Holding

When the plaintiff is a party to the deed and the relief sought effectively amounts to cancellation, the court fee is payable under Section 40 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, 1955.

Summary

The original plaintiff, J. Vasanti & Ors., filed a suit seeking a declaration that several sale deeds relating to her inherited property were null and void and also sought a permanent injunction. The defendants argued that the plaintiff, being a party to the sale deeds, was effectively seeking cancellation of those deeds and therefore the court fee should be payable under Section 40 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, 1955, not under Section 25(d). The trial court and the Madras High Court ordered the plaintiff to pay the fee under Section 40. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that when the plaintiff is a party to the deed and the relief sought, though couched as a declaration, amounts in substance to cancellation; consequently, the fee must be paid under Section 40. The appellate court set aside the lower courts' orders and directed the trial court to give the plaintiff three months to pay the requisite fee. The appeal was allowed.

Issues considered

The appropriate provision for payment of court fee when a plaintiff, who is a party to a sale deed, seeks a declaration that the deed is null and void – whether Section 40 (cancellation) or Section 25(d) (valuation) of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, 1955 applies.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order VII Rule 11
Court Fees Act, 1870 (as amended)
Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, 1955s. 25(d), s. 40

Subjects

court feeSection 40Section 25(d)cancellation of deeddeclaration of nullityTamil Nadu Court Fees Actvaluation of suitcivil procedureoriginal plaintiff party to deedrevision

Judgment

[2b! 7) 9 S.C.K 625

J. VASANTHI & ORS. A
v.
N. RAMAN! KANTHAMMAL (D) REP. BY LRS. & ORS.
(CivilAppeal No. 3396 of2017)
AUGUST 10, 2017 B
(DIPAK MISRA, A.M. KHANWILKAR AND
MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, JJ.J
Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, 1955 -
ss.25(d), 40 - Payment of court fees - Applicable provision - Suit
by original plaintiff (respondents are her legal heirs) seeking C
declaration that various sale deeds in relation to suit property were
null and void and also for permanent injunction against appellants-
defendants - Appellants filed application for rejection of the plaint
praying for directing the plaintiff to pay the court fees u!s. 40 failing
which to reject the plaint - Application dismissed by trial court - D
Appeal filed by appellants, dismissed by High Court which observed
that since the plaintiff denied execution of sale deeds on the ground
of fraud, the court fee was payable uh.25(d) and not uls.40- Plea
of appellant that plaintiff sought declaration for treating the
documents as null and void which amounted to seeking cancellation
of the sate deeds and hence, the court fee was payable uls.40 and E
not u/s.25(d) - Held: In the instant case, the original plaintiff was a
party to the transaction - Thus, when the plaintiff itself is a party to
the sale deeds and seeks to get rid of the sale deed~ in substance it
amounts to cancellation of decree - Though the prayer is couched
in the form of seeking declaration that the document is not valid, F
the relief in substance indirectly amounts to seeking cancellation of
the sale deed~ - Thus, court fee is payable uls.40 - Impugned orde1:~
passed by the trial court and High Court, being unsustainable are
set aside - Trial court is directed to grant three months time to the
· plaintiff to pay the requisite court fee.
G
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The valuation of a suit and payment of court fee
shall depend upon the special provision in a State if provided for.
The view taken by the Madras High Court in Chellakannu, is the
correct exposition of law. (Para 24] [639-B]
H
625
626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 9 S.C.R.

A Chel/akannu v. Kolanji AIR 2005 Mad 405 - approved.
2.1 Proper valuation of the suit property stands on a
different footing than applicability of a particular provision of an
Act under which court fee is payable and in such a situation, it is
not correct to say that it has to be determined on the basis of
B evidence and it is a matter for the benefit of the revenue and the
State and not to arm a con- testing party with a weapon of defence
to obstruct the trial of an action. It is because the Act empowers
the defendant to raise the plea of jurisdiction on a different
yardstick. [Para 27) [641-B-C)
c 2.2 The trial court is directed to grant three months time
to the plaintiff to pay the requisite court fee. There shall be no
order as to costs. [Para 28) [641-D)
P. Thilfai Se/van v. Shyna Paul & Anr. (2014) 7 MLJ
732 ; Shailendra Bhardwaj and others v. Chandra Pal
D and another (2013) 1 SCC 579 : (20121 10 SCR
1125 ; Suhrid Singh alias Sardoof Singh v. Randhir
Singh and others (2010) 12 SCC 112 : (2010( 3 SCR
1121 ; A. Nawab John and others v. V.N. Subramaniyam
(2012) 1 sec 738 120121 6 scR 369;
Rathnavarmaraja v. Vim/a AIR 1961 SC 1299 : (1961)
SCR 1015 - distinguished.
G Seethadevi v. R. Govindaraj & Ors. (2011) 6 MLJ
399; Siddha Construction (P) Ltd. Rep. By its Power
Agent, Anjay Sharma, No.32 Guruswamy Road,
Chetpet, Chennai - 600031 v. M Shanmugam & Ors.
F 2006 (5) CTC 255 : (2006) 4 MLJ 924 ; Alamelu v.
Manickammal 1979 (II) M.L.J. 8 ; Gnanambal Ammal
v.Kannappa Pillai 1959 (l) M.L.J. 353 ;
K. Palaniswamy and another v. S.B. Subramani and
another 2007 (1) CTC 300 - referred to.
G Case Law Reference
(2011) 6 MLJ 399 referred to Para 5
(2006) 4 MLJ 924 referred to Para 5
1979 (II) M.L.J. 8 referred to Para 12
H
J. VASANTHI & ORS. v. N. RAMAN! KANTHAMMAL (D) 627
REP. BY LRS. & ORS.

