Holding

Article 16(4) permits reservations for backward classes based on social backwardness, subject to exclusion of the creamy layer and a 50% ceiling, but does not permit reservations based solely on economic criteria or in promotions.

Summary

The case challenged the Office Memorandums of 1990 and 1991 providing 27% reservation for Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBCs) and 10% for economically backward sections in central government services. The Supreme Court, in a 9-judge bench decision, settled the legal position on reservations under Article 16(4). The Court held that Article 16(4) is not an exception to Article 16(1) but an instance of classification. It upheld the 27% reservation for OBCs but struck down the 10% reservation based solely on economic criteria. The Court directed exclusion of the 'creamy layer' from the backward classes and held that reservations should not exceed 50% of appointments in a year. It also held that reservations in promotions are not permissible under Article 16(4). The Court directed the government to constitute a permanent body to examine inclusion/exclusion complaints in OBC lists.

Issues considered

Whether the 'provision' under Article 16(4) must be made by Parliament/Legislature or can be made by executive order.
Whether Article 16(4) is an exception to Article 16(1) and whether it is exhaustive of reservations for backward classes.
The meaning of 'backward class of citizens' and whether caste can be the basis for identification.
Whether economic criteria alone can identify backward classes.
Whether backward classes can be further categorized into backward and more backward.
The 50% rule for reservations and whether Devadasan was correctly decided.
Whether reservations can be provided in promotions.
Whether reservations are anti-meritarian.
The scope of judicial review in identification of backward classes.
Validity of the distinction between poorer sections and others in the 1991 Memorandum.
Validity of the 10% reservation for economically backward sections.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 15, s. Article 16, s. Article 335, s. Article 340, s. Article 341, s. Article 342, s. Article 38(2), s. Article 46

Subjects

ReservationBackward ClassesArticle 16(4)Creamy Layer50% RuleSocial BackwardnessEconomic CriteriaMandal CommissionPromotionJudicial Review

Judgment

A INDRA SA\VHNEY AND ORS. ETC. ETC.
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. ETC. ETC.

NOVEMBER 16, 1992

B (M.H. KANIA, 0., M.N. VENKATACHALIAH, S. RATNAVEL
PAJ'!DIAN, DR. T.K. THOMMEN, AM. AHMADI, KULDIP SINGH,
P.B. SAWANT, R.M. SAHAI AND B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, JJ.)

Constitution of India, 1950:
c
Article 16(4}-'Provision'-Whether to be made by the Parlia-
ment/Legislature-Making such a provision by executive orde,-.Legality of.
Constitution of India, 1950:
Article 16(1)(4}-Whether Article 16(4), an exception to Article 16(1),
D whether clause(4) exhaustive of special provisions to be made in favour of ...
'backward class of citizens' or in favour of all sections, classes or groups--
Whether reservations to be made under clause (1) or whether it only permitted
extending concession.
Constitution of India, 1950:
E
Art.icle 16(4)-11 Class 11 , "Backward ·class of citizens 11, "Communities'~
11
Castes'~ class of citizens"-iVot adequately represented in the senJices under
11

the State--Reasons for not using the word tlcaste" or 1Castes 11 -Constrnc-
tion--Backward class of citizen-ldentijication-Procedure-'Means test'
whether to be applied-''Creamy layer'4ffect of-Backwardness whether to
F be social and economical-Whether a class to be situated similarly to the
Scheduled Caste/Tribe for being qualified as a Backward Class.
Constitution of India, 1950:
Articles 15, 16-:Backward c/asses-ldentification--Criteria.
G Constitution of India, 1950:
Articles 15, 16-:Backward classes-Classification into backward and
more backward-Legality of.
Constitution of India, 1950:
H Articles 15, 16-Reservation-50% rule in Balaji-£ffect of-50% rule
454
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.l. 455

whether includes all types of reservations under Article 16 or those reserva- A
tions made under Article 16(4 j-f'rocedure to apply 50% rnle-Devadasan
whether good law.
Constitution of India, 1950:

Article 16(4}-f'rovision for reservation in promotiun matters-Legality B
of

Constitution of India, 1950:

Articles 14, 15, 16, 38(2), 46, 333-Reservation whether anti-meritan-
Constrnction of Article 16 in the relevancy of Articles 333, 38(2), 46.

Constitution of India, 1950: c
Articles 14, 15, 16, 226, 3"}-[dentification of backward classes and
fu:ation of percentage of reservations-Judicial review-Scope of

Constitution of India, 1950:

Articles 14, 15, 16-'Poorer sections' of backward classes and
D
others-Distinction made in the Memorandum dated 25.9.1991-Validity of
Constitution of India, 1950:

Articles 14, 15, 16, 341>--Memorandum dated 25.9.1991-l?.eservation
of 10% of the posts in favour of "other economically backward sections" of E
the·people, not covered under the existing schemes of reservation-Validity
of--Lists of State Governments identifying SEBCs!OBC,--EffecrWhether
appointing Commission to identify OBCs necessary.

Comparative Law-{f.S. Constitution Fourteenth Amendment-Section
1 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 1964, read with Articles 14, 15, 16, F
Constitution of India, 1951>-Reservation of seats or vacancies or appoint-
111ents or posts-Reasonable reservation in America-ldeas still in the process
of evolution.

The Central Government appointed a Backward Class Commission
(popularly known as Kaka Kalekar Commission) under Article 340 of the G
Constitution on January 29, 1953. The Commission was required "to
investigate the conditions of socially and educationally backward classes
within the territory of India and the difficulties under which they labour
and to make recommendations as to the steps that should be taken by the
Union or any State to remove difficulties and to improve their conditions." H
456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A The Commission submitted its report on March 30, 1955. According
lo the Commission, the criteria for identifying the backward classes,
under Article 15(4) would be their traditional occupation and.profession,
the percentage of literacy or the gener!ll education advancement made by
them; the estimated population of the community; the distribution of the
various communities throughout the State or the concentration in certain
B areas and the s.ocial position which a cc;>mmunity occupied in the caste
hierarchy. It also stated that the causes of educational backwardness
amongst the educationally and backward communities were (i) traditional
apathy for education on account of social and ~nvironmental conditions
or occupational handicaps; (ii) poverty and lack of educational institu-
C tions in rural areas and (iii) living in inaccessible areas.

In the enclosing letter addressed to the President, the Chairman of
the Commission stated that effecting reservations and other remedies on
the basis of caste would not be in the interest of society and country; that
if the principle of caste is eschewed altogether, to make it would be
.D possible to help the ·extremely poor and deserving members of all the
communities and that preference ought, to be given to those who come
from traditionally neglected social classes.

The Central Government did not take any action on the report.

E On August 14, 1961, the Central Government wrote to the State
Gove:-nments to choose their own criteria for defining backwardness.

Various State Governments thereupon app3inted Co!Dmissions for
identifying backward classes. Later they issued orders identifying the
Socially and Educationally Backward Classes and reserving certain per-
F centage of posts in their favour. In Centra.1 services, reservations were
made in favour of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes but not in
favour of other backwards classes.

On January 1, 1979 the Second Backward Classes Commission
G und~r the Chairmanship of Sh. B.P. Manda!, popularly known as Manda!
Commission, was appointed under Article 340 of the Constitution of
India, to investigate the conditions of Socially and Educationally backward
Classes· (SEBCs) within the territority. of India and to determine the
~

criterfu for defining the SEBCs.

H The report was submitted on December 31, 1980. The Commission
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.l. 457

evolved 11 Indicators or criteria for determining social and educational A
backwardness, grouping them under three broad heads, i.e., Social,
Educational and Economic. The Social indicators were given a weightage
of 3 points each; the Educational Indicators 2 points each and the
,_ Economic Indicators l point each.

The Commission according to its report, adopted a multiple ap- B
proach for preparing the lists of OBCs for all the States and Union
Territories. The main sources examined for preparing these lists were: (i)
soci~-eduq1tional field survey (ii) sensus reports of 1961 (iii) personal
knowledge gained through its extensive tour of the country and (iv) lists
of OBCs notified by the various State Govts. It applied difficult tests for
identifying OBCs among Hindus and non-Hindus. It recommended 27%
c
reservation in favour of"OBCs.

The Manda! Commission Report was laid before each House of
·parliament. It was discussed in 1982 and again in 1983 in the Parliament.
D·
Vide Office Memorandum dated 13th August, 1990, the Government
of India considering the .recommendations of the Mandal Commission,
extended and provided for certain benefits in the services of the Union and
their Public Sectors Undertakings, in favour of the socially and education-
ally backward classes. The Office Memorandum provided (i) tliat 27% of E
the vacancies in civil posts and services under the Government of India to
be reserved for SEBCs., (ii) that the aforesaid reservation was to apply
to vacancies to be filled by direct recruitment; (iii) that candidates belong-
ing to SEBCs recruited· on the basis of merit in open competition on the
same standards prescribed for the general candidates not to be adjusted
against the reservation quota of 27%; (iv) that the SEBCs would comprise F
the castes and communities common to the lists prepared by the Commis-
sion and L'ie State Governments; and (v) that the reservation to be effected
from 7.8.1970 prospectively.

. The issuance of the Memorandum dated 13th August 1990 caused G
wide-spread protest. Law and order was disturbed and private and public
properties damaged. Some young people lost their lives by self-immolation.

Writ petitions were filed in this Court challenging the Memorandum
dated 13th August 1?90 along with applicatfons for staying the operation
of the Memorandum; This Court allowed the applications for stay. H
458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Following the general election held in the first half of 1991, the
Government at the Centre changed. The new Government issued another
Office Memorandum dated 25th September 1991 modifying the Memoran-
dum dated 13th Augnst 1990.
_,
The Memorandum dated 25th September 1991 was issued in order to
B enable the poorer sections of the SEBCs to receive the benefits of reservation
on a preferential basis and to provide reservation for other economically
backward sections of the people not covered by any of the existing schemes of
reservation. The Memorandum provided (i) that within the 27% of the
vacancies in civil posts and services under the Government oflndia reserved
for SEBCs, preference to be given to candidates belonging to the poorer
C sections of the SEBCs and in case sufficient number of such candidates were
not available, the vacancies to be filled up by the other SEBC candidates; and
(ii) that 10% of the vacancies in civil posts and services under the Govern-
ment oflndia to be reserved for other economically backward sections of the
people, not covered by any of the existing schemes of reservation.
D
Though it is stated in the Memorandum, that the criteria for deter-
mining the poorer sections of the SEBCs or the other economically back-
ward sections of the people not covered by any of the existing schemes of
reservation will be issued separately, till the date of the judgment by this
Court, the Ceutral Government did not evolve the economic criteria.
E
The Writ Petitions were beard originally by a Constitution Bench
presided by the then Chief Justice of India. The Constitution Bench
referred the petitions to a Special Bench of Nine Judges to finally settle
the legal position relating to reservations in an authoritative way.

F The petitioner in W.P.No. 948 of 1990 contended that caste was a
prohibited ground of distinction under the Constitution and it co•tld not
be the basis for determining backward classes referred to in Article 15 (4);
that the Mandal CommJssion treated the expreSBion "backward classes" as
synonymous with backward castes and identified backward classes ignor·
G ing other considerations like poverty; that if half of the posts were
reserved for backward classes, it would seriously jeopardise the efficiency
of the administration, educational system, and all other services resulting
in backwardness of the entire nation; that merit would disappear by
deifying backwardness; that Article 16(4) was broader than Article 15(4);
that the .xpression "backward class" in Article 16(4) was not limited to
H "socially and educationally backward classes" in Article 15(4).
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 459

The petitioner in writ petition No. 930 of 1990 submitted that the A
'provision' contemplated by clause (4) of Article 16 could be made by the
Legislature alone and not by the executive or any other authority; thatBalaji
was not correctly decided; that since the provision made under Article 16(4)
affected the fundamental rights of other citizens, such a provision could be
made only by the Parliament/Legislature; that if the power of making the
"provision" was given to the Executive, it would give room for any amount of B
abuse; that backwardness under Article 16(4) should be determined on the
basis of social, educational and economic backwardness; that the authority
appointed to identify backward classes was first to settle the criteria or the
indicators for determining backward classes and then to apply the criteria to
each and every group in the country and it was not permissible to start with
castes to determine whether a caste was a backward class; that since castes
c
did not exist among Muslims, Christians, and Sikhs, caste could never be the
basis ofindentification.

The petitioner in W.P. No. 972 of 1990 urged that survey to identify
backward classes should be from individual to individual and not to be D
caste..wise.

The petitioner (W.P.No. 1061 of 1990) submitted that the only basis
for identifying backward classes would be occupation~um-means; that a
secular socialist society could never countenance identification of backward E
classes on the basis of caste which would only perpetuate and accentuate
caste differences.and generate antagonism and antipathy between castes.

The petitioners submitted that some members of the designated
backward classes were highly advanced socially as well as economically
and educationally; that they constituted the forward section of that par- F
ticular backward class and that they were lapping up all the benefits of
reservations meant for that class, Without allowing the benefits to reach
the truly backward members of that class and with them a class could not
be treated as backward; that the resenation of appointments or posts
contemplated by Article 16(4) was only at the stage of entry i~to State G
senice, i.e., direct recruitment; that providing for reservation thereafter
in the matter of promotion amounts to a double reservation; that if such
a provision was made at each successive stage of promotion i! would be a
case of res~nation being provided that many times; that by providing
reservation in the matter of promotion, the members of a- re~erved
category would generate acute heart·burning and cause inefficiency in H
460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A administration; that the caste-based approach adopted by the Commis-
sion divided the nation into a forward section and a backward section;
that the Commission was ~ctuated by malice towards upper castes !ind its
report was unbalanced, unjust and unconstitutional.

The respondent-Union of India urged that the reservation provided
B for by Article 15(4) was not in favour of backward citizens, but in favour
of backward class of citizens; that what was to be identified was backward
class of citizens and not citizens who could be classified as backward; that
groups based on religion, race, caste, place of birth etc. could form a class
of citizens and if that class was backward there could be a reservation in
C favour of that class of citizens; that caste was relevant consideration to
determine backward class; that Article 16(2) prohibited discrimination
only on any or all of the grounds mentioned therein; that if reservation
was made in favour of backward class or citizens, the bar contained in
Article 16(2) was not attracted, even if the backward classes were iden-
tified with reference to castes, as the backward classes were not adequately
D represented in the services of the State; whether a backward class was
represented adequately in the service under the state is a question of fact
and was within the domain of the executive decision; that adequacy in .
representation did not mean representation at the lowest level alone, but
at all levels in the administration; that plain words of the Constitution
should be given their due meaning and that there was no warrant for
E cutting down their ambit on the basis of certain suppositions with respect
to interpretation of clauses (I), (2) and (4) of Article 16.

The State of Bihar contended that backward castes in Article 16(4)
meant only the members of Shudra caste and the out-Castes (Panchamas)
F referred to as Scheduled Castes; that the expression "backward classes"
did not refer to any current characteristic· of a backward caste save and
except paucity or inadequacies of representation in the apparatus of the
Government; that poverty was not a necessary criterion of backwardness;
that it was for the State to determine who were the backward classes and
H was not a matter for the Court; that the decision of the Government was
G not judicially reviewal as it was extremely limited • to the only question:
whether the exercise of power was a fraud on the Constitution.

Respondent·Srinarayana Dharma Paripalana Yogam submitted
that Articles 16(4) and 15(4) occupy different fields and serve different
H purposes; that while Article 15(4) contemplated positive action program~
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 461

mes. Article 16(4) enabled the State to undertake schemes of positive A
discrimination; that the social and educational backwardness which was
the basis of identifying backwardness under Article 15(4) was only partly
true in the case of 'backward class of citizens' in Article 16(4); that the
expression "any backward class of citizens" in Article (16(4) has to be
understood in the light of the purpose of the said clause; that the
Scheduled Castes!fribes were to be beneficiaries of Article 16(4), there B
was no reason why caste not to be an exclusive criteria for determining
beneficiaries under Article 16(4); that Article 16(4) contemplated with
group protection and not individual protection.

The Communist Party of India, an Intervenor contended that caste
plus poverty plus location plus residence to be the basis of identification
c
and not mere caste; that a national concensus was essential to introduce
reservations for 'other backward classes' under Article 16(4).

The State of Tamil Nadu contended that the backward classes to be
identified only on the basis of caste and no economic criteria be adopted D
for the purpose; that economic criteria may be employed as one of the
indicators for identific~tion of backward classes; that once a backward
class was identified, there was no question of excluding any one from that
class on the basis of income or means or on any other economic criterion.

The State of Kerala submitted that caste furnished a perfectly scien- E
tific basis for identification of backward classes.

Respondent-All India Federation of Backward Classes, Scheduled
Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Religious Minorities submitted that caste to
be the sole criteria for determining backwardness; that the Shudras and
Panchamas to be given a share in the governance of the country to assure F
their dignity and to instill in them a sense of confidence and a spirit of
competition.

The Respondents urged that once a class was identified as a back-
ward class after applying the relevant criteria Including the economic one, G
it was not permissible to app.Iy the economic criteria once again and
sub-divide a backward class into two sub-categories; that the argument of
'Creamy layer' was but a mere ruse, a trick to deprive the backward
classes .of the benefit of reservations.

On the questions:- H
462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A "l (a) Whether the 'provision' contemplated by Article 16(4) must
necessarily be made by the legislative wing of the State?

(b) Ir the answer to clause (a) is in the negative, whether an
executive order making such a provision is enforceable without
incorporating it into a rule made under the proviso to Article 309?
B
2(a) Whether clause (4) of Article 16 is an exception to clause (1)
of Article 16?

(b) Whether clause (4) of Article 16 is exhaustive of the special
provisions that can be made in favour of 'backward class of
c citizens'? Whether it is exhaustive of the special provisions that
can be made in favour of all sections, classes or groups?

(c) Whether reservations can be made under clause (1) of Article
16 or whether it permits only extending of preferences/conces-
D sions?

3(a) What does the expression 'backward class of citizens' In
Article 16(4) means?

(b) Whether backward classes can be identified on the basis and
E with reference to caste alone?

(c) Whether a class, to be designated as a backward class, should
be situated similarly to the S.Cs. & S.Ts.?

(d) Whether the 'means' test can be applied in the course of
F identification of backward classes? And If the answer is yes,
whether providing such a test is obligatory?

4(a) Whether the backward classes can be identified only and
exclusively with reference to economic criteria?
G (b) Whether a criteria like occupation-cum-income without refer-
ence to caste altogether, can be evolved for identifying the back-
ward classes?

5. Whether the backward classes can be further categorised into
H backward and more backward categories?
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 463

6. To what extent can the reservation be made? (a) Whether the A
50% rule enunciated in Ba/aji a binding rule or only a rule of
caution or rule of prudence?

(b) Whether the 50% rule, if any, is confined to reservations made
under clause (4) of Article 16 or whether it takes in all types of
reservations that cau be provided under Articles 16? B

(c) Further while applying 50% rule, ifany, whether an year should
be taken as a unit or whether the total strength of the cadre should
be looked to?

(d) Whether Devedasan was correctly decided?
c
7. Whether Article 16 permits reservations being provided in the
matter of promotions?

8. Whether reservations are anti·meritian? To what extent are D
Articles 335, 38(2) and 46 of the Constltntion relevant in the
matter of construing Article 16?

9. Whether the extent of judicial review is restricted with regard
to the identification of Backward Classes and the percentage of
reservations made for such classes to a demonstrably perverse E
identification or a demonstrably unreasonable percentage?

10. Whether the distinction made in the second Memorandum
between poorer sections of the backward classes and others per·
missible under Article 16?
F
11. Whether the reservation of 10% of the posts in favour of other
economically backward sections of the people who are not covered
by any of the eXisting schemes of the reservations made by the
Office Memorandum dated 25.9.1991 permissible under Article
16.". G
Disposing of the Writ Petitions and Transferred Cases, This Court,

(Constituting M.H. Kania, CJ., M.N. Venkatachaliah, S. Ratnavel
Pandian, Dr. T.K. Thommen, A.M. Ahmadi, Kuldlp Singh, P.B.
Sawant, R.M. Sahai and B.P. Jeevan Reddy, JJ • Majority View: H
464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Per B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J. on his behalf and or behalf of M.H.
Kania, CJ., M.N. Venkatachaliah, A.M. Ahmadi, JJ. Per. S. Rat-
navel Pandian and P.B. Sawant, JJ partly concuning, Dr. T.K.
Thommen, Kuldip Singh and R.M. Sahai, JJ. (Dissenting).

HELD : Per Majority View (B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J. on his behalf and
B on behalf of M.H. Kania, CJ., M.N. Venkatachaliah and A.M. Ahmadi, JJ.)

.A 'provision' under Article 16(4) can be made by an executive order.
It is not necessary that it should be made by Parliament/Legislature.
[692-H; 693-A]
)
c \.
Per S. Ratnavel Pandian, J. (Concuning)
I
Any provision under Article 16(4) is not necessarily to be made by
the Parliament or Legislature. Such a provision could also be made by an
Executive order. [778-B]
D
Per br. T.K. Tbo~men,J. (Concuning)

It is open to the State to adopt any valid affirmative action programme,
otherwise than by reservation, for amelioration of the disabilities of all
disadvantaged persons, including backward classes of citizens. (820-B]
E
Per Kuldip Singh, J. ( Concuning)

The Brother Judges have held that the reservations can be provided
by the Parliament, State Legislatures, statutory mies as well as by way of
Executive Instructions issued by the Central Government and the State
F Governments from time to time. (853-G]

The Executive Instructions can be issued only when there are no
statutory provisions on the subject. Executive Instructions can also be
issued to supplement the statutory provisions when those provisions are
G silent on the subject of reservations. These propositions of law are unex-
ceptionable. (853-H)

Any Executive Instruction [issued under Articles 16(4), 73 or 162)
providing reservations, which goes contrary to statutory provisions or the
mies under Article 309 or any other statutory rules, shall not be operative
H to the extent it is contrary to the statutory provisions/mies. (854-A)
fNDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.I. 465

Per P.B. Sawant, J. (Concurring) A
The provision for reservation in the services under Article 16(4) can
be made by an executive order. (938-D]

Per Majority view.
B
Article 16(4) is not an exception to Article 16(1). It is an instance of
classification inherent in Article 16(1). Article 16(4) is exhaustive of the
subject of reservation in favour of backward classes, though it may not be
exhaustive of the very concept of reservation. Reservations for other clas-
ses can be provided under clause (1) of Article 16. (696-F, GI
c
Per S. Ratnavel Pandian, J. (Concurring)

Article 16(4) of the Constitution is neither an exception nor a
proviso to Article 16(1). It is exhaustive of all the reservations that can be
made in favour of backward cl3ss of citizens. It has an overriding effect
on Article 16(1) and (2). (777-E] D
No reservation can be made under Article 16(4) for classes other
than backward classes. But under Article 16(1) reservation can be made
for classes, not covered by Article 16(4). (777-F]

Per Dr. T.K. Thommen, J. (Partly dissenting) E

It is open to the State to adopt valid classification and make special
provisions for the protection of classes of citizens whose comparative back-
wardness the State has a mandate to redress by affirmative action program·
mes. Any such programme must be strictly tailored to the constitutional
requirement that no citizen shall be excluded from being considered on the F
basis of merits for any public employment except to the exteni that a valid
reservation has been made in favour of backward classes of citizens. (815-F]

The Constitution prohibits discrimination on grounds only of
religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them. Any G
discrimination solely on any one or more of these prohibited grounds will
result in invidious reverse discrimination which is imperimissible. None of
these grounds is the sole or the dominant or the indispensable criterion to
identify backwardness which qualifies for reservation. But each of them is, in
~onjunction with factors such as poverty, illiteracy, demeaning occupation,
malnutrition, physical and intellectual deformity and like disadvantages, a H
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A relevant criterion to identify socially and educationally backward classes of
citizens for whom reservation.is intended. [815-G-H; 816-A]

Reservaiim contemplated under Article 16 is meant exclusively for
backward classes of citizens who are not adequately represented in the
services under the State. [816-B]
B
Only such classes of citizens who are socially and educationally
backward are qualified to be identified as backward classes for the pur-
pose of reservation under Article 15 or Article 16, their backwardness
must have been either recognised by means of a notification by the Presi-
C dent under Article 341 or Article 342 declaring th~ to be. Scheduled .
'
Castes or Scheduled Tribes, or, on an objective consideration, identified
by the State to be socially and educationally so backward by reason of
identified prior disc.riminalion and its continuing ill-effects as to be com·
parable to the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes. In the case of
the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled tribes, these conditions are, in
D view of the notifications, presumed to be satisfied. [816-B-D]

In the case of the other backward classes of citizens qualified for
reservation, the burden is on the State to show that these .classes have
been subjected to such discrimination in the past that they are reduced to
E a state of helplessness, poverty and the consequential social and educa-
tional backwardness as in the case of the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes. [816-D, El

Reservation is meant exclusively for the Harijans, the Girijans, the
Adivasis, the Dalits or other like "depressed" classes or races or tribes most
F unfortunately referred to in the past as the "untouchables" or the "outcastes"
by reason of their being born in what was wrongly regarded as low castes and
associated with what was equally wrongly treated as demeaning occupations,
or any other class of citizens amicted by like degree of poverty and degrada·
lion caused by prior and continuing discrimination and exploitation,
whatever be their professed faith, "religion" or caste. These classes of
G
citizens, segregated in slums and ghettos and affiicted by grinding poverty,·
disease, ignorance, ill-health and backwardness, and hunted by fear and
anxiety, are the constitutionally intended beneficiaries of reservation, not
because of their castes or occupations, Which are merely Incidental facts of
history, but because of their backwardness and disabilities stemming from
H identilied past or continuing inequities and discrimination. [816-E-G]
INDRA SAWHNEYv. U.0.1. 467

Members of the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes do not A
lose the benefits of reservation and other affirmative action programmes
intended for backward classes merely by reason of their conversion from
the Hindu or the Sikh or the Buddhist religion to any other religion, and
all such persons shall continue to be accorded all such benefits until such
time as they cease to he backward. (816-H; 817-A]
B
Identification of backward classes for the purpose of reservation
with reference to historical discrimination and its continuing ill effects is,
however, subject to the overriding condition that no person whose means
exceeded a predetermined economic level should be entitled to the protec-
tion of reservation, however, backward he may he socially and education- C
ally. He may, however be considered for the benefits of other affirmative
action programmes, but in doing so his comparative affiuence in relation
to other backward class candidates may be a relevant c~nsideration to
exclude him. (817-B, CJ

Per Kuldip Singh, J. (Conculring with R.M. Sahai, !.) D
Article 16(1) and Article 16(4) operate in the same field. (849-G]

Article 16(4) is exhaustive of the State-power to provide reservations
in State services. (849-G]
E
Protective discrimination, short of reservations, which satisfy the
tests of reasonableness, is permitted under Article 16(1). No reservation
of any kind can be made for any class or category whether backward or
non-backw3rd under Article 16(1). (849-H; 850-E]

Per P.B. Sawant, J. (Conculring with Majority View) F

Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to clau~e (1) thereof. It
only carves out a section of the society, viz., the backward class of citizens
for whom the reservations in services may be kept. The said clause is
exhaustive of the reservations of posts in the senices so far as the G
backward class of citizens is concerned. It is not exhaustive of all the
reservations in the services that may be kept. The reservations of posts In
the services for the other sections of the society can be kept under clause
(1) of that Article. (936-F]

Per. R.M. Sabal, J. (Dissenting) H
468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Article 16(4) being part of the scheme of equality doctrine it is
exhaustive of reservation, therefore no reservation can be made under ·
Article 16(1).

Constitutional law bar under Article 16(2) against State for not
discriminating on race, religion or caste is as much applicable to Article
B 16(4) as to Article 16(1) as they are part of the same scheme and serve
s~me constitutional purpose of ensuring equality. [1005-E]

Reservation being extreme form of protective measure or affirmative
action it should be confined to minority of seats. [1006-C]
c Per Majority View:-

The expression 'backward class' in Article 16(4) takes in Other Back·
ward Classes', S.Cs., S.Ts. and ma;- be some other backward classes as well.
The accent in Article 16(4) is upon social backwardness. Social backward-
D ness leads to educational backwardness and economic bacI<.wardness. They
are mutually contributory to each other and are inter-twined with low
occupations in the Indian society. A caste can be and quite often is a social
class in India. Economic criterion cannot be the sole basis for determining
the backward class of citizens contemplated by Article 16(4). The weaker
sectlons referred to in Article 46 do include S.E.3.Cs. referred to in Article
E 340 and covered by Article 16(4). [696-H; 697-A]

Even under Article 16(1), reservations cannot !>e made on the basis
of economic criterion alone. [697-B]

Per S. Ratnavel Pandian, J. (Concurring)
F
The expression, "backward class of citizens" occurring in Article
16(4) is neither defined nor explained in the Constitution. However, the
backward class or classes can certainly be identified in Hindu Society with
reference to castes along with other criteria such as traditional occupa-
G lion, poverty, place of residence, lack of education, etc. and in ccm-
munities where caste is not recognised by the above recognised and
accepted criteria except caste criterion. [777-G]

In the process of identification of backward class of citizens under
Article 16(4) among Hindus, caste is a primary criterion or a dominant
H factor though lt~is not the sole criterion. [777-H; 778-A)
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 469

Per Dr. T.K. Thommen, J. (Dissenting) A
The validity of the impugned Govt. orders providing for reservation
of posts depends on co!'vincing proof of proper identification of backward
classes of citizens by recourse to relevant criteria, such as poverty, il-
literacy, disease, unhygienic living condi~ions, low caste and consequential
isolation, and in accordance with correct principles, i.e. with reference to B
the continuing ill effects of historical discrimination resulting in social
and educational backwardness comparable to that of the Scheduled Cas-
tes or the Scheduled Tribes, and inadequate representation of snch classes
of citizens in the services under the State, bot subject to the overriding
condition that all those persons whose means have exceeded a predeter-
mined economic level shall be denied reservation. Amoniist the aforemen-
c
. tioned backward classes of citizens correctly identified to be qualified for
reservation, preference may be ligitimately extended to the comparatively
poorer or more disadvantaged sections. [819-A-F]

Reservation Of seats or posts solely on the basis of economic back- D
wardness, i.e. without regard to evidence of historial discrimination finds
no justification in the Constitution. [819-GJ

Once a class of citizence is identified on correct principles as back-
ward for the purpose of reservation, the "m~ns test" must be strictly and
uniformly applied to exclude all those persons in that class reaching above E
the predetermined economic level. [817-D]

Per Kuldip Singh, J. (Concuning with R.M. Sahai, !.)

The expression 'backward class of citizens" under Article 16(4) does
not mean the same thing as the expression "any socially and educationally F
backward classes of citizens" in Article 15(4). [837-A]

A class which is adequately represented in the State-services cannot
be considered a backward class. A class may not be backward even if it
has inadequate representation in the State-services, but once it secures G
adequate representation in the State-services it no longer remains back-
ward. It is not possible to read the expression "not adequately repre-
sented" in Article 16(4) in relation to "any backward class." [841-D, E]

Under the Constitution the "backward class" which bas been iden-
tified for preferential treatment is the "socially and educationally back- H
•

470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A ward class". Article 16(4) does not provide job-reservations for the back-
ward classes. That is why the expression "socially and educationally back-
ward" has not been used therein. The classes of citizens to be identified
under Article 16(4) are those who are not adequately represented in the
services under the State. [841-A-C]

B 'Class' under Article 16(4) cannot be read as 'caste'. Castes cannot
be adopted as collectivities for the purpose of identifying the "backward
class" under Article 16(4). [822-C]

Occupation (plus income or otherwise) or any other secular collec-
tivity can be the basis for the identification of "backward classes". Caste-
c collectivity is unconstitutional and as such not permitted. [822-C, DJ

A backward class for the purpose of Article 16(4) can be identified
solely on the basis of economic criteria. [853·F]

D Per P.B. Sawant, J.

The backward class of citi7.ens referred to in Article 16(4) is the
socially backward class of citizens whose educational and economic back-
w~rdness is on account of their social backwardness. A caste by itself may
constitute a class. However, in order to constitute a backward class the
E caste concerned must be socially backward and its educational and
economic backwardness must be on account of its social backwardness.
[936-G, H; 937·A]

The economic criterion by itself cannot identify a class as backward
F unless the economic backwardness of the class is on account of its social
backwardness. [937-A]

No reservations of posts can be kept in services under the State
based exclusively on economic criterion either under Article 16(4) or
G under Article 16(1). [937-D]

The weaker sections mentioned in Article 46 are a genus of which
backward class of citizens mentioned in Article 16(4) constitute a species.
Article 16(4) refers to backward classes who are not adequately repre·
sented in the services, and not for all the weaker sections that the reser-
H vations in services are provided under Article 16(4). [937-B, CJ
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 471

Per R.M. Sahai, J. (Dissenting) A
Reservation under Article 16(4) being for any class of citizens and
citizen having been defined in Chapter 11 of the Constitution includes not
only Hindus, but Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains etc., the
principle of identification has to be of universal application so as to
extend to every community and not only to those who are either converts B
from Hinduism or some of whom to carry same occupation as some of the
Hindus. [1006-A, B)

Social and educational backward class under Article 340 being nar-
rower in import than backward class in Article 16(4) it has to be construed in
restricted manner. And the words, "educationally backward11 in this Article C
cannot be disregarded while determining backwardness. [1005-H)

ldentificatioin or backward class by caste is against the Constitu-
tion. [1005-E)

Identification or a group or collectivity by any criteria other than D
caste, such as, occupation-cum-social-cum-educational-cum-economic
criteri~· ending in caste 1nay not be invalid. [1005-G]

The prohibition is not mitig"ated by using the word, 'only' in Article
16(2) as a cover and evolving certain socio-economic indicators and then
applying it to caste as the identification then suffers from the same vice. E
Such identification is apt to become arbitrary as well as the indicators
evoived and applied to one community may be equally applicable to other
community which is excluded and the backward class of which is denied
similar benefit. [1005-F]

Economic backwardness may give jurisdiction to State to reserve, F
provi.ded it can find out m.echanism to ascertain inadequacy of repre·
sentation of such class. But such group or collectivit)' does not fall under
Article 16(1). [1006-F]

Per Majority View:
G
There is no constitutional bar to classification of backward classes
into more backward and backward classes for the puposes or Article 16(4).
The distinction should be on the basis of degrees of social backwardness. In
case of such classification however, it \l'ould be advisable. nay, necessary. to
ensure equitable distribution amongst the various bacirn'ard classes to avoid
lumping so that one or two such classes do not eat away the entire quota lI
472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A leaving the other backward classes high and dry. [697·F]
Per Kuldip Singh, J. (Concurring)

The members of the backward class are differentiated into superior
and inferior. The discrimination which was practised on them by the
B superior class is in turn practised by the affiuent members of the back-
ward class on the poorer members of the. said class. It is, therefore,
necessary that the benefit of the reservation must reach the poorer and the
weakest section of the backward class. Means-test can be applied to skim
off the affiuent section of the "backward class". [850-G, H; 851-A-C]

C Per P.B. Sawant, J.

Article 16(4) permits classification of backward classes into back-
ward and more or most backward classes. However, this classification is
permitted only on the basis of the degrees of social backwardness and not
D on the basis of the economic consideration alone. [937-H]

If backward classes are classified into backward and more or most
backward classes, srparatc quotas of reservations will have to be kept for
each of such classes. In the absence of such separate quotas, the reserva-
tions will be illegal. [938-Aj
E It is not permissible to classify backward classes or a backward
class social group into an advanced section and a backward section either
on economic or any other consideration. The test of advancement lies in
the capacity to compete with the forward classes. If the advanced section
in a backward class is so advanced as to be able to compete with the
F forward dasses, the advanced section from the backward class no longer
belongs to the backward class and should cease to be considered so and
denied the benefit of reservations under Article 16(4). [938-B-C]

Per Majority View:

G For excluding 'Creamy layer', an economic criterion can be adopted
as an indicium or measure of social advancement. [697-G]

Per S. Ratnavel Pandian, J. (Concurring)

No section of SEBCs can be excluded on the ground of creamy layer
H till the Government - Central and State - takes a decision in this regard
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 473

on a review on the recommendations of a Commission or a. Committee to A
be appointed by the Government. (779-E]

Per R.M. Sahai, J. (Concuning)

Creamy layer amongst backward class of citizens must be excluded
by fixation of proper income, property or status criteria. [1006-F] B

Per Majority View:

The reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not
exceed 50%, while 50% shall be the rule, it is necessary not to put out of
consideration certain extraordinary situations inherent in the great diver- c
sity of this country and the people. It might happen that in far-flung and
remote areas the population inhabiting those areas might, on account of
their being out of the main-stream of national life and in view of the
conditions peculiar to and characteristic of them need to be treated in a

- different way, some relaxation in this strict rule may become imperative. D
In doing so, extreme caution is to be exercised and a special case made
out. (694-H; 695-A, Bl

For applying this rule, the reservations should not exceed 50% of the
appointments in a grade. cadre or service in any given year. Reservation can
be made in a service or category only when the State is satisfied that E
representation of backward class of citizens therein is not adequate. [697-EJ

To the extent, Devadasan is inconsistent herewith, it is over-ruled.

Per S.Ratnavel Pandian, J. (Dissenting)
F
No maximum ceiling of reservation can be fixed under Article 16(4)
of the Constitution for reservation of appointments or posts in favour of
any backward class of citizens "in the services under the State". The
decisions fixing the percentage of resen-ation only up to the maximum of
50% are unsustainable. [778-H; 779-A] G

Per Dr. T.K. Thommen, J. (Concuning)

Reservation of seats or posts for backward classes of citizens, in-
cluding the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes must remain well
below 50% of the total seats or pos<s. [819-B] H
474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Per Kuldip Singh, J. (Concuning)

The reservations under Article 16(4) must remain below 50% and
under no circumstance be permitted to go beyond 50%. Any reservation
beyond 50% is constitutionally invalid. [850-BJ

B It is for the State lo adopt the methodology of providing reserva-
tions below 50%. The State may provide the said reservation in respect of
the substantive vacancies arising in a year or in the cadre or service. It
would he permissible to carry forward the reserve vacancies of one year to
the next year. The vacancies reserved in a year including those which are
carried forward shall not exceed 50%. [850-C, DJ
c
Per P.B. Sawant, J. (Concuning)

Ordinarily, the reservations kept both under Article 16(1) and Ar-

D
ticle 16(4) together would not exceed 50 per cent of the appointments in a
grade, cadre or service in any particular year. It is only for extraordinary
reasons that this percentage may be exceeded. However, every excess over
50 per cent will have to be justified on valid grounds which grounds will
-
haveto be specifically made not. [937-E]

The adequacy of representation is not to he determined merely on
E the basis of the over all numerical strength of the backward classes in the
senices. For determining the adequacy, their representation at different
levels of administration and in different grades has to be taken into
consideration. It is the effective voice in the administration and not the
total number which determines the adequacy of representation. (937-F]
F Per Majority View:. (*Except Ahinadi, J]

Reservation of appointment or posts under Article 16(4) is confined to
initial appointment only and cannot extend to providing reservation in the
matter of promotion. !tis directed that this Court's decision on this question
G shall operate only prospectively and shall not affect promotions already
made, whether on temporary, officiating or regular/permanent basis. It is
further directed that wherever reservations are already provided in the
matter of promotion - be it Central Services or State Services, or for that
matter services under any Corporation, authority or body falling under the
definition of 'State' in Article 12 · such reservations may continue in opera-
H ti on for a period of five years from this day. Within this period, it would be
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 475

open to the appropriate authorities to revise, modify or re-issue the relevant A
rules to ensure the achievement of the objective of Article 16(4). If any
authority thinks that for ensuring adequate representation of 'backward
class of citizens' in any service, class or category, it is necessary to provide for
direct recruitment therein, it shall be open to it do so. (698-B-D]

(*Ahmadi J was of the opinion that this question does not arise for con- B
sideration in these writ petitions, hence need not be anwered. He did not
associate himself with the discussion in that behalf.)

Per S. Ratnavel Pandian, J. (Concurring)

As regard the reservation in the matter of promotion under Article C
16(4), the conclusion of the Majority is agreed with. (779-B]

Per Dr. T.K. Thommen, J. (Concurring)

Reservation has no application to promotion. It is confined to initial
appointment, whichever be the level or grade at which such appointment D
is made in the administrative hierarchy, and whether or not the post in
question is borne on the cadre of the service. (817-F]

Per Kuldip Singh, J. (Concurring)

Article 16(4) permits reservation of appointments or posts in favour of E
any backward class of citizens only at the initial stage of entry into the State
services. Article 16( 4) does not permit reservation either to the selection
posts or in any other manner in the process of promotion. [849-A, BJ

Per P.B. Sawant, J. (Partly Concurring)
F
The reservations in the promotions in the services are unconstitu-
tional as they are inconsistent with the maintenance of efficiency of ad-
ministration. [938-Gl

However, the backward classes may be provided with relaxations, G
exemptions, concessions and facilities etc. to enable them to compete for
the promotional posts with others whenever the promotions are based on
selection or merit-cum-seniority basis. [938-G]

The committee or body entrusted with the task of selection must be
representative and manned by suitable persons including those from the H
476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {1992J SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
'
A backward classes to make an impartial assessment of the merits.
[938-H; 939-A)

To ensure adequate representation of the backward classes which
means representation at all levels and in all grades in the services, the
rules of recruitment must ensure that there is direct recruitment at all
B levels and in all grades in the services. [939-B]

Per R.M. Sahai, J. (Concurring)

Reservation in promotion is constitutionally impermissible as, once
the advantaged and disadvantaged are made equal and are brought, in one
c class or group then any further benelit extended for promotion on the
inequality existing prior to be brought in the group would be treating
equals unequally. It would not be eradicating effects of past discrimina-
tion but perpetuating it. [1006-E)

Per Majority View:
D
While the rule of reservation cannot be callerl anti~meritarion, there
are certain services and posts to which it may not be advisable to apply
the rdle of reservation. [695-H]

Per S. Ratnavel Pandian, J. (Concuning)
E
It is agreed with the conclusion of the Maj.)rity qua exception to the
rule of reservation to certain Services and posts. [779-C]

Per Dr. T.K. Thommen, J. (Concuning)

F Reservation in all cases must be confined to a minority of availahle
posts or seats so as not to unduly sacrifice merits. [817-E]

Per Majority View:

No special standard of judicial scruitiny can he predicated in mat-
G ters arising under Article 16(4). [697-H; 698-A]
Per S. Ratnavel Pandian, J. (Dissenting)

The power conferred on the State under Article 16(4) is one coupled
with a duty and, therefore, the State has to exercise that power for the benefit
H of all those, namely, backward class for whom it is intended. [778-C]
'
INDRA SAWHNEY F. U.0.1. 477

The provision for reservation of appointrilents or posts in favour of A
any backward class of citizens is a matter of policy of the Government, of
course, Sl!bject to the constitutional parameters and well settled principles
of judicial review. [778-D]

Per Dr. T.K. Thommen, J. (Dissenting)
B
A periodic administrative review of all affirmative action program·
mes, including reservation of seats or posts, must be conducted by a
specially constituted Permanent Authority with a view to adjustment and
readjustment of such programmes in proportion to the nature, degree and
extent of backwardness. All such programmes must stand the test of C
judicial review whenever challenged. Reservation being exclusionary in
character must necessarily stand the test of heightened administrative
and judicial solicitude so as to be confined to the strict bounds of constitu·
tional principles. [817-H; 818-A, BJ

Per P.B. Sawant, J. (Dissenting) D
There Is no special law judicial review when the reservations under
Article 16(4) are under scrutiny. The judicial review will be available only
in the cases of demonstrably perverse identification of the backward
classes and in the cases of unreasonable percentage of reservations made
for them. (938-E] E

Per R.M. Sahai, J. (Dissenting)

Reservation in public sen-ices either by legislative or executive ac·
~ion is neither a matter of policy nor a political issue. The higher courts
in the country are constitutionally obliged to exercise the power of judicial F
review in every matter which is constitutional in nature or has potential
of constitutional repercussions. [1005-C, DJ

Per Majority View:
G
The distinction made between 'poorer sections' and ,others among
the backward class is not invalid, if the classification is understood and
operated as based upon relative backwardness among the several classes
identified as other backward classes. (696-A)

Per S. Ratnavel Pandian, J. (Dissenting) H
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A The expression 'poorer sections' mentioned in para 2(i) of.the
amended Office Memorandum of 1991 denotes a division among SEBCs
on economic criterion. Therefore, no division or sub-classification as
'poorer sections' and other backward class (non poorer sections) out of
the identified SEBCs can be made by application of 'means test' based on
economic criterion. Such a division in the same identified and ascertained
B unit consisting of SEBCs having common characteristics and attributes,
the primary characteristic or attribute being the social backwardness is
violative of clause (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. Hence the division
of the SEBCs as 'poorer sections' and others, brought out in para 2(i) of
the impugned amended Office Memorandum dated 25th September 1991
c is constitutionally invalid and impermissible, Para 2(1) of the said
amended Office Memorandum is struck down. (778-E-GJ

Per Dr. T.K. Thommen, J. (Dissenting)

Once a class of citizens is identified on correct principles as back-
D ward for the purpose of reservation, the "means test" must. be strictly and
uniformly applied to exclude all those persons in that class reaching above
t~e predetermined economic level. (817-D]

Whenever and wherever poverty and backwardness are identified, it
is the costitutional responsibility of the State to initiate economic and
E other measures to ameliorate the conditions of the p•ople residing in
those regions. But economic backwardness without more does not justify
reservation. (818-C]

Poverty demands affirmative action. Its eradication is a constitu-
tional mandate. The immediate' target to which every affirmative action
F programme contemplated by Article 15 or Article 16 is addressed is
poverty causing backwardness. But it is only such poverty which is the
continuing ill-effect of identified prior discrimination, resulting in back-
wardness comparable to that of the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled
Tribes, that justifies reservation. (818-D]
G
Per Majority View:

The reservation of 10% of the posts in favour of 'other economically
backward sections of the people who are not convered by any of the existing
schemes of the reservation' made in the impugned Office Memorandum
·H dated25.9.1991 is constitutionally invalid and is struck down. (696-B]
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 479

Per S. Ratnavel Pandian, J. (Concurring) A
The reservation of 10% of the vacancies in civil posts and services in
favour of other economically backward sections of the people who are not
covered by any other scheme of the reservation as mentioned in para 2(ii)
of the impugned amended Office Memorandum dated 25th September
1991 is constitutionally invalid and it is also struck down. [779-D) B
Per B.P. Jeevan Reddy. J. on his behalf and on behalf of M.H. Kania,
CJ., M.N. Venkatachaliab and A.M. Ahmadi, JJ.

1. The doctrine of equality has many facets. It is a dynamic, and an
evolving concept. its main facets, relevant to Indian Society, have been C
referred to in the Preamble and the Articles under the sub-heading "Right
to equality" - (Articles 14 lo 18). In short, the goal is "equality of status
and of opportunity"; Articles 14 to 18 must be understood not merely with
reference to what they say but also in the light of the several articles in
Part IV (Directive Principles of State Policy). "Justice, Social, Economic
and Political", is the sum total of the aspirations incorporated in Part IV. D
(543-H; 544-A]

2. The significance attached by the founding fathers to the right to
equality is evident not only from the fact that they employed both the
expressions 'equality before the law' and 'equal protection of the laws' in E
Article 14 but proceeded further to state the same rule in positive and
affirmative terms in Articles JS to 18. (544-G]

3. It is evident that "the weaker sections of the people" in Art. 46 do
include the "backward class of citizens" contemplated by Article 16( 4).
(547-F]
F

-~ M.R. Balaji & Ors. v. State of Mysore, [1963) Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 439;
CA. Rajendran ·1. Union of India, (1968) 1 S.C.R. 721; State ofAndhra
Pradesh & Ors. v. P. Sagar, [1968] 3 S.C.R. 595; State of Andhra Pradesh
· & Ors. v. U.S. V. Bairam, (1972] 3 S.C.R. 247; A. Peeriakarnppan etc. v. State G
of Tamil Nadu, [1971) 2 S.C.R..430; T. Devadasan v. Union of India, (1964]
4 S.C.R. 680 and General Manager, Southern Railway v. Rangachari, (1962)
2 s.c.Ii 586, referred to. .

4. If the claims of even Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are
to_. be taken into consideration consistently with the maintenance of ef- H
480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS f1992J SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A ficiency of administration, the said admonition has to be respeoted equally
while taking into consideration the ~!aims of other backward classes and
other weaker sections. [550-0]

5. What do the two memorandums say, reatl together. The first
provision made is: 27% of vacancies to be filled up by direct recruitment in
B civil posts and services under the Governemnt of India are reserved for
backward classes. Among the members of the backward classes preference
has to be given to candidates belonging to the poorer sections. Only in case,
sufficient number of such candidates are not available, will the unfilled
vacancies be filled by other backward class candidates. The second provision
made is: backward class candidates recruited on the bqsis of merit in open
c competition along with general candidates shall not be adjusted against the
quota of27% reserved for them. Thirdly, it is provided that backward classes
shall mean those castes and communities which are common to the list in the
report of the Manda! Commission and the respective State Government's
list. Lastly, it is provided that 10% of the vacancies shall be reserved for
D other economically backward sections of the people who are not covered by
any of the existing schemes of reservations. [571-B-E]

"Judging the World: Law and Politics in the Worlds" Leading Couns -
By Sir Anthony Mason, Page 343, referred to.

E 6. The objective behind clause (4) of Article 16 was the sharing of State
power. The State power which was almost exclusively monopolised by the
upper castes i.e., a few communities, was now sought to be made broad based.
The backward communities who were till then kept out of apparatus of
power, were sought to be inducted therein and since that was not practicable
in the normal course, a special prOvision was made to effectuate the said
F objective. The objective behind Article 16(4) is empowerment of the deprived
backward communities to give them a share in the administrative apparatus
and in the governance of the community. [580-G, H; 581-A)

State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan, [1951) S.C.11.: 525;
G Venkataraman v. State of Madras, A.l.R.1951S.C.229; T.Devadasan v. Union
of India, [1964) 4 S.C.R. 680; General Manager, Southern Railway v. Ran-
gachari,. [1962) 2 S.C.R. 586; Balaji v. The State of Mysore, [1963) Suppl. 1
S.C.R. 439; Chitralekha v. State of Mysore, [1964) 6 S.C.R. 368; Minor P.
Rajendran v. State of Madras, [1968) 2 S.C.R. 1012; Triloki Nath, [1969) 1
S.C.R. l03;A. Peeriakaruppan etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1971) 2 S.C.R. 430;
H State ofA.P. v. U.S. V Balaram, [1972) 3 S.C.R. 241;/anaki Prasad Parimoo v.
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 481

State ofJ. & K., (1973] 3 S.C.R. 236; State of U.P. v. Pradip Tandon, [1975] 2 A
S.C.R. 761; Thomas, [1976] 1S.C.R.906 and K.C. Vasant Kumar&Anr. v.
State of Kamataka, (1985] Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 352, referred to.

7. Parliament, which enacted the first Amendment to the Constitu-
tion, was in fact the very same Constituent Assembly which had framed
the Constitution. [584-C] B
8. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment (insofar as it guarantees
equal protection c-' the laws) corresponds to Article 14 but they do not
have provisions corresponding to Article 16(4) or 15(4). Title IV of the
Civil Rights Act enacted in 1964 roughly corresponds to Clause (2) of C
Articles 15 and 16. (606-H; 607-A]

Dred Scott v. Sanford, [1857] 15 L.E. 691; Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, [1954] 98 L.E. 591; Rolling v. Sharpe, [1954] 98 L.E. 583; Plessey v.
Ferguson, [1896] 41 L.E. 256 = (1896] 163 US 537; Defunis v. Charles
Odegaard, (1974] 40 L.Ed. 2nd. 164; Regents of the University of California D
v. Allan Bakke, (1978] 57 L.Ed. 2nd 750 Fullilove v. Phillip M. Klutznic
(1980] 65 Lawyers Ed. 2nd 90; Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Com-
munications Commission, 58 IW 5053, referred to.

9. Article 16(1) is a facet of Article 14. Just as Article 14 permits
reasonable classification, so does Article 16(1). A classification may in- E
volve reservation of seats or vacancies, as the case may be. In other words,
under clause (1) of Article 16, appointments and/or posts can be reserved
in favour of class. (607-B]

Bakke, [1978] 59 L.Ed. 2nd 750; Board of Education v. Swann, 28 L.
Ed. 2nd 586 and Metro Broadcasting Inc., 58 IW 5053, referred to. F
10. The words "order", "by-law", "rule" and "regulation" in definition
clanse (a) of Article 13(3) are significant. Reading the definition of 'State'
in Article 12 and of "Law" in Article 13(3) (a), it becomes clear that a
measure of the nature contemplated by Article 16(4) can be provided not G
only by the Parliament/Legislature but also by the Executive in respect of
Central/State services and by the local bodies and "other authorities"
contemplated by Article 12, in respect of their respective services. Some of
the local bodies and some of the statutory corporations like Universities
may have their own legislative wings. In such a situation, it would be
unreasonable and inappropriate to insist that reservation in all these H
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A services should be provided by Parliament/Legislature. The situation and
circumstances of each of these bodies may vary. The rule regarding reser-
vation has to be framed to suit the particular situations. All this cannot
reasonably be done by Parliament/Legislature. [609-B-D)

11. The very use of the word "provision" in Article 16(4) is significant.
B Whereas clauses (3) and (5) of Article 16 - and clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19
- use the wold "Law", Article 16(4) uses the word "provision". Regulation of
service conditions by Orders and Rules made by the Executive was a weil
known feature at the time of the framing of the Constitution. (609-E)

12. Provision contemplated by Article 16(4) can also be made by the
c executive wing of the Union or of the State, as the case may be, as has been
done in the present case. (609-F]

B.S. Yadav, AIR 1981 S.C. 561, referred to.

13. There is adequate safeguard against misuse by the political
D executive of the power under Article !6(4) in the provision itself. Any
determination of backwardness is not a subjective exercise nor a matter
of subjective satisfaction; the exercise is an objective one. (609-G]

Balaji, (1963) Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 439 and Comptroller & Auditor
E General of India v. Mohan Lal Mehrotra, A.l.R. 1991 S.C. 2288, referred to.
14. Certain objective social and other criteria has to be satisfied before
any group or class of citizens could be treated as backward. If the executive
includes, for collateral reasons, groups or classes not satisfying the relevant
criteria, it would be a clear case of fraud on power. (609-H; 610-A)
F
15. The appropriate government is empowered to prescribe the condi-
tions of service of its employees by an executive order in the absence of the
rules made under the proviso to Article 309. Even where Rules under the
proviso to article 309 are made, the government can issue orders/instruc-
tions with respect to matters upon which the Rules are silent. (610-H; 611-A)
G
Sant Ram Shanna v. State of Rajasthan, [1968) 1 S.C.R. 111 and
Comptroller and Auditor General v. Mohan Lal Mehrotra, [1990) 2 SCC 1,
relied on.

16. Until a law is made or rules are issued under Article 309 "1th
H respect to reservation in favour of backward classes, it would always be open
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 483

to the Executive (Government) to provide for reservation of appoint- A
ments/posts in favour of Backward Classes by an executive order. [611-F, G)

17. The impugned Memorandums were not issued under the proviso to
Article 309. They were never intended to be so, nor is that the stand of the
Union Government before the court. They are executive orders issued under
Article 73 of the Constitution read with clause (4) of Article 16. The mere B
omission of a recital "in the name and by order of the President of India" does
not affect the validity or enforceability of the orders. [611-G, H; 612-A]

18. Reservation is the highest form of special provision, while
preference, concession and exemption are lesser forms. The constitutional
scheme and context of Article 16(4) induces the view that larger concept c
of reservations takes within its sweep all supplemental and ancillary
provisions as also lesser types of special provisions like exemptions,
concessions and relaxations, consistent no doubt with the requirement of
maintenance of efficiency of administration · the admonition of Article
335. The several concessions, exemptions and other measures issued by D
the administration are instances of supplementary, incidental and ancil-
lary provisions made with a view to make the main provisions of reserva-
tion effective i.e., to ensure that the members of the l'eserved class fully
avail of the provision for reservation in their favour. [614-A-C)

19. Where the State finds it necessary - for the purpo;e of giving full E
effect to the provision of reservation to provide certain exem1-•tions, conces-
sions or preferences to members of backward classes, it can e~end the same
under clause (4) itself. In other words, all supplemental and .ancillary
provisions to ensure full availment of provisions for reservations can be
provided as part of concep.t of reservation itself. Similarly, in a given
situation, the State may think that in the case of a particular backward class F
it is not necessary to provide reservation of appointments/posts and that it
would be sufficient if a certain preference or a concession is provided in their
favour. This can be done under clause (4) itself. In this sense, clause (4) of
Article 16 is exhaustive of the special provisions that can be made in fa,·our
of "the backward class of citizen". Backward classes having been classified by G
the Constitution itself as a class deserving special treatment and the Con-
stitution having itself specified the nature of special treatment, it should be
presumed that no further classification or special treatment is permissible
in their favour apart from or outside of clause (4) o~ Article 16. [615-C-EJ

..
20. ¥ticle 16(1) does permit reasonable classification for ensuring H
484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A attainment of the equality of opportunity assured by it. For assuring
equality of opportunity, it may well be necessary in certain situations to
treat unequally situated persons unequally. Not doing so, would per-
petuate and accentuate inequality. Article 16(4) is an instance of such
classification, put into place the matter beyond controversy. The "back·
ward class of citizens" are classified as a separate category deserving a
B special treatment in the nature of reservation of appointments/posts in the
services of the State. [612-G, HJ

21.Clause (4) ofArticle 16is not an exception to clause (1) ofArticle 16.
It is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by clause (1).
C Article 16(4) is a provision which must be read along with and in harmony
with clause (1). Even without clause (4), it would have been permissible for
the State to have evolved such a classification and made a provision for
reservation of appointments/posts in their favour. Clause (4) merely puts
the matter beyond any doubt in specific terms. [612H; 613-A·CJ

D Balaji, [1963] 1 Supp. S.C.R. 439 and Devadasan, [1964] 4 S.C.R.
680, referred to.

22. Clause (4) is not, and cannot be held to be, exhaustive of the concept
of resen-ations; it is exhaustive of reservations in favour of backward classes
alone. Merely because, one form of classification is stated as a specific
E clause, it does not follow that the very concept and power of classification
implicit in clause (1) is exhausted thereby. To say so would not be correct in
principle. But, at the same time, one thing is clear. It is in very exceptional
situations, • and not for all and sundry reasons • that any further reserva-
tions, of whatever kind, should be provided under clause (1). In such cases,
the State bas to satisfy, if called upon, that making such a provision was
F necessary (in public interest) to redress a specific situation. The very
presence of clause (4) should act as a damper upon the propensity to create
further clauses deserving special treatment. [615·C-F]

Balaji, [1963] Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 439 and Champakam, [1951] S.C.R.
525, referred to.
G
State of Kera/a & Ors. v. N.M. Thomas, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 906, ap-
proved.

