Holding

The State Government is competent to entertain revision under Section 128 and the two authorities are not interchangeable; the Service Rules applied, and the appeal is dismissed.

Summary

Ishwar Singh, a manager of Sadul Shahar Kray Vikray Sahakari Samiti, was compulsorily retired under Rule 244(2)(i) of the Rajasthan Service Rules. He challenged the order by filing a revision before the Additional Registrar, who held that the Service Rules did not apply and that retirement required Registrar approval under Rule 41 of the Cooperative Societies Rules. The Additional Registrar's order was set aside in a subsequent revision before the State Government. The Rajasthan High Court (single judge) held that the Additional Registrar had exercised only the delegated power of the Registrar, not of the State Government, and therefore the State Government could entertain a further revision. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that Section 128 of the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies Act vests revisional power in both the State Government and the Registrar, but they are not interchangeable; the State Government may entertain the revision because no delegation to the Additional Registrar existed. The Court also affirmed that the society had adopted the Rajasthan Service Rules, making them applicable to the appellant. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

The scope of Section 128 of the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies Act and whether the State Government and the Registrar are interchangeable authorities for revision.
Whether a revision exercised by the Additional Registrar exhausts the revisional jurisdiction of the State Government.
Whether the Rajasthan Service Rules were applicable to the appellant despite the society's claim of using Cooperative Society Rules.
Whether the Additional Registrar had jurisdiction to entertain the first revision.

Legislation cited

Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951s. Rule 244

Subjects

cooperative societiesrevisiondelegation of powercompulsory retirementservice rulesSection 128administrative law

Judgment

A ISHWAR SINGH
v.
ST ATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ORS.
""
JANUARY 5, 2005

B [AR[J[T PASAYAT AND S.H. KAPADIA, JJ.]

Co-operative Societies :

Rajasthan Cooperative Societies Act, 1965-Section 128-Revision
c under-Authorities to exercise revisional power-State Government and
Registrar-Distinction between-Compulsory retirement of Appellant
employee-Revision petition against it allowed by Additional Registrar-On
further revision before State Government, the order of Additional Registrar
set aside-On a writ petition filed, High Court held that the Additional Registrar
D had exercised delegated power ofthe Registrar and not ofthe State Government,
and therefore, revision before the State Government was maintainable-On
appeal, held, State Government was competent to entertain the revision
application-The two authorities i.e. the State Government and the Registrar ,.
are not interchangeable-The State Government had nowhere delegated
revisional power to the Additional Registrar.
E
Word~ and Phrases-"Delegation" and "delegate"-Meaning of

The Appellant was compulsorily retired from service under the
provisions of Rule 244(2)(i) of the Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951. He
challenged the said order by way of a revision petition before the
F Additional Registrar, Cooperative Societies who held that Rule 244(2) of
the Rajasthan Service Rules was not applicable to the employer-society,
and that Rule 41 of the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies Rules, 1966 was
applicable and that approval of the Registrar is a condition precedent for
pre-mature retirement. This order was set aside in revision before the
G Government.

The said order was challenged by the appellant under Article 226
of the Constitution. Single Judge held that Additional Registrar had
exercised the delegated power of the Registrar and not of the State
Government and, therefore, the revision before the State Government was
H 96
ISHWAR SINGE v. STATE 97

maintainable and the Secretary had jurisdiction to deal with the matter, A
and in any event, Additional Registrar could not have entertained the
revision. The judgment of Single Judge was questioned by way of Letters
Patent Appeal. The LPA was dismissed.

It was contended by the Appellant that the High Court erred in
holding that Section 128 of the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies Act related B
to two authorities i.e. the State Government and the Registrar, that the
two authorities are interchangeable; that if one authority has exercised
the revisional power, other authority logically could not have exercised
such power. In any event, second revision was not maintainable; and that
the Rajasthan Service Rules had no application as the employer had never C
decided to adopt the service rules.

