Holding

Section 133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 exclusively vests jurisdiction in the Land Tribunal to determine agricultural land status and tenancy, rendering civil courts powerless to entertain or overturn such matters.

Summary

The dispute concerned an 18‑acre agricultural plot in Gadag taluka, claimed by two families who had jointly cultivated it before the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 came into force. Both families filed Form No. 7 for occupancy rights, and the Land Tribunal held that the land was jointly cultivated and entitled both parties to occupancy rights. The respondents later filed a suit in a civil court seeking a declaration of title, which the trial court granted, but the appellate court set aside on the ground that the civil court lacked jurisdiction under Section 133 of the Act. The High Court reversed that decision, prompting the appellants to seek special leave to appeal. The Supreme Court examined Section 133, which vests exclusive jurisdiction in the Land Tribunal to decide whether land is agricultural and who the tenant is, and held that once the Tribunal decides, civil courts cannot entertain or overturn such matters. Consequently, the Court restored the appellate court’s order that the civil suit was barred, setting aside the High Court’s judgment. The appeal was allowed, confirming that the civil court’s jurisdiction was ousted by the Act.

Issues considered

Whether Section 133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 ousts the jurisdiction of civil courts to decide questions of agricultural land status and tenancy.
Whether a civil suit for declaration of title can be entertained after the Land Tribunal has decided the tenancy issue.
Whether an order of a civil court setting aside a Land Tribunal decision is a nullity.

Legislation cited

Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961s. 112B(bbb), s. 133, s. 48A

Subjects

land reformsjurisdictionland tribunaltenancycivil courtoccupancy rightsagricultural landouster of jurisdiction

Judgment

[2008] 15 S.C.R. 838

ISHWARAGOUDA & _ORS.
v.
· MALLIKARJUN GOWDA & ORS .
. (Civil Appeal No. 5878 of 2002) .__
: NOVEMBER 7, 2008
B
[TARUN CHATTERJEE AND AFTAB ALAM, JJ.]

Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961:

c s. 133 - Jurisdiction to decide as to whether a land is
agricultural land and the person claiming its possession is
··--
Jt
,..ll

a tenant - HELD: Vests only on Land Tribunal and no suit
or ptoceedings in such matter shall be entertained by any
civil court - Further, once such a question /Jas been decided
.0 by the Tribunal, the decision cannot be challenged before
any civil court and if any order in the matter is passed by a
civil court setting aside the decision of the Land Tribunal,
· the same would be a nullity - In the instant case,· the first
appellate court rightly held that the land Tribunal having
decided that both the parties were entitled to occupancy rights
E with regard to land in dispute, civil court had no jurisdiction
to decide whether joint family or one of its members was the
tenant - High Court in -second appeal erred in setting aside
the judgment of'first .appellate· court - Judgment of High
Court set aside.
F
The suit land was under· cultivation of the
predecessor-in-title of the parties. After coming into ,...
/
operation of the Karnataka La.nd Reforms Act, 1961 the
father of the respondents filed Form No~ 7 for grant of ·
G · occupancy rights in respect of \the entire land whereas
father' of the appellants filed Form No. 7 claiming that the
·land was being cultivated jointly by both the families. The
Land Tribunal held that since the· land· was being
,cultivated jointly, both the applicants were entitled to
H 838
ISHWARAGOUDA& ORS. v. MALLIKARJUN GOWDA & 839
ORS.

occupancy rights. The High Court dismissed the writ A
petition of the respondents, and remitted the matter to the
Land Tribunal for demarcation. Th.e appeal filed by the
respondents was also dismissed. Against the order of
demarcation passed by· th_e Land Trib.unal, the
respondents, having remained unsuccessful in the B
appeal before Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal as also
in the revision petition before the High Court, filed a suit
for declaration of title in respect of the suit land. The suit
was decreed by the trial court. But the first appellate court
dismissed the suit holding that the civil court had no c
jurisdiction in the matter. The High Court having allowed
the second appeal filed by the respondents and directed
the first appellate court to decide the appeal filed by the
appellants, the latter filed the appeal.