1959(1) M.L.J. 353 referred to Para 12 A
2007 (1) CTC 300 referred to Para 15
(2014) 7 MLJ 732 distinguished · Para 19
~
.)

AIR 2005 Mad, 405 · approved Para 24
[2010) 3 SCR 1121 distinguished Para 24 B
(20121 10 SCR 1125 distinguished Para 24
[2012) 6 SCR 369 distinguished Para 26
[1961) SCR 1015 ·distinguished Para 27

. . .
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal N<;>.3396 .
of2017.
·From the impugned Judgment and Final Orderdated 16.03.2016
of the High Court of Judicature at Madras~ Bench at Madurai in C.R.P. o
(MD) No.847 of2015 (PD). · .
Ms. V. Mohana, Sr. Adv., Y. Arunagiri, T.R.B. Sivakumar, Advs.
for the Appellants. ·
S.Gowthaman, P. Soma Sundaram, K. Mayil- Samy,
S. Muthukrishnan, P. Ramesh, M.P. Parthiban,Advs. for the Respondents. E
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DIPAK MISRA, J. I. This appea~ by special leave, is at the
instance of the appellants calling in question the legal propriety ofthe
judgment and order dated 1~th March, 2016 passed by the High Court of F
Judicature at Madras, Bench at Madurai in C.R.P. (MD) No. ~47 of
2015 (PD), whereby the High Court has affirmed the order passed by
the Principal District Judge, Dindigul in I.A. No .. 94of2014 in Original
Suit No. 20 of2014 rejecting the prayer otthe applicant/defendant for
dismissal of the Original Suit on the ground of payment cif inadequate
court fee by placing reliance on a wrong provision of the Tamil Nadu G
Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, 1955 (for b~evity, "the A.ct").
2. The facts in a nutshell are that the~"A Schedule .property", as
appended to the plaint, was purchased by the plaintiff's father, late Raja'
Chidanibara Reddiyar from one Balasundaralyyer on 12.08.1943 through
H
628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 9 S.C.R.

A document No. 412/194 3 and also "B schedule property" was purchased
by him from one Swaminatha Iyyer on 09.08.1943 through document •
No. 238/1943. After the purchase, he got the patta transferred in his
name and paid the government taxes and enjoyed the properties. On
21.02. I 948 through document No. 596/1948 plaintiff's father made a •
B sale of the A and B Schedule properties along with some other properties •
in favour ofSellammal w/o Rangoon Krishnasamy Reddiyar. As aveJTed I
in the plaint, the Aand B schedule properties and other properties which
were sold, were again purchased by the father of the plaintiff on
19.04.1948 through document No. 1469/1948 from Sellammal and,
therealter, changed the patta in his name bearing patta Nos. 621, 705,
C 2032 and 2133; and held the suit A and B Schedule properties during his
life time. As pleaded, the plaintiff's father died on 07 .10.1986 leaving
behind the plaintiff and her sister Gowri as his legal heirs. The 1"
defendant is the son of the plaintiff. The 2nd defendant is the husband of
the 3rd defendant and the 4'h defendant is their son. The S'h defendant is
the father of3rd and 61h defendants and father-in-law of the znd defendant.
D
The suit was basically filed for seeking declaration that the sale deeds
dated 30.08.1991, 23.03.1993, 04.01.1994, 10.06.2002 and 11.03.2004
as per document Nos. Document Nos.922/1991, DocumentNo.330/1993,
Document No.2395/1994, Document No.1239/2002 and Document No.
214/2004, respectively as null and void and for permanent injunction.
E 3. The further narration of the factual score is that as regards the
"A Schedule property", the plaintiff asked for a loan of Rs. l lakh from
the 2nd defendant, Janakiraman, who in tum, suggested that an agreement
for sale should be made in favour of his brother-in-law, the 6'h defendant,
Saravanaprabhu. The plaintiff agreed to make an agreement for sale as
F proposed by the 2"d defendant. As per the said agreement an amount of
Rs. 50,000/- was received by the plaintiff and her son, the 1" defendant
and executed an agreement for sell.
4. It is claimed that at that time, the znd defendant obtained
signatures in blank papers. Since the document was for security which
G was. made in favour of the 61h defendant on the request of the 2•d
defendant, no action was taken regarding document No. 805/91. It is
further contended that the A and B Schedule properties were maintained
by the plaintiff and her sister in the name of their father only. When the
plaintiff was making arrangements for partition of the A and B Schedule
properties on 10.03.2011, it came to their knowledge that the defendant
H
J. VASANTHI & ORS. v. N. ,RAMAN! KANTHAMMAL (D) 629
REP. BY LRS. & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