The respondents contended that the employer society had decided
to adopt the Rajasthan Service Rules long before the order directing pre-
mature retirement was passed; that the State Government was competent
to entertain the revision application as the Registrar was one of the two D
authorities indicated in Section 128 to exercise revisional power.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court
·' HELD: 1.1. The word 'delegation' implies that powers are committed
to another person or body which are as a rule, always subject to
resumption by the power delegating. The person delegating does not E
denude himself. Delegation implies also the power to withdraw delegation.
The word 'delegate' means little more than an agent. An agent exercises
no power of his own but only the powers of his principal. In general, a
delegation of power does not imply parting with authority. The delegating
body will retain not only power to revoke the grant, but also power to act F
concurrently on matters within the area of delegated authority except in
so far as it may already have become bound by an act of its delegate.
(101-E-G]

Roop Chand v. State of Punjab and Anr., AIR (1963) SC 1503; Huth
v. Clarke, 25 Q.B.D. 391 and Ballel/ey v. Finsbury Borough Council, (1958) G
LG R 165, referred to.

1.2. If an authority delegates the power to act it shall be deemed to
be an act of the delegator. In such a situation there is no scope for revision
of the order of the delegate by the delegator. However, in facts of the
present case it was in reality not revision by a delegator. The State H
98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] I S.C.R.

A Government had nowhere delegated revisional power to the Additional
Registrar. 1103-A; 104-BI

State of Orissa and Ors. v. Commissioner of land Records & Selllement,
C111tack and Ors., 1199817 SCC 162 and OCL India ltd. v. State of Orissa
and Ors., 120031 2 SCC 101, relied on.
B
2.1. The Single Judge categorically held that the Board of Directors
on 4.5.1977 adopted resolution making the Rajasthan Service Rules
applicable in respect of employees of the society and a notification dated
3.8.1980 was issued by the Registrar Cooperative Societies, Jaipur by
C which the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958
were made applicable to the employee also. Therefore the Service Rules
were clearly applicable to the appellant. 1104-E)

2.2. Rule 244 of the Service Rules which is applicable to the appellant
clearly provides that an employee may be compulsorily retired after
D completion of 25 years of service. Bare reading of the aforesaid provision
makes the position clear that the appointing authority has the absolute
right to retire in public interest any employee by giving him a previous
notice in writing. The compulsory retirement can be effected on the date
on which he completes 25 years of service or he attains SO years of age,
whichever is earlier or, on any date thereafter. The age and service period
E are applicable in this case. 1104-B-D)

3. Under Chapter Xlll a clear distinction is made between the State
Government and the Registrar. The test is whether the two authorities
with concurrent revisional jurisdiction are equal in rank. It is, therefore,
not correct that the two authorities i.e. the State Government and the
F Registrar are interchangeable. The power of the Government and the
Registrar in terms of Section 128 excludes matters which are covered by
Section 125 i.e. revision by the Tribunal. (107-8-C)

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 31 of 2005

G From the Judgment and Order dated 8.8.2003 of the Rajasthan High
Court in D.B.C.S.A. No. 502 of 2003.

Ajay Pal, Rakesh Dahiya, Ms. Madhurmita Bora, Nikhil Jain and
Mahabir Singh for the Appellant.

H Aruneshwar Gupta, Addi. Advocate General for State, Naveen Kumar
ISHWAR SINGH v. STATE [PASA YAT, .I.] 99
Singh and Ms. Shivangi for the Respondents. A
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

ARIJIT PASA YAT, J. Leave granted.

Appellant calls in question legality of the judgment rendered by a B
Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur, affirming the view of
the learned Single Judge that the pre-mature retiremer>t o~ ::ppellant as directed
by the respondents was in order.

