Supreme Court of India

ISHWAR CHAND JAINversusHIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AND ANOTHER

Citation: 1988 INSC 169
Decided: 26 May 1988
Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed
Bench: E S VENKATARAMIAH

Holding

The High Court erred in terminating the appellant’s services as there was no material showing unsatisfactory conduct, rendering the dismissal violative of constitutional protection and natural‑justice norms.

Summary

The appellant, an Additional District and Sessions Judge on a two‑year probation, was dismissed after the High Court, relying on a vigilance inquiry and several complaints—including a Bar Association resolution—concluded his work and conduct were unsatisfactory. The appellant argued that his dismissal without a hearing violated Article 311(2) of the Constitution and natural‑justice principles. The Supreme Court examined the vigilance report, found that the complaints were either unsubstantiated, required further investigation, or related to routine early‑career errors, and noted that no material demonstrated unsatisfactory performance. It held that the High Court had no basis to deem the appellant’s conduct unsatisfactory and erred in terminating his services. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court and State Government orders, reinstated the appellant with full back pay and benefits, and awarded costs.

Issues considered

Whether termination of a probationary judicial officer without a hearing violates Article 311(2) of the Constitution and principles of natural justice.
Whether the material before the High Court was sufficient to conclude that the appellant's work and conduct were unsatisfactory.
Whether complaints and a Bar Association resolution, lacking substantive proof, can be considered as grounds for dismissal of a judicial officer on probation.
Whether the vigilance inquiry report, which did not record any adverse finding, can justify disciplinary action.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedures. Section 482
Constitution of Indias. Article 311(2)
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 148, s. 149, s. 324, s. 325, s. 332, s. 353, s. 363, s. 366
Punjab Superior Judicial Service Rules, 1963s. Rule 10(3)

Subjects

probationary judicial officerservice terminationArticle 311natural justicehigh court controlBar Association resolutionvigilance inquiryreinstatement

Judgment

A ISHWAR CHAND JAIN
v.
HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AND ANOTHER

MAY 26, 1988
B
[E.S. VENKATARAMIAH AND K.N. SINGH, JJ.]

Service matter-Whether the High Court was right in recommend-·
ing termination of the services of the appellant, a judicial officer, on
probation, on the ground that his work and conduct were not satis-
factory, on complaints of trifling nature and complaints motivated and
c allegations unsubstantiated, against the appellant.

This appeal by special leave was directed against the Judgment of
the High Court, dismissing the appellant's writ petition challenging the
order dispensing with his services.
D
The appellant was appointed as Addi. District and Sessions Judge
on probation for two years. While he was on probation, there were
certain complaints against him, and an inquiry was held by a Judge of
the High Court, as a result whereof the High Court by its resolution
recommended the termination of the appellant's services to the State
E Government. The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court,
challenging the said resolution of the High Court. The High Court
dismissed the writ petition whereupon the State Government issued
orders terminating the appellant's services. Aggrieved, the appellant
moved this Court, challenging the orders of the High Court and the
State Government above said.
F
The appellant contended that since the High Court had resolved
that his services should be terminated on the basis of the inquiry report,
the constitutional protection available to him under Article 311(2) of the
Constitution and the principles of natural justice had been violated.

G Counsel for the High Court submitted that the inquiry held was
merely to judge the appellant's suitability for service, and the appellant
was not entitled to the constitutional protection of Article 311(2) of the
Constitution, or to any opportunity of hearing before taking the deci-
sion regarding the termination of his probationary period.

H Allowing the appeal, the Court,

396
J.C. JAIN v. HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB 397

HELD: The High Court had no relevant material in coming to
A
the conclusion that the appellant's work and conduct was not satis·
factory during his prohatiOnary period. The material taken into·
consideration was non-existen\, while the other material was not
relevant, and the allegations taken into consideration against him
remained unsubstantiated. The High Court erred in holding the appel-
lant's work and conduct to he unsatisfactory, and in terminating his B
services. (401A-C]