Nos. 2 to 6 had created fabricated documents on the basis of the A
document No.805/91. It is urged in the plaint that the 2"d defendant was
a Sub-Registrar and taking advantage of his position the sale agreement
made in favour of the 61h defendant, who is the brother-in-law of the 2nd
defendant, fabricated sale deeds were created by the defendant Nos~ 2
to 6 as if the plaintiff had executed the sale deed in favour of the 6'h B
defendant.
5. The defendants filed I.A. No.94 of2014 in 0.S. No.20 of2014
praying for directing the plaintiff to pay the court fees under Section 40
of the Act failing which to reject the plaint since the plaint'was highly
undervalued. The said application for rejection of the plaint preferred .C
under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure was dismissed
by the Principal District Judge, Dindigul, as mentioned hereinbefore.
The trial Judge, while dismissing the I.A., relied upon the decisions in G
Seethadevi v.. R. Govindaraj & Ors. 1 , P. Thillai Se/van v. Shyna
Paul & Anr. 1, and Siddha Construction (P) Ltd. Rep. By its Power
Agent, Anjay Sharma, No.32 Guruswamy Road, Chetpet, Chen11ai D

• - 60003J 1( M. Shanmugam & Ors. 3• Be
her legal heirs have been brought on record.
it clarified that the original
plaintiff died during the pendency of the case, i.e., on 15.01.2015, and

6. Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid order, the appellants
preferred C.R.P. (MD) No. 847 of2015 (PD). It was contended before E
the High Court that the learned trial Judge has completely erred by
rejecting the prayer inasmuch as the plaintiff was seeking declaration
for cancellation of the sale deeds and hence, she was liable to pay the
court fee under Sedion 40 of the Act and not under Section 25 (d) of the
said Act. It was also urged that the trial court has completely erred by
placing reliance on Siddha Construction (supra). The said stand of the F
revisionists was resisted by the opposite parties contending, inter alia,
that when a plea had been advanced that she had not executed any sale
deed and the documents were fabricated, then the court fee is payable
as per Section 25(d) and Section 40 of the Act is not attracted. That
apart, it was also urged that the payment of the court fee is a mixed G
question of fact and law and, therefore, the plaint was not liable to be
rejected by entertaining a petition as regards evaluation of the suit

I (2011) 6 MLJ 399

'(2014) 7 MLJ 732
' 2006 (5) CTC 255 : (2006) 4 MLJ 924 H
630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 9 S.C.R.

A property. It is worthy to mention here that the issue of limitation was
raised before the trial court which was not accepted as a ground for
rejection of the plaint and the High Court conclllTed with the same. We
do not intend to address the issue of limitation as that can be dealt with
at the stage of trial of the suit.
B 7. The High Court, as the impugned judgment would show, referred
to the averments in the plaint which were to the effect that the sale
deeds were not executed by their predecessor-in-interest and she had
not received consideration and, therefore, the principle enunciated in G
Seethadevi (supra) is squarely applicable to them. The High Court further ..
observed that on a perusal of the plaint, it is manifest that the plaintiff
C had denied execution of the sale deeds and in that context the court fee
payable could be under Section 25(d) and not under Section 40 of the
Act.
8. Ms. V. Mohana, learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellants submits that the court fees has to be paid under Section 40 of
D the Act when the plaintiff has sought declaration for treating the
documents as null and void, which basically amounts to seeking the relief
of cancellation of the said documents. It is urged by her that when the
requisite court fees as payable under the Act is not paid, the court has no
other option but to reject the plaint and the said factum is obvious from
· E the assertions in the plaint.
9. Mr. G Gowthaman and Mr. P. Soma Sundaram, learned counsel
for the respondent Nos. I, 5, 6, 7 and 9 to 14 in support of the order
passed by the High Court contend that the reasons ascribed by the High
Court are absolutely impregnable and in a case of the present nature,
F court fee has to be paid under Section 25(d) of the Act. It is further
submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that the sale deeds
executed in favour of the defendants were fraudulent ones, for they
were never executed by the original plaintiff and hence, the court fees is
required to be paid under Section 25(d) of the Act.
G JO. Section 40 of the Act reads as under:
"40. Suits for cancellation of decrees, etc.- ( 1) In a suit for
''cancellation of a decree for money or other property having a
money value. or other document which purports or operates to ,
create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or
in future, any right. title or interest in money. movable or immovable
H
J. VASANTH(& ORS. v. N. RAMANI KANTHAMMAL (D) 631
REP. BY LRS. & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