A bird's eye view of the factual position would suffice.
c
Sadul Shahar Kray Vikray Sahakari Samiti (hereinafter referred to as
the 'employer') is a society registered under the Rajasthan Cooperative
Societies Act, 1965 (in short the 'Act'). The appellant was serving as its
manager. On consideration of service records of the appellant the employer
concluded that there was continuous fall in his work performance and as such D
it was in the public interest to pre-maturely retire him. He had attained the
. age of 56 years and served for more than 27 years. The Chief Executive
officer issued an office order dated 1.4.1988 compulsorily retiring him from
service under the provisions of Rule 244(2)(i) of the Rajasthan Service Rules,
1951 (in short 'Service Rules'). The appellant challenged the said order by E
way of a revision petition before the Additional Registrar-II, Cooperative
Societies, Rajasthan Jaipur (in short 'Additional Registrar'). By order dated
9.5.1996, the revision was allowed on the ground that Rule 244(2) of the
Service Rules was not applicable to the employer-society and on the other
hand his service conditions were governed by Rule 41 of the Rajasthan p
Cooperative Societies Rules, 1966 (in short the 'Rules'). Under the said Rule
approval of the Registrar is a condition precedent for pre-mature retirement.
Employees-society challenged the decision of the Additional Registrar by
way of revision before the State Government under Section 128 of the Act.
The Secretary, Cooperative Department, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur (in G
short 'Secretary') found that the revision before the Additional Registrar was
not competent as the order was passed by the Administrator who was not an
officer subordinate to the Registrar. He was, therefore, of the view that the
Additional Registrar had no jurisdiction to hear the revision in terms of
Section 128 of the Act. Accordingly, he set aside the order of the Additional H
100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] I S.C.R.

A Registrar. The order was challenged by the appellant under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the 'Constitution') before the High
Court.

Before the learned Single Judge, who heard the matter it was contended
B that the power of revision under Section 128 of the Act stood exhausted by
order of the Additional Registrar and as such the Secretary could not have
exercised the revisional power in respect of the same order. Learned Single
Judge rejected the contention holding that Additional Registrar had exercised
the delegated power of the Registrar and not of the State Government and,
therefore, the revision before the State Government was maintainable and the
c Secretary had jurisdiction to deal with the matter. In any event, Additiqnal
Registrar could not have entertained the revision. The judgment of learned
Single Judge was questioned by Letters Patent Appeal. Stand of the appellant
before the Division Bench was that once the delegate exercised the power of
revision, it stands exhausted and such power cannot be exercised again by
D original authority. Reference was made to certain decisions of this Court in
this context. The Division Bench of the High Court was of the view that the
factual position was entirely different. Under Section 128 the revisional
power can be exercised by two authorities i.e. Government and the Registrar.
In the cases to which reference was made by the appellant there was a single
E authority who had delegated the power. It was further noted that under the
Act revisional power is vested with two authorities. The Registrar who was
the delegator of power to the Additional Registrar could not have entertained
the revision. But there was no embargo on the State Government to entertain
the revision application. Further the Secretary had clearly observed that the
F Additional Registrar had no power to entertain the revision as the Administrator
was not an officer subordinate to him. Accordingly, LPA was dismissed.

In support of the appeal Mr. Mahabir Singh, learned counsel submitted
that the High Court erred in holding that Section 128 of the Act related to
G two authorities i.e. the State Government and the Registrar. In fact the two
authorities are interchangeable. If one authority has exercised the revisional
power other authority logically could not have exercised such power. In any
event, second revision was not maintainable. Strong reliance was placed on
Roop Chand v. State of Punjab and Anr., AIR (1963) SC 1503 for supporting
the plea. It was further contended that the service rules had no application
H
ISHWAR SINGH v. STATE [PASAYAT. J.] JOI

as the employer had never decided to adopt the service rules. Before the A
Additional Registrar a plea was taken that Administrator had no power to
direct compulsory retirement as he was not the appointing authority. This
plea was given up stating that the Administrator having taken over the
management had authority to pass the order of pre-mature retirement subject
of course to fulfilment of requirements of Rule 41 of the Rules, and not under B
Rule 244 of the Service Rules.

Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents sub;nitt"u that the factual
scenario as presented by the appellant is not correct. In fact, the employer
society had decided to adopt the service rules long before the order directing
pre-mature retirement was passed. Further the State Government was competent C
to entertain the revision application as the Registrar was one of the two
authorities indicated in Section 128 to exercise revisional power. The impugned
orders of the learned Single Judge and Division Bench of the High Court did
not suffer from any infirmity to warrant any interference.

It is an accepted position in law that to 'delegate' to another is not to D
denude yourself. As was observed by Wills, J. in Huth v. Clarke 25 Q.B.D.
391, "In my opinion the word, in its general sense and as generally used,
does not imply, or point to, a giving up of authority, but rather the conferring
of authority upon someone else". As observed by Lord Coleridge, C.J. in 25
Q.B.D. 304, the word 'delegation' implies that powers are committed to E
another person or body which are as a rule, always subject to resumption by
the power delegating. The person delegating does not denude himself. (Per
Wharton's Law Lexicon, 1976 Reprint Ed. at page 316). Delegation implies
also the power to withdraw delegation. As indicated in Wharton's Law
Lexicon, delegation is a sending away; a putting into commission; the
assignment of a debt to another; the entrusting another with a general power F
to act for the good of those who depute him. The word 'delegate' means little
more than an agent. An agent exercises no power of his own but only the
powers of his principal. The observation in Huth 's case (supra) was referred
to in Roop Chand's case (supra). In general, a delegation of power does not
imply parting with authority. The delegating body will retain not only power G
to revoke the grant, but also power to act concurrently on matters within the
area of delegated authority except in so far as it may already have become
bound by an act of its delegate. [See Battelley v. Finsbury Borough Council,
(1958) LGR 165].

In Corpus Juris Secondum, Volume 26, 'delegate' has been described H
102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] I S.C.R.
A as follows:
"As a noun, a person sent and empowered to act for another, one
deputed to represent another in a more popular but less accurate
sense, a regularly selected member of a regular party convention.

As a verb, in its general sense and as generally used, the term
B
does not imply, or point to, a giving up of authority, but rather the
conferring authority upon someone else.

At common law, it is the transfer of authority by one person to
another, the act of making or commissioning a delegate.
c Expression 'delegation of authority of power' is a term which
like the word 'delegate' does not imply a parting with powers by the
person who grants the delegation, but points rather to the conferring
of an authority to do things which otherwise that person would have
to do himself."
D In Collins English Dictionary the word 'delegate' has been stated to be
a person who is chosen to vote or make decisions on behalf of a group of
other people. If you delegate duties, responsibilities or power to someone,
you give them those duties, those responsibilities, or that power so that they
can act on your behalf. If you are delegated to do something you are given
E the duty of acting on someone else's behalf by making decisions, voting, or
doing some particular work.

In Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, the word 'delegate' has been
stated to mean a person who is appointed, authorized, delegated or
commissioned to act in the stead of another. Transfer of authority from one
F to another. A person to whom affairs are committed by another. 'Delegation'
according to said dictionary means, instructing another with a general power
to act for the good of those who depute him; transfer of authority by one
person to another.

According to Venkataramaiya's Law Lexicon, 'delegation' as the word
G generally used does not imply a parting with powers by the person who
grants the delegation, but points rather to a conferring of an authority to do
things which otherwise the person would have to do himself.