In one case, adverse remarks made against the appellant by the
High Court (Bains, J.) bad been directed by this Court in appeal to be
expunged as they were found to be unjustified and unwarranted. In
another case, members of the Bar Association had passed a resolution
condemning the appellant on a trifling matter without applying their c
mind to the question involved. The members of the Bar practising
before the Court should be aware of the° legal position and they should
not have passed the resolution condemning the appellant without there
being any justifiable cause. If the members of the Bar· Association pass
resolutions against the presiding officers working in subordinate courts I)
without any justifiable cause, it would be difficult for the judicial offi-
cers to perform their judicial functions and discharge their responsibili-
ties in an objective and unbiased manner. The High Court, instead of
protecting the appellant, distressingly took the Bar resolution into consi-
deration in assessing the appellant's work and conduct. [402B; 404B-D]
E
The complaints against the appellant were enquired into by
Justice Sutinder Singh, Vigilance Judge, and his report had formed the
foundation for the action taken by the High Court against the appellant.
An analysis of the report of the Vigilance Judge showed that out of.four
complaints, in respect of two of them the Vigilance Judge had expressed
the opinion that the matter needed further investigation and enquiry F
and he was not in a position to record any definite finding on the
allegations made in those complaints. As regards the third complaint,
officers had committed no wrong in postponing the pronouncement of
the order, with a view to give time to the parties to compromise. As
regards the fourth matter-Khem Chand's complaint-the Vigilance
Judge had not expressed any opinion. The report of the Vigilance Judge G
did not show that the work and conduct of the appellant were not
satisfactory or that he was not fit to act as a judicial officer. The comp-
laints in respect of which the Vigilance Judge had observed that the
same needed further inquiry, could not at all be considered against the
appellant. The High Court was not justified in considering those
matters in concluding that the appellant's work and conduct was not H
satisfactory. [407H; 408A-D]
398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I1988] Supp. 1 S.C.R.
So far as the annual entry on the appellant's confidential roll was
A
concerned, there was no material against him to show that his work and
conduct was unsatisfactory. [408G-H]

While considering complaints of irregularities against the judicial
officer on probation, the High Court should have kept in mind that the
B incidents related to the very first year of appellant's service. Every J.udi-
cial Officer is likely to commit mistakes of some kind or the other in
passing orders in the initial stage of his service, which a mature judicial
officer would not do. If the orders are passed without any corrupt
motive; the same should be overlooked by the High Court and proper
guidance should he provided to him. If after the warning and guidance,
the officer on probation is not able to improve, his services may be
C terminated. [409C-E]

While exercising control over the subordinate judiciary under
the Constitution, the High Court is under a constitutional obligation to
guide and protect judicial officers. An honest, strict judicial officer is
D likely to have adversaries. If complaints are entertained on trifling
matters relating to judicial orders which may have been upheld by the
High Court on .the judicial side, and if the judicial officers are under
constant threat of complaints and enquiry on trifling matters, and if the
High Court encourages annonymous complaints, no judicial officer
would feel, secure, and it would he difficult for him to discharge his
E duties in an honest and independent manner. An independent and
honest judiciary is a sine qua non for the Rule of law. It is imperative
that the High Court should take steps to protect its honest judicial
officers by ignoring ill-conceived or motivated complaints made by
unscrupulous lawyers and litigants. [409E-G]
"
F In this case, the resolution passed by the Bar Association against
the appellant was wholly unjustified and the complaints made by others
were motivated which did not deserve credit. Even the Vigilance Judge
did not record any finding that the appellant was guilty of any corrupt
motive or that he had not acted judicially. [409H; 410A]

G The orders of the High Court and the State Government were
set aside. The appellant was directed to he reinstated with conti-
nuity of service and arrears of salary and allowances and other bene-
fits. [410B-C] .

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 811
H of 1988.
J.C. JAIN v. HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB [SINGH ,J.J 399

From the Judgment and Order dated 9.12.1986 of the Punjab A
and Haryana High Court in C.W.P. No. 2213 of 1986 and C.M.P.
No·l519 of 1986.

P.P. Rao, K.K. Patel, P.S. Pradhan and Rajiv Dutta for the
Appellant.
B
Dr. Y .S. Chitale, S.C. Mahanta, S. Ramachandran, Mahabir
Singh and C. V. Subba Rao for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SINGH, J. Special Leave granted.
c
This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the
High Court of Punjab and Haryana dated 9.12.1986 dismissing the
appellant's writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challen-
ing the order dated 30.12.1986 dispensing with the appellant's services
as Addi. District and Sessions Judge in terms of Rule 10(3) of the D
Punjab Superior Judicial Service Rules, 1963.