Devadasan, [1964] 4 S.C.R. 680, overruled.

H 23. Reservation is the highest form of special provision, while
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 485

preference, concession and exemption are lesser forms. The Constitution- A
al scheme and context of Article 16(4) induces this Court to take the view
that larger concept of reservation takes within its sweep all supplemental
and ancillary provisions as also lesser types of special provisions like
exemptions, concessions and relaxations, consistent no doubt with the
requirement of maintenance of efficiency of administration - the admoni-
tion of Article 335. [614-A, BJ
B

Karamchari Sangh, [1981J 2 S.C.R. 185 and T11omas, [1976J 1 S.C.R.
906, referred to.

24. Where the State finds it necessary - for the purpose of giving full C
effect to ~he provision of reservation to provide certain exemptions, con-
cessions or preferences to members of backward classes, it can extend the
same under clause (4) of Article 16 itself. In other words, all supplemental
and ancillary provisions to ensure full availment of provisions for reser-
vations can be provided as part of concept of reservation itself. Similarly
in a given situation, the State may think that in the case of particular D
backward class it is not necessary to provide reservation of appoint-
ments/posts and it would be sufficient if a certain preference or a conces-
sion is provided in their favour. This can be done under clause (4) itself.
In this sense, clause (4) of Article 16 is exhaustive of the special provisions
that can be made in favour of "the backward class of citizens". Backward
E
Classes having been classified by the Constitution itself as a class deserv-
ing special treatment and the Constitution having itself specified the
nature of special treatment, it should be presumed that no further clas-
sification or special treatment is permissible in thier favour apart from or
ontside of clause (4) of Article 16. [615 C-FJ
F
25. Clause (4) of Article 16 is not, and cannot be held to be, exhaus-
tive of the concept of reservations; it is exhaustive of reservations in
favour of backward classes alone. It is in very exceptional situations, - and
not for all and sundry reasons - that any further reservations, of whatever
kind, should be provided under clause(l). In such cases, the State has to G
satisfy. If called upon, that making such a provision was necessary (in
public inte~est) to redress a specific situation. [615-H; 616-A, BJ

26. If reservations are made both under claude (4) of Article 16 as
well as under clause (1), the vacancies available for free competition as

- well as reserved categories would be correspondingly whittled down and H
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [J992J SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A that is not a reasonable thing to do. [616-C]

27. The argument that clause (I) of Article 16 permits only extend-
ing of preferences, concessions and exemptions, but does not permit
reservation or appointments/posts is rejected. [616-E, F]

B 28. What kind of special provision should be made in favour of a
particular class is a matter for the State to decide, having regard to the
facts and circumstances of' a given situation. [616-F)

29. In pre-independent India, the expressions 'class' and 'caste' were
used interchangeably and caste was understood as an enclosed class.
c [633-C]

30. The words "class of citizens - not adequately represented in the
services under the State" would have been a vague and uncertain descrip-
tion. By adding the word "backward" and by the speeches of Dr. Ambedkar
D and Sri K.M. Munshi, it was made clear that the "class of citizens ....not
adequately represented in the services i.nder the State" meant only those
classes of citizens "'ho were not so represented on account of their social
backwardness. [634-E]

Cilitra/ekha, [1964) 6 S.C.R. 368; Venkatramana, A.l.R.1951S.C.229;
Champakam, [1951) S.C.R. 525; Ba/aji, [1963) Suppl. l S.C.R. 439;
Parimoo. [1973] 3 S.C.R. 236; Minor P.Rajendran, [1968) 2 S.C.R. 786;
Bairam, [1972) 3 S.C.R. 247; Triloknath, [1969) l S.C.R.103; Vasant Kumar,
[1985] Suppl. l S.C.R. 352; Jaysree, [1977) l S.C.R- 194; Madhu Limaye,
A.1.R. 1969 S.C. 1014 at 1018; Go/aknath, A.l.R. 1967 S.C. 1643 at 1657;
Dhillon, [1972] 2 S.C.R. 33, Keshavananda, [1973) 4 S.C.C. 225 and
F Peeria Kamppan, [19711 2 S.C.R. 430, referred to.

31. The word "Community" is clearly wider than "caste" - and "back-
ward communities" meant not only the castes -wherever they may be found -
but also other groups, classes and sections among the populace. It is
G significant to notice that through-out his speech in the ConstitutentAssemb-
ly, Or. Ambedkar was using the word, "communities" (and not "castes"),
which expression includes not only the castes among the Hindus but several
other groups. There are very go?d reasons why the Constitution could not
have used the expression "castes" or "caste" in Article 16(4) and why the word
"class" \t'as the natural choice in the context. The Constitution was meant for
H the entire country and for all time to come. Non-Hindu religions like Islam,
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 487

Christianity and Sikh did not recognise caste as such though, castes did exist A
even among these religions to a varying degree. [635-D-G]

"Castes in India: Their A1echanisnz, <Jenesis and Developtnent: Dr.
Ambedkar (speech delivered on 9.5.1916 at the Columbia University uf
New York, U.S.A.) - Published in Indian Antiquary - May 1917 - Vol. X LI;
Encyclopaedia Britanica - Vol. 16; Legal Thesaurus (Regular Edition); B
Webster's English Dictionary; Encyclopaedia Britanica - II - Micro-paedia,
pages 618-619, referred to.

32. A Constitution is supposed to be a permanent document expected
to last several centuries. It must surely have been envisaged that in future
many classes may spring-up answering the test of backwardness, requiring c
the protection of Article 16(4). It, therefore, follows that from the use of the
word 'class' in Article 16(4) it cannot be concluded either that 'class' is
antithetical to 'caste' or that a caste cannot be a class or that of a citizens. The
word 'class' in Article 16(4) is used in the sense of social class and not in the
sense it is understood in Marxist jargon. [ 635-G, H; 636-A] D
33. A caste is nothing but a social class - a socially homogeneous class.
It is also an occupaiional grouping, with this difference tbatits membership
is hereditary. One is born into it. Its membership is in voluntary. Even if one
ceases to follow that occupation, still he remains and continues a member of
that group. Endogamy is its main characteristic. Its social status and E
standing depends upon the nature of the occupation followed by it. Lowlier
the occupation, lowlier the social standing of the class in the graded hierar-
chy. In rural India, occupation - caste nexus is true even today. A few
members may have gone to cities or even abroad but when they return - they
do, barring a few exceptions - they go into the same fold again. It doesn't
matter if be has earned money. He may not follow that particular occupation. F
Still,the label remains. His identity is not changed. For the purposes of
marriage, death and all other social functions, it is his social class -the caste
- that is relevant. Urbanisation bas to some extent broken this caste -
occupation nexus but not wholly. Lowly occupation results not only in low
social position but also in poverty; it generates poverty. "Caste- occupation- G
poverty" cycle is thus an ever present reality. This is the stark reality not
withstanding all our protestations and abhorrence and all attempts at
weeding out this phenomenon. We are not saying it ought to be encouraged.
It should not be. It must be eradicated. That is the ideal - the goal. But any
programme towards betterment of these sections and classes of society and
any programme designed to eradicate this evil must recognise this ground H
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A reality and attune its programme accordingly. Merely burying our heads in
the sand ·Ostrich - like. wouldn't help. One cannot fight his enemy without
recognising him. [637-C-H; 638-A-D]

34. Without a doubt, an extensive restructuring of socio-economic
'system is the answer. That is indeed the goal, as would be evident from the
B Preamble and Part JV (Directive Principles). [638-E]

35. The true purport of clause (2) of Article 16 is, it prohibits
discrimination of any or all of the grounds mentioned therein. The sig·
nificance of the word 'any' cannot be minimised. Reservation is not being
C made under clause (4) in favour of a 'caste' but a 'backward class'. Once
a caste satisfies the criteria of backwardness, it becomes a backward class
for the purposes of Article 16(4). Even that is not enough. It must be
further found that backward class is not adequately represented in the
services of the State. In such a situation, the bar uf clause (2) of Article
16 has no application whatsoever. [641-A-C]
D
36. If a Commission/Authority begins its process of identification
with castes (among Hindus) and occupational groupings among others, it
cannot ~y that reason alone be said to be constitutionally or legally bad.
There is no rule of law that a test to be applied for identifying backward
classes should be only one and/o~ uniform. In a vast country like India, it
E is simply not practicable. If the real object is to discover and locate
backwardness, and if such backwardness is found in a caste, it can be
treated as backward; if it is found in any other group, section or class, they
too can be treated as backward. [640-F, GI

Air India v. Nargesh Mirza, [1981] 4 S.C.C. 335; Metro Broadcasting,
F 58 IW 5053; Defunis, 416 ·u.s. 3U [1974] and Bakke 438 US 265 [1978] and
Fullilove, 448 US 448, referred to.

37. None can deny· in the face of the material collected by the various
Commissions including Manda! Commission - that discrimination persists
G even today in India. The representation of the socially backward classes in
the Governmental apparatus is quite inadequate and that conversely the
upper classes have a disproportionately large representation therein. This is
the lingering effect, if one wants to see it. [643-B, CJ

38. Certain classes which may not qualify for Article 15(4) may
H qualify as backward class of citizens for the purposes of Article 16(4). It
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 489

is equally relevant to notice that Article 340 does not expressly refer to A
services or to reservations in services under the State, though it may be
that the Commission appointed thereunder may recommend reservation
in appointments/posts in the services of the State as one of the steps for
removing the difficulties under which S.E.B.Cs. are labouring and for
improving their conditions. Thus, S.E.B.Cs. referred to i~ Article 340 is
only one of the categories for whom Article 16(4) was enacted; Article B
16(4) applies to a much larger class than the one contemplated by Article
340. It would, thus, be not correct to say that 'backward class of citizens'
in Article 16(4) are the same as the socially and educationally backward
classes in Article 15(4). Saying so would mean and imply reading a
limitation into a beneficial provision like Article 16(4). Moreover, when c
speaking of reservation in appointments/posts in the State services - which
may mean, at any level whatsoever - insisting upon educational backward-
ne£s may not be quite appropriate. [643-C-F)

Balaji, [1963) Snppl. 1 S.C.R. 439 and Parimoo, [1973) 3 S.C.R. 236,

- referred to.

39. The backwardness contemplated by Article 16(4) is mainly social
backwardness. It would not be correct to say that the backwardness under
D

Article 16(4) should be both social and edncational. The Scheduled Tribes
and the Scheduled Castes are without a doubt backward for the purposes E
· of the clause; no one has suggested that they sbonld satisfy of test the
social and edncational backwardness. The Manda! Commission appointed
under Article 340 was concerned only with the socially and educationally
backward classes contemplated by the said Article. Even so, it is evident
that social backwardness has been given precedence over others by the
Manda! Commission - 12 Ol!t of 22 total points. Social backwardness - it F
may be reiterated - leads to edncational and economic backwardness. No
objection can be, nor is taken, to the validity and relevancy of the criteria
. adopted by the Manda! Commission. [644-B-D)

40. Itis not a question of permissibility or desirability of means test but G
one of proper and more appropriate identification of class' - a backward
class. The very concept of a class denotes a number of persons having certain
common traits which distinguish them from o.thers. In a backward class
under clause (4) of Article 16, ifthe connecting link is the social backward-
ness, it should broadly be the same in a given class. If some of the members
are too far advanced socially (which in the context, necessarily means H
490 Slfl'RFMF COURT R\,l'ORTS jl992J SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A econon1ically and, may also mean educationally) the connecting thread
between them and the remaining class snaps. They would be misfits in the
class. After excluding them alone, would the class be a compact class. In fact,

-
surh exclusion benefits the trul backward. Clause (4) aims at group back-
wardnes~; exclusion of such socially advanced members will make the 'class'
a truly backward dass and would more appropriately serve the purpose and
B obect of c!ause (4). (647-H; 648-A-C]

Jayasree, (1977] 1 S.C.R. 194; Vasant Kumar, (1985] Suppl. l S.C.R.
352 and Ba/aji, (1963] Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 439, referred to.

41. Neither the Constitution nor the law prescribe the procedure or
c method of identification of backward classes. Nor is it possible or ad-
visable for the court to lay down any such procedure or method. It must
be left to the authority appointed to identify. It can adopt such
method/procedure as it thinks convenient and so long as its sun'ey covers
the entire populace, no objection can be taken to it. Identification of the
D back"'·ard classes can certainly be done with reference to castes among and
along with other groups, classes and sections of people. One can start the
process with the castes, whenever they are found, apply the criteria
(evolved for determining backwardness) and find out whether it satisfies
the criteria. If it does - what emerges is a "backward class of citizens"
within the meaning of and for the pm·pose of Article 16(4). Similar process
E can be adopted in the case of other occupational groups, communities and
classes, so as to cover the entire populace. The central idea and overall
objective should be to consider all available groups, sections and classes
in society. Since caste represents an existing, identifiable socia ~
group/class encompassing an overwhelming majority of the country's
population, one can well begin with it and then go to other groups,
F
sections and classes. (651 -C-F]

42. It is not necessary for a class to be designated as backward class
that it is situated similarly to the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes.
'Creamy layer' can be and must be, excluded. [651-F, G]
G
Exclusion of'Creamy layer' must be on the basis of social advancement
(such advancement as renders them misfits in the backward classes) and not
on the basis of mere econon1ic criteria. Income or the extent of property held
by -a person can be taken as a measure of social advancement and on that
basis 'creamy layer' of a given caste/community/occupational group can be
H excluded to arrive ata true backward class. [679-E, F]
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 491

43. A backward class cannot be determined only and exclusively with A
reference to economic criterion. It may be a consideration or basis along
with and in addition to social backwardness, but it can never be the sole
criterion. A backward class can be identified on the basis of occupation-
cum-income without reference to castE. [652-G]

Chitralekha, [1964] 6 SCR 368, relied on. B
44. It is not correct to say that the backward class contemplated by
Article 16(4) is limited to the socially and educationally backward classes
referred to in Article 15(4) and Article 340. It is much wider. The test or
requirement of social and educational backwardness cannot be applied to
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, who indubitably fall within the c
expression 'backward class of citizens". The accent in Article 16(4) ap-
pears to be on social backwardness. Of course, social, educational and
economic backwardness are closely inter-twined in the Indian context. The
cla.-es contemplated by Article 16(4) may be wider than those con-
templated by Article 15(4). [651-G, H; 652-A] D
45. The Government of India is directed to specify the basis of
exclusion - whether on the basis of income, extent of holding or otherwise
- of 'creamy layer'. This shall be done as early as possible, but not
exceeding four 111onths. On such specification persons falling within the
net of exclusionary rule shall cease to be the members of the. Other E
Backward Classes (covered by the expression 'backward class of citizens')
for the purpose of Article 16(4). [649-D]

46. The impngned Office Memorandum dated 13th August. 1990 and
25th September, 1991 shall be implemented subject only to such specifica-
tion and exclusion of socially advanced persons from the backward classes F
contemplated by the said O.M. In other words, after the expiry of four
A•
months from today, the implementation of the said O.M. shall be subject
to the exclusion of the creamy layer' in accordance with the criteria to be
specified by the Government of India and not otherwise. [649-E, F]
G
47. There is no constitutional or legal bar to a State categorising the
backward classes as backward and more backward. Th•s is not saying that
it ought to be done. [655-B]

48. Just as every power must be exercised reasonably and fairly, the
power conferred by clause (4) of Article 16 should also be exercised in a H
492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A fair manner and within reasonable limits - and what is more reasonable
than to say that reservation under clause (4) shall not exceed 50% of the
appointments or posts, barring certain extra-ordinary situations. From
this point of view, the 27% reservation provided by the impugned
Memorandum in favour of backward classes is well within the reasonable
limits. Together with reservation in favour of Scheduled Castes and
B Scheduled Tribes, it comes to a total of 49.5%. [659-B-D]

49. The provision under Article 16(4) - conceived in the interest of
certain sections of society - should be balanced against the gnarantee of
equality enshrined in clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out
C to every citizeu and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr.
Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being 'confined to a minority
of seats'. [659-F]

SO. While 50% shall be all rule, it is necessary not to put out of
consideration certain extra-ordinary situations inherent in the great diver-
D sity of this country and the people. It might happen that in fartlung and
remote areas the population inhabiting those areas might, on account of
their being out of the main stream of national life and in view of conditions
peculiar to and cbaracteristical to them, need to be treated in a different way,
some relaxation in this strict rule may become imperative. In doing so,
E extreme caution is to be exercised and a special case made out. [660-B]

Devadasan, [1964] 4 S.C.R. 680; Thomas, [1976] 1 SCR 906; Vasanl
Kumar, [1985] Sppl. 1 S.C.R. 352; Ba/aji, [1963] Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 439 and
Karamchari Sangh, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 185, referred to.

F 51. All reservations are not of the same nature. There are two types
of reservations, which may, for the sake of convenience, be referred to as
'vertical resen-ations' and 'horizontal reservations', The resenrations in
favour of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other backward classes
[under Article 16(4)] may be called vertical reservations whereas reserva-
G !ions in favour of physically handicapped [under clause (1) of Article 16]
can be referred to as horizontal reservations. Horizontal reservations cut
across the vertical resen-ations - what is called interlocking reservations.
To be more precise, suppose 3% of the vacancies are reserved in favour of
physically handicapped persons; this would be a reservation relatable to
clause (1) of Article 16. The persons selected against this quota will be
H placed in the appropriate category; if he belongs to S.C. category be will
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 493

be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustment; similarly, if he A
belongs to open competition (0.C.) category, he will be placed in that
category by making necessary adjustments. Even after providing for these
horizontal reservations, the percentage of reservations in favour of back-
ward class of citizens remains - and should remain - the same. This is how
these reservations are worked out in several States and there is no reason
not to continuo that procedure. [660-E-HJ B
52. It Is made clear that the rule of 50% shall be applicable only to
reservations proper; they shall not be - indeed cannot be - applicable to
exemptions, concessions or relaxations, if any, provided to 'backward
class of citizens' under Article 16(4). [661-AJ
c
53. It must be remembered that the equality of orportunity guaran-
teed by clause (1) is to each individual citizen of the country while clause
(4) contemplates special provision being made in favour of socially disad-
vantaged classes. Both must be balanced against each other. Neither
should be allowed to eclipse the other. For the purpose of applying the D
rule of 50% an year should be taken as the unit and not the entire strength
of the cadre, service or the unit, as the case may be. [663C, DJ

Balaji, [1963J Supp. 1 S.C.R. 439; Karamchari Sangh, [1981] 2 S.C.R.
185 and Thomas, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 906, referred to.
E
Devadasan, [1964] 4 S.C.R. 680 - Partly approved (Note so far as it
strikes down the rule providing for carry forward of unfilled reserved
vacancies, held not sustainable.)

54. Reservation in the case of promotion is normally provided only
where the promotion is by selection i.e., on the basis of merit. For, if the F
promotion is on the basis of seniority, such a rule may not be called for;
in such a case the position obtaining in the lower category gets reflected
in the higher category (promotion category) also. Where, however, promo-
tion is based on merit, it may happen that members of backward classes
may not get selected in the same proportion as is obtaining in the lower G
category. With a view to ensure similar representation in the higher
category also, reservation is thought of even in the matter of promotion
based on selection. This is, ~r course, in addition to the provision for
reservation at the entry (direct recruitment) level. [667H; 668-A, BJ

SS. At the initial stage of recruitment resen-ation can be made in H
194 SUPRJ,ME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A favuur of backward class of citizens but once they enter the service,
efficiellcy of administration demands that these members too compete
nith others and earn promotion like all others; no further distinctiun can
be made thereafter with reference to their "birth-mark". They are expected
to operate on equal footing "ith others. Cnitches cannot be provided
throughout one's career. That would not be in the interest of the nation.
B It is wrong to think that by holding so, the Court is confining the back·
ward class of citizens to the lowest cadres. It is well-known that direct
recruitment takes place at several higher levels of administration and not
merely at the level of Class IV and Class III. [672-D-F)

Rangachari, [1962) 2 S.C.R. 586; Hiralal. [1971) ~ S.C.R. 267; Karam-
c chaii Sangh, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 185 and Jagannathan, [1986) 2 S.C.R. 17,
referred to.

56. While it is certainly just to say that a handicap should be given to
back\lard class of citizens at the stage of initial appointment, it would be a
D serious and unacceptable inroad into the nile of equality of opportunity to
say that ouch a handicap should be provided at every stage of promotion
throughout their career. That would mean creation of a permanent separate
category apart from the mainstream· a vertical division of the administra-
tive apparatus. The members of resen-ed categories need not have to com-
pete "1th others but only among themselves. There would be no "111 to work,
E compete and excel among them. Whether they work or not, they tend to think,
their promotion is assured. This in turn is bound to generate a feelinr_ of
despondence and 'heart·burning' among open competition members. All
this is bound to effect the efficiency of administration. [672-A-C)

57. Putting the members of back\larcl classes on a fast track would
F necessarily result in leap-frogging and the deleterious effects of 'leap-
frogging' need no illustration. [672-D)

58. To the extent, the majority opinion in Rangachari holds, that
Article 16( 4) permits reservation even in the matter of promotion, is not
G sustainable in principle and ought to be departed from. [673-A]

59. Decision on this question shall operate only prospectively and shall
not affect promotions already made, whether on temporary, officiating or
regular/permanent basis. [tis further directed that wherever reservations
are already provided in the matter of promotion - be it Central Services or
H State Sen·ices, or for that matter services under any corporation, authority
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 495

or body falling under the definition of 'State' in Article 12 - such reserva- A
tions shall continue in operation for a period of five years from this day.
Within this period, it wo~ld be open to the appropriate authorities to revise
modify or re-issue the relevant Rules to ensure the achievement of the
objective of Article 16(4). If any authority thinks that for ensuring adequate
representation of backward class of citizens in any service, class or category,
it is necessary to provide for direct recruitment therein, it shall be open to it B
to do so. It shall be open to the Government to notify which classes among the
several desig!lated other backward classes are more backward for the pur-
poses of this clause and the apportionment of reserved vacancirs/pGsts
among 'backward' and 'more backward'. On such notification the clause will
become operational. [673-A-D; 680-H]
c
Rangachari, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 586 and Karamchari Sangh, [1981] 2
S.C.R. 185, referred to.

60. Clause (i) of the Office Memorandum dated 25th September,
1991 provides for a preference in favour of "poorer sections" of the back- D
ward classes over other members of the backward classes. The object of
the clause is to provide a preference in favour of more backward among
the "socially and educationally backward classes". In other words, the
expression, "poorer sections" was meant to refer to those who are socially
and economically more backward. The use of the word 'poorer', in the
context, is meant only as a measure of social backwardness. Understood E
in this sense, the said classification is not and cannot be termed as invalid
either constitutionally speaking or in law. [680-A-D]

61. There are certain services and positions where either on account
of the nature of duties attached to them or the level (in the hierarchy) at
which they obtain, merit alone counts. In such situations, it may not be F
'. advisable to provide for reservations. [677-F, G]

62. It may not be permissible to debar a citizen from being cosidered
for appointment to an office under the State solely on the basis of his income
or property-holding. Since the employment under the State is really con- G
ceiverl to service the people no such bar can be created. Any such bar would
be inconsistent with the guarantee of equal opportunity held out by clause (l)
of Article 16. On this ground alone, the said clause in the Office Memoran-
dum dated 25.5.1991 fails and is accordingly declared as such. [681-D, E]

63. The Government of India has adopted the State lists obtained as H
496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
.·
A on 13th August, 1990 for its own purposes but that does not mean that
those lists are meant to "be sacrosanct and unalterable. There may be cases
where commissions appointed by the State Government may have, in their
reports, recommended modification of such lists by deletion or addition
of certain castes, communities and classes. Wherever such cnmmission
reports are available, the State Government is bound to look into them
B and take action on that basis with reasonable promptitude. If the State
Government effects any modification or alteration by way of deletions or
additions, the same shall be intimated to the Government oLindia
forthwith which shall take appropriate action on that basis and make
necessary changes in its own list relating to that State. Further, it shall be
c equally open to, indeed the duty of, the Government of India - since it has
adopted the existing State lists - to look into the reports of such commis-
sion, if any, and pass its own orders, independent of any action by the
'
State Government, thereon with reasonable promptitude by way of
modification or alteration. It shall be open to the Government of India to
make such modification/alteration in the lists adopted by way of additions
D or deletions, as it thinks appropriate on the basis of the Reports of the
Commission(s). [689G, H; 690-A-C]

64. Appointment of a Commission under Article 340 is not necessary
to identify the other backward classes. Article 340 does not say so. [690-E]
E
65. The direction for constitution of a permanent Commission to
examine complaints of over-inclusion or under-inclusion obviates the need
of any such scrutiny by this Court. Constitution of such Commission both ·.
at Central and State level is directed. Persons aggrieved can always
approach them f~r appropriate redress. Such Commission, which will
F have the power to receive evidence and enquire into disputed questions of
fact, can more appropriately decide such complaints than this Court
under Article 32. [691-D, E]

66. The Government of India, each of the State Governments and the
G Administrations of Union Territories are directed to constitute a permanent
body within four months for entertaining, examining and recommending
upon requests for inclusion and complaints of over-inclusion and under-in-
clusion in the lists of other backward classes of citizens. The advice tendered
by such body shall ordinarily be binding upon the Government. [698-F, GI

H 67. Within four months, the Government of India is directed to
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.I. 497

specify the basis, applying the relevant and requisite socio-economic A
criteria to exclude socially advanced persons/sections ('Creamy layeI-')
from 'other Backward Classes'. The implementation of the bnpugned
O.M. dated 13th September, 1990 shall be subject to. exclusion of such
socially advanced persons ('Creamy layer'). This direction shall not how-
ever apply to States where the reservations in favour of backward classes
are already in operation; they can continue to operate them. Such States
B
shall however evolve the said criteria within six months and apply the
same to exclude the socially advanced persons/sections from the desig-
nated 'Other Backward Classes'. [698-H; 699-A, Bl

68. The Office Memorandum dated August 13, 1990 is held valid and C
enforceable subject to the exclusion of the socially advanced members/sec-
tions from the notified 'Other Backward Classes'. [699-E]

69. To make Clause (i) of the Office Memorandum date.-September
ZS, 1991 valid, it is to be read, interpreted and understood as intending a
distinction between backward and more backward classes on the basis of D
degrees of social backwardness and a rational and equitable distribution
of the benefits of the reservations amongst them. [699-F]

70. Clause (ii) of the Office Memorandum dated September ZS, 1991
is held invalid and inoperative. [699-G] E

Per S. Ratnavel Pandian, J.

1. The founding fathers of the Constitution have designedly couched
Articles 14, 15 and 16 in comprehensive phraseology so that the frail and
emaciated section of the people living in poverty, rearing in obscurity, F
possessing no wealth or inRuence, having no education, much less higher
education and suffering from social repression and oppression should not
be denied of equality before the law and equal protection of the laws and
equal opportunity in the matters of public employment or subjected to any
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or G
place of birth. [700-F, G]

Z. The expression deployed in both the OMS, "Socially and Educa-
tionally Backward Classes" is on the strength of the Report of the Com-
mission, though no such expression is used in Article 16(4) whereunder
the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class H
498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A of citizens is to be made. This expression is used as an explanatory one to
the words 'backward class' occurring in Article 16(4). [713-E, F]

3. The object of the newly introduced clause (4) to Article 15 was to
·bring Articles 15 and 29 in line with Article 16( 4), 46 and 340 and to make :
it constitutionally valid for the State to reserve se•ts for backward class
B of citizens, scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in the public education-
al institutions as well as to make other special provisions as may be
necessary for their advancement. (715-D)

Smt. Champakam Dorairajan & Anr. v. State of Madras, A.l.R. 1951
C Madras 120; State of Madras v. Smt. Champakam Dorairajan, [1951)
S.C.R. 525 and State of Uttar Pradesh v. Pradeep Tandan & Ors., [1975) 2
S.C.R. 761 at 766, referred to.

4. The Goveniment both in the earlier O.M. and the subsequent
amended O.M. has used the expression 'socially and educationally backward
D classes' thereby qualifying the word 'backward' as 'socially and educational-
ly backward' though in the second amended O.M., the 'economic
backwardness' is alone taken as a ground for providing reservation for the
economically backward section of the people not covered by the same reser·
vation meant for'socially and educationally backward classes'. [718-G, HJ

E 5. The words 'backward class' in Article 16(4) are used with a wider
connotation and without any qualification or explanation. Therefore, it must
be construed in the wider perspective. Though the O.Ms. speak of social and
edncational backwardness of a class, the primary consideration in identify.
leg a class and ia ascertaining the inadequate representation of that class in
the services under the State under Article 16(4) is the social backwardness
which results in educational backwardness, both of which culminate in
economic backwardness. The degree of importance to be attached to social
backwardness is much more than the importance to be given to ibe educa-
tional backwardness and the economic backwardness, because in identifying
aod classifying a section of people a5 a backward class within the meaning of
G Article 16(4) for the reservation of appointments or posts, the 'social
backwardness' plays a predominant role. [738-H; 739-A)

Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume Vil, pages 700-703, nferred to.

M.R. Balaji v..ShJte of Mysore, [1963] Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 439 and
H Vasanth &mar, [1935] Supp. s.c.R. 352, referred to.
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.OJ. 499

6. The word 'backward' is very wide bringing within its fold the A
social backwardness, educational backwardness, economic backwardness,
political backwardness and even physical backwardness. [718-H; 719-A]

7. A group of persons having common traits or attributes coupled
with retarded social, material (economic) and intellectual (educational)
development in the sense not having so much of intellect and ability will
B
fall within the ambit of 'any backward class of citizens' under Article 16(4)
of the Constitution. [723-D}

8. Articles 15(4), 16(4) and 340(1) do not speak of 'caste' but only
'class'. [724-C] C

9. The word 'caste' is not used in the Constitution as Indicative of
any section of people or community except in relation to 'Scheduled
Castes' which is defined in Article 366(24). However, the word 'caste' in
Articles 15(2), 16(2) and 29(2) does not include 'scheduled caste' but It D
refers to a caste within the ordinary meaning of caste. The word
'scheduled caste' came into being only by the notification of the .President
under Article 341. (724-F]

Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. II; Webster Comprehensive Dictionary
(International Exition); Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of E
the English Language; Corpus Juris Secundum (14); Black Law Dictionary
(Sixth Edition), Centnnial Edition (1891-1991), Encyclopedia American
(5), referred to.

Chitralekha & Anr. v. State of Mysore & Ors., [1964] 6 S.C.R. 368 at F
388; Triloki Nath v. J & K State, [1969] l S.C.R. 103 at 105; KC. Vasanth
Kumar v. Kamataka, [1985] Suppl. l S.C.R. 352; State of Kera/a & Ors. v.
N.M. Thomas & Ors., (1976] l S.C.R. 906 at 996; Akhil bhartiya Soshit
Karamchari Sangh v. Union of India & Ors., (1981] 2 S.C.R. 185 at 234;
M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore, [1963] Suppl. l S.C.R. 439; Minor P. G
Rajendran v. State of Madras & Ors., [1968] 2 S.C.R. 786 at 790; State of
Andhra Pradesh v. P. Sagar, [1968] 3 S.C.R. 59; A. Peeria Karuppan, etc. v.
State of Tamil Nadu, [1971] 2 S.C.R. 430 at 443; State of Andhra Pradesh
& Ors. v. U.S. V. Ba/ram etc., [1972] 3 S.C.R. 247; Kumari K.S. Jayasree &
Anr. v. The State of Kera/a & Anr., [1977] 1 S.C.R. 194 and UP. State v.
Pradip Tandon & Ors., [1975] 2 S.C.R.,761 at 766, referred to. H
5011 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Rise & Awakening of Depressed Classes in India: by Sh. J. R. Kamble,
referred to.

10.01. Caste neither can be the sole criterion nor can it be equated
with 'class' for the pupose of Article 16(4) for ascertaining the social and
educational backwardness of any section or group of people so as to bring
B them within the wider connotation of'backwart! class'. Never the less caste
in Hindu society becomes a dominant factor or primary criterion in
determining the backwardness of a class of citizens. Unless 'caste' satisfies
the primary test of social backwardness as well as the educational and
economic backwardness which are the established and accepted criteria to
c identify the 'backward class', a caste per se without satisfying the agreed
formula generally cannot fall within the meaning of 'backward class of
citizens' under Article 16(4), save in given exceptional circumstances such
as the caste itself being identifiable with the traditional occupation of the
lower strata indicating the social backwardness. [728-D-F)

D 10.02. Though the caste system is unknown to other communities
such as Muslisms, Christians, Sikhs, Jews, Parsis, Jains etc. in whose
respective religion, the caste system is not recognised and permitted, in
practice, it cannot be irrefutably asserted that Islam, Christanity, Sikhism
are all completely immune from casteism. [728-H; 729-A)
E
II. The basic policy of reservation is to off-set the inequality and
remove the manifest imbalance, the victims of which for bygone genera·
tions lag far behind and demand equality by special preferences and their
strategies. Therefore, a comprehensive me!hodological approach encom-
passing jurisprudential, comparative, historical and anthropological con·
F ditions is necessary. Such considerations raise controversial issues
transcending the routine legal exercise because certain social groups who
are inherently unequal and who have fallen victims of societal discrimina-
tion require compensatory treatment. Needless to emphasise that equality
in fact or substantive equality involves the necessity of beneficial treat·
G ment in order to attain the result which establishes an equilibrium be-
tween two sections placed unequally. [799-B, CJ

The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, Vol. V page 29; New
Testament; Sura IO Verse No. 44 of Holy Quran, referred to.
~

H Kesavananada Bharati v. Kera/a [1973) Suppl. I S.C.R., referred to.

••
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.I. 501

12. A programme of reservation may sacrifice merit but does not in A
any way sacrifice competence because the beneficiaries under Article 16(4)
have to possess the requisite basic qualifications and eligibility and have
to compete among themselves though not with the mainstream candidates.
[751'8]
B
13. The analytical study of American cases shows that the American-
style justification of positive discrimination is on the gound of utility
whereas the Indian-style justification is on the ground of constitutional
rights. [753-F]

Bakke, Defimis & Minority Administrations (The Quest for Equal C
Opportunity) By Allan P. Sindler, referred to.

Regents of the University of California v. Allan Bakke, 51 L.Ed. 2d 750;
Defunis. v. Charles Odeganrd, (1974) 40 L.Ed. 2nd 164, referred to.

14. Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Article 16(1) and D
(2) but it is an enabling provision and permissive in character overriding
Article 16(1) and (2); that it is a source of reservation for appointments
or posts in the Services so far as the backward class of citizens is con-
cerned and that under clause (1) of Article 16 reservation for appoint-
ments or posts can be n1ade to other sections of the society such as E
physically handicapped etc. [754-E]

Punjab Province v. Dau/at Singh & Ors., 1942 FCR 67 at 87 and 88;
Orient Paper & Industries Ltd. v. State of Orissa, A.1.R. 1991 S.C. 672 at 677
and 678; In re; Hatschek's Patents, 1909 Chancery Division Vol. II 68 at 82
and 85; Hari Vishnu Karnath v. Syed Ahmed Ishaque & Ors., [1955] 1 S.C.R. F
1104 at 1121 and Triloki Nath's Case, General Manager, Southern Railways
v. Rangachari, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 586, referred to.

15. Article 16(4) itself does not limit the power of the Government in
making the reservation to any maximum percentage; but it depends upon G
the quantum of adequate representation required in the Services. [759-D]

B. Venkataramana v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 229; Balaji's
Case, [1963] Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 439; Comptroller & Auditor General v. Mohan
Lal Mehrotra,, [1992] 1 S.C.C. 20; State of Punjab v. Hiralal & Ors., [1971)
3 S.C.R. 267; Mangat Singh v. Punjab State Police, A.I.R. 1968 Punjab 306; H
502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS \1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Chief Controlling Revenue Authority v. Maharashtra Sugar Mills Ltd., [1950)
S.C.R. 536; Official Liquidator v. Dharti Dhan; Delhi Administration v. l.K
Nangia, [1980) 1 S.C.R. 1016; Jagannathan 's Case; Dr. N.B. Khare v. The
State of Delhi, [1950) S.C.R. 519; Govindji v. Municipal Corporation, Ah·
medabad, 1957 Bom.147; Virendra v. The State of Punjab & Anr., [1958)
B 's.C.R. 308; The Barium Chemicals Ltd. & Anr. v. The Company Law Board
& Ors., [1%6] Suppl. S.C.R. 311; Rohtas Industries v. S.D. Agarwal & Ors.,
[1969) 1 S.C.C. 325; Mohan Kumar Singhania v. Union of India, [1992)
Suppl. 1 S.C.C. 594; Hindustan Zinc v. A.P. State Electricity Board, [1991)
3 S.C.C. 299; Sitaram Sugars v. Union of India & Ors., [1990) 3 S.C.C. 223;
D.C.M. v. S. Paramjit Singh, [1990) 4 S.C.C. 723; Minerva Talkies v. State
C of Kamataka & Ors., [1988) Suppl S.C.C. 176; State of Kamataka v. Ran-
ganath Reddy, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 641; Kera/a State Electricity Board v. S.N.
Govind Prabhu, [1986] 4 S.C.C.: Prag Ice Company v. Union of India &
Ors., [1978) 2 S.C.C. 459; Saraswati Industries Syndicate Ltd., v. Union of
India, (1975) l S.C.R. 956; Murti Match Works v.Assistanl Collector, Central
D Excise & Ors., [1974] 3 S.C.R. 121: l. Govindraja Muda/iar v. State of Tamil
Nadu & Ors., [1973] 3 S.C.R. 222 and Narendru Kumar v. Union of India &
Ors., [1%9) 2 S.C.R. 375, referred to.

H.W.R. Wade Administrative Law V. Edu. Pages 228 and 229,
Halsbury's Laws of England IV Edu. Vol. 1 Paras 27, 29 pages 34. 35,
E referred to.

16. The O.M. has specifically used the expression, 'poorer sections'
but not 'weaker sections' as contemplated under Article 46 of the Constitu·
lion. Though the expressions 'poorer sections' and 'weaker sections' may
F connote in general, 'the disadvantaged position of a section of the people
they do not convey one and the same meaning and they are not
synonymous. When the O.M. deliberately uses the expression 'poorer
sections', it has become incumbent to examine what that expression means
and whether there can be any sub-classification as 'poorer' and 'non~
poorer' among the same category of potential backward class of citizens
G on the anvil of economic criterion. [762-B, Cl

17. The O.M. firstly considers all the identified SEBCs in general as
belonging to 'poor sections' from and out of which the 'poorer sections'
are to be culled out by applying a test to be yet formulated by the
H Government evidently on economic criterion or by application of poverty
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.l. 503

test based on the ceiling of income. ~fter the segregation of 'poorer A
sections' of the SEBCs, the left out would be the 'poor sections'. By the use
of the word 'poorer', the Government is super~impoSing a relative poverty
test for identifying and determining a preferential class among the iden-
tified SEBCs. [762-E, Fl

18. When the 'means test' is analysed in depth so as to explore its B
merits and demerits, one would come to an inevitable conclusion that it is not
a decisive test but on the other hand it will serve as a protective umbrealla for
many io get into this segregated section by adopting all kinds of illegal and
unethical methods. Further, this will be totally unworkable and imprac-
ticable in the determination of 'getting somebody in and getting somebody C
out' from among the same identified SEBCs. [765·8-D]

19. It will be futile exercise for the courts to find out the reasons in
support of the division between and among the group of SEBCs and make
rule therefor, for multiple reasons. [765-D]
D
20. The O.M. does not speak of any 'creamy layer test'. It cannot be
said by any strech of imagination that the Government was not aware of
some few individuals having become both socially and educationally above
the general average and entered in the All India Services or any other Civil
Services. Despite the above fact, the Government has accepted the listed
groups of SEBCs as annexed to the Report and it has not thought it E
prudent to eliminate those individuals. Therefore, in such circumstances
it is doubted whether the judicial supremacy can work in the broad area
of social policy or in the great vortex of ideological and philosophical
decisions directing the exclusion of any section of the people from the
accepted list of OBCs on the mere ground that they are all 'creamy layers' F
which expression is to be tesied with reference to various factors or make
suggestions for exclusion of any section of the people who are otherwise
entitled for the benefit of reservation in the decision of the Government so
long that decision does not suffer from any constitutional infirmity.
[773-E-HJ G
21. When this Court is not called upon to lay a test or give any guideline
as to who are all to be eliminated from the listed groups of the Report, there
is no necessity to lay any test much less 'creamy layer test'. There is no grey
area to be clarified and consequently it has to be held that what one is notfree
to do directly cannot do it indirectly by adopting any means. Therefore, the H.
504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A argument of'creamy layer' pales into insignificance. (775-D)

22. All SEBCs brought in the lists of the Commission which have been
accepted and approved by the Government should be given equal oppor-
tunity in availing the benefits of the 27 per cent reservations. In other words,
the entire 27% of the vacancies in civil posts and services under the Govern-
B ment of India shall be reserved and extended to all the SEBCs. [775-E)

23. The'poorer sections' of the SEBCs may be provided with various
kind of concessions and f~cilities such as educational concessions, special
coaching facilities, financial assistance~ relaxation of upper age limit,
increase of' number of attempts etc. for government services with a view to
c give them equal opportunity to compete and keep pace with the advanced
sections of the people. [776·C)

It is for the first time that controversial issue as regards ihe equality
of opportunity in matters of public .~mployment as contemplated under
D Article 16(4) have come up for deliberation before a nine-Judge Bench, on
being referred to by a five-Judges Bench. (705-C, D)

There are various Constitutional provisions such as Articles 14, 15,
16, 17, 38, 46, 332, 335, 338 and 340 which are designed to redress the
centuries old grievances of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes as
E
well as the backward classes and which have co1ne for judicial interpreta-
tion on and oft'. It is not merely a part of the Constitution but also a
national commitment. (705-D, E]

This Court which sta[\ds as a sentinel on the quie vie over the rights
F of people of this country has to interpret the Constitution in its true spirit
with insight into social values and suppleness of the adoption to the
changing social needs upholding the basic structure of the Constitution
for securing social justice, economic justice and political justice as well as
equality of status and quality of opportunity. [705-F)

G The very blood and soul of our Constitutional scheme are to achieve
the objectives of our Constitution as contained in the preamble which is
part of our Constitution. So it is incumbent to lift the veil and see the
notable aspirations of the Constitution. [705-G]

H Kcsvananda Bharti v. Kera/a, [1973) Suppl. SCR I, referred to.
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 505

No one can be permitted to invoke the Constitution either as a A
sword for an offence or as a shield for anticipatory defence, in the sense
that no one under the guise of interpreting the Constitution can cause
irrevertible injustice and irredeemable inequalities to any section of the
people or can protect those unethically claiming unquestionable dynastic
monoply over the Constitution benefits. (705-H; 706-A]
B
Per Dr. T.K Thommen, J.

1. Reservation is one of the measures adopted by the Constitution to
remedy the continuing eVil effects of prior inequities stemming from.dis-
criminatory practices against various classes of people which have resulted C
in their social, educationa.l and economic backwardness. (786-B, CJ

2. Reservation is meant to be addressed to the present social, educa-
tional and economic backwardness caused by purposeful societal dis-
crimination. To attack the continuing ill effects and perpetuation of such
injustice, the Constitution permits and empowers the State to adopt D
corrective devices even when they have discriminatory and exclusionary
effects. Any such measure, insofar as one group is preferred to the ex-
clusion of another, must necessarily be narrowly tailored to the achieve-
ment of the fundamental constitutional goal. (786-C; D]

. 3. Benign classification for affirmative action by resenation must E
stay strictly within the narrow bounds of remedial actions. Any such
programme must be consistent with the fundamental objective of equality.
Reservation is a remedy or a cure for the ill effects of historical dis-
crimination. (786-E, H; 787-A]
F
4. Reservation is not an end in itself. It is a means to achiev~
equality. The policy of reservation adopted to achieve that end must,
therefore, be consistent with the objective in view. Every reservation
founded on benign discrimination, and justifiably adopted to achieve the
constitutional mandate of equality, must necessarily be a transient pas-
sage to that end. It is temporary in concept, limited in duration, condition- G
al in application and specific in object. Reservation must contain within
itself the seeds of its termination. Any attempt to perpetuate reservation
and upset the constitutional mandate of equality is destructive of liberty
and fraternity and all the basic values enshrined in the Constitution. A
balance has to be maintained between the competing values and the rival H
5Q6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A claims and interests so as to achieve equality and freedom for all.
(787-D-F]

5. The makers of the Constitution were fully conscious of the unfor-
tunate position of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. To
them equality, liberty and fraternity are but a dream; an idea guaranteed
B
by the law, but far too distant to reach; far too illusory to touch. These
backward people and others in like positions of helplessness are the
favoured children of the Constitution. It is for them that ameliorative and
remedial measures are adopted to achieve the end of equality. To permit
those who are not intended to he so specially protected to compete for
C reservation is to dilute the protection and defeat the very constitutional
aim. !787-G, H; 788-A]

6. Reservation must one day become unnecessary and a relic of an
unfortunate past. Every such action must be a transient self-liquidating
D programme. That is the hope and dream cherished by the Constitution
Makers and that is the end to which the State has to address itself in
making special provisfons for the chosen classes of people for special
constitutional protection. [788-C, DJ

ConslituentAssembly Debates, Vol. 7 pp. 701·70.2 (1948-49), referred to.
E
Regents of the University of Califomia v. Allan Bakke, 438 U.S.
265=57 L. Ed. 2d 750: H. Earl Fullilove v. Philip M. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
44R = 65 LEO 2d 902; Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications
Commission, 58 l.W. 5053 (Decided on 27.6.1990); Oliver Broin v. Board of
Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 4113 = 98 L.Ed. 2d 873; City of Richmond v.
F JA. Croson Co., 48R U.S. 469 and Wendy Wygant v. Jackso11 Board of
Education, 476 U.S. 267 = 90 L.Ed. 2nd 260, referred to.

7. The Constitution seeks to secure to all its citizens Justice, Liberty,
Eqnality and Fraternity. These are the basic pillars on which the grand
G concept of India as a Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic Republic
rest•. This splendour that is India rests on these magnificent concepts,
each of which, supportuing the other, upholds the dignity and freodom of
the individual and secures the inte.,-ity and unity of the nation. [788-G]

Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain, [1976) 2 S.C.R. 347,
H 659; Minerva Mills Ltd. & Or.<. v. Union of India & Or.<., [1981) 1 S.C.R. 206,
lNDRA SAWJJNEY v. U.0.1. 507

241; Waman Rao & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [1981] 2 S.C.R. 1, 19; The A
General Manager, Southern Railway v. Rangachari, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 586, 597;
State of Kera/a & Anr. v. N.M. Thomas & Ors.,· [1976] 1 S.C.R. 906, 956,
referred to.

8. The Constitution permits valid classification founded on an
intelligible differentia distinguishing persons or things grouped together B
from others left out. of the group. And such differentia must have a
rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the law. [789-B)

State of Kera/a &Anr. v. N.M. Thomas & Ors., [1976) I S.C.R. 906;Shri
Ramkrisltna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar & Ors; [1959] S.C.R. 279;
South West Africa Cases (Second Phase). ICJ Rep. p. 6, 305-6, referred to. c
9. While Article 1.4 prohibits the State from denying equality to any
person, Articles 15 and 16 are specially concerned with citizens. [790-B)

10. Backward class is composed of persons whose backwardness is D
in degree and nature comparable to that of the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes, whatever be their religion. There can be no doubt abont
the identity of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. Nor can
there be any doubt about the identity of backward classes other than the
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, if this identifying charac-
teristic, bearing the stamp of prior discrimination and its continuing ill E
effects, is borne in mind. [793-E, F)

State of A.P. & Anr. v. P. Sagar, [1968} 3 S.C.R. 595, 600: M.R.Balaji
& Ors. v. State of Mysore, [1963] Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 439, 458; State of U.P. v.
Pradip Tandon & Ors., [1975) 2 S.C.R. 761, 766 and Janki Prasad Parimoo
& Ors. v. State of J.& K & Ors ... [1973) 3 S.C.R. 236, 25Z, referred to. F

11. In identifying backwardness, caste, religion, residence etc. are of
course relevant factors, but none of them is a dominant or much less an
indispensahle factor. What is of ultimate relevance is I.he social and
educational backwardness of a class of citizens, whutever be their caste, G
religion, etc. [795-F]

12. Identification of the backward classes for the purpose of reser-
vation must be with reference to their social and educational backward-
ness resulting from the continuing ill effects of prior discrimination or
exploitation; and not solely with reference to any one or 1nore of the H
508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A prohibited criteria mentioned in Article 15(1) or Article 16(2), although
any one or more of such criteria may have been the ultimate cause of such
discrimination or exploitation and the resultant poverty and backward-
ness. [795-G, HJ

M.R. Balaji & Ors. v. State of Mysore, [1963J Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 439 at
B 458; Kumari K.S. Jayasree & Anr. v. State of Kera/a & Anr., [1977J 1 S.C.R.
194, 198; Janki Prasad Parimoo & Ors. v.State of Jammu & Kashmir& Ors.
[1973J 3 S.C.R. 236, 252; State of U.P. v. Pradip Tandon & Ors., [1975J 2
S.C.R. 761, 766; State of Kera/a & Anr. v. N.M. Thomas & Ors., [1976J 1
S.C.R. 906, 997; State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. v. P. Sagar, [1968J 3 S.C.R.
C 595, 600; K.C. Vasanth Kumar & Anr. State of Kamataka, [1985] Suppl. 1
S.C.R. 352, 376; R. Chitralekha & Anr. v. State of Mysore & Ors., [1964J 6
· S.C.R. 368 at 388; Triloki Nath & Anr. v. State of J & K & Ors., [1969J 1
S.C.R. 103, 105; A. Peeriakaruppan, etc., v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors.,
[1971J 2 S.C.R. 430; State of A.P. & Ors. v. U.S. V. Bairam etc., [1972] 3
D S.C.R. 247, 280, 285; Akhil Bharaiiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway) v.
Union of India & Ors., [1981] 2 S.C.R. 185, referred to.

Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. 7 (1948-49), I'· 697, 702; Mannual
of Election Law, Vol. I (1991) p. 141, B. Shiva Rao: The Framing of India's
Constitution- A Study, (1968) pp. 198-199, referred to.
E
13. Historically, backwardness has been the curse of people most of
whom are characterised as the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.
These are not castes as such, but classes of people composed of castes, races
or tribes or tribal communities or parts or groups thereof and classified as
such by means of presidential notifications owing to their extreme backward-
F ness and other disadvantages vide Articles 341-342. [797-A, BJ

14. What is sought to be identified for the purpose of reservation is
not caste or religion, but poverty and backwardness caused by historical
discrimination and its continuing evil effects. Caste may be a guide in this
search, just as occupation or residence may be a guide, but what is sought
G to be identified is none but backwardness stemming from historical dis-
crimination. If caste is more often than not a guide in the search for
backwardness and if the lowest of the low castes has for historical reasons
become the indicium of backwardness of the kind attracting reservation,
caste in the absence of any better guide is a factor to be taken into account
H along with other factors such as poverty illiteracy, physical and mental
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 509

disabilities and other diseases caused by malnutrition, unhygienic condi· A
!ions and the like. [798-C, D]

15. The Constitution is neither caste-blind nor caste-prejudiced.nor
caste-overcharged, but fully alive to caste as one of the relevant criteria to be
reckoned in the process of identification of backward classes of citizens.
India is not a nation of castes but of people with roots· in divergent castes. B
What the Constitution seeks to identify is not the backward caste, but the
backward class of citizens who may in many cases be partly or in some cases
predominantly or even solely identified with particular castes. [799-B]

Minor P. Rajendran v. State of Madras & Ors., [1968] 2 S.C.R. 786,
referred to. C
16. Poverty by itself is not the test of backwardness for if it were so
most people in this country would be in a position to claim reservation.
[800-BJ
D
Janki Prasad Parimoo & Ors. v. State of J & K Ors., [1973] 3 S.C.R.
236, 285, referred to.

17. Reservation for all would be reservation for none, and that would
be an ideal condition if amueoce, and not poverty was its basis. But
unfortunately the vast majority of our people are not blessed by affiuence E
but affiicted by poverty. Poverty is a disgrace to any nation and the
resultant backwardness is a shame. But the Constitution envisages reser-
vation for those persons who are backward because of identified prior
victimisation and the consequential poverty. Poverty invariably results in
social and educational backwardness. [800-B-D]
F
M.R. Ba/aji & Ors. v. State of Mysore, [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 439 at
460 and Janki Prasad Parimoo & Ors. v. State of Jammu & Kashmir & Ors.,
[1973) 3 S.C.R. 236, 299, referred to.

18. Poverty reduces a man to a state of helplessness and ignorance. The G
poor have no social status. They have no access to learning. Over the years
they invariably become socially and educationally backward. They may have
no place in society and no education to improve their conditions. For them,
employment in services on the basis of merits is a far cry. All these persons,
along with other disadvantaged groups of citizens, are the favourites of the
law for affirmative action without recourse to reservation. [801-B·CJ H
510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A State of U.P. v. Pradip .Tandon & Ors., [1975] 2 S.C.R. 761; State of
Kera/a & Anr. v. N.M. Thomas & Qrs., [1976]_ 1 S.C.R. 906, 960, 997; Kumari
KS. Jayasree & Anr. v. State of Kera/a & Anr., 11977] 1S.C.R.194 and K.C.
Vasanth Kumar v. State of Kamataka, [1985] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 352, 399, 400,
referred to.

B 19. Article 16 deals with equality of opportunity lo matters of public
employement. The kind of backwardness which is required to aUra<:t the
special provisions protecting the backward classes or citizens under Ar-
ticle 16 in respect of public employment is identical to the social and
educational backwardness mentioned in Article 15(4). [801-E, FJ
c M.R. Ba/aji & Ors. v. State of Mysore, [1963) Supp. 1 S.C.R. 439, 473,
474; Janki Prasad Parimoo & Ors. v. State of J & K Ors., [1973] 3 S.C.R.
236; State of Kera/a & Anr. v. N.M. Thomas & Ors., [1976) 1 S.C.R. 906,
956; The General Manager, Southern Railway v. Rangachari, [19ti2] 2 S.C.R.
586, 599; State ofA.P. &Anr. v. P. Sagar, [1968) 3 S.C.R. S95;Akhi/ Bhartiya
D Soshit Kannachari Sangh (Railway) v. Union of India & Ors., [1981) 2
S.C.R. 185; Triloki Nath & Anr. v. State of J. & K & Ors., [1969) 1 S.C.R.
103, 104; C.A. Rajendran v. Union of India & Ors., [1968) 1 S.C.R. 721, 730,
733; State of Punjab v. Hirata/ & Ors., [1971] 3 S.C.R. 267, 272 and
T.Devadasan v. The Union of India & Anr., [1964] 4 S.C.R. 680, referred
E to.

Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. 7 (194849) p. 702, refer1'd to.

20. The twin conditions to warrant reservation under Article 16(4)
are: backwardness of the chosen classes of citizens and there inadequate
F representation in the public services. The backwardness of the classes of
I citizens mentioned in Article 16(4) is of the same degree and kind of social
and educational backwardness as postulated in Article 15(4). Article 16(4)
is meant for the protection of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled
Tribes and other comparably backward classes of citizens who are the
G unfortunate victims of continuing ill effects of identified prior discrimina·
tion. (802-F, GJ

21. Whether the conditions postulated for reservation are satisfied
or not is a matter on which the State has to form an opinion. But the
opinion of the State must be founded on reason. The satisfaction on the
JH basis of which an opinion has been formed by the State must be rationally
INDRA SAWHNEY v. LJ.0.1. 511

·supported by an objective consideration. 1'he State must take into account A
all relevant matters and eschew from its mind all irrelevant 1natters, and
1nake a proper assessment of the competing clain1s· of classes of citizens
and evaluate t.heir respective backwardnes·s before it conies to the con·
clusion that particular classes of citizens are so baCkl\·ard and so inade.
quately represented in the public services as to be worthy of special
protection by means or reservation. 'This must be an objective evaluation
B
of the competi-ng claims for reservation. Any such co-nclllsion must be
subject to periodic administrative review by a permanent body or experts
with a view to adjustment and readjustment ~r the State action in accord-
ance with the changing circumstances or the beneficiaries or such action.
'The conclusion thus periodically arrived at by such administrative review- C
ing body must necessarily pass the test of judicial review whenev.er chal-
lenged. [802-H; 803-A-C)

A. Peen'akamppan etc. v. Stale of Tamil Nadu & Ors., [1971) 2 S.C.R.
430; Shri Silaram Sugar Company Ltd. & Anr. elc. v. Union of India & Ors.,
[1990) 1 S.C.R. 909; Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Association v. D
Union of India & Anr., [1989) 4 S.C.C. 187, referred to.

22. Identification or backwardness is an ever continuing process or
inclusion and exclusion. Classes or citizens entitled to the constitutional
· protection or reservaton must be constantly and periodically identified for E
their inclusion and for the exclusion or those who do not qualify. To allow
the undeserved to benefit by reservation is to deny protection to those who
are meant to be protected. [803-G-H]

A. Peeriakamppan etc. v. Stale of Tamil Nadu & Ors., [1971] 2 S.C.R.
430 at 444, referred to. F

23. Any affirmative action must be supported by a valid classifica-
tion and must have a rational nexus with the object of redressing back-
wardness. It is much more so where such programmes totally exclude
from consideration persons outside the chosen classes without regard to G
merits because of the set aside quotas. [804-D]

State of Kera/a & Anr. v. N.M. Thomas & Ors., [1976) 1 S.C.R. 906,
956; Rangachari, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 586; M.R. Ba/aji, [1963) Supp. 1 S.C.R.
439 473; P. Sagar, [1968] 3 S.C.R. 595; Akhil Bhartia Soshit Karamchari
Sangh (Railway), [1981] 2 S.C.R. 185; Triloki Nafh, [1969] 1 S.C.R. 103; H
512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

I\ ,c.A. 11.iijendran, (1968) 1 S.C.R. 721; Hirata/, (1971) 3 S.C.R. 267 and T.
JJevatfaSan, [1964) 4 S.C.R. 680, referred to.

Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. 7 (1948-49), p. 702, referred to.
.,
24. Unlike Article 16(4), Article 15(4) is not so worded as to suggest
B that it is exclusionary in character. The 'special provision' contemplated
in Article 15(4) is an emphatic reference to the affirmative action which
the State may adopt to improve the conditions of the disadvantaged
members of the backward classes of citizens. Significantly, Article 15 (4)
does not specifically speak of reservation, but it bas been generally under-
C stood to include that power. [805-C, DJ

M.R. Ba/aji & Ors. v. State of Mysore, [1963) Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 439,
referred to.

25. The concept of equality is not inconistent with reservation in
D public services because the Constitution specially says so, but, in view of
Its exclusion of others irrespective of merits, it can be resorted to only
where warranted by compelling State interests postulated in Article 16.
The State must be satisfied that in order to achieve equality in given cases,
reservation is unavoidable by reason of the nature and degree of back-
wardness. neservation must be narrowly tailored to that end, and sub-
E jected to strict scrutiny. [805-F, G]

State of Kera/a & Anr. v. N.M. Thomas & Ors., (1976) 1 S.C.R. 906,
referred to. I
26. Reservation is intended to redress backwardness of a higher
F degree. Reservation prima facie is the very antithesis or a free and open
selection. It is a discriminatory exclusion of the disfavoured classes of
meritorious candidates. [807-C)

M.R. Ba/aji, (1963) Suppl. S.C.R. 439 and Jayasree, [1977) 1 S.C.R.
G 194, referred to.
27. The State has vital interest to uphold the efficiency of ad-
ministration. To ignore efficiency is to fail the nation. Any step taken by
the State in considering the claims of members of the Scheduled Castes
and the Scheduled Tribes for appointment to public services and posts
H must be consistent with the maintenance of efficiency of administration.
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 513

This principle, as stated in Article 335, must necessarily guide all affirm- A
ative action programmes for backward and other disadvantaged classes of
people in matters of appointment to public services and posts. Likewise,
efficieny being a compelling State interest, it must strictly guide affirm-
ative action in matters of admission to academic institutions, and more so
in specialised institutions of higher learning, for. in the final analysis
efficiency of public administration is governed by the quality of education
.B
and the skill of the scholars. To weaken efficiency is to injure the nation.
Any reservation made without due regard to the command of Article 335
is invidious and impermissible. (808-G, H; 809-A, BJ

17ie General Manager, Southern Railway v. Rangachari, (1962) 2 C
S.C.R. 586 and Akhil Bharliya Sos hit Karamchari Sangh (Railway), [1981)
2 S.C.R. 185, referred to.

28. To be overlooked at the time of promotion in favour of a person
who is junior in service and having no claim to superior merits is to cause
frustration and passionate prejudice, hostility and ill will not only in the D
mind of the overlooked candidates, but also in the minds of the generality
of employees. Any such discrimination is unfair and it causes dissatisfac-
tion, indiscipline and inefficiency. [809-G]

29. An appointment is necessarily to a post, but every appointment E
need not necessarily be to a post in a service. An appointment to an
ex-cadre post is as much an appointment to a post as it is in the case of
a cadre post. The words 'appointments or posts' used in the alternative,
and in respect of which reservation can be made, indicate that the ap-
pointment contemplated in Article 16(4) is not necessarily confined to
posts in the services, but can be made to any post whether or not borne F
on the cadre of a service. Inadequate representation of any backward class
of citizens enable the State to make provisions for the reservation of
'appointments or posts'. (8111-E, F)

17ie General Manager, Southern Railway v. Ranganchari, (1962) 2 G
S.C.R. 586, referred to.

30. The object of reservation is to maintain numerical and qualita-
tive or relative equality by ensuring sufficient representation for all clas·
ses of citizens. In whichever service a backward class of citizens is
inadequately represented, it is open to the State to create ·sufficient num- H
514 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A ber of posts for dired appointments. No matter whether the appointment
is made to a cadre post or an ex-cadre post, the State action is beyond
reproach so long as the Constitutional objective of numerical and qualita-
tive equality of opportunity is maintained by making direct appointments
at the appropriate levels whenever inadequate representation of any back-
ward class in the services is noticed by the State. [810-H; 811-A, BJ
B
31. Promotion by selection, though based on merits, is ultimately
governed by seniority, for the concerned rules generally provide that,
where merits are equal, officers will be ranked according to their seniority.
In the case of promotion by seniority subject to fitness, merits are not
C entirely disregarded, for even a senior officer can be overlooked in favour
of junior officer, if the former is found to be unfit for promotion. In all
promotions, whether by selection or otherwise, merits and seniority are
both significantly relevant and reservation of such posts in disregard of
these two elements will result in invidious discrimination. [811-E, F]

D 32. In whichever post that a member ofa backward class is appointed,
reservation provisions are attracted at the stage of his initial appointment
and not subsequently. Further promotions must be governed by common
rules applicable to all employees of the respective grades. [811-G)

The General Manager, Southern Railway v. Rangachari, [1962) 2
E S.C.R. 586; State of Punjab v. Hirata/ & Ors., [1971) 3 S.C.R. 267 andAkhi/
Bharatiya Soshit Kamiachari Sangh (Railway), [1981) 2 S.C.R. 185,
referred to. '•-

33, Reservation is the extreme limit to which the doctrine of affirm~

F
alive action can be extended. Beyond the strict confines of clause (4) of
Article 16, reservation in public employment has no warrant in the law for
it then becomes the very antithesis of equality. [812-D)
I
Thomas, [1976) 1 S.C.R. 906, referred to.

G 34. Reservation affords backward classes of citizens a golden oppor-
tunity to serve the nation and thus gain security, status, comparative
affiuence and inOuence in decision making process. But it is wrong to see
it as a mere weapon to capture power. [812-F)

Akhil Bharatiya Sos hit Karamchari Sangh (Railway), [1981) 2 S.C.R.
H 185 at 203, referred to.
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.l. 515

35. The sooner the need for reservation is brought to an end, the A
better it would be for the nation as a whole. The sooner all disabilities are
redressed and wiped out all traces of historical discrimination, and sloped
identifying classes of citizens by the stereotyped, stigmatised and ig-
nominious label of backwardness, the stronger, healthier and better
united we would have emerged as a nation founded on diverse customs,
practices, religions and languages but knitted together by innumerable
B
binding strands of common culture and tradition. [813-D]

3~. Reservation should be avoided except in extreme cases of acute
backwardness resulting from prior discrimination as in the case of the
scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes and other classes of persons in C
comparable postilions. Jn all other cases, preferential treatment short of
reservation can be adopted. Any such action, though in some respects
discriminatory, is permissible on the basis of a legitimate classification
rationally related to the attainment of equality in all its aspects. [814-E]

37. Affirmative action is not merely compensatory justice which it is, D
but it is also distributive justice seeking to ensure that community resour-
ces are more equitably and justily shared among all classes of citizens.
Furthermore, from the point of view of social utility, affirmative action
promotes maximum well-being for the society as a whole and strengthens
forces of national integration and general economic prosperity. Affirm- E
ative action must find justification in the removal of disadvantages and
not in their imposition. [815-C]

Tribe; American Constitutional Law, 2nd Edn. (1988) pp. 1521, 1554;
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Tenn's Affinnative Ac-
tion Cases, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 100 p. 78 (1986-87), Mare Galanter: F
Competing Equalities, (1984); Myrl L. Duncan: The Future of Affinriative
Action: A Jurispntdential/Legal Critique, Harvad Civil Rights Civil Liberties
Law Review, Vol. 17, 1982, p. 503; The Rights of Peoples, Edited by James
Crawford, Oxford (1988), referred to.
G
Per Ku/dip Singh, J.

1. Secularism is the basic feature of the Indian Constitution. It
envisages a cohesive, unified and casteless society. The Constitution has
completely obliterated the caste-system and has assured equality before
law. Reference to caste under Articles 15(2) and 16(2) is only to obliterate H
516 SUPREME COURT REPOR.TS [1992J SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A it. The prohibition on the ground of caste is total, the mandate is that
never again in this country caste shall raise its head. Even access to shops
on the ground of caste is prohibited. The progress of India has been from
casteism to egalitarianism, from feudalism to freedom. [827-F, GI

2. Caste and class are different etymologically. When you talk of
B caste you never mean class or the vice-versa. Caste is an ironwframe into
which people keep on falling by birth. [828-C]

Rg-Veda (The PurnshaSr<kta) - 10.90; Manava Dhanna Sastra (Law of
Manu); Professor Harold A. Gould: "The Hindu Caste System'; L.P. Shar-
ma: ''1ncient History of India"; Professor: Andre Beteille; "The Backward
c Classes in Contemporary India"; M. Weber: "The Religion of India", referred
to.

3. On a bare reading of the two sub-clauses of Article 16 it is obvious
that the Constitution forbids classification on the ground of caste. No
D backward class can, therefore, be identified on the basis of caste. [829-C]

R. Chitralekha & Anr. v. State of Mysore & Ors., [1964] 6 S.C.R. 368;
Triloki Nath & Anr. v. State of Jammu & Kashmir & Ors., [1969] 1 S.C.R.
103; State of U.P. v. Pradip Tandon & Ors., (1975] 2 S.C.R.'761 andKumari
KS. Jayasree & Anr. v. The State of Kera/a & Anr., [1977] 1 S.C.R. 194,
E referred to.

4. Secular feature of the Constitution is its basic structure. Hin-
duism, from which the caste-system flows is not the only religion in India.
Caste is an anathema to Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains.
Even Arya Samajis, Brahmo Samajis, Lingayats _and various other
F
denominations in this country do not believe in caste-system. (831-F]

5. 'Class' under Article 16(4) cannot be read as 'caste'. Castes
cannot' be adopted as collectivities for the purpose of identifying the
'backward class' under Article 16(4). [832-C]
G
M.R. Balaji & Ors. v. State of Mysore, [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 439,
referred to.

6. Occupation (plus income or otherwise) or any other secular
collectivity can be the basis for the identification of 'backward classes'.
H Caste-collectivity is unconstitutional and as such not permitted. (832-D]
INDRASAWHNEYv. U.0.1. 517

7. Articles 340 and 15(4) are part of the same Constitutional A
Scheme. Socially and educationally backward classes may be identified by
a commission appointed under Article 340 and the said commission ·after
investigation · may make recommendations, including the sanctioning of
grants, for the uplift of the backward classes. Article 15(4) makes it
possible to implement the recommendations of the commission and for
that purpose permits protective discrimination by the State. Since there is
B
identity of purpose between the two Articles the 'backward class' in the
context of these Articles has been defined identically. [834-E, F]

Janki Prasad and Parimoo & Ors. etc. etc. v. State of Jammu &
Kashmir, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 236 and M.R.Ba/aji & Ors. v. State of Mysore, c
[1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 439, referred to.

8. Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of Constitution in juxtaposition ·enacted
in consecutive years • use markedly different phraseology, well established
canons of interpretation dictate that such meanings should be assigned to
the words as are indicated by the difference in phraseology. Article 16(4) D
has different purpose than Article 15(4). The subject matter of Article
16(4) is the service under the State. [834-G, H; 835-A]

9. The expression 'backward' in the context of Article 16(4) is entire-
ly different than the expression 'socially and educationally backward class' E
in Article 15(41. [835-8]

10. Under Article 16(4) the backward class has to be culled out from
amongst the classes which are not adequately represented in the State
services. Any species of backwardness is relevant in the context of Article
16(4). By contrast, any special provision to be made under Article 15(4) • F
e.g. grants out of the publie exchequer · can only be made for 'socially and
educationally backward classes'. [835-B, CJ

11. Whal is to be identified under Artice 16(4) is not the "backward
class" but a •class of citizens' which is inadequately represented in the G
State-services. On the other hand it is the 'backward class' which is to be
identified under Article 15(4). When the two classes to be identified in the
t\l'o articles are different the question of giving them the same meaning
does not arise. [835-C]

12. The expression 'backward class of citizens' under Article 16(4) H
518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A does not mean the same thing as the expression 'any socially and educa-
tionally backward classes of citizens' in Article 15(4). The judgments of
this Court wherein it is assumed that the two expressions in Articles IS( 4)
and 16(4) mean the same thing do not lay down correct law and are
overruled to such extent. [837-B]

B Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. 7 (1948-49) p. 684 to 702, referred
to.

13. Article 16(4) was enacted with the sole purpose of giving repre-
sentation to the classes of citizen who are not adequately represented
therein. The sine qua non for pro,·iding reservation is the inadequate
c representation of the class concerned in the State services. [837-H; 838-A]

14. The reservation under Article 16(4) is not meant for backward
classes but for backward sections of the classes which are not adequately
represented in the State-services. There may be a class which is inade-
D quately represented in the State-services and it may be backward as a
whole, like the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. Such a class
as a whole is eligible for the reserve posts. [840-F, G]

15. To make every word of Article 16(4) meaningful and workable the
said expression can only be read in relation to 'class of citizens'. (841-F]
E
16. The condition precedent for a class to get benefit under Article
16(4) is not its bacl<W"drdness but its inadequacy in State-services. Once
inadequacy is established and the classes on that test are identified then
the backward sections of those classes become eligible to the benefit of
reservation. [842-D]
F
17. Once a class which is inadequately represented, is identified it is
only the backward section of that class which is eligible for job reserva-
tions. Backward section can be culled out by adopting a means test, or on
the basis of social, educational or economic backwardness. Once the
G classes are identified there can be no difficulty for the State to find out the
backwardness. Once the classes are identified there can be no difficulty for
the State to find out the backWard·parts of those elasses. [842-E, F]

18. The framers of the Constitution, with secularism, egalitarianism,
integrity and unity as their avowed objects, could not have permitted
H horizontal division of the country into backward and non-backward for
INDRA SAWHNEYv. U.O.l. 519

the sake of job-reservations. (842-G, HJ A
19. Article 16(4) permits reservation of appointmen!Jposts in favour
of classes of citizens which in the opinion of the State are not adequately
represented in the services under the State. Once such classes are iden-
tified then the reserve posts are offered to the backward sections of those
classes. [843-AJ B

20. Job-reservations as a dole, has been the vote-catching platter.
Neither the job-reservations nor the reservation of seats in the education-
al institutions are of material help. Unless illiteracy and poverty are
removed, the backward classes cannot be benefited by the reservations C
alone. (843-B, CJ

21. An individual citizen's right guaranted under Article 16(1) can
only be curtailed by providing reservations for backward class and not for
backward individuals. The promotional posts are not offered to the back-
ward class. Only the individuals are benefited. (846-H; 847-AJ D

The General Manager, Southern Railway v. Rangachari, [1962J 2 SCR.
586, disagreed with.

State of Punjab v. Hirata/ & Ors., [1971J 3 SCR 267 and Akhil
Bharatiya Soshit Karamchal' Sangh (Railway) v. Union of India & Ors .. E
[1981J 2 SCR 185, referred to.

22. The object, context and the plain language of Article 16(4) made
it clear that the job-reservation can be done only in the direct recruitment
and not when the higher posts are filled by way of promotion. (847-A]
F
23. Promotion is an incident of service which comes after appointment.
Appointment simpliciter means initial appointment to a service. 1"847-BJ

24. Constitution oflndia aims at equality of status and opportunity for
all citizens including those who are socially, economically and educationally G
backward. IC members of backward classes can maintain minimum neces*
sary requirement of administrative efficiency not only representation but
also preference in the shape of reservation may be given to the1n to achieve
the goal of equality enshrined under the Constitution. Article 16( 4) is a
special provision for resen·ation of appointments and posts for them in
Government services to secure their adequate representati11n. 1'he entry of H
520 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A backward class candidates to the State services through an easier ladder is,
therefore, within the concept of equality. [848-B, CJ

25. Article 16(4) permits reservation of appointments or posts in
favour of any backward class of citizens only at the initial stage of entry
into the State services. Article 16(4) does not permit reservation either to
B the selection posts or in any other manner in the process of promotion.

26. Article 16(4) is another facet of Article 16(1). It exclusively provides
for reservation which is one of the forms of classification.Article 16(4) being
a special provision regarding reservation it completely takes away such
classification from the purview of Article 16(1). Thus the State power to
c provide job reservations is wholly exhausted under Article 16(4). No reserva-
tion of any kind permissible under Article 16(1). Article 16(4) completely
overrides Article 16(1) in the matter of job-reservations. [849-D, E]

27. Article 16(4) thus exclusively deals with reservations and it
D cannot be invoked for any other form of classification. Article 16(1),
however, permits protective discrimination, short of reservation, in the
matter relating to employment in the State-services. [849-E, F]

28. The protective discrimination in the shape of job-reservations
has to be programmed in such a manner that the most deserving section
E of the backward class is benefited. Means-test ensures such a result. The
process of identifying backward class cannot be perfected to the extent
that every member of the said class is equally backward. There are bound
to be disparities in the class itself. Some of the members of the class may
have individually crossed the barriers of backwardness but while identify-
ing the class they may have come within the collectivity. [850-F)
F
29. Economic ceiling to cut off the backward class for the purpose
of job-reservations is necessary to benefit the needy-sections of the class
means test is imperative to skim-off the affiuent sections of the backward
classes. [851-CJ
G
30. In the context of Article 16(4) the economic criterion is essential-
ly relevant. [852-C]

31. Poverty has a direct nexus to social backwardness. It is an essential
and dominant characteristic of poverty. A rich belonging to backward caste -
H depending upon his disposition - may be or may not be socially backward, but
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.l. 521

a poor Brahmin struggling for his livelihood invariably sufteres from social A
backwardness. The reality of present-day life is that the economic standards
confer social status on individuals. (852-D, EJ

32. Executive Instructions can be issued only when there are no
statutory provisions on the subject. Executive Instructions can also be
issued to supplement the statutory provisions when those provisions are B
silent on the subject of reservations. (853-G, HJ

Per P.B. Sawant, J.

1. The inequalities in Indian society are borne in homes and sus-
tained through every µiedium of social .advancement. Inhuman habita-
c
tions, limited and crippling ·social intercourse, low-grade educational
institutions and degrading occupations perpetuate the inequities in
myriad ways. Those who are fortunate to make their escape from these
all-pervasive dragnets by managing to attain at least the minimum of
... attainments in spite of the paralysing effects of the debilitating social D
environment, have to compete with others to cross the threshold of their
backwardness. (866-B, CJ

Pandit Nehru: "Discovery of India'; "Dr. ,4-mbedkar": By Dr. Dhanan-
jay Keer; The Hindu dated 8.10.1990, referred to.
E
Oliver Brown et. al. v. Board of Education of Topeka et. al., 347 US
483 = 98 L Ed. 873; Spottswood Thomas Bolling et. al. v. C. Melvin Sharpe
et. al. 347 US 497 = 98 I Ed 884; Marco Defunis et. al. v. Charles Odegaard,
416 US 312 =40 L Ed 2d 164; Regents of the University of California v.Allan
Bakke, 438 US 265=57 L Ed 20 7, 50; H. Earl Fullilove et. al. v. Philip F

'
K/utznick, 448 US 448 = 65 L Ed 2d 902 and Metro Broadcasting Inc. v.
Federal Communications Commission, 111 L Ed 2d 445, referred to.

2. Article 14 which guarantees equality before law would by itself,
without any other provision in the Constitution, be enough to validate
such equalising measure~. The founders of the Constitution, however, G
thought it advisable to incorporate another provision, viz., Article 16
specifically providing for equality of opportunity in matters of public
employment. Further they emphasised in clause (4) thereof that for
equalising the employment opportunities in the services under the State,
the State may adopt positive measures for re~ervation of appointments or H
522 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A posts in favour of any backward class or citizens which in the opinion of
the State, is not adequately represented in such services. [870-E-G]

3. The trinity of the goals of the Constitution viz., socialism,
secularism and democracy cannot be realised unless all sections of the •
society participate in the State power equally, irrespective of their caste,
B community, race, religion and sex and all discriminations in the sharing
of the State power made on those grounds are eliminated by positive
measures. [871-D)

4. The claims of other backward class of citizens and weaker sec-
C lions must also be considered consistently with the maintenance of the
efficiency. For whomsoever, therefore, reservation is made, the efficiency
of administration is not to be sacrificed, whatever the efficiency may mean.
That is the mandate of the Constitution itself. [871-G]

5. The various provisions in the Constitution relating to reservation,
D therefore, acknowledge that reservation is an integral part or the principle
of equality where inequalities exist. Further they accept the reality of
inequalities and of the existence of unequal social groups in the Indian
society. They are described variously as 'socially and educationally back-
ward classes' [Article 15(4) and Article 340), 'backward class' [Article
E 16(4)] and 'weaker sections of the people' (Article 46). The provisions or
the Constitution also direct that the unequal representation in the ser-
vices be remedied by taking measures aimed at providing emplo)'lllent to
the discriminated class, by whatever dijlerent expressions the said class is
described. How does one identify the discriminated class is a question of
methodology. But once it is identified, the fact that it happens to be a
F caste, race, or occupational group, is irrelevant. [871-H; 872-A-C]

6. Social integration cannot be achieved without giving equal status
to all. The administration of the country cannot also be carried on impar-
tially and efficiently without the representation in it of all the social
G groups and interests, and without the aid and assistance of all the views
and social experiences. Neither democracy nor unity will become real,
unless all sections of the society have an equal and effective voice in the
affairs and the governance of the country. [873-C, D

7. Culture is a cumulative product of economic and educational
H attainments leading to social accomplishment and refinement of mind,
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 523

morals and taste. Employment and particularly the governmental employ- A
ment promotes economic and social advancement which in turn also leads to
educational adv'ancement of the group. Though it is true that economic and
educational advancement is not necessarily accompanied by cultural
growth. it is also equally true that without them. cultural advancement is
difficult. Employment is thus an important aid for cultural growth. To
achieve total unity and integration of_the nation, reservations in employment B
are, therefore, imperative in the present state of our society. (873-F -HJ

8. Article 16(4) which provides for reservations, also at the same
time prescribed their limits and conditions. In the first place~ the reserva-
tions are not to be kept in favour of every backward class of citizens. It is
only that backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of that State, is
c
not adequately represented in the services under the State, which is
entitled to the benefit of the reservations. Secondly, and this follows from
the first, even that backward class of citizens would cease to be the
beneficary of the reservation policy, the moment the State comes to the
conclusion that it is adequately represented in the services. (874-A-C] D

9. Clausc(4) of Article 16 is not an exception to clause(l) thereof, but
is merely an en1phatic "''ay of stating what is implicit in clause(l).
[876-H; 877-A]
E
State of Keraia & A11r. v. N.M. Thomas & Ors., [1976] I SCR 906,
referred to.

T. Devadasan v. Unio11 (}{India & A11r.. [1964] 4 SCR 680, disagreed
with.
F
10. Equality postulates not merely legal equality hut also real equality.
The equality of opportunity has to be distinguished from the equality of
results. The various provisions of our Constitution and particularly those of
Articles 38, 46, 335, 338 and 340 together with the Preamble, show that the
right to equality enshrined in our Constitution is not mefely a formal right G
or a vacuous <leclaratit1n. It is a positive right, and the State is under an
obligation to undertake measures to make it real and en·ectual. A more
formal declaration of the right would not make unequals equal. To enable all
to compete wit.It each other on equal plane, it is necessary to take positive
measures to equip the disadvantaged and the handicapped to bring them to
thr level of the fortunate advantaged. [877-A-C) H
524 SuPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A ~1. So far as 'backwarcf classes' are concerned, the reservations for
them can only be made under clause(4) since they have been taken out
from the classes for which reservation can be made under Article 16(1).
Hence, Article 16(4) is exhaustive of all the reservations that can be made
for the backward classees as. such, but is not exhaustive of reservations
that can be made for classes other than backward classes undec Article
B
16(1). So also, no reservation can be made under Article 16(4) for classes
other than 'backward classes' implicit in that Article. They have to look
for their reservations, to Article 16(1). [879-C, DJ

12. There is no doubt that the expression '.backward class of
C citizens'; is wider and includes in it socially and educationally backward
classes of citizens and 'Scheduled ('.,astes and Scheduled Tribes.' [882-H)

The State of Madras v. Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan etc., [1951)
S.C.R. 525; M.R: Balaji & Ors. v. State of Mysore, [1963) Supp.1SCR439;
Janki Prasad Parimoo & Ors. etc. etc. v. State of J.&K. & Ors., [1973] 3 SCR
D 236; KC. Vasanth Kumar&Anr. v. State of Kamataka, [1985] Supp. 1 SCR
352; State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. v. P. Sagar, [1968] 3 SCR 595; State of
Andhra Pradesh & Ors. v. US. V: Bairam etc., [1972) 3 SCR 247 and Kumari
KS. Jayasree and Anr. v. State of Kera/a & Anr., [1977] l SCR 194 at
197-198, referred to.
E
13. The expression 'backward class of citizens' has been used in
Article 16( 4) in a particular context taking into consideration the social
history or this country. The expression is used to denote thosf, classes in
the society which could not advanced socially and educationally because of
the taboos and handicaps created by the society in the past or on account
F of geographical or other similar factors. [885-A, BJ

Lok Sabha Debates, 16.5.1951 - Column 1821, referred to.

14. 'Class' is a wide term. 'Caste' is only a species of the 'class'. A caste
G has all the attributes or a class and can form a separate class. If, therefore, a
caste is also a backward class within the meaning of Article 16(4), there is
nothing in the said Article or in any other provision of the Constitution, to
prevent the conferment of the special benefits under that Article on the said
caste. When the members of the entire caste are backward and on the account
are treated as a backward class, the expression 'backward caste' and 'back-
H ward class' become synonymous. [887·G: 888-E: 890-B]
INDRA SAWHNEY 1·. IJ.0.1. 525

Shorter Oxford Dictionary; Framing of India's Constitution - Ed. B. A
Shiva Rao, Vol. I pp. 768-772 and Vol. IV P. 594; 77te Cens11s Report of 1901
of The Province of Bengal; Pakisthan of Partition of India, By Dr. B.R.
Ambedkar, pp. 218-220; Backward Classes Commission's Report(Kelelkar
Commission Report) Paras 10,14 3 of Chapter V, referred to.

State of Madras v. Smt. Champakam Dorairajan, [1951] S.C.R. 525 = B
AIR 1951 SC 226; B. Venkataramana v. 77te State of Madras & Anr., AIR
1951 SC 229; M.R. Balaji & Ors. v. State of Mysore, [1963] Supp. l SCR
439; l.R. Chitralekha & Ors. v. State of Mysore, [1964] 6 SCR 368 = AIR
1964 SC 1823; State of A.P. v. U.S. V. Bairam, [1972] 3 SCR 247; Minor P.
Rajendran v. State of Madras & Ors., [1968] 2 SCR 786; State of A.P. & Anr.
v. P. Sagar, [1968] 3 SCR 595; Triloki Nath & Anr. v. State of J&K. & Ors.,
c
(1969] 1 SCR 103; Minor A. Periakarnppan etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu &
Ors. etc., AIR 1971 SC 2303 = (1971] 2 SCR 430; Narayan Vasudev v.
Emperor, AIR 1940 Bombay 379; Kumari K.S. Jayasree v. State of Kera/a,
[1977] l SCR 194; Vasa/If Kumar v. State of Kamataka, [1985] Supp. 1
SCR 352; Regents of the University of Ca/ifomia, 438 US 265; Fullilove, 448 D
US 448, referred to.

15. Article 46 enjoins upon the State to promote with special care, the
educational and economic interests of the '1.veaker sections' of the people,
and, in particular, of the SCs/STs, and to protect them from social injustice E
and all forms of exploitation. The expression 'weaker sections' of the people
is obviously wider· than the expression 'backward class of citizens' in Article
16(4) which is only a part of the weaker sections. [900-G]

16. The expression 'weaker sections' of the people used in Article 46,
also includes other backward classes as well, whether they are socially and F
educationally backward or not and whether they are adequately represented
in the se_rvices or not. What is further, the expressions 'weaker section.s' of
the people does not necessarily refer to a goup or a class. The expression can
also take within its compass, individuals who constitute weaker sections or
weaker parts of the society. This weakness may be on account of factors other G
than past social and educational backwardness. The backwa'rdness again
may be on account of poverty alone or on account of the present impoverish-
ment arising out of physical or social handicaps. The inst3nces__ of such
weaker sections other than SCs/STs and socially and educationally back-
ward clasSes may be varied, viz., flood - earth'quake - cyclone - fire - famine
and project affected persons, war and riot torn persons, physically hand-· H
526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A icapped persons, those without any or adequate means of' livelihood, those
who live below the poverty line, slum dwellers etc. [901-B-F']

17. Article 16(4) carves out a particular class of' people and not
individuals from the 'weaker sections' and the class it carves out is the one
which does not have adequate representation in the services under the
B State. The concept of 'weaker sections' in Article 46 has no such limitation.
[901-H; 902-A]

18. Economic criterion by itself will not identify the backward clas·
ses under Article 16(4). The economic backwardness of the backward
C classes under Article 16(4) has to be on account of their social and
educational backwardness. [903-F]

Chitra/ekha, [1964] 6 SCR 368; Parimoo, [1973] 3 SCR 236 and
Vasanth Kumar, [1985] Supp. 1 SCR 352, referred to.

D 19. No reservation of posts in services under the State, based ex-
clusively on economic criterion would be valid under clause (1) of Article
16 of the Constitution. [908-B]

20. Not only Article 16(4) but for that matter Article 335 also does
not speak of giving proportional representation to. the backward classes
E and SCs/STs respectively. Article 16(4) in terms, speaks of adequate
representation to the backward classes, while Article 335 speaks of the
'claims' of the members of the SCs/STs. Howevtr, it cannot be disputed
that whether it is the appointments of SCs/S'fs or other backward classes,
both are to be made consistently with the maintenance of the efficiency ir
F administration. [913-E, F]

State ofPunjab v.Hiraia/ & Ors., (1971] 3 SCR267 at 212;Fullilove, 448
US 448; Thomas, (1976] 1SCR906; Vasanth Kumar, [1985] Supp. I SCR 352;
Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh, (1981] 2 SCR 185; Ba/aji, [1963]
Supp. I SCR 439 andDevadasan, [1964] 4 SCR, 680, referred to.
G
Constitutent Assembly Debates, Vol. 7, (1948-49) pp. 701-702, referred
to.

21. A mechanical approach in keeping reservations in all fields and at
all levels of administration and that too at a uniform percentage is unrealisa
H tic. There is no reason why the authorities concerned should not apply their
INDRA SAWHNEY 1·. U.0.1. 527

mind and evolve a realistic policy in this behalf. There are fields and levels of A
administration where either there may be no candidate from backward
classes available or may not be available in adequate number. [914-F, GI

22. The adjustment of the reservations and their percentages, fields
and grade·wise as well as from time to time, as per the availability of the
candidates from the backward classes, is not only implicit in the constitu- B
tional provisions but is also warranted for purposeful and effective im-
plementation of the spirit of those provisions. (914-H; 915-A]

23. Education is the source of advancement of the individual in all
walks of life. The teaching profession, therefore, holds a key position in
societal life. It Is the quality of education received that determines and
c
shapes the equipment and the competitive capacity of the Individual, and
lays the foundation for his career in life. It is, therefore, in the interests of
all sections of the society • socially backward and forward • and of the
nation as a whole, that they aim at securing and ensuring the best of
education. [915-B, C] D
24. Reservations for individuals are permissible under clause (1) on
a ground other than economic, provided, of course, the ground is not hit
by Article 16(2). (917-B]

25. The extent of the percentage of the reservation should ht: calcu- E
lated yearwise with due allowance to the operation of the rule with regard
to the backlog, if any. Still better method is to regulate and calculate the
appointments on the roster basis. [918-G)

CA. Rajendran v. Union of India & Ors., [1968] 1 SCR 721 at
732-733, referred to. F

26. The adequacy does not mean a mere proportionate numerical or
quantitative strength. It means effective voice or share in power in run-
ning the administration. Hence, the extent of reservations will ·have to be
estimated with reference to the representation in different grades and G
categories. [919-A, BJ

Yhe General Manager, Southern Railway v. Rangachari, (1962] 2 SCR
586, referred to.

27. Society does not remain static. The industrialisation and the H
528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A urbanisation which necessarily followed in its wake, the advance on politi-
cal, social and economic fronts made particularly after the commencement
of the Constitution, the social reforms movements of the last several
decades, the spread of education and the advantages of the special
provisions including reservations secured so far, have alJ undoubtedly
seen ~t least some individuals and families in the backward classes,
B however small in number, gaining sufficient means to develop their
capacities to compete with others in every field. That is an undeniable fact.
Legally, therefore, they are not entitled to be any longer called as part of
the backward classes whatever their original birth mark. [920-B-D]

c for Class-III
28. A Class-IV employee's children may develop capacity to compete
posts and in that sense, he and his children may be forward
compared to those in his class who have not secured even Class-IV posts.
It cannot, however, be argued that on that account, he has reached the
'creamy' level. If the adequacy of representation in the services is to be
evaluated in terms of qualitative and not mere quantitative repre-
D sentation, which means representation hi. the higher rungs of administra-
tion as well, the competitive capacity should be determined on the basis of
the capacity to compete for the higher level posts also. Depending upon
the facts of each case, sub-classification of the backward classes into the
backward and more or most backward would be justifiable, pro•ided
separate quotas art prescribed for each of them. [922-A·C; 924-F]
E
Balaji, [1963] Supp. 1 SCR 439 and Vasanth Kumar, [1985) Supp. 1
SCR 352, referred to.

29. Article 16(4) enables the State to make a 'provision' 'or the
F reservation of appointments to the posts. The provision may be made
either by an" Act of Legislature or by rule or regulation made under such
Act or in the absence of both, by executive order. Executive order is no less
a law under Article 13(3) which defines law to include, among other things,
order, by-laws and notifications. The provisions of reservation under
G Article 16(4) being relatable to the recruitment and conditions of service
under the State, they are also covered by Article 309 of the Constitution.
Article 309 expressly provides that until provision in that behalf is made
by or under an Act of the appropriate legislature, the rules regulating the
recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to services
under the Union or a State may be regulated by rules made by the
H President or the Governor as the case may be. (925-A·C]
INDRA SAWHNEY 1·. U.0.1. 529

Balaji, [1963] Supp. I SCR 439; Ma11gal Si11gh v. Punjab State, Cha11- A
digarh & Ors. AIR 55 (1%8); i'w1jal1 wid Harya11a 306 and Comptroller &
Auditor General of India & Ors. v. Mohan/a/ Mehrotra & Ors., [1992] l SCC
20, referred to.

30. Judicial scrutiny would be available (i) ihhe criterion inconsistent
with ·1he provisions of Article 16 is applied for identifying the classes for B
whom the special or unequal benefit can be given under the said Article; (ii)
if the classes who are not entitled to the said benefit are wrongly included in
or excluded from the list of beneficiaries of the special provisions. In such
cases, it is not either the entire exercise or the entire list which becomes
invalid so long as the tests applied for identification are correct and the C
inclusion or exclusion is only marginal; and (iii) if the percentage offeserva-
tions is either. disproportfonate or unreasonable so as to deny the equality of
opportunity to the unreserved classes, and obliterates Article 16(1).
Whether the percentage is unreasonable or results in the .obliteration of
Article 16(1), so far as the unreserved classes are concerned, It will depend
upoit the facts and circumstances of each case, and no hard and fast rule of D
general application with regard to the percentage can be laid down for all the
·regions and for all times. [928-G, H; 929-A, BJ

Balaji, [1963] Supp. 13 SCR 439; 11wmas, [1976] 1 SCR 906; Vasanth
Kumar,. [1985] Sup. I SCR 352; P. Sagar, [1968] 3 SCR 595; A. Peeriakamp-
pa11, [1971]2 SCR430; P. Sukhadev& Ors. v. 11ie Government ofA:P., [1966] E
1 Andhra W.R. 294 and Hirata/, [1971] 3 SCR 267, referred to.

31. l'he Court, does not_ ~ecide questions which do not arise. The
t(adition is both wise and advisable. 'fhere is a long line of decisious of
this Court on the point. [928-D, El
F
The Central Bank of India v. 11ieir .Workmen, [1960] l SCR 200 and
Harshalan Venna· v. Union of India & Anr., AIR 1987 SC 1969; re:erred to.

32 .. It. is foolhardy to ignore I.he consequences to the administration
when juniors supersede seniors although the seniors are as much or even G
more competent than the juniors. Whe.n reservations are kept in promotion,
the inevitable consequence is the phenomenon of juniors, however low in the
seniority list; stealing a march over their seniors to the promotional post.
When further reservation.s are kept at eyery premotional level, the.juniors
not only steal march over their seniors in the same grade but also over their ·
superiors at more than one higher level. This has been witnessed and is being H
530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS f1992J SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A witnessed frequently wherever reservations are kept in promotions. It is
naive to expect that in such circumstances those who are superseded, 1i~1f
they are many) can work with equanimity and with the same devotion to and
interest in work as they did before. (931-F-HJ

The R'angachan', (1962] 2 SCR 586, referred to.
B
33. The expression 'consistently with the maintenance of efficiency of
administration' used in Article 335 is related not only to the qualifications
of those who are appointed, ii covers all consequences lo the eri'iciency of
administration on account or such appointments. (932-F]

c Per R.M. Sahai, J.

1. Judicial Review has come to be one of the ways of obliging
government to control itself. A reservation for a class which is not back-
ward would be liable to be struck down. Similarly, if the class is found to
D be backward but it is adequately represented the power cannot be exer-
cised. Therefore, the exercise of power must precede the determination of
these aspects each of which is mandatory. Since the exercise of power
depen,ds on existence of the two, its determination too must satisfy the
basic requirement of being in accordance with Constitution, its belief and
thought. Any determination of backward class in historical perspective
E may be legally valid and constitutionally permissible. But Ir In determina-
tion or identification of the backward class any constitutional provision is
violated or it is contrary to basic feature of Constitution then the action
is rendered vulnerable. (948-D, E]

Bakerv. Carr, 369 US 186; Davis v. Bandemer, 54 USLW 4898 [1986]:
F Kehar Singh & Anr. v. Union of India & Anr., (1989] 1 SCC 204; Kihoto
Holloh on v. Zachilhu, (1992] 1 SCR309; State ofRajasthan & Ors. v. Union of
India, (1977] 3 SCC 592; University of California Regents v. Allan Bakke, 57
LEd 2 d 750; H. Earl Fullilove v. Philip M. Klutznick, 6SL Ed 2d 902; Metro
Broadcasting Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, SB LW 5053 and
G Genera/Manager, SouthemRailwayv.Rangachari, [19fi2] 2SCRS86,referred
to.

Samuel Krislov : 'The Supreme Coult in the Political Process,' p. 66;
C. Herman Pritchett: "The Amen'can Constitution'; p. 154 (Quoted in. "The
Judicial Review of Legislative Acts": By Dr. Chakradhar Jba, p. 355);
H Charles Gordon Post: "The Supreme Court Questions" (Quoted in "The

••
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 531

Judicial Review of Legislative Acts": By Dr. Chakradhar Jha, p. 351; Gran- A
ville Austin's "The Indian Constitution - Cornerstone of a Nation:; Tagore
Law Lecture - From Marshall to Mukherjea - "Studies in American and
Indian Constitution Law" : By William 0. Douglas, P .38; Wade: "Ad-
ministrative Law"; "The Court and the Constitution": By A. Cox, p. 372;
Federalist No. 51 1Extracted in ·~merican Constitutional Law": By Alpheus
T. Mason/D.G. Stephenson, Jr., referred to.
B

2. Article 16(1) and (4) operate in same field. Both are directed
towards achieving equality of opportunity in services under the State. One is
broader in sweep and expansive in reach. Other is limited in approach and
narrow in applicability. Former applies to all citizens whereas latter is
available to 'any' class of backward citizens. Use of words 'all' in 16(1) and
c
'any' in 16(4) read together indicate that they are part of same scheme. The
one is substantive equality and other is protective equality. Article 16{1) is a
fundamental right ofa citizen whereas 16(4) is an obligation of the State. The
former is enforceable in a court oflaw, whereas lite latter is 'not constitution-
al compulsion' but an enabling provision. (951-C, DJ D

Plessy v.· Ferguson, 163 US 537(1896); The State of Madras v.
Shrimathi Champakam Dorairajan, (1951] SCR 525: K.C. Vasanth Kumar
v. State of Kamataka, AIR 1985 SC 1495 at 1529, referred to.

Herbert J. Gans · "The New Egalitarianism" - (The inequality and E
Justice by Rainwater); "The Equal Protection of the Law": P.G. Polyviou, p.
302, referred to.

3. Article 16(4) is a complete code for reservation for backward class
of citizens as it not only provides for exercise of power but also lays down F
the circumstances, in which the power can be exercised, and the purpose
and extent of its exercise. One is mandatory and operates automatically
whereas the other comes into play on identification of backward class of
citizens and their inadequate representation. (951-F, G]

State of Kera/a & Ors. v. N.M. Thomas., (1976] 1 SCR 906; 939, 956, G
960, 969 and 978 and B. Venkataramanna ·v. The State of Madras & Anr.,
AIR 1951 SC 229, referred to.

"Reservation Policy & Practice in India" : By Anirudh Prasad, p. 318;
B. Sivaramayya: H
5.12 SlJl'RloMI', COURT JU'l'OKIS IJ992J SUPP, 2 S,C,R,

A "Jnequaiiries and the Law'',' "Liberty to Equality": Ry Harold Laski(A
(;rammar of Politics~Published in "Inequality and Justice": By Rainwater,
referred to. ·

4. The expression 'any backward class of citizens' is capable of being
l'onstrued as class of backwards, backward among any class of citizens,
B backward class etc. depending on for whom the reservation is being made
and why. [956-E I

5. Backward may be relative such as professional or occupational
backwardness or it may be economic, social, educational or it may be
C racial suth as in America or caste based as in Hindu social system or it
may be natural such as physically handicapped or even of sex. Article 16
of the Constitution deals with equality of opportunity in services under the
State. The meaning of the word 'backward' therefore, has to be understood
"ith reference to opportunity in public employment. Since this, is a con-
D stitutional issue it cannot be resolved by cliches founded on fictional
mythological stories of misdirected philosophies or odious comparisons
without any regard to social and economic conditions but on pragmatic,
purposi"e and rnlue oriented approach to the Constitution as it is the ,
fundamental law whkh requires careful navigation by political set up of _
the country and any deflection or deviation disturbing or threatening the
E social balance has to be restored, as far as possible, by the judiciary.
Rack"'ardness in such a vast country with divergent religions, cultures,
languages, hahils, sot:ial and economic conditions arising out of historical
reasons, geographical locations, feudal system, rigidity of caste is bound
to have regional navour. [956-F-H; 957-A]
F
Plcssy v. Ferguson, 167 US 537 [1896]; Brown v. Director Board of
Educa.ion, 347 US 483 [1954]; Brown v. Director Board of Education, 349
US 294 (1955]; Green v. Coumry School Board, 391 US 430 (1968]; Swann
v. Charlotte, Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 USl [1970]; CA,
G Rajendran v. Union of India & Ors,, [1968] l SCR 721; Janaki Prasad
Parimoo v. State of J & K, (1973] 3 SCR 236; State of Kera/a & Ors, v.N,M
Thomas & Ors,, [1976] l SCR 906; Karamchari Sangh v. Union of India,
[1981] 2 SCR 185; Trilokinath Ttkku v. State of J,&K., [1967] 2 SCR Z65;
Tri!okinath & Ors, v. State of J,& K, [1969] I SCR 103; A. Peeriakarnppan,
etc v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1971] 2 SCR 430; MR, Ba/aji & Ors, v. State
H of Mysore, [1963] Supp. l SCR 439; Heggade Janardhan Subharya v. Stale
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 533

of Mysore, [1963) Supp. l SCR 475; P. Rajndran v. State of Madras, [1968] A
2 SCR 786; State of A.P. & Ors. v. P. Sagar, [1968] 3 SCR 595; State of A.P.
v. U.S. V. Balaram, [1972) 3 SCR 247; State of U.P. v. Pradeep Tandon,
[1975] 2 SCR 761; R. Chitralekha v. State of Kamataka, [1964] 6 SCR 368;
Smt. KS. Jayasree v. State of Kera/a, [1977] I SCR 194 and KC. Vasanth
Kumar v. State of Kamataka, AIR 1985 SC 1495, referred to.
B
Constituent Assembly Debates,· Vol. VII p. 701 (1948-49); 'Equality,
Justice and Rectification": By Derek L. Phillips, P-289-290; Glen M. and
Johnson Sipra Bose: 'Social Mobility Among Untouchables"- In Cohesion
and Conflict in Modern India, referred to.

6. The word 'class' cannot and was not used as caste as it was
c
constitutionally considered to he destructive of secularism. In our country
caste system is peculiar to Hindus. It is unknolln to Mulsims, Christians,
Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains. The Constitution was framed not for Hindus
only. ?rovision was made for a society hetrogreneous in character but
secular in outlook. It was a 'compromistic formula', a positive effort to D
equalise one and all. [958-D, E]

Oxford Dictionary: Legal Thesaums: William C. Burien; Webster Dic-
tionary, referred to.

1. 'Class' was used in a wider sense and not in the restricted sense E
of caste. [959-B]

8. When the Constitution was framed the founding fathers were
aware of the meaning and understanding of the word 'backward'. They
were also aware that hereinafter members of all co1nmunity .were to be
treated alike. The State was made responsible, therefore, for 'any' back- F
ward class of citizens coming from whatever community, caste or
religions . State, therefore, cannot discriminate, while identifying backward
class on race, religion, caste or birth. [961-E]

"Competing Equalities": By Marc Galanter: "Rescn•ation Policy and G
Practice in India: By Dr. Anirudh Prasad; Sturges v. Crowninshield (1819)
Quoted in Encyclopaedia of American ConstiUttion, Vol. I: By Levy, Karst
& Mahoney, referred to.

9. Caste has never been accepted by this Court as exclusive or sole
criteria for determination or identification of backward class. [964-F] I-I
534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A /.C .Galaknath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643; Oliver Brown v.
Board of Educa~on, 347 US 483; Venkataramana, AIR 1951 SC 229; Bakke,
438 US 265 [1978); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 US 537 (1896); Champakam,
(1951) SCR 525; Venkataramana, AIR 1951 SC 229; Balaji, (1963) Supp. 1
SCR 439; Chitralekha, (1964) 6 SCR 368; Rajendran, [1968) 2 SCR 786;
B Sagar, (1968) 3 SCR 595; Peeriakaruppan, (1971) 2 SCR 430; Bairam,
(1972) 3 SCR 247; Soshit Karamchari, (1981) 2 SCR 185 and Jayasree,
(1977) 1 SCR 194, referred to.

A. Cox: The Coult and The Constitution, The New Encyclopaedia
Britanica, Micropaedia, Vol. 10. p. 919; "The Caste System in India" By: Dr.
C Rajendra Pandey; Pradeep Kumar Bose: 'Mobility & Conflict' - published
in Caste, ConRict and Reservation; 'Should the caste be the basis for
recognising the backwardness" • l.P. Desai (Extracted from Caste, Conftict
and Reservation), referred to.

10. A State is not bound to grant reservation to every backward
D class. In one State or at one place or at one point of time it may be
historical and social backwardness or ~eograpbical and habitational
backwardness and at another it may be social and educational or back-
wardness arising out of natural cause. (966-F-G)

E 11. Use of expression, 'nothing in this Article shall prevent
Parliament' in Article 16(4) cannot be read as empowering the State to
make reservation under Article 16(4) on race, religion or caste. It would
result in regenerating the communal representatioin in senrices infused by
Britishers by different orders issued rrom 1924 to 1946. (974-F-H; 975-A]

F 12. In earlier decision rendered by the Court till sixties Article 16(4)
was held to be exception to Articles 16(1). But from 1976 onwards it has been
understood differently. Today Articles 16(1) and 16(4) are understood as
part of one and same scheme directed towards promoting equality. There-
fore what is destructive of equality for Article 16(1) would apply equally to
G Article 16(4). The non-obstante clause was to take out absolutism of Article
16(1) and not to destroy the negatism of Article 16(2). [974-H; 975-A)

Javed Niaz Beg& Anr. v. Union of India & Anr., AIR 1981 SC 794 and
State of Rajasthan v. Pradip Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1208, referred to.

H 13. 'Backward' used in Article 16(4) is wider than socially and educa-
JNDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 535

tionally used in Article 15( 4) and 'weaker sections' used in Article 46. SC/ST A
are covered in either expression. But same cannot be said for others.
Backward, cannot be defined as was wisely, done by the Constitution makers.
It has to emerge as a result of interaction of social and economic forces. It
cannot be static. [976-H; 977-A]

14. A Commission appointed under Article 340 by the President is not B
to identify Hindu backwards only but the backward class within the territory
or India which includes Hindu, Muslim, Sikh or Christian etc. born and
residing in India within meaning of Articles 5 of the Constitution. The
expression is not only backward class but backward class of citizens. And
citizen means all those who are mentioned in Articles 5 and 10 of the
Constitution. [977-E, Fl c
15. Existence of caste in the past and present, its continuance in future
cannot be denied but insistence that since ii is being practised or observed
for political purpose even though unfortunately it should be the basis for
identification of backwardness in services is not only robing the Constitution D
of its fresh look it promised and guaranteed but would result in perpetuating
a system under ugly weight of which the society had bent earlier. [980-E, Fl

"Equal Protection of the Laws": By Polyvious G. Polyviou; Seervai:
Constitutional Law of India. p. 897, referred to.
E
16. Subjective perception of one's position in the 'v~rna' system
varies and changes from time to time, place to place and context to
context. For instance, the Patidars of Gujarat were considered sudras a
few decades age, but now they call themselves vaishyas, and are acknow-
ledged as such by others. It is significant that they are not have-nots.
Similar is the case of Vokkaligas and Lingayats of Karnataka, Reddies F
and Kammas of Andhra Pradesh, Marathas of Maharashtra and to some
extent Yadavas of Bihar. Yet these castes or groups have been identified
as backward class in their State. Whether such inclusion on political,
economic and social condition is justified in State list or ~ot but inclusion
of a group or collectivity ip list of socially and educationally backward G
classes, which is a term narrower and different than backward class for
services under Union without proper identification only on State list may
not be valid. For services under the Union, therefore, some principle may
have to be evolved which may be universal application to members of every
community and which may be adopted by States, as well, after adjusting
it with prevalent local conditions. [982-D-G] H
516 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A A. Cox: TllP. Court and the Constitution; "Econo1nic and Political
Week£v'~ Vol. 26 (1991) p. 601 - "The Caste System in India": By Rajendra
Pandey, Pages 8,45; Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences Vol. 3; "Equality" By
R.H. Tawney, referred to.

Balaji, [1963] Supp. 1 SCR 439, referred to.
B
17. The Mandal Commission recommended occupation identifica-
tion for non-Hindus if the community was traditionally known to carry on
the hereditary occupation of their counterpart amongst Hindus and in-
cluded in the test of OBS. TI1e Commission thus recognised occupational
C divider-among Hindus. If occupation amongst Hindus can be basis for
identification of backwardness among non-Hindus then why cannot it
furnish basis for identification amongst Hindus itse.lf. [985-F, G]

18. Occupation should furnish the starting point of determination of
backward ciass. And if in ultimate analysis any Hindu ca~tf: is found to be
D occupationally, socially. educationally and eronomirally backward it
should be regarded as eligible for benefit unde: Article 16(4) because it
would be within constitutional sanction. [988-E]

Re Hatschek's Patents ex pzeienne.x, [1909] 2 Ch. On. 68, referred to.

E 19. Reservation corelafl'd with population was not accepted even by
the Cnnstituent Assembly. On plain construf.tion inadequacy of repre~
sentation cannot be tht measure of resfn'ation. That is creative of inris-
diction only. [992-B]

Balaji, [1963] Supp. I SCR 439; Devadasan, [1964] 4 SCR 680;
F ChitraGhosh, AIR 1970 SC 351, Chancltala, AIR 1971 SC 1762; Subhashini,
AIR 1966 Mysore 40; 77wmas, [1.976] 1 SCR 906; Jagdish Roi v. State of
Haryana. AIR 1977 Haryana 56; State of Kamataka v. Jacob Mathew, ILR
(1964) 2 Kerala 53; Chhotey Lal v. State of U.P., AIR 1979 All. 135;
Slaughter House Cases, (16 Wall) 36=21 L Ed. 394 [1875]; Griffin v.
G !i/io11ois, 351 US 12 [1956]; Harper v. Virginia Board of Education, 383 US
M3 [1966); Soshit Karamchari, [1981] 2 SCR 185 and Vasanth Kw,,~r,
[1985] Supp. I SCR 352, refrrred to.

20. Any construction of Article 16(4) cannot he divorced ~ithout taking
into ac<'onnt Artirlt' 16(1 ). Elfuality in srrvi<·rs has hf'en balant.•ed by provid-
H ing e(1ual opport.unit,y to every citizen at the same thne ernpowering the State
INDRA S!\WIINEY r. lU.J.L 537

to take protective measure for the backward class of citizens \vho are not A
adequately represented. This balancing of equality cannot be lost sight of
while interpreting these provisions. Since there is no clear-indication either
way the role of the courts hecome both important an~ reSp!lnsiblc, by
interpreting the provision reasonably and with common sense so as to carry
out the objective of its enactment. And the purpose was to enable the
backward class of citizens to share the power if they were riot adtquately B
represented but not to grant proportional representation, a typical British
concept rejected by our Founding Fathers. [993-G, H; 994-A, BJ

21. Equality has various shades .. Its understanding and application
have been shaped by social, economic and political conditions prevailing
in the society. [994-C]
c
22. Jn our constitutional scheme the classification in ~atters of
employment or appointment in the services has been ~one constitutioilally.
From the entire class of all citizens any backward class has been classified
for beneficial or benign treatment. The Legislature.or executh-·e therefore D
cannot transgress it. Since the Constitution treats all citizen~ alike for
purposes of employment except those who fall under Article 16(4) any
further classification or grouping for reservation \\'Otdd he constitutionaJly
invalid. No legislative exercise can transcendent the constitutional barrier..
For valid ciassification legislature or 1!xecutive measures must be co-related
with legislative purpose or objective. Once the Constitution itself unfolded E
the purpose of achieving the goal of equality by permitting reservation for
backward classes only, any further reservation being beyond constitutional
purpose would. be impermissible and per se in valid. [994-F -G; 995-A)

Dhirendra Kumar Manda/ v. The Supdt. & Remembrancer of Legal
Affairs to the Govt. of West Bengal & Anr., [1955] I SCR 224, referred to. · F

"The Equal Protection of the Laws'~ 37 California Rev. 341, referred to.

23. Principle of reasonable classification for purposes of creating
another class or planting one class in another woi1ld he constitutionally G
infirm. [995-HJ

24. Difference between reservation and preferential treatment is that
in a gro~1p or class or collectivity is separately proYided for and the .co1npeti~
tion is amongst them only. \Vhereas in preferential treatment. the collectivity
is part of the same group hut it is permitted Some weightage due to sor.ial, H
538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A economic or any justifiable reason. For purposes of achieving equality by
result Article 16 creates two compartments, one general and the other
reserved and then both are paired together. But preference is available in the
same compartment. Validity of one depends on constitutional sauetion
whereas the second has to stand on test of reasonableness. For instance the
reservation of backward class cannot be assailed as being violative of
B constitutional i:uarantee whereas preferential treatment can be upheld only
lfit is reasonable with the nexus it seeks to achieve. Article 16 unlike Article
14 is a positive right or equal opportunity. [995-H; 996·A·C)

25. Promotion is the most sensitive branch of service jurisprudence.
C Althoup its purpose is manifold but the principle objective Is, to secure the
best possible incumbents for the higher positions while maintaining the
morals of the whole organisation as it not only, serves the public interest but
is founded on the inherent principle that the higher one moves, the greater is
the responsibility he assumes. [997·H; 998-A)

D 26. Manner and method of promotion is usually linked with the nature
of posts, iflt is selection or non-selection. [998-BJ

"Introduction to the Study of Public Administration": Leonard D. White,
Page 380, referred to.

Rangachari, [1962) 2 SCR 586; Soshit Karamchari, [1981) 2 SCR 185;
E Hira/a/, [1971) 3 SCR267 andJagannathan, [1986) 2SCR17, referred to.
27. After entry in service the class is one that of employees. lfthe social
scar of backwardness is carried even, thereafter the entire object of equalisa·
lion stands frustrated. No further classification amongst employees would
F be justified as is not done amongst students. [998-E, F]

Thomas, [1976) 1 SCR 906; Bakke, 438 US 265 (1978), referred to.

28.Coostltutlonal sanction is to reserve for backward class of persons.
That Is class or group Interest has been preferred over individual. But
G promotion from a class or group of employees Is not promoting a group or
class but an Individual. It is one against other. [999-E)

29. Art. 16(4) by Its nature, and purpose cannot be applicable to
economically backward, except probably when a proper methodology is
worked out to determine Inadequacy of representation of such class.
H [1000-DJ
INDRA Sr\ WHNEY v. U.0.1. 519

30. Reservation for backward classes seeks to achieve the social A
purpose of sharing in services which had been monopolised by few of the
forward classes. To bridge the gap, thus, created the affirmative actions
have been upheld as the social and educational difference between the two
classes furnished reasonable basis for classification. Sarne cannot be said
for rich and poor. Indigence cannot be rational basis for classification for
public employment. (1000-G]
B

Jawaharlal Nehru, Quoted from Dorothy Norman ed. "Nehrn",
referred to.

Griffin, 351US12 (1956]; Harper, 383 US 663 (1966], referred to. C
31. Poverty may have relevance and may furnish valid justification
while dealing with social and economic measure. Any legislation or executive
measure undertaken to remove disparity in wealth cannot be suspected but a
classification based on economic conditions for purposes of Article 16(1)
would be violative of equality doctrine. [1001-D] D
32. While reserving posts for backward classes, the departments
should make a condition precedent that every condidate must disclose the
annual income of the parents beyond which one could not be considered
to be backward. What should be that limit can be determined by the E
appropriate State. Income apart provision should be made that wards of
those backward classes of persons who have achieved a particular status
in society either politica! or social or economic or if their parents are in
higher services than such individuals should be precluded to avoid mo-
nopolisation by the services reserved for backward classes by a few.
Creamy layer, thus, shall stand eliminated. And once a group or collec- F
tivity itself is found to have achieved the constitutional objective then it
should be excluded from the list of backward class. (1001-E-H]

33. Finality is necessary not only for courts or tribunal but for the
guidance of the affirmative action ameliorative or preferential by the Legis- G
lature or the Executive. [1003-G]

34. The exercise of power to reserve is coupled with duty to deter-
mine backward class of citizens and if they were adequately represented.
If the Government failed to discharge its duty then the exercise of power
stands vitiated. (1004-F) H
540 SUPRFME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A ORfGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 930of1990.

