ISWARLAL MOHANLAL THAKKARversusPASCHIM GUJARAT VIJ COMPANY LTD. & ANR.

                          [2014] 4 S.C.R 858


A                ISWARLAL MOHANLAL THAKKAR
                                   v.
         PASCHIM GUJARAT VIJ COMPANY LTD. & ANR.
                (Civil Appeal No. 4558 of 2014)
                           APRIL 16, 2014
B
    [GYAN SUDHA MISHRA AND V. GOPALA GOWDA, JJ.)

          Service law: Service records - Date of birth - Application
    for change of date of birth on the basis of birth certificate
C   issued by Municipal Corporation - Respondent-Employer
    rejected application and relied upon the School Leaving
    Certificate and thereby retired the employee - Labour court
    set aside the said order holding that employer ought to have
    not relied on the School Leaving Certificate since as per
o   certificate issued by school to the brother of the appellant, the
    difference between appellant and his brother was only 5
    months and that was improbable and impossible - Writ
    petition u!Art.227 - High Court set aside the order of labour
    court - On appeal, held: Respondent-board ought not to have
E   relied upon the School Leaving Certificate and instead, the
    birth certificate issued by the Municipal Corporation should
    have been relied upon - High Court wrongly held that the
    appellant was estopped from raising the issue of his date of
    birth since he had signed the records in 1978 but raised this
F   issue only in 1987 - This is also clear from the circular issued
    by respondent in 1987 to the effect that those employees who
    wished to change their date of birth in the records may do so
    by furnishing the necessary birth certificate and further, they
    can do it before they become 50 years of age - The appellant
    had not attained 50 years of age at the time he raised the
G   issue of mistake of his date of birth - High Court did not apply
    its mind in setting aside the award of the labour court in
    exercise of its power of judicial review and superintendence -
    Therefore, impugned judgment and order of the High Court

H                                 858
ISWARLAL MOHANLAL THAKKAR v. PASCHIM GUJARAT 859
             VIJ COMPANY LTD.

set aside and the award of the labour court restored -             A
Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 227.

      Constitution of India, 1950: Article 227 - Scope of- Held:
High Court cannot exercise its power u/Article 227 as an
appellate court or re-appreciate evidence and record its           B
findings on the contentious points - Only if there is a serious
error of law or the findings recorded suffer from error apparent
on record, can the High Court quash the order of a lower court
- Service law..

      Evidence Act, 1872: s.35 - Birth certificate issued by the   C
Municipal Corporation - Evidentiary value of - Held: Birth
certificate issued by the municipal corporation is a conclusive
proof of age, the same being an entry in the public record as
per s.35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Service law.
                                                                   D
     The appellant was the employee of the erstwhile
Bhavnagar Electricity Company Ltd. which was taken
over by the respondent-board and the appellant was
appointed afresh as per the agreement in 1978. The
appellant gave an application in the year 1987 to change E
his birth date from 27 .6.1937 to 27 .6.1940 but he was
orally informed of the rejection of his request. The
Executive Engineer of the respondent-board addressed
a letter to the appellant directing him to produce a school
leaving certificate or Municipal Birth certificate as proof F
and stated that in the absence of production of the
required documents, the date of birth recorded in the
service book would be final. The appellant's elder brother
filed a criminal application wherein it was prayed that the
Registrar of Birth and Date Records be directed to enter
the date of birth of the appellant as 27 .6.1940 on its record G
and a birth certificate be issued. The Court of the JMFC
vide order dated 22.05.1987 directed the Bhavnagar
Municipal Corporation (BMC) to issue a birth certificate
to the appellant.
                                                               H
    860     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 4 S.C.R.