Initially' the appellant was an advocate practising law in the High
Court of Pun jab and Haryana. He was selected for appointment to the
Haryana Superior Judicial Service by the High Court. On the recom-
mendation of the High Court the State Government by its order dated E
14.4.1983 appointed the appellant as Addi. District and Sessions Judge
on probation for a period of two years in accordance with Rule 10(1) of
the Punjab Superior Judicial Service Rules 1963, as adopted by the
State of Haryana (hereinafter referred to as the Rules).· The High
Court by its order dated 27.4.1983 posted the appellant to Hissar as
Addi. District and Sessions Judge where he joined his duties on F
2.5.1983. While he was posted at Hissar certain incidents took place as
a result of which the Bar Association of Hissar passed a resolution
against the appellant aud as a result of which he was transferred from
Hissar to Namaul as Addi. District & Sessions Judge where he
assumed charge of his office on 5.5.1984. While the appellant was
posted at Narnaul inquiry into certain complaints against him was held G
by a Judge of the High Court. After the inquiry the High Court at its
meeting held on 21.3.1985 resolved that the appellant's worl' and con-
duct was not satisfactory during his probationary period and as such
his services deserved to be dispensed with forthwith. The High Court
forwarded its recommendation for terminating the appellant's services
to the State Government by its letter dated 28.3.1985. Before the State H
400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988) Supp. 1 S.C.R.

Government could issue any orders, the appellant filed a writ petition
A under Article 32 of the Constitution before this Court challenging the
High Court's decision. On 14.4.1985 this court permitted the appellant
to withdraw the petition with liberty to file the same before the High
Court. The appellant thereafter filed a writ petition before the High
'
Court challenging the resolution of the High Court as well as certain
B other consequential orders to which reference shall be made at a later
stage. A Division Bench of the High Court by its elaborate order Jated
9 .12 .1986 dismissed the writ petition on the findings that the appel-
lant's work and conduct was not satisfactory and as he was on proba-
tion his services were rightly terminated without giving any oppor-
tunity to the appellant. Thereafter, the State Government pursuant to
the recommendation of the High Court issued orders on 30.)2.1986
C terminating the appellant's services in accordance with Rule 10(3). r
Aggrieved, the appellant has challenged the order of the High Court I
I
under appeal as well as the order of the State Government tern1inating \
his services. \

D Before the High Court the appellant laid main stress on the
question that the order of termination which had been passed without
holding an enquiry giving reasonable opportunity to him to defend
. himself was violative of Article 311(2) of the Constitution as the same
was based on a number of <;<>mplaints and allegations as well as the
report of a Judge of the High Court who had made inquiries into the
E complaints against the appellant. The High Court considered the ques-
tion in detail and recorded its finding that since the appellant was a
probationer his services could be discharged without giving any
opportunity to him in accordance with -the Rules. The High Court
further held that the- inquii;y which was held by a Judge of the High ,•
Court was not for the purpose of taking any disciplinary proceedings
F or im,Posing any punishment on the appellant instead the inquiry was
held to find out the appellant's suitability to the service. Shri P .P. Rao,
learned counsel for the appellant, challenged the findings of the High
Court and urged that since the High Court resolved to terminate the
appellant's services on the basis of the inquiry report submitted by a
learned Judge of the High Court, the constitutional protection avail-
G able to the appellant under Article 311(2) of the Constitution, and the
principles of natural justice had been violated. On the other hand, Dr.
Y .S. Chit ale appearing for the High Court submitted that the resolu-
tion of the High Court did not cause any stigma to the appellant and
the inquiry held by the High Court was merely to judge his suitability
for the service. The appellant was not entitled to the constitutional
H protection of Article 311(2) of the Constitution nor he was entitled to
J.C. JAIN v. HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB [SINGH ,J.J 401

. any opportunity of hearing before taking the decision for 'terminating
A
the appellant's probationary period. We do not consider it necessary
to deal with these rival submissions as in our opinion the High Court
had no relevant material in coming to the conclusion that the appel-
lant's work and conduct was not satisfactory during his probationary
period. It appears to us as we shall presently show that the material
which was taken into account was non-existent, while the other mate- B
rial was not relevant and further the allegations which were taken into
consideration remained unsubstantiated. Having perused the entire
material placed before us we are of the opinion that the High Court
committed error in holding that the appellant's work and conduct was
not satisfactory and that his services were liable to be terminated.