Allowing the appeal, the Court D

HELD:1.1. A plain reading of s.133 of the Karnataka
Land Reforms Act, 1961 would make it clear that
jurisdict~on to decide the question whether a particular
land is an agricultural land, and whether the person E
claiming possession thereof is a tenant shall vest only on
the Land Tribunal and no suit or proceeding etc. shall be
entertained by any civil court. It would be further evident
that even when a suit is pending on the said question,
the civil court shall refer such dispute to be decided by F
the Tribunal for decision. Once the Land Tribunal decides
the question, the civil court cannot have any jurisdiction
in the matter in view of s.133 of the Act. [Para 6] [845-A-
C]
1.2. Furthermore, once a land tribunal decides the G
question enumerated in s.133 of the Act, such decision
of the Land Tribunal also cannot come under challenge
before any civil court and if any order is passed by the
civil court setting aside the decision of the Land Tribunal,
such an order would be a nullity. If any consequential H
840 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 15 S.C.R.

A or.der., is also passed by the civil court, setting aside the
decision of the Land Tribunal and directing the ).. .;.__
possession Qf land in dispute to be delivered, it must be
held that the said ord.er was without jurisdiction and
therefore a nullity. [Para 6] [845-0-E]
H
Mu·qakappa vs~ Rudrapp·a & Ors. (1994) 2 ·sec 57,
relied on. · · ·

Balawwa & Anr. vs. Hasanabi & Ors. (2000) 9 SCC 272,
distinguished.
c 1.3. In the instant case, before the Land Tribunal it
was conclusively decided that the predecessor-in-title of
both t~e pa_rties had taken the land in dispute for
cultivation jointly and that they had been jointly
cultivating the same. That being the position, and in view
D of Section 133 of the Act, the jurisdiction of the civil court
having been ousted, the High Court was in error in setting
aside the judgment of the first appellate court and .,,,-.f '

remanding the matter to it for decision in the light of the
observations made in the impugned judgment. [Para 10]
E [848-F-G, H; 849-A]

1.4. The High Court in the earlier writ petition, by its
order dated 17th of December, 1982, had held on
consideration of evidence produced by the parties and
F materials on record that the land in dispute was taken for
cultivation jointly -by the parties and, therefore, the parties
were in joint cultivation. It would be evident from the said )

order of the High Court that only to demarcate the share
of the parties, the matter was remitted back to the Land
\,
G Tribunal. Therefore, the question of reopening the issue,
namely, whether any one is in possession of the land as
a personal cultivator, or it was in joint possession of the
family members of the parties, is no longer available to
·be agitated before the civil c,ourt. [Para 10] [848-C-E]
·H 1.5. The judgment of the High Court is set aside and
ISHWARAGOUDA & ORS. v. MALLIKARJUN GOWDA & 841
ORS.

that of the first appellate court holding that the civil court A
had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit for declaration of
title as it was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Land
· Tribunal is restored. [Para 11] [849-8] .,
..... ~ ... i . '. -~ ' ,·: ':'""
Case Law Reference: B
•.'"I ,.,.. j - •;..-

. (2000) 9 sec 212 distinguished · .. para 4
(1994) 2 sec 57 relied on para 8

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
5878 of 2002. C

From the final Judgment and Order dated 20.8.2001 of the
High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in RSA No. 100of1998.

Kiran Suri and Aparna Bhat for the Appellants. D
S.K. Kulkarni, M. Gireesh Kumar and Khwairakpaln Nobin
"'~ Singh for the Respondents. ,

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
E
TARUN CHATTERJEE, J. 1. This appeal is directed
against the judgment and order dated 28th of August, 2001 of
the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in a Second Appeal
whereby, the High Court had allowed the appeal filed by the
respondents against the judgment and decree of the 2nd F
Additional District ~udge, Dharwad, remanding back the matter
to the First Appellate Court to decide in accordance with law
in view of the findings made by the High Court in the second
appeal.

2. The relevant facts, as arising from the case made out G
by the appellants, which would assist us in appreciating the
controversy involved are narrated in a nutshell, which are as
follows:

3. The disputed land bearing RS No. 40 measuring 18 H:
•
842 · SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 15 S.C.R.