A        The birth certificate was issued by the Bhavnagar
    Municipal Corporation (BMC) wherein his date of birth
    was shown as 27.06.1940. The appellant forwarded the
    birth certificate issued by the BMC to the respondent on
    25.5.1987 and sent a reminder on 11.6.1987 to make
B   corrections in the service record with regard to his date
    of birth. He was informed by the Executive Engineer of
    the respondent-board that he has to produce his original
    school leaving certificate or SSC pass certificate in order
    to effect corrections in the service records. The Electricity
c   Board by its circular dated 28.5.1989 informed all the
    employees that for the purpose of deciding date of birth
    and making corrections for the same, only School
    Leaving Certificate of SSC or HSC may be taken into
    account. The appellant filed a civil suit for declaration
    regarding his date of birth which was dismissed. The
0
    appeal was also rejected. The respondent-board on
    27.6.1997, on the basis of the date of birth in its records,
    terminated the services of the appellant and the appellant
    raised an industrial dispute. The Labour Court allowed
    the reference after conducting an enquiry and passed an
E   award dated 31.7.2001 holding that the termination of the
    services of the appellant prematurely on the basis of his
    incorrect date of birth was wrong and further directed the
    respondent to pay full salary, all admissible ancillary
    benefits from the date he was wrongfully and prematurely
F   terminated from service till the date of his actual
    retirement and further, also ordered that a sum of
    Rs.1,500/- be paid as costs. The respondent filed a petition
    under Articles 226 and 227 before the High Court which
    was allowed. The instant appeal was filed challenging
G   the order of the High Court.
       The questions would arose for consideration in the
  instant appeal were: In the event that there is a dispute
  in the date of birth between the birth certificate issued by
H the competent authority and the school leaving certificate,
 ISWARLAL MOHANLAL THAKKAR v. PASCHIM (3UJARAT 861
              VIJ COMPANY LTD.

which document will prevail; whether the High Court was          A
correct in passing an order setting aside the judgment
and Award of the Labour Court?

    Allowing the appeal, the Court

     HELD: 1. The Labour court while passing its award           B
and judgment examined all the evidence on record and
held that as per Ex.36 which is the certificate of birth
given by the school for the brother of the appellant,
wherein his date of birth is written as 27/1/1937 and
therefore, it is impossible that the appellant's date of birth   C
would be 27/6/1937 as the difference would be only 5
months and so it is clear that when both the brothers
joined the school, the Director/Principal had inadvertently
written date of birth which revealed from Court's order
and hence, the date of birth in the school record for the        o
appellant was corrected to 27/6/1940 as per the court's
order. The Labour Court further went on to observe that
before the court order, as and when the applicant got the
chance, he gave an application to the respondent
or~anisation by letter dated 18.4.1987 requesting them to        E
correct his date of birth as per documents enclosed - the
statement of the Bhavnagar Electricity Company Ltd, his
Identity card and copy of the LIC policy, all of which
showed his date of birth as 27.6.1940, and to record the
entry in the service· records. The respondent did not            F
accept the same and the appellant then got a court order
dated 22.05.1987 which directed the entry of date of birth
of the appellant as 27 .6.1940 to be passed in the Birth &
Deaths Register but in spite of this order, the respondent
did not accept such judicial/court evidence or the               G
government documents. They neither cared to inform the
appellant that they did not accept the documents nor did
they give him any opportunity to defend his application
and retired him arbitrarily by taking an ex-parte decision
which is illegal and against the principles of natural
                                                                 H
   862     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2014] 4 S.C.R.


A justice. The Labour Court then went on to observe that
  in the case of other employees, the dates of birth were
  corrected on the basis of affidavits but in the case of the
  appellant, in spite of producing a court order and other
  documents, they were not accepted by the respondent
8 and   thus, this action of the respondent, retiring the
  applicant from service was illegal and unconstitutional
  and against the principles of natural justice. Thereby the
  reference of the appellant was accepted and the
  respondent was ordered to pay the appellant full salary
C along with all admissible ancillary benefits from the date
  he was retired till the date of his actual retirement as per
  his date of birth, and Rs.1,500/- towards costs of the
  matter. [Para 8] [869-G-H; 870-A-H]
        2. The judgment and award of the labour court well-
D. reasoned and based on facts and evidence on record.
   The High Court has erred in its exercise of power under
   Article 227 of the Constitution of India to annul the
   findings of the labour court in its Award as it is well
   settled law that the High Court cannot exercise its power
E under Article 227 of the Constitution as an appellate court
   or re-appreciate evidence and record its findings on the
   contentious points. Only if there is a serious error of law
   or the findings recorded suffer from error apparent on
   record, can the High Court quash the order of a lower
F court. The Labour Court in the instant case has
   satisfactorily exercised its original jurisdiction and
   properly appreciated the facts and legal evidence on
   record and given a well reasoned order and answered the
   points of dispute in favour of the appellant. The High
G Court had no reason to interfere with the same as the
   award of the labour court was based on sound and
   cogent reasoning, .which has served the ends of justice.
   [Para 9] [871-A-D]
      Shalini Shyam Sheffy & Anr. v. Rajendra Shankar Patil
H (2010) 8 SCC329: 2010 (8) SCR 836; Harjinder Singh v.
  ISWARLAL MOHAN LAL THAKKAR v. PASCHIM GUJARAT 863
                VIJ COMPANY LTD.

