INTERNATIONAL ASSET RECONSTRUCTION COMPANY OF A INDIA LTDversusTHE OFFICIAL LIQUIDATOR OF ALDRICH PHARMACEUTICALS LTD. AND OTHERS

                         [2017) 10 S.C.R. 199



INTERNATIONAL ASSET RECONSTRUCTION COMPANY OF                             A
                   INDIA LTD.
                                  v.
           THE OFFICIAL LIQUIDATOR OF ALDRICH
           PHARMACEUTICALS LTD. AND OTHERS
                                                                          B
                   (Civi1Appea1No.16962of2017)
                         OCTOBER 24, 2017
    [RANJAN GOGOi, ABBAY MANOHAR SAPRE AND
                NAVIN SINHA, JJ.]
       Limitation Act, 1963: s.5 - D.elay - Condonation of-
                                                                          c
Applicability of s.5 to proceeding under s.30 of the RDB Act -
 Whether s.5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 can be inFoked to condone
the prescribed period of 30 days, under s.30( 1) of the Recovery of
 Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (RDB Act), for preferring an appeal
before the Tribunal, against an order of the Recove1y officer - Held:     D
 711e RDB Act is a special law and a complete code by itself with
regard to expeditious recoFery of dues to banks and financial
institutions - The fact that the Tribunal may be vested with some of
the powers as a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure does
not vest in it the status of a Court - s.22( 1), in fact, provides that
                                                                          E
the Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedures under the C.P. C.,
and can regulate its own procedures in accordance with natural
justice - s.5 of the Limitation Act provides that the appeal or
application, with the exception of Order XX!, CPC may be admitted
after the prescribed period, if the applicant satisfies the court that
he has sufficient cause for not preferring the application within         F
time - The pre-requisite, therefore, is the pendency of a proceeding
before a court - The proceedings under the Act being before a
statutory Tribunal, it cannot be placed at par with proceedings
before a court - The Tribunal shall, therefore, have no powers to
condone delay, unless expressly conferred by the statute creating         G
it - s.24 of the RDB Act makes the provisions of the Limitation Act
applicable only to such an original "application" made under s.19
only - The definition of an "application" under r. 2(c) cannot be
extended to read it in conjunction with s. 2(b) of the Act extending
the meaning thereof beyond what the Act provides for and then
make s.24 of the RDB Act applicable to an appeal under s.30( 1) of        H
                                  199
200            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2017] 10 S.C.R.



A the Act - Any such interpretation shall be completely contrary to
      the legislative intent, extending the Rules beyond what the Act
      provides for and limits - The exclusion of any provision for extension
      of time by the Tribunal in preferring an appeal under s.30 of the
      Act makes it manifest that the legislative intent for exclusion was
      express - The application of s.5 of the Limitation Act by resort to
B
      s.29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 therefore does not arise - The
      prescribed period of 30 days under s.30( l) of the RDB Act for
      preferring an appeal against the order of the Recovery officer
      therefore cannot be condoned by application of s.5 of the Limitation
      Act - Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 - ss.19, 24, 30.
c            Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, l 993: Object of
      legislation - Discussed.
            Dismissing the appeals, the Court
        HELD: 1. The RDB Act was enacted to facilitate and
D expedite recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions
  by summary proceedings before a statutory Tribunal. Section 18
  bars the jurisdiction of any court or other authority in such matters
  (except the Supreme Court/High Court under Articles 226 and
  227 of the Constitution). The Act provides a complete procedure
  for institution of recovery proceedings, the method of its
E enforcement including the right to appeal. The RDB Act is
  undoubtedly a special law and a complete code by itself with regard
  to expeditious recovery of dues to banks and financial.institutions.
  The fact that the Tribunal may be vested with some of the powers
  as a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, regarding
p summoning and enforcing attendance of witnesses, discovery and
  production of the documents, receiving evidence on affidavits,
  issuing commission for the examination of witnesses or
  documents, reviewing its decisions etc. does not vest in it the
  status of a Court. Section 22(1), in fact, provides that the Tribunal
  shall not be bound by the procedures under the C.P.C., and can
G regulate its own procedures in accordance with natural justice.
  [Paras 9, 10] [204-F-H; 205-A-B]
         2. Section 5 of the Limitation Act provides that the appeal
   or application, with the exception of Order XXI, CPC may be
   admitted after the prescribed period, if the applicant satisfies the
 H court that he has sufficient cause for not preferring the application
 INfERNATIONALASSETRECONSTRUCTION COMPANY v. OFFICIAL                 20 I
         LIQUIDATOR OF ALDRICH PHARMACEUTICALS