As was observed by this Court in State of Orissa and Ors. v.
H Commissioner uf land Records and Settlement, Cuttack and Ors., [1998] 7
ISHWARSINGHv. STATE [PASAYAT,J.] 103
sec 162 and in OCL India ltd V. State of Orissa and Ors., (2003] 2 sec A
IO I, if an authority delegates the power to act it shall be deemed to be an act
of the delegator. In such a situation there is no scope for revision of the order
of the delegate by the delagator. In Commissioner of land Records and
Settlement's case (supra) it was noted that the delegator (also described as the
principal) cannot review an order of the delegate. It was, inter alia, observed B
by this Court as follows:

"It may be argued that if the order of the delegate is tantamount
to the order of the principal, then the principal can review such an
order of the delegate. This appears to be plausible at first blush but
is, in our opinion, not correct because of the intervention of another C
fundamental principle relating to "review" of orders. The important
principle that has to be kept in mind here is that a review application
is to be made only to the same Judge or if he is not physically
available, to his successor.

The decision of the Privy Council in Maharajah Moheshur Sing D
v. Bengal Govt. 3 WR 45 (PC)) to which reference was made by
learned Senior Counsel, Shri T. L. Vishwanath Iyer, is very apt in
this connection. Adverting to the basic concept of review, it was
observed by the Privy Council: (p.4 7)
"It must be borne in mind that a review is perfectly distinct from E
an appeal; that is quite clear from all these Regulations that the
primary intention of granting a review was a reconsideration of
the same subject by the same Judge, as contradistinguished to an
appeal which is a hearing before another Tribunal."
Their Lordships added:
F
"We do not say that there might not be cases in which a review
might take place before another and a different Judge; because
death or some other unexpected and unavoidable cause might
prevent the Judge who made the decision from reviewing it; but
we do say that such exceptions are allowable only ex necessitate. G
We do say that in all practicable cases the same Judge ought to
review; ......"

It is, therefore, clear that the same Judge who disposes of a matter,
if available, must "review" the earlier order passed by him inasmuch
as he is best suited to remove any mistake or error apparent on the H
104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005) I S.C.R.

A face of his own order. Again, he alone will be able to remember what
was earlier argued before him or what was n0t argued. In our opinion,
the above principle is equally applicable in respect of orders of review
passed by quasi-judicial authorities.

However, these principles about which there is no dispute have no
B application to the facts of the present case. It was in reality not revision by
a delegator. The State Government had nowhere delegated revisional power
to the Additional Registrar. Rule 244 of the Service Rules which is noted
above, is applicable to the appellant clearly provides that an employee may
be compulsorily retired after completion of 25 years of service.
c Bare reading of the aforesaid provision makes the position clear that
the appointing authority has the absolute right to retire in public interest any
employee by giving him a previous notice in writing. The compulsory
retirement can be effected on the date on which he completes 25 years of
service or he attains 50 years of age, whichever is earlier or, on any date
D thereafter. As noted at the threshold, the age and service period are applicable
in this case.

It is to be noted that the learned Single Judge categorically held that the
Board of Director on 4.5.1977 adopted resolution making service rules ,.
applicable in respect of employees of the society and a notification dated
E 3.8.1980 was issued by the Registrar Cooperative Societies, Jaipur by which
the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (in short
the 'CCA Rules') were made applicable to the employee also. Therefore
Service Rules were clearly applicable to the appellant.

Coming to the basic issue as to whether the State Government could
F have exercised revisional power, a few provisions need to be noted:-

Section 128 of the Act reads as follows:

"128. Power of the Government and Registrar to call for proceeding
of subordinate officers and to pass orders thereon - (l) The State
G Government and the Registrar may call for and examine the record
of any inquiry or the proceedings of any other matter, of any officer
subordinate to them, except those referred to in section 125, for the
purpose of satisfying themselves as to the legality or propriety of any
decision or order passed, and as to the regularity of the proceedings
of such officer. If in any case, it appears to the State Government or
H
ISHWAR SINGH v. STATE [PASAYAT, J.] 105
the Registrar, that any decision or order or proceeding so called for A
should be modified, annulled or reversed, the State Government or
the Registrar, as the case may be, may after giving persons affected
thereby an opportunity of being heard, pass such order thereon as it
or he thinks just:

Provided that every application to the Registrar or the Government B
for the exercise of the powers under this section all be preferred
within ninety days from the date on which the proceedings, decision
or order to which the application relates was communicated to the
applicant.