 Punjab State Warehousing Corporation (2010) 3 SCC 19~         A
 2010 (1) SCR 591; Heinz India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. State of
 UP & Ors. (2012) 5 SCC443: 2012 (3) SCR 898 - relied
 on.

     Reid v. Secretary of State for Scotland (1999) 1 All ER   8
 481 - referred to.

       3. The High Court has committed a grave error by
  setting aside the findings recorded on the points of
  dispute in the award of the labour court. A grave
  miscarriage of justice has been committed against the C
  appellant as the respondent should have accepted the
  birth certificate as a conclusive proof of age, the same
  being an entry in the public record as per Section 35 of
  the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 ,and the birth certificate
  mentioned the appellant's date of birth as 27 .6.1940, D
  which is the documentary evidence. iherefore, there was
  no reason to deny him the benefit of the same, instead
  the respondent-board prematurely terminated the
  services of the appellant by taking his date of birth as
  27.6.1937 which is contrary to the facts and evidence on E
  record. This date of birth is highly improbable as well as
  impossible as the appellant's elder brother was born on
. 27.1.1937 as per the School Leaving Certificate, and there
  cannot be a mere 5 months difference between the birth
  of his elder brother and himself. Therefore, it is apparent F
  that the School Leaving Certificate cannot be relied upon
  by the respondent-board and instead, the birth certificate
  issued by the BMC which is the documentary evidence
  should have been relied upon by the respondent. Further,
  the date of birth is mentioned as 27.6.1940 in the LIC G
  insurance policy on the basis of which the premium was
  paid by the respondent to the Life Insurance Corporation
  on behalf of the appellant. Therefore, it is only just and
  proper that the respondent should have relied on the birth
  certificate issued by the BMC on the face of all these H
   864     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2014] 4 S.C.R.

                                                       ..
A discrepancies as the same was issued on the order of the
  JMFC. The High Cour.t has wrongly held that the
  appellant was estopped from raising the issue of his date
  of birth as he had signed the records in 1978 but he
  raised this issue only in 1987. The reason for this is clear
B that the respondent came out with a circular in 1987 that
  those employees who wished to change their date of
  birth in the records may do so by furnishing the
  necessary birth certificate and further, they can do it
  before they become 50 years of age. The appellant had
c not attained 50 years of age at the time he raised the
  contention regarding mistake in his date of birth. The High
  Court has not applied its mind in setting aside the
  judgment and award of the labour court in exercise of its
  power of judicial review and superintendence as it is
0 patently clear that the labour court has not committed any
  error of jurisdiction or passed a judgment without
  sufficient evidence. The impugned judgement and order
  of the High Court deserves to be set aside and the award
  and judgment of the labour court be restored. [Para 10]
E [873-C-H; 874-A-D]
        4. The impugned judgment and order of the High
  Court is set aside and the award of the Labour Court is
  restored since the services of the appellant were
  prematurely superannuated taking his date of birth as
F 27.06.1937 instead of 27.06.1940, and therefore, he is
  entitled to full back wages and other consequential
  monetary benefits from the date of termination till the date
  of his correct superannuation considering his date of
  birth as 27.06.1940. The back wages shall be calculated
G on the basis of revised pay scale and the same must be
  paid by way of demand draft to the appellant within six
  weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of this order,
  failing which the respondent shall pay interest@ 12% per
  annum on the amount due, towards back wages and
H other consequential monetary benefits, from the date of
 ISWARLAL MOHANLAL THAKKAR v. PASCHIM GUJARAT 865
              VIJ COMPANY LTD.

the Award of the Labour Court till the date of payment.              A
[Para 11) [874-E-H]

                      Case Law Reference:
     2010 (8) SCR 836           Relied on              Para 8
                                                                     B
     2010 (1) SCR 591           Relied on              Para 10

     2012 (3) SCR 898           Relied on              Para 10

     (1999) 1 All ER 481        Referred to            Para 10
    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.                  c
4558 of 2014.