We would now consider the facts and circumstances which C
persuaded the High Court on its administrative side in taking the
decision to dispense with the appellant's services. On· his selection the
appellant was firstly posted at Hissar where he joined his duties on
2.5.1983. While at Hissar the appellant decided a criminal case under
Sections 363/366 IPC (State v. Ram Niwas) on 10.9.1983. The appel- D
!ant acquitted the accused for the offence under Section 366 IPC but
convicted him under Section 363 IPC and released him on one year's
probation. The accused preferred appeal against his conviction to· the
High Court. Justice A.S. Bains by his order dated 5.4.1984 allowed the
appeal on the ground that the prosecution had failed to prove its case
against the accused beyond reasonable doubt and therefore it was not E
safe to maintain his conviction. In the course of his judgment Justice
Bains made the following observations against the appellant:

"I am constrained to remark that the judgment recorded by
the trial court is extremely poor and is not based on the
evidence on the record. The trial court seems to have F
wrongly convicted the appellant."

The appellant made representation against the aforesaid remarks but
the High Court refused to grant any relief to the appellant on the
ground that the remarks awa~ded to him had be~n made irt judicial
proceedings. The appellant made a representation for placing his G 1

representation before the learned Judge who had awarded remarks
against him but that too was not accepted. The appellant, thereafter,
approached the High Court in the judicial side by means of an applica-
tion under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for expung-
ing the aforesaid remarks but he could not get any relief. Ultimately,
the appellant approached this court by means of Criminal Misc. Peti- H
402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

' tion No. 1377 of 1987 for expunging the aforesaid remarks. This Court
. A tiy its order dated 7th September 1987 held that from the facts and
circumstances of the case it could not be said that the order and judg-
ment of the Addi. District & Sessions Judge was not based on the
evidence on record and the remarks made by Justice Bains were
unwarranted. This Court directed that the aforesaid remarks should be
B expunged from the judgment in appeal. These facts show that the
remarks made by Justice Bains againstthe appellant were unjustified,
unwarranted and they ceased to be in force.

On 26. 9 .1983 while the petitioner was recording the statement of
an Assistant Sub-inspector of police in a sessions case, an advocate of
Hissar Sh. Nar Singh Bishnoi, came into the appellant's court and
C made a request to the appellant that Thakur Dass, the Assistant Sub-
inspector of police whose statement was being recorded as a witness in
a sessions case should be directed to appear in a complaint case against
him (the Assistant Sub-inspector of police) pending in the court of
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hissar. The appellant told the Advocate Sh.
o N ar Singh Bishnoi that the Chief Judicial Magistrate should direct
Thakur Dass the witness to appear in his court and Shri Bishnoi might
himself bring summons and serve the same on Thakur Dass. Sh.
Bishnoi went to the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate for bringing
summons meanwhile the statement of Thakur Dass was recorded and
on being discharged from the witness box he became free. The appel-
E !ant waited for more than half an hour but Shri Bishnoi did not turn up
with the summons. Thereupon he discharged Thakur Dass. It was not
strictly his duty as a Judge to detain the witness after his evidence was
recorded for the purpose of serving summons in a complaint case on
him. Shortly, thereafter Sh. Bishnoi, advocate, came to the appellant's
court and finding that the witness had already left the court he expres-
F sed his anger towards the appellant who was still presiding axer his
court and threatened him saying that he would see that no judicial
officer would dare to act in such a manner. Sh. Nar Singh Bishnoi,
advocate, thereupon addressed a letter to the President of Bar Associ-
ation requesting that a meeting of the Bar Association should be held
which read as follows:
G
"To
The President,
Distt. Bar Association Hissar,

Subject: To consider the behaviour of Sh. LC. Jain,
H Additional Sessions Judge.
I.C. JAIN v. HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB [SINGH ,J.J 403