property, fee shall be computed on the value of the subject-matter A .
of the suit, and such value shall be deemed to be-
if the whole decree .or other document is sought to be
cancelled, the amount or value of the property for which the decree
was passed or other document. was executed;
if a part of the decree or other document is sought to be B
cancelled, such part of the amount or value Of the property.
(2) If the decree or other document is such that the liability
under it cannot be split up and the relief claimed relates only to a
particular item of property belonging to the plaintiff or to the
plaintiff's share in any such property, fee shall be computed on C
the value of such property or share or on the amount of the decree,
whichever is less.
Explanation.- A suit to set aside an award shall be deemed to
be a suit to set aside a.decree within the meaning of this section."
D
[Emphasis added]
11. The singular issue that gains significance in this case is that
the original plaintiff was a party to the transaction.· Section 40 of the
Act, as we notice, provides that in a suit for cancellation of a document,
the court fee has to be computed on the value of the subject-matter of E
the suit and such value shall be deemed to be the whole decree or other
document which is sought to be cancelled, the amount or value of the
property for which the decree was passed or other document was
executed. It also spelt out that a part of the decree or other document is
to be cancelled, such part of the amount or value of the property. On a
careful scrutiny of the provision, it is limpid that it refers to the decree or F
other document and in that co.ii.text, it uses the word "value". The stand
of the respondents before the High Court as well as before this Court is
that the documents were sought to be declared as null and void on the
ground of fraud and, therefore, Section 40 of the Act would not be
attracted. In this regard, we may notice certain decisions of the High G
Court of Madras.
12. InSiddha Construction (supra), the learned single Judge has
opined that for the value of the Court Fee payable by the plaintiff the
averments in the plaint alone are to be considered. In the said case, it
was observed that the plaintiffs had not executed th.e sale deed and did
H
632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 9 S.C.R.

A not receive any sale consideration and they had not alienated the property
in favour of any one. Jn the said case, the third defendant was the
petitioner in the revision petition. The suit was filed to declare that the
sale deed executed by the first defendant in favour of the third defendant
was null and void. The High Court referred to the decision in Alame/11 v.
B Ma11ickammal4 wherein it has been held that the plaintiff is not a party
to the sale deed and when he seeks only a declaration that the impugned
sale deed is null and void, it is subject to the value of the suit under
Section 25(d) of the Act. The learned single Judge also quoted a passage
from G11anambal Ammal v. Ka11nappa Pillai5 wherein it has been
held:
c "Where a plaintiff's case is that a document is sham and nominal,
it need not be set aside, and the suit for relief on that footing is not
one for cancellation, so as to attract the application of Section 40
of the Madras Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955. But even
in such a case, if the plaintiff sues for cancellation he would have
D to pay Court-fee on that relief, whether it is necessary to have the
deed cancelled or not."
13. The learned c01msel for the appellant would submit that the
said decision is distinguishable as in the said case the plaintiffs were not
parties to the impugned sale deed.
E 14. In G Seethadevi(supra), the High Cowt followed the principle
stated in Siddha Construction (supra) and held thus:
"In the case on hand, it is to be seen that the case of the Petitioner
is that she has not executed Power of Attorney in favour of one
Bhaskaran so as to execute the sale deed in favour of third parties.
F That apart, it is contended that the said Bhaskaran is unknown to
the Petitioner and he is an employee of the first Respondent in his
petrol bunk. When such statement has been made in the plaint,
the court fee that has to be payable on the relief that has been
sought for by the Petitioner viz., for declaration that the sale deed
G dated 25.04.2008 is null and void and not binding on the Petitioner,
under Section 25( d) of the Act and not under Section 40 of the
Act. The Petitioner has not admitted the execution of Power of
Attorney. The court below is not justified in directing the Petitioner

4
1979 (ll) M.L.J. 8
H 'I 959(1) M.L.J. 353
J. VASANTHI & ORS. v. N. RAMANI KANTHAMMAL (0) 633
REP. BY LRS. & ORS. [DIPAJ( MISRA, J.]