A acres 32 guntas was an agricultural land belonging to one _..z. •
j
Laxmibai·, ·situated in Harlapur village in Gadag taluka: After the
death 6fSmt. Laxmibai, her grand sons inherited the said land
and it was under cultivation of the p'redecessor in· title· of the
appellants and the. respondents. After coming into operation of
B the Karnataka Land Reforms Act (in short "the Act"),
Basanagowda, the father of the respondents filed Form No. 7
under the Act for grant of occupancy rights on the ground that
they were in actual cultivation of the entire land. Parwategowda,
the father of the appellants, simultaneously also filed an
c application under Form No. 7 claiming that the said land was
being cultivated jointly by the family, i.e. the family of
Basanagowda, the father of the respondents, and
Parwategowda, the father of the appellants. Both the above-·
mentioned applications were registered on the file of Land
o Tribunal, Gadag. On 21st of November, 1976, the Land Tribunal
passed orders holding that Basanagowda and Parwategowda
were jointly cultivating the lands and were entitled to occupancy
rights in the said land. Aggrieved by the said order of the Land
Tribunal, the respondents filed a Writ Petition in the High Court
E of Karnataka being WP No. 2088 of 1977. The High Court
dismissed the writ petition by its order dated 17th of December,
1982, inte:;r alia, holding that the disputed land was taken on
cultivation jointly by the family and that it was in joint cultivation.
However, for demarcation of haif portion of the disputed land,
F the matter was remitted to the Land Tribunal. The respondents
thereafter filed an appe,al before a Division Bench of the High
Court, which was dismissed by an order dated 6th of June,
1983. Meanwhile, the Land Tribunal after being remanded back
the matter for demarcation of the disputed land between the
G parties by the High Court, allotted southern half portion to
Parwategowda and his family and the Northern half portion to
Basanagowda and his family by its order dated 3rd of January,
1985. Against the said order, the respondents preferred an
appeal before the Land Reforms Appellate Authority being L. R.
H Appeal No: ·1687of1986 which was dismissed by the Appellate
ISHWARAGOUDA & ORS. v. MALLIKARJUN GOWDA & 843
ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]

. \
Authority on 14th of September 1987. A

4. Against the said judgment and order, the respondents
preferred a civil revision petition being CRP No. 5632 of 1987
before the High Court of Karnataka. The High Court dismissed
the revision petition, inter alia, observing that the party ·8

.
prejudiced can approach a civil court to claim exclusive
possession of the disputed land. On the basis of such an
observation, the respondents thereafter filed a suit for
....... declaration of title and possession in respect of the disputed
land being O.S No. 131 of 1989 in the Court of Civil Juc!ge,
Gadag. The Civil Judge by its judgment decreed the suit
c
holding that it had the jurisdiction to decide as to whether it was
a joint family property or an individual property. Aggrieved by
the said judgment and decree of the civil judge, the appellants
herein filed an appeal before the 2nd Additional District Judge,
D
Dharwad. The Additional District Judge allowed the appeal
~
... holding that th~ civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the
suit for declaration of title and possession, which is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Land Tribunal. The respondents filed
a Second Appeal in the High Court against the aforesaid
E
judgment passed in the appeal. Relying on a decision of this
Court, in Balawwa & Anr. v. Hasanabi & Ors. [(2000) 9 SCC
272], the High Court set aside the judgment of the appellate
court and allowed the appeal remanding back the matter to the
......_ first appellate court directing it to decide the matter in
accordance with law in view of the observations made by the F
High Court.

Feeling aggrieved by the judgment of the Division Bench
of the High Court, the appellants filed this special leave petition,
which was heard by us on grant of leave in the presence of the G
learned counsel for the parties.

r 5. The moot question that needs to be decided in this
" appeal is as follows:
H
844 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 1~.C.R.

A "Whether the jurisdiction of the civil court is ousted in view
of Section 133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act to
decide whether an individual is a tenant or the joint family
is the tenant of the disputed land the same being within
. the exclusive.jurisdiction of'the Land Tribunal?" ··
B
· 6. We have· heard the learned counsel appearing for the
parties and perused the materials on record; It is pertinent to
refer to Section 133 of the Act for a better understanding of the
·issue in hand. Section 133 in so far as it is relevant for the
C present case states:

"133. Suits, proceedings etc. involving questions required
to be decided by the Tribunal:-1) Notwithstanding anything
in any law for the time being in force,-