Sir, A

It is submitted that today i.e. on 26.9.1983, I had
presented an application in the court of Sh. LC. Jain,
Additional Sessions Judge, Hissar in the presence and on
behalf of my client, Sh. Punam Chand, for effecting the
service of summons on accused Thakur Dass S.L At that B
time Thakur Dass S.L was appearing as witness in the wit-
ness box in the court of Sh. LC. Jain, and LC. Jain refused
to pass any order on my application and I was asked lo
bring the summons. When after obtaining the Dasti sum-
mons from the court of Sh. L.N. Mittal, C.J.M. Hissar, in
whose court complaint was pending, I went to the court of
Sh. LC. Jain, by that time Thakur Dass had already fled
c
away and he was seen going on Motor Cycle by my client.
Behaviour meted out to me by Shri I.C Jain is in fact wrong
and misb.ehaviour with the lawyers community at large. I
pray to all the members of Bar Association, Hissar that
matter may be considered by calling for urgent meeting. D

Sd/-
Nar Singh Bishnoi, Advocate
Hissar"

E
On the aforesaid letter a meeting of the Bar was convened on
27.9.1983 and the following resolution was passed:

"Resolved that the attitude and the behaviour of Shri LC.
Jain, Additional District & Sessions Judge, Hissar towards
the members of the Bar is most deplorable, verges (sic) and F
condemnable for being rude un-cooperative and insulting."

The Bar Association forwarded a copy of the resolution to the
High Court and also to the District and Sessions Judge, Hissar. The
appellant on getting information about the resolution addressed a
letter to the Registrar of the High Court on 8.10.1983 giving his ver- G
sion about the incident and he further sought advice of the High Court
as to whether in the circumstances the witness (Thakur Dass) should
have been detained on the request of the counsel for a party to enable
him to bring summons for effecting service on him and further whether
it was the duty of the appellant as an Addi: District & Sessions Judge
to get the service effected without their being any requisition from the H
404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

A court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate. It appears that the High Court
did not give any reply to the appellant and the guidance sought for by
the appellant remained unattended. These facts clearly show how the
members of the Bar Association passed the resolution condemning a
.
judicial officer on trifling matter without applying their mind to the
question. The appellant being an Additional Sessions Judge was not
B bound by law to detain the witness to enable counsel of a private party
to bring Dasti summons for effecting service on the said witness. The
members of the Bar practising before the court $)1ould be aware of the
legal position and they should not have indulged in passing a resolu-
tion condemning the appellant without there being any justifiable
cause for the same. If the members of the Bar Association pass resolu-
tion against the presiding officers working in subordinate courts with-
c out there being any justifiable cause it would be difficult for judicial
officers to perform their judicial functions and discharge their res-
ponsibilities in an objective and unbiased manner. We are distressed
to find that the High Court instead of protecting the appellant took
this incident into consideration in assessing the appellant's work and
D conduct.

In May 1984 the appellant was transferred to Narnaul and it
appears that some incidents took place there also and complaints were
made to the High Court against the appellant. On 14.9.1984 RamNath
Mehlawat, an advocate-cum-journalist publishing a local weekly news-
E paper named 'Jan Hirdey' and who was also connected with a social
organisation 'Janata Kalyan Samiti' was assaulted by certain persons.
On a complaint made by Sh. Mehlawat, a criminal case was registered
and it was committed to sessions for trial. The appellant convicted the
accused persons except one under Sections 325/324 read with Section
34 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant rejected the plea of the
F complainant Sh. Ram Nath Mehlawat that he was a public servant that
the in juries were caused to him while performing public duty. The
appellant held that no offence under Sections 332/353 IPC was made
out. Sh. Ram Nath Mehlawat made a complaint to the High Court
against the appellant alleging that the appellant had adjourned the
case ori several dates and he had acquitted the accused of offence
G punishable under Sections 332/353 IPC on extraneous consideration.
He further alleged that the appellant had accepted illegal gratification
in acquitting the accused and further releasing the convicting accused
persons on probation. The allegations contained in the complaint of
Sh. Ram Nath Mehlawat were enquired into by Justice Surinder Singh.
As regards correctness of the judgment is concerned it is relevant to
H note that Sh. Ram Nath Mehlawat filed appeal before the High Court
J.C. JAIN v. HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB (SINGH ,J.] 405