to pay the court fee under Section 40 of the Act. In the case A
relied on by the Respondents, the Power of Attorney was admitted
by the Respondents/Plaintiffs therein and hence, this Court in the
said decision has directed the party to pay the Court Fee under
Section 40 of the Act."
15. In K. Pala11iswamy and another v. S.B. Subrama11i a11d B
a11other6, the learned single Judge took note of the facts that the plaintiff
had filed a suit for declaring the sale deeds executed by the first defendant
in favour of the second and third defendants as null and void and
unenforceable and would not bind the plaintiff and for consequential
permanent injunction and an application under Order VII Rule 11 of C
Civil Procedure Code (CPC) was filed as proper court fee had not been
paid and the suit was not properly valued and it deserved to be rejected.
In the said case, the second respondent was the power of attorney of
the first respondent and after revocation of power of attorney, he had
executed the sale deed in favour of the defendants. The High Court
took note of the fact that when the first respondent was not a party to D
the document, the relief sought for in the suit would not come under
Section 40 of the Act and accordingly, dismissed the civil revision.· ·
16. Chellaka1111u v. Kolanji7, dealt with a civil revision that was
filed by the plaintiff assailing the order of the trial court directing the
plaintiff to pay the comt fee under Section 40 of the Act. The narration E
of the facts in the plaint was adverted to by the High Court and for
proper appreciation of the controversy that has been raised in the instant
case, we may reproduce the same: .
" ... the Suit Property belonged to his Father-Pichamuthu.
Pichamuthu had two wives, through whom he had Three Sons. F
Earlier, there was Partition in the family of the Plaintiff on
04.08.1971 wherein the Plaintiff and the Sons through the First
Wife have partitioned the family properties. There was further
partition between the Plaintiff and his Brothers in 1977. Item l of
the Suit Property was allotted to one Poomalai. Items 2 and 4 -
S.Nos.155/3 and 339/13A were allotted fo the Plaintiff. First G
Defendant is the Wife of Shanmugam. Third Defendant has been
keeping the First D'efendant as his concubine. The Third Item
was allotted to the Plaintiff's Sister. The Third Defendant is the
'' 2007 (I) CTC 300
7
AIR 2005 Mad 405
H
634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [2017] 9 S.C.R.

A Third Party. With the help of the First Defendant, the Third
Defendant secured the Suit Properties - Item Nos. l to 3 under a
false representation that the Plaintiff is executing a Will in favour
of the First Defendant. On that mis-representation, Plaintiff's
thumb impression was obtained and two Sale Deeds dated
05.06.1995 and23.08.1995 are said to have been obtained. Those
B
Sale Deeds obtained from the Plaintiff under false representation
is not binding on the Plaintiff. Hence, the Plaintiff has filed the
Suit for Declaration that the Sale Deeds are not binding on him
and for Permanent Injunction, restraining the Defendants from in
any way interfering with the Plaintiff's peaceful possession and
c enjoyment of the Plaint Schedule Items I, 11 and IV."

17. The further stand taken by the plaintiff was that the sale deeds
were obtained from him under fraud and hence, suit had been filed for
declaration that the sale deeds were not binding on the plaintiff and
since the suit was not filed for cancellation of the sale deeds, the
D defendants could not insist the plaintiff to pay the court fee under Section
40 of the Act. The trial court recorded a find that the sale deeds had
been executed by the plaintiff himself and prima facie the sale deeds
were binding on the executants and when there is a prayer to declare
the sale deeds as invalid, it tantamounts to seeking cancellation of sale
E deeds and therefore, court fee payable would be governed by Section
40 of the Act.

18. The High Court posed two questions, namely, (i) whether in
the Suit filed for Declaration that the Sale Deeds are invalid, Court Fee
paid under Section 25(d) of the Act is incorrect and (ii) whether the
F impugned order directing the Plaintiff to pay the CoUit Fee under Section
40 of the Act suffers from any infirmity warranting interference. Dealing
with the factual matrix, the High Court observed:

"Thus, the Plaintiff himself is a party to the Sale Deed; when the
Party himself seeks to get rid of the Sale Deeds in substance it
G amounts to Cancellation of Decree. The Plaintiff might seek to
avoid the Sale Deeds ifhe is not a party to the Sale Deeds. But,
since the Plaintiff himself is a party to the Sale Deeds before he is
suing for any relief, the Plaintiff must first obtain the cancellation
of the Sale Deeds."
H
J. VASANTHI & ORS. v. N. RAMANI KANTHAMMAL (D) 635
REP. BY LRS. & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA; J.]