D i) no civil or criminal court or officer or authority shall,
in any suit, case or proceedings concerning a land
decide the question whether such land is or is not
agricultural land and whether the person claiming
to be in possession is or is not a tenant of the said .
E land from prior to 1st March, 1974;

ii) such court or officer or authority shall stay such suit
or proceedings in so far as such question is
concerned and refer the same to the Tribunal for
decision;
F
iii) all interim order issued or made by such court,
officer or authority, whether in the nature of
temporary injunction or appointment of a Receiver
·or otherwise, concerning the land shall stand
G dissolved or vacated, as the case may be;·

iv)

It is clear from a plain reading of the aforesaid provisions
of the Act, that no Court or any authority has any jurisdiction to
H
ISHWARAGOUDA & ORS. v. MALLIKARJUN GOWDA & 845
ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
)._
\
decide whether a person claiming to be in possession is or is A
not a tenant of the disputed land and the sole authority to decide
such dispute vests only in the Land Tribunal. A plain reading of
Section 133 of the Act would make it clear that any questions
concerning a land whether such land is or is not an agricultural
land, and whether the person claiming possession is or is not B
a tenant of the land shall vest only on the Land Tribunal and no
....;,_j suit or proceeding etc. shall be entertained by any civil or
..... criminal court. It would be further evident that even when a suit
is pending on the said question, the Court shall refer such
dispute to be decided by the tribunal for decision. Once a land c
tribunal decides the aforesaid question, the Civil Court cannot
have any jurisdiction to decide the said dispute in a civil
proceeding in view of Section 133 of the Act. Furthermore, once
a land tribunal decides the said question enumerated in section
133 of the Act, such decision of the Land Tribunal also cannot
-.. come under challenge before any civil court and if any order is
passed by the civil court setting aside the decision of the Land
D

Tribunal, such an order would be a nullity. If any consequential
order is also passed by the civil court, setting aside the decision
of the Land Tribunal and directing the possession of the E
disputed land to be delivered, it must be held that the said order
was without jurisdiction and therefore a nullity. Therefore, we are
of the view that the High Court fell in error by directing the order
.Jo.. of remand to the first appellate court to decide the said issue
after it was decided by the tribunal which was uncalled for and F
was therefore liable to be set aside.

7.A plain reading of the judgment of the High Court would
clearly demonstrate that it had relied on the decision this Court
in the case of Balawwa & Anr. vs. Hasanabi & Ors. (supra), in
which this Court had held that inspite of the special jurisdiction G
under the Act, the jurisdiction of the civil court was not ousted
'f.... after considering the reliefs claimed in the suit. In that decision
this Court had noted that in the said suit the relief of partition
was granted and it was that decree of partition, which was the
H
· 846 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 15 S.C.R.

·A subject matter of appeal in that case. In.that context, this Court
in pa:agraph no.7 obser\ted as follows: ·

"Having·examined the provisions of the Karnataka
~an~ Refo'rm~ Act and the aforesaid two judgments of this
'' Cou'rt, we have no doubt in our mind that the Civil Court
., cannot be said to be ousted of the jurisdiction, in granting
the relief sought for. It is too well settled that when a
Special Tribunal is created under a special statute and the
· jurisdiction of the Civil Court is sought to be ousted under
·· the said statute, it is only in respect of those reliefs which
c could be granted by the Special Tribunal under the special
statute, the jurisdiction of the civil court cannot be said to
be ousted.

8. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
D respondents relied on this case before us also contending that
the jurisdiction of the civil court could not be ousted and it could
decide as to the title of the disputed land. We cannot agree to
this contention of the respondents. In paragraph no.8 of the
aforesaid decision, this Court had observed as follows:
E
"Looking at the provisions of section 48A of the Karnataka
Land Reforms Act and the relief which is sought for in the
present case, it is difficult to hold that the Tribunal had the
jurisdiction of the civil court. Under Section 48A, the
Tribunal can only grant the relief of declaring occupancy
F
right in favour of an applicant provided the preconditions
for. the samr. are satisfied, namely, that the land was in
possession of the tenant concerned on the relevant date.
That being the position and the Tribunal under the Land
Reforms Act not having jurisdiction to grant relief of
, .G
partition, the civil court itself has the jurisdiction to
entertain the suit for partition."