against the appellant's order releasing accused persons on probation A
and also a criminal revision against the order of acquittal on the
charges under Sections 332/353/149 and 148 of Indian Penal Code and
also against the order of releasing the convicted accused persons on
probation. The appeal was dismissed on merits by Justice Tiwana, who
observed that he found no infirmity in the conclusion recorded by the
trial judge. The learned Judge held that Ram Nath Mehlawat, B
Advocate, was not a public servant though he may have been a Project
Director of Adult Education Project run by a social organisation. The
karned Judge further held that the conclusion of the trial judge
(appellant) was correct and there was no merit in the appeal. In this
view both appeal and revision filed by Sh. Ram Nath Mehlawat were
dismissed and the order passed by the appellant was upheld.
c
These facts show that Ram Nath Mehlawat failed in his attempt
to get the appellant's order set aside by the High Court. Having failed
to do so on the judicial side he made several complaints against the
appellant making wild allegations against him about the aforesaid
cases. It appears he was instrumental in getting complaints made about D
other matters also. These complaints were referred to the vigilance
judge, who enquired into those matters and the report of the vigilance
judge was placed before the full court of the High Court on 27.7.1985.
After considering the appellant's confidential roll the High Court
resolved to dispense with the appellant's services.
E
It is asserted on behalf of the High Court that since the appel-
lant's work and conduct were not found satisfactory during the period
of probation of two years the court decided to dispense with his
services forthwith. Consequently it made recommendation to the State
Government for issuing necessary orders. The decision to dispense
with the appellant's services was taken at the full court meeting of the F
High Court held on 21st March, 1980. Along with agenda a note was
circulated to the Hon'ble Judges, referring to five complaints out of
which four complaints had been inquired into by Justice Surinder
Singh and the fifth complaint remained without any inquiry. The re-
port of Justice Surinder Singh was considered by the High Court along
with app_ellant's service record. The High Court formed opinion that G
the appellant's work and conduct was not satisfactory. Since the report
of Justice Surinder Singh vigilance judge formed foundation for taking
action against the appellant, we consider it necessary to refer to the
same in detail. A copy of the report is on file on perusal of the same we
find that in all four complaints were referred to Justice Surinder Singh
who was Vigilance Judge for inquiry. The first complaint was by R.N. H
406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988) Supp. I S.C.R.

Mehlawat, Project Director, Adult Education. He raised a grievance
A that on July 25, 1984 the appellant convicted the four accused but he
went out of the way to institute an inquiry against Ranjit Singh accused
and also against the defence witness for forging a document. He
further released all the convicted accused persons on probation. Shri
Mehlawat was aggrieved that though he was a public servant the
B accusel:! were not convicted under Section 332 of the Indian Penal
Code. He alleged that he had received information that the appellant
had received illegal gratification to the tune of Rs.25,000 from the
accused for taking lenient view in the matter. The vigilance judge
recorded the statement of the appellant and other relevant persons in
his report he stated that it was difficult for him to come to a definite
finding although the allegations contained in the complaint filed by
c Shri Mehlawat could not be said without any basis but he recom-
mended that the complaint required further investigation. We have
earlier noted that Mehlawat had filed appeal and revision against the
appellant's order but he failed. Justice Tiwana found no merit in the
appeal and revision and he upheld the order of the appellant. Justice
D Tiwana expressly held that Mehlawat was not a public servant even
though he was a project Director of the Adult Education Project, and
the conclusion of the trial court was correct and there was no merit in
the appeal and revision. We are distressed to notice that.even though
the High Court had upheld the appellant's order on the judicial side it
took exception to the appellant's conduct in passing the orders against
E Sh. Mehlawat. Sh. Mehlawat had also made allegations that the appel-
lant had accepted illegal gratification in instalments in giving judgment

-
in his case but during the enquiry by the vigilance judge he could not
produce any evidence to that effect. It is a matter of common
knowledge that many a time when a litigant is unsuccessful he makes
allegations _against the presiding officer stating that he had received
F illegal gratification. Sh. Mehlawat was an unsuccessful litigant and he
was highly prejudiced and biased against the appellant. Any complaint
made by him against the appellant could not be taken at its face value
specially so when the appellant's order had been upheld by the High
Court. The vigilance judge did not record any finding against the
appellant. He observed that the complaint required further investi-
G gation.