Andagain: A
"The word "Cancellation" implies that the persons suing should
be, a party to the document. Strangers are not bound by the
documents and are not obliged to sue for cancellation. When the
party to the document is suing, challenging the document, he must
first obtain cancellation before getting any further relief/ Whether B
cancellation is prayed for or not or even it is impliedly sought for
·in substance, the Suit is one for cancellation. in the present case,
when the Plaintiff attacks the Sale Deeds as having been obtained
from him under fraud and mis-representation the Plaintiff cannot
seek for any further relief without setting aside the Sale Deeds.
. ,. . ~--- c
x x x . x x
The allegation on the Plaint in substance mounts to cancellation
of the document. Though the prayer is couched in the form of
seeking declaration that the document is not valid and not binding,
the reliefiri substance indirectly amounts to seeking for cancellation
of the Sale Deed. LeamedDistrict Munsifwas right in ordering D
payment of Court Fee under Section 40 of the Act. This Revision
' Petition has no merits and, is bound to faH."
Being of this view, the High Court dismissed the i;ivil revision and
directed the plaintiff to pay court fee with further stipulation that unless
paid, plaint would stand refected. · ·. ,. ·E
19. To appreciate the decision in P. Thillai Se/van (supra), we
have carefully gone through the same and we find the High Court has
referred to Order VII Rule 1.1 CPC, adverted to the issue of payment of
court fee both as a question of fact and law and opined that the trial
court has rightly rejected the petition. Thus, the said decision does not F
really d~al with Section 40 of the Act.
20.In this context, we may profitably refer to the pronouncement
of this Court in Suhrid Singh alias Sardoo/ Singh 1;._ Randhir Singh
and otlrers 8• In the sai~ case, the Court referred to ievera~ elaborate
prayers contained in the plaint and summarized the saine. The Court G
took note of the fact that the issue had come before the trial court :which
had come to hold that prayers relating to the sale deeds amounted to
seeking cancellation of the sale deeds and, therefore, ad volerem court
. fee was payable on the sale consideration in respect of the sale deeds.

'(2010) 12 sec 112 H
636 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] 9 S.C.R.

A The said view was affirmed in the revision. The Court addressed the
core issue pertaining to court fee payable in regard to the prayer for a
declaration that the sale deeds were void and not "binding on the
coparcenary", and for the consequential relief of joint possession and
injunction. After referring to the provisions of the Court Fees Act, 1870
B as amended in Punjab (as the controversy arose from the High Court of
Punjab and Haryana), the Court held:
"Where the executant of a deed wants it to' be annulled, he has to
seek cancellation of the deed. But if a non-executant seeks
annulment of a deed, he has to seek a declaration that the deed is
invalid, or non est, or illegal or that it is not binding on him. The
c difference between a prayer for cancellation and declaration in
regard to a deed of transfer/conveyance, can be brought out by
the following illustration relating to A and B, two brothers. A
executes a sale deed in favour of C. Subsequently A wants to
avoid the sale. A has to sue for cancellation of the deed. On the
D other hand, if B, who is not the executant of the deed, wants to
avoid it, he has to sue for a declaration that the deed executed by
A is invalid/void and non est/illegal and he is not bound by it. In
essence both may be suing to have the deed set aside or declared
as non-binding. But the fonn is different and court fee is also
different. If A, the executant of the deed, seeks cancellation of
E the deed, he has to pay ad valorem court fee on the consideration
stated in the sale deed. IfB, who is a non-executant, is in possession
and sues for a declaration that the deed is null or void and does
not bind him or his share, he has to merely pay a fixed court fee of
Rs. 19.50 under Article l 7(iii) of the Second Schedule of the Act.
F But if B, a non-executant, is not in possession, and he seeks not
only a declaration that the sale deed is invalid, but also the
consequential relief of possession, he has to pay an ad valorem
court fee as provided under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Act.
Section 7(iv)(c) provides that in suits for a declaratory decree
G with consequential relief, the court fee shall be computed according
to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint.
The proviso thereto makes it clear that where the suit for
declaratory decree with consequential relief is with reference to
any property, such valuation shall not be less than the value of the
property calculated in the manner provided for by clause (v) of
H Section 7."
----- ~ ~ -- ~~-'-- -- .-·--·-· -~ -~-· ' --

J. VASANTHI & ORS. v. N. RAMAN! KANTHAMMAL (D) 637
REP. BY LRS. & ORS. [DIPAK. M~SRA, J.]

21. On the basis of the aforesaid analysis, the Court opined that A
the view expressed by the trial court and the High Court was not justified
inholding th~!the court fee is required to be paid on the sale consideration
mentioned in the sale deeds.