within time. The pre-requisite, therefore, is the pendrncy of a A
proceeding before a court. The proceedings under the Act being
before a statutory Tribunal, it cannot be placed at par with
proceedings before a court. The Tribunal shall, therefore, have
no powers to condone delay, unless expressly conferred by the
Statute creating it. An "application" is defined under Section B
2(b) of the RDB Act as one made under Section 19 of the Act.
The latter provision in Chapter IV, deals with institution of original
recovery proceedings before a Tribunal. An appeal lies against
the order of the Tribunal under Section 20, before the Appellate
Tribunal within 45 days, which may be condoned for sufficient
cause under the proviso to Section 20(3) of the Act. The Tribunal C
issues a recovery certificate under Section 19(22) to the Recovery
officer who then proceeds under Chapter V for recovery of the
certificate amount in the manner prescribed. A person aggrieved
by an order of the Recovery officer can prefer an appeal before
the Tribunal under Rule 4, by an application in the prescribed D
Form IH. Rule ?.(c) defines an "application" to include a memo
of appeal under Section 30(1). The appeal is to be preferred
before the Tribunal, as distinct from the appellate tribunal, within
30 days. Section 24 of the RDB Act, therefore, manifestly makes
the provisions of the Limitation Act applicable only to such an
original "application" made under Section 19 only. The definition E
of an "application" under Rule 2(c) cannot be extended to read it
in conjunction with Section 2(b) of the Act extending the meaning
thereof beyond what the Act provides for and then make Section
24 of the RDB Act applicable to an appeal under Section 30(1) of
the Act. Any such interpretation shall be completely contrary to
                                                                       F
the legislative intent, extending the Rules beyond what the Act
provides for and limits. Had the intention been otherwise, nothing
prevented the Legislature from providing so specifically. [Paras
11, 12] [205-C-D; 206-A-E]
     3. A comparative study of Section 30, pre and post
amendment in the year 2000, reveals that the deemed status of G
proceedings before the Recovery officer, as a Tribunal, stands
denuded. Had the proceedings before the Recovery officer
deemed to be before a Tribunal, entirely different considerations
may have arisen. [Para 13] [206-E-F]
                                                                  H
202            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2017] I 0 S.C.R.


A       4. The exclusion of any provision for extension of time by
  the Tribunal in preferring an appeal under Section 30 of the Act
  makes it manifest that the legislative intent for exclusion was
  express. The application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act by
  resort to Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, therefore,
B does not arise. The prescribed period of 30 days under Section
  30(1) of the RDB Act for preferring an appeal against the order
  of the Recovery officer therefore cannot be condoned by
  application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. [Para 14] [207-E-F]
            Sakuru v. Tanaji (1985) 3 SCC 590 : [1985] 2 Suppl.
            SCR 109 - relied on
c
            A.R. Venugopal @ R. Venugopal v. Jotheeswaran & Ors.
            2016 (16) sec 588 - referred to
                            Case Law Reference
      2016 (16) sec 588             referred to     Para 8
D
      [1985] 2 Suppl. SCR 109       relied on       Para 11
           CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 16962
      of2017
           From the Judgment and Order dated 10.07.2013 of the High Court
E     of Bombay in Writ Petition No. 1416 of 2013.
                                    WITH
            C. A. NO. 16963 OF 2017
           Ms. Madhavi Divan, Sr. Adv., Mahesh Agarwal, Anukur Saigal,
F     Himanshu Satija, E. C. Agrawala, Kishore Jain, Mahesh Agarwal,
      Abhinav Agrawal, Ad vs. for the Appellant.
        Arvind P. Datar, Sr. Adv., Ardhendumauli Kumar Prasad,
  Ms. Sushma Nagaraj, Ms. TarunaArdhendumauli Prasad, Namit Saxena,
  Pratap Venugopal, Ms. Surekha Raman, Anuj Sarma, Ms. Niharika,
G Ms. Kanika Kalaiyarasan (for Mis. K. J. John and Co.), Rajeev Pandey,
  Rabin Majumder, Sanjay Bhatt, Abhishek Aggarwal, Advs. for the
  Respondents.
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
            NAVIN SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted.
H
  INTERNATIONALASSETRECONSTRUCTION COMPANYv. OFFICIAL                        203
  LIQUIDATOR OF ALDRICH PHARMACEUTICALS [NAVIN SINHA, J.]