The second matter in respect of which the vigilance judge held
inquiry was on the basis of an annonymous complaint pertaining to a
civil appeal entitled Sher Singh & Ors v. Mahender Singh in which it
was alleged that the appellant had during the course of arguments tried
H to persuade the respondent to compromise the matter. It was alleged
I.C. JAIN v. HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB [SINGH ,J.J 407

that after the arguments were concluded the case was adjourned for
several dates for judgment. There was no allegation of any corruption A
or dishonest motive. The vigilance judge came to the conclusion that
the adjournment of the case was unnecessary as the case was a very old
one. However the vigilance judge, further held that the complaint
being annoymous it required further probe. The third complaint was
made by Mukut Bihari Sanghi, an advocate, practising at Narnaul. He B
alleged that the appellant heard civil appeal entitled. Mohan Lal v.
Honda Ram on 20th September 1984 and fixed the same for orders for
22nd September, 1984 but the judgment was pronm!nced on 10th
October, 1984. We have perused the copy of the complaint made by
Shri Sanghi but there is no allegation that the appellant committed any
misconduct or that he acted on any extraneous reasons in granting
adjournment. The appellant stated before the vigilance judge that C
after arguments were completed he had fixed a date for order but as
the parties wanted to compromise, he postponed the delivery of judg-
ment for few days in order to enable the parties to settle the dispute
but since no settlement was communicated to the court he pronounced
the judgment on 10th October, 1984. The vigilance judge, however, D
made an· observation that the case was glaring example of the manner
of working of the appellant in judicial cases. In the absence of any
extraneous circumstances, we do not find any impropriety in a judicial
officer postponing the pronouncement of the order to enable the
parties to settle the dispute. It is interesting to note that Sh. Mukut
Bihari Singhi, advocate, was twice held guilty for contempt of court. E
He was convicted for conti;mpt of cQurt by the High Court. He wanted
to browbeat the appellant. His complaint, however, did not contain
any allegation of corruption. The High Court failed to appreciate that
no appeal was preferred against the appellant's judgment in the case of
Mohan Lal v. Honda Ram as the parties were satisfied with the judg-
ment. In our opinion the complaint deserved no consideration it F
should have been rejected out-right. The fourth complaint had been
made by one Khem Chand, his grievance had been that his Rent Con-
trol Appeal had been dismissed by the appellant on 24th November
1984 and he had allowed him two months time to vacate the premises.
He applied for obtaining a certified copy of the judgment but he could
not get the same. Instead he got the same, after inordinate delay. The G
appellant's explanation was that the copying section was not under his
'
control or supervision therefore he could not be blamed for the delay
caused in supplying certified copy of the judgment to Khem Chand.
The vigilance judge did not express any opinion on this matter.

The ab_ove analysis of the report of the Vigilance Judge would H
408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

A show that out of four complaints the vigilance judge expressed opinion
that matter relating to item no. 1 and 2 needed further investigation
and enquiry as he was not in. a position to record any definite finding
on the allegations made in those complaints. As regards the third
complaint of Mukut Bihari Sanghi there was nothing w~ong in post-
poning the pronouncement of the order with a view to give time to the
B parties to compromise the matter. Finally, as regards Khem Chan d's
complaint the vigilance judge did not express any opinion on the
matter. The report of the vigilance judge does not show that the appel-
lant's work and conduct were not satisfactory or that he was not fit to
act as a Judicial Officer. While considering this question it must be
kept in mind that complaints, in respect of which the learned Judge
observed that the same needed further inqmry into the matter, could
C not at all be considered against the appellant. If the inquiry had been
held and the appellant had been given opportunity to place his version
before the inquiry officer, correct facts would bave emerged. But in
the absence of any further inquiry as suggested by the vigilance judge,
the High Court was not justified in considering those matters in
D concluding that the appellant's work and conduct was not satisfactory.