22. In Slrailendra Bhardwaj and others v. Chandra Pal and
another9, the Court was dealing with an issue whether suit filed seeking B
a declaration that a will and a sale deed are void resulting in their
cancellation fell under Section 7(iv-A) of the Court· Fees Act, 1870 as
amended by the U.P. Amendment Act (Act-19 ofl 938) or Article 17(iii)
of Schedule II of tlie Court Fees Act, 1870 for the purpose of valuation.
Be,j_t noted, in the said case the trial court had taken the view that the C
court fee had to be paid under Section 7(iv-A) and the High Court has
concurred with the same. The two-Judge Bench took noie of the
provisions of the Court Fees Act, 1870 as amended by the U.P.
Amendment Act (Act 19 of 1938) and after referring to the same in
detail, held thus: · .
D
"On comparing the abovementioned provisions, it is clear that
Article l 7(iil) of Schedule II of the Col!fl Fees Act is applicable
in cases- where the plaintiff seeks to obtain a declaratory decree
without any consequential relief and there is no other provision
under the Act for payment of fee relating to relief claimed. Article
17(iii) of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act makes it clear that E
this article is applicable in cases w~ere the plaintiff seeks to obtain
a declaratory decree without consequential refo:fs and there is no
other provision under the Act for payment of fee relating to relief
claimed. Ifthere is no other provision under the Court Fees Act in
case of a suit involving cancellation or adjudging/declaring void or F
yoidable a will or sale deed on the question of payment of court
fees, then Article 17 (iii) of Schedule II shall be applicable. But if
such relief is covered by any other provisions of the Court Fees_
Act, then Article 17(ii1}ofSchedule 11 willnot~584be applicable.
On a comparison between the Court Fees Act and the U.P.
Amendment Act, it is clear that Section 7(iv-A) of the U.P. G
Amendment Act covers suits. for or involving cancellation or, · <'
adjudging/declaring null and void decree for money or an instrument
securing money or other property having such value." _
• (2013) 1 sec s19
H
' \
638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 9 S.C.R.

A 23. The Court took note of the fact that the suit was filed after the
death of the testator and, therefore, on that basis observed that the suit
property covered by the will was required to be valued. The Court fUI111er
opined that since Section 7(iv-A) of the U.P. Amendment Act specifically
provides that payment of court fee in case where the suit is for or involving
B cancellation or adjudging/declaring null and void decre~ for money or an
instrument, Article l 7(iii) of Schedule Irof the Court Fees Act would
not apply. The U.P. Amendment Act, therefore, is applicable in the said
case, despite the fact that no consequential relief has been claimed.
Consequently, in terms of Section 7(iv-A) of the U.P. Amendment Act,
the court fees have to be computed according to the value of the subject-
C matter and the trial court as well as the High Court·have correctly held
so. The two-Judge Bench distinguished Suhrid Singlt's case by
expressing thus:
"! 0. We are of the view that the decision of this Court in Suhrid
Singh (.rnpra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case.
D First ofall, this Court had no occasion to examine the scope of the
C'.P. Amendment Act. That was a case in which this Court was
dealing with Sections 7(iv)(c), (v) and Schedule II Article 17(iii),
as amended in the State of Punjab. The position that we get in the
State of Punjab is entirely different from the State of U.P. and the
effect of the U.P. Amendment Act was not an issue'which arose
E for consideration in that case. Consequently, in our view, the said
judgment would not apply to the present case.
11. The plaintiff, in the instant case, valued the suit at Rs 30 lakhs
for the purpose of pecuniary jurisdiction. However, for the purpose of
court fee, the plaintiff paid a fixed court fee of Rs 200 under Article
F I7(iii) of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act. The plaintiff had not noticed
the fact that the abovementioned article stood amended by the State, by
adding the words "not othe[Wi~e provided for by this Act". Since Section
7(iv-A) of the U.P. Amended Act specifically provides for payment of
court fee in case where the suit is for or involving cancellation or
G adjudging/declaring void or voiaable an instrument securing property
having money value, Article 17(iii) of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act
shall not be applicable."
24. The decisions in Suhrid Singlt (supra) and Slzaile11dra
Bhardwaj (supra) have to be UI1derstood in their proper perspective.
H
J. VASANTHI & ORS. v. N. RAMANI KANTHAMMAL (D) 639
REP. BY LRS. & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