(~nder Article 32 of the Constitution Of India).

WfTH

B (With W.P. (C) Nos. 97/91, 948190, 966/90, 965/90, 953/90, 954/90,
971/90, 972/90, 949/90, 986/90 1079/'10, 1106190, 1158/90, 1071/90, 1069/90,
1077/90, 1119/90, 1053/90, 1102/90, 1120/90, 1112/90. l 276/90, 1148/90,
1105/90, 974/90, 1114/89, 987/90, 1061/90, !064/90, \101/90, 1115/90,
1116/90, 1117/90, 1123/90, 1124/90, 1126/90, 1130/90, 1141/90, 1307/90, T.C.
C (C) Nos. 27/90, 28-31/00, 32-33/90, 34-35/90, i\5/90, J/91, W.P. (C) Nos.
10~1/90. 343/91, 1362190, 1094191, 1087/90, 1128/90. 36191, 3/91, LA. No.1-20
in T.C. (C) No. 27-35190 & W.P. (C) No. 11/92, 111/92, 261/92.)

Advocates appearpd for the Petitioners:

D K.K Venugopal, Shahid Rizvi, P.P. Tripathi, K.Y. Yishwanathan,
Ashok Mukhoty, B.B. Sawhncy, Mrs, Indian Sawhncy-in-person. (In W.P.
No. 930/90) Indra Makwana, (Jn W.P. No. 97/91) N.A. Palkhiwala, Ms. Lira
Goswami, D.N. Misra, J.B. Dadachanji, (In W.P. 948/90 for JBD & Co.)
/\. Marh1rputham & Mrs. Aruna Mathur, for Arputh::i.m, Aruna & Co. in
W.P. 966/90 R.C. Guorelc, (In W.P. No. 965/90). Petitioncrs-inperson (In
E W.P. Nos. 953 & 954/90.) S. Menon, (Jn W.P. No. 97l/90) Mrs. Shyamla
Pappu, Y.K. Chinlla, Ajay Agarwal and D.B. Vohra, (In W.P. No. 972/90)
Petitioner-in-person (In W.P. No. 949/90) O.P. Poplai, S.K. Tewari, for
Singhania & Co. in W.P. 986/90 C.S. Srinivasa Rao, (In W.P. No. 1079/90).
Mrs. K. Hingorani, (Jn W.P. No. Jl06/90) N.H. Hingorani, (In W.P. No.
F 974/90) Ms. Priya Hingorani, (In W.P. No. 343/90) Petitioner-in-person (In
W.P. No. 1158/90) Balbir Singh Gupta, (In W.P. Nos. 1071/90 & 1069/90)
K.M. Sharma &. Randhir Jain, (In W.P. 1077/90) .Jagdish Prasad, R.K.
(>upta, Pritarn Chand Kapur, (In W.P. No. 1119/90) L.K. Pandey, in W.P.
Nn. 1276/90. Prem Sunder Jha, (!n W.P. No. 1053/90) M.M. Kashyap, (In
W.P. 1102/90) Petitioners-in-person (In W.P. Nos. 1148/90 & 1120/90) P.P.
G Singh, (In W.P. No. 1105/90) 5.M. Ashri, Petitioner-in-person (In W.P ..
1112/90) R. Mohan, (In W.P. No. 1114/89) Mrs. Chitra Markandeya (NP) 1

& S. Markandeya, .(In W.P. No. 987/90) P. Parmeswara Rao, and K.K.
Gupta, (In W.P. No. 1061/90) C.S. Vaidyanathan, (Jn W.P. No. 1064/90)
S.R. Setia, (In W.P. No. 1101/90) Ms. Lira Goswami, for JBD & Co. in
H W.P. Nos. 1115, 1116 & 1117/90. Petitioner-in-person (In W.P. No.
INDIL\ Si\WHNFY 1·. U.O.l. 541

1123/90) S. B. Upadhyay, (in W.P. No. 1124/90) Ms. Rani .lcthmalani, P.K. A
Dey, Ms. Pravcen Khatra and Ms.G.K. Das, (In W.P. No. 1126/90) Ms. S.
Chaturvedi, (In 'N.I'. No.1130/90) Sushi! Kumar Jain. (In W.P. No.1141/YIJ)
Manoj Prasad, (Jn W.P. No. 1307/90) Mukul Mudgal, (ln T.C. No. 27190)
A. Subhashini, (In T.C. No. 28-33/90, 34-35/90 & 65/90) P. Parmeswaran,
(In T.C. 1/91) Mrs. Urmile Sirur and Ms. ~fanjulagupta, (In W.P. 1081/90
& lJ 1/92) S.N. Mehta, (In \V.P. No. 1362/90) Dr. Rajcev Dhawan, R.
B
Sasiprabhu and M.T. George, (In W.P. No. Hl94/91) P.N. Puri, (In W.P.
No. 1087/90) C.S.S. Rao, (In W.P.No. 1128/90) Indeevar Goodwill, (In W.P.
No. 36/91) N.S. Bist, (In W.F. No. 3/91)

Advocates appeared for tire R"'ponde/lls: c
Altaf Ahmed, Addi. Solicitor General, K. Parasaran, Mrs. Anil
Katiyar, B. Parthasarthy, Ms. \'ijay Lakshmi Mennn and Ms. A. Subhashini,
(In W.P. No. 930/90-U.O.L) Ram Jethmalani, Ms. Lala Krishnamorty, K.
Jatinder Cheema, P.K. Dey, R.K. Yadav and B.B. Singh, (For the State of D
Bihar). S. Sivasubramaniam, P.N. Ramalingam, V. Balaji and E.C.
Agrawala, (For the State of Tamilnadu) P.S Poli, V.K. Veeran, Addi.
Advoatc-General and T.T. Kunhikannan, (For the Stale of Kerala) S.C.
Roy, Advocate-General, Ms. Mona Mehta, A.K. Panda and R.K. Mehta,
(For the State of Orissa). A.S. Nambiar, Mrs. Shanta Vasudevan and P.K.
Manohar, (For the State of Pondicherry) V.K.S. Choudhary, Advocate- E
General, Vishwajit Singh, Ms. Parenna Swarup and R.B. Misra, "(For the
State of U.P.) H.S. Munjrai, G.K. Bansal, (For the State of Punjab) Sakesh
Kamar and Salish K. Agnihotri, (For the State of M.P.) A.S. Bhasme, (For
the State of Maharashtra) Pravin Choudhary, for the State of Assam. Kh.
Nobin Singh and M. Veerappa, for the State of Karnataka. Aruncshwar ·f
Gupta, for the Stale of Rajasthan. Ms. Suruchi Aggarwal and T. V.S..
Narasimhachari, for the State of Andhra Pradesh. K.R. Nambiar, Ms. Bina
Gupta and Ms. Monika Mohil, for the State of Himachal Pradesh) Ms.
lndu Malhotra and Ms. Shirin Jain, for the State of Haryana. D.K. Sinha
.l.R. Das, for the State ·of West Bengal in W.P. No. 1079/90 for Sinha and
Das. Mrs. Veena Devi Khanna, in W.P. Nos. 948, 966/90 C.V. Subba Rao G
and Ms. A. Subhashini, in W.P. No. 965/90 & in Union of India. Ms.
Kamini Jaiswal, in W.P. Nos. 965, 949 & 971-72/90. Guntur Prabhakar, In
W.P. No. 949/90. Mrs. Hemantika Wahi, In W.P. No. 1079/90. Ms. Alpana
Kirpal, Kailash Vasdev, Ranjan Dwivedi, K. Garg, A.L. Trehan, B.D.
Sharma, E.M.S. Anam, Naresh K. Sharma, M.K.D. Namboodiri, R.D. H
542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19Y2] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Upodhyay, N. Sudhakaran, M.A. Firoz, Y. Krishnamurty, D.K. Garg, R.
Karanjawala, Mrs. Nandini Gore, Mrs. Aditi Choudhary (for Mrs. M.
Karanjawala), Jagdish Prasad, R.K. Aggarwal, P.C. Kapoor, R.K. Mahesh·
wari, K.M.K. Nair, Naresh Kaushik, Lalitha Kaushik, N.D.B. Raju, Anis
Suhrawardy, Manoj Prasad, C.L. Sahu, Attar Singh, M.K. Michael, K,
Swami, Brij Bhushan, for the State ol Arunachal Pradesh.
B
Advocates appeared as Intervener:

Yasant Sathe, R.K.Garg, N.B. Shetye, D.B. Vohra, Jitendra Sharma,
S.N. Bhat, S.K. Bhattacharya, Ranjesh, KN. Rao-in-persen, Ram Avadesh
c Singh-in-person, Dr. L.M. Khanna-in-person, Shiv Pujan Singh, Dr. B.S.
chauhan, Sunil Singh, Ms. Niranjana Singh, Ms. Subhadra Chaturvedi, P.N.
Puri, S.Y. Krishnamurty, Mukul Gupta, and Yishaljeet.

The Judgments of the Court were delivered by

D JUDGMENT OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE, M.N.
VENKATACHAL!AH, A.M. AHMAD! AND B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, ff.
DELWERED BY B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.

Forty and three years ago was founded this republic with the fourfold
objective of securing to its citizens justice, liberty, equality and fraternity.
E Statesmen of the highest order · the like of which this country has not '°en
since · belonging to the fields of law, politics and public life came together
to fashion the instrument of change . the Constitution of India. They did
not rest content with evolving the framework of the State; they also pointed
out the goal-and the methodology for reaching that goal. In :he preamble,
F they spelt out the goal and in parts Ill and IV, they elaborated the
methodology to be followed f.Jr reaching that goal.

2. The Constituent Assembly, though elected on the basis of a limited
franchise, was yet representative of all sections of society. Above all, it was
composed of men of vision, conscious of the historic but difficult task of
G carving an egalitarian society from out of a bewildering mass of religions,
communities, castes, races, languages, beliefs and practices. They knew
their country well. They understood their society perfectly. They were
aware of the historic injustices and inequities afflicting the society. They
realised the imperative of redressing them by constitutional means, as early
H as possible . for the alternative was frightening. Ignorance, illiteracy and

•
INDRA SAWI-!NEY v_ U.O.!. 543

above all, mass poverty, they took note of. They were conscious of the fact A
that the Hindu religion - the religion of the overwhelming majority - as it
was being practiced, was not known for its egalitarian ethos. It divided its
adherents into four wotertight compartments. Those outside this fourtier
system ( chaturvarnya) were the outcastes (Panchamas), the lowliest. They
did not even believed all the caste system " ugly as its face was. The fourth,
shudras, were no better, though certainly better than the Panchamas. The
B
lowliness attached to them (Shudras and Panchamas) by virtue of their
birth in these castes, unconnected with their deeds. There was to be no
deliverance for them from this social stigma, except perhaps death. They
were condemned to be inferior. All lowly, menial and unsavoury occupa-
tions were assigned to them. In the rural life, they had no alternative but c
to follow these occupations, generation after generation, century after
centmy. It was their 'karma', they were told, the penalty for the sins they
allegedly committed in their previous birth. Pity is, they believed all this.
They were conditioned to believe it. This mental blindfold had to be
removed first. This was a phenomenon peculiar to this country. Poverty D
there has been - and there is - in every country. But none had the
misfortune of having this social division - or as some call it, degradation -
super-imposed on poverty. Poverty, low social status in Hindu caste system
and the lowly occupation constituted - and _do still constitute - a vicious
circle. The founding fathers were aware of all this - and more.
E
3. 'Liberty, equality and fraternity' was the battlecry of the French
Revolution. It is also the motto of our Constitution, with the concept of
'Justice-Social Economic and Poilitical' - the sum-total of modern political
thought - super-added to it. Equality has been and is the single greatest
craving of all human beings at all points of time. It has inspired many a
F
great thinker and philosopher. All religious and political schools of thought
swear by it, including the Hindu religious thought, if one looks to it ignoring
the later crudities and distortions. Liberty of thought, expression, belief,
faith and worship has equally been an abiding faith with all human beings,
and at all times in this country in particular. Fraternity assuring the dignity
of the individual has a special relevance in the Indian context, as this G
Judgment will illustrate in due course.

4. The doctrine of equality has many facets. It is a dynamic, and an
evolving concept. Its main facets, relevant to Indian Society, have been
referred to in the preamble and the articles under the sub-heading "Right H
544 Slll'REMI'. CO!IRT REPORTS IJ992J SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A lo equality"-(Articlcs 14 to 18), In short, the goal is "equality of status and
of opplntunity". Artic.:le:; 14 to 18 must be understood not _merely \Vith
reference to what they say but also in the light of the seVeral articles in
Part f\ 1 (Directive Principle:<; of State Policy). '1Justicc, Social, Ecouomic
and Political", ·is thi.: sum total of the aspiralions incorporated in part IV.

B 5. Article 14 cnjoi1ls upon the state not to deny to any person
"equality before the law" or "the equal protection of the laws" within the
territory of India, Most constitutions speak of either "equality before the
law" or "the equal protection of the laws'', but very few of both. Section 1
of the XIV Amendment to the US Constitution uses only the latter
c expression while the Austrian Constitution (1920), the Irish Constitution
(1937) and the West German Constitution (1949) use the expression "equal
before the law". (Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
11
1948, of course, declan:.:s that all are equal before the law ar.d are entitled
without any discrimination to equal protection of the law".) The content
D and sweep of these two concepts is not the same though there may be much
in common. The content of the expression "equality before the la\\~' is
illustrated not only by Articles 15 to 18 but also by the several articles in
Part IV, in par.icular, Articles 38, 39, 39A, 41 and 46, Among others, the
concept of equality before the law contemplates minimising the inequalities
in income and eliminating the inequalities in status, facilities and oppor-
E tunities not only amongst individuals but also amongst groups of people,
securing adequate means of livelihood to its citizens and to pr0mote with
special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections
of the people, including in particular the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes and lo protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploita-
tion. Indeed, in a society where equality of status and opportunity do not
F
obtain and where there are glaring inequalities in incomes, there is no room
for equality - either equality before law or equality in any other respect.

6, _The significance attached by the founding fathers to the right to
equality is evident not only from the fact that they employed both the
G expressions 'equality before the law' and 'equal protection of the laws' in
Article 14 but proceeded further to state the same rule in positive and
affirm~tive terms in Articles 15 to 18, Through Article 15 they declared in
positive terms that the state shall nOt discriminate again&t any citizen on
the grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them,
H With a view to eradicate certain prevalent undesirable practices it was
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 545

declared in clause (2) of Article 15 that no citizen shall on the grounds A
only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them be subject
to any disability, liabiliLy, restTiction or condition with regard to shops,
public rest~urants 1 hotels and place of public entertainment or to the use
of well, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and place of public resort maintained
wholly or partly out of state funds or dedicated to the use of general public.
At the same Litne, \\ith a view to ameliorate the conditions of women and B
children a provision was made in clause (1) 1hat nothing in the said Article
shall prevent the state from making any special provision for women and
children.

7. In as much as public employment always gave a certain status and C
power - it has always been the repository of State power - besides the
means of livelihood, special care was taken to decla.re equality of oppor-
tunity in the matter of public employment by Article 16. Clause (l) express-
ly declares that in the matter of public employment or appointment to any
office under the state, citizens of this country shall have equal opportunity
while clause (2} declares that no citizen shall be discriminated in the said D
matter on the grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of
birth, residence or any of them. At the same time, care was taken to declare
in clause ( 4) that nothing in the said Article shall prevent'the state from
making any provision for reservation of appointments or posts in favour of
any backward class of citizen which in the opinion of the state is not E
adequately represented in the serVice.s under the state. Article 17 abolishes
the untouchability while Article 18 prohibits conferring of any titles .(not
reprcsenling military or academic distinction). It also prohibits the citizens
of this country from accepting any litlc fro1n a foreign state.

8. Artjclc 16 has remained unamended, except for a minor amend- F
ment in clause (3) whereas Article 15 had clause (4) inserted in it by the
First Amendment Act, 1951. As amended,. they read as follows:

"15. Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion,
race, caste, sex or place of birth. - (l) The State shall not
G
discrim.inate against any_ citizen on grounds only of
religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.

(2) No citiZen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste,
sex, place of birth or any of them, be subject to any
disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to- H
546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A (a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places
of public entertainment; or

(b) the use of welis, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places
of public resort main:ained wholly or partly out of
State funds er dedicated to the use of the general
B public.

(3) Nothmg in this article shall prevent the State from
making any special provision for women and children.

(4) Nothing in this article or in clause (2) ol Article 29 shall
c prevent the State from making any special provision for the
advancement of any socially and educationally backward
classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes.

D 16. Equality of opportunity in matters of public employ-
ment. - (1) There shall be equality of opportunity for all
citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment
to any office under the State.

(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste,
E sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them, be
ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of, any
employment or office under the State.

(3) Nothing in this article shall prevent Parliament from
F making any la\\i prescribing, in regard to a class or classes
of employment or appointment to an office under the
Government of, or any local or other authority within, a
State of Union territory, any requirement as to residence
within that State or Union territory prior to such employ-
mCnt or appointment.
G
(4) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from
making any provision for the reservation of apointments or
posts in favour of any back\\·ard class of citiezens which, in
th~ opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in
H the services under the State.
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 547

. (5) Noting in this article sh~ll affect the operation of any A
law which provides that the incumbent of an office in
connection with the affairs of any religious or denomina-
tional institution or any member of the governing body
thereof shall be a person professing a particular religion or
belonging to a particular denomination.
B
The other provisions of the Constitution having. a bearing on Article
16 are Articles 38, 46 and the set of articles in Part XVI. Clause (1) of
Article 38 obligates the State to "strive to promote the welfare of the people
by securing and protecting as effectively as it may a. social order in which
justice, social, economic and political, shall inform all the institutions of the C
11
national life.

Clause (2) of Article 38, added by the 44th Amendment Act says,
11
the State shall, in particular, strive to minimise the inequalities in income,
and endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and oppor-
tunities, not only amongst individuals but also amongst groups of people D
residing in different areas or engaged in different vocations."

Article 46 contains a very significant directive to the State. It says:

46. Promotion or educational and economic interests of
Schedule'd Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other weaker
E
sections. - The State shall promote with special care the
educational and economic interests of the weaker sections
of the people, and, in particular, of the Scheduled Castes
and the Scheduled Tribes, and shall protect them from
social injustice and all forms of exploitation. 11 F
It is evident that "the· weaker sections of the people" do include the
"backward class of citizens" contemplated by Article 16(4).

Part XVI of the Constitution contains 11 special provisions relating to
certain classes''. The ''classes'' for which special provisions are made are, G
Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and the Anglo-Indian Community. It
a]so prOvides for apponintment of a Commission to investigate the condi-
tions of and the difficulties faced by the socially «nd educationally back-
~'ard classes and to make appropriate recommendations. Article 340 reads
as follows: H

,,
548 SUPREME COUkT RHOl<TS 11992] ~UPP. 2 S.C.R.

A 340. Appointment of a Commission to investigate the
canrlitions of backward clas.es. - (1) The President may
by order appoint a Commission consisting of such persons
as he thinks lit lo investigate the conditions of socially and
educationally backv1ard cJasscs ~'ithin the territory of India.
and the difficulties under which they labour and lo make
B recommendations as to the steps that should be taken by
the Union or any State to remove such difficulties and to
improve their condition and as to the grants that should be
made for the purpose by the Union or any State and the
conditions subject to which such grants should be made,
c and the order appointing such Commission shall define the
procedure to be followed by the Commission.

(2) A Conuuission so appointed !>hall investigate the mat-
t':rs referred then1 and present to the President a report
setting out the facts as found by them and making such
D recon1me-n<lations as they think proper.
/
I
(3) The President shall cause a copy of the report so
presented together with a memorandum explaining the
action taken thereon to be laid before each House of
11
E Par1ian1ent.

Article 338, which has been extensiveiy amended by the Sixty-fifth
An1cndment Act, provides for establishment of a Cotnmission for the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduied Tribes to be kr.own as ''the National
Comrnissio1; for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes''. Clause (5)
F prescribes the duties of the Commission. They are:

(5) It shall be duty of the Commission -

(a) to investigate and monitor all matters relating to the
safeguards provided for the Scheduled Castes and
G Scheduled Tribes under this Constitution or under any
other la\\' for the time being in force or under any order of
the Government and to evaluate the working of such
safeguards;

H (b) to inquire into specific complaints with respect to the
JNDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.l. 549

deprivation of rights and safeguards of the Scheduled cas- A
tes and Schednlcd Tribes;

(e) to participate and advise on the planning process of
socio-economic development of the Scheduled Castes and
Schcrluled Tribes and to evaluate the progress of their
development under the Union and any State; B
( d) to present to the President, annually and at such other
times as the Cotnmission may deem fit, reports upon the
working of those safeguards;

( e) to make in such reports recommendations as to the c
measmes that should bdaken by the Union or any State
for the r,ffcctive in1plementatio~ of thqse safeguillds and
other measures for the protection! welfare and socio-
economic development of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes; and D
(f) to discharge such other functions in relation to the
protection, \valfare antl development and advancement of
the Scheduled Castes and Scheuled Tribes as the President
may, subject to the provi~.ions of any law made·by Parlia-
ment, by rule specify." E
Clause (6) provides that "the President shall cause all such reports
to be laid before each House of Parliament along with a memorandum
explaining the action taken or proposed to be taken on the recommenda-
tions relating to the Union and the reasons for the non-acceptance, if any,
of any of such rccomrnendatio:ns.11 F

Clause (7) being relevant may also be read here. It reads, "where any
·su.eh report, or any part thereof, rehtes to any matter with which any State
Government is concerned, a copy of such report shall be forwarded to the
Governor of the State who shall cause it to be laid before the Legislature G
of th~ State along· with a memorandum explaining the action taken or
proposed t0; ~e taken on the recommendations relating to the State and
the reas()il~s fbr the nori-acceptance, if any, of any of such recommenda-
~ - . .
tions."

Clause (10) [clause (3) prior to 65th Amendment Act] bring.s in H
550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A socially and educationally backward classes identified by the Government
on the basis of the report of the Commission appointed under Article 340
and Anglo-Indians within the purview of the expressions ''Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes". It reads as follows:

"10. In this article references to the Scheduled Castes and
B Scheduled Tribes shall be construed as including refer-
ences to such other backward classes as the President may,
on receipt of the report of a Commission appointed under
clause (1) of Article 340, by order specify and also to the
Anglo-Indian community."
c Article 335 provides that "the claims of the members of the
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes shall be taken into considera-
tion, consistently with the maintenance of efficiency of administration, in
the making of appointments to services and posts in connection with the
affairs of the Union or of a State." It is obvious that if the claims of even
D Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are to be taken into consideration
consistently with the maintenance of efficiency of administration, the said
admonition has to he respected equally while taking into consideration the
claims of other backward classes and other weaker sections.

THE FIRST BACKWARD CLASSES COMMISSION (KALELKAR
E COMMISSION):

9. The proceedings of the Constituent Assembly on draft Article (10)
disclose a persistent and strident demand from certain sections of the
society for providing reservations in their favour in the matter of public
F employment. While speaking on the draft Article 10(3) [corresponding to
Article 16(4)] Dr. Ambedkar had stated, "then we have quite a massive
opinion which insists that although theoritically it is good to have the
principle that there shall be equality of oppo•tunity, there must at the same
time be a prov;sion made for t·he entry of certain communities which have
so far been outside the admirllstration.'' It \Vas this deipand which was
G mainly responsible for the incorporation of clause (4) in Article 1.6. As
matter of fact, in some of the southern States, reservations in. favour of
O.B.Cs. were in vogue since quite a number of years prior to the Constitu-
tion. There was a demand for similar reservations at the Centre. In
. response to this demand and also in realisation of its obligation to provide
H for such reservations in favour of backward sections of the society, lhe
INDRA SAWHNEY 1•. lJ.0.1. 551

Central Government appointed a Backward Class Commission under Ar- A
tide 340 of the Constitution on January 29, 1953. The Commission,
popularly known as Kaka Kalelkar Commis.;ion, was requi~ed to inves-
11

tigate the conditions of socially and educationally backward classes within
the territory of India and the difficulties under which they labour and to
make recommendations as to the steps that should be taken by the Union
or any State to remove difficulties and to improve their conditions". The B
Commission submitted its report on March 30, 1955. According to it, the
relevant factors to consider while classifying backward classes would be
their traditional occupation and profession, the percentage of literacy or
the general educational advancement made by them; the estimated popula-
tion of the community and the distribution of the various communities c
throughoufthe state or their concentration in certain areas. The Commis-
sion was also of the opinion that the social position which a community
occupies in the caste hierarchy would also have to be considered as well
as its ··representation in Government service or in the Industrial sphere.
According· to the Commission, the causes of educational backwardness D
amongst the educationally and backward communities were (i) traditional
apathy for education on account of social and environmental conditions or
occupa'iiori~l handicaps: (ii) poverty and lack of educational institutions in
rural areas and (iii) living in inaccessible areas. .The Chariman of the
commission, Kaka Kalelkar, however, had second thoughts after signing the
report. Jn the enclosing letter addressed to the President he .virtually E
pleaded for the rejection of the report on the ground that the reservations
and other remedies recommended on the bas;s. of caste would ·not be in
the interest of society and country. He opined that the,principle of caste
should be eschewed altogether. Then alone, he said, would it be possible
to help the extremely poor and deserving members of all the communities.
F
At the same time, he added, preference ought to be given to those who
come from traditionally neglected social classes.

10. The report made by the Commissio~ was considered by the·
Central Government, which apparently was not satisfied with the approach
adopted by the Commission in determining the criteria for identifying the G
backward classes under Article 15(4). The Memorandum of action ap-
pended to the Report of the Commission while placing it on the table of
the Parliament [as required by clause (3) of Article 34-0] on September 3,
1956, pointed out that' the caste system is thi: greatest hindrance in the way
of our progress to egalitarian society a.nd that iµ such a situation recogni~ H
552 SIJl'REME COURT REPORTS IJ992J SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A tion of certain specified castes as backwllrd may serve to n1aintain and
perpetuate the existing distinctions on the hasis of caste. The Mcmoran-
du1n also found fault with cerlain tests adopted by the (:ommission for
identifying the backward classes. It expressed the opinion t:hat a more
systematic and elaborate basis has to be evolved for identifying backward
classes. Be that as it may. the Rep0rt was never discussed hy the Parlia-
B ment.

11. No meaningful action was taken after 1956 either for constituting
another Commission or for evolving a hetter criteria. Ultimately, on August
14, 1961, the Central Government wrote to all the State Governments
C stating inter alia that !!while the State Governments have the discretion to
choose their own criteria for defining har:kwardne~s: in the view of the
Government of India it would be better to apply economic tests than to go
by caste." The letter stated further, rather inexplicably,** that "even jf the
Central Government were to specify under Artir:le 3~8(3) certain groups
D of people as bclonging to 'other backward classes', it will still be open to
every State Government to draw up its own lists for the purposes of
Articles 15 and 16. As, therefore, the State Governments mav adhere to
their own lists, any All-India list drawn up by the Central Government
would have no practical utiJity. 11 Various Slate Governments thereupon
appointed Commissions for identifying backward classes and i'5ued orders
E identifying the socially and educationally backward classes and rescn1ng
r~rtain percentage of posts in I he.ir favour. So far as the Central sr,rVlces
are concerned. no resen·ations were ever made in favour of other hackwilrd
classes though made in favour of Scheduled Castes and Schedulod Tribes.

THE SECOND BACKWARD CLASSES COMMISSION (MANDAL
F COMM/SS TON):

12. By an Order made by the President of India, in the year 1979,
under Article 340 of the Constitution, a Backward Class Commission 'Nas
appointed to investigate the conditions of socially and educationally hack-
G ward classes within the territory of India, which Cemmission is popularly
kncwn as Manda! Commission. The te.rm.s of reference of the Cnn1mission

• • The lists drawn by State Govemment8 would not apply to Central services. The Central
Government has got to draw up its o~n list for the purposes. of Central services, though it
may not draw up an· All-India Ii.st <i.ppliC"'.ible to Central and State Services-assuffiing that
H Central Government can draw up a list for State Government s.ervices. as wt"ll.
INDRA SAWllNl'Y 1. li.0.1. 553

were: A

"The terms of reference of the Con1n1ission \Vere:-

(i) to determine the criteria for defining the sociolly and
cduca~ionally backward classes;
B
(ii) to recommend steps to be l<tken for t:hc advancement
of the socially and educationally backward classes of
cil izcns so identified;

(iii) to examine the desirability or otherwise of making
provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in
c
favour of such backv.'ard classes of citizens which are not
adequately represenf'ed in public services and posts in
connectioin with the affairs of the Union or of any State;
and
D
(iv) present to the President a report setting out the facts
as found by them and making such recommendations as
they think proper."

The Commission was empowered to:-
E
~ (a) obtain such information as they n1ay consider neces~
1

sary or relevant for their purpose in such form and such
-.manner as they may think appropriate, from the Central
Government, the Stat.e Gov~rnmcnt, thr, Union Territory
Adm.inistra6ons and such other authorities, organisations F
or i~dividuals as may in th'e opinion of the Commission·, be
of assistance to thr,m; and

(b) hold their sittings or the sittings of such sub-committees
as they may appoint from amongst their own members of
suCh times 'lnd such plac~s a& m(jy be determined hy, or G
under the authority of the Chairman. 1'

13. The report of the Commiss~on \Vas~_rcquired to be submitted not
later than 31st December, 1979, which date ·was later extended upto
Decen1ber 31, 1980. It \\'as so submittCd. H

.. ._
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS IJ992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Chapter-I of the Report deals with the Constitution of First Back-
ward Classes Commission (Kaka Kalclkar Commission), its report, the
letter of Kaka Kalelkar lo the President, the lack of follow-up action and
the letter of the Central Government referred to hereinbefore lo State
Governments to draw up their own lists. It also poi~ts out cert~~n !tint~Tn,~l .
contradictions" in the Report. Chapter-II deals with the "Status of Other
B backward classes in some States". It sets out the several provisions relating
to reservation in favour of 0.B.Cs. obtaining in. <eyeral Stafe(and· the
history of such reservations. Chapter-III is entitled·'methoi!oiogy' and data
base'. It sets out the procedure followed by the ciim,.rni~sion ;ind the
material gathered by them. Paras 3.1 and 3.2 read thus: ~:.. \~
c
3.1. One important reason as to why the CentraJ Govern-
11

ment", could not accept the recommendatioins of Kaka
Kalelkar Commission was that it had not worked out ob-
jective teSts and criteria for the proper classification of
socially and educationaJly backward classes. In several
D
petitions filed against reservation orders issued by some
State Governments, the Supreme Court and various High
Courts have also emphasised the imperative need for an
empirical approach to the defining oi socially and educa-
tionally backwardness or identification of Other Backward
E Classes.

3.2 The Commission has constantly kept the above re-
quiremetnts in view in planning the scope of its activities.
It was to serve this very purpose that the Commission made
F special efforts to associate the leading Soc;iologists, Re·
search Organisations and Specialised Agencies of the
country v.ith every important facet of its activity. Instead
of relying on one or.~wo es_tab1ishe<l t.eachniqucs of enquiry,
we tried to caste Ol.ir tiet far and \Viele so as to collect facts
and get feed-back-from as large an area as possible. A brief
G account of this actiVity is given below."

It then refers to th~ Seminar held by Department oi
Anthropology
of Delhi University in Marc~ 1979, to the q~estionnaire issued to all
departments of Central Government: and to the Slate Governments (the
H proformas are co111piled in Vol. II ~fthe RepGrt) the country-wide touring
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 555

undertaken by the Commission, the evidence recorded by it, the socio- A
cducational field survey conducted by it and other studies and Reports
involved in its work. In Chapter-IV the Commission deals with the inter-
relationship between social backwardness and caste. It describes how the
fourth caste, Shudras, were kept in a state of intellectual and physical
subjugation and the historical injustices perpetrated on them. In para 4.5.
the Commission states: "The real triumph of the caste system lies not in B
upholding the supremacy of the Brahmin, but in conditioning the con-'.
sciousness of the lower castes in accepting their inferior status in the ritual
hierarchy as a part of the natural order of things ........ It was through an
elaborate, complex and subtle scheme of scripture, mythology and ritual
that Brahminism succeeded in investing the caste system wlth a moral c
authority that has been seldom effectively challenged even by the most
ardent social reformers. 11

14. Chapter-V deals with 'social dynamics of caste'. In this chapter,
the Commission emphasises the fact that notwithstanding public declara- D
tions condemning the caste, it has remained a significant basis of action in
politics and public life. Reference is made to several caste. associations,
which have come into being after the Constitution. The concluding part in
this Chapter, para 5.1.7, reads:

!!The above account should serve as a warning against any E
hasty conclusion about the weakening of caste as the basis
of social organis<ition of the Hjndu society. The pace of
social mobility is no doubt increasing and some traditional
features of the caste system have inevitably weakened. But
\Vhat caste has lost on the ritual front, it has more than
F
gained on the political front. This has also led to some
adjustments in the power equation between t:he high and
low castes and thereby accentuated social tensions.
Whether these tensions rent the social fabric or the country
is able to resolve them by internal adjustments will depend
on how understandingly the ruling high castes handle the G
legitimate aspirations and demands of the historically sup-
pressed and backward classes."

Chapter-VJ deals with 'Social Justice, Merit and Privilege'. It at-
tempts to establish. that merit in a elitist society is not something ;nherent H
SlJPRl'ME COURT Rl'PORTS [ 1'1921 SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A hut is lhc consequence of environmcnlal privileges cn.ioycd by the 1ncmbcrs
of higher castes. This is sought to he illustrated by giving an exa1nplc nf
two hews - Lallu and Mohan. Lallu is a village boy hclonging to a backwa"I
class occupying a low social position in the village caste hierarchy. I-le
comes from a poor illiterate family and studies at a village schnol, where
the level of instruction is woeful. On the ot.hcr hand. Mohan comes from
B a fairly well-off middle class and educated family, attends one of the good
puhlic schools in the city, has assistance at home besides the means of
acquiring knowledge through television. radio. magazines and so on. Even
though bot.h Lallu and Mohan possess the same level of intelligence, Lallu
can never compete with Mohan in any open competition because of the
c several environmental disadvantages suffered by him.

15. Chapter-Vil deals with 'Social justice. Constitution and the law'.
It refers to the relevant Provisions of the Constitution. to the decision in
M.R. Balaji & Ors. v. State of Mysore, [1961] Suppl. l S.C.R. 439 and various
subsequent decisions of this Court and discusses the principles flowing
D from the said decisions. It notes that the subsequent decisions of this Court
in C.A. Rajendran v. Union of India, [1968) 1 S.C.R. 721; State of Andhra
Pradesh & Ors. v. P. Sagar, [1968) 3 S.C.R. 595 and State of Andhra Pradesh
& Ors. v. U.S.V. Bairam, [197213 S.C.R. 247 etc. e.how a marked shift from
the original position taken in Balaji on scvcrJ! important points. In par-
E ticular, it refers to the observations in Rajendran to the effect that "caste
is also a class of citizens and if the class as a whole is socially and
educationally backward, reserval ion can be made in favonr of such a caste
on the ground that it was socially and edocationally backward class of
citizens within the meaning of Article 15(4) 11 • It refer5 to the statement in
A. Peeriakamppan etc. v. Stae of Tamil Nadu, [1971! 2 S.C.R. 430, to the
F effect that 11 a caste has always been recognised as a class. 11 It also co111mends
the dissenting view of Subba Rao, J. in T. Devadasan v. Un inn of bidia,
[1964] 4 S.C.R. 680, (wrongly referred to as Rangachari) - Genral Mana1:er,
Southem Railway v. Rangahari, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 586.

G Chapter-VIII deals with 'North-South Comparison of other Back-
ward Classes Welfare'. It is a case study of provisions in force in two
Southern States namely Tamil Nadu and Karnataka and the two Northen
States, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. The conclusions drawn from the discus-
sion arc stated in para 8.45 in the following words:

H "In view of the foregoing account. the reasons for much
INDRA SAWHNEY "- U.O.l. 557

stronger reaction in the North than South to reservations, A
etc. for other Back\vard Classes may be summarised as
below:-

(J) Tamil Nadu and Karnalaka had a long history of Back-
ward Cl::tsses 1noven1ents and various n1easures for their
welfare were taken in a phased manner. In Uttar Pradesh B
and Bihar such measures did not mark the culmination of
a mass movement.

(2) Jn the South "the forward communities have been
divided either by the classification schemes or politically
or both ......... In Bihar and U.P. the G.Os. have not divided
c
the forward castes. 11

(3) In the South, clashes between Scheduled Castes and
Backward peasant castes have been rather mild. In the
North these cleavages have been much sharper, often D
resulting in acts of violence. This has furhter weakened the
backward classes solidarity in the North.

(4) In the non-Sanskritic South, the basic Varna cleavage
was between Brahmins and non-Brahmins and Brahmins
constituted only about 3 per cent of the population. In the
E
Sanskritic North, there was no sharp cleavage between the-
forward castes and together they constituted nearly 20 per
cent of the population. In view of this the higher castes in
U.P. and Bihar were in a stronger position to mobilise
opposition to backward class movement. F

(5) Owing to the longer history and better organisation of
Other Backward castes in the South, they were able to
acquire considerable political clout. Despite the lead given
by the Yadavas and other peasant castes, a unified and
strong OBC movement has. not emerged in the North so
G
far.

(6) The traditions of semifeudalism in Uttar Pradesh and
Bihar have e-nabled the forward castes to keep tight control
over smaller backward castes and prevent them from join· H
558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A ing th9 mainstream of backward classes n1ovcn1ent. This is
not so in the south.

(7) "The economies of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka have
been expanding relatively faster. The private tertiary sector
appears lo be growing. It can shelter many forward caste
B youths. Also, they are prepared to migrate outside the
State. The private tertiary sectors in Bihar and U.P. are
stagnant. The forward caste youths in these two States have
to depend heavily on Government jobs. Driven to despera-
tion, they have reacted \1olently."
c
17. Chapter-IX sets out the evidence tendered by Central and State
Governments while Chapter-X deals with the evidence tendered by the
Public. Chapter-Xl is quite important inasmuch as it deals with the "Socio-
Educational Field Survey and Criteria of Bac6wardness". In this Chapter,
the Commission says that it decided to tap a of number of sources for the
D collection of data, keeping in mind the criticism against the Kaka Kalelkar
Commission as also the several Judgments of this Court. It says that
Socio-Educational Field Survey was the most comprehensive inquiry made
by the Commission in this behalf. Right from the beginning, this Survey was
designed with the help of top social scientists and specialists in the country.
Experts from a number of disciplines were associated with different phases
E
of its progre55, It refers to the work of Research Planning Team of
Sociologists and the work done by a panel of experts led by Prof. l'>.N.
Srinivas. ft refers to the fact that both of them concurred that "in the Indian
context such collectivities can be castes or other hereditary groups tradi-
tionally associated \Vith spt!cific occupations which arc considered to be
F low and in1pure and \Vith which educational backwardness and lo\\' income
arc found to be assuciated. 11 The Commis:'lion says furtht:r that with a vie\I,'
to providing co·ntinuous guidance at the operational level, <.i 'l'echnical
Advisory Committee was set up under Dr. K.C. Seal. Director General,
Central Statistical Organisation with the Chief Executive, National Sample
Survey Organisation and representatives of Directors of State Bureau of
G Economics ·and Statistics as Members. The Commission sets out the
Methodology evolved by the Experts' panel and states that survey opera-
tions were entrusted to the State Statistical Organisations of the concerned
States/Union Territories. It refers to the training imparted to the survey
staff and to the fact that the entire data so collected was led into a
computer for electronic processing of such data. Out of the 406 districts in
H the country, lhe survey covered 405 districts. In every district, two villages
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.l. 559

and enc urban block was selected and in each of these villages and urban A
blocks, every single household was surveyed. The entire data collected was
tabulated "ith the aid and National lnformatic Centre of Electronics
Commission of India. 1he Technical Committee constituted a Sub-Com-
mittee of Experts to help the Commission prepare "Indicators of Back-
wardness" for analysing the data contained in the computerised tables. In
para 11.23 (page 52) the Commission sets out the eleven Indicators/Criteria B
evolved by it for determining social and educational backwardness. Paras
11.23, 11.24 and 11.25 are relevant and may be set out in full:-

11.23. As a result of the above exercise, the Commission
evolved eleven 'indicators' or 'criteria' for delcrmining
social and educational backwardness. These 11 'Indicators' c
were grouped under three broad heads, i.e., Social, Educa-
tional and Economic. They are :-

A. Social:
'D
(i) Castes/Classes considered as socially backward by
others.

(ii) Castes/Classes which mainly depend on manual
labour for their livelihood.
E
(iii) Castes/Classes where at least 25% females and
10% 1nales above the state average g~t rQarried at
an age belo\v 17 years in rural areas and at least
10% fen1ales and 590 males do so in urban areas.

(iv) CaslcS/Classes. where participati.on .of fe1nales in F
work is at least 25% above ·the State average.

B. Educational :

(v) Castes/Classes where the. number of children in the
G
age group of 5-15 years who never attended school
is at least.25% above the Stat~ average.

(vi) Castes/Classes where the rate of student drop-out
in the age group of 5-15 years is at least 25% above
the State average. H
560 SUPREME COURT REl'ORTS j1992J SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A (vii) Castes/Classes amongst whom the proportion of
matriculates is at least 25% below the State average.

C. Econurnic :

(viii) Castes/Classes where the average value of farnily
B assets is at least 25% below the State average.

(ix) Castes/Classes where the number of families living
in Kuccha houses is at least 25% above the State
average.

c (x) Castes/Classes where the source of drinking water
is beyond half a kilometer for more than 50% of
the households.

(xi) Castes/Classes where the number of households
having taken consumption loan is at least 25%
D above the State average.

11.24. As the above three groups are not of equal impor-
tance for our purpose, separate weightage was given to
'Indicators' in each group. All the Social 'Indicators' were
given a wcightagc of3 points each. Educational 'Indicators'
E a weightagc of 2 points each and Economic 'Indicators' a
wcightage of one point each. Economic, in addition to
Social and Educational tndicators, were considered impor-
tant as thry directly flowed from social and educational
backwardness. This also helped to highlight the fact that
F socially and educationally backward classes are economi-
cally backward also.

11.25. It will be seen that from the values given to each
Indicators, the total score adds upto 22. All these 11
Indicators were applied to all the castes covered by the
G survey for a particular State. As a result of this application,
all castes which had a score of 50 percent (i.e., 11 points)
or above were listed as socially and educationally backward
and the rest w~re treated as 'advanced'. (It is a sheer
coincidence that the number of indicators and minimum
H point score for backwardness, both happen ·to.be eleven).
INDRA SAWllNEY v. U.0.1. 561

Further, in case the number of households covered by the A
survey for any particular caste were below 20, it was left
out of consideration, as the sa1nple was considered too
small for any dependable inference.

It will also be useful to set out the observations of the Commission
in para 11.27> B
"l 1.27. In the end it may be emphasised that this survey has
no pretentious to being a piece of academic research. It
has been conducted by the administrat tve machinery of the
Government and used as a rough and ready tool for evolv-
ing a set of simple criteria for identifying social and educa-
c
tional backwardness. Throughout this survey our approach
has been conditioned by practical considerations, realities
of field conditions, constraints of resources and trained
manpower and paucity of time. All these factors obviously
militate against the requirements of a technically sophisti- D
cated and academically ;atisfying operation."

17. Chapter-XII deals with 'Identification of OBCs'. In the first
instance, the Commission deals with OBCs among Hin4u Communities. It
says that it applied several tests for determining the SEBCs like stigmas of
low-occupation, criminality, nomadism, beggary and untouchability besides E
inadequate representation in public services. 'fhe multipie approach
adopted by the (~omrnission is set out in para 12.7 which reads:·

"12.7. Thus, the Commission has adopted a multiple ap-
proach for the preparation of comprehensive lists of Other
Backward Classes for all the States· and Union Territories. F
The main sources examined for the preparation of these
lists are:·

.' (i) Socio-educational field survey;

(ii) Census Report of 1961 (particularly for the iden-
G
tification of primitive tribes, aboriginal tribes, hill
tribes, forest tribes and indigenous tribes);

(iii) Personal knowledge gained through extensive tour-
ing of t:he country and receipt of voluminous public
562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A evidences as described in Chapter X of this Report;
and

(iv) Lists of OBCs notified by various State Governments."

The Commission next deals with OBCs among Non-Hindu Cum-
B munities. In paragraphs 12.11to12.16 the Commission refers to the fact that
even among Christian, Muslim and Sikh religions, which do not recognise
caste, the caste system is prevailing though without religious sanction. After
giving a good deal of thought lo several difficulties in the way of identifying
OBCs among Non-Hindus, the Commission says, it has evolved a rough and
C ready criteria viz., (!) all untouchables coverted to any Non-Hindu religion
and (2) such occupational communities which are known by the name of their
traditional hereditary occupation and whose Hindu counter-parts have been
included in the list of Hindu OBCs - ought to be treated as SEBCs. The
Commi;;ion then sought to work out the estimated population of the OBCs
in the country and arrived at the figure of 52 per cent. Paras 12.19, 12.22 may
D be set out in full in view of their relevancy:

"12.19 Systematic caste-wise enumeration of pupulation
was introduced by the Registrar General of India in 1881
and discontinued in 1931. In view of this, figures of caste-
Wise population beyond 1931 are not available. But assum-
E ing that the inter se rate of growth of population of various
castes communities and religious groups over the last half
a century has remained more or less the same, it is possible
to work out the percentage that all these groups constitute
of the total population of the country.
F
12.22. From the foregoing it Will be seen that excluding
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward
Classes constitute nearly 52% of the Indian population.

Percentage Distribution of Indian Population by
G Caste and Religious Groups. '·

S.No. Group Name percentage
of Tptal
population

H I. Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 563

A-I Scheduled Castes 15.05 A
A-2 Scheduled Tribes 7.51

Total of 'A' 2.56

.IL Non-Hindu Comn1unities, Religious Groups, etc.
B
B-1 Muslims (other than STs) 11.19 (0.02)'
B-2 Christians (other than STs) 2.16 (0.44)'
B-3 Sikhs (other than SCs & STs) 1.67 (0.22)'
B-4 Bndhists (other than STs) 0.67 (0.03)*
B-5 Jains 0.47
c
Total of 'B' 16.16

Ill. Forward Hindu Castes & Communities

C-1 Brahmins (including Bhnmidars) 5.52
C-2 Rajputs 3.90 D
C-3 Marathas 2.21
C-4 lats 1.00
C-5 Vaishyas-Bania, etc. 1.88
C-6 Kayasthas 1.07
C-7 Other forward Hindu castes groups 2.00
E
Total of 'C' 17.58

TOTAL OF 'A', 'B' & 'C' 56.30

IV. Backward Hindu Castes & Communities
F
D. Remaining Hindn castes/groups which come in the
category of "Other Backward Classes" 43.70@

V. ,Backward Non-Hindu ,Commnnitites

· E. 52% of religions groups under Section B may also be G
· treated as OBCs. 8.40

F. The approximate derived population-of Other Back-
ward Classes including non-Hindu Communities. 52%

(Aggregate of D & E, rounded) H
5M SliPRFMF COURT REPORTS IJ992J SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A @This is a derived figure.

'Figures in brackets give the population of S.C. & S.T.
among these non-Hindu Comraunitics."

18. C:hapter-Xlll contains various recomn1_endations including reser-
B
vations in services. In view of the decisions of the Supreme Court limiting
the total reservation to 50 per cent, the Commission recommended 27 per
cent reservation in favour of OBCs (in addition to 22.5 per cent already
existing in favour of SCs and STs). It recommended several measures for
improving the condition of these backward classes. Chapter-XIV contains
c a summary of the report.

19. Volumes 2 to 9 of the Report contain and set out the material
and the data on the basis of which the Commission made its recommen-
dations. Vol. II contains the State-wise lists of Backward Classes, as
D identified by the Commission. (It may be remembered that both the
Scheduled Castes order and Scheduled Tribes order notified by the Presi-
dent contain State-wise lists of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes).
Volume II inter alia contains the questionnaire issued to the State Govern-
ments/Union Territories, the qur.stionnaire issued to the Central Govern-
E ment Ministries/Departments, the questionnaire issued to the general
public, the list of M.Ps. and other experts who appeared and gave c11dence
before the Commission, the criteria furnished to <~entral Government
offices for identifying OBC employees for both Hindu and non-Hindu
Communities, report of the Reasearch Planning Team of the Sociologists
and the proformas employed in conducting the Socio-Education Survey.
F
20. The Report of the Manda! Commission was laid before each
House of Parliament and discussed on two occasions - once in 1982 and
again in the year 1983. The proceedings of the Lok Sabha placed before :
us contain the statement of Sri R. Venkataraman, the then Minister for
G Defence and Home Affairs. He expressed the view that "the debate has cut
across party lines and a number of people on this side have supported the
recommendations of the Manda] Commission. A 1.arge number of people
on the other side have also supported it. If one goes through the entire
debate one will be impressed with a fairly unanimous desire on the part of
H all sections of the House to find a satisfactory solution to this social evil of
INDRA SAWHNEY 1·. !HJ.I. 565

backwardness of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes etc. which is a fester- A
ing sore in our body politic." The Hon'ble Minister then proceeded to
state,'' the Members generally said that the recommendations_ should be
accepted. Some Members said that it should be accepted in toto. Some
Members have said that it should be accepted with certain reservations.
Some Members said, there should be other criteria than only social and
B
educational backwardnecs. But all these are ideas which Government will
take into account. The problem that confronts Government today is to
arrive at a satisfactory definition of backward classes and bring about an
acceptance of the same by all the state concerned." The Hon'ble Minister
referred to certain difficulties the Government was facing in implementing
the recommendations of the Commission on account of the large number c
of castes identified and on account of the variance in the State lists and
the Manda! Commission lists and stated that consultation with various
departments and State Governments was in progress in this behalf. He
stated that a meeting of the Chief Ministers would be convened shortly to
take decisions in !he matter. D

The Report was again discussed in the year 1983. The then Hon'hle
Minister for Home Sri P.C. Sethi, while replying to the debate stated:
nwhile referring to the Commission whose report has been discussed today,
I would like to remind the House that although this Commission had been E
appointed by our predecessor Government, we now desire to contin.ue with
this Commission and implement its recommendations. 1'

77ie Office Memorandum dated 13th August, 1990:

21. No action was, however, taken on the basis of the Mandal
F
Commission Report until the issuance of the Office Memorandum on 25th
September, 1991. On that day, the then Prime Minister Sri V.P. Singh made
a statement in the Parliament in which he stated inter alia as follows:

"After all, if you take the strength of the whole of the G
Government employees as a proportion of the population,
it will be 1% or 1-1/2. I do not know exactly, it may be less
than 1%. We are under no illusion that this 1% of the
population, or a fraction of it will resolve the economic
problems of the whole section of 52%. No. We consciously H
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A want to give them a position in the decision-making of the
country, a share in the power structure. We talk about
merit. What is the merit of the system itself? That the
section which has 52% of the population gets 12.55% in
Government employment. What is the merit of the system?
That in Class I employees of the Government it gets only
B
4.69%, for 52% of the population in decision-making at the
top echelons it is not even one-tenth of the population of
the country; in the power structure it hardly 4.69. I want to
challenge first the merit of the system itself before we come
and question on the merit, whether on merit to reject this
c individual or that. And we want to change the structure
basically, consiciously, with open eyes. And I know when
changing the structures comes, there will be resistance ...... .

What I want to convey is that treating unequals as equals
D is the greatest injustice.

And, correction of this injustice is very important and that
is what I want to convey. Here, the National Front
Government's Commitment for not only change of Govern-
ment, but also change of the social order, is something of
E great significance to all of us: it is a matter of great sig-
Pificance. Merely making programmes of economic henefit
to various sections of the society will not do .......

There is a very big force in the argument to involve the
F poorest in the power structure. For a lot of time we have
acted on behalf of the poor. We represent the poor ......

Let us forget that the poor are begging for some crumbs.
They have suffered it for thousands of years. Now they are
fighting for their honour as a human being.........
G
A point was made by Mahajan ji that if there are different
lists in different States how will the Union List harmonise?
It is so today in the case of the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes. That has not caused a problem. On the
H same pattern, this will be there and there will be no prob-
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 567

lem." A
22.The Office Memorandum dated 13th August, 1990 reads as fol-
lows:

OFFICE MEMORANDUM
B
Subject : Recommendations of the Second backward Clas-
ses Commission (Manda! Report) - Reservation for
Socially and Educationally Backward Classes in ser-
vices under the Government of India.

In a multiple undulating society like ours, early achieve- c
ment of the objective of social justice as enshrined in the
Constitution is a must. The Second Backward Classes
Commission called the Manda! Commission was estab-
lished by the then Government with this purpose in view,
which submitted its report to the Government of India on D
31.12.1980.

2. Goveynment have carefully considered the report and
the recommendations of the Commission in the present
context regarding the benefits to be extended to the socially
E
and educationally backward classes as opined by the Com-
mission and are of the clear view that at the outset certain
weightage has to be provided to such classes in the services
of the Union and their Public Undertakings. Accordingly
orders are issued as follows:-
F
(i) 27% of the vacancies in civil posts and services under
the Government of India shall be reserved for SEBC.

(ii) The aforesaid reservation shall apply to vacancies to
be filled by direct recruitment. Detailed instructions
relating to the procedures to be followed for enforcing
G
reservation will be issued separately.

(iii) Candidates _belonging to SEBC recruited on the basis
of merit in an open competition on the same standards
prescribed for the general candidates shall not be H
568 SlJPREME COlJJ(T REPORTS 119921SUPP.2 S.C.R.

A adjusted against the reservation quota of 27%.
(iv) The SEBC would comprise in the first phase the
castes and communities which are common to both the
list in the report of the Manda! Commission and the
State Governments' lists. a list of such castes/com-
B munities is being issued separately.

(v) The aforesaid reservation shall take effect from
7.8.1990. However, this will not apply to vacancies
where the recruitment process has already been in-
itiated prior to the issue of these orders.
c
3. Similar instructions in respect of public sector undertak-
ings and financial institutions including public sector banks
will be issued by the Department of Public Enterprises and
Ministry of Finance respectively.
D
sd/-
(Smt. Krishna Singh)
Joint Secretary to the ~ovt. of India!!

23. Soon after the issuance of the said Memorandum there was
E wide-spread protest in certain Northern States against it. There occurred
serious disturbanace to law and order involving damage to private and
public property. Some young people lost their lives hy self-immolation.
Writ Petitions were filed in rhis Court questioning the said Memoradum
along with applications for staying the operation of the Momorandum. It
F was stayed hy this court.

The Office Memorandum dated 25th September, 1991:

24. After the change of the Government at the centre following the
general election held in the first half of 1991 1 another Office Memorandum
G was issued on 25th September, 1991 modifying lhe earlier Memorandum
dated 13th August. 1990. The faler Mnmornndum reads as follows:

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

Subject: Recommendations of the Second Backward Clas-
H ses Commission (Manda! Rcpor!) - Reservation for socially
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 569

and Educationally Backward Classes in service under the A
• Government of India .

The undersigned is directed to invite the attention to O.M.
of even number dated the 13th August, 1990, on the above
mentioned subject and to say that in order to enable the
poorer sections of the SEBCs to receive the benefits of B
reservation on a preferential basis and to provide reserva-
tion for other economically backward sections of the
people not covered by any of the existing schemes of
reservation, Government have decided to amend the said
Memorandum with immediate effect as follows:- c
(i) Within the 27% of the vacancies in civil posts and
services under the Government of India reserved for
SEBCs, preference shall be given to candidates
belonging to the poorer sections of the SEBCs. In case
sufficient number of such candidates are not available, D
unfilled vancancies shall be filled by the other SEBC
candidates.

(ii) 10% of the vancies in civil posts and services ·under
the Government of India shall be reserved for other E
economically backward sections of the people who are
not covered by any of the existing schemes of reserva-
tion.

(iii) The criteria for determining the poorer sections of
the SEBCs or the other economirnlly backward sec- F
tions of the people who are not covered by any of the
existing schemes of reservations are being issued
... separately .

The O.M. of even number dated the 13th August, 1990,
shall be deemed to have been amended to the eXlent
G
specified above.

sd/-
(A.K. Harit)
DY. SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA" H
570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A 25. Till now, the Central Government has not evolved the econoiflic-
criteria as contemplated by the later Memorandum, though the hearing of
these writ petitions was adjourned on more than one occasion for the
purpose. Some of the writ petitions have meanwhile been amended chal-
lenging the later Memorandum as well. Let us notice at this stage what do
B the two memoradums say, read together. The first provision made is: 27%
of vacancies to be filled up by direct recruitment in civil posts and services
under the Goverument of India are reserved for backward classes. Among
the members of the backward classes preference has to be given to can-
didates belonging to the poorer sections. Only in case, sufficient number
of such candidates are not available, will the unfilled vacancies he filled by
c other backward class candidates. The second provision made is: backward
class candidates recruited on the basis of merit in open competition along
with general candidates shall not be adjusted against the quota of 27%
reserved for them. Thirdly, it is provided that backward classes shall mean
those castes and communities which are common to the list in the report
D of the Manda! Comruission and the respective State Government's list. It
may be remembered that Manda! Commission has prepared the list of
backward classes State-wise, Lartly, it is provided that 10% of the vacancies
shall be reserved for other economically backward sections of the people
who are not covered by any of the existing schemes of reservations. As
E stated above, the criteria for determining the poorer sections among the
backward classes or for determining other economically backward sections
among the non-reserved category has so far not been evolved. Though the
first Memorandum stated that the orders made therein shall take effect
from 7.8.1990, they were not in fact acted upon on account of the orders
F made by this Court.

Issues for consideration:

26. These writ petitions were heard in the first instance by a Con-
stitution Bench presided over by the then Chief Justice Sri Ranganath
-
G Misra. After hearing them for some them. the Constitution Bench referred
them to a Special Bench of Nine Judges, "to finally settle the legal position
relating to reservations." The reason for the reference being, 1'that the
several Judgments of this Court have not spoken in the same voice on this
issue and a final look by a larger Bench in our opinion should settle the
H la\v in an authoritative wayn,
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 571

We have, accordingly, heard all the parties and intervenors who A
wished to be heard in the matter. Written submissions have been filed by
almost all the parties and intervenors. Together, they run into several
hundreds of pages.