As regards the confidential roll of the appellant is concerned it is
noteworthy that when the High Court considered the matter on
21.3.1985 the appellant's annual report was available only for the first
year of his service namely 1983-84. The report for that year was
E satisfactory. Entry for the year 1984-85 was awarded by Justice S.P.
Goyal who was Inspecting Judge on 15.4.1985. He awarded Grade 'B'
plus to t)le appellant which means that appellant's work was good. But
this entry could not be taken into consideration by the High Court as it
had already taken the decision on 21.3.1985 to dispense with the
appellant's services. We are distressed to find that when the aforesaid
f entry for 1984-85 came up for consideration before the full court of the
High Court it modified the same and down-graded the entry from 'B'
plus to 'C' which means appellant's work was unsatisfactory. During
the hearing we asked the learned counsel appearing for the High Court
to produce material on the basis of which the High Court modified the
entry given by Justice S.P. Goyal for the year 1984-85 but he was
G unable to place any material before us to support the decision of the
High Court in modifing the entry. The modification of the entry is
therefore without any material and is not sustainable in law. It is thus
clear that so far as annual entry on the appellant's confidential roll is
concerned there was no material against him which could show that the
appellant's work and conduct was unsatisfactory. The facts and
H circumstances discussed earlier clearly show that the appellant's
J.C. JAIN v. HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB [SINGH ,J.] 409

services were terminated merely on the basis of the report made by the
vigilance judge which we have discussed in detail earlier. The note A
appended to the agenda of the meeting referred only to the inquiry
report and it did not refer to any other matter. The Vigilance Judge
failed to express any positive opinion against the ·appellant instead he
observed that the complaints required further investigation. If the
High Court wanted to take action against the appellant on the basis of B
the complaints which were the subject of enquiry by the vigilance
judge, it should have initiated disciplinary proceedings against the
appellant, then the appellant could get opportunity to prove his
innocense. We have already discussed in detail that the facts stated in
the complaints and the report submitted by the vigilance judge did not
show any defect in appellant's work as a judicial officer. While consi-
dering complaints of irregularities against a judicial officer on proba- c
tion the High Court should have kept in mind that the incidents which
were subject matter of enquiry related to the very first year ~f appel-
lant's service. Every judicial officer i.s likely to commit mistake of
some kind br the other in passing orders in the initial stage of his
service which a matur.e judicial officer would not do. However, if the D
orders are passed without there being any corrupt motive, the same
should be over-looked by the High Court and proper guidance should
be provided to him. If after warning and guidance the officer on proba-
tion is not able to improve, his services should be terminated.

Under the Constitution the Higli Court has control over the E
subordinate .judiciary. While exercising that control it is under a con-
stitutional obligation to guide and protect judicial officers. An honest
strict judicial officer is likely to have adversaries in the mofussil courts.
If complaints are entertained on trifling matters relating to judicial
orders which may have been upheld by the High Court on the judicial
side no judicial officer would feel protected and it would be difficult F
for him to discharge his duties in an honest and independent manner.
An independent and honest judiciary is a sine qua non for.Rule of law.
If judicial officers are under constant threat of complaint and enquiry
on trifling matters and if High Court encourages annonymous comp-
laints to hold the field the subordinate judiciary will not be able to
administer justice in an independent and honest manner. It is .there- G
fore imperative that the High Court should also take steps to protect
its honest officers by ignoring ill-conceived or m.otivated complaints
made by the unsi:rupulous lawyers and litigants. Having regard to facts
and circumstances of the instant case we have no doubt in our mind
that the resolution passed by the Bar Association against the appellant
was wholly unjustified and the complaints made by Sh. Mehalawat and H
410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11988) Supp. 1 S.C.R.

A others were motivated which did not deserve any credit. Even the
vigilance judge after holding enquiry did not record any finding that
the appellant was guilty of any corrupt motive or that he had not acted
judicially. All that was said against him was that he had acted improp-
erly in granting ad joumments.

B In view of our discussion we allow the appeal, set aside the order
dated 9 .12.1986 and order of the State Government dated 30.12.1986.
We direct that app~llant shall be reinstated in service, with continuity
of service and arrears of salary and allowances and other benefits. The
appellant is entitled to the costs which we quantify at Rs.5,000.

S.L. Appeal allowed.

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