     From the Judgment and Order dated 19.04.2011 of the
High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Special Civil
Application No. 4168 of 2002.
                                                                     D
     Pravin H. Parekh, Galau C. Sharma, Vishal Prasad, Ritika
Sethi, Kshatrashal Raj, Himanjali Gautam, Parekh & Co. for the
Appellant.
     Hemantika Wahi for the Respondents.
                                                                     E
     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
     V.GOPALA GOWDA, J. 1. Leave granted.

     2. This appeal is filed by the appellant against the final
judgment and order dated 19.04.2011, passed by the High              F
Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Special Civil Application No.
4168 of 2002, whereby the High Court allowed the petition filed
by the respondent under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India, praying for issuance of an appropriate writ
or direction for quashing and setting aside the judgment and         G
award dated 31.7.2001 passed by the Labour Court,
Bhavnagar in Reference(LCB) No.225 of 1998.
     3. Bn~f facts of the case are stated hereunder:
     The appellant was the employee of the erstwhile                 H
    866     SUPREME COURT REPbRTS                  [2014] 4 S.C.R.


A   Bhavnagar Electricity Company Ltd. which was taken over by
    the respondent-board and the appellant was appointed afresh
    as per the agreement in 1978. The appellant gave an
    application in the year 1987 to change his birth date from
    27.6.1937 to 27.6.1940 but he was orally informed of the
B   rejection of his request. The Executive Engineer of the
    respondent-board addressed a letter to the appellant directing
    him to produce a· school leaving certificate or Municipal Birth
    certificate as proof and stated that in the absence of production
    of the required documents, the date of birth recorded in the
c   service book shall be final. The appellant's elder brother filed
    a criminal application no.227 of 1987 wherein it was prayed
    that the Registrar of Birth and Date Records, Bhavnagar be
    directed to enter the date of birth of the appellant as 27.6.1940
    on its record and a birth certificate be issued. The Court of the
D   JMFC vide order dated 22.05.1987 directed the Bhavnagar
    Municipal Corporation(BMC) to issue a birth certificate to the
    appellant. Pursuant to this order a birth certificate was issued
    by the BMC, the Xerox copy of which is marked as Ex.52,
    wherein his date of birth was shown as 27 .6.1940. The
    appellant forwarded the birth certificate issued by the BMC to
E   the respondent on 25.5.1987 and sent a reminder on 11.6.1987
    to make corrections in the service record with regard to his
    date of birth. He was informed by the Executive Engineer of
    the respondent-board that he has to produce his original school
    leaving certificate or SSC pass certificate in order to effect
F   corrections in the service records. The Electricity Board vide
    its circular dated 28.5.1989 informed all the employees that for
    the purpose of deciding date of birth and making corrections
    for the same, only School Leaving Certificate of SSC or HSC
    may be taken into account.
G
        4. As his date of birth was not corrected, the appellant filed
  a civil suit in the year 1997 for declaration regarding his date
  of birth and prayed for interim relief, but the same was rejected. '
  He then filed a civil misc. appeal No.124 of 1997 before the
H District Court, Bhavnagar; against the ·order of the civil court,
ISWARLAL MOHANLAL THAKKAR v. PASCHIM GUJARAT 867
    VIJ COMPANY LTD. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]

but this also came to be rejected. The respondent-board, on            A
27.6.1997, pursuant to the date of birth in its records,
terminated the services of the appellant and the appellant raised
an industrial dispute before the Conciliation Officer which was
referred by. the State Government for adjudication to Labour
Court, Bhavnagar vide reference(LCB) no.225 of 1998. The               B
LC1bour Court has allowed the reference after conducting an
enquiry and passed an Award dated 31.7.2001 holding that the
termination of the services of the appellant prematurely on the
basis of his incorrect date of birth was wrong and further
directed the respondent to pay full salary, all admissible ancillary   c
benefits from the date he was wrongfully and prematurely
terminated from service till the date of his actual retirement and
further, also ordered that a sum of Rs.1,500/- be paid as costs.
The respondent filed a petition under Articles 226 and 227,
being special civil application no.4168 of 2002 before the High
                                                                       0
Court of, Gujarat at Ahmedabad. The same was allowed and
the award passed by the Labour Court in Reference(LCB)
No.225 of 1998 was set aside. Aggrieved by the same, the
appellant has filed the present civil appeal urging various facts
and legal contentions in support of his case.
                                                                       E
       5. Mr. P.H. Parekh, the learned senior counsel for the
appellant has argued that the appellant came to know about
his wrongly mentioned date of birth in his service record of the
respondent in the year 1987 only. Prior to that, he had no
knowledge about the incorrect recording of his date of birth and       F
so he immediately made representation to the respondent for
its correction which was not acceded and therefore, he had
raised the industrial dispute and the Labour Court had recorded
its finding in the Award after adjudication of the dispute and held
that there was no delay on the part of the appellant in                G
approaching his employer and the Conciliation Officer to
correct his date of birth as he had approached it within
reasonable time. It is contended by him that the appellant's
submission with respect to his date of birth is based on
documentary evidence i.e the birth certificate issued by the
                                                                       H
    868      SUPREME COURT' REPORTS                 [2014] 4 S.C.R.