At the inception of arguments, counsel for both sides put their heads
together and framed eight questions arising for our discussion. They read
B
as follows:

(1) Whether Article 16(4) is an exception to Article 16(1) and would
be exhaustive of the right to reservation to posts in services under the
State? c
(II) What would be the content of the phrase Backward Class in
Article 16(4) of the Constitution and whether caste by itself could con-
stitute a class and whether economic criterion by itself could identify a class
for Article 16(4) and whether backward Classes in Article 16(4) would D
include the Article 46 as well?

(III) If economic criterion by itself could not constitute a Backward
Classe under Article 16(4) whether reservation of posts in services under
the State based exclusively on economic criteria would be covered by
Article 16(1) of the Constitution? E

(IV) Can the extent of reservation to posts in the services under the
State under Article 16(4) or. if permitted under Articles 16(1) and 16(4)
together, exceed 50% of the posts in a cadre or Service under the State or
exceed 50% of the appointment in a cadre or Service in any particular year F
and can such extent of reservation b~ determined without determining the
inadequacy of representation of each class in the different categories and
grades of Services under the State?

(V) Does Article 16( 4) permit the classification of 'Backward
Classes' into Backward Classes and Most Backward Classes or permit G
Classification among them based on economic or other considerations?

(VI) Would making "any provision" under Article 16(4) for reserva-
tion by the State'' nccessnrily have to be by la¥/ made by the Legislatures
11

of the State or by law made by Parliament? Or could such provisions be H
572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A made by an executive order?

(VII) Will the extent of judicial review be limited or restricted in
regard to the identification of Backward Classes and the percentage of
reservations made for such classes, to a demonstrably perverse identifica- ..
tion or a demonstrably unreasonable percentage?
B
(VIII) Would reservation of appointments or posts "in favour of any
Backward Class" be restricted to the initial appointment to the post or
would it extend to promotions as well?

For the sake of convenient discussion and in the interest of clarity,
c we found it necessary to elaborate them. Accordingly, we have re-framed
the questions. We shall proceed to answer them in the same order. The
rcframed questins are:

l(a) Whether the 'provision' contemplated hy Article 16(4) must
D necessarily be made by the legislative wing of the State?

(h) If the answer to clause (a) is in the negative, whether an executive
order nlaking such a provision is enforceable without incorporating it into
a rule made under the proviso to Article 309?

E 2(a) Whether clause (4) of Article 16 is an exception tr, clause (1)
of Article 16?

(b) Whether clause (4) of Article 16 is exhaustive of the special
provisions that can he made in favour of 'hackward class of citizens'?
\Vhcthcr it is exhaustive of the special provisions that can he made in
F favour of all sections. classes or groups?

( c) Whether reservations can be made under clause (1) of Article 16
or whether it permits only ext.ending of preferences/concessions?

G 1(a) What does the expression 'backward cla<S of citizens' in Article
16( 4) means?

(b) Wh•other backward classes can be identified on the basis and with
reference to caste alone?

H (c) Whether a class, to be designated as a backward class, should be
INDRA SAWllNEY v. U.0.1. 573

situated similarly to the S.Cs./S.Ts.? A
( d) Whether the 'means' lest can be applied in the course of iden-
tification of backward classes? And if the answer is yes, whether providing
such a test is obligatory'

4(a). Whether the backward classes can be identified only and ex- B
elusively with reference to economic criteria?

(b) Whether a criteria like occupation-cum-income without reference
to caste altogether, can be evolved for identifying the backward classes'!

5. Whether the backward classes can be further categorised into c
backward and more backward categories'!

6. To what extent can the reservation be made?

(a) Whether the 50% rule enunciated in Balaji a binding rule or only D
a rule of caution or rule of prudence?

(b) Whether the 50% rule, if any, is confined to reservations made
under clause (4) of Article 16 or whether it takes in all types of reservations
that can be prm1ded under Article 16?
E
(c) Furthc1 while applying 50% rule, if any, whether an year should
be taken as a unit or whether the total strength of the cadre should be
looked to?

(d) Whether Devadasan was correctly decided?
F
7. Whether Article 16 permits reservations being provided m the
matter of promotions?

8. Whether reservations are anti-meritian? To what .extent are Ar-
ticles 335,38(2) and 46 of the Constitution relevant in the matter of con-
struing Article 16? G

9. Whether the extent of judicial review is restricted with regard to
the identification of Backward Classes and the percentage of reservations
made for such classes to a demonstrably perverse identification or a
demonstr~bly unreasonable percentage? H
574 SUPREME COURT REJ'ORTS [1992J SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A 10. Whether the distinction n1adc in the Mernorandun1 between
'poorer sections' of the back\vard classes and others permissible under
Article 16?

11. Whether the reservation of 10% of the posts in favour of 'other
economically backward sections of the people who are not covered by any
B of the existing schemes of the reservations) made by the Office Memoran-
dum dated 25.9.1991 permissible under Article 16?

26A. Before we proceed to deal with the question, we may be
permiued to n1ake a few observations: The questions arising herein are not
c only of great morr1enl and consequence, they are also extremely delicate
and sensitive. They rLprcsent con1plcx problems of Indian Society, wrapped
and presented to us as constitutional and legal questions. On son1e of these
questions, the decisions of this Court have not been uniform. They speak
with more than one voice. Several opposing points of view have been
D pressed upon us with equal force and passion and quite often with great
emotion. We recognize that these view-points are held genuinely by the
respective exponents. Each of them feels his own point of view is the only
right one. We cannot, however, agree with all of them. We have to find -
and we have tried 0ur best lo find - answers which.according to us are the
E right one> constitutionally and legally. Though, we are siting in a larger
Bench, we have kept in mind the relevance and significance of the principle
of Stare decisis. We are conscious of the fact that in law certainty, consis~
tency and continuity are highly desirable features. Where a decision has
stood the test of time and has never been doubted, we have respected it -
unless, of course, there are compelling and strong reasons to depart from
F it. Where, however, such uniformity is not found, we have tried to ans\ver
the question on principle keeping in mind the scheme and goal of our
Constitution and the material placed before us.

There are occasions when the obvious needs to be stated and, we
G think, this is one such occasion. We are dealing with complex social,
constitutional and legal questions upon which there has been a sharp
division of opinion in the Society, which could have been settled more
satisfactorily through political processes. But that was not to be. The issues
have been relegated to the judiciary - Which shows both the disincliriation
H of the executive to grapple with these sensitive issues as also the confidence
INDRA Si\WHNEY v. U.0.1. 575

reposed in this organ of the Slate. We are reminded of what Sir Anthony A
Mason, Chief Justice of Australia once said:

nsocicty exhibits more signs of conflict and disagreement
today than it did bcforc ......... Governmenls have always had
the option of leaving questions to be determined by the
courts according to law ............. . B
There are other reasons, of course ---- that cause govern-
ments to leave decisions to be made by Courts. They are
of expedient political character. The community may be so
divided on a particular issue that a government feels that
the safe course for it to pursue is to leave the issue to be c
resolved by the Courts, thereby diminishing the risk it will
alienate significant sections of the Community."

But then answering a question as to the legitimacy of the Court to decide
such crucial issues, the learned Chief Justice says:
D
"........my own feeling is that the people accept the Courts
as the appropriate means of resolving disputes when gover-
nemtns decide not to attempt to solve the disputes by the
political process."
(Judging the World: Law and Politics in the Worlds E
Leading Courts - page 343)

We hope and trust that our people too are mature enough to ap-
preaciate our endeavour in the same spirit. They may well remember that
"the law is not an abstract concept removed from the society it serves, and F
that Judges, as safe-guarders of the Constitution, must constantly strive to
narrow the gap between the ideal of equal justice and the reality of social
inequality."

.PART- II
G
Before we pro,ceed to answer the questions.aforementioned, it would
be helpful to notice (a) the debates in the Constituent Assembly on Article
16 (draft Article 10); (b) the decisions of this Court on Articles 16 and 15;
and (c) a few decisions of the U.S.Supreme Court considering the validity
of race-conscious programmes. H
57<1 SUl'Rl'.MF COllkT REPORTS l1992J SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A 771e f~rarning ofAniclc l6: Dehutes in the Constituent AssenibZr

25. Draft Article 10 corresponds lo Article 16. The debate in the
Cnnst1tucnt Assembly on draft Article 10 and particularly clause (3),
•
thereof feorrcsponding to clause (4) of Article 16) helps us lo appreciate
I he background and understand the objective underlying Article 16, and in
B
particular, clause (4) thereof. The origi11al intent comes out clear and loud
l ro111 lhcse debaLrs.

Omitting draft clause (4) [which corresponds to clause (5) of Article
1.6) the three clauses in draft Article 10, as introduced in the ConstitLLent
c As;;e1nb1y, read as follows:

"10(1 ). There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens
in matters of employment under the State.

D (2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste,
sex, descent, place of birth or any of them by ineligible fur
any office under the State.

(3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from
making any provision for the reservation of appointments
E
or posts in favour of any class of citizens who in the opinion
of the State are not adequately represented in the services
under the Statc.'1

lt was the Drafting Committee under the Chairmanship of Dr. B.R.
F Ambedkar that inserted the word ''backward" in between the words "in
favour of any'' and "class of citizens". The discussion on draft Article 10
took place on November 30, 1948. Serveral members including S/Sri
Damodar Swamp Seth, Pt. Hirdya Nath Kunzru and R.M. Nalavade com-
-
plained that the expressions 'backward' and 'backward classes' are quite
G vague and are likely to lead to complications in future. They suggested that
appointments to public services should be made purely on the basis of
merit. Some others suggested that such reservations should be available
only for a period of first ten years of the Coustitution. To this criticism the
Vice-President of the Assembly (Dr. H.C.Mookherjee) replied in the
H following words:
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 577
11
Before we start the general discussion, I would like to A
place a partaicular matter before the Honourable Mem-
bers. ·The clause which has so long been under discussion
affects particularly certain sections of our population ·
sections which have in the past been treated very cruelly -
and although we are -today prepared to make reparation
B
for the evil deeds of our ancestors, still the old story
continues, at least here and ihere, and capita'l is made out
of it outside India ....... .! would therefore very much ap-
preciate the permission of the House so that I might give
full discussion on this particular matter to our brethren of
the backward classes. Do 1 have that permiS&ion?" c
26. In the ensuing discussion Sri Chandrika Ram (Bihar-General)
supported draft clause (3) with great passion. He pleaded for reservations
in favour of Backward Classes both in services as well as in the legislature,
just as in the case of Harijans. ~ D
Sri Chandrika Ram was supported by another Member Sri P.Kakkan
(Madras-General) and Sri T.Channiah (Mysore), Sri Chan~Jah, in par-
ticular, co~mented upon the Members coming from Northern India being
puzzled about' the meaning of the expression 'backward class' and
proceeded to clarify the same in the following words:- E

"The backward classes of people as. understood in South
India, are tho~e classes of people who are educationaily
backward, it is those classes that require adequate repre-
sentation in the services. There are other classes of people F
who are socially backward; they also require adequate
representation in the service."

27. After the discussion proceeded for some more time, Sri
KM.Munshi, who was a Member of the Drafting Committee rose to
explain the content of the word 'backward'. He said:- G

"\\'.hat we want to secure by this clause are two things. In
the fundamental right in the first clause we want to aChieve
the highest efficiency in the services of the State-highest
efficiency which \Vould enable the services to function H
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A effectively and promptly. At the same time, in view of the
conditions in our country prevailing in several provinces,
we want to see that backward classes, classes who are really
backward, should be given scope in the State services; for
it is realised that State services give a status and an oppor-
tunity to serve the country, and this opportunity should be
B
extended to every community, even among the backward
people. That being so, we have to find out some generic
term and the worcl "backward class" was the best possible
11
term.

c Sri Munshi proceeded to state:

"! may point out that in the province of Bombay for several
years now, there has been a definition of backward classes,
which includes not only Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes but also other backward classes who are economi-
D
cally, educationally and socially backward. We need not,
therefore, define or restrict the scope of the word "back-
ward" to a particular community. Whoever is backward will
be covered by it and I think the apprehensions of the
Honourable Members are not justified."
E
Ultimately Dr. B.R.Ambedkar, the Chairman of the Drafting Com-
mittee, got up to clarify the matter. His speech, which put an end to all
discussion and led to adopting of draft Article 10(3), is worth quoting in
extenso, since it throws light on several questions relevant herein:
F
".... there are three points of view which it is necessary for
us to reconcile if we are to produce a workable proposition
which will be accepted by all. Of the three points of view,
the first is that there shall be equality of opportunity for all
citizens. It is the desire of many Members of this House
G that every individual who is qualified for a particular post
should be free to apply for that post, to sit for examinations
and to have his qi.alifications tested so as to determine
whether he is fit for the post or not and that there ought
to be no limitations, there ought to be no hindrance in the
H operation of this principle of equality or opportunity.
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.L 579

An'Other view mostly shared by a section of the House is A
that, if this principle is to be operative-and it ought to be
operative in their judgment to its fullest extent-there ought
to be no reservations of any sort for any class or community
at all, that all citizens, if they are qualified, should be placed
on the same footing of equality so far as the public services
B
are concerned. That i~ the second point of view we have.
Then we have quite a massive opinion which insists that,
although theoretically it is good to have the principle that
there shall be equality of opportunity, there must at the
same time be a provision made for the entry of certain
communities which have so far been outside the ad- c
ministration. As I said, the Drafting Committee had to
produce a formula which would reconcile these three
points of view, firstly, that there shall be equality of oppor-
tunity, secondly that there shall be reservations in favour
of certain communities which have not so far had a 'proper D
look-in' so to say into the administration. If honourable
Members will bear these facts in mind-the-three principles
we had to reconcile,-they will see that no better formula
could be produced than the one that is embodies in sub-
clause (3) of Article 10 of the Constitution. It is a generic
E
principle. At the same time, as I said, we had to reconcile
this formula with the demand made by certain communities
that the administration which has now-for historical
reasons-been controlled by one community or a few com-
munites, that situation should disappear and that the others
also must have an opportunity of getiing into the public F
services. Supposing, for instance, we were to concede in
full the demand of those communities who have not been
so far employed in the public service to the fullest extent,
what would really happen is, we shall be completely
destroying the first proposition upon which we are all G
agreed, namely, that there shall be an equality of oppor-
tunity. Let me give an illustration. Supposing, for instance,
reservations were made for a community or a collection of
communities, the total of which came to something like 70
H
580 SlJPREMio COURT REPORTS IJ992J SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A per cent of the total posts under the Stale and only 30 per
cent arc retained as the unreserved. Couid anybody say that
the reservation of 30 per cent as open to general con1pcti 8

tion won!d he satisfactory fron1 the point of view of giving
effect to the first principic, na:ncly, that there shall be
equality of opportunity'! h_ ca11not be in my judgment.
B
fhereforc the seats to be reserved, if the rcscrvalion is lo
be consistent with sub .. clausc (1) of Article 10, must oe
confined to a minority of seats. It is then only that the first
principle could find its place in the Constitution and effec-
tive in operation. If honourable Members understand this
c position that: we havl'- to safeguard two things, na1nelyi the
principle of equality of opportunity and at the sanic tirnc
satisfy the den1and of con1munities which have not had so
far representation in the State, then, I an1 sure they will
agree that unless you use so1nc such qualifying µhrase as
D "backward 11 the exception 1na<le in favour of reservation will
ultimately cat up the rule altogether. Nothing of the rule
will ren1ain. That I think if I 111ay say so, is the justification
\vhy the Drafting Con1n1itlee undertook on its own
shoulders the responsibility of introducing the word "back-
ward'' which, I admit, did not originally find a place in the
E
fundamental right in the way in which it was passed by this
Assembly.......

Somebody asked me: 11 \Vhat is a back\vard conHnunity'"?
Wcli, I think any one who reads the language of the draft
F itself will find that we have left it to be determined by each
local Government. A backward community is a community
which is backward in the opinion of the Governmenl. 11

The above material makes it amply clear that the objective behind
G clause (4) of Article 16 was the sharing of State power. The State power
which was almost exclusively monopolised by the upper cas~es i.e., a fe\V
communities, was. no\v sought to he made broad-based. The back\vard
communities \:\'ho \¥ere till then kept out of apparatus of poYv·cr, \Vere
sought to be inducted thercinto an<l since that v.'as not practicable in the
I-f nonnal course, a special provi~ion was 1nade to effectuate the said objcc-
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 581

tivc. In short, the objective behind Article 16(4) is empowerment of the A
deprived backward communities - to give them a share in the administrative
apparatus and in the governance of the community.

Decisions of this Court on Articles 16 and 15:

29. Soon after the enforcement of the Constitution two cases reached
B
this Court from the State of Madras - one under Article 15 and the other
under Article 16. Both the cases were decided on the same date and by
the same Bench. The one arising under Article 15 is State of Madras v.
Champakam Dorairajan, [1951] S.C.R. 525, and the other arising under
Article 16 is Venkataraman v. State of Madras A.I.R. 1951· S.C. 229. By C
virtue of certain orders issued prior to coming into force of the Constitu-
tion,-popularly known as 'Communal G.O.' - seats in the Medical and
Engineering Colleges in the State of Madras were apportioned in the
following manner: Non-Brahmin (Hindus)-6, Backward Hindus-2, Brah-
min-2, Harijan-2, Anglo Indians and Indian Christians-1, Muslims-1. Even D
after the advent of the Constitution, the G.O. was being acted upon which
was challenged by Smt. Champakam as violative of the fundamental rights
gurantecd to her by Articles 15(1) and 29(2) of the Constitution of India.
A Full Bench of Madras High Court declared the said G.O. as void and
un-enforceable with the advent of the Constitution. The State of Madras
brought the matter in appeal to this Court. A Special Bench of Seven E
Judges heard the matter and came to the unanimous conclusion that the
allocation of seats in the manner aforesaid is violative of Articles 15(1) and
29(2) inasmuch as the refusal to admit the respondent (writ petitioner)
notwithstanding her higher marks, was based only on the ground of caste.
The State of Madras sought to sustain the G.O. with reference to Article
F
46 of the Constitution. Indeed the argument was that Article 46 over-rides
Article 29(2). This argument was rejected. The Court pointed out that
while in the case of employment under the State, clause (4) of Article 16
provides for reservations in favour of backward class of citizens, no such
provision \Vas made in Article 15.
G
30. In the matter of appointment to public services too, a similar
communal G.O. was in force in the State of Madras since prior to the
Constitution. In December, 1949, the Madras Public Service Commission
invited applications for 83 posts of District Munsifs, specifying at the same
time that the selection of the candidates would be made from the various H
582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.CR.

A castes, religions and communities as specified in the communal G.C. The
83 vacancies were distributed in the following manner: Harijans-19, Mus-
lims-5, Christians-6, Backward Hindus-10, Non-Brahmin (Hindus)-32 and
Brahmins-11. The petitioner Venkataraman (it was a petition under Article
32 of the Constitution) applied for and appeared at the interview and the
admitted position was that if the provisions of the communal G.O. were to
B be disregarded, he would have been selected. Because of the G.O., he was
not selected (he belonged to Brahmin community). Whereupon he ap-
proached this Court. S.R.Das, J. speaking for the Special Bench referred
to Article 16 and in particular to Clause (4) thereof and observed: "Reser-
vation of posts in favour of any backward class of citizens cannot, therefore,
c be regarded as unconstitutional''. He proceeded to hold:

"The Communal G.O. itself makes an express reservation
of seats for Harijans & Backward Hindus. The other
categories, namely, Muslims, Christians, Non-Brahmin
D Hindus & Brahmins must be taken to have been treated as
other than Harijans & Backward Hindus. Our attention
was drawn to a schedule of Backw.ird Classes set out in
Sch.III to Part I of the Madras Provincial & Subordinate
Service Rules. It was, therefore, argued that Backward
Hindus would mean Hindus of any of the communities
E mentioned in that Schedule. It is, in the circumstances,
impossible to· say that classes of people other than Harijans
& Backward Hindus can be called Backward Classes. As
regards the posts reserved for Harijans & Backward Hin-
dus it may be said that the petitioner who does not belong
F to those two classes is regarded as ineligible for those
reserved posts not on the ground of religion, race, caste
etc. but because of the necessity for making a provision for
reservation of such posts in favour of a backward class of
citizens, but the ineligibility of the petitioner for any of the
posts reserved for communities other than Harijans and
G Backward Hindus cannot but be regarded as founded on
the ground only of his being a Brahmin. For instance, the
petitioner may be far better qualified than a Muslim or a
Christian or a Non-Brahmin candidate & if all the posts
reserved for those communities were open to him he would
H be eligible for appointment, as is conceded by the learned
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 583

Advocate General of Madras, but, nevertheless, he cannot A
expect to get any of those posts reserved for those different
categories only because he happens to be a Brahmin. His
inaligibility for any of the posts reserved for the other
communities, although he may have far better qualifica-
tions than those possessed by members falling within those
categories, is brought about only because he is a Brahmin
B
& does not belong to any of those categories. This in-
eligibitlty created by the Communal G.O. does not appear
to us to be sanctioned by cl.(4) of Art.16 and it is an
infringement of the fundamental right guaranteed to the
petnr. as an individual citizen under Art.16(1) & (2). The c
Communal G.O., in our opinion, is repugnant to the
provisions of Art.16 & is as such void and illegal."

31. Sri Ram Jethmalani, the learned counsel appearing for the
Respondent-State of Bihar placed strong relinace on the above passage. D
He placed before us an extract of the Schedule of the backward classes
appended to the Madras Provincial and Subordinate Service Rules, 1942.
He pointed out that clause (3)(a) in Rule 2 defined the expression back-
ward classes to mean "the communities mentioned in Schedule III to this
part", and that Schedule III is exclusively based upon caste. The Schedule
E
describes the communities mentioned therein under the heading 'Race,
Tribe or Caste'. It is pointed out that when the said Schedule was sub-
stituted in 1947, the basis of classification still remained the caste, though
the heading "Races, Tribes and Castes!! was removed. Mr. Jethmalani
points out that the Special Bench took note of the fact that Schedule III
was nothing but a collection of certain 'communities', notified as backward F
classes and yet upheld the reservation in their favour. According to him,
the decision in Ve11katarama11 clearly supports the identification of back-
ward classes on the basis of caste. The Communal G.O. was struck down,
he submits, only in so far as it apportioned the remaining vacancies
between sections other than Harijans and backward classes. It is rather G
curious, says the counsel, that the decision in Venkataraman has not
attracted the importance it deserves all these years; All the subsequent
decisions of this court refer to Champakam. Hardly any decision refers to
Venkataraman notwithstanding the fact that Venkataraman was a decision
rendered with reference to Article 16. H
584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A 32. Soon after the said two decisions were rendered the Parliament
intervend and in exercise of its constituent power, amended Article 15 by
inserting clause (4), which reads:

"Nothing in this article or in clause (2) of Article 29 shall
prevent the State from making any special provision for the
B advancement of any socially and educationally backward
classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes."

It is worthy of notice that the Parliament, which enacted the first
Amendment to the Constitution, was in fact the vel'}' same Constituent
c Assembly which had framed t[,e Constitution. The speech of Dr. Ambed-
kar on the occasion is again instructive. He said:-

"Then with regard to article 16, clause (4), my submission
is this that it is really impossible to make any reservation
D which would not result in excluding somebody who has a
caste. I think it has to be borne in mind and it is one of the
fundamental principles which I believe is stated in Mulla's
edition on the very first page that there is no Hindu who
has not a caste. Every Hindu has a caste-he is either a
Brahmin or a Mahratta or a Kundby or a Kumbhar or a
E carpenter. There is no Hindu-that is the fundamental
proposition-who has not a caste. Consequently, if you make
a reservation in favour of what are called backward classes
which are nothing else but a collection of certain castes,
those who are excluded are persons who belong to certain
F c·astes. Therefore, ih the circumstances of this country, it
is impossible to avoid reservation without excluding some
people who have got a caste."

33. After the enactment ohhe First Amendment the first case that
came up before this Court is Ba/aji v. The State of Mysore. (In the year
G 1961, this Court decided the General Manager, Southern Railway v.
Rasngachari, but that related to reservations in favour of the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the matter of promotion in the Railways.
Rangachari will be referred to at an appropri~te stage later.) In the State·
of Karnataka, reservations were in force since a few decades prior to the
H advent of the· Constitution and were being continued even thereafter. On
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 585

July 26, 1958 the State.of Mysore issued an order under Article 15(4) of A
the Constitution declaring all the communities excepting the Brahmin
community as socially and educationally backward and reserving a total of
75 per cent seats in Educational Institutions in favour of SEBCs and
SCs/STs. Such orders were being issued every year, with minor variation in
the percentage of reservations. On 13th of July, 1972, a similar order was
issued wherein 68 per cent of the seats in all Engineering and Medical
B
Colleges and Technical Institutions in the State were reserved in the favour
of the SEBCs, SCs and STs. SEBCs were again divided into two categories-
backward classes and more backward classes. The validity of this order was
questioned under Article 32 of the Constitution. While striking down the
said order this Court enunciated the following principles:- c
(1) Clause (4) of Article 15 is a proviso or an exception to
clause (1) of Article 15 and to clasue (2) of Article 29;

(2) For the purpose of Article 15(4), backwardness must
be both social and educational. Though caste in relation to
D
Hindus may be a relevant factor to consider; in determining
the social backwardness of a class of citizens, it cannot be
made the sole and dominant test. Christians, Jains and
Muslims do not believe in caste system; the test of caste
cannot be applied to them. Inasmuch as identification of E
all backward classes under the impugned order has been
made solely on the basis of caste, it is bad.

(3) The reservation made under Clause (4) of Article 15
should be reasonable. It should not he such as to defeat or
F
nullify the main Rule of equality contained in clause (1).
While it is not possible to predicate the exact permissible
percentage of reservations, it can be stated in a general and
broad way tkt they should be less than 50 per cent.

(4) A provision under Article 15(4) need not be in the form G
of legislation; it can be made by an executive order.

(5) The further categorisation of backward classes into
backward and morn backward is not warranted by Article
15(4)." H
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11 992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A It must be remembered that Ba/aji was a decision rendered under
and with reference to Article 15 though it contains certain observations
with respect to Article 16 as well.
,. '

34. Soon after the decision in Ba/aji this Court was confronted with
B a case arising under Article 16 - Devadasan v. Union of India. This was
also a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. It related to the validity
of the 'carry- forward' rule obtaining in Central Secretariat Service. The
reservation in favour of Scheduled Castes was twelve and half per cent
while the reservation in favour of Scheduled Tribes was five per cent. The
c 'carry-forward' rule considered in the said decision was in the following
terms: "If a sufficient number of candidates considered suitable by the
recruiting authorities, are not available from the communities for whom
reservations are made in a particular year, the unfilled vacancies should be
treated as unreserved and filled by the best available candidates. The
D number of reserved vacancies, thus, treated as unreserved will be added as
an additional quota to the number that would be reserved in the following
year in the normal course; and to the extent to which approved candidates
are not available in that year against this additional ·quotas, a corresponding
addition should be made to the number of reserved vacancies in the second
E following year." Because sufficient number of SC/ST candidates were not
available during the earlier years the unfilled vacancies meant for them
were carried forward as cantemplated by the said rule and filled •tp in the
third year - that is in the year 1961. Out of 45 appointments made, 29 went
to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. In other words, the extent of
reservation in the thir.d year came to 65 per cent. The rule was declaied
F unconstitutional by the'Constitution Bench, with Subba Rao, J. dissenting.
The majority held that the carry forward rule which resulted in more than
50 per cent of the vacancies being reserved in a particular year, is bad. The
principle enunciated in Ba/aji regarding 50 percent was followed. Subba
•
Rao, J. in his dissenting opinion, however, upheld the said rule. The
G learned Judge observed: 11 The expression, "nothing in this article 11 is a legis-
lative device to express its intention in a most emphatic way that the power
conferred thereunder is not limited in any way by the main provision but
falls outside it. It has not really carved out an exception, but has preserved
a power untrammelled by the other provisions of the Article." The learned
H Judge opined that once a class is a backward class, the question whether
INDRA SAWHNEY 1·. U.O.l. 587

it is adequately represented or not is left to the subjective satisfaction of A
the State and is not a matter for this Court to prescribe.

We must, at this stage, clarify that a 'carry-forward' rule may be in a
form different than the one considered in Devadasan. The Rule may
provide that the vacancies reserved for Scheduled Castes or Scheduled
•• Tribes shall not be filled up by general (open competition) canddates in B
case of non-availability of SC/ST candidates and that such vacencies shall
be carried forward.

35. In the year 1964 another case from Mysore arose, again under
Article 15 - Chitra/ekha v. State of Mysore. The Mysore Government had
by an order defined backward classes on the basis of occupation and
c
income, unrelated to caste. Thirty per cent of seats in professional and
technical institutions were reserved for them in addition to eighteen per
cent in favour of SCs and STs. One of the arguments urged was that the
identification done without taking the caste into consideration is impermis-
sible. The majority speaking through Subba Rao, J., held the identifkation D
or classification of backward classes on the basis of occupation-cum-in-
) come, without reference to caste, is not bad and does not offend Article
15(4).

36. During the years 1968 to 1971, this Court had to consider the
validity of identification of backward classes made by Madras and Andhra E
Pradesh Governments. Minor P.Rajendran v. State of Madras related to
specification of socially and educationally backward classes with reference
to castes. The question was whether such an identification infringes Article
15. Wanchoo, CJ., speaking for the Constitution Bench dealt with the
contention in the following words: F
"The contention is that the list of socially and educationally
backward classes for whom reservation is made under r.5
nothing but a list o(. certain castes. Therefrore, reservation
' in favour of certain castes based only on caste considera-
tions violates Art.15(1), which prohibits discrimination on G
the ground of caste only. Now if the reservation in q11estion
had been based only on caste and had not taken into
account the social and educational backwardness of the
caste in question, it would !Je violative of Art.15(1). But it
must· not be forgotten t~at a caste is also a class of citizens H
588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A and if the caste as a whole is socially and educationally
backward reservation can be made in favour of such a caste
on the ground that it is a socially and educational~y back-
ward class of citizens within the meaning of Art.
15(4) ........... .lt is true that in the present cases the list of
socially and educationally backward classes has been
B specified by caste. But that does not necessarily mean that
caste was the sole consideration and that person belonging
to these castes are also not a class of socially and educa-
tionally backward citizens .........As it was found that mem-
bers of these castes as a whole were educationally and
c socially backward, the list which had been coming on from
as far back as 1906 was finally adopted for purposes of
Art.15(4)

In view however of the explanation given by the State of
Madras, which has not been controverted by and rejoinder,
D it must be accepted thal though the list shows certain
castes, the members of those castes are really classes of
educationally and socially backward citizens. No attempt
'·
was made on behalf of the petitioners/appellant to show
that any caste mentioned in this list was not educationally
E and socially backward. In this state of the pleadings, we
must come to the conclusion that though the list is prepared
ca.steRwise, the castes included therein are as a whole
educationally and socially backward and therefore the list
is not violative of Art.15. The challenge to r5 must there-
fore fail."
F
37. The shift in approach and emphasis is obvious. The Court now
held that a caste is a class of citizens and that if a caste as a whole is socially
and educationally backward, reservation can be made in favour of such a
caste on the ground that it is a socially and educationally backward class
G of citizens within the meaning of Article 15(4). More over the burden of
proving that the specification/identification was bad, was placed upon the
petitioners. In case of failure to discharge that burden, the identification
made by the State was upheld. The identification made on the basis of caste
was upheld inasmuch as the petitioner failded to prove that any caste
H mentioned in the list was not socially and educationally backward.
INDRA SA WI !NEY v. lJ.0.1. 589

38. Another Constitution Bench took a simiiar vic\v in Triloki Nath A
(1969j I S.C.R. 103.

Rajendran was expressly referred to and followed in Pecriakanlppon
v. State of Tamil Nadu, a decision rendered by a Bench of three Judges
(J.C.Shah, K.S.Hegdc and A.N.Grover, .JJ.). This was a Petition under
Article 32 of the Constitution and one arising under Article 15. The B
argument was that identification of SEBCs having been done on the basis
of caste alone is bad. Repelling the argument, Hegde,J. held:-

Thcrc is no gainsaying the fact that there are nu1nerous
11

castes in this country which are socially and educationally
backward. To ignore their existence is to ignore the facts
c
of life. Hence, we are unable to uphold the contention that
impugned reservation is not in accordance withArt.15( 4}."

39. Again, in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Bairam, a case arising fro1n
Andhra Pra<!esh, a Division Bench (Vaidyalingam and Mathew,JJ.) D
adopted the same approach and upheld the identification made by Andhra
Pradesh Government on the basis of caste. Answering the criticis1n that
the Backward Classes Commission appointed by the State Government did
not do a scientific and thorough job, the Bench observed:

1
'In our opinion, the Cornmission has taken considerable E
pains to collect as much relevant material as possible i:o
judge the social and educational backwardness of the per-
sons concerned. When, for-· instance, it had called for in-
formation regarding the student population in classes X
and XI from nearly 2224 institutions, if only 50% of the F
institutions sent replies, it is not the fault of the Commission
for they could not get more particulars. If the commission
has only to go on doing the work of collecting particulars
and materials, it will be a never ending matter. In spite of
best efforts that any commission may make in collecting
materials and datas, its conclusions cannot be always scien- G
tifically acccurate in such matters. Therefore, the proper
approach, in our opinion should be to see whether the
relevant data and materials referred to in the report of the
Comtnission justify its conclusions. In our opinon, there
was sufficient inaterial to enable the Conuuission to be H
•

590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A satisfied that the persons included in the list are really
socially and educationally bakcward. No doubt there are
few instances where the 'educational average is slightly
above the State average, but that circumstances by itself is
not enough to strike down the entire list. Even assuming
there are few categories which are little above the State
B average, in literacy, that is a matter for the State to take
note of and review the position of such categories of
persons and take a suitable decision."

We respectfully agree with these 0bservations.
c Answering the main criticism that the list of SEBCs was wholly based
upon caste, the Bench observed:-

"To conclude, though prima facie the list of Backward
Classes which is under attack before us may be considered
D to be on the basis of caste, a closer examination will clearly
show tha• it is only a description of the group following the
particular occupations or professions, exhaustively
referred to by the Commission. Even on the assumption
that the list is based exclusively on caste, it is clear from
the materials before the Commission and the reasons given
E by it in its report that the entire caste is socially and
educationally backward and therefore their inclusion in the
list of Backward Classes is warranted by Art.15(4). The
groups mentioned therein have been included in the list of
Backward classes as they satisfy the various tests, which
F have been laid down by this Court for ascertaining the
social and educational backwardness of a class."

40. In certain cases including Janaki Prasad Parimoo v. State of
Jammu & Kashmir [1973] 3 S.C.R. 236 and State of Uttar Pardesh v. Pradip
Tandon [1975] 2 S.C.R. 761, it was held that poverty alone cannot be the
G basis for determining or identifying the social and educational backward-
ness. It was emphasised that Article 15(4) - or for that matter Article 16(4)
- is not an instance of poverty alleviation programme. They were directed
mainly towards removal of social and educational bachwardness, it was
pointed out. In Pradip Tandon, a decision under Article 15(4), Ray,C.J.
H speaking for the Division Bench of three Judges opined:
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 591
1
'Broadly stated, neither caste nor race nor religion can be A
made the basis of classification for the purposes of deter-
mining social and educational backwardness within the
meaning of Article 15(4). When Article 15(1) forbids dis-
crimination on grounds only of religion, ·race, caste, caste
cannot be made one of the criteria for determining social
and educational backwardness. If caste or religion is recog- B
nised as a criterion of social and educational backwardness
Article 15(4) will stultify Article 15(1). It is true that Article
15(1) forbids discrimination only on the ground of religion,
race, caste but when a classification taken recourse to caste
as one of the criteria in determining socially and educa- c
tionally backward classes the expression "classes" in that
case violates the rule of expressio unious est exclusio alterius.
The socially and educationally backward classes of citizens
are groups other than groups based on caste."

D
This statement was made without referring to the dicta in Rajendran,
a decision of a larger Bench. 'fhough Balaji· was referred to, we must point
out with respect that Balaji does not support the above statement. Balaji
indeed said that "though castes in relation to Hindus may be a relevant
factor to consider in determining the social backwardness of groups or
classes of citizens, !' ..;annot be made the sole or the dominant test in that E
behalf."

41. Thomas marks the beginning of a new thinking on Article 16,
though the seed of this thought is to be found in the dissenting opinion of
Subba Rao,J. in Devadasan. The Kerala Government had, by amending F
Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules empowered the Government
to exempt, by order, for a specified period, any member or members
belonging to Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes and already in service,
from passing the test which an employee had to pass as a precondition for
promotion to next higher post. Exercising the said power, the Government.
of Kerala issued a notification granting "temporary exemption to members G
already in service belonging to any of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled
Tribes from passing all tests (unified, special or departmental test) for a
period of two years". On the basis of the said exemption, a large number
of employees belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, who
had been stagnating in their respective posts for want of passing the
departinental tests, were promoted. They were now required to pass the H
•.
592 SUPREME r:Ol!RT REPORTS [1992[ SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A tests within the period of exemption. Out of 51 vacancies \Vhich arose in
the category of Upper Division Clerks in the year 1972, 34 were filled up
by members of Scheduled Castes leaving only 17 for others. This was
questioned by Thomas, a mcn1ber belonging to non-reserved category. 1-lis
grievance was: but for the said concession/exemption given to mcn1bers of
Scheduled CJstcs/Scheduled Tribec. he would have been promoted to one
B of those j'XISts in view of his pas~ing the relevant tests. He contended that
Article 16(4) permits only reservations in favour of backward classes but
not such an exemption. This argument was accepted by the Kerala High
Court. It also upheld the further contction that inasmuch as more than 50%
vacancies in the year had gone to the members of Scheduled Castes as a
result of the said exemption, it is bed for violating the 50% rule in Ba/aji.
c The Stale of Keraia carried the matter in appeal ta this Court which was
allowed by a majority of 5:2. AU the Seven Judges wrote separate opinions.
The head-note to the decision in Supreme Court Reports succintly sets out
the principles enunciated in each of the judgments. We do not wish to
burden this judgment by reprnducing them here. We would rest content
with delineating the broad features emerging from these opinions. Ray, CJ.
D held that Article 16(1), being a facet of Article 14, permits reasonable
classification. Article 16(4) clarifies and explains that classification on the
basis of backwardness. Classification of Scheduled Castes does not fall
within the mischief of Article 16(2) since Scheduled Castes historically
oppressed and backward, are not castes. The concession granted to them
is permissible under and legitimate for the purposes of Article 16(1). The
E rule giving preference to an un-representcd or under-represented back-
ward communicy docs not contravene Articles 14, 16(1) or 16(2). Any
doubt on this score is removed by Article 16(4). He opined further that for
determining \Vl1ether a reservation is excessive or not one must have to look
to the total number of posts in a given unic or depari.inent, as the case may
be. Mathew, J. agreed that Article 16(4) is not an exception to Article
F 16(1), that Article 16(1) permits reasonable classification and that
Scheduled Castes are not 'castes' \\othin the meaning of Article 16(2). He
espoused the theory of 'proportional equality' evolved in certain American
decisions, lie does not refer to the decisions in Balaji or Devadasan in his
opinion nor does he express any opinion the extent of permissible reserva-
G lion. Beg, J. adopted a different reasoning. According to him, the rule and
the orders issued thereunder was 11 a kind of reservation" falling under
Article 16(4) itself. Krishna Iyer,). was also of the opinion that Article 16(1)
being a facet of Article 16 permits reasonable classification, that Article
16(4) is not an exception but an emphatic statement of whal is inherent in
Article i6(1) and further that Scheduled Castes are not 'costes' within the
H tncaning of Article 16(2) but a collection of castes, races an<l groups.
lNDRA Si\WHNEY v. U.0.1. 593

Article 16(4) is one made of reconciling the claims of backward people and A
the opportunity for free competition the forward sections are ordinarily
entitled to, held the learned Judge. He approved the dissenting opinion of
Subba Rao,J. in lJevadasan. Fazal Ali, J. too adopted a similar approach.
The learned Judge pointed out "it we read Article 16(4) as an exception
to Article 16(1) then the inescapable conclusion would be that Article
16(1) does not pern1il any classification at all because an express provision B
has been made for this in clause (4). This, however, is contrary to the basic
concept of equality contained in Article 14 which implicitly permits clas-
sification in any form provided certain conditions are fulfilled. Further-
more, if no classification can be made under Article 16(1) except
reservation contained in clause (4) then the mandate contained in Article
335 would be defeated." He held that the Rule and the orders impugned C
are referable to and sustainable under Article 16. The learned Judge went
further and held that the rule of 50% evolved in Balaji is a mere rule of
caution and was not meant to be exhaustive of all categories. He expressed
the opinion that the extent of reservation depends upon the proportion of
the backward classes to the total population and their representation in
public services. He expressed a doubt as to the correctness of the majority D
view in Devadasan. Atnong the n1inority Khanna, J. preferred the view
taken in Ba/aji and other cases to the effect that Article 16(4) is an
exceptiL>n to Article 16(1). He opined that no preference can be provided
in favour of backward classes outside clause (4). AC.Gupta, J. concurred
with this view.
E
42. The last decision of this Court on this subject is in K.C. Vasant
Kumar & Anr. v. State of Kamataka, [1985[ Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 352. The Five
Judges consti1uting the Bench wrote separate opinions, each treading a
path of his own. Chandrachud, C.J. opined that the present reservations
should continue for a further period of 1.5 years making a total oi 50 years F
from the date of commencement oi the Constitution. He added that the
means lest must be applied to ensure that the benefit of reservations
actually reaches the deserving sections. Desai, J. was of the opinion that
the only basis upon which backward classes should be identified. is the
economic one and that a time has come to discard all other bases. Chin-
nappa Raddy, J. was of the view that identification of backward classes on G
the basis of caste cannot be- taken exception to for the reason that in the
Indian context caste is a class. Caste, the learned Judge said, is the prin1ary
index of social backwardness, so that social back\vardncss is often readily
idcntificablc \Vith reference to a person's caste. It it is found in the case of
a given caste that a fc\v mt:1nhcrs have progressed far enough so as tG H
594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A compare favourably with the forward classes in social, economic and
educational fields, an upper income ceiling can perhaps be prescribed to
ensure thal the benefit of reservation reaches the really deserving. He
opined that identification of SEBCs in the Indian milieu is a difficult and
comlex exercise, which does not admit of any rigid or universal tests. It is
not a matter for the courts. The !!backward c]ass of citizens 11 , he held, are
B the very same SEBCs referred to in Article 15( 4). The learned Judge
condemned the argument that reservations are likely to lead to deteriora-
tion in efficiency or that they are anti-merit. He disagreed with the view
that for being identified as SEBCs, the relevant groups should be com-
parable to SCs/STs in social and educational backwardness. The learned
c Judge agreed with the opinion of Fazal Ali, J. in 77wmas that the rule of
50% in Ba/uji is a rule of caution and not an inflexible rule. At any rate,
he said, it is not for the court to lay down any such hard and fast rule.
A.P.Sen, J. was of the opinion that the predominant and only factor for
making special provision under Article 15(4) or 16(4) should be poverty
D and that caste should be used only for the purpose of identification of
groups comparable to Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes. The reservation
should continue only till such time as the backward classes attain a state
of enlightenment. Venkataramiah, J. agreed with Chinnappa Rcddy,J. that
identification of backward classes can be made on the basis of caste. He
cited the Constituent Assembly and Parliamentary debates in support of
E this view. According to the learned Junge, equality of opportunity revolves
around two dominant principles viz., (i) the traditional value of equality of
opportunity and (ii) the newly appreciated - though not newly conceived -
idea of equality of results. He too did not agree with the argument of
'merit'. Application of the principle of in~ividual merit, un-mitigated by
other consideration, may quite often lead to inhuman results, he pointed
F
out. He supported the imposition of the 'means' test but disagreed with the
view that the extent of reservations can exceed 50%. Periodic review of this
list of SEBCs and extention of other facilities to them is stressed.

Decisions of U:S. Supreme Court
G
43. At this stage, it would be interesting to notice the development
of law on the subject in the U.SA. The problem of blacks (Negroes) -holds
a parallel to the problem of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and
Backward Classes in India, with this difference that in U.S.A. the problem
H is just about 200 years' old and far less complex. Blacks were held not
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 595

entitled to be treated as citizens. They were the lawful property of their A
masters iDred Scott v. Sanford, [f857] 15 L.E.691]. In spite of the Thirteenth
Amendment abolishing slavery and the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee-
ing equality, it persisted in South and Mid-West for several decades. All
challenges to slavery and aparthied failed in courts. World War II and its
aftermath, however, brought about a radical change in this situation, the B
culmination of which was the celebrated decisions in Brown v. Board of
Education, (1954] 98 L.E. 591 and Bolling v. Shrarpe, [1954] 98 L.E.583
over-ruling the 'separate but equal' doctrine evolved in Plessey v. Ferguson
[1986] 41 L.E.256. In quick succession followed several decisions which
effectively out-lawed all discrimination against blacks in all walks of life.
But the ground-realities remained. Socially, educationally and economical- C
ly, blacks remained a backward community. Centuries of discrimination,
deprivation and degradation had left their mark. They were still unable to
compete with their white counterparts. Siiniliar was the case of other
minorities like Indians and Hispanics. It was not a mere case of economics.
It was. really a case of 'persisting effects of past-descriminalion'. The D
Congress, the State Universities and other organs of the State took note of
these lingering effects and the consequent disadvantage suffered by them.
They set out to initiate measures to a1neliorate them. That was the com-
mand of the Fourteenth Amendment. Not unnaturally, these measures
were challenged in C9urts-with varying results. The four decisions ex-
amined hereinafter, rendered during the period 1974-1990 mirror the E
conflict and disclose the judicial thinking in that country.

44. The first decision is in Defunis v. Charles Odeqaard, [1974] 40
L.Ed. 2nd. 164. The University of Washington Law School - a school
operated by the State - evolved, in December 1973, an admissions policy F
whereunder certain percentage of seats in the Law School \Vere reserved
for minority racial groups. Para 6 of the progran1mc ::-.lated, "because
certain ethnic groups in our society have historically been limited in their
access to the legal profession and because the resulting under-repre-
sentation can affect the quality of legal services available to members of G
such groups, as well as limit their opportunity for full participalion in !he
governance of our comnzunities, the faculty recognises a special obligation
in its admissions policy to contribute to the solution of the problem."
(emphasis added) Procedure for admission for the minority students was
different and of a lesser standard than the one adopted for all others.
Defuni~, a non-minority student was denied admission while granting it to 1-1
596 SUl'REMJ' COURT REPORTS I1"92] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A minor.ity applicants 'Nith lo\ver evaluation. He commenced an action chal~
lcnging the validity of the programme. According to him, the special
admissions programme \Vas violative of the Equal Protection Clause in the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Trial Court granted the requested relief
including admission lo the plaintiff. On Appeal, the Supreme Court of
Washington reversed the Trial Court's Judgment. It upheld the con-
B stilutionality of the Admissions Policy. The matter was brought by Defunis
to United States Supreme Court by way of certiorar' The Judgment of the
Washington Supreme Court was stayed pending the decision. By the time
the matter reached the stage of final hearing, Defunis had arrived in the
final quarter of the last term. In view of this circums.tance, five Members
c of the Court held that the Constitutional question raised has become 'moot'
(academic) and, therefore, it is unnecessary to go into the same. r :Ur of
the Judges Brennan, Douglas, White and Marshall, JJ., however, did not
agree with that view. Of them, only Douglas, J. recorded his reasons for
upholding the Special Admissio.1s' Programme. The learned Judge was of
D the opinion that the Equal Protection Clause did r.Jt require that law
schools employ an admissions formula based solely upon testing results and
under-graduate grades nor does it prohibit Law Schools from evaluating
an applicant's prior achievements in the light of the barriers that he had
to overcome. It wuul<l be appropriate to quote certain observations of the
learned Jurlge to the above affect which inter a/ia emphasise the impor-
E tance of looking to the proniise and potential of a candidate rather than to
mere score: obtained in Lhc relevant tests. He said:

"the Equal Protection Clause did nor enact a requ1Tement
thal Law Schools employ as the sole criterion for admis-
F sions a formula based upon the LSAT (Law School Ad-
mission Test) and under·graduate graCes, nor dues it
prohibit law schools from evaluating an applicant's prior
achievements in light of the barriers that he had to over-
come. A black applicant who pulled himself out of the
ghetto into a junior college may thereby demonstrate a level
G of motivation, perseverence and ability that would lead a
fairmin<led admissions committee to conclude that he
shouws more promise for law study than the son of a rich
alumnus who achieved better grades at Harvard. That
applicant \Vuuld not be offered admission because he is
H hlack, hut hccausc as an individual he has shown he has
INDRA SAWllNEY 1: U.O.l. 597

the potential, while the Harvard 1n£1n may have taken less A
advantage of the vastly superior opportunities offered to
him. Because of the weight of the prior handicaps, the black
applicant may not realize his full potential in the first year
of law school, or even in the full three years, but in the long
pull of a legal career, his achievements may far outstrip
those of his classmates whose earlier records appeared
B
superior by cenventional criteria.''

The learned Judge while agreeing that any programme employing
racial classification to favour certain minority groups would be subject to
strict scrutiny under Equal Protection Clause, yet concluded that the C
material placed before the Court did not establish that Defunis was in-
vidiously discriminated against because of his race. Accordingly, he opined
that the matter should be remanded for fresh trial to consider whether the
plaintiff has been individually discriminated against becasuc of his race.
D
45. The next case is in Regents of the University of California v. Allan
Bakke (1978] 57 L.Ed. 2nd 750. The Medical School of the University of
California at Davis had been following two admissions programmes, one in
respect of the 84 seats (general) and the other, a special admissions
programme under which only disadvantaged members of certain minority E
races were considered for the remaining 16 scats - the totBl seats available
being 100 a year. For these 16 scats, none except the members of the
minority races were considered and evaluated. The respondent. Bakke, a
white. could not obtain admission for two consecutive years, in vi.cw of his
evaluation score~: while admission was given to members of minority races
who had obtained lesser scores than hin1. He questioned the validity of F
special admissions programme on the ground that it violated the equal
protection clause in the Fourteenth Amendment lo the f~onstitution and
also Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. 1964. The Trial Co11rt upheld the plea
on the ground that the progran1me excluded 1nemhers nf non-minority
races from the 16 reserved seats only on the hasis of race and thus operated G
as a racial quota. It, however, refused to direct the plaintiff to be admitted
inasmuch as he failed to establish that he would have heen admitted but
for the existence of the special admissions programme. The matter v.'as
carried in direct appeal to Suprcn1c Court of C~alifornia, which nol only
affirmed the l'rial Court's Judgrnent in so far as it held the special admis- H
598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS f1992J SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A sion programme to be invalid but also granted admission to the plaintiff-
respondcnt into the Medical School. It was of the view that the University
had failed to prove that in the absence of special admissions programme
the respondent would not have been admitted. The matter was then carried
to the United States Supreme Court, where three distinct view-points
B emerged. Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ. were of the opinion
that the special admissions programme was a valid one and is not violative
of the Federal or State Constitutions or of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act,
1964. They were of the opinion that the purpose of overcoming substantial,
chronic minority under-representation in the medical profession is suffi-
ciently important to justify the University's remedial use of race. Since the
c Judgment of the Supreme Court of California prohibited the use of race
as a factor in University admissions, they reversed that Judgment. Chief
.Justice Warren Burger, Stevens, Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ. took the other
view. They affirmed the judgment of the California Supreme Court. They
D based their judgment mainly on Title VJ oi Civile Rights Act, 1964, which
provided that "no person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
colour or national origin, be excluded from participation ini be denied the
benefits of or be subjected to discrimination under any programme or
activity receiving Federa.! Financial assistance.'' They opined that Bakke
was the victim of, what may be called, reverse discrimination and that his
E exclusion from consideration in respect of the 16 seats being solely based
on race, is impermissible. Powell, J. tnok the third view in his separate
opinion, partly agreeing and partly disagreeing with the other view-points.
He based his decision on Fourteenlh Amendment alone. He did not take
into consideration the 1964 Act. The learned Judge held that though racial
F and ethl'Jc classifications of any kind are inherently suspect and call for the
most exacting judir.ial scrutiny, the goal of achieving a racially balanced
student body is sufficiently compelling to justify consideration of race in
admissions decisions under certain circumstances. He was of the opinion
that while preference can be provided in favour of minority races in the
G matter of admission, setting up of quotas (which have the effect of foreclos-
ing cosidcration of aJJ others in respect thereot) is not necessary for
achieving the said compelling goal. He was of the opinion that impugned
programme is bad since it set apart a quota for minority races. He sus-
tained the admission granted to Bakke on the ground that the University
H failed to establish that even without the quota, he would not have been
TNDRA SAWHNEY 1·. U.O.L 599

admitted. A

46. It would be useful to notice the three points of view in a little
more detail. Brennan, J. (with whom Marshall, White and Blackmun, .JJ.
agreed) observed that though the C.S. Constitution was founded on the
principle that "all men are created equal", the truth is that it is not so in
fact. Racial discrimination still persists in the society. In such a situation
B
the claim that the law must be '1colour-blind11 * is more an aspiration rather
than a description of reality. The context and the reasons for which Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act, 1964 was enacted leads to the conclusion that
the prohibition contained in Title VI was intended to be consistent with
the commands of the Constitution and no more. Therefore, "any claim that c
the use of racial criteria is barred by the plain language of the statute must
fail in light of the remedial purpose of Title VI and its legislative history."
On the contrary, said the learned .Judge, prior decisions of the court
strongly suggest that Title VI does not prohibit the remedial use of race
where such action is constitutionally permissible. D

Dealing with the equal protection clause in the Fourthecrrth Amend-
ment, the learned Judge observed:

11
The assertion of human equality is closely associated with
E
the proposition that differences in colour or creed, birth
or status, are neither significant nor relevant to the way in
which person should be treated. Nonetheless, the position
that such factors must be "constitutionally an irrelevance 11
summed up by the shorthand phrase 11 our Constitution is
colour-blind" has never been adopted by this Court as the F
proper meaning of the Equal Protection clause. We con-

(This expression was used for the fir:>t time in the dissenting opinion of Harlan, J. in
Plessey• v. Ferguson, (1986) 163 U.S. 537. The lesmed Judge said: "... in .,.iew of the
Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this countiy no superior, dominant,
ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is colour-blind, and G
neither knows nor tolerates dasses among citizens. In respect of civil rights, a!! citizens
are equal before the law, The humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The taw
regards man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his colour when
his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved. It is,
therefore, to be regretted that this high tribunsl, the final expositor of the fundamental
law of the lar.d. has reached the conclusion that it is competent for a state to regulate
the .!njoyment by citizens of theil' civil rights solely upon the basis of race." f-I
600 SUPREME COURT REPOR1S [1992J SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A elude, therefore, that racial classifications are not per se
invalid under the FourtheenthAn1endn1ent. Accordingly, we
turn to the problem of articulating what our role should be
in reviewing state action that expressly classifies by race."

(emphasis added)
B
After examining a large number of decided cases, the learned Judge
held:

11
The conclusion that state educational institutions may
constitutionally adopt admissions programs designed to
c avoid exclusion of historically disadvanta~ed minorities,
even when snch programs expJlcltly take r::tce into account,
finds direct support in our cases construing congressional
legislation designed to overcome the present effects of past
discrimination."
D
Indeed. held the leMned Judge. fail11re lo lake rnce into account to
remedy unequal access to lJniversity programs caused by their nwn or by
past societal discrimination wo11lrl not be consist~nt \\lith the mandate of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The special adnJis~ions programme wherc-
un<lcr whites are excluded from the 16 reserved seats is not had for the
E reason that "its purpose is to overcome the effects of segregation by
bringing races together." The learned Judge then pointed out the relevance
of race and t.he lesser impact of er.onomir. ciisadvantage, with re:fcrence to
certain facts and figures, and concluded:

F "While race is positively cnm/ated with di(femnces in GPA
and MCA T scores economir: disadvantaKe is not. Thus~ it
1

appears that economically disadvantaged whites do not
score less well than economica11y advantaged whites while
ei..~onomically advantaged blacks score less well than do
disadvantaged whites."
G
47. Warren Burger,CJ., with whom Stevens. Stewert and Rehnquist,
JJ. agreed opined that since in respect of 1.6 seats reserved for racial
n1inorities~ \vhites are totally excluded only on the basis of their race, it is
a clear case of ~iscriminJtion on the basi5 of r'1ce and) therefore, violative
H of the Fourteenth Amemdment to the Co11stitution as well as Title VJ of
•
J

INDRA SAWHNLY 1·. U.O.l. 601

the Civil Rights Act, 1964. A
48. Powell, J. took different line agreeing in part with both the points
of view. His approach is this:
•. (1) It is not necessary to consider the impact o: the scope of Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act inasmuch as the said question was not raised or B
considered in the courts below. The matter had to be examined only with
reference to the Fourteenth Amendment;

(2) Any distinction based on race is inherently suspect in the light of
the equal protection clause and calis for more exacting judicial examina-
tion. It is for the State in such a case to establish that the distinction was
c
precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.

(3) Since the special admissions program of the University totally
excluded some indivi<lual (non-minorities) from enjoying the Statc-
provided benefit of admission to the medical school solely because of their D
race, the classific8.tion m11st be regarded as suspect and it will be sustained
only if it is supported by substantial state purpose or interest and only
where it is established that the classific~tion is necessary to the accomplish·
ment of such purpose or for safeguarding such interest. The lJnlvcrsity has
failed to discharge this burden, though the State interest in removing
E
nidcntified disCr_imintion" and attainment of a !!diverse student borly" \Vere
certainly compelling interests. In othe.re words, the lJniversity has. failed to
establish that for attaining the. said ahjectives, creation of quotas was
necessary.

(4) While preferences can be provided in favour of disadvantaged F
sections, reservation of seats whlch h11d the effect of excluding members of
a race or races from those seats altogether, is not permissible. For this
reason too, the special admissions program of the University must be held
to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.

In the course of his opinion) the learned Judge observed:
G

"A facilll in1·cnt to discriminate, however, is evident in
petitioner's preference program and not denied in this
case. No such facial infirmity exists in an admissions pro·
grarn whP-re race or ethnic background is simply one e.le- H
602 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l992J SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A ment - to be weighed fairly against other clements - in the
selection process ........ .

In summary, it is evident that the Davis special admissions
program involves the use of an explicit racial classification ·'
never before countenanced by this Court. It tells applicants
B who are not Negro, Asian, or Chicano that they are totally
excluded from a specific percentage of the seats in an
entering class. No matter how strong their qualifications,
quantitative and extracurricular including their own poten-
tial for contribution to educational diversity, they are never
c afforded the chance to compete with applicants from the
preferred groups for the special admissions seats. At the
same time, the preferred applicants have the opportunity
to compete for every seat in the class."