       2. A common question of law arising for consideration in both         A
appeals is whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter
referred to as "the Limitation Act"), can be invoked to condone the
prescribed period of 30 days, under Section 30(1) of the Recovery of
Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred as the "RDB
Act"), for preferring an appeal before the Tribunal, against an order of     B
the Recovery officer.
      3. In view of the pure question of law involved, the facts of the
case need not be elucidated. Suffice to observe that pursuant to a
recovery certificate issued by the Tribunal under Section 19(22) of the
RDB Act, the Recovery officer passed necessary orders under Section
28 of the Act. An appeal was preferred by the aggrieved against the          C
same before the Tribunal, beyond the prescribed period of 30 days. It
was held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act not being applicable to
proceedings under Section 30 of the Act, the delay beyond the prescribed
period could not be condoned.
        4. Ms. Madhavi Divan, learned senior counsel on behalf of the        D
appellants, submitted that the RDB Act was not a complete Code by
itself. A mere expeditious procedure for recovery was not conclusive to
infer express or implied exclusion of the Limitation Act. In the absence
of an express exclusion of the.Limitation Act to Section 30, implied
exclusion cannot be readily inferred, considering the nature of the rights   E
and interests of the borrower involved, raising issues with regard to
fairness of procedure. By virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act,
any implied exclusion is ruled out and the provisions of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act will apply to proceedings under Section 30( I) of the RDB
Act.
                                                                             F
       5. Under Section 22(1) of the RDB Act, the Tribunal was not
bound by the procedures of the Code of Civil Procedure and was guided
by the principles of natural justice, which would include the power to
condone delay beyond the prescribed period of 30 days under Section
30(1) of the Act. Section 19(25) provided for passing of necessary
orders to secure the ends of justice, which again would include the power    G
for extension of the prescribed period. The scheme of the RDB Act
does not exclude application of the Limitation Act to proceedings under
it. Referring to Section 2(b) of the Act and reading the same in
conjunction with Rule 2(c) of the Debt Recovery Tribunal (Procedure)
Rules, 1993, (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules") it was urged that      H
204             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017] IO S.C.R.


