time is the uncertainty during the whole of it". The U.S. Supreme F
Court and other courts have repeatedly held that "the cruelty of
capital punishment lies not only in the execution itself and the
pain incident thereto, but also in the dehumanizing effects of
the lengthy imprisonment prior to execution" arid that "the
prospect of pending execution exacts a frightful toll during the G
inevitable long wait between the imposition of sentence and the
) actual infliction of death".(Furman v. Georgia 408 U.S. 238,
288-289 (1972)

13. We are of the opinion that the underlying principles of
H
752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A the Eighth Amendment with regard to the infliction of a cruel -I ...
and unusual punishment has its echo in Article 21 of our
Constitution as well and it would, therefore, be open to a
condemned prisoner, who has been under a sentence of death
over a long period of time, for reasons not attributable to him,
B to contend that the death sentence should be commuted to one
of life. The power of the President and the Governor to grant
pardon etc. under Articles 72 and 161 of our Constitution
though couched in imperative terms, has nevertheless ·to be
exercised on the advice of the executive authority. In this ~ .
c background, it is the Government which, in effect, exercises that
power. The condemned prisoner and his suffering relatives
have, therefore, a very pertinent right in insisting that a decision
in the matter be taken within a reasonable time, failing which
the power should be exercised in favour of the prisoner. We,
as Judges, remain largely unaware as to the reasons that
D ultimately bear with the Government in taking a decision either "!--
in favour of the prisoner or against him but whatever the
decision it should be on sound legal principles related to the ..
facts of the case. We must, however, say with the greatest
emphasis, that human beings are not chattels and should not
E be used as pawns in furthering some larger political or
..
government policy. We may hark back to our own experiences
in life. Even a matter as mundane or trivial as the impending
,,,,.
result of an examination or the report of a medical test arising :+
out of suspicion of a serious disease, or the fate of a loved·one
F who has gone missing or a person hanging between life and ...
death on account of a severe injury, makes it impossible for a
person to maintain his equanimity or normal way of life. Contrast
this with the.plight of a prisoner who has been under a sentence
of death for 15 years or more living on hope but engulfed in
G fear as his life hangs in balance and in the hands of those who
have no personal interest in his case and for whom he is only ).

a name. Equally, consider the plight of the family of such a
prisoner, his parents, wife and children, brothers and sisters,
who too remain static and in a state of limbo and are unable
,- ~

H to get on with life on account of the uncertain fate of a loved
.
JAGDISH v. STATE OF M.P. [HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.] 753

one. What makes it worse for the prisoner is the indifference. A
~ ) and ennui Which ultimately develops in the family, brought about
by a combination of resignation, exhaustion, and despair. Wh?t.
may be asked is the fault of these hapless individuals and
should they be treated in such a shabby manner.
B
14. The observations reproduced above become
extremely relevant as of today on account of the pendency of
26 mercy petitions before the President of India, in some
cases, where the Courts had awarded the death sentences
~ ~ more than a decade ago. We, too, take this opportunity to
remind the concerned Governments of their obligations under
c
the aforementioned statutory and Constitutional provisions.

15. Those of us who have had the occasion to inspect a
..... Jail where executions are carried out. have first hand knowledge
of the agony and horror that a condemned prisoner undergoes p
-~ every day. The very terminology used to identify such prisoners
- death row in-mates, or condemned prisoners, with their even
' more explicit translations in the vernacular - tend to remind them
of their plight every moment of the day. In addition to the solitary
confinement and lack of privacy with respect to even the daily E
ablutions, the rattle on the cell door heralding the arrival of the
Jailor with the prospect as the harbinger of bad news, a
.... condemned prisoner lives a life of uncertainty and defeat. In one
particular prison, the horror was exacerbated as the gallows
~
could be seen over the wall from the condemned cells. The F
effect on the prisoners on seeing this menacing structure each
morning during their daily exercise in the courtyard, can well be
• imagined. To cap it all, some of these prisoners, sentenced to
death by the Sessions Judge in a case of multiple murders,
were later acquitted by the High Court in appeal for lack of
G
evidence.

16. The facts of the present case; the incident happened
on the 20th August 2005. The Additional Sessions Judge
rendered his judgment on 24th April 2006 and the judgment
H
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A was confirmed by the High Court on 27th June 2006. This
matter first came up in this Court on 1st September 2006 and
was adjourned repeatedly on the request of the appellant's
counsel so as to find out if some material could be collected
to substantiate his claim that he was unsound mind and it was
s on 12th March 2007 that leave was granted limited to the
>,
question of sentence only. The matter is being disposed of by
us in September 2009. We are, therefore, of the opinion that
there is no delay whatsoever in the aforesaid circumstances.
The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.
c D.G. Appeal dismissed .. _