A BMC, the Xerox copy of which is Ex.52 herein. Further, the LIC
  Policy, Ex.42 for which the premium was paid by the
  respondent on behalf of the appellant to the Life Insurance
  Corporation and the same was deducted from his monthly
  salary, mentions his date of birth as 27 .6.1940. There wa>s an
B apparent mistake in his school records and it is submitted that
  the appellant approached the authorities for rectification of the
  same on the basis of the birth certificate issued by BMC and
  the school authorities rectified it. The learned senior counsel
  submitted that the birth certificate issued by the BMC is a legally
c binding document and that the appellant was prematurely,
  arbitrarily and illegally superannuated from his services, without
  notice, even though the respondent was aware of the
  appellant's real date of birth as the same was reflected in
  records namely : Identity Card issued by the Bhavnagar
0 Electricity Co., the Birth Certificate issued by the BMC, the
  Certificate of birth date issued by the principal of the appellant's
  school, statement of employees and their relevant details
  handed over by the Bhavnagar Electricity Co. to the respondent
  at the time of takeover, confidential reports maintained by the
E respondent in its records and lastly the LIC Policy by which
  preniium was paid. It was further contended that the High Court
  erred in not appreciating that the respondent, by permitting
  other employees to correct their date of birth by merely
  producing an affidavit has discriminated against the appellant
  by refusing to correct the date of birth even on production of
F an affidavit and a birth certificate issued by the BMC pursuant
  to an order of the JMFC court and other such documents
  furnished to it for correction that also formed part of the
  respondent's own record of its employees which proved the
  date of birth of the appellant to be 27.6.1940 and not 27.6.1937.
G
       6. On the other hand, Ms. Hemantika Wahi, the learned
  counsel for the respondent submits that the respondent-board
  had taken over the erstwhile Bhavnagar Electricity Co. in the
  year 1978 and whatever service record was available with the ·
H erstwhile company was transferred to the respondent-board
 ISWARLAL MOHANLAL THAKKAR v. PASCHIM GUJARAT 869
     VIJ COMPANY LTD. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
and as per the said record, birth date of the appellant was               A
27.6.1937. It is submitted that the appellant signed all the
documents with open eyes and it was open for him to raise the
issue of the alleged wrong date of birth in the year 1978 but
he did not take any steps towards that till the year 1987. It was
further contended that the confidential reports was signed by             B
him every year and there also his birth date was indicated as
27 .6.1937 and the service book of the appellant also reflects
the same and all this evidence has estopped him from
contending any birth date other than 27.6.1937. The learned
counsel has raised the point that the Labour Court merely on              c
the basis of conjectures and surmises and without assigning
any detailed justification or reasons has accepted the birth
certificate issued by the BMC to the appellant with the date of
birth as 27 .6.1940 and is thus ex-facie illegal and, therefore,
the findings and reasons recorded by it is rightly set aside by           D
the High Court in exercise of its power of judicial review.
      7. We have heard the rival legal contentions urged on
 behalf of both the parties. The following questions would arise
 for our consideration:
                                                                          E
       i.     In the event that there is a dispute in the date of birth
              between the birth certificate issued by the
              competent authority and the school leaving
              certificate, which document will prevail?
       ii.    Whether the High Court was correct in passing an            F
              order setting aside the judgment and Award of the
              Labour Court?
       iii.   What Award?
       8. We will first examine the award and judgment of the             G
  Labour Court. The Labour court while passing its award and
  judgment has given cogent reasons for the same. The labour
  court examined all the evidence on record and held that as per
. Ex.36 which is the certificate of birth given by the school for the
  brother of the appellant, Batuklal Mohanlal Thakker wherein his         H
    870      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2014] 4 S.C.R.