A an "application" filed under Section 30(1) of the Act was also amenable
  to condonation under Section 24 of the RDB Act. Section 20(3) likewise
  provides for condoning delay beyond -45 days in preferring an ?.ppeal
  before the appellate tribunal.
          6. Sh. Arv ind P. Datar, learned senior counsel for the respondents,
13 contended that the RDB Act was a complete Code by itself with regard
   to recovery of dues to banks and financial institutions. Section 24 of the
   RDB Act applied only to an application made under Section 19 by a
   bank or financial institution, to the Tribunal for recovery of a debt. Section
   20(3) expressly applied to proceedings before the appellate tribunal only.
   The scheme of the Act manifests, that thl'. Legislature expressly intended
C to exclude any extension of the prescribed period of 30 days under
   Section 30(1), which is further manifest from the amendment to the
   same in the year 2000 denuding the deemed status of the Recovery
   officer as a Tribunal, for purposes of the provision.
        7. The definition of"application" under Section 2(b) of the Act
D was confined to Section 19 of the RDB Act only. Its meaning could not
  be extended beyond that prescribed u_nder the Act, by invoking Rule
  2(c) which had to be read with Rule 4 providing the procedure for making
  an application, inter-alia, under Section 30 of the RDB Act in the
  prescribed Form III.
E            8. Shri Datar with all fairness also invited our attention to a two-
      Judge Bench decision dated 01.07.2015 in Civil Appeal No. 4926 of
      2015, A.R. Venugopal@R. Venugopal vs. Jotlleeswaran & ors., holding
      that the delay in preferring an appeal under Section 30( l) beyond the
      prescribed 30 days was condonable by virtue of Section 20 read with
p     Section 24 of the RDB Act.
         9. We have considered the submissions. The RDB Act was
  enacted to facilitate and expedite recovery of debts due to banks and
  financial institutions by summary proceedings before a statutory Tribunal.
  Section 18 bars the jurisdiction of any court or other authority in such
G matters (except the Supreme Court/High Court under Articles 226 and
  227 of the Constitution). Section 31 provides for transfer of pending
  cases from a Court to the Tribunal.. The Act provides a complete
  procedure for institution of recovery proceedings, the method of its
  enforcement including the right to appeal. The RDB Act is undoubtedly
  a special law and a complete code by itself with regard to expeditious
H recovery of dues to banks and financial institutions.
  lNIERNATIONALASSETRECONSTRUCTION COMPANYv. OFFICIAL                           205
  LIQUIDATOROFALDRICHPHARMACEUTICALS [NAVIN SINHA,J.]

        10. The fact that the Tribunal may be vested with some of the           A
powers as a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, regarding
summoning and enforcing attendance of witnesses, discovery and
production of the documents, receiving evidence on affidavits, issuing
commission for the examination of witnesses or documents, reviewing
its decisions etc. does not vest in it the status of a Court. Section 22( I),
                                                                                B
in fact, provides that the Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedures
under the C.P.C., and can regulate its own procedures in accordance
with natural justice.
        11. Section 5 of the Limitation Act provides that the appeal or
application, with the exception of Order XXI, CPC may be admitted
after the prescribed period, if the applicant satisfies the court that he has   c
sufficient cause for not preferring the application within time. The pre-
requisite, therefore, is the pendency of a proceeding before a court.
The proceedings under the Act being before a statutory Tribunal, it cannot
be placed at par with proceedings before a court. The Tribunal shall
therefore have no powers to condone delay, unless expressly conferred           D
by the Statute creating it. In Sakuru vs. Tanaji, (1985) 3 SCC 590, it
was observed that:
        "3 ... that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 apply only to
        proceedings in 'courts' and not to appeals or applications before
        bodies other than courts such as quasi-judicial Tribunals or            E
        executive authorities, notwithstanding the fact the such bodies
        or authorities may be vested with certain specified powers
        conferred on courts under the Codes of Civil or Criminal
        Procedure. The Collector before whom the appeal was preferred
        by the appellant herein under Section 90 of the Act not being a
        court, the Limitation Act, as such, had no applicability to the         F
        proceedings before him. But even in such a situation the relevant
        special statute may contain an express provision conferring on
        the appellate authority, such as the Collector, the power to extend
        the prescribed period oflimitation on sufficient cause being shown
        by laying down that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation       G
        Act shall be applicable to such proceedings. Hence it becomes
        necessary to examine whether the Act contains any such
        provision entitling the Collector to invoke the provisions of Section
        5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of the delay in the filing
        of the appeal..." ·
                                                                                H
206            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                              [2017] !OS.CR.