Provided further that the Registrar shall not exercise the powers under C
this section in case in which an appeal lies to him under this Act.

Explanation:- For the purpose of this sub-section the Assistant
Registrar, Deputy Registrar and Joint Registrar exercising all or any
of the powers of the Registrar under this Act shall be deemed to be
subordinate to the Registrar. D
(2) pending the hearing under sub-section (I), the government or the
Registrar may pass such interlocutory order as it or he thinks fit to
prevent the ends of justice from being defeated."

In addition, Sections 123, 124 and 125 are also relevant. Section 124 E
deals with "Appeals to other authorities". Chapter XIII deals with "Appeal,
Revision and Review". Section 123 deals with "Constitution of and appeals
to the Tribunal". Sub-section (6) of Section 123 provides for appeal to the
Tribunal against the decision of the Registrar under certain provisions. Section
124 reads as follows:
F
"124. Appeals to the other authorities: (I) An appeal shall lie under
this section against,
(a) an order of the Registrar made under sub-section (2) of Section
8 refusing to register a Co-operative Society;
(b) an order of the ~egistrar made under sub-section (4) of Section
G
13 refusing to register an amendment of the bye-laws of a co-
operative society;
(c) an order of the Registrar made under sub-section (2) of Section
14;
H
!

106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005) I S.C.R.

A (d) an order of the Registrar made under sub-section (I) of Section
17; -
(e) a decision of the co-operative society other than that ofa Farming
and Producers' Society, as classified under the rules, refusing to
admit any person as a member of the society or expelling any
B member of the society;
(f) an order of the Registrar rescinding in whole or in part any
resolution under Section 32;
(g) a decision under sub-section (5) of Section 34;
C (h) an order declaring an officer or member of a committee a~
disqualified from being elected or being an officer or a member
of the committee or of imposing a penalty on a servant of the
society under sub-section (5) of Section 30;
(i) an order made by the Registrar made under Section 73
apportioning the costs of an enquiry held under Section 70 or an
D
inspection made under Section 71 ;
0) an order of surcharge made by the Registrar under Section 74;
(k) an order made by the Registrar under Section 78 directing the '.
winding up of a co-operative society;
E (I) any order made by liquidator of a co-operative society in exercise
of the powers conferred on him by Section 80, with respect to
matters speci tied in the rules; or
(m) an order made by the Registrar under Section 118.
F (2) An appeal against any decision or order under sub-section (I)
shall be made within sixty days from the date of the decision or
order:-
(a) if the decision or order was made by the Registrar, to the
Government; or
G (b) if the decision or order was made by any other person, or a
co-operative society, to the Registrar.

Explanation: - For the purpose of this sub-section, Registrar shall not
include any other person except Additional Registrar exercising all or
any of the powers of the Registrar.
H
ISHWARSINGHv.STATE [PASAYAT,J.J 107

(3) No appeal shall lie under this Section from any decision or order A
made in appeal."

Sub-section (2) of Section 124 provides that if the decision or order is
made by the Registrar, appeal lies to the Government and if the decision or
order is made by any other person, or a co-operative society, the appeal lies
to the Registrar. Therefore, under Chapter XIII a clear distinction is made B
between the State Government and the Registrar. The test is whether the two
authorities with concurrent revisional jurisdiction are equal in rank. It is,
therefore, not correct as contended by teamed counsel for the appellant that
the two authorities i.e. the State Government and the Registrar are
interchangeable. The power of the Government and the Registrar in terms of C
Section 128 excludes matters which are covered by Section 125 i.e. revision
by the Tribunal.

In view of the aforesaid position, we find no merit in this appeal which
is accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs.

B.B.B. Appeal dismissed. D