From a plain reading of the observation of this Court in the
aforesaid decision as quoted above, it is clear that the relief
H
ISHWARAGOUDA & ORS. v. MALLIKARJUN GOWDA & 847
ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]

that could. be granted by the Civil Court itself which is a decree A
"'1.
for partition could not be granted by the tribunal and it was only
the civil court which can entertain a suit involving partition of the
said land as we have already held that it was beyond the
jurisdiction of the Land Tribunal. Therefore, the aforesaid
Paragraph no. 8 on which reliance was placed by the B
respondents would not help them but in contrary would help the
appellants because in that case this Court had clearly held that
-~
a relief for grant of partition rights could not be granted by the
~
> Tribunal. That apart, this Court in the case of Mudakappa vs.
Rudrappa & Ors. [(1994) 2 SCC 57], laid down the law in c
respect of the question posed in this case which is reproduced
as under:

"If one of the members of the family cultivates the joint
family, under these circumstances, pending the suit, when
the question arises whether the member or the joint family D
·-• is the tenant, that question should be decided by the
Tribunal alone under Section 48A read with Section 133
and not by the civil court. Since the Tribunal constituted
under the Act has been invested with the power ,and
jurisdiction to determine rival claims, it should record the E
evidence and decide the. matter so that its correctness
could be treated either by an appeal or by judicial review,
under Article 226 or under Article 227 as the case may
~
be. But, it cannot by necessary implication, be concluded
that when rival claims are made for tenancy rights, the F
jurisdiction of the Tribunal is ousted or its decision is
subject of the decision once over by the Civil Court. It is
clear from Section 48A(5) and Section 112B(bbb) read
with Section 133, that the decision of the Tribunal is final
under Section 133 (iii). The Civil Court has power only to G
decide other issues. It cannot, therefore, be said that the
rival claims for tenancy or the nature of the tenancy are
.., exclusively left to be dealt with by the Civil Court."
"
9. Thus in view of the aforesaid decision, we hold that the H
848 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 15 S.C.R

A 'civi(C6urt had no·jurisdiction to decide as to whettierthe join·t -<'
)

'family·or one·of the members was a tenant, when that question
~
,was·c~ns.idered finally· and authoritatively on merits b¥ the Land
Tribunal'C3adag. Therefore·, we are ofthe view that the learned
Additional DistrictJudge, D_harwad, was perfectly justified in
B view of ouster of jurisdiction of the civil court under Section 133
dfthe Act, in setting aside the judgment of the trial court to.this
extent. Consequent thereupon, we are, therefore, also of the
view that the High Court was wrong in setting aside the order
J-
{
of the 2nd Additional District Judge, Dharwad on an appeal -"'

c preferred b'y'the respondents.

10. Before we conclude, we may note that as observed
herein earlier, the High Court in the earlier Writ Application by "'
its order dated 17th of December, 1982, held on consideration
of evidence produced by the parties and materials on record
D that the disputed land was taken for cultivation jointly by the ._..,
parties and, therefore, the parties were in joint cultivation. It
would be evidehtfrom the order of the High Court passed on
•
17th of December, 1982, that only to demarcate the share of
the parties, the matter was remitted back to the Land Tribunal.
E Therefore, the question of reopening this issue, namely whether
a person is in possession of the disputed land as a personal
cultivator, or the disputed land was in joint possession of the
family members of the parties, is no longer available to be
agitated before the civil court: At the risk of repetition, we may )..._ )

F also note that before the Land Tribunal it was· conclusively
decided that the predecessor-in-title of both the parties had
taken the disputed land for cultivation jointly and that they were
jointly cultivating the same. That being the position, and in view
of Section 133 of the Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil court
G having been- ousted and applying the principles as laid down
by this Court in the case of Mudakappa vs. Rudrappa & Ors. '>
(Supra), and Balawwa & Anr. vs. Hasanabi & Ors. (supra), in '
....,. ~

paragraph no. 7 and 8 of the same, as mentioned herein earlier, I

we are of the view that the High Court was in error in setting
H ..... _
..
ISHWARAGOUDA & ORS. v. MALLIKARJUN GOWDA & 849
ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]

aside the judgment of the first Appellate Court and remanding A
the matter to the same for decision in the light of the
observations made in the impugned judgment.

11. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned judgment of
the High Court thereby restoring the judgment of the 2nd B
Additional District, Judge holding that the civil court had no
jurisdiction to entertain the suit for declaration of title as it was
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Land Tribunal.

12. The appeal is accordingly allowed. There will be no
order as to costs. C

RP. Appeal allowed.