There was U.P. Amendment in Shailendra Bhardwaj (supra). In Suhrid A
Singh (supra) the Court was dealing with a different situation. Be that
as it may, the valuation of a suit and payment of court fee shall depend
upon the special provision in a State if provided for. The view taken by
the Madras High Court in Chellakannu (supra), in our considered
opinion, is the correct exposition oflaw.
B
· 25. Another aspect needs to be noted. As we notice from the
impugned judgment, the High Colllt has expressed the view that payment
of the court fee is a mixed question of fact and law and that has to be
decided on the basis of evidence.
26. In this context, we have been commended to the decision in c
A. Nawab John and others v. V.N. Subramaniyamto, On a careful
perusal of the said decision, we find that the said authority nowhere
addresses the issue that is involved in the case at hand. Proper valuation
of the subject matter or u.nder valuation is an aspect which can be
contested by the defe11dant, but the said contest is limited. In this regard,
the two~Judge Bench has reproduced two passages from D
Ratlmavarmaraja v. Vimla 11 which we think seemly to reproduce:
"The Court Fees Act was enacted to collect revenue for the
benefit of the State and not to arm a contesting party with a
weapon of defence to obstruct the trial of an action. By
recognising that the defendant was entitled to contest the valuation E
of the properties in dispute as if it were a matte~ in issue between
him and the plaintiff and by entertaining petitions preferred by the
defendant to the High Court in exercise of its revisionaljurisdiction
against the order adjudging colllt fee payable on the plaint, all
progress in the suit for the trial of the dispute on the merits has F
been effectively frustrated for nearly five years. We fail to
appreciate what grievance the defendant can make by seeking to
inv-0ke the revisionaljurisdiction of the High Court on the question
whether the plaintiff has paid adequate court fee on his plaint.
Whethe/ proper court fee is paid on a plaint is primarily a
question between the plaintiff and the ,State. How by an order G
relatillg to the adequacy of the court fee paid by the plaintiff~ the
defendant may feel aggrieved, it is difficult to appreciate. Again,
the jurisdiction in revision exercised by the High Court under Section
'° (2012) 7 sec 738
II AIR 1961 SC 1299 H
640 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 9 S.C.R.

A 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is strictly conditioned by clauses
(a) to (c) thereof and may be invoked on the ground of refusal to
exercise jurisdiction vested in the subordinate court or assumption
of jurisdiction which the court does not possess or on the ground
that the court has acted illegally or with material irregularity in the
exercise of its jurisdiction. The defendant who may believe and
B
even honestly that proper court fee has not been paid by the plaintiff
has still no right to move the superior courts by appeal or in revision
against the order adjudging payment of court fee payable on the
plaint. But counsel for the defendant says that by Act 14 of 1955
'enacted by the Madras Legislature which applied to the suit in·
c question, the defendant has been invested with a right not only to
contest in the trial court the issue whether adequate court fee has
been paid by the plaintiff, but also to move the High Court in
revision if an order contrary to his submission is passed by the
court. Reliance in support of that contention is placed upon sub-
section (2) of Section 12. That sub-section, insofar as it is material,
D
provides:
x x x x
But this section only enables the defendant to raise a
contention as to the proper court fee payable on a plaint and
E to assist the court in arriving at a just decision on that
question. Our attention has not been invited to any provision of
the Madras Court Fees Act or any other statute which enables
the defendant to move the High Court in revision against the
decision of the court of first instance on the matter of court fee
payable in a plaint. The Act, it is true by Section 19 provides that
F for the purpose of deciding whether the subject-matter of the suit
or other proceeding has been properly valued or whether the fee
paid is sufficient, the court may hold such enquiry as it considers
proper and issue a commission to any other person directing him
to make such local or other investigation as may be necessary
G and report thereon. The anxiety of the legislature to collect court
fee due from the litigant is manifest from the detailed provisions
made in Chapter Ill of the Act, but those provisions do not arm
the defendant with a weapon of technicality to obstruct the progress
of the suit by approaching the High Court in revision against an
. order determining the court fee payable." (emphasis supplied)
H
J. VASANTHI & ORS. v. N. RAMANI KANTHAMMAL (D) 641
REP. BY LRS. & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

27. On a perusal of the decision in Rath11avarmaraja (supra), A
we find the controversy had arisen with regard to proper valuation and
the stand of the defendant was that the court fee had not been properly
paid and in that context, the Court has held what as we have reproduced
hereinabove. The issue being different, the said decision is distinguishable.
We may reiterate that proper valuation of the suit property stands on a B
different footing than applicability of a particular provision of an Act
under which court fee is payable and in such a situation, it is not correct
to say that it has to be determined on the basis of evidence and it is a
matter for the benefit of the revenue and the State and not to arm a
contesting party with a weapon of defence to obstruct the trial of an
action. It is because the Act empowers the defendant to raise the plea C
of jurisdiction on a different yardstick.
28. In the ultimate anlaysis, we arrive at the conclusion that the
appeal is to be allowed, the impugned orders passed by the trial court
and the High Court, being unsustainable are to be set aside and we so
direct. The trial court is directed to grant three months time to the D
. plaintiff to pay the requisite court fee. There shall be no order as to
costs.

Divya Pandey Appeal allowed.