A   date of birth is written as 27/1/1937 and therefore, it is
     impossible that the appellant's date of birth would be 27/6/1937
    as the difference would be only 5 months and so it is clear that
    when both the brothers joined the school, the Director/Principal
     had inadvertently written date of birth which revealed from
B   Court's order and hence, the date of birth in the school record
    for the appellant was corrected to 27/6/1940 as per the court's
    order. The Labour Court further went on to observe that before
    the court order, as and when the applicant got the chance, he
    gave an application to the respondent organisation vide letter
c   dated 18.4.1987 requesting them to correct his date of birth
    as per documents enclosed - the statement of the Bhavnagar
     Electricity Company Ltd, his Identity card and copy of the UC
    policy, all of which showed his date of birth as 27.6.1940, and
    to record the entry in the service records. The respondent did
    not accept the same and the appellant then got a court order
D   dated 22.05.1987 which directed the entry of date of birth of
    the C!PPellant as 27.6.1940 to be passed in the Birth & Deaths
    Register but in spite of this order, the respondent did not ~ccept
    such judicial/court evidence or the government documents. They
    neither cared to inform the appellant that they did not accept
E   the documents nor did they give him any opportunity to defend
    his application and retired him arbitrarily by taking an ex-parte
    decision which is illegal and against the principles of natural
    justice. The Labour Court then went. on to observe that i~ the
    case of other employees, the dates of birth were corrected on
F   the basis of affidavits but in the case of the appellallt, in spite
    of producing a court order and other documents, they were not
    accepted by the respondent and thus, this action of the
    respondent, retiring the applicant from service was illegal and
    unconstitutional and against the principles of natural justice.
G   Thereby the reference of the appellant was accepted and the
    respondent was ordered to pay the appellant full salary along
    with all admissible ancill~ry benefits from the date he was
    retired till the date of his actµal retirement as per his date of
    birth, and Rs.1,500/- towards costs of the matter.
H
ISWARLAL MOHANLAL THAKKAR v. PASCHIM GUJARAT. 871
    VIJ COMPANY LTD. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
     9. We find the judgment and award of the labour court well- A
reasoned and based on facts and evidence on record. The
High Court has erred in its exercise of power under Article 227
of the Constitution of India to annul the findings of the labour
court in its Award as it is well settled law that the High Court
cannot exercise its power under Article 227 of the Constitution B
as an appellate court or re-appreciate evidence and record its
findings on the contentious points. Only if there is a serious
error of law or the findings recorded suffer from error apparent
on record, can the High Court quash the order of a lower court.
The Labour Court in the present case has satisfactorily c
exercised its original jurisdiction and properly appreciated the
facts and legal evidence on record and given a well reasoned
order and answered the points of dispute in favour of the
appellant. The High Court had no reason to interfere with the
same as the Award of the labour court was based on, sound
                                                                 0
and cogent reasoning, which has served the ends of ju~tice.
     It is relevant to mention that in the case of Shalini Shyam
Shetty & Anr. v. Rajendra Shankar Pati/ 1, with regard to the
limitations of the High Court to exercise its jurisdiction under
Article 227, it was held in para 49 that-                          E
     "The power of interference under Art.227 is to be kept to
     a minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not
     come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and
     unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the      F
     functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the
     High Court."
     It was also held that-
     "High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of G
     its power of superintendence under Art.227 of the
     Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts
     inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a
     court of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal
     subordinate to it."
                                                                   H




/"
    872       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2014] 4 S.C.R.


A Thus it is clear, that the High Court has to exercise its power
  under Article 227 of the Constitution judiciously and to further
  the ends of justice.
       In the ca·se of Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State
    Warehousing Corporation 2, this Court held that,
B
          "20 ...... ln view of the above discussion, we hold that the
          learned Single Judge of the High Court committed serious
          jurisdictional error and unjustifiably interfered with the award
          of reinstatement passed by the Labour Court with
c         compensation of Rs.87,582 by entertaining a wholly
          unfounded plea that the appellant was appointed in
          violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and the
          Regulation."
        10. The power of judicial review of the High Court has to
D be alluded to here to decide whether or not the High Court has
  erred in setting aside the judgment and order of the labour court.
  In the case of Heinz India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. State of UP &
  Ors. 3 ,. this Court referred to the position held on the power of
  judicial review in the case of Reid v. Secretary of State for
E Scotlar;id4, wherein it is stated that :-