In this manner, the learned Judge agreed with Brennan, J. that
D
race-conscious admissions programmes arc permissible under the Four-
teenth Amendment, but qualified the meaning of the race-conscious
programmes. At the same time, he agreed with the learned Chief Justice
that the special admissions programme of Davis was unconstitutional. He
commended the Harvard admissions programme which provided for cer-
E tain preferences in favour of racially disadvantaged sections, without
reserving any seats as such for them.

49. We may next notice the decision in Fullilove v. Phillip M.
K/utznick, [1980] 65 Lawyers Ed. 2nd 90. The Public Works Employmenl
F Act, 1977 contained a provision to the effect that atleast 10% of federal
funds granted for local public works projects must be used by the State or
the local grantee to procure services or supplies from businesses owned by
minority group members, defined as United State citizens "who are
negroes, spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos and Aleuts 11 •
Regulations were framed under the Act and guidelines issued requiring the
G grantees and private contractors to seek out all available qualified bona
fide minority business enterprises (MBEs), to the extent feasible, for ful-
filling the 10% MEE requirement. The guidelines provided that contracts
shall be awarded to bona fide MBEs, even though they are not the lowest
bidders if their bids reflect merely attempts to cover costs inflated by the
H present effects of prior disadvantage and discrimination. This requirement
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 603

coufd, however, be waived in individual cases if the grantee established the A
infeasibility of the requirement. Several associations of construction con-
tractors and Sub-contractors filed a suit in the Federal District Court for
a declaration that the said provision of the Public Works Employment Act
and the regulations made thereunder are void and unforccable being
violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
equal protection component of the due process clause of the Fifth Amend- B
ment. The challenge failed in the District Court as well as in the Court of
Appeals. The matter was then carried to the United State Supreme Court.
By a majority of 6:3 (Stewart, Rehnquist and Stevens, JJ. dissenting) the
Supreme Court repelled the challenge. Chief Justice Burger speaking for
himself. White and Powell, JJ. stated the object of the impugned provision c
in the following words:

''The device of a 10% MBE participation requirement,
subject to administrative waiver, was thought to be required
to assure minority business participation, otherwise it was
thought that repetition of the prior experience could be D
expected, with participation by minority business account-
ing for an inordinately small percentage of government
11
contracting.

The learned Chief Justice then proceeded to examine 11 the question
E
whether as a nleans to accomplish these plainly constitutional objectives,
congress can use racial and ethnic criteria in this limited way as a condition
attached to a federal grant." Indeed, he posed the same question in this
form: "Whether the limited use of racial and ethnic criteria is a constitu-
tionally permissible means for achieving the congressional objectives'', and
proceeded to answer the same - after referring exhaustively to the earlier F
decisions of the court relating to school admissions - in the following words:

"We held that 'Just as the race ofsu1dents must be considered
in determining whetJJ.er a constitutional violation has oc-
cu"ed, so also must race be considered in formulating a
G
remedy."

(emphasis added)

"............ .In dealing with this facial challenge to the statute,
doubts must be resolved in support of the congressional H
S!ll'Rl'MI·: COllRT Rl·:l'ORTS !l'l'J21SUPP.2 S.C.R.

A ju<lg111l'.nl t.hal this limitl'.d progra1n is a necessary step to
effectuate th1.; constitutioniil mandate for equality of
economic npportunity."

511. Marshall, J. speaking for himself, Brennan and Blackmun, JJ. in
his concurring opinion, pointed out the approach lo be adopted in judging
B the validity of the race-conscious programmes and concluded with these
rcsnun<ling word.1.:
1
'ln my scp<1ralc op1n1on 111 Bakke, I recounted the in-
genious and pervasive forms of discrimination against the
Ncgrn" long condoned under the Constitution and con-
c cluded that "the position of the Negro today in Amercia is
the tragic hut inevitable consequence of centuries of une-
qual treatment" I there stated:

"ll is because of a legacy of unequal treatment that
D \Ve now musl permit the institutions of this society
lo give consideration to race in making decisions
about who will hold the positions of influence,
affluence, and prestige in An1erica. For far too
-
long, the doors io those positions have been shut
to Negroes. If \VC are ever to hccomc a fully in~
E tcgratcd society, one in which the color of a
person's skin will not <let.ermine the opportunities
available to him or her, we mus! he willing to take
steps hl open those doors."

F 51. \Ve may now examine the decision in MP.fro Brriadcasting, Inc. v.
Federal C"on11nunications ('on1111ission, rendered on June 27, 1990 (Copies
of the decision have been n1ade availahJe to us by Sri K. Parasaran, counsel
for Union of India). Under !he Communications Ac.t 1934, the Federal
Comn1unica1inns Commi~_..;ion was vested wi1h the exclu~ive ;:inthority to
grant lir:enccs lo persons wishing to construct and op~ratc Radio and
(J Television Broadcilsting Station in United Stal.cs. The grant of licences was
to he based on 'puhlic convenience, interest or necessity'. The commission
found that over the last two decades relatively fewer members of minority
groups have held broadcasting licences, indeed less than one percent. Even
as late as in 1986, they owned just 2.1%. The Con1mission proposed to
remedy this under-representation and accordingly evolved a policy
Ji whereundcr n1inoritics were to he granlcd certain preferences in the matter
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 605

of grant of these licences. The policy had two prominent features. The first A
v.,:as to provide for a pr.cference in the matter of evaluation of applicants
and the second was, what may be called, 'distress sale policy'. The second
feature meant that where the qualifications of a licencee to hold a broad-
cast licence comes into question he was entitled to transfer the said licence
to save the disqualification provided such transfer is made in favour of a
member of a minority. The said two features were questioned by Metro B
Broadcasting Inc., which matter was ultimately brought to the Supreme
Court. The decision of the majority (Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun
and Stevens, JJ.) rendered by Brennan, J. is note-worthy for the shift of
approach from the earlier decisions. It is now held that a classification
based on race (b,; nign race conscious measures) is constitutionally permis~
sible even ii it is not designed to compensate victims of past governmental C
vr societal discrimination so long as it serves important governmental
objectives and is substantially related to achievement of those objectives.
In other words, it is held that it is not necessary that the court apply a strict
standard of scrutiny to evaluate racial classification to ascertain whether it
is ner::essary for achieving the relevant objective and further whether it is
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. Brennan, J. relied D
upon the opinion of Chief Justice Burger in Fullilove for this liberal
approach. It would be appropriate to quote certain observations from his
opinion:

"We hold that benign race-conscious measures mandated
by Congress - even if those mansures are not !!remedial" in E
the sense of being designed to compensate \ictims of past
governmental or societal discrimination - are constitution-
ally permissible to the extent that they serve important
governmental ob; xtives within the power of Congress and
are substantially related to achievement of those objec·- F
tives. .Congress and the FCC have selected the minon ..v
ownership policies primarily to promote programming
diversity, and they urge that such diversity is an important
governmental objective that can serye a~ a constitutional
basis for the preference policies. We agree .......... .
G
Against this background, we conclude that the interest in
enhancing broadcast diversity is, at the very least an impor-
tant governmental objective and is therefore a sufficient
basis for the Commission's minority ownership policies ...
we niust pay close attention to the expertise of the Com- H
606 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A mission and the fact finding of the Congress when analyzing
the nexus between minority ownership and programming
1
diversity. With respect to this 'complex" expirical question,
ibid., we are required to give "great weight to the decisions
of Congress and the experience of the Commission."

B 52. On the other hand, the minority (O'connor, J. speaking for
herself, Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia and Kennedy, JJ.) protested against the
abandonment of what they thought was a well established standard of
scrutiny in such cases in the following words:

"Strict scrutiny" requires that, to be upheld, racial classifica-
c tions must be determined to be necessary and narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. The court
abandons this traditional safeguard against discrimination
for a lower standard of review, and in practice applies a
standard like that applicable to routine legislation. This
D Court's precedents in no way justify the Court's marked
departure from our traditional treatment or race classifica-
tions and its conclusion that different equal protection
principles apply to these federal actions."

53. We have examined the decisions of U.S. Supreme Court at some
E length only with a view to notice how another democracy is grappling with
a problem similiar in certain respects to the problem facing this country.
The minorities (including blacks) in United Stales are just about 16 to 18%
of the total population, whereas the backward classes (including the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) in thi; country - by whichever
F yardstick they are measured - do certainly constitute a majority of the
population. The minorites there comprise 5 to 7 groups - Blacks, spanish-
speaking people, Indians, Purto Ricano, Aleuts and so on - whereas the ,•
castes and communities comprising backward classes in this country run
into thousands. Untouchability - and 'unapproachability', as it was being
practised in Kerala - is something which no other country in the world had
G the misfortune to have - nor the blessed caste system. There have been
equally old civilisations on earth like ours, if not older, but none had
evolved these pernicious practices, much less did they stamp them with
scriptural sanction. Now coming to Constitutional provisions, Section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment (insofar as it guarantees equal protection of
H the laws) correspo'!ds lo Article 14 but they do not have provisions
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 607

corresponding to Article 16(4) or 15(4). Title VI of the Civil Rights Act A
enacted in 1964 roughly corresponds to Clause (2) of Articles 15 and 16.

54. At this stage, we wish to clarify one particular aspect. Article
16(1) is a facet of Article 14. Just as Article 14 permits reasonable clas-
sification, so does Article 16(1). A classification may involve reservation of
seats or vacancies, as the case may be. In other words, under clause (1) of B
Article 16, apointments and/or posts can be reserved in favour of a class.
' But an argument is now being advanced - evidently inspired by the opinion
of Powell, J. in Bakke that Article 16(1) permits only preferences but not
reservations. The reasoning in support of the said argument is the same as
was put forward by Powell, J. This argument, in our opinion, disregards C
the fact that that is not the unanimous view of the court in Bakke. Four
Judges including Brennan, J. took the view that such a reservation was not
barred by the Fourteenth Amendment while the other four (including
Warren Burger, C.J.) took the view that the Fourteenth Amendment and
Title VI of the Civil Right Acts, 1964 bars all race-conscious progammes.
At the sarne time, there are· a series of decisions relating to school D
desegregation - from Brown to Board of Education v. Swann (28 L.Ed. 2nd
586) - where the .court has been consistently taking the view that if race be
the basis of discrin1inatiun, race can equally form the basis of remedial
action. The shift in approach indicated by Metro Broadcasting Inc. is equally
significant. The 'lingering effects' (of past discrimination) theory as well as E
the standard of strictest scrutiny of race-conscious programmes have both
been abandoned. Suffice it to note t.hat no single uniform pattern of
thought can be discerned from these decisions. Ideas appear to be still in
the process of evolution.

PART - III (QUESTIONS 1 AND 2) F

We n1ay now proceed to deal with the questions aforementioned.

Question.J(a): Whether the 'provision' in Article 16(4) must necessarily
be made by the Parliament/Legislature?
G
55. Sri K.K.Venugopal, learned counsel for the petitioner in Writ
Petition No.930 of 1990 submits lhat the ''provision" contemplated by clause
(4) of Article 16 can be made only by and should necessarily be made by
the legislative wing of the State and not by the executive or any other
authority. He disputes the correctness of the holding in Balaji negativing H
608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A an identical content.ion. He submits that siuce the provision made under
Article 16(4) affects the fundamental rights of other citizens, such a
provision can be made only by the Parliament/Legislature. He submits that
if the power of making the 'provision is given to the executive, it well give
1 1
'

room for any amount of abuse. According to the learned counsel, the
political executive, owing to the degeneration of the electoral process,
B normally acts out of political and electoral compulsions, for which reason
it may not act fairly and indepenently. If, on the other hand, the provision I
is to be made by the legislative wing of the State, it will not only provide
an opportunity for debate and discussion in the Legislature where several
shades of opinion are represented but a balanced a~d unbiased decision
c free from the allurements of electoral gains is more likely to emerge from
such a deliberating body. Sri Venugopal cites the example of Tamil Nadu
where, according to him, before every general election a few communities
are added to the list of backward classes, only with a view to winning them
over to the ruling party. We are not concerned with the aspect of what is
D ideal or desirable but with what is the proper meaning to be ascribed to
the expression 'provision' in Article 16(4) having regard to the context. The
use of the e.xpression 'provision' in clause ( 4) of Article 16 appears to us
to be not without design. According to the definition of 'State' in Article
12, it includes not mere'.y the government and Parliament of India and
Government and Legislature of each of the States but all local authorities
E and other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of
the Government of India which means that such a measure of reservation
can be provided not only in the matter of services under the Central and
State Governn1ents but also in the services of local and other authorilt.s
referred to in Article 12. The expression 'Local Authority' is defined in
F Section 3(31) of the General Clauses Act. It takes in all municipalites,
Panchayats and other similar bodies. The expression 'other authorities' has
received extensive attention from the court. It includes all statutory
authorities and other agencies and instrumentalities of the State Govern-
mcntiCcntral Governmenl. Now, \vould it be reasonable, possible or prac·
ticablc to say that the Parliament or the Legislature of the State should
G provide for reservation of posts/appointments in the services of all such
ho<lics beside~ pr9vi<ling for in respect of services under the CentraVStatc
Cfovcrnmcnt? Thi'..; aspect would become clearer if we notice the definition
of "Law" in Article 13(3)(a). It reads:

H "13(3) Int hi~ article, unless the context otherwise requires,-
INDRA SJ\ WHNEY v. U.0.1. 609

(a) 1'Law'' includes any ()rdinance, order, bye-law, rule, A
regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the
territory of India the force of law; ....... .''

The words ''order", ~'bye-law", "rule11 and "regulation" in this definition
are significant. Reading the definition of "State" in Article 12 and of "Law"
in Article 13(3)(a), it becomes clear that a measure of the nature con-
B
templated by Article 16(4) can be provided not only by the Parlia-
ment/Legislature but also by the executive in respect of Central/State
services and by the local bodies and "other authorities" contemplated by
Article 12, in respect of their respective services. Some of the local bodies
and and some of the statutory corporations like Universities may have thier c
own legislative wings. In such a situation, it would be unreasonable and
inappropriate to insist that reservation in all these services should be
provided by Parliament/Legislature. The situation and circumstances of
each of these bodies may vary. The rule regarding reservation has to be
framed to suit the particular situations. All this cannot reasonably be. done D
by Parliament/Legislature .
•
Even textually speaking, the contention cannot be accepted. The very
use of the word 11 provision 11 in Article 16(4) is significant. Whereas clauses
(3) and (5) of Article 16 - and clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19 - use the
, word 11 Law", Article 16(4) uses the word "provision!!. Regulation of service E
conditions by orders and Rules made by the Executive was a well known
feature at the time of the framing of the Constitution. Probably for this
reason, a deliberate departure has been made in the case of clause (4).
Accordingly, we hold, agreeing with Balaji, that the 11 provision11 con-
templated by Article 16( 4) can also be made by the executive wing of the F
Union or of the State, as the case may be, as has been done in the present
case. Bajaji has been followed recently in Comptroller and Auditor General
of India v. Mohan Lal Mehrotra, A.I.R.1991 S.C.2288. With respect to the
argument of abuse of power by the political executive, we may say that
there is adequate safeguard against misuse by the political executive of the
power under Article 16(4) in the provision itself. Any determination of G
backwardness is not a subjective exercise nor a matter of subjective satis-
faction. As held herein - as also by earlier judgments ' the exercise is an
objective one. Certain objective social and other criteria has to be satisfied
before any group or class of citizens could be treated as backward. If the
executive includes, for collateral reasons, groups or classes not satisfying H
610 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A the relevant criteria, it would be a clear case of fraud on power.

Question l(b) : U1iether an executive order making a 'provision' under
Article 16(4) is enforceable forthwith?

56. A question is raised whether an executive order made in terms
B of Article 16(4) is effective and enforceable by itself or whecher it is
1
necessary that the said 'provision is enacted into a law made by the
11

appropriate Legislature under Article 309 or is incorporated into and
issued as a Rule by the President/Governor under the proviso to Article
309 for it to become enforceable? Mr. Ram Jethmalani submits that Article
C 16( 4) is merely declaratory in nature, that it is an enabling provision and
that it is not a source of power by itself. He submits that unless made into
a law by the appropriate Legislature or issued as a rule in terms of the
proviso to Article 309, the "provision 11 so made by the Executive does not
become enforceable. At the same time, he submits that the impugned
Memorandums must be deemed to be and must be treated as Rules made
D and issued under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. We fmd it
difficult to agree with Sri Jethmalani. Once we hold that a provision under
Article 16( 4) can be made by the executive, it must necessarily follow that '
such a provision is effective the mement it is made. A Constitution Bench
of this Court in B.5. Yadav (1981 S.C. 561), (Y.V. Chandrachud, C.J.,
E speaking for the Bench) has observed:

"Article 235 does not confer upon the High Court the
power to make rules relating to conditions of service of
judicial officers attached to district courts and the courts
subordinate thereto. Whenever it was intended to confer
F on any ·authority the power to make any special provisions
or rules, including rules relating to conditions of service,
the Constitution has stated so in express terms. See, for
example Articles 15(4), 16(4), 77(3), 87(2), 118, 145(1),
146(1) and (2), 148(5), 166(3), 176(2), 187(3), 208, 225,
227(2) and (3), 229(1) and (2), 234, 237 and 283 (1) and
G
(2)."

Be that as it may, there is yet another reason, why we cannot agree
that the impugned Memorandums are not effective and enforceable the
moment they are issued. It is well settled by the decisions of this court that
H the appropriate government is empowered to prescribe the conditions of
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 611

service of its employees by an executive order in the absence of the rules A
made under the proviso to Article 309. It is further held by this court that
even where Rules under the proviso to Article 309 are made, the goverment
.can issue orders/instructions with respect to matters upon which the. Rules
are silent. [see Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan [1968] 1S.C.R.111].
This view has been reiterated in a recent decision of this court in Comp-
troller and Auditor General v. Mohan/al Mehrotra [1990] 2 S.C.C. 1 wherein B
it is held:

"The High Court is not right in stating that there cannot be
an administrative order directing reservation for Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes as it would alter the statutory c
rules in force. The rules do not provide for any reservation.
In fact it is silent on the subject of reservation. The Govern-
ment could direct the reservation by executive orders. The
administrative orders cannot be issued in contravention of
the statutory rules but it could be issued to supplement the
statutory rules [See the observations in Santram Sharma v.
D
State of Rajasthan, [1968] I SCR 111 AIR 1967 SC 1910].
In fact similar circulars were issued by the Railway Board
introducing reservations for Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes in the Railway Services both for selection
and non-selection categories of posts. They were issued to E
implement the policy of the Central Government and they
have been upheld by this Court in Akhil Bhartiya Soshit
Karamchari Sangh (Railways) v. Union of India, [1991] 1
sec 246 = AIR 1981 SC 298".
F
It would, therefore, follow that until a law is made or rules are issued
under Article 309 with respect to reservation in favour of backward classes,
it would always be open to the Executive (Government) to provide for
reservation of appointments/posts in favour of Backward Classes by an
executive order. We cannot also agree with Sri Jethmalani that the im-
pugned Memorandums should be treated as Rules made under the proviso G
to Article 309. There is nothing in them suggesting even distantly that they
were issued under the proviso to Article 309. They were never intended to
be so, nor is that the stand of the Union Government before us. They are
executive orders issued under Article 73 of the Constitution read with
clause (4) of Article 16. The mere omission of a recital "i'l. the name and H
612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A by order of the President of India" does not affect the validity or enfor-
ceability of the orders, as held by this court repeatedly.

Question 2(a). Whether clause (4) of Article 16 is an exception to
clause (1)?

57. In Ba/aji it was held - "there is no doubt that Article 15(4) has to
be read as a proviso or an exception to Articles 15(1) and 29(2)". It was
observed that Article 15(4) was inserted by the First Amendment in the
light of the decision in Champakam, with a view to remove the defect
pointed out by this court namely, the absence of a provision in Article 15
C corresponding to Clause (4) of Article 16. Following Balaji it was held by
another Constitution Bench (by majority) in Devadasan - "further this court
has already held that clause (4) of Article 16 is by way of a proviso or an
exception to Clause (1)''. Subbarao, J., however, opined in his dissenting
opinion that Article 16(4) is not an exception to Article 16(1) but that it is
D only an emphatic way of stating the principle inherent in the main provision
itself. Be that as it may, since the decision in Devadasan, it was assumed
by this court that Article 16(4) is an exception to Article 16(1). This view,
however, received a severe set-back from the majority decision in State of
Kera/a & Ors. v. N.M. Thomas, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 906. Though the minority
(H.R. Khanna and A.C. Gupta, JJ.) stuck to the view that Article 16(4) is
E an exception, the mejority (Ray, CJ., Mathew, Krishna Iyer and Fazal Ali,
JJ.) held that Article 16(4) is not an exception to Article 16(1) but that it
was merely an emphatic way of stating a principle implicit in Article 16(1).
(Beg. J. took a slightly different view which it is not necessary to mention
here). The said four learned Judges - whose views have been referred to
F in para 41 - held that Article 16(1) being a facet of the doctrine of equality
enshrined in Article 14 permits reasonable classification just as Article 14
does. In our respectful opinion, the view taken by the majority in Thomas
is the correct one. We too believe that Article 16(1) does permit reasonable
classification for ensuring attainment of the equality of opportunity assured
by it. For assuring equality of opportunity, it may well be necessary in
G certain situations to treat unequally situated persons unequally. Not doing
so,· would perpetuate and accentuate inequality. Article 16(4) is an instance
of such classification, put in to place the matter beyond controversy. The
"backward class of citizens" are classified as a separate category deserving
a special treatment in the nature of reservation of appointments/posts in
H the services of the State. Accordingly, we hold that clasue (4) of Article 16
INDRA SAWHNEY "- U.O.l. 613

is not exception to clause (1) of Article 16. It is an instance of classification A
implicit in and permitted by clause (1). The speech of Dr. Ambedkar
during the debate on draft Article 10(3) [corresponding to Article 16(4)]
in the Constituent Assembly - referred to in para 28 - shows that a
substantial number of members of the Constituent Assembly insisted upon
a "provision (being) made for the entry of certain communities which have
so far been outside the administration'', and that draft clause (3) was put
B
·_in recognition and acceptance of the said demand. It is a provision which
must be read along with and in harmony with clause (1). Indeed, even
without clause (4), it would have been permissible for the State to have
evolved such a classification and made a provision for reservation of
appointments/posts in their favoµr. Clause (4) merely puts the mailer C
beyond any doubt in specific terms.

Regarding the vie\v expressed in Ba/aji and Devadasan, it must be
remembered that at that time it was not yet recognised by this court that
Article 16(1) being a facet of Article 14 does implicitly permit classifica-
tion. Once this feature was recognised the theory of clause (4) being an
D
exception to clause (l) became untenable. It had to be accepted that clause
(4) is an instance of classification inherent in clause (1). Now, just as
Article 16(1) is a facet or an elaboration of the principle underlying Article
14, clause (2) of Article 16 is also an elaboration of a facet of clause (l).
If clause (4) is an exception to clause (I) then it is equally an exception to E
clause (2). Question then arises, in \Vhat respect is clause (4) an Cx:ception
to clause (2), if 'class' docs not means 'caste'. Neither clause (1) nor clause
(2) speak of class. Does the contention mean that clause (1) does nut
pern1il classification and therefore clause (4) is an exception to it. Thus,
from any point of vic\v, the contention of the petitioners has no merit.
F
Question 2(b): Whether Article 16(4) is exhaustive of the concept of
reseroations in favour of backlvard classes?

58. The question than arises whether clause (4) of Article 16 is
exhaustive of the topic of reservations in favour of backward classes. Before G
we answer this question it is \Vell to examine the meaning and content of
the expression "reservation". lls 1neaning has to be ascertained having
regard to the Context in \Vhich it OCCUTS. rhe relevant words are "any
provision for the reservation of appointments or posts." The question is
\Vhethcr the said words contemplate only one form of provision namely H
614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (!992J SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A reservation simplicitor, or do they take in other forms of special provisions
like preferences, concessions and exemptions. In our opinion, reservation
·is the highest form of special provision, while preference, concession and
exemption are lesser forms. The Constitutional scheme and context of
Article 16(4) induces us to take the view that larger concept of reservations
takes within its sweep all supplemental and ancilliary provisions as also
B
lesser types of special provisions like exemptions, concessions and relaxa-
tions, consistent no doubt with the requirement of maintenance of efficien-
cy of administration - the admonition of Article 335. The several
concessions, exemptions and other measures issued by the Railway Ad-
ministration and noticed in Karamchari Sangh are instances of supplemen-
c tay, incidental and ancilliary pruvisions made with a view to make the main
provision of reservation effective i.e., to ensure that the members of the
reserved class fully avail of the provision for reservation in their favour.
The other type of measure is the one in Thomas. There was no provision
for reservation in favour of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes in the
D matter of promotion to the category of Upper Division Clerks. Certain tests
were required to be passed before a Lower Division Clerk could be
promoted as Upper Division Clerk. A large number of Lower Division
Clerks belonging to S.C./S.T. were not able to pass those tests, with the
result they were stagnating in the. category of L.D.Cs. Rule 13AA was
E accordingly made empowering the government to grant exemption to mem-
bers of S.C./S.T. from passing those tests and the Government did exempt
them, not absolutely, but only for a limited period. This provision for
exemption was a lesser form of special treatment than reservation. There
is no reason why such a special provision should not be held to be included
within the larger concept of reservation. It is in this context that the words
F 11
any provision for the reservation of appointments and posts'1 assume
significance. The word "any" and the associated words must be given their
due meaning. They are not a mere surplusage. It is true that in Thomas it
was assumed by the majority that clause (4) permits only one form of
provision namely reservation of appointments/posts and that if any conces-
G sions or exemptions are to be extended to backward classes it can be done
only under clause (1) of Article 16. In fact the argument of the writ
petitioners (who succeeded before the Kerala High Court) was that the
only type of provision that the State can make in favour of the backward
classes is reservation of appointments/posts provided by clause (4) and that
H the said clause does not contemplate or permit granting of any exemptions
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.l. 615

or concessions to the backward classes. This argument was accepted by A
Kerala High Court. This Court, however, by a majority (Ray,C.J., Mathew,
Krishna Iyer and Fazal Ali, JJ.) reversed the view taken by Kerala High
Court, holding that such exemptions/concessions can be extended under
clause (1) of Article 16. Beg, J. who joined the majority in exemption
provided by impugned notification was indeed a kind of reservation and
was warranted by and relatable to clause (4) of Article 16 itself. This was
B
because - according to the learned Judge - clause (4) was exhaustive of the
provisions that can be made in favour of the backward classes in the matter
of employment. We are inclined to agree with the view taken by Beg, J. for
the reasons given hereinabove. In our opinion, therefore, where the State
finds it necessary - for the purpose of giving full effect to the provision of C
reservation to provide certain exemptions, concessions or preferences to
members of backward classes, it can extend the same under clause (4)
itself. In other words, all supplemental and ancilliary provisions to ensure
full availment of provisions for reservation can be provided as part of
concept of reservation itself. Similarly, in a given situation, the State may D
think that in the case of a particular backward class it is not necessary to
provide reservation of appointments/posts and that it would be sufficient
if a certain preference or a concession is provided in their favour. This can
be done under clause (4) itself. In this sense, clause (4) of Article 16 is
exhaustive of the special provisions that can be made in favour of 11 the
backward class of citizens". Backward Classes having been classified by the
E
Constitution itself as a class deserving special treatment and the Constitu-
tion having itself specified the nature of special treatment, it should be
presumed that no further classification or special treatment is permissible
in their favour apart from or outside of clause (4) of Article 16.
F
Question 2(c): Whether Article 16(4) is exhaustive of the very concept
of reservations?

59. The aspect next to be considered is whether clause (4) is exhaus-
tive of the very concept of reservations? In other words, the question is G
whether any reservations can be provided outside clause (4) i.e., und~r
clause (1) of Article 16. There are two views on this aspect. On a fuller
consideration of the matter, we are of the opinion that clause (4) is not,
and cannot be held to be, exhaustive of the concept of reservations; it is
exhaustive of reservations in favour of backward classes alone. Merely H
616 SUPREME C:OlJiff REPORTS (l992j SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A bacausc, one form of classification is stated as a specific clause, it docs not
follow that the very concept and power of classification implicit in clause
(1) is exhausted thereby. To say so would not be correct in principle. But,
at the same time, one thing is clear. It is in very exceptional situations, -
and not for all and sundry reasons - that any further reservations, of
whatever kind, should be provided under clause (1). In such cases, the
B State has to satisfy, if called upon, that making such a provision was
necessary (in public interest) to redress a specific situation. The very
presence of clause (4) should act as a damper upon the propensity to
create further classes deserving special treatment. The reason for saying so
is very simply. If reservations are made both under clause (4) as well as
c under clause (1), the vacancies available for free competition as well as
reserved categories would be correspondingly wittled down and that is not
a reasonable thing to do.

Whether clause (I) of Anicle 16 does not permit any reservations?

D 60. For the reasons given in the preceding paragraphs we must reject
the argument that clause (l) of Article 16 permits only extending of preferen-
ces, concessions and exemptions, but does Dot permit reservation of appoint-
ments/posts. As pointed out in para (54) the argument that no reservations
can be made under Article 16(1) is really inspired by the opinion of Powell, J.
E in Bakke. But in the very same paragraph we had pointed out that it is not the
unanimous opinion of the Court. In principle, we see no basis for acceding to
the said contention. What kind of special provision should be made in favour
of a particular class is a matter for the State to decide, having regard to the
facts and circumstances of a given situation - subject, of course, to the
observations in the preceding paragraph.
F
PART - W (QUESTIONS 3, 4 AND 5)

Question 3(a): Meaning of the expression "Backward Class of citizens"
in Anic/e 16(4).

G 61. What does the expression "Backward Class of Citizens" in Article
16( 4) signify and how should they be identified? This has been the single-
most difficult question tormenting this nation. The expression is not
defined in the Constitution. What does it mean then? The arguments
before us mainly revolved round this question. Several shades of opinion
H have been presented to u.s ranging from one extreme to the other. Indeed,
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 617

it may be difficult to set out in full the reasoning presented before us orally A
and in several written propositions submitted by various counsel. We can
mention only the subslance of and the broad features emerging from those
submissions. At one end of the spectrum stands Sri N.A.Palkhiwala (sup-
... ported by several other counsel) whose submissions may briefly be sum-
marised in the following words: a secular, unified and caste-less society is
a basic feature of the Constitution. Caste is a prohibited ground of distinc- B
tion under the Constitution. It ought be erased atogether from the Indian
Society. It can never be the basis for determining backward classes referred
to in Article 16( 4). The Report of the Manda! Commission, which is the
basis of the impugned Memorandums, has treated the expression "back-
ward classes" as synonymous with backward castes and has proceed to c
identify backward classes solely and exclusively on the basis of caste,
ignoring all other considerations including poverty. It has indeed invented
castes for Non-Hindus where none exists. The Report has divided the
nation into two sections, backward and forward, placing 52% of the
population in the former section. Acceptance of Report would spell dis- D
aster to the unity and integrity of the nation. If half of the posts are reserved
for backward classes, it would seriously jeopardise the efficiency of the
administration, educational system, and all other sevices resulting in back-
wardness of the entire nation. Merit will disapear by deifying backward-
ness. Article 16(4) is broader than Article 15(4). The expression "backward
class of citizens" in Article 16(4) is not limited to "socially and educationally E
backward classes" in Article 15(4). The impugned Memorandums, based
on the said report must necessarily fall to the ground along with the
Rcporl. Jn fact the main thrust of Sri Palkhiwala's argument has been
against the Manda) Commission Report.
F
62. Sri K.K.Yenugopal appearing for the petitioner in Writ Petition
No.930 of 1990 adopted a slightly different approach while reiterating that
the expression "backward classes of citizens" in Article 16(4) cannot be
constured as backward castes. According to him, backwardness may be
social and educational and may also be economic. The authority appointed
to identify backward classes must first settle the criteria or the indicators G
for determining backward classes and then it must apply the said criteria
to each and every group in the country. In the course of such identification,
it may well happen that certain castes answer and satisfy the criteria of
backwardness and may as a whole qualify for being termed as a backward
class. But it is not permissible to start with castes to determine whether a H
618 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A caste is. a backward class. He relied upon the provision in clause (2) of
Article 38 and Article 46 to say that the objective is to minimize the
inequalities in income not only among individuals but also among groups
of persons and to help the weaker sections of the society. The economic
criterion is an important one and must be applied in determining backward
classes and also for excluding those sections or identified groups who may
B for the sake of convenience be referred to as the 'creamy layer'. Since
castes do not exist among Muslims, Christians and Sikhs, caste can never
be the basis of identification. The learned counsel too pointed out the
alleged basic errors in the approach adopted by and conclusions arrived at
by the Manda! Commission.
c
Smt. Shyamala Pappu also took the stand that caste can never be the
basis for identification. According to her, survey to identify backward
classes should be from individual to individual; it cannot be caste-wise. To
the same effect are the submissions of Sri P.P. Rao appearing for the
D Supreme Court Bar Association. According to him, the only basis for
identifying backward classes should be occupation-cum-means as was done
in the State of Karnataka at a particular stage which aspect is dealt with
and approved by this court in Chitra/ekha & Ors. v. State of Mysore, (1964]
6 S.C.R.368. A secular socialist society, he submitted, can never
counterance identification of backward classes on the basis of caste which
E would only perpetuate and accentuate caste differences and generate
antagonism and antipathy between castes.

63. At the other end of the spectrum stands Sri Ram Jethmalani,
counsel appearing for the State of Bihar supported by several other coun-
F sel. According to him, backward castes in Article 16(4) meant and means
only the members of Shudra casts which is located between the three upper
castes (Brahmins, Kshatriyas and Vaishyas) and the out-castes
(Panchamas) referred to as Scheduled Castes. According to him, Article
16(4) was conceived only for these "middle castes" i.e., castes categorised
as shudras in the caste system and for none else. These backward castes
G have suffered centuries of discrimination and disadvantage, leading to their
backwardness. The expression "backward classes 11 does not refer to any
current characterstic of a backward caste save and except paucity or
inadequacies of representation in the apparatus of the Government. Pover-
ty is not a necessary criterion of backwardness; in is in fact irrelevant. The
H provision for reservation is really a programme of historical compensation.
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.L 619

It is neither a measure of economic reform nor a poverty alleviation A
programme. The learned counsel further submitted that it is for the State
to determine who are the backward classes; it is not a matter for the court.
The decision of the Government is not judicially reviewable. Even if
reviewable, the scope of judicial review is extremdy limited - to the only
question whether the exercise of power is a fraud on the Constitution. The
learned counsel referred to certain American decisions to show that even
B
in that country several programmes of affirmative action and compensatory
discrimination have been evolved and upheld by courts.

64. Dr. Rajiv Dhawan, learned counsel appearing for Srinarayana
Dharama Paripalana Yogam (an association of Ezhavas in Kerala) sub- C
mitted that Article 16(4) and 15(4) occupy different fields and serve
different purposes. Whereas Article· 15(4) contemplates positive action
programmes, Article 16(4) enables the State to undertake schemes of
positive discrimination. For this reason, the class of intended beneficiaries
under both the clauses is different. The social and educational backward-
ness which is the basis of identifying bakcwardness under Article 15(4) is D
only partly true in the case of 'backward class of citizens' in Article 16(4).
The expression nany backward class Of citizens" occurring in Article 16(4}
must be understood in the light of the purpose of the said clause namely,
empowerment of those groups and classes which have been kept out of the
administration - classes which have suffered historic disabilites arising from E
discrimination or disadvantage or both and who must now be provided
entry into the administrative apparatus. In the light of the fact that the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes were also intended to be
beneficiaries of Article 16( 4) there is no reasor: why caste cannot be an
exclusive criteria for determining beneficiaries under Article 16(4). Coun-
F
sel emphasised the fact that Article 16(4) speaks of group protection and
not individual protection.

Sri R.K.Garg appearing for the Communist Party of India, an Inter-
venor, submitted that caste plus poverty plus location plus residence should
be the basis of identification and not mere caste. According to the learned G
counsel, a national 1,;oncensus is essential to introduce reservations for
'orther backward classes' under Article 16(4) and that efforts must be
made to achieve such a concensus.

65. Sri Siva Subramanium appearing for the State of Tamil Nadu H
620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A ·supported the Mandal Commission Report in its entirety. According to
him, backward classes must be identified only on the basis of caste and that
no economic criteria should be adopted for the said purp~se. He submitted
that economic criteria may be employed as one of the indicators for
identification of backward classes but once a backward class is identified
as such, there is no question of excluding any one from that class on the
-
B basis of income or means or on any other economic criterion. He referred
to the history of reservations in the province of Madras prior to inde-
pendence and now it has been working there successfully and peacefully
over the last several decades.

c Sri P.S.Poti appearing for the State of Kerala ~upported the iden-
tificaion of backward classes solely and exclusively on the basis of caste.
He submitted that the caste system is scientifically organised and practiced
in Kerala and, therefore, furnishes a perfectly scientific basis for identifica-
tion of backward classes. He submitted that besides the vice of un-
touchability, another greater vice of 'unapproachability' was also being
D practiced in that State.

Sri Ram Awadesh Singh, M.P., President of Lok Dal and President
of All India Federation of Backward Classes, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled
Tribes and Religious minorites submitted that caste should be the sole
E criteria for determining backwardness. He referred to c..:enturies of injustice
meted out by upper castes to shudras and panchamas and submitled that
these castes must now be given a share in the governance of the country
which alone will assure their dignity besides instilling in them a sense of
confidence and a spirit of competition.

F 66. Sri K.Parasaran, learned counsel appearing for the Union of
India urged the following submissions:

(!)The reservation provided for by clause (4) of Article 16 is not in
favour of backward citizens, but in favour of backward class of citizens.
What is to be identified is backward class of citizens and not citizens who
G can be classified as backward. The homogeneous groups based on religion,
race, caste, place of birth etc. can form a class of citizens and if that class
is backward there can be a reservation in favour of that class of citizens.

(2) Caste is a relevant consideration. It can even be the dominant
H consideration. Indeed, most of the lists prepared by the States are prepared
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 621

with reference to and on the basis of castes. They have been upheld by this A
court.

(3) Article 16(2) prohibits discrimination only on any or all of the
grounds mentioned therein. A provision for protective discrimination on
any of the said grounds coupled with other relevant grounds would not fall
within the prohibition of clause (2). In other words, if reservation is made B
in favour of backward class of citizens the bar contained in clause (2) is
not attracted, even if the backward classes are identified with reference to
castes. The reason is that the reservation is not being made in favour of
castes simplicitor but on the ground that they are backward castes/classes
which are not adequately represented in the services of the State. c
(4) The criteria of backwardness evolved by Manda! Commission !s
perfectly proper and unobjectionable. It has made an extensive investiga-
tion and has prepared a list of backward classes. Even if there are instances
of under-inclusion or over-inclusion, such errors do not vitiate the entire D
exercise. Moreover, whether a particular caste or class is backward or not
and whether it is adequately represented in the services of the State or not
are questions of fact and are within the domain of the executive decision.

67. In paragraphs 33 to 42, we have noticed how this court has been
grappling with the problem over the years. In Venkataraman's case, a E
Seven-Judge Bench of this court" noticed the list of backward cl~sses
mentioned in Schedule III to the Madras Provincial and Subordinate
Service Rules, 1942, as also the fact that backward classes were enumerated
on the basis of caste/race. It found no objection thereto though in Cham-
pakam, rendered by the same Bench and on the same day it found such a F
classification bad under Article 15 on the ground that Article 15 did not
contain. a clause corresponding to clause ( 4) of Article 16. In
Venkataraman's case this court observed that in respect of the vacancies
reserved for backward classes of Hindus, the petitioner (a Brahmin) cannot
have any claim inasmuch as "those reserved posts (were reserved) not on
the ground of religion, race, caste etc. but because of the necessity for G
malcing a provision for reservation of such post in favour of a backward
class of citizens." The writ petition was allowed on the ground that the
allocation of vacancies to and among communities other than Harijans and
backward classes of Hindus cannot be sustained in view of clauses (1) and
(2) of Article 16. H
622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A 68. Though Balaji was not a case arising under Article 16(4), what it
said about Article 15( 4) came to be accepted as equally good and valid for
the purpose of Article 16( 4). The formulations enunciated with respect to
Article 15(4) were, without question, applied and adopted in cases arising
under Article 16(4). It is, therefore, necessary to notice precisely the
formulations in Balaji relevant in this behalf. Gajendragadkar,J. speaking
B for the Constitution Bench found, on an examination of the Nagangowda
Committee Report, "that the Committee virtually equated the class with
the castes." The learned Judge then examined the scheme of Article 15, the
meaning of the expression 'class', the importance of caste in the Hindu
social structure and observed, while dealing with social backwardness:
c
"Therefore, in dealing with the question as to whether any
class of citizens is socially backward or not, i: may not be
irrelevant to consider the caste of the said group of
citizens .........Though the caste of the group of citizens may
be relevant, its importance should not be exaggerated. If
D
the classification of backward classes of citizens was based
solely on the caste of the citizen, it may not always be logical
and may perhaps contain the vice of perpetuating the caste
themselves. 11

E The learned Judge further proceeded to hold:

"Besides, if the caste of the group of citizens was made the
sole basis for determining the social backwardness of the
said group, the test would inevitably break down in relation
F to many sections of Indian society which do not recognise
castes in the c0nventional sense known to Hindu society.
How is one going to decide whether Muslims, Christians
or Jains or even Lingayats are socially backward or not?
The test of castes would be inapplicable to those groups,
but that would hardly justify the exclusion of these groups
G in to to from the operation of Art.15(4). It is not uolikely
that in some States some Muslims or Christians or Jains
forming groups may be socially backward. That is why we
think that though castes in relation to Hindus may be a
relevant factor to consider in determining the social back-
H wardness of groups or class of citizens, it cannot be made
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 623

the sole or the dominant test in that behalf. Social back- A
wardness is in the ultimate analysis the result of poverty to
a very large extent... .. .!! is true that social backwardness
which results form poverty is likely to be aggravated by
considerations of caste to which the poor citizens may
belong, but that only shows the .relevance of both caste and
poverty in determining the backwardness of citizens. 11
B

The learned Judge stressed the part played by the occupation, con-
ventional beliefs and place of habitation in determining the social back-
wardness. Inasmuch as the identification of backward classes of
Nagangowda Committee was based almost solely on the basis of caste, it C
was held to be bad.

'The criticism of the Respondents' counsel against the Judgment runs
thus: While it recognises the relevance and significance of the caste and
the integral connection between caste, poverty and social backwardness, it
yet refuses to accept caste as the sole basis of identifying socially backward D
classes, partly for the reason that castes do not exist among non-Hindus.
The Judgment does not examine whether caste can or cannot form the
starting- point of process of identification of socially backward classes. Nor
does it consider the aspect - how does the non-existence of castes among
non-Hindus (assuming that the said premise is factually true) makes it E
irrelevant in the case of Hindus, who constitute the bulk of the country's
population. There is no rule of law that a test of basis adopted must be
uniformly applicable to the entire population in the country as such.

Before proceeding further it may be noticed that Ba/aji was dealing
with Article 15(4), which clause contains the qualifying words "socially and F
educationally" preceding the expression "backward classes". Accordingly, it
was held that the backwardness contemplated by Article 15(4) is both
social and educational. Though, clause (4) of Article 16 did not contain
any such qualifying words, yet they came to be read into it. ln!anaki Prasad
Parimoo, Palekar, J. speaking for a Constitution Bench, took it as "well-set- G
tied that the expression 'backward classes' in Article 16(4) means the same
thing as the expression 'any socially and educationally backward class of
citizens' in Article 15(4)". More of this later.

69. In Minor P.Rajendran, the caste vis-a'vis class debate took a sharp
turn. The ratio in this case marks a definite and clear shift in emphasis. H
624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS f1992J SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A (We have dealt with it at some length in para 36). Suffice it to mention
here that in this decision, it was held that "a caste is also a class of citizens
and if the caste as a whole is socially and educationally backward reserva-
tion can be made in favour of such a caste on the ground that it is a socially
and educationally backward class of citizens within the meaning of Article
15(4) ....... .It is true that in the present case the list of socially and educa-
B tionally backward classes has been specified by caste. But that does not
necessarily mean that caste was a sole consideration and that persons
belonging to these castes are also not a class of socially and educationally
backward citizens." This principle was reiterated in Peeriakampan. Bairam
and Trilokinath-I/. We have referred to these decisions at some length in
C paras 38 and 39. In Peeriakamppan, Hegde,J. concluded, "a caste has
always been recognised as a class."

70. This issue was gone into jn some detail in Vasant Kumar, where
all the five Judges constituting the Constitution Bench expressed different
D opinions. Chandrachud,CJ. did not express himself on this aspect but other
four learned Judges did. Desai, J. recognised that "in the early stages of
the functioning of the Constitution, it was accepted without dissent or
dialogue that caste furnishes a working criterion for identifying socially and
educationally backward class of citizens for the purpose of Art.15(4)." He
also recognised that "there has been some vacillation on the part of the
E judiciary on the question whether the caste should be the basis for recog-
nising the backwardness." After examining the significance of caste in the
Indian social structure, the learned Judge observed:

F "Social hierarchy and economic position exhibit an indis-
putable mutuality. The lower the caste, the poorer its
member. The poorer the members of a caste, the lower the
caste. Caste and economic situation, reflecting each other
as they do are the Deus ex-Machina of the social status
occupied and the economic power weilded by an individual
G or class in rural society. Social status and economic power
are so woven and fused into the caste system in Indian rural
society that one may without hesitation, say that if poverty
be the cause, caste is the prilnary index of social backward-
ness, so that social backwardness is often readily identifi-
H able with reference to a person's caste. 11
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 625

The learned Judge also recognised that caste system has even A
penetrated other religions to whom the practice of caste should be
anathema. He observed:

"So sadly and oppressively deep-rooted is caste in our
country that it has cut across even the barriers of religion.
The caste system has penetrated other religious and dis- B
sentient Hindu sects to whom the practice of caste should
be anethma and today we find that practitioners of other
religious faiths and Hindu dissentients are some times as
rigid adherents to the system of caste as the conservative
Hindus. We find Christians Harijans, Christian Madars,
Christian Reddys, Christian Kamm as, Mujbi Sikhs, etc. etc.
c
InAndhra Pradesh there is a community known as Pinjars
or Dudekulas (known in the North as 'Rui Pinjane Wala'):
(professional cottonbeaters) who are really Muslims but
are treated in rural society, for all practical purposes, as a
Hindu caste. Several other instances may be given." D

Having thus noticed the pernicious effects of the caste system, the
learned Judge opined that the only remedy in such a situation is to devise
a method for determining social and educational backward classes without
reference to caste. He stressed the significance of economic criterion and
E
of poverty and concluded that a time has ·come when the economic
criterion alone should be the basis ior identifying the backward classes.
Such an identification has the merit of advancing the secular character of
the nation and will tend towards nuilifying caste influence, said the learned
Judge.
F
71. Chinnappa Reddy,J. aealt with the question at quite some length.
The learned Judge quoted Mh Weber, according to whom the three
dimensions of social inequality· are class, status and power - and stressed
the importance of poverty in this matter. Learned Judge opined that caste
system is closely entwined with economic power. In the words of the G
learned Judge:

nsocial status and economic power a:re so woven and fused
into the caste system in Indian rural society that one may
without hesitation, say that if poverty be the cause, caste is
the primary index of social backwardness, so that social H
626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A backwardness is often readily identifiable with reference
to a person's caste.'1

The learned Judge too recognised the percolation of caste system
into other religions and concluded his opinion in the following words:

B ''Poverty, caste, occupation and habitation are the principal
factors which contribute to brand a class as socially back-
ward .........But mere poverty it seems is not enough to invite
the Constitutional branding, because of the vast majority
of the people of our country are poverty-struck but some
among them are socially and educationally forward and
c others backward ........ True, a few members of those caste
or social groups may have progressed far enough and
forged ahead so as to compare favourably with the leading
forward classes economically, socially and educationally.
In such cases, perhaps an upper income ceiling would
D secure the benefit of reservation to such of those members
of the class who· really deserve it ...... Class poverty, not
individual poverty, is therefore the primary test... .. ~ Once
the relevant conditions are taken into consideration and
the backwardness of a class of people is determined, it will
E not be for the court to interfere in the matter. But, lest
there be any misunderstanding, judicial review will not
stand excluded."

72. A.P.Sen,.J. dealt with this question in a short opinion. According
to him:
F
".... .The predominant aP.d only factor for making special
provisions under Art.15(4) or for reservation of posts and
appointments under Art.16{4) should be poverty, and caste
or a sub-caste or a group should be used only for purposes
of identification of persons comparable' to Scheduled Cas-
G tes or Scheduled Tribes, till such members of backward
classes attain a state of enlightenment and there is eradica-
tion of poverty amongst them and they become equal
partners in a new social order in our national life. 11

H 73. "E.S.Venkataramiah,J. too dealt with this aspect at some length.
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 627

After examining the origins of the caste and the ugly practices associated A
with it, the learned Judge opined:

An examination c: the question in the background of the
11

Indian social conditions shows that the expression 'back-
ward classes' used in the Constitution referred only to those
who were born in particular castes, or who belonged to B
particular races or tribes or religious mii1orities which were
11
backward.

The learned Judge then referred to the debates in the Constituent
Assembly on draft Article 10 and other allied articles, including the speech
of Dr. Ambedkar and observed thus:
c
"The whole tenor of discussion in the Constituent Assembly
pointed to making reservation for a minority of the popula,
tion including Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
which were socially backward. During the discussion, the D
Constitution (First Amendment) Bill by which Article
15(4) was introduced, Dr. Ambedkar referred to Article
16(4) and said that backward classes are 'nothing else but
a collection of certain castes. This statement leads to a
reasonable inference that this was the meaning which the
E
Constituent Assembly assigned to classes' at any rate so far
as Hindus were concerned.11

The learned Judge also supported the imposition of a means test as
was done by the Kerala Government in KS.Jayasree & Anr. v. State of
Kera/a & Anr., [1977] 1 S.C.R.194. F
The aboVe opinions emphasise the integral connection between caste,
occupation, poverty and social backwardness. They recognise that in the
Indian context, lower castes are and ought to be treated as backward
classes. Rajendran and Vasant Kumar (opinions of Chinnappa Reddy and G
Venkataramiah, JJ.) constitute important milestones on the road to recog-
nition of relevance and significance of caste in the context of Article 16(4)
and Article 15(4).

74. At this stage, it would be fruitful to examine, how he words "caste"
and class 11 were understood in pre-Constitution India. We shall first refer H
11
628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A to various Rules in force in several parts of India, where these expressions
were used and notice how were these expressions defined and understood.
In the Madras Provincial and Subordinate Service Rules, 1942, framed by
the Governor of Madras under Section 241(2)(b) read with 255 and 275 of
the Government of India Act. 1935, the expression "backward classes" was
defined in clause 3(A) of Rule 2. (The porvinces of Madras at that time
B covered not only the present State of Tamil Nadu but also a major portion
of the present State of Andhra Pradesh and parts of present States of
Kerala and Karnataka.) The definition read as follows:

"3(A)."Backward classes" means the communities men-
c tioned in Schedule III of this part."

Schedule III bore the heading "backward classes". It was a collection
of castes and tribes under the sub-heading '1race, tribe or caste. 11 The
backward classes in the Schedule not only included the backward castes
and tribes in Hindu religion but also certain sections of Muslims in the
D nature of castes. For example, item (23) in Schedule lII referred to
'Dudekula' who, as is well known, is a socially disadvantaged section of
Muslims - in effect, a caste - pursuing the occupation of ginning and
deaning of cotton and preparing pillows and mattresses. In this connection,
reference may be had to Chapter III - 'History of the Backward Classes
Movement in Tamil Nadu' - of the Report of the Tamil Nadu Second
E Backward Classes Commission (1985), which inter alia refers to formation
of 'The Madras Provincial Backward Classes League, an association rep-
resenting the various backward Hindu communities' in 1934 and its
demand for separate representation for them in services.

The former State of Mysore was one of the earliest States, where
F certain provisions were made in favour of Backward Classes. The opinion
of E.S.Venkataramiah, J. in Vasant Kumar, (at pages 442-443) traces briefly
the history of reservations in the State of Mysore from 1918-21 upto the
re-organisation of State. The learned Judge points out how the expression
'backward classes' and 'backward communities' were used interchangeably.
G All the castes/communities' except Brahmins in the State were notified as
backward communities/castes. As far back as 1921, preferential reeruit-
men~ was provided in favour of "backward communities", in Government
services.

In Bombay province, the Government of Bombay, Finance Depart-
H men! Resolution No.2610 dated 5.2.1925 defined "Backward Classes" as all
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 629

except Brahmins, Prabhus, Marwaris, Parsis, Banyas and Christians. Cer- A
tain reservations in Government service were provided for these classes. In
1930, the State Committee noticed the over-lapping meanings attached to
the expressions "depressed classes" and 11'ackward classes11 and recom-
mended that "Depressed Classes" should be used in the sense of untouch-
ables, a usage which "will coincide with existing common practice." They
proposed that the wider group should be called "Backward Classes", which B
should be subdivided into Depressed Classes (i.e., untouchables);
Aboriginals and Hill Tribes; Other Backward Classes {including wandering
tribes). They opined that the groups then currently called Backward Clas-
ses should be renamed "intermediate classes". In addition to 36 Depressed
classes (approximate 1921 population 1.475 millions) and 24 Aboriginal c
and Hill Tribes (approximate 1921 population 1.323 millions), they listed
95 Other Backward Classes {approximate 1921population1.041 millions)".

75. In the former princely State of Travancore, the expression used
was "Communities", as would be evident from the Proceedings of the
Government of His Highness the Maharaja of Travancore, contained in D
Order R. Dis. N.893/general dated Trivandrum, 25th June, 1935. It refers
to earlier orders on the subject as well. What is significant is that the
expression "communities" was used as taking in Muslims and certain sec-
tions of Christians as well; it was not understood as confined to castes in
Hindu social system alone. The operative portion of the order reads as
follows: E

".....Accordingly, Government have decided that all com-
munities whose population is approximately 2 per cent of
the total population of the State or about one lakh, be
recognised as separate communities for the purpose of F
recruitment to the public service. The only exception from
the above rule will be the Brahmin community who, though
forming only 1.8 per cent of the total population, will be
dealt with as a separate community. On the above basis the
classification of communities will be as follows:-
G
A. HINDU
1. Brahmin.
2. Nayar.
3. Other Caste Hindu.
4. Kummula. H

,I
630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A 5. Nudar.
6. Ezlmva.
7. Cheramar (Pulaya)
8. Other Hindu.

B. MUSLIM.
B
C. CHRISTIAN.
1. Jacobite.
2. Marthomite.
3. Syriac Catholic.
c 4. Latin Catholic.
5. South India United Church.
6. Other Christian."

In the then United Provinces, the term "Backward Classes" was
understood as covering both the untouchable classes as well other "Hindu
D Backward" classes. Marc Galanter says:

"The United Provinces Hindu Backward Classes League
{founded in 1929) submitted a memorandum which sug-
gested that the term "Depressed" carried a connotation "of
untouchability, in the sense of causing pollution by touch
E as in the case of Madras and Bombay" and that many
communities were ·reluctant to identify themselves as
depressed. The League suggested the term "'Hindu'
Backward"' as a more suitable nomenclature. The list of
115 castes submitted included all candidates from the
F untouchable category as well as a stratum above. "All of
the listed communities belong to non-Dwijas or degenerate
or Sudra classes of the Hindus." They were described as
low socially, educationally and economically and were said
to number over 60% of the population."
G The expression !!depressed and other backward classes" occurs in the
Objectives Resolution of the Constituent Assembly moved by Jawaharlal
Nehru on December 13, 1946.

76. We may also refer to a speech delivered by Dr. Ambedkar on
H May 9, 1916 at the Columbia university of New York, U.S.A. on the subject

I
'•
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 631

"castes in India: their mechanism, genesis and development" (the speech A
was published in Indian Antiquary-May 1917-Vol.XLI), which shows that
as early as 1916, 11 class" and 11 caste" were used inter-changeably. In the
course of the speech, he said:

"....society is always composed of classes. It may be an
exaggeration to assert the theory of class-conflict, but the B
existence of definite classes in a society is a fact. Their basis
illay differ. They may be economic or intellectual or social,
but an individual in a society is always a member of a class.
This is a universal fact and early Hindu society could not
have been an exception to this rule, and, as a matter of fact,
we know it was not. If we bear this generalization in mind,
c
our study of the genesis of caste would be very much
facilitated, for we have only to determine what was the class
that first made itself into a caste, for class and caste, so to
say, are next door neighbours, and it is only a span that
separates the two. A Caste is an Enclosed Class." D

A little later he staied:

"We shall be well advised to recall at the outset that the
Hindu society, in common with other societies, was c0m-
posed of classes and the earliest known are the (1) Brah- E
mins or the priestly class; (2) the Kshatriya, or the military
class; (3) the Vaishya, or the merchant class and (4) the
Shudra or the artisan and menial class. Particular attention
has to be paid to the. fact that this was essentially a class
system, in which individuals, when qualified, could change F
their class, and therefore classes did change their person-
nel. At some time in the history of the Hindus, the priestly
class socially detached itself from the rest of the body of
people and through a closed-door policy became a caste
by itself. The other classes being subject to the law of social
G
division of labour underwent differentiation, some into
large, other~ into very minute groups."

77. In Encyclopaedia Britannica Vol.16, the following statement oc-
curs under the heading "Slavery, Serfdom and Forced labour" under the
sub-heading "servitude in Ancient India and. China~ - 11 castes in India."
11
H
632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [~92] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A "More abundant than slavery were serfdom. Within the
rigid classification of social classes in ancient India, the
Sudra caste was obliged to serve the Ksatriya, or warrior
caste, the Brahmins, or priests, and the Vaisyas, or farmers,
cattle raisers and merchants. There is an unbreakable
barrier, however, separating these castes from the inferior
B Sudra caste, the descendants of .the primitive indigenous
people who lived in serfdom.

In those times it was not a person's economic wealth that
gave him his social rank but rather his social and racial
c level; and thus one of the Mano's laws says" Although able,
a Sudra must not acquire excess riches, since when a Sudra
acquires a fortune, he vexes the Brahmans with his in-
solence." The barrier separating the servile castes took on
extreme cruelty in some laws:

D The legal condition of the Sudra left him only death as a
means of improving his condition."