A            12. An "application" is defined under Section 2(b) of the RDB
      Act as one made under Section 19 of the Act. The latter provision in
      Chapter lV. deals with institution of original recovery proceedings before
      a Tribunal. An appeal lies against the order of the Tribunal under Section
      20, before the Appellate Tribunal within 45 days, which may be condoned
      for sufficient cause under the proviso to Section 20(3) of the Act. The
B
      Tribunal issues a recovery certificate under Section 19(22) to the
      Recovery offic~r who then proceeds under Chapter V for recovery of
      the certificate amounc in the manner prescribed. A person aggrieved by
      an order of the Recovery officer can prefer an appeal before the Tribunal
      under Ruic 4, by an application in the prescribed Form Ill. Ruic 2(c)
c     defines an "application" to inclc!de a memo ofappeal under Section 30(1 ).
      The appeal is to be preferred before the Tribunal, as distinct from the
      appellate tribunal, within 30 days. Section 24 of the RDB Act, therefore,
      manifestly makes the provisions of the Limitatian Act applicable only to
      such an original "application" made under Section 19 only. The definition
      of an "application" under Rule 2(c) cannot be extended to read it in
D
      conjunction with Section 2(b) of the Act extending the meaning thereof
      beyond what the Act provides for and then make Section 24 of the RDB
      Act applicable to an appeal under Section 30(1) of the Act. Any ,uch
      interpretation shall be completely contrary to the legislative intent,
      extending the Rules beyond what the Act provides for and limits. Had
E     the intention been otherwise, nothing prevented the Legislature from
      providing so specifically.
             13. A comparative study of Section 30, pre and post amendment
      in the year 2000, reveals that the deemed status of proceedings before
      the Recovery officer, as a Tribunal, stands denuded. Had the proceedings
 F    before the Recovery officer deemed to be before a Tribunal, entirely
      different considerations may have arisen.
               Old Section 30 before 2000          Section     30    post    2000 I
               amendment                           amendment
               us. 30 Orders of Recovery           "S. 30. Appeal against the
               Officer to be deemed as             order of Recovery Officer.
G              orders of Tribunal-                 ( l J Notwithstanding anything
               Notwithstanding     anything        contained in Section 29. any
               contained in Section 29. an         person aggrieved by an order
               order made by the Recovery          of the Recovery Officer made
               0 fficcr   in   exercise   of his   under this Act may.within
               powers under Sections 25 to 28
H
 INTERNATIONALASSET RECONSTRUCTION COMPANY v. OFFICIAL                              207
 LIQUlDATOR OF ALDRICH PHARMACEUTICALS [NAVIN SINHA, J.]


            (both inclusive), shal I be thirty days from the date on I              A
            deemed to have been made by which a copy of the order is
            the Tribunal and an appeal
            against such orders shall lie to issued to him. prefer an appeal I
            the Appellate Tribunal."         to the Tribunal.                !
                                             (2) On receipt.   o f an appeal I
                                             under sub-section ( l ), the           B
                                             Tribunal may, after giving an
                                             opportunity to the appellant to
                                             be heard, and after making
                                             such enquiry as it deems fit,
                                             confirm, modify or set aside
                                             the order made by the
                                             Recovery Officer in exercise
                                                                                    c
                                             of his powers under Scctio11'
                                             25 to 28 (both inclusive)."
       14. The RDB Act is a special law. The proceedings are before a
statutory Tribunal. The scheme of the Act manifestly provides that the
Legislature has provided for application of the Limitation Act to original D
proceedings before the Tribunal under Section 19 only. The appellate
tribunal has been conferred the power to condone delay beyond 45 days
under Section 20(3) of the Act. The proceedings before the Recovery
officer are not before a Tribunal. Section 24 is limited in its application to
proceedings before the Tribunal originating under Section 19 only. The
exclusion of any provision for extension of time by the Tribunal in E
rreferring an appeal under Section 30 of the Act makes it manifest that
the legislative intent for exclusion was express. The application of Section
5 of the Limitation Act by resort to Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act,
1963 therefore does not arise. The prescribed period of 30 days under
Section 30(1) ofthc RDB Act for preferring an appeal against the order F
of the Recovery officer therefore cannot be condoned by application of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
       15. Insofar as A.R. Ve1111gopal @ R. Ve11ugopal (supra) is
concerned, all that would be required to be noticed and observed is that
the entire statutory scheme did not fall for consideration of the court in          G
that case.
       16. The appeals lack merit and are dismissed.


Devika Gujral                                                 J\ppeals dismissed.