          "Judicial review involves a challenge to the legal validity of
          the decision. It does not allow the court of review to
          examine the evidence with a view to forming its own view
          about the substantial merits of the case. It may be that the
F         tribunal whose decision is being challenged has done
          something which it had no lawful authority to do. It may
          have abused or misused the authority which it had. It may
          have departed from the procedures which either by statute
          or at common law as a matter of fairness it ought to have
G         observed. As regards the decisions itself it may be found
          to be perverse or irrational or grossly disproportionate to
          what was required. Or the decision may be found to be
          erroneous in respect of a legal deficiency, as for example,
          through the absence of evidence, or of sufficient evidence,
H
 ISWARLAL MOHANLAL THAKKAR v. PASCHIM GUJARAT 873
     VIJ COMPANY LTD. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J .]

      to support it, or through account being taken of irrelevant A
      matter, or through a failure for any reason to take account
      of a relevant matter, or through some misconstruction of
      the terms of the statutory provision which the decision
      maker is required to apply. But while the evidence may
      have to be explored in order to see if the decision is B
      vitiated by such legal deficiencies it is perfectly clear that
      in case of review, as distinct from an ordinary appeal, the
      court may not set about forming its own preferred view of
      evidence."
  Therefore, in view of the above judgments we have to hold that        C
  the High CC?urt has committed a grave error by setting aside
  the findings recorded on the points of dispute in the Award of
  the labour court. A grave miscarriage of justice has been
  committed against the appellant as the respondent should have
  accepted the birth certificate as a conclusive proef of age, the      D
  same being an entry in the public record as per Section 35 of
  the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and the birth certific'ate
  mentioned the appellant's date of birth as 27 .6.1940, which is
  the documentary evidence. Therefore, there was no reason to
  deny him the benefit of the same, instead the respondent-board        E
  prematurely terminated the services of the appellant by taking
  his date of birth as 27 .6.1937 which is contrary to the facts and
  evidence on record. This date of birth is highly improbable as
  well as impossible as the appellant's elder brother was born
  on 27.1 .1937 as per the School Leaving Certificate, and there        F
  cannot be a mere 5 months difference between the birth of his
  elder brother and himself. Therefore, it is apparent that the
  School Leaving Certificate cannot be relied upon by the
  respondent-board and instead, the birth certificate issued by
  the BMC which is the documentary evidence should have been            G
   relied upon by the respondent. Further, the date of birth is
   mentioned as 27 .6.1940 in the LIC insurance policy on the
   basis of which the premium was paid by the respondent to the
. Life Insurance Corporation on behalf of the appellant. Therefore,
 · it is orily just and proper that the respondent should have relied   H
    874     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 4 S.C.R.


A on the birth certificate issued by the BMC on the face of all
  these discrepancies as the same was issued on the order of
  the JMFC. The High Court has wrongly held that the appellant
  was estopped from raising the issue of his date of birth as he
  had signed the records in 1978 but he raised this issue only in
B 1987. The reason for this is clear that the respondent came out
  with a circular in 1987 that those employees who wished to
  change their date of birth in the records may do so by furnishing
  the necessary birth certificate and further, they can do it before
  they become 50 years of age. The appellant had not attained
c 50 years of age at the time he raised the contention regarding
  mistake in his date of birth. The High Court.has not applied its
  mind in setting aside the judgment and award of the labour court
  in exercise of its power of judicial review and superintendence
  as it is patently clear that the labour court has not committed
  any error of jurisdiction or passed a judgment without sufficient
0
  evidence. The impugned judgement and order of the High
  Court deserves to be set aside and the award and judgment
  of the labour court be restored.
         11 . In view of the aforesaid reasons, we allow the appeal,
E set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court
  and restore the award of the Labour Court, since the services ·
  of the appellant were prematurely superannuated taking his
  date of birth as 27.06.1937 instead of 27.06.1940, and
  therefore, he is entitled to full back ·wages and other
F consequential monetary benefits from the date of termination
  till the date of his correct superannuation considering his date
  of birth as 27.06.1940. The back wages shall be calculated on
  the basis of revised pay scale and the same must be paid by
  way of demand draft to the appellant within six weeks from the
G date of receipt of the copy of this order, failing which the
  respondent shall pay interest @ 12% per annum on the amount.
  due, towards back wages and other consequential monetary
  benefits, from the date of the Award of the Labour Court till the
  date of payment.

H D.G.                                            Appeal allowed.