In Legal Thesaurus (Regular Edition) the following meanings are
1
given to the word 'class":
E Assortment, bracket, branch, brand, breed, caste, category,
classification, classes, denomination, designation, divi-
sion ..... ; gradation, grade, group, grouping hierarchy..... .
sect, social rank, social status ..... ".

F The following meanings are given to the word "caste" in Webster's
English Dictionary:

"(1) a race, stock, or breed of men or animals (2): one of
the hereditary classes into which the society of India is
divided in accordance with a system fundamental to Hin-
G duism, reaching back into distant antiquity, and dictating
to every orthodox Hindu the rules and restrictions of all
social intercourse and of which each has a name of its own
and special customs that restrict that occupation of its
members and their intercourse with the members of the
H other classes (3)(a): a division or class of society comprised
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 633

of persons within a separate and exclusive order based A
variously upon differences of wealth, inherited rank or
privilege, profession, occupalion ...... (b) the position con-
ferred by caste standing. (4) a system of social statification
more rigid than a class and characterized by hereditary
status, endogamy and social barriers rigidly sanctioned by
custom law or' religion."
B

All the above material does go to show that in pre-Independence
India, the expressions 'class' and 'caste' were used interchangeably and that
caste was understood as an enclosed class.
c
78. We may now turn to Constituent Assembly debates with a view
to ascertain the original intent underlying the use of words "backward class
of citizens". At the outset we must clarify that we are not taking these
debates or even the speeches of Dr. Amhedkar as conclusive on the
meaning of the expression 11backward classes." We are referring to these D
debates as furnishing the context in which and the objective to achieve
which this phrase was put in clause (4). We are aware that what is said
during these debates is not conclusive or binding upon the court because
several members may have expressed several views, all of which may not
be reflected in the provision finally enacted. The speech of Dr. Ambedkar
on this aspect, however, stands on a different footing. He was not only the E
Chairman of the Drafting Committee which inserted the expression "back-
ward" in draft Article 10(3) [it was not there in the original° draft Article
10(3)], he was virtually piloting the draft Article. In his speech, he explains
the reason behind draft clause (3) as also the reason for which the Drafting
Committee added the expre~sion 11 backward" in the clause. In this situation, F
we fail to understand how can anyone ignore his speech while trying to
ascertain the meaning of the said expression. That the debates in Con-
stituent Assembly can be relied upon as an aid to interpretation of a
constitutional provision is borne out by a series of decisions of this Court.
See Madhu Limaye, A.LR. 1969 S.C. 1014 at 1018; Go/aknath v. State of
Punjab, A.LR. 1967 S.C.1643 at 1657 (Subba Rao, CJ.); opinion of Sikri, G
CJ., in Dhillon v. Union of India, [1972] 2 S.C.R.33 and the several opinions
in Keshavananda Bharati, [1973] 4 S.C.C.225 where the relevance of these
debates is pointed out, emphasising at the same time, the extent to which
and the purpose for which they can Le referred to). Since the expression
"backward" or "backward class of citizens" is not defined in the Act, H
634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A reference to such debates is permissible to ascertain, at any rate, the
context, background and objective behind them. Particularly, where the
Court wants to ascertain the 'original intent' such reference may be un-
avoidable.

79. According to Dr. Ambedkar (his speech is referred in para 28
B and need not be reproduced here), the Drafting Committee was of the
opinion that such a qualifying expression was necessary to indicate that the
classes of citizens for whom reservations were to be made are those
Tlcommunities which have not had so far representation in the State. 11 It was
also of the opinion that without such a qualifying expression (like
C 'backward') the "exemption made in favour of reservation will ultimately
eat up the rule altogether". This was also the opinion of Sri K.M.Munshi,
who too was a member of the Drafting Committee. In his speech (referred
to in para 27) he explains why the said qualifying expression "backward"
was inserted by the Drafting Committee in draft Article 10(3). His speech,
in so far as it is relevant on this aspect, has been quoted in extenso in para
D 28 and need not be repeated here.

In our opinion too, the words 1'class of citizens - not adequately
represented in the services under the State" would have been a vague and
uncertain description. By adding the word "backward" and by the speeches
of Dr. Ambedkar and Sri K.M.Munshi, it was made clear that the "class of
E
citizens ........ not adequately represented in the services under the State"
meant only those classes of citizens who were not so represented on
account of their social backwardness.

Reference can also be made in this context to the speech of Dr.Am-
F bedkar in the Parliament at the time the First Amendment to the Constitu-
tion was being enacted: It must. be remembered that the Parliament which
enacted the First Amendment was the very same Constituent Assembly
which framed the Constitution and Dr. Ambedkar as the Minister of Law
was piloting the Bill. He said that backward classes "are nothing else but
G a collection of certain castes". (the relevant portion of his speech is referred
to in papa 32) and that it was for those backward classes that Article 15(4)
was being enacted.

80. Pausing here, we may be permitted to make a few observations. The
speeches of Dr. Ambedkar may have to be understood in the context of the
H then obtaining ground realities viz.. (a) Hindus constituted 84% of the total
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 635

population of India. And among Hindus, caste discrimination was unfor- A
tunately an unpleasant reality; (b) caste system had percolated even the
Non-Hindu religions - no doubt to varying extents. Particularly among Chris-
tians in Southern India, who were converts from Hinduism, it was being
practised with as much rabidity as it was among Hiridus. (This aspect has
been stressed by the Manda! Commission (Chapter 12paras11to16) and has
also been judicially recognised. (See, for inst:ince, the opinions of Desai and B
Chinnappa Reddy, JJ. in Vasant Kumar). Encyclopaedia Britannica-Il-
Micropaedia refers to existence of castes among Muslims and Christians at
pages 618 and 619. Amo!lg Muslims, it is pointed out, a distinction is made
between 'Ashrats' (supposed to be descendants scondants of Arab im-
migrants) and non-Ashrafs (native converts). Both are divided into sub- c
groups. Particularly, the non-Ashrafs, who are converts from Hinduism, it is
. pointed out, practice caste system (including endogamy)" in. a manner close
to that of their Hindu counter-parts." All this could not have been unknown

- to Dr_. Ambedkar, the keen social scientist that he was.

( c) It is significant to notice that throughout his speech in the
Constituent Assembly, Dr. Amb~dkar was using the word 11 communities 11
(and not 'castes') which expression includes not only the castes among the
D

Hindus but several other groups. For example, Muslims as a whole were
treated as a backward community in the princely State of Travancore
besides several sections/denominations among the Christians. The word E
"community" is clearly wider than 11 caste 11 - and "backward communities"
meant not only the castes - wherever they may be found - but also other
groups. classes and sections among the populace.

81. Indeed, there are very good reasons why the Constitution could F
not have used the expression "castes" or "caste" in Article 16(4) and why
the word "class" was the natural choice in the context. The Constitution was
meant for the entire country and for all time to come. Non-Hindu religions
like Islam, Christianity and Sikh did not recognise caste as such though, as
pointed out hereinabove, castes did exist even among these religions to a
varying degree. Further, a Constitution is supposed to be a permanent G
document expected to last several centuries. It must surely have been
envisaged that in future many classes may spring-up answering the test of
backwardness, requiring the protection of Article 16(4). It, therefore,
follows that from the use of the word "class" .in Article 16(4), it cannot be
concluded either that "class" is antithetical to '1casten or that a caste cannot H
636 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [199i] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A be a class or that a caste as such can never be taken as a backward class
of citizens. The word "class" in Article 16(4), in our opinion, is used in the
sense of social class - and not in the sense it is understood in Marxist
Jargon.
--
In Rajendran, Trilokinath-II, Bairam and Peerikarupan, this reality
B was recognised and given effect to, notwithstanding the fact that they had
to respect and operate within the rather qualified formulation of Ba/aji.

For the sake of completeness, we may refer to a few passages from
Vasant Kumar to show what does the concept of 'caste' signify? DA. Deasi,
c J. defines and describes "caste" in the following terms:
What then is a caste? Though caste has been discussed by
scholars and jurists, no precise definition of the expression
has emerged. A caste is a horizontal segmental division of
society spread over a district or a region or the whole State
D and also sometimes outside it. Homo Hierarchicus is ex-
pected to be the central and substantive element of the
caste/system which differentiate it from other social sys-
tems. The concept of purity and impurity conceptualises
the caste system .......There are four essential features of the
caste system which maintained its homo hierarchicus char-
E
acter: (1) hierarchy (2) commensality: (3) restrictions on
marriage; and (4) hereditary occupation. Most of the caste
are endogamous groups. Intermarriage between two
groups is impermissible. But 'Pratilom' marriages are not
wholly known."
F
Venkataramiah,J. also defined "caste" in practically the same terms.
He said:

11
· A caste is an association of families which practice the
custom of endogamy i.e. which permits marriages amongst
G the members belonging to such families only. Caste rules
prohibit its members from marrying outside their caste ..... .
A caste is based on various factors. Sometimes it may be a
class, a race or a racial uDil. A caste has nothing to do with
wealth. The caste of a person is governed by his birth, in a
H family. Certain ideas of ceremonial purity are peculiar to
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 637

each caste ....... Even the choice of occupation of members A
of castes was predetermined in many cases, and the mem-
bers of particular caste were prohibited from· engaging
themselve:; in other types of callings, profession or occupa-
tions. Certain occupations were considered to be degrad-
ing or impure. 11
B
82. The above material makes it amply clear that a caste is nothing
but a social class - a socially homogeneous class. It is also an occupational
grouping, with this difference that its membership is hereditary. One is
born into it. Its membership is involuntary. Even if one ceases to follow
that occupation, still he remains and continues a member of that group. To C
repeat, it is a socially and occupationally homogenous class. Endogamy is
its main charateristic. Its social status and standing depends upon the
nature of the occupation followed by it. Lowlier the occupation, lowlier the
social standing of the class in the graded hierarchy. lit rural India, occupa-
tion-caste nexus is true even today. A few members may have gone to cities D
or even abroad but when they return - they do, barring a few exceptions -
they go into the same fold again. It doesn't matter if he has earned money.
He may not follow that particular occupation. Still, the label remains. His
identity is not changed. For the purposes of marriage, death and all other
social functions, it is his social class - the caste - that is relevant._ It is a
matter of common knowledge that an overwhelming majority of doctors, E
engineers and other highly qualified people who go abroad fdr higher
studies or employment, return to India and marry a girl from their own
caste. Even those who are settled abroad come to India in search of brides
and bridegrooms for their sons and daughters from among their own caste
or community. As .observed by Dr. Ambedkar, a caste.is an enclosed class F
and. it was mainly these classes the Constituent Assembly had in mind -
though not exclusively - while enacting Article 16(4). Urbanisation has to
some.extent broken this caste- occupation nexus but not wholly. If one.sees
around himself, even in towns and cities, a barber by caste continues to do
the same job - may be, in a shop (hair dressing saloon). A washermaD.
ordinarily carries on the same job though he may have a laundry of his own. G
May be some others too carry on the profession of barber or washerman
but that does not detract from the fact that in the case of an ove~-whelming
majority, the caste-occup3ti~n nexus subsists. In a rutal c9ntext, of course,
a member of barber caste .carrying on the occupation of a washerman or
vice versa would indeed be a rarity - it is simply not done; There, one is H
638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A supposed to follow his caste occupation, ordained for him by his birth.
There may be exceptions here and there, but we are concerned with
generality of the scene and not with exceptions or aberrations. Lowly
occupation results not only in low social position but also in poverty; it
generates poverty. 'Caste- occupation-poverty' cycle is thus an ever present
reality. In rural India, it is strikingly apparent; in urban centers, there may
B be some dilution. But since rural India and rural population is still the
overwhelmingly predominant fact of life in india, the reality remains. All
the decisions since Ba/aji speak of this 'caste-occupation-poverty' nexus.
The language and emphasis may very but the theme remains the same. This
is the stark reality notwithstanding all our protestations and abhorrence
c and all attempts at weeding out this phenomenon. We are not saying it
ought to be encouraged. It should not be. It must be eradicated. That is
the ideal - the goal. But any programme towards betterment of these
sections-classes of society and any programme designed to eraC:icate this
evil must recognise this ground reality and attune its programme accord-
D ingly. Merely burying our heads in the sand - Ostrich-like - wouldn't help.
One cannot fight his enemy without recognizing him. The U.S.Supreme
Court has said repeatedly, if race be the basis of discrimination - past and
present - race must also form the basis of redressal programmes though in
our constitutional scheme, it is not necessary to go that far. Without a
doubt, an extensive restructuring of socio-economic system is the answer.
E That is indeed the goal, as would be evident from the preamble and Part
IV (Directive Principles). But we are concerned here with a limited aspect
of equality emphasised in Article 16(4) - equality of opportunity in public
employment and a special provision in favour of backward class of citizens
to enable them to achieve it.
F
(b). Identification of "backward class of citizens".

83. Now, we may turn to the identification of "backward class of
citizensn. How do you go about it? Where do you begir.? Is the method to
very from State to State, region to region and from rural to urban? What
G do you do in the case of religions where caste system is not prevailing?
What about other classes, groups and communities which do not wear the
label of caste? Are the people living adjacent to cease-fire line (in Jammu
and Kashmir) or hilly or inaccessible regions to be surveyed and identified
as backward classes for the purpose of Article 16(4)? And so on and so
H forth are the many questions asked of us. We shall answer them. But our
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.l. 639

· answers will necessarily deal with generalities of the situation and not with A
problems or issues of a peripheral nature which are peculiar to a particular
State, district or region. Each and every situation cannot be visualised and
answered. That must be left to the appropriate authorities appointed to
identify. We can lay down only general guidelines.

At the outset, we may state that for the purpose of this discussion, B
we keep aside the Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes (since they are
admittedly included within the backward classes), except to remark that
backward classes contemplated by Article 16( 4) do comprise some castes
- for it cannot be denied that Scheduled Castes include quite a few castes.
c
Coming back to the question of identification, the fact remains that
one has to begin somewhere - with some group, class or section. There is
no set or recognised method. There is no law or other statutory instrument
prescribing the methodology. The ultimate ide.a is to survey the entire
populace. If so, one can well begin with castes, which represent explicit D
identifiable social classes/groupings, more particularly when Article 16( 4)
seeks to ameliorate social backwardness. What is unconstitutional with it,
more so when caste, occupation, poverty and social backwardness are so
closely inter-twined in our society? [Individual survey is out of question,
since Article 16(4) speaks of class protection and not individual protec-
tion]. This does not mean that one can wind up the process of identification E
with the castes. Besides castes (whether found among Hindus or others)
there may be other communities, groups, classes and denominations which
may qualify as backward class of citizens. For example, in a particular
State, Muslim community as a whole may be found socially backward. (As
a matter of fact, they are so treated in the State of Karnataka as well as in F
the State of Kerala by their respective State Governments). Similarly,
certain sections and denominations among Christians in Kerala who were
included among backward communities notified in the former princely
State of Travancore as far back as in 1935 may also be snrveyed and so on
and so forth. Any authority entrusted with the task of identifying backward
classes may well start with the castes. It can take caste 'A', apply the criteria G
of backwardness evolved by it to that caste and determine whether it
qualifies as a backward class or not. If it does qualify, what emerges is a
backward class, for the purposes of clause (4) of Article 16. The concept
of 'caste' in this behalf is not confined to castes among Hindus. It extends
to castes, wherever they obtain as a fact, irrespective of religious sanction H
640 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A for such practice. Having exhausted the castes or simultaneously with it,
the authority may take up for consideration other occupational groups,
communities and classes. For example, it may take up the Muslim com-
munity (After excluding those sections, castes and groups, if any, who have
already been considered) and find out whether it can be characterised as
a backward class in that State or region, as the case may be. The approach
B may differ from State to Stale since the conditions in each Slate may differ.
Nay, even within a State, conditions may differ from region to region.
Similarly, Christians may also be considered. If in a given place, like Kerala,
there are several denominations, sections or divisions, each of these groups
may separately be considered. In this manner, all the classes among the
c populace will be covered and that is the central idea. The effort should be
to consider all the available groups, sections and classes of society in
whichever order one proceeds. Since caste represents an eAisting, identifi-
able, social group spread over an overwhelming majority of the country's
population, we say one may well begin with castes, if one so chooses, and
then go to other groups, sections and classes. We may say, at this stage,
D
that we broadly commend the approach and methodology adopted by
Justice 0.Chinnappa Reddy Commission in this respect.

We do not mean to suggest - we may reiterate - that the procedure
indicated hereinabove is the only procedure or method/approach to be
E adopted. Indeed, there is no such thing as a standard or model proce-
dure/approach.- It is for the authority (appointed to identify) to adopt such
approach and procedure as it thinks appropriate, and so long as the
approach adopted by it is fair and adequate, the court has no say in the
matter. The only object of the discussion in the preceding para is to
emphasise that if a Commission/Authority begins its process of identifica-
F
tion with castes (among Hindus) and occupational groupings among others,
it cannot by that reason alone be said to be constitutionally or legally bad.
We must also say that there is iJ.o rule of law that a test to be applied for
identifying backward classes should be only one and/or uniform. In a vast
conntry like India, it is simply not practicable. If the real object is to
G discover and locate backwardness, and if such backwardness is found in a
caste, it can be treated as backward; if it is found in any other group,
section or class, they too can be treated as backward.

83A. The only basis for saying that caste should be excluded from
H consideration altogether while identifying the Backward Class of Citizens
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 641

for the purpose of Article 16( 4) is clause (2) of Article 16. Thi' argument, A
however, overlooks and ignores the true purport of clause (2). lt prohibits
discrimination on any or all of the grounds mentioned therein. The sig-
nificance of the word "any"· cannot be minimised.** Reservation is· n~t
being made under clause (4) in favour of a 'caste' but a 'backward class'.
Once a caste satisfies the criteria of backwardness, it becomes a backward
class for the purposes of Article 16(4). Even that is not enough. It must
B
be further found that that backward class is not adequately represented in
the services of the State. In such a situation, the bar of clause (2) of Article
16 has no application whatsoever. Similarly, the argument based upon
secular nature of the Constitution is too vague to be accepted. It has been
repeatedly held by the U.S. Supreme Court in School desegregation cases c
that if race be the basis of discrimination, race can equally form the basis
of redressal. In any event, in the present context, it is not necessary to go
to that extent. It is sufficient to say that the classification is not on the basis
of the caste but on the ground that that caste is found to be a backward
class not adequately represented in the services of the State. Born Heathen, D
by baptism, it becomes a Christian - to use a similie. Baptism here means
passing the test of backwardness.

84. Another contention urged is that only that group or section of
people, who are suffering the lingering effects of past discrimination, can
E
alone be designated as a backward class and not others. This argument,
inspired by certain American decisions, cannot be accepted for more than
one reason. Firstly, when the caste discrimination is still prevalent, more
particularly in rural India (which comprises the bulk of the total popula-
tion), the theory of lingering effects has no relevance. Where the dis-
crimination has ended, does that aspect become relevant and not when the F
discrimination itself is continuing. Secondly, as we have noticed
hereinabove, the said theory has practically been given up by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Metro Broadcasting. In this case, it is held sufficient for
introducing and implementing a race-conscious programme that such
.. In Air India v. Nargesh Mina, this court held: "What Articles 15(1) and 16(2) prohibit
is that discrimination should not be made only and only on the ground or sex. These
G

Articles of the Constitution do not prohibit the State from making discrimination on
the ground of sex coupled with other considerations. On this point, the matter is no
longer res intergra but is covered by several authorities of this court." Reference is then
made to Ywuf Abdul Aziz v. State of Bombay, (1954} S.C.R. 930 and Miss C.B.
Mu:hamma v. Union of India, (1979) 4 S.C.C. 260. H
642 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A programme serves important State objectives. In other words, according to
this test, it is no longer necessary to prove that such programme is designed
to compensate victims of past societal or governmental discrimination.
Thirdly, the basic premise of the theory of lingering effects is not accepted
by all the learned Jndges of U.S. Supreme Court. If one sees the opinion
B of Douglas, J. in Defunis and of Marshall, J. in Bakke and Fullilove. It
would become evident. They also say that discriminatory practices against
blacks and other minorities have not come to an end but are still persisting.
In this country too, none can deny - in the face of the material collected
by the various Commissions including Manda! Commission - that dis-
crimination persists even today in India The representation of the socially
C backward classes in the Government apparatus is quite inadequate and that
conversely the upper classes have a disproportionately large representation
therein. This is the lingering effect, if one wants to see it.

Whether the backwardness in Anicle 16(4) should be both social and
D educational7
85. The other aspect to be considered is whether the backwardness
contemplated in Article 16(4) is social backwardness or educational back-
wardness or whether it is both social and educational backwardness. Since
the decision in Balaji, it has been assumed that the backward class of
E citizens contemplated by Article 16(4) is the same as the socially and
educationally backward classes, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
mentioned in Article 15(4). Though Article 15(4) came into existence later
in 1951 and Article 16(4) does not contain the qualifying words 'socially
and educationally' preceding tl:te words "backward class of citizens' the
F same meaning came to be attached to them. Indeed, it was stated in Janaki
Prasad Parimoo (Palekar,J. speaking for the Constitution Bench) that:

'Article 15(4) speaks about socially and educationally
-backward classes of citizens." However, it is now settled
that the expression "backward class of citizens" in Article
G 16(4) means the same thing as the expression 'any socially
and educationally backward class of citizens" in Article
15(4). In order to qualify for being called a 'backward class
citizens' he must be a member of a socially and education-
ally backward class. It is social and educational backward-
H ness of a class which is material for the purposes of both
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 643

Article 15(4) and 16(4)." A
It is true that no decision earlier to it specifically said so, yet such an
impression gained currency and it is that impression which finds expression
in the above observation. In our respectful opinion, however, the said as"
sumption has no basis. Clause (4) of Article 16 does not contain the qualifying
words 'socially and educationally' as does clause (4) of Article 15. It may be B
remembered that Article 340 (which has remained unamended) does employ
the expression 'socially and educationally backward classes' and yet that
expression does not find place in Article 16(4). The rea5on is obvious:
"backward class of citizens" in Article 16{4) takes in Scheduled Tribes,
Scheduled Castes and all other backward classes of citizens including the C
socially and educationally backward classes. Thus, certain classes which may
not qualify for Article 15(4) may qualify for Article 16(4). They may not
qualify for Article 15(4) but they may qualify as backward class of citizens for
the purposes of Article 16(4). It is equally relevant to notice that Article 340
does not expressly refer to services or to reservations in services under the D
State, though it may be that the Commission appointed thereunder may
recommend reservation in appointments/posts in the services of the State as
one of the steps for removing the difficulties under which SEBCs are la,bour-
ing and for improving their conditions. Thus, S.E.B.Cs, referred to in Article
340 is only one of the categories for whom Article 16(4) was enacted; Article
16(4) applies to a much larger class than the one contemplaied by Article 340. E
It would, thus, be not correct to say that barkward class of citizens' in Article
16(4) are the same as the socially and educationally backward classes in
Article 15(4). Saying so would mean and imply reading a limitation into a
beneficial provision like Article 16(4). Moreover, when speaking of reserva-
tion in appointments/posts in the State services - which may mean, at any level
F
whatsoever - insisting upon educational backwardness may not be quite
appropriate.

Further, if one keeps in mind the context in which Article 16(4) was
enacted it would be clear that the accent was upon social backwardness. It
goes without saying that in Indian context, social backwardness leads to G
educational backwardness and both of them together lead to proverty -
which in turn breeds and perpetuates the social and educational backward-
ness. They feed upon each other constituting a vicious circle. It is a well
known fact that till independence the administrative apparatus was manned
almost exclusively by members of the 'upper' castes. The Shudras, the H
644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A ·Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes and other similar backward
social" groups among Muslims and Christians bad practically no entry into
the administrative apparatus. It was this imbalance which was sought to be
redressed by providing for reservations in favour of such backward classes.
In this sense Dr. Rajiv Dbawan may be right when he says that the object
B of Article 16(4) was "empowerment" of the backward classes. The idea was
to enable them to share the state power. We are, accordingly, of the
opinion that the backwardness contemplated by Article 16(4) is mainly
social backwardness. It ,would not be correct to say that the backwardness
under Article 16(4) should oe both social and educational. The Scheduled
Tribes and the Scheduled Castes are without a doubt backward for the
C purposes of the clause; no one bas suggested that they should satisfy the
test of social and educational backwardness. It is necessary to state at this
stage that the Manda! Commission appointed under Article 340 was con-
cerned only with the socially and .educationally backward classes con-
templated by the said Article. Even so, it is evident that social
D backwardness bas been given precedence over others by the Manda!
Commission - 12 out of 22 total points. Social backward:aess - it may be
reiterated - leads to educational and economic backwardness. No objection
can be, nor is taken, to the validity and relevancy of the criteria adopted
by the Manda! Commission. For a proper a appreciation of the criteria
adopted by the Manda! Commission and the difficulties in the way of
E evolving the criteria of backwardness, one must read closely Chapters lII
and XI of Volume I along with Appendixes 12 and 21 in Volume II.
Appendix XII is the Report of the Research Planning Team of the
Sociologists while Appendix 21 is the 'Final List of Tables' adopted in the
course of socio-educational survey. In particular, one may read paras 11.18
F to 11.22 in Chapter XI, which are quoted hereunder for ready reference:

"11.18. Technical Committee constituted a Sub-Committee
of Experts (Appendix-20, Volume II) to help the Commis-
sion prepare 'Indicators of Backwardness' for analysing
data contained in computerised tables. After a series of
G meetings and a lot of testing of proposed indicators against
the tabulated data, the number of tables actually required
for the Commission's work was reduced to 31 (Appendix-
21 Volume II). The formulation and refinement of in-
dicators involved testing and validation checks at every
H stage.

I-
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.l. 645

11.19. In this connection, it may be useful to point out that A
in social sciences no mathematical formulae or precise
bench-marks are available for determining various social
traits. A survey of the above type has to read warily on
unfamiliar ground and evolve its own norms and bench-
marks. This exercise was full of hidden pitfalls and two
simple examples are given below to illustrate this point. B

11.20. In Ba/aji's case the Supreme Court held that if a
particular community is to be treated as educationally
backward, the divergence between its educational level and
that of the State average should not be marginal but sub-
c
stantial. The Court considered 50% divergence to be satis-
factory. Now, 80% of the population of Bihar (1971
Census) is illiterate. To beat this percentage figure by a
margin of 50% will mean that 120% members of a
caste/class should be illiterates. In fact it will be seen that D
in this case even 25% divergence will stretch us to the
maximum saturation point of 100%.

11.21. In the Indian situation where vast majority of the
people are illiterate, poor or backward, one has to be very E
careful in setting deviations from the nornts as, in our
conditions, norms themselves are very low. For example,
Per Capita Consumer Expenditure for 1977-78 at .current
prices was Rs.991 per annum. For the same period, the
poverty line for urban areas was at Rs.900 per annum and F
for rural areas at Rs.780. It will be seen that this poverty
line is quite close to the Per C~pita Consumer Expenditure
of an average Indian. Now following the dictum of Ba/aji
case, if 50% deviation from this average Per Capital Con-
sumer Expenditure was to be accepted to identify
'economically backward' classes, their income level will G
have to be 50% below the Per Capital Consumer Expen-
diture i.e. less than Rs.495.5 per year. This figure is so much
below the poverty line both in urban and rural areas that
most of the people may die of starvation before they qualify
for such a distinction. H
646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A 11.22. In view of the above, 'Indicators for Backwardness'
were tested against various cut-off points. For doing so,
about a dozen castes well-known for their social and educa-
tional backwardness were selected from amongst the castes
covered by our survey in a particular State. These were
treated as 'Control' and validation checks were carried out
B by testing them against 'Indicators' at various cut-off points.
For instance, one of the 'Indicators' for social backward-
ness is the rate of student dropouts in the age group 5-15
years as compared to the State average. As a result of the
above tests, it was seen that in educationally backward
c castes this rate is at least 25 per cent above the State
average. Further, it was also noticed that this deviation of
25% from the State average in the case of most of the
'Indicators' gave satisfactory results. In view of this,
wherever an 'Indicator' was based on deviation from the
State average, it was fixed at 25%, because a deviation of
D 50% was seen to give wholly unsatisfactory results and, at
times, to create anomalous situations."

It is after these paragraphs that the Report sets out the indicators
(criteria) evolved by it, set out in Paras 11.23 and 11.24 of the Report.
E
The S.E.B.Cs. referred to by the impugned Memorandums are un-
doubtedly 'backward class of citizens' within the meaning of Article 16(4).

(d) 'Means' test and 'creamy layer':

F 86. 'Means test' in this discussion signifies imposition of an income
limit, for the purpose of excluding persons (from the backward class) whose
income is above the said limit. This submission is very often referred to as "the
creamy layer" argument. Petitioners submit that some members of the desig-
nated backward classes are highly advanced socially as well as economically
and educationally. It is submitted that they constitute the forward section of
G that particular backward class - as forward as any other forward class mem-
ber - and that they are lapping up all the benefits of reservations meant for
that class, without allowing the benefits to reach the truly backward members
of that class. These persons are by no means backward and with them a class
cannot be treated as backward. It is pointed out that since Jayasree, almost
H every decision has accepted the validity of this submission.
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 647

On the other hand, the learned counsel for the State of Bihar, Tamil A
Nadu, Kerala and other counsel for respondents strongly oppose any such
distinction. It is submitted that once a class is identified as a backward class
after applying the relevant criteria including the economic one, it is not
permissible to apply the economic criteria once again and sub-divide a
backward class into two sub-categories. Counsel for the State of Tamil
Nadu submitted further that at one stage (in July 1979) the State of Tamil
B
Nadu did indeed prescribe such an income limit but had to delete it in view
of the practical difficulties encountered and also in view of the repre-
sentation received. In this behalf, the learned counsel invited our attention
to Chapter 7-H (pages 60 to 62) of the Ambashankar Commission (Tamil
Nadu Second Backward Classes Commission) Report. According to the c
respondents the argument of 'creamy layer' is but a mere ruse, a trick, to
deprive the backward classes of the benefit of reservations. It is submitted
that no member of backward class has come forward with this plea and
that it ill becomes the members of forward classes to raise this point. Strong
reliance is placed upon the observations of Chinnappa Reddy,J. in Vasant D
Kumar, to the following effect:

11
••• 0ne must, however, enter a caveat to the criticism that
the benefits of reservation are often snatched away by the
top creamy layer of backward class or caste. That a few of
the seats and posts reserved for backward classes are E.
snatched away by the more fortunate among them is not to
say that reservation is not necessary. This is bound to
happen in a competitive society such as ours. Are not the
unreserved seats and posts snatched away, in the same way,
by the top creamy layers amongst them on the same prin- F
ciple of merit on which the non reserved seats are taken
away by the top layers of society. How can it be bad if
reserved seats and posts are snatched away by the creamy
layer of backward classes, if such snatching away of un~
reserved posts by the top creamy layer of society itself is
not bad? 11 G

In our opinion, it is not a question of permissibility or desirability of
such test but one of proper and more appropriate identification of a class - a
backward class. The very concept of a class denotes a number of persons
having certain common traits which distinguish them from the others. In a H
648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS jl992} SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A backward class under clause (4) of Article 16, if the connecting link is the
social backwardness, it should broadly be the same in a given class. If some of
the members are far too advanced socially (which in the context, necessarily
means economically and, may also mean educationally) the connecting
thread between them and the remaining class snaps. They would be misfits in
the class. After excluding them alone, would the class be a compact class. In
B
fact, such exclusion benefits the truly backward. Difficulty, however, really
lies in drawing the line - how and where to draw the line? For, while drawing
the line, it should be ensured that it does not result in taking away with one
hand what is given by the other. The basis of exclusion should not merely be
economic, unless, of course, the economic advancement is so high that it
c necessarily means social advancement. Let us illustrate the point. A member
of backward class, say a member of carpenter caste, goes to Middle East and
works there as a carpenter. If you take his annual income in rupees, it would
be fairly high from the Indian standard. Is he to be excluded from the
Backward Class? Are his children in India to be deprived of the benefit of
D Article 16( 4)? Situation may, however, be different, if he rises so high
economically as to become - say a factory owner himself. In such a situation,
his social status also rises. He himself would be in a position to provide
employment to others. In such a case, his income is merely a measure of his
social status. Even otherwise there are several practical difficulties too in
E imposing an income ceiling. For example, annual income of Rs.36,000 may
not count for much in a city like Bombay, Delhi or Calcutta whereas it may be
a handsome income in rural India anywhere. The line to be drawn must be a
realistic one. Another question would be, should such a line be uniform for
the entire country or a given State or should it differ from rural to urban areas
and so on. Further, income from agriculture may be difficult to assess and,
F therefore, in the case of agriculturists, the line may have to be drawn with
reference to the extent of holding. While the income of a person can be taken
as a measure of his social advancement, the limit to be prescribed should not
be such as to result in taking away with one hand what is given with the other.
The income limit must be such as to mean and signify social advancement. At
G the same time, it must be recognised that there are certain positions, the
occupants of which can be treated as socially advanced without any further
enquiry. For example, if a member of a designated backward class becomes a
member of l.A.S. or l.P.S. or any other All India Service, his status in society
(social status) rises; he is no longer socially disadvantaged. His children get
H full opportunity to realise their potential. .They are in no way handicapped in
INDRA Si\WHNEY .._ U.0.1. 649

the race of life. His salary is also such that he is above want. It is but logical A
that in such a situation, his children are not given the henefit of reservation.
For by giving them the benefit of reservation, other disadvantaged members
of that backward class may be deprived of that benefit. It is then argued for
the Respondents that 'one swallow doesn't make the summer', and that
merely because a few members of a caste or class become socially advanced,
the class/caste as such does not cease to be backward. It is pointed out that B
clause (4) or Article 16 aims at group backwardness and not individual
backwardness. While we agree that clause (4) aims at group backwardness,
we feel that exclusion of such socially advanced members will make the 'class'
a truly backward class and would more appropriately serve the purpose and
object of clause (4). (This discussion is confined to Other Backward Classes c
only and has no relevance in the case of Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled
Castes).

Keeping in mind all these considerations, we direct the Government
of India to specify the basis of exclusion - whether on the basis of income, D
extent of holding or otherwise - of 'creamy layer'. This shall be done as
early as possible, but not exceeding four months. On such specification
persons falling within the net of exclusionary rule shall cease to be the
members of the Other Backward Classes (covered by the expression 'back-
ward class of citizens') for the purpose of Article 16( 4). The impugned
Office Memorandums dated 13th August, 1990 and 25th September, 1991 E
shall be implemented subject only to such specification and exclusion of
socially advanced persons from the backward classes contemplated by the
said O.M. In other words, after the expiry of four months from today, the
implementation of the said O.M. shall be subject to the exclusion of the
'creamy layer' in accordance with the criteria to be specified by the
Government of India and not otherwise.
F

(c) Whether a class should be situated similarly to the Scheduled
Caste/Scheduled Tribe for being qualified as a Backward Class?

87. In Balaji it was held "that the backward classes for whose im- G
provement special provision is contemplated by Article 15(4) are in the
matter of their backwardness comparable to Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes." The correctness of this observation is questioned by the
counsel for the respondents. Reliance is placed upon the observation..'\ of
Chinnappa 'leddy,J. in Vas ant Kumar (at page 406) where, dealing with lhe H
650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992j SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A above observations in Ba/aji, the learned Judge said:

"We do not think that these observations were meant to lay
down any proposition that the socially Backward Classes
were those classes of people, whose conditions of life were
very nearly the same as those of the Scheduled Castes and
B Tribes .....There is no point in attempting to determine the
social backwardness of other classes by applying the test
of nearness to the conditions of existence of the Scheduled
Castes. Such a test would practically nullify the provision
for reservation for socially and educationally Backward
c Classes other than Scheduled Castes and Tribes."

88. We see no reason to qualify or restrict the meaning of the
expression "backward class of citizens" by saying that it means those other
backward classes who are situated similarly to Scheduled Castes .and/or
D Scheduled Tribes. As pointed out in para 85, the relevant language
employed in both the clauses is different. Article 16(4) does not expressly
refer to Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes; if so, there is no reason
why we should treat their backwardness as the standard backwardness for
all those claiming its protection. As a matter of fact, neither the several
castes/groups/tribes within the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are
E similarly situated nor are the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
similarly situated. If any group or class is situated similarly to the Scheduled
Castes, they may have a case for inclusion in that class but there seems to
be no basis either in fact or in principle for holding that other clas-
ses/groups must be situated similarly to them for qualifying as backward
F classes. There is no warrant to import any such a priori notions into the
concept of Other Backward Classes. At the same time, we think it ap-
propriate to clarify that backwardness, being a relative term, must in the
context be judged by the general level of advancement of the entire
population of the country or the State, as the case may be. More than this,
it is difficult to say. How difficult is the process of ascertainment of
G backwardness would be known if one peruses Chapters III and XI of
Volume I of the Manda! Commission Report along with Appendixes 12
and 21 in Volume II. It must be left to the Commission/Authority ap-
pointed to identify the backward classes to evolve a proper and relevant
criteria and test the several groups, castes, classes and sections of people
H against that criteria. If, in any case, a particular caste or class is wrongly
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 651

designated or not designated a backward class, it can always be questioned A
before a court of law as well. We may add that relevancy of the criteria
evolved by Manda! Commission (Chapter XI) has not been questioned by
any of the counsel before us. Actual identification is a different matter,
which we shall deal with elsewhere.

B
88A. We may now summarise our discussion under Question
No.3.(a) a caste can be an quite often is a social class in India. If it is
backward socially, it would be a backward class for the purposes of Article
16(4). Among non-Hindus, there are several occupational groups, sects and
denominations, which for historical reasons are socially backward. They too
represent backward social collectives for the purposes of Article 16(4). (b) c
Neither the constitution nor the law prescribe the procedure or method of
identification of backward classes. Nor is it possible or advisable for the
court to lay down any such procedure or method. It must be left to the
authority appointed to identify. If can adopt such method/procedure as it
thinks convenient and so long as its survey covers the entire populace, no D
objection can be taken to it. Identification of the backward classes can
certainly be down with reference to castes among, and along with, other
groups, classes and sections of people. One can start the process with the
castes, wherever they are found, apply the criteria (evolved for determining
backwardness) and find out whether it satisfies the criteria. If it does - what
emerges is a 11backward class of citizens11 within the meaning of and for the E
purposes of Article 16(4). Similar process can be adopted in the case of
other occupational groups, communities and classes, so as to cover the
entire populace. The central idea and overall objective should be to con-
sider all available groups, sections and classes in society. Since caste
represents an existing, identifiable social group/class encompassing an F
overwhelming majority of the country's population, one can well begin with
it and then go to other groups, sections and classes. (c) It is not necessary
fur a class to be designated as a backward class that it is situated similarly
to the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes. ( d) 'Creamy layer' can be, and
must be, excluded. ( e) It is not correct to say that the backward class
contemplated by Article 16(4) is limited to the socially and edcuationally G
backward classes referred to in Article 15( 4) and Article 340. It is much
wider. The test or requirement of social and educational backwardness
cannot be applied to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, who in-
dubitably fall within the expression 11backv 1ard class of citizens." The accent
in Article 16( 4} appears to be on social backwardness. Of course, social, H
652 Slll'RFME COURT REl'ORTS l1992J SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A educational and economic backwardness arc closely inter-twined in the
Indian context. The classes contemplated by Article 16(4) may be wider
than those contemplated by Article 15(_4).

Adeqllacy of Representation in the services under the State:

B 89. Not only should a class be a back\vard class for meriting reserva-
tions, it should also be inadequately represented in the services under the
State. The language of clause (4) makes it clear that the question whether a
backward class of citizens is not adequately represented in the services under
the State is a matter within the subjective satisfaction of the State. This is
c evident from the fact that the said requirement is preceded by the words "in
the opinion of the State". This opinion can be formed by the State on its own,
i.e., on the basis of the material it has in its possession already or it may gather
such material through a Commission/Committee, person or authority. All
that is required is, there must be some material upon which the opinion is
formed. Indeed, in this matter the court should show due deference to the
[) opinion of the State, which in the present context means the executive. The
executive is supposed to know the existing conditions in the society, drawn as
it is from among the representatives of the people in Parliament/Legislature.
It does not, however, mean that the opinion formed is beyond judicial
scrutiny altogether. The scope and reach of judicial scrutiny in matters within
E subjective satisfaction of the executive are well and extensively stated in
Barium Chemicals v. Compa11y Law Board, A.LR. 1967 S.C. 295, which need
not be repeated here. Sufficed it to mention that the said principles apply
equally in the case of a constitutional provision like Article 16( 4) which
expressly places the particular fact (inadequate representation) within the
subjective _judgment of the State/executive.
F
Qllestion 4: (a) Whether backward classes can be identified only a11d
exclusively with reference to the econon1ic criterion:

90. It follow from the discussion under Question No.3 that a backward
G class cannot be determined only and exclusively with reference to economic
criterion. It may be a consideration or basis alongwith and in addition to
social backwardness, but it can never be the sole criterion. This is the view
uniformly taken by this court and we respectfully agree with the same.

(b). Whether a backward class can be ide11tified 011 the basis of
H occupatio11-cun1-inconie without reference to caste?
INDRASAWHNEYv. U.0.1. 653

91. In Chitralekha, this court held that such an identification is A
permissible. We see no reason to differ with the said view inasmuch as this
is but another method to find socially backward classes. Indeed, this test
in the Indian context is broadly the same as the one adopted by the Manda!
Commission. While answering Question 3(b), we said that identification of
backward classes can be done with reference to castes alongwith other
occupational groups, communities and classes. We did not say that that is B
the only permissible method. Indeed, there may be some groups or classes
in whose case caste may not be relevant to all. For example, agricultural
labourers, Rickshawpullers/drivers, street-hawkers etc. may well qualify for
being designated as Backward Classes.
c
Question No.5: Whether Backward Classes can be further divided into
backward and more backward categories?

92. In Balaji it was held "that the sub-classification made by the order
between Backward Classes and more backward classes does not appear lo be D
justified under article 15(4). Article 15(4) authorises special provision being
made for the really backward classes. In introducing two categories of back-
ward classes, what the impugned order, in substance, purports to do is to
devise measures for the benefit of all the classes of citizens who are less
advanced compared to the more advanced classes in the State and that, in our
opinion, is not the scope of Article 15(4). The result of the method adopted E
by the impugned order is that nearly 90% of the population of the State is
treated as backward, and that illustrates how the order in fact divides the
population of the State into most advanced and the rest, and puts the latter
into two categories of backward and more backward. The classification of the
two categories, therefore, is not warranted by Article 15(4)." The correctness F
of this holding is questioned before us by the counsel for the respondents. It
is submitted that in principle there is no justification for the said holding. It is
submitted that even among backward classes there are some who are more
backward than the others and that the backwardness is not and cannot be
uniform throughout the country nor even within a State. In support of this
contention, the Respondents rely upon the observations of Chinnappa G
Reddy, J. in Vas ant Kumar, where the learned judge said:

"We do not see why on principle there cannot be a clas-
sification into Backward Classes and More Backward Clas-
ses, if both classes are not merely a little behind, but far H
654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A far behind the most advanced classes. In fact such a clas-
sification would be necessary to help the More Backward
Classes; otherwise those of the Backward Classes who
might be a little more advanced than the More Backward
Classes might walk away with all the seats."

B
92A. We are of the opinion that there is no constitutional or legal
bar to a State categorizing the backward classes as backward and more
backward. We are not saying that it ought to be done. Wc are concerned
with the question if a State makes such a categorisation, whether it would
be invalid? We think not. Let us take the criteria evolved by Manda!
c Commission. Any caste, group or class which scored eleven or more points
was treated as a backward class. Now, it is not as if all the several thousands
of castes/groups/classes scored identical points. There may be some cas-
tes/groups/classes which have scored points between 20 to 22 and there
may be some who have scored points between eleven and thirteen. It
D cannot reasonably be denied that there is no difference between these two
sets of castes/groups/classes. To give an illustration, take two occupational
groups viz., gold-smiths and vaddes (traditional stone-cutters in Andhra
Pradesh) both included within Other Backward Classes. None can deny
that gold-smiths are far less backward than vaddes. If both of them are
grouped together and reservation provided, the inevitably result would be
E that gold-smiths would take away all the reserved posts leaving none for
vaddes. In such a situation, a State may think it advisable to make a
categorisation even among other backward classes so as to ensure that the
more backward among the backward classes obtain the benefits intended
for them. Where to draw the line and how to effect the sub-classification
F is, however, a matter for the Commission and the State - and so long as it
is reasonably done, the Court may not intervene. In this connection,
reference may be made to the categorisation obtaining in Andhra Pradesh.
The Backward Classes have been divided into four categories. Group-A
comprises of 'Aboriginal tribes. Vimukta jatis. Nomadic and semi-nomadic
1

tribes etc.". Group-B comprises professional group like tappers, weavers,
G carpenters, ironsmiths, goldsmiths, kamsalins etc. Group-C pertains to
"Scheduled Castes converts to Christianity and their progency", while
Group-D comprises of all other classes/communities/groups, which are not
included in groups A,B and C. The 25% vacancies reserved for backward
classes are sub-divided between them in proportion to their respective
H population. This categorisation was justified in Bairam, (1972] 3 S.C.R. 247
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.L 655

AT 286. This is merely to show that even among backward classes, there A
can be a sub·classification on a reasonable basis.

There is another way of looking at this issue. Article 16(4) recognises
only one class viz., "backward class of citizens". It does speak separately of
• Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, as does Article 15(4). Even so, it
is beyond controversy that Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes arc also B
included in the expression "backward class of citizens" and that separate
reservations can be provided in their favour. It is a well-accepted
phenomenon throughout the country. What is the logic behind it? It is that
if Scheduled Tribes, Scheduled Castes and Other Backward Classes are
lumped together, O.B.Cs. will take away all the vacancies leaving C
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes high and dry. The same logic also
warrants categorisation as between more backward and backward. We do
not mean to say - we may reiterate - that this should be done. We are only
saying that if a State chooses to do it, it is not impermissible in law.

PART - V (QUESTION NOS.6. 7 AND 8) D

Question 6: To what extent can the reservation be made?

(a) Whether the 50% mle enunciated in Balaji a binding rule or only
a mle of caution or mle of pmdence?
E
(b) Whether the 50% mle, if any, is confined to reservations made
under clause (4) of Article I 6 or whether it takes in all types of reservations
that can be provided under Article 16?

(c} Further while applying 50% mle, if any, whether an year should be
taken as a unit or whether the total strength of the cadre should be looked to? F

-· 93. In Balaji, a Constitution Bench of this Court rejected the argu-
ment that in the absence of a limitation contained in Article 15(4), no
limitation can be prescribed by the court on the extent of reservation. It
observed that a provision under Article 15(4) being a "special provision"
must be within reasonable limits. It may be appropriate to quote the
G

relevant holding from the judgment:

"When Art.15( 4) refers to the special provision for the
advancement of certain classes or Scheduled Castes or
Scheduled Tribes, it must not be ignored that the provision H
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A which is authorised to be made is a special provision; it is
not a provision which is exhaustive in character, so that in
looking after the advancement of those classes, the State
would be justified in ignoring altogether the advancement
of the rest of the society. It is because the interests of the
society at large would be served by promoting the advan-
B cement of the weaker elements in the society that Art.15(4)
authorises special provision to be made. But if a provision
which is in the nature of an exception completely excludes
the rest of the society, that clearly is outside the scope of
Art.15(4). It would be extremely unreasonable to assume
c that in enacting Art.15(4) the Parliament intended to pro-
vide that where the advancement of the Backward Classes
or the Scheduled Castes and Tribes was concerned, the
fundamental rights of the citizens constituting the rest of
the society were to be completely and absolutely ig-
nored .... A Special provision contemplated by Art.15(4)
D like reservation for posts and appointments contemplated
by Art.16(4) must be within reasonable limits. The interests
of weaker1 sections of society which are a first charge on
the State and the Centre have to be adjusted with the
interests of the community as a whole. The adjustment of
E these competing claims is undoubtedly a difficult matter,
but if under the guise of making a special provision, a State
reserves practically all the seats available in all the colleges,
that clearly would be adverting the object of Art.15(4). In
this matter again, we are reluctant to say definitely what
would be a proper provision to make. Speaking generally
F
and in a broad way a special provision should be less than
50%; how much less than 50% would depend upon the
relevant prevailing circumstances in each case."

In De»adasan this rule of 50% was applied to a case arising under
G Article 16(4) and on that basis the carry-forward rule was struck down. In
Thomas, however the correctness of this principle was questioned. Fazal
Ali, J. observed:

"This means that the reservation should be within the
H permissible limits and should not be a cloak to fill all the
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.l. 657

posts belonging to a particular class of citizens and thus A
violate Art.16(1) of the Constitution indirectly. At the same
time clause (4) of Art.16 does not fix any limit on the power
••
of the government to make reservation. Since clause (4) is
a part of Art.16 of the Constitution it is manifest that the
State cannot be allowed to indulge in excessive reservation
so as to defeat the policy contained in Art.16(1). As to what
B
would be a suitable reservation within permissible limits
will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case
and no hard and fast rule can be laid down, nor can this
matter be reduced to a mathematical formula so as to be
adhered to in all cases. Decided cases of this Court have c
no doubt laid down that the percentage of reservation
should not exceed 50%. As I read the authorities, this is
however, a rule of caution and does not exhaust all
categories. Suppose for instance a State has a large number
of backward class of citizens which constitute 80% of the
D
population and the Government, in order to give them
proper representation, reserves 80% of the jobs for them
can it be said that the percentage of reservation is bad and
violates the permissible limits of clause (4) of Art.16? The
answer must necessarily be in the negative. The dominant
object to this provision is to take steps to make inadequate E
11
representation adequate.

Krishna Iyer, J. agreed with the view taken by Fazal Ali, J. in the
following words:
F
"I agree with my learned brother Fazal Ali, J. in the view
that the arithmatical limit of 50% in any one year set by
some earlier rulings cannot perhaps be pressed too far.
Overall representation in a department does not depend
on recruitment in a particular year, but the total strength
of a cadre. I agree with his construction of Art.16(4) and G
his view about the carry forward' rule."

Mathew, J. did not specifically deal with this aspect but from the
principles of 'proportional equality' and 'equality of results' espoused by
the.learned Judge, it is argued that he did not accept the 50% rule. Beg,J. H
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A also did not refer to this rule but the following sentence occurs in his
judgment at pages 962 and 963:

"If a reservation of posts under Article 16(4) for employees
of backward classes could include complete reservation of
higher posts to which they could be promoted, about which
B there could be no doubt now, I fail to see why it cannot be
partial or for a part of the duration of service and hedged
round with the condition that a temporary promotion
would operate as a complete and confirmed promotion
only if the temporary promotee satisfies some tests within
11

c a given time.

Ray, C.J., did not dispute the correctness of the 50% rule but at the
same time he pointed out that this percentage should be applied to the
entire service as a whole.

D After the decision in Thomas, controversy arose whether the 50%
rule enunciated in Ba/aji stands overruled by Thomas or does it continue
to be valid. In Vasant Kumar, two learned judges came to precisely op-
posite conclusions on this question. Chinnappa Reddy, J, held that Thomas
has the effect of undoing the 50% rule in Ba/aji whereas Venkataramiah,
E J. held that it does not.

94. It is argued before us that the observations on the said question
in Thomas were obiter and do not constitute a decision so as to have the
effect of overruling Ba/aji. Reliance is also placed upon the speech of Dr.
Ambedkar in the Constituent Assembly, where he said that reservation
F must be confined to a minority of seats (See para 28). It is also pointed
out that Krishna Iyer, J. who agreed with Fazal Ali, J. in Thomas on this
aspect, came back to, and affirmed, the 50% rule in Karamchari Sangh (at
pp. 241 and 242). On the other hand, it is argued for the respondents that
when the population of the other backward classes is more than 50% of
G the total population, the reservation in their favour (excluding Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes) can also be 50%.

94A. We must, however, point out that clause (4) speaks of adequate
representation and not proportionate representation. Adequate repre-
sentation cannot be read as proportionate representation. Principle of
H proportionate representation is accepted only in Articles 330 and 332 of
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.l. 659

the Constitution and that too for a limited period. These articles speak of A
reservation of seats in Lok Sabha and the State Legislatures in favour of
Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes proportionate to their population,
but they are only temporary and special provisions. It is therefore not
possible to accept the theory of proportionate representation though the
proportion of population of backward classes to the total population would
certainly be relevant. Just as every power must be exercised reasonably and B
fairly, the power conferred by clause (4) of Article 16 should also be
exercised in a fair manner and within reasonably limits - and what is more
reasonable than to say that reservation under clause (4) shall not exceed
50% of the appointments or posts, barring certain extra-ordinary situations
as explained hereinafter. From this point of view, the 27% reservation C
provided by the impugned Memorandums in favour of backward classes is
well within the reasonable limits. Together with reservation in favour of
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, it comes to a total of 49.5%. In
this connection, reference may be had to the Full Bench decision of the
Andhra Pradesh High Court in Narayan Rao v.State 1987 A.P. 53, striking
down the enhancement of reservation from 25% to 44% for O.B.Cs. The D
said enhancement had the effect of taking the total reservation under
Article 16(4) to 65%.

It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Article 14 and 16
is equality and equality of opportunity and that clause (4) of Article 16 is but E
a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision
- though not an exception to clause (1). Both the provisions have to be
harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the
principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article
16(4) - concieved in the interest of certain sections of society - should be
F
balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in clause (1) of Article
16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is
relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation
being "confined to a minority of seats" (See his speech in Constituent As-
sembly, set out in para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly
suggested otherwise. It is, thus clear that reservation of a majority of seats was G
never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present
context requires Us to depart from that concept.

From the above discussion, the irresistible conclusion that follows is
that the reservations contemplated in clause (4) of Article 16 should not H
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A exceed 50%.

While 50% shall be the rule, it is necessary not to put out of
consideration certain extraordinary situations inherent in the great diversity
of this country and the people. It might happen that in far-flung and remote
areas the population inhabiting those areas might, on account of their being
B out of the main stream of national life and in view of conditions peculiar
to and characteristical to them, need to be treated in a different way, some
relaxation in this strict rule may become imperative. In doing so, extreme
caution is to be exercised and a special case made out.

C In this connection it is well to remember that the reservations under
Article 16(4) do not operate like a communal reservation. It may well
happen that some members belonging to, say Scheduled Castes get selected
in the open competition field on the basis of their own merit; they will not
be counted against the quota reserved for Scheduled Castes; they will be
D treated as open competition candidates.

95. We are also of the opinion that this rule ef 50% applies only to
reservations in favour of backward classes made under Article 16(4). A
little clarification is in order at this juncture: all reservations are not of the
same nature. There are two types of reservations, which may, for the sake
E of convenience, be referred to as 'vertical reservations' and 'horizontal
reservations'. The reservations in favour uf Scheduled Castes, Scheduled
Tribes and other backward classes [under Article 16(4)] may be called
vertical reservations whereas reservations in favour of physically hand-
icapped [under clause (1) of Article 16] can be referred to as horizontal
F reservations. Horizontal reservations cut across the vertical reservations ·
that is called inter-locking reservations. To be more precise, suppose 3%
of the vacancies are reserved in favour of physically handicapped persons;
this would be a reservation relatable to clause (1) of Article 16. The
persons selected against this quota will be placed in the appropriate
category; if he belongs to S.C. category he will be placed in that quota by
G making necessary adjustments; similarly, if he belongs to open competition
(0.C.) category, he will be placed in that category by making necessary
adjustments. Even after providing for these horizontal reservations; the
percentage of reservations in favour of backward class of citizens remains
- and should remain the same. This is how these reservations are worked
w

H out in several States and there is no reason not to continue that procedure.
INDRA SAWHNEY 1·. U.0.1. 661

It is, however, made clear that the rule of 50% shall be applicable A
only to reservations proper: they shall not be - indeed cannot be - ap-
plicable to exemptions, concessions or relaxations, if any provided to
'Backward Class of Citizens' under Article 16(4).

96. The next aspect of this question is whether an year should be
taken as the unit or the total strength of the cadre, for the purpose of
B
applying the 50% rule. Balaji does not deal with this aspect but Devadasan
(majority opinion) does. Mudholkar, J. speaking for the majority says:

"We would like to emphasise that the guarantee contained
in Article 16(1) is for ensuring equality of opportunity for c
all citizens relating to employment, and to appointments to
any office under the State. This means that on every oc-
casion for recruitment the State should see that all citizens
are treated equally. The guarantee is to each individual
citizen and, therefore, every citizen who is seeking employ-
D
ment or appointment to an office under the State is entitled
to be afforded an opportunity for seeking such employment
or appointment whenever it is intended to be filled. In
order to effectuate the guarantee each year of recruitment
will have to be considered by itself and the reservation for
backward communities should not be so excessive as to E
create a monopoly or to disturb unduly the legitimate
claims of other communitics. 11

On the other hand is the approach adopted by Ray, C.J. in 77wmas.
While not disputing the correctness of the 50% rule he seems to apply it F
to the entire service as such. In our opinion, the approach adopted by Ray,
C.J. would not be consistent with Article 16. True it is that the backward
classes, who are victims of historical social injustice, which has not ceased
fully as yet, are not properly represented in the services under the State
but it may not be possible to redress this imblance in one go, i.e., in a year
or two. The position can be better explained by taking an illustration. Take G
a unit/service/cadre comprising 1000 posts. The reservation in favour of
Scheduled Tribes, Scheduled Castes and Other Backward Classes is 50%
which means that out of the 1000 posts 500 must be held by the members
of these classes i.e., 270 by other backward classes, 150 by Scheduled
Castes and 80 by Scheduled Tribes. At a given point of time, let us say, the H
662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A number of members of O.B.Cs. in the unit/service/category is only 50, a
short fall of 220. Similarly the number of members of Scheduled Caste'
and Scheduled Tribes is only 20 and 5 respectively, shortfall of 130 and 75.
If the entire service/cadre is taken as a unit and the backlog is sought to
be made up, then the open competition channel has to be choked al-
together for a number of years until the number of members of all back-
B ward classes reaches 500, i.e., till the quota meant for each of them is filled
up. This may take quite a number of years because the number of vacancies
arising each year are not many. Meanwhile, the members of open competi-
tion category would become age barred and ineligible. Equality of oppor-
tunity in their case would become a mere mirage. It must be remembered
C that the equality of opportunity guaranteed by clause (1) is to each in-
dividual citizen of the country while clause (4) contemplates special
provision being made in favour of socially disadvantaged classes. Both must
be balanced against each other. Neither should be allowed to eclipse the
other. For the above reason, we· hold that for the purpose of applying the
D rule of 50% an year should be taken as the unit and not the entire strength
of the cadre, service or the unit, as the case may be.

(d) Was Devadasan co"ectly decided?

97. The rule (providing for carry forward of unfilled reserved vacan-
cies as modified in 1955) struck down in Devadasan read as follows:
E
"3( a) If a sufficient number of candidate considered
suitable by the recruiting authorities, are not available from
the communities for whom reservations are made in a
particular year, the unfilled vacancies should be treated as
F unreserved and filled by the best available candidates. The
number of reserved vacancies thus treated as unreserved
will be added as an additional quota to the number that
would be reserved in the following year in the normal
course; and to the extent to which approved candidates are
not available in that year against this additional quota, a
G
corresponding addition should be made to the number of
reserved vacancies in the second following year."

The facts of the case relevant for our purpose are the following:

H (i) Reservation in favour of Scheduled Castes and
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.I. 663

Scheduled Tribes was 12Vz% and 5% respectively; A
(ii) In 1960, U.P.S.C. issued a notification proposing to hold
a limited competitive examination for promotion to the
category of Assistant Superintendents in Central Secretariat
Services. 48 vacancies were to be filled, out of which 16
were unreserved while 32 were reserved for Scheduled B
Castes/Scheduled Tribes, because of the operation of the
carry forward Rule: 28 vacancies were actually carried
forward;

(iii) U.P.S.C. recommended 16 for unreserved and 30 for
reserved vacancies - a total of 46;
c
(iv) the Government however appointed in all 45 persons,
out of whom 29 belonged to Scheduled Castes/Scheduled
Tribes.
D
The said Rule and the appointments made on that basis were ques-
tioned mainly on the ground that they violated the 50% rule enunciated in
Balaji. It was submitted that by virtue of the carry forward Rule, 65% of
the vacancies for the year in question came to be reserved for Scheduled
Castes/Scheduled Tribes.
E
The majority, speaking through Mudholkar,J. upheld the contention
of the petitioners and struck down the Rule purporting to apply the
principle of Ba/aji. The vice of the Rule was pointed out in the following
wards:
F
"In order to appreciate better the import of this rule on
recruitment, let us take an illustration. Supposing in two
successive years no candidate from amongst the Scheduled
Castes and Tribes is found to be qualified for filling any of
the reserved posts. Supposing also that in each of those two
years the number of vacaneies to be filled in a particular G
service was 100. The reserved vacancies for each of those
years would, according to the Govermnent resolution, be
18 for each year. Now, since these vacancies were not filled
in those years a total of36 vacancies will be carried forward
to the third year. Supposing in the third year also the H
664 Slll'RFMF COURT Rl·:J'ORTS 11992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A number of vacancies to he filled is 100. Then 18 vacancies
out of these will also have to he reserved for members of
the Scheduled Castes and Tribes. By operation of the carry
forward rule the vacancies to be filled by persons from
amongst the Scheduled Castes and Tribes would be 54 as
against 46 by persons from amongst the more advanced
B classes. The reservation would thus be more than 50%."

98. We are of the respectful opinion that on its own reasoning, the
decision in so far as it strikes down the Rule is not sustainable. The most
that could have been done in that case was to quash the appointments in
C excess of 50%, inasmuch as, as a matter of fact, more than 50% of the
vacancies for the year 1960 came to be reserved by virtue of the said Rule.
But it would not be correct to presume that that is the necessary and the
only consequence of that rule. Let us take the very illustration given at pp.
691-2, - namely 100 vacancies arising in three successive years and 18%
D being the reservation quota · and examine. Take a case, where in the first
year, out of 18 reserved vacancies 9 are filled up and 9 are carried forward.
Similarly, in the second year again, 9 are filled up and another 9 are carried
forward. Result would be that in the third year, 9+9+18=36 (out of a
total of lOO) would be reserved which would be far less than 50%; the rule
in Balaji is not violated. But by striking down the Rule itself, carrying
E
forward of vacancies even in such a situation has become impermissible,
which appears to us indefensible in principle. We may also point out that
the premise made in Balaji and reiterated in Devadasan, to the effect that
clause (4) is an exception to clause (1) is no longer acceptable, having been
given up in Thomas. It is for this reason that in Karamchari Sangh, Krishna
F Iyer, J. explained Devadasan in the following words:

''In Devadasan's case the court went into the actuals, not
into the hypothcticals. This is most important. The Court
actually ve1 ified the degree of deprivation of the 'equal
G opportunity' right.. ...

...... What is striking is that the Court did not take an
academic view or make a notional evaluation but checked
up to satisfy itself about the seriousness of the infraction
H of the right. ..... Mathcmatical calculations, departing fro1n
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U .0.1. 665

realitir.s of the case, may startle us without justification, the A
apprehension being misplaced. All that we need say is that
the Railway Board shall take care to issue instructions to
see that in no year shall SC&ST candidates be actually
appointed to substantially more than 50% of the promo-
tional posts. Some excess will not affect as mathematical
precision is different in human affairs, but substantial ex- B
cess will void the selection. Subject to this rider or condition
that the 'carry forward' rule shall not result, in any given
year, in the selection of appointments of SC&ST candidates
considerably in excess of 50% we uphold Annexure !".

We are in respectful agreement with the above statement of law.
c
Accordingly, we over-rule the decision in Devadasan. We have already
discussed and explained the 50% rule in paras 93 to 96. The same position
would apply in the case of carry forward rule as well. We, however, agree
that an year should be taken as the unit or basis, as the case may be, for
applying the rule of 50% and not the entire cadre strength. D

99. We may reiterate that a carry forward rule need not necessarily
be in the same terms as the one found in Devadasan. A given rule may say
that the unfilled reserved vacancies shall not be filled by unreserved
category candidates but shall be carried forward as such for a period of E
three years. In such a case, a contention may be raised that reserved posts
remain a separate category altogether. In our opinion, however, the result
of application of carry forward rule, in whatever manner it is operated,
should not result in breach of 50% rule.

Question No.7: Whether clause (4) of Article 16 provides reservation F
only in the matter of initial appointments/direct recntit1nent or does it con-
template and provide for reservations being made in the matter of promotion
as well?**

100. The petitioner's submission is that the reservation of appoint- G
ments or posts contemplated by clause (4) is only at the stage of entry into
.. One of us, Ahmadi. J. is of the opinion that this question does not arise for considera-
tion in these writ p~litions and hence need not be answered. Accordingly. the opinions
e..pressed and conclusion rel'orded on rhi.s question are those of the Chief Justice. M.N.
Venkatachaliah. and B.P. Jeevan Reddy. JJ. only.
H
666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A State service, i.e., direct recruitment. It is submitted that providing for
reservation thereafter in the matter of promotion amounts to a double
reservation and if such a provision is made at each successive stage of
promotion it would be a case of reservation being provided that many
times. It is also oubmitted that by providing reservation in the matter of
promotion, the member of a reserved category is enabled to frog- leap over
B his compatriots, which was bound to generate acute heart - burning and
may well lead to inefficiency in administration. The members of the open
competition category would come to think that whatever be their record
and performance, the members of reserved categories would steal a march
over them, irrespective of their performance and competence. Examples
c are given how two persons (A) and (B), one belonging to O.C. category
and the other belonging to reserved category, having been appointed at the
same time, the member of the reserved category gets promoted earlier and
how even in the promoted category he jumps over the members of the O.C.
category already there and gains a further promotion and so on. This would
D generate, it is submitted, a feeling of dis-heartening which kills the spirit
of competition and develops a sense of dis-interestedness among the
members of O.C. category. It is pointed out that once persons coming from
different sources join a category or class, they must be treated alike
thereafter in all matters including promotions and that no distinction is
permissible on the basis of their "birth-mark". It is also pointed out that
E even the Constituent Assembly debates on draft Article 10(3) do not
indicate in any manner that it was supposed to extend to promotions as
well. It is further submitted that if Article 16(4) is construed as warranting
reservation even in the matter of promotion it would be contrary to the
mandate of Article 335 viz., maintenance of efficiency in administration. It
is submitted that such a provision would amount to putting a premium
F
upon in-efficiency. The members of the reserved category would not work
hard since they do not have to compete with all their colleagues but only
within the reserved category and further because they are assured of
promotion ;-vhether they work hard and efficiently or not. Such a course
would also militate against the goal of excellence referred to in clause (J)
G of Article 51A (Fundamental Duties).

101. Sri K.Parasaran, learned counsel appearing for the Union of
India raised a preliminary objection to the consideration of this question
at all. According to him, this question does not arise at present inasmuch
H as the impugned Memorandums do not provide for reservation in the
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.L 667

matter of promotion. They confine the reservation only to direct recruit- A
ment. Learned counsel reiterated the well-established principle of Con-
stitutional Law that Constitutional questions should not be decided in
vaccum and that they must be decided only if and when they arise properly
on the pleadings of a given case and where it is found necessary to decide
them for a proper decision of the case. A large number of decisions of this
court and English courts are relied upon in support of this proposition.•• B
If for any reason this court decides to answer the said question, says the
counsel, the answer can only be one - which is already given by this court
in a number of decisions namely, Rangachari, Hirata/ and Karamchari
Sangh. He submits that an appointment to a post is made either by direct
recruitment or by promotion or by transfer. In all these cases it is but an c
appointment. If so, Article 16(4) does undoubtedly take in and warrant
making a provision for reservation in the matter of promotion as well.
Learned counsel commended to us the further reasoning in Rangachari that
adequate representation means not merely quantitative representation but
also qualitative representation. He says further that adequacy in repre- D
sentation does not mean representation at the lowest level alone but at all
levels in the administration. Regarding the Constituent Assembly debates,
his submission is that those debates do not indicate that the said pn;wision
was not supposed to apply to promotions. In such a situation, it is argued,
plain words of the Constitution should be given their due meaning and that
there is no warrant for cutting down their ambit on the basis of certain E
suppositions with respect to interpretation of clauses (1), (2) and ( 4). This
is also the contention of the other counsel for respondents.

102. With respect to the preliminary objection of Sri Parasaran, there
can hardly be any dispute about the proposition espoused by him. But it
must be remembered that reference to this larger Bench was made with a F
view to "finally settle the legal position relating to reservations". The idea
was to have a final look at the said question by a larger Bench to settle the
law in an authoritative way. It is for this reason that we have been per-
suaded to express ourselves on this question. But before we proceed to
express ourselves on the question, a few clarifications would be in order. G

103. Reservation in the case of promotion is normally provided only
where the promotion is by selection, i.e., on the basis of merit. For, if the
.. It is this objection, Ahmadi, J. (one of us) upholds:
H
668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A promotion is on the basis of seniority, such a rule may not be called for; in
such a case the position obtaining-in the lower category gets reflected in the
higher category (promotion category) also. Where, however, promotion is
based on merit, it may happen that members of backward classes may not get
selected in the same proportion as is obtaining in the lower category. With a
view to ensure similar representation in the higher category also, reservation
B is thought of even in the matter of promotion based on selection. This is, of
course, in addition to the provision for reservation at the entry (direct
recruitment) level. This was the position in Rangachari. Secondly, there may
be a service/class/category, to which appointment is made partly by direct
recruitment and partly by promotion (i.e., promotion on the basis of merit).
c If no provision is made for reservation in promotions, the backward class
members may not be represented in this category to the extent prescribed.
We may give an illustration to explain what we are saying. Take the category
of Assistant Engineers in a particular service where 50% of the vacancies
arising in a year are filled up by direct recruitment and 50% by promotion (by
D selection i.e., on merit basis) from among Junior Engineers. If provision for
reservation is made only in the matter of direct recruitment but not in
promotions, the result may be that members of backward classes (where
quota, let us say, is 25%) would get in to that extent only in the 50% direct
recruitment quota but may not get in to that extent in the balance 50%
promotion quota. It is for this reason that reservation is thought of even in the
E matter of promotions, particularly where promotions are on the basis of
merit. The question for our consideration, however, is whether Article 16(4)
contemplates and permits reservation only in the matter of direct recruit-
ment or whether it also warrants provision being made for reservation in the
matter of promotions as well. For answering this question, it would be
appropriate, in the first instance, to t.:xamine the facts of and dicta in Ran-
F
gachari, Hirata/ and Karamchari Sangh.

104. In Rangachari, validity of the circulars issued by the Railway
administration providing for reservation in favour of Scheduled Cas-
tes/Scheduled Tribes in promotions (by selection) was questioned. The
G contention was that Article 16(4) does not take in or comprehend reserva-
tion in the matter of promotions as well and that it is confined to direct
recruitment only. The Madras High Court agreed with this contention. It
held that the word '"appointments'" in clause (4) did not denote promotion
and further that the word "posts" in the said clause referred to posts outside
H the cadre concerned. ( )n appeal, this Court reversed by a majority of 3:2.
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.l. 669

Gajendragadkar, .I. speaking for the majority enunciated certain proposi- A
tions, of which the following are relevant for our discussion:

"(a) matters relating to employment [in clause (1)] must
include all matters in relation to employment both prior,
and subsequent, to the employment which are incidental
to the employment and form part of the terms and condi- B
tions of such employment.

(b) in regard to employment, like other terms and condi-
tions associated with and incidental to it, the promotion to
a selection post is also included in the matters relating to
employment, and even in regard to such a promotion to a
c
selection post all that Article 16(1) guarantees is equality
of opportunity to all citizens who enter service."

(c) "The condition precedent for the exercise of the powers
conferred by Art.16(4) is that the State ought to be satisfied D
that any backward class of citizens is not adequately rep-
resented in its services. This condition precedent may refer
either to the numerical inadequacy of representation in the
services or even to the qualitative inadequacy of repre·
sentation. The advancement of the socially and education-
ally backward classes requires not only that they should
E
have adequate representation in the lowest rung of services
but that they should aspire to secure adequate repre-
sentation in selection posts in the services as well. In the
context the expression 'adequately represented' imports
considerations of ''size" as well as values'\ numbers as well
11
F
as the nature of appointments held and so it involves not
merely the numerical test but also the qualitative one."

(b) "in providing for the reservation of appointments or
posts under Art.16(4), the State has to take into considera-
tion the claims of the members of the backward classes G
consistently with the maintenance of the efficiency of ad-
ministration. It must not be forgotten that the efficiency of
administration is of sucli paramount importance that it
Y.'Ould be unwise and impermissible to make any reserva-
tion at the cost of efficiency of administration. That un- H
670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A doubtedly is the effect of Art.335. Reservation of appoint-
ments or posts may theoritically and conceivably mean
some impairment of efficiency; but the risk involved in
sacrificing efficiency of administration must always be
borne in mind when any State sets about making a provision
for reservation of appointments of posts."
B
105. In State of Punjab v. Hira/al, validity of an order made by the
Government of Punjab providing for reservation in promotion (in addition
to initial recruitment) was questioned. Though the High Court upheld the
challenge, this Court (Shah, Hegde and Grover,JJ.) reversed and upheld
C the validity of the Government order following Rangachari.

106. Validity of a number of circulars issued by the Railway Ad-
ministration was questioned in Karamchari Sangh, a petition under Article
32. The experience gained over the years disclosed that reservation of ap-
D pointments/posts in favour ofSC/STs, though made both at the stage of initial
recruitment and promotion was not achieving the intended results, inasmuch
as several posts meant for them remained unfilled by them. Accordingly, the
Administration issued several circulars from time to time tending further
concessions and other measures to ensure that members of these categories
avail of the posts reserved for them fully. (The original circular is referred to
E in the judgment as Ann.-F, whose validity was upheld in Rangachari itself.
The other circulars are referred to as Annexures 1,H,J and K). These cir-
culars contemplated (i) giving one grade higher to SC/ST candidates than is
assignable to an employee (ii) carrying forward vacancies for a period of
three years and (iii) provision for in-service training and coaching (after
F promotion) to raise .the level of efficiency of SC/ST employees who were
directed to be promoted on a temporary basis for a specified period, even if
they did not obtain the requisite places. The contention of the writ petitioners
was that these circulars, being inconsistent with the mandate of Article 335,
are bad. Rangachari was sought to be reopened by arguing that Article 16(4)
does not take in reservation in the matter of promotion. The Division Bench
G (Krishna Iyer, Pathak and Chinnappa Reddy,JJ.) not only refused to re-open
Rangachari but also repelled the attack upon the circulars. It was held that no
dilution of efficiency in administration resulted from the implementation of
the circulars inasmuch as they preserved the criteria of eligibility and mini-
mum efficiency required and also provided for in-service training and coach-
H ing to correct the deficiencies, if any. The carry forward rule was also upheld
INDRA SAWHNEY "· U.0.1. 671

subject to the condition that the operation of the rule shall not result, in any A
given year, scloction/appointment of Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe can-
didates in excess of 50%.

In Comptroller and Auditor General v. KS. Jagannathan, (1986] 2
S.C.R. 17, it was held:
B
It is now well settled by decisions of this court that the
11

reservation in favour of backward classes of citizens includ·
ing the members of the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes, as contemplated by Art.16( 4) can be
made not merely in respect of initial recruitment but also c
in respect of posts to which promotions are to be made.
(See for instance: (1971] 3 SCR 267 and Akhil Bhartiya
Soshit Karamchari Sangh v. U.0.1., (1981] 1 S.C. 246.]"

107. We find it difficult to agree with the view in Rangachari that D
Article 16(4) contemplates or permits reservation in promotions as well. It
is true that the expression 11 appointmentn takes in appointment by direct
recruitment, appointment by promotion and appointment by transfer. It
may also be that Article 16(4) contemplates not merely quantitative but
also qualitative support to backward class of citizens. But this question has
not to be answered on a reading of Article 16(4) alone but on a combined E
reading of Article 16( 4) and Article 335. In Rangachari this fact was
acknowledged but explained away on a basis which, with great respect to ·
the learned Judges who constituted the majority - does not appear to be
acceptable. The propositions emerging from the majority opinion in Ran-
gachari have been set out in Para 104. Under proposition (d) (as set out F
in para 104), the majority does say that "in providing for the reservation of
appointments or posts under Art.16(4), the State has to take into con-
sideration the claims of the members of the back-ward classes consistently
with the maintenance of the efficiency of administration. It must not be
forgotten that the efficiency of administration is of such paramount impor-
tance that it would be unwise and impermissible to make any reservation G
at the cost of efficiency of administration. That undoubtedly is the effect
of Art.335. Reservation of appointments or posts may theoratically and
conceivably means some impairment of efficiency;" but then it explains it
away by saying 11but the risk involved in sacrificing efficiency of administra·
tion must always be borne in mind when any State sets about making a H
672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A provision for reservation of appointments of posts." We see no justification
to multiply 'the risk', which would be the consequence of holding that
reservation can be provided even in the matter of promotion. While it is
certainly just to say that a handicap should be given to backward class of
citizens at the stage of initial appointment, it would be a serious and
unacceptable inroad into the rule of equality of opportunity to say that such
B a handicap should be provided at every stage of promotion throughout
their career. That would mean creation of a permanent separate category
apart from the mainstream - a vertical division of the administrative ap-
paratus. The members of reserved categories need not have to compete
with others but only among themselves. There would be no will to work,
c compete and excel among them. Whether they work or nvt, they tend to
think, their promotion is assured. This in turn is bound to generate a feeling
of despondence and 'heart-burning' among open competition members. All
this is bound to affect the efficiency of administration. Putting the members
of backward classes on a fast-track would necessarily result in leap-frogging
D and the deleterious effects of "leap-frogging" need no illustration at our
"
hands. At the initial stage of recruitment reservation can be made in favour
of backward class of citizens but once they enter the service, efficiency of
administration demands that these members too compete with others and
earn promotion like all others; no further distinction can be made there-
after with reference to their "birth-mark", as one of the learned Judges of
E this Court has said in another connection. They are expected to operate
on equal footing with others. Crutches cannot be provided throughout
one's career. That would not be in the interest of efficiency of administra-
tion nor in the larger interest of the nation. It is wrong to think that by
holding so, we are confining the backward class of citizens to the lowest
cadres. It is well-known that direct recruitment takes place at several
F
higher levels of administration and not merely at the level of Class-IV and
Class-III. Direct recruitment is provided even at the level of All India
Services. Direct recruitment is provided at the level of District Judges, to
give an example nearer home. It may also be noted that during the debates
in the Constituent Assembly, none referred to reservation in promotions;
G it c!oes not appear to have been within their contemplation.

It is true that Rangachari has been the law for more than 30 years
and that attempts to re-open the issue were repelled in Karamchari Sangh.
It may equally be true that on the basis of that decision, reservation may
H have been provided in the matter of promotion in some of the Central and

,.
INDRA SAWHNEY i·. U.0.1. 673

State services but we are convinced that the majority opinion in Rangachari, A
to the extent it holds, that Article 16(4) permits reservation even in the
matter of promotion, is not sustainable in principle and ought to be
departed from. However, taking into consideration all the circumstances,
we direct that our decision on this question shall operate only prospectively
and shall not affect promotions already made, whether on temporary,
officiating or regular/permanent basis. It is further directed that wherever B
reservations are already provided in the matter of promotion - be it Central
Services or State Services, or for that matter services under any corpora-
tion, authority or body falling under the definition of 'State' in Article 12-
such reservations shall continue in operation for a period of five years from
this day. Within this period, it would be open to the appropriate authorities c
to revise modify or reissue the relevant Rules to ensure the achievement
of the objective of Article 16{4). If any authority thinks that for ensuring
adequate representation of 'backward class of citizens' in any service, class
or category, it is necessary to provide for direct recruitment therein, it shall
be open to it do so.
D
A purist or a legal theoretician may find this direction a little
illogical. We can only answer them in the words of Lord Roskill. In h_is
presidential address to the Bentham Club at University College of London
on February 29, 1984 on the subject 11 Law Lords, Reactionaries or
Reformers?", the learned Law Lord said: E

"Legal policy now stands enthroned and will I hope remain
one of the foremost considerations governing the develop-
ment by the House of Lords of the common law. What
direction should this development now take? I can think of F
several occasions upon which we have all said to ourselves
"this case requires a policy decision - what is the right policy
01
decision? The answer is, and I hope will hereafter be, to
follow that route which is most consonant with the current
needs of the society, and which will be seen to be sensible
and will pragmatically thereafter be easy to apply. No doubt G
the Law Lords will continue .to be the targets for those
academic lawyers who will seek intellectual perfection
rather than imperfect pragmatism. But much of the com-
mon law and virtually all criminal law, distasteful as ii may
be to some to have to ackno~l~dge it, is a blunt instrument H
674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A by means of which human beings, whether they like it or
not, are governed and subject to which they are required
to live, and blunt instruments are rarely perfect intellec-
tually or otherwise. By definition they operate bluntly and
not sharply."

B We must also make it clear that it would not be impermissible for
the State to extend concessions and relaxations to members of reserved
categories in the matter of promotion without compromising the efficiency
of the administration. The relaxation concerned in Thomas and the con-
cessions namely carrying forward of vacancies and provisions for in-service
C coaching/training in Karamchari Sangh are instances of such concessions
and relaxations. However, it would not be permissible to prescribe lower
qualifying marks or a lesser level of evaluation for the members of reserved
categories since that would compromise the efficiency of administration.
We reiterate that while it may be permissible to prescribe a reasonably
D lesser qualifying marks or evaluation for the O.B.Cs., S.Cs. and S.Ts. -
consistent with the efficiency of administration and the nature of duties
attaching to the office concerned - in the matter of direct recruitment, such
a course would not be permissible in the matter of promotions for the
reasons recorded hereinabove.

E Question No.8: Whether Reservations are anri-meritarian?

108. In Ba/aji and other cases, it was assumed that reservations are
necessarily anti-meritarian. For example, in Janaki Prasad Parimoo it was
observed, 11 it is in1plicil in the idea of reservation that a less meritorious
F person be preferred to another who is more meritorious." To the same
effect is the opinion of Khanna,J. in Thomas, though it is a minority
opinion. Even Subba Rao, J. who did not agree with this view did recognize
some force in it. In his dissenting opinion in Devadasan , While holding
that there is no conflict between Article 16(4) and Article 335, he did say,
"it is inevitable in the nature of reservation that there will be a lowering of
G standards to some extent", but, he said, on that account the provision
cannot be said to be bad, inasmuch as in that case, the State had, as a
matter of fact, prescribed minimum qualifications, and only those possess-
ing such minimum qualifications were appointed. This view was, however,
not accepted by Krishna Iyer,J. in Thomas. He said "efficiency means, in
H terms of good government, not marks in examinations only, but responsible
INDRA SAWllNEY v. U.0.1. 675

and responsive service to the people. A chaotic genius is a grave danger A
to public administration. The inputs of efficiency rule include a sense of
belonging and of accountability (not pejoratively used) if its composition
takes in also the weaker segments of "We, the people of India". No other
understanding can reconcile the claim of a radical present and the hang-
over of the unjust past. 11 A similar view was expressed in Vasant Kumer by
Chinnappa Reddy, J. The learned judge said "the mere securing of high B
marks at an examination may not necessarily mark out a good ad-
ministrator. An efficient administrator, one takes it, must be one who
possesses among other qualities the capacity to understand with sympathy
and, therefore, to tackle bravely the problems of a large segment of
population constituting the weaker sections of the people. And, who better c
than the ones belonging to those very sections? Why not ask ourselves why
35 years after Independence, the position of the Scheduled Castes etc. has
not greatly improved? Is it not a legitimate question to ask whether things
might have been different, had the district administrators and the State and
Central Bureaucrats been drawn in larger numbers from these classes? D
Courts are not equipped to answer these questions, but the courts may not
interfere with the honest endeavours of the Government to find answers
and solutions. We do not mean to say that efficiency in the civil service is
unnecessary or that it is a myth. All that we mean to say is that one need
not make a fastidious fetish of it."
E
109. It is submitted by the learned counsel for petitioners that reser-
vation necessarily means appointment of less meritorious persons, which in
turn leads to lowering of efficiency of administration. The submission,
therefore, is that reservation should be confined to a small minority of
appointments/posts, . in any event, to not more than 30%, the figure
F
referred to in the speech of Dr. Ambedkar in the Constituent Assembly.
The mandate of Article 335, it is argued, implies that reservations should
be so operated as not to affect the efficiency of administration. Even
Article 16 and the directive of Article 46, it is said, should be read subject
to the aforesaid mandate of Article 335.
G
110. The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the marks
obtained at the examination/test/interview at the stage of entry into service
is not an indicia of the inherent merit of a candidate. They rely upon the
opinion of Douglas,J. in Defunis where the learned Judge illustrates the
said aspect by giving example of a candidate coming from disadvantaged H
676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992[ SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A sections of society and yet obtaining reasonably good scores - thus
manifesting his "promise and potcntiaJI' - vis-a-vis a candidate from a higher
strata obtaining higher scores. (His opinion is referred to in para 44). On
account of the disadvantages suffered by them and the lack of oppor-
tunities, - the Respondents say - members of backward classes of citizens
B may not score equally with the members of socially advanced classes at the
inception but in course of time, they would. It would be fallacious to
presume that nature has endowed intelligence only to the members of the
forward classes. It is to be found everywhere. It only requires an oppor-
tunity to prove itself. The directive in Article 46 must be understood and
C implemented keeping in view these aspects, say the Respondents.

111. We do not think it necessary to express ourselves at any length
on the correctness or otherwise of the opposing points of view referred to
above. (It is, however, necessary to point out that the mandate - if it can
be called that - of Article 335 is to take the claims of members of SC/ST
D into consideration, consistent with the maintenance of efficiency of ad-
ministration. It would be a misreading of Article to say that the mandate
is maintenance of efficiency of administration.) May be, efficiency, com-
petence and merit are not synonymous concepts; May be, it is wrong to
treat merit as synonymous with efficiency in administration and that merit
E is but a component of the efficiency of an administrator. Even so, the
relevance and significance of merit at the stage of initial recruitment cannot
be ignored. It cannot also be ignored that the very idea of reservation
implies selection of a less meritorious person. At the same time, we
recognise that this much cost has to be paid, if the constitutional promise
F of social justice is to be redeemed. We also firmly believe that given an
opportunity, members of these classes are bound to overcome their initial
disadvantages and would compete with - and may, in some cases, excel -
members of open competitor candidates. It is undeniable that nature has
endowed merit upon members of backward classes as much as it has
G endowed upon members of other classes and that what is required is an
opportunity to prove it. It may noti therefore, be said that reservations are
anti meritian. Merit there is even among the reserved candidates and the
small difference, that may be allowed at the stage of initial recruitment is
bound to disappear in course of time. These members too will compete
H with and improve their efficiency alongwith others.

,I
I
INDRASAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 677

·Having said this, we must append a note of clarification. In some A
cases arising under Article 15, this court has upheld the removal of
minimum qualifying marks, in the case of Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe
, candidates, in the matter of admission to medical courses. For example, in
State of M.P. v. Nivedita Jain, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 759 admission to medical
/course was regulated by an entrance test (called Pre-Medical Test). For B
general candidates, the minimum qualifying marks were 50% in the ag-
gregate and 33% in each subject. For Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe
candidates, however, it was 40% and 30% respectively. On finding that
Scheduled Cast/Schedule Tribe candidates equal to the number of the seats
reserved for them did not qualify on the above standard, the Government
did away with the said minimum standard altogether. The Government's C
action was challenged in this court bnt was upheld. Since it was a case
under Article 15, Article 335 had no relevance and was not applied. But
in the case of Article 16, Article 335 would be relevant and any order on
the lines of the order of the Government of M.P. (in Nivedita Jain) would
not be permissible, being inconsistent with the efficiency of administration. D
To wit, in the matter of appointment of Medical Officers, the Government
or the Public Service Commission cannot say that there shall be no mini-
mum qualifying marks for Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes candidates,
while prescribing a minimum for others. It may be permissible for the
Government to prescribe a reasonably lower standard for Scheduled Cas-
tes/Scheduled Tribes/Backward Classes - consistent with the requirements E
of efficiency of administration - it would not be permiss'ible not to prescribe
any such minimum standard at all. While prescribing the lower minimum
standard for reserved category, the nature of duties attached to the .post
and the interest of the general public should also be kept in mind.
F
112. While on Article 335, we are of the opinion that there are certain
services and positions where either on account of the nature of duties
attached to them or the level (in the hierarchy) at which they obtain, merit
as explained hcreinabove, alone counts. In such situations. It may not be
advisable to provide for reservations. For example, technical posts in
research and development organisations/departments/institutions, in spe- G
cialities and super-specialities in medicine, engineering and other such
courses in physical sciences and mathematics, in defence services and in
the establishments connected therewith. Similarly, in the case of posts at
the higher echelons e.g., Professors (in Education), Pilots in Indian Airlines
and Air India, Scientists and Technicians in nuclear and space application, H
678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A provision for reservation would not be advisable.

As a matter of fact, the impugned Memorandum dated 13th August,
1990 applies the rule of reservation to "civil posts and services under the
Government of India" only, which means that defence forces are excluded
from the operation of the rule of reservation though it may yet apply to
B civil posts in defence services. Be that as it may, we are of the opinion that
in certain services and in respect of certain posts, application of the rule
of reservation may not be advisable for the reason indicated hereinbefore.
Some of them are: ( 1) Defence Services including all technical posts
therein but excluding civil posts. (2) All technical posts in establishments
C engaged in Research and Development including those connected with
atomic energy and space and establishments engaged in production of
defence equipment; (3) Teaching posts of Professors - and above, if any.
(4) Posts in super-specialities in Medicine, engineering and other scientific
and technical subjects. (5) Posts of pilots (and co-pilots) in Indian Airlines
and Air India. The list given above is merely illustrative and not exhaustive.
D It is for the Government of India to consider and specify the service and
posts to which the Rule of reservation shall not apply but on that account
the implementation of the impugned Of'.:ce Memorandum dated 13th
August, 1990 cannot be stayed or withheld.

We may point out that the services/posts enumerated above, on
E
account of their nature and duties attached, are such as call for highest
level of intelligence, shill and excellence. some of them are second level
and third level posts in the ascending order. Hence, they form a category
apart. Reservation therein may not be consistent with "efficiency of ad-
ministration" contemplated by Article 335.
F
We may add that we see no particular relevance of Article 38(2) in
this context. Article 16(4) is also a measure to ensure equality of status
besides equality of opportunity.

PART- VI
G
(QUESTIONS 9,10 & 11 AND OTHER MISCELLANEOUS
QUESTIONS).

Question No.9: Will the extent of judicial review be limited or restricted
H in regard to the identification of Backward Classes and the percentage of
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 679

reservations made for such classes, to a demonstrably perverse identification A
or a demonstrably unreasonable percentage?

113. It is enough to say on this question that there is no particular or
special standard of judicial scrutiny in matters arising under Article 16(4) or
for that matter, under Article 15(4). The extent and scope of judicial scrutiny
depends upon the nature of the subject matter, the nature of the right B
affected, the character of the legal and constitutional provisions applicable
and so on. The acts and orders of the State made under Article 16(4) do not
enjoy any particular kind of immunity. At the same time, we must say that
court would normally extend due deference to the judgment and discretion of
the Executive - a co- equal wing - in these matter<. The political executive, c
drawn as it is from the people and represent as it does the majority will of the
people, is presumed to know the conditions and the needs of the people and
hence its judgment in matters within its judgment and discretion will be
entitled to due weight. More than this, it is neither possible nor desirable to
say. It is not necessary to answer the question as framed.
D
Question No. JO: Whether the distinction made in the second Memoran-
dum between 'poorer sections' of the backward classes and others permissible
under Article 16?

114. While dealing with Question No.3(d), we held that that exclusion E
of 'creamy layer' must be no the basis of social advancement (such advan-
cement as renders them misfits in the backward classes) and not on the
basis of mere economic criteria. At the same time, we held that income or
the extent of property held by a person can be taken as a measure of social
advancement and on that basis 'creamy layer' of a given caste/com- F
munity/occupational group can be excluded to arrive at a true backward
class. Under Question No.5, we held that it is not impermissible for the
State to categories backward classes into backward and more backward on
the basis of their relative social backwardness. We had also given the
illustration of two occupational groups, viz., gold-smiths and vaddes (tradi-
tional stone-cutters in Andhra Pradesh); both are included within 'other G
backward classes'. If these two groups are lumped together and a common
reservation is made, the gold-smiths would walk away with all the vacancies
leaving none for vaddes. From the said point of view, it was observed, such
classification among the designated backward classes may indeed serve to
help the more backward among them to get their due. But the question H
680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A ·now is whether clause (i) of the Office Memorandum dated 25th Septem-
ber, 1991 is sustainable in la~. The said clause provides for a preference
in favour of "poorer sections11 of the backward classes over other members
of the backward classes. On first impression, it may appear that backward
classes are classified into two sub-groups on the basis of economic criteria
alone and a preference provided in favour of the poorer sections of the
B backward classes. In our considered opinion, however, such an interpreta-
tion would not be consistent with the context in which the said expression
is used and the spirit underlying the clause nor would it further the
objective it seeks to achieve. The object of the clause is to provide a
preference in favour of more backward among the "socialy and education-
c ally backward classes". In other words, the expression 'poorer sections' was
meant to refer to those who are socially and economically more backward.
The use of the word 'poorer', in the context, is meant only as a measure
of social backwardness. (Of course, the Govermnent is yet to notify which
classes among the designated backward classes are more socially backward,
D i.e., 'poorer sections'). Understood in this sense, the said classification is
not and cannot be termed as invalid either constitutionally speaking or in
law. The next question that ;rrises is: what is the meaning and context of
the expression 'preference'? Having regard to the fact the backward classes
are sought to be divided into two sub-categories, viz., backward and more
backward, the expression 'preference' must be read down to mean an
E equaitable apportionment of the vacancies reserved (for backward classes)
among them. The object evidently could not have been to deprive the
'backward' altogether from benefit of reservation, which could be the result
if word 'preference' is read literally - if the 'more backward' take away all
the available vacancies/posts reserved for O.B.Cs., none would remain for
F 'backward' among the 0.B.Cs. It is for this reason that we are inclined to
read down the expression to mean an equitable apportionment. This, in
our opinion, is the proper and reasonable way of understanding the expres-
sion preference in the context in which it occurs. By giving the above
interpretation, we would be effectuating the underlying purpose and the
true intertion behind the clause.
G
It shall be open to the Government to notify which classes among the
several designated other backward classes are more backward for the purM
poses of this clause and the apportionment of reserved vacancies/posts
among 'backward' and '1more backward11 • On such notification the clause will
H become operational.
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 681

Question No.11: Whether the reservation of 10% of the posts in favour of A
'other economically backward sections of the people who are not covered by
any of the existing schemes of the reservations' made by the Office Memoran-

.. dum dated 25.9.1991 permissible under Article 16?

115. This clause provides for a 10% reservation (in appoint-
ments/posts) in favour of economically backward sections among the open B
competition (non-reserved) category. Though the criteria is not yet evolved
by the Government of India, it is obvious that the basis is either the income
of a person and/or the extent of property held by him. The impugned
Memorandum does not say whether this classification is made under clause
(4) or clause (1) of Article 16. Evidently, this classification among a C
category outside clause (4) of Article 16 is not and cannot be related to
clause (4) of Article 16. If at all, it is relatable to clause (1). Even so, we
find it difficult to sustain. Reservation of 10% of the vacancies among open
competition candidates on the basis of income/property-holding means
exclusion of those above the demarcating line from those 10% seats. The D
\ question is whether this is constitutionally permissible? We think not. It
may not be permissible to debar a citizen from being considered for
appointment to an office under the State solely on the basis of his income
or property-holding. Since the employment under the State is really con-
ceived to serve the people (that it may also be a source of Livelihood is
secondary) no such bar can be created. Any such bar would be inconsistent E
with the guarantee of equal opportunity held out by clause ( 1) of Article
16. On this ground alone, the said clause in the Office Memorandum dated
25.5.1991 fails and is accordingly declared as such.

"THE CONCEPT OF POSITIVE ACTION AND POSI-
F
TIVE DISCRIMINATION"

- 116. Dr. Rajiv Dhawan describes Article 15(4) as a provision envisag-
ing programmes of positive action and Article 16(4) as a provision war-
ranting programmes of positive discrimination. We are afraid we may not
be able to fit these provisions into this kind of compartmentalisation in the G
context and scheme of our const:tutional provisions. By now, it is well
settled that reservations in educational institutions and other walks of life
can be provided under Article 15(4) just as reservations can be provided
in services under Article 16(4). If so, it would not be correct to confine
Article 15(4) to programmes of positive action alone. Article 15(4) is wider H
682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS IJ992j SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
_,
A than Article 16( 4) inasmuch as several kinds of positive action programmes
can also be evolved and implemented thereunder (in addition to reserva-
tions) to improve the conditions of SEBCs., Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes, whereas Article 16( 4) speaks only of one type of
remedial measure, namely, reservation of appointments/posts. But it may
not be entirely right to say that Article 15(4) is a provision envisaging
B programmes of positive action. Indeed, even programmes of positive action
may sometimes involve a degree of discrimination. For example, if a special
residential school is established for Scheduled Tribes or Scheduled Castes
at State expense, it is a discrimination against other students, upon whose
education a far lesser amount is being spent by the State. Or for that
c matter, take the very American cases - Fullilove or Metro Broadcasting -
Can it be said that they do not involve any discrimination? They do. It is
another matter that such discrimination is not unconstitutional for the
reason that it is designed to achieve an important governmental objective.

DESIRABILITY OF A PERMANENT STATUTORY
D BODY TO EXAMINE COMPLAINTS OF OVER IN-
CLUSION/UNDER INCLUSION.

117. We are of the considered view that there ought to be a per-
manent body, in the nature of a Commission or Tribunal, to which com-
E plaints of wrong inclusion or non-inclusion of groups, classes and sections
in the lists of Other Backward Classes can be made. Such body must be
empowered to examine complaints of the said nature and pass appropriate
orders. Its advice/opinion should ordinarily be binding upon the Govern-
ment. Where, however, the Government does not agree with its recommen-
F dation, it must record its reasons therefor. Even it any new class/group is

-
proposed to be included among the other backward classes, such matter
must also be referred to the said body in the first instance and action taken
on the basis of its recommendation. The body must be composed of experts
in the field, both official and non-official, and must be vested with the
necessary powers to make a proper and effective inquirey. It is equally
G desirable that each State constitutes such a body, which step would go a
long way in redressing genuine grievances. Such a body can be created
under clause (4) of Article 16 itself - or under Article 16(4) read with
Article 340 - as a concomitant of the power to identify and specify back-
ward class of citizens, in whose favour reservations are to be provided. We
H direct that such a body be constituted both at Central level and at the level
INDRA SAWHNEY 1·. U.0.1. 683

of the States within four months from today. They should become imme- A
diately operational and be in a position to entertain and examine forthwith
complaints and matters of the nature aforementioned, if any, received. It
should be open to the Government of India and the respective State
Governments to devise the procedure to be followed by such body. The
body or bodies so created can also be consulted in the matter of periodic
revision of lists of O.B.Cs. As suggested by Chandrachud; CJ. in Vasant B
Kumar, there should be a periodic revision of these lists to exclude those
who have ceased to be backward or for inclusion of new classes, as the
case may be.

SHOULD THE MATTER GO BACK TO CONSTITU- c
TION BENCH TO GO INTO .THE DEFECTS OF THE
MANDAL COMMISSION REPORT.

118. Now that we have answered all the questions raised for our
consideration, question new arises, whether in view of the answers given D
and directions being given by us, is it necessary to send back the matter to
the Five-Judge Bench to consider whether the investigation and survey
done, and conclusions arrived at, by the Mandal Commission are contrary
to law and if so, whether the impugned Office Memorandums, based as
they are on the report of the said Commission, can be sustained? We think
not. This is not a case where the Five-Judge Bench framed certain ques- E
lions and referred them to this Bench. All the matters as such were placed
before this Bench for disposal. During the course of hearing, · however,
when some counsel wanted to take us into details of castes/groups/classes
which, according to them, have been wrongly included or excluded, as the
case may be, we refused to go into those details saying that those details F
can be gone into before the Five-Judge Bench later. Otherwise, we heard
the counsel fully on the alleged illegalities in the approach and methodol-
ogy adopted by the Commission. The written arguments bear them out. We
shall notice the criticism first and then answer the question posed at the
inception of this para.
G
118A. The first and foremost criticism levelled against the approach
and the procedure adopted by Manda! Commission in that the Manda!
Commission has adopted caste and caste alone as the basis of its approach
throughout. On this count alone, it is argued, '.he entire report of the
Commissio_n is vitiated. It is pointed out that in its very first letter dated H
684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS j 1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A 25th April, 1979 (Appendix VII at page 91-Vol.2) addressed to all the
Ministries and Departments of the Central Government, the Commission
has prescribed the following lest for determining the socially and educa-
tionally backward classes:

"(a) In respect of employees belonging to the Hindu com-
B munities

(i) an employee will be deemed to be socially backward
if he does not belong to any of the three twice-born
(Dvij) 'Varnas' i.e., he is neither a Brahmin, nor a
Kshatriya/nor a Vaishya; and
c
(ii) he will be deemed to be educationally backward if
neither his father nor his grant father has studied
beyond the primary level.

(b) Regarding the non-Hindu Communities
D •
(i) an employee will be deemed to be socially backward
if either

(1) he is a convert from those Hindu communities
E which have been defined as socially backward as
per para 4(a)(i) above, or

(2) in case he is not such a convert, his parental
income is below the prevalent poverty line, i.e.,
Rs.71 per head per month.
F
(ii) he will he deemed to be educationally backward if
neither his father nor his grand father had studied
beyond the primary level."

Serious objection is taken to the above criteria. Treating all the
G Hindus not belonging to three upper castes as socially and educationally
backward classes, it is submitted, is faulty to the core. In the case of
non-Hindus, the prescription of income limit is said to be arbitrary. The
criteria for identifying backward classes must be uniform for the entire
population; it cannot vary from religion to religion. This shows, says the
H counsel, the impropriety and impennissiblity of adopting the caste as the
.,
INDRA SAWHNEY i·. U.0.1. 685

basis of identification, since castes exist only in the Hindu religion and not A
in others. On the basis of the statements made in Chapters IV and V, it is
submitted that the Commission was obsessed by caste and was blind to all
other determinants. It is also pointed out that the Survey done by the
Commission is cursory, totally inadequate and faulty. According to the
petitioners, the survey must be an exhaustive one like the one done by B
Venkataswamy Commission in Karnataka, which also forms the basis of
Justice Chinnappa Reddy Commsission Report. Carrying out the Survey to
cover merely two villages and one urban block in each District is not likely
to disclose a true picture since it does not represent survey of even one
percent of the population. Objection is also taken to use of personal
knowledge and also to reliance upon lists of backward classes prepared by C
State Governments. It is repeatedly urged that the survey done by the
Commission cannot be called a scientific one, which has led to discovery
of as many as 3,743 castes and their identification as socially and educa-
tionally backward classes. This is a steep increase over Kaka Kalelkar
Commission, according to which, the number of S.E.B.Cs. was only 2,733. D
It is pointed out further that certain castes which obtained less than 11
points on being tested against the criteria evolved by the Commission are
included among the backward classes. Conversely, certain castes which
obtained 11 or more points are yet excluded from the list of backward
classes. It is urged that the castebased approach adopted by the Commis- E
sion has practically divided the nation into a forward section an.d a back-
ward section. If Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are also added
to the Other Backward Classes, more than 81 per cent of the population
gets designated as backward. But for the decision in Balaji, it is submitted,
the Commission would certainly have recommended reservation of 52 per F
cent of the appointments/posts in favour of the backward classes. The
Commission was actuated by malice towards upper castes and has sub-
mitted an unbalanced, unjust and unconstitutional report, it is argued

Respondent's counsel, on the other hand, have refuted each and
every contention of the petitioners. According to them, the criteria evolved, G
the methodology adopted, identification made and lists prepared are all
perfactly valid and legal. The Union of India, while justifying the Report,
has taken the stand that even if there are any errors or inadequacies in the
work and report of the Commission, it is no ground for throwing out the
report altogether, more particularly when the Government of India has H
686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A taken care by 'marrying' the Manda! lists with the State lists. If any errors
are brought to the notice of the Government, Sri Parasaran says, the
Government will certainly look into them and rectify them, if satisfied
about the error.

B 119. Before we decide to answer the question, it is necessary to point
out that each and every defect, if any, in the working and Report of the
Manda! Commission does not automatically vitiate the impugned Office
Memorandums. It has to be shown further that that particular defect has
crept into the Office Memorandum as well. In addition to the above, the
following factors must also be kept in mind:
c
(a) The Manda! Commission Report has not been accepted by the
Government of India in its fullness, nor has the Government accepted the
list of Other Backward Classes Prepared by it in its entirety. What is now
D in issue is not the validity of the Report but the validity of the impugned
Office Memorandums issued on the basis of the Report. The First
Memorandum expressly directs that only those classes will be treated as
backward classes for the purposes of Article 16(4) as are common to both
the Manda! List and the respective State List. (It may be remembered that
the Manda! Commision has prepared the lists of Other Backward Classes
E State-wise). Almost every caste, community and occupational group found
in the State lists is also found in the concerned State list prepared by
Mandal Commission; Mandal lists contain many more castes/occupational
groups than the respective State lists. (H should indeed be rare that a
particular caste/group/class is included in the State list and is not included
F in the Manda! list relating to that State. In such a case, of course, such
caste/group/class would not be treated as an O.B.C. under the Office
Memorandum dated 13th August, 1990). In such a situtation, what the
Office Memorandum dated 13th August, 1990 does in effect is to enforce ,
the respective state lists. In other words, the Government of India has, for
all practical purposes, adopted the respective State lists, as they obtained
G on 13th August, 1990. In this sense, the lists prepared by Manda! have no
real significance at present. The State lists were prepared both for the
purposes of Article 16(4) as well as Article 15(4). The following particulars
furnished by the Union of India do establish that these State lists have been
prepared after due enquiry and investigation and have stood the test of
H time and judicial scrutiny:
INDRA Si\ WHNEY i·. U.O.l. 687

Basis of identification of SEBCs/OBCs in A
the States covered by 0.M. of 13.8. 1990.

S. No. Name of Whether State's list, is Status
States based on report of
commission/Committee
B
1. 2. 3. 4.
1. Andhra Reports of the State's G.O. based on
Prndesh Commission headed by the report of the
Shri K.M. Ananth- Anantharam Commi-
araman and Shri ssion was upheld by the
Muralidhara Rao (June ~uprcmc Court m c
1970 and Angus~ 1982 Balaram case (AIR 1972
respectively). SC 1375). The modified
list of OBCs based on
the report of Murali-
dhara Rao Commission D
was upheld by the AP.
High Court but the
increased quantum of
reservation from 25% to
44% was struck down
E
(Judgment of 5-9-1986).
2. Bihar Commission set up in N0t challenged.
1971 under the chair-
manship of Sri
Mungeri Lal.
3. Gujarat Commission headed by F
Shri AR.Bakshi, Retd.
High Court Judge
(Report of Feb, 1976).
4. Goa No The list was challenged in
Commission/Cammi- the High Court in 1986 G
ttee State Government for quashing the G.O.
have notified 4 and instead declare all
communities as OBC the 19 communities reco-
on their own. mmended by the Manda!
Commission as OBCs.
H
688 Slll'REMF COURT REPORTS 119921 SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A The High Court rejected
the petitioner's claim on
I 0.3.88. The malt er is
now before the Supreme
Court through SLP No.
B 9813 of 1988.
5. Haryana Committees of 1951
and 1965. (In 1990
Gurnam Singh
Commission was also
set up and its report
c accep-ted by State
Govern·ment.
6. Himachal Based on the list of Not challenged
Pradesh 0 BCs declared by the
erstwhile State of
D Punjab for the areas
merged in the State of
Himachal Pradesh in
November, 1966. The
list is now extended to
the entire State.
E 7. Karnataka Commission head by The Karnataka High
Shri L.G.Havanuri Court struch down the
(Report of Nov.75) inclusion of certain
communities in the list
of SEBCs. The matter
F was then taken to the
Supreme Court in the
Vasanth Kumar's case.
(High Court judgment was
prior to Manda! report.)
8. Kerala (i) Commission The Kerala Govt. vide
G
headed by Shri communication dt. 8.2.91
G.Kumara Pillai set up has intimated that the
in 1964. list of OBCs has not
(ii) Commission headed been challenged.
by Shri N.P.Damodaran
H set up in 1%7.
INDRA SAWHNEY v. u.o.I. 689

9. Madhya Mahajan Commission List stayed by M.P. High A
Pradesh (report of Dec.1983) Court.
(when Manda! was
working, no State list)
10. Maharashtra Committee headed by Not challenged
Shri B.D.Deshmukh
B
(report of Jan.1964)
11. Punjab Committees set up in Not challenged
1951 and 1965. The
latter committee was
headed by Shri Brish
Bhan. c
12. Tamil Nadu (i) Commission The revised list prepared
headed by Shri by the Ambasankar
A.N.Sattanathan set Commission has been
up in 1969. challenged in the
(ii) Commission Supreme Court vide WP D
headed by Shri No. 1 of 1987 which JS
J .A.Ambasankar pending
(report of Feb.1985)
13. Uttar Commission headed Status report not
Pradesh by Shri Chhedi Lal received from State
Sathi (Report of 1977). Government. E

Even if in one or two cases (e.g., Goa), the list is prepared without
appointing a Commission, it cannot be said to be bad on that account. The
Government, which drew up the list, must be presumed to be aware of the
conditions obtaining in their State/area. Unless so held by any competent F
court - or the permanent mechanism (in the nature of a Commission)
directed to be created herewith holds otherwise - the lists must be deemed
to be valid and enforceable.

At the same time, we think it necessary to make the following clarifica-
tion: It is true that the Government of India has adopted the State lists G
obtaining as on 13th August, 1990 for its own purposes but that does not mean
that those lists are meant to be sacrosanct and unalterable.· There may be
cases where commission~ appointes by the State Government may have, in
their reports, recommeded modification of such lists by deletion or addition
of certain castes, communities and classes. Wherever such commission H
690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A reports are available, the State Government is bound to look into them and
take action on that basis with reasonable promptitude. If the State Govern-
m,ent effects any modification or alteration by way of deletions or additions,
the same shall be intimated to the Government of India forthwith which shall
take appropriate action on that basis and make necessary changes in its own
list relating to that State. Further, it shall be equally open to, indeed the duty
B of, the Government of India - since it has adopted the existing State lists - to
look into the reports of such commission, if any, and pass its own orders,
independent of any action by the State Government, thereon with reason-
able promptitude by way of modification or alteration. It shall be open to the
Government of India to make such modification/alteration in the lists
c adopted by way of additions or deletions, asit thinks appropriate on the basis
of the Reports of the Commission(s). This direction, in our opinion, safe
guards against perpetuation of any errors in the State lists and ensures
rectification of those lists with reasonable promptitude on the b•sis of the
reports of the Commission already submitted, if any. This course may be
D adopted de hors the reference to or advice of the permanent mechanism (by
way of Commission) which we have directed to be created at both central and
state level and with respect to which we have made appropriate directions
elsewhere.

(b) Strictly speaking, appointment of a Commission under Article 340
E is not necessary to identify the other backward classes. Article 34-0 does not
say so. According to it, the Commission is to be constituted "to investigate the
conditions of socially and educationally backward classes ......... and the dif-
ficulties under which they labour and to make recommendations as to the
steps that should be taken of the Union or any State to remove such difficul-
F ties ........ " The Government could have, even without appointing a Commis-
sion, specified the O.B.Cs., on the basis of such material as it may have had
before it (e.g., the lists prepared by various State Governments) and than
appointed the Commission to investigate their conditions and to make ap-
propriate recommendations. It is true that Mandal Commission was con-
stituted "to determine the criteria for defining the socially and educationaly
G backward classes" and the Commission did determine the same. Even so, it is
necessary to keep the above constitutional position in mind, - more par-
ticualrly in view of the veto given to State lists over the Manda! lists as
explained in the preceding sub-para. The criteria evolved by Manda! Com-
mission for defining/identifying the Other Backward Classes cannot be said
H to be irrelevant. May be there are certain errors in actual exercise of iden-
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 691

tification, in the .nature of over-inclusion or under- inclusion, as the case may A
be. But in an eJ<ercise of such magnitude and complexity, such errors are not •
uncommon. These errors cannot be made a basis for rejecting either the
relevance of the criteria evolved by the Commission or the entire exercise ·of
identification, It is one thing to say that these errors must be rectified by the
Government of India by evolving an appropriate mechanism and an al-
together different thing to say that on that account, the entire exercise B
becomes futile. There can never be a perfect report. In human affairs, such as
this, perfection is only an ideal - not an attainable goal. More than forty years
have passed by. So far, no reservations could be made in favour of O.B.Cs. for
one or the other reason in Central services though in many States, such
reservations are in force. Reservations in favour of 0.B.Cs. are in force in thec
States of Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra,
Orissa, Bihar, Gujarat, Goa, Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Haryana and Himachal
Pradesh among others. In Madhya Pradesh, a list of O.B.Cs. was prepared on
the basis of Mahajan Commission Report but it appears to have been stayed
by the High Court.
D
(c) The direction made herein for constitution of a permanent Com-
mission to examine complaints of over-inclusion or under-inclusion ob-
viates the need of any such scrutiny by this Court. We have directed
constitution of such Commission both at Central and State level. Persons
aggrieved can always approach them for appropriate redress. Such Com-
mission, which will have the power to receive evidence and enquire into
E
disputed questions of fact, can more appropriately decide such complaints
than this Court under Article 32.

In this view of the matter, it is unnecessary for us to express any opinion
on the correctness or adequacy of the exercise done by the Manda[ Commis- F
sion. (If and when the Government of India notifies any caste/com-
munity/group/class from out of the Manda! list, which caste etc., is not
included in the appropriate State list, would the said question fall for con-
sideration. It is then that it would be necessary to deal with the criticism
against the Mandal Commission). For the same reason, it is unnecessary to
refer or deal \\1th the arguments of the counsel for Union of India and the G
Respondents in justification of the Manda! Commission Report.

Before parting with this aspect, we must say that identifying the im-
pugned Office Memorandums with the Manda) Con1mission report is basi-
cally erroneous. Such an identification is bound to lead one into confusion. H
692 SUfREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A · He would be missing the wood for the trees. Instead of concentrating on the
real issues, he would deviate into irrelevance and imbalance. Manda! Com-
mission report may have led to the passing of the impugned Office Memoran-
dum dated 13th August, 1990; it may have acted as the catalytic agent in
bringing into existence the reservation in favour of O.B.Cs. (loosely referred
to as SEBCs. in the O.M.) but the- Office Memorandum dated 13th August,
B 1990 doesn't incorporate the Manda! lists of O.B.Cs. as such. It incorporates,
in truth and effect, the State lists as explained hereinabove. In a social
measure like the impugned one, the court must give due regard to the
judgment of the Executive, a co-equal wing of the State and approach the
measure in the spirit in which it is conceived. This very idea is put forcefully
C by Joseph Raz (Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford) in his article "The Rule of
Law and its virtue" ( 1977) 93 Law Quarterly Review 195 at 211 in the
following words:

"... one should be wary of disqualifying the legal pursuit of
major social goals in the name of the rule of law. After all
D the rule of law is meant to enable the law to promote social
good, and should not be lightly used to show that it should
not do so. Sacrificing too many social goals on the altar of
the rule of law may make the law barren and empty."

A note of clarification may be appended at this stage. We are told that
E
in the State of Madhya Pradesh a list of Other Backward Classes has been
prepared but it has been stayed by the High Court. The said stay, in our
opinion, does not affect the operation of the Office Memorandum dated 13th
August, 1992 even with respect to the other backward classes in Madhya
Pradesh. What the said Office Memorandum does is to import and adopt the
F said list for its own purposes i.e., for the purpose of making reservations in
central services in favour of other backward classes. In such a situation, the
stay of the operation of the said list by the State of Madhya Pradesh does have
no relevance to the importation and adoption of the said list into Office
Memorandum dated 13th August, 1990.
G
PART- Vil

121. We may summarise our answers to the various questions dealt
with and answered hereinabovc:

H (l)(a) It is not necessary that the 'provision' under Article 16(4)
INDRA SAWHNEY v. UO.l. 693

should necessarily be made by the Parliament/Legislature. Such a provision A
can be made by the Executive also. Local bodies, Statutory Corporations
and other instrumentalities of the State falling under Article 12 of the
Constitution are themselves competent to make such a provision, if so
advised. (Para 55)

(b) An executive order making a provision under Article 16(4) is B
enforceable the moment it is made and issued. (Para 56)

(2)(a) Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to clause (1). It is
an instance and an illustration of the classification inherent in clause (1).
(Para 57) C

(b) Article 16(4)' is exhaustive of the subject of reservation in favour
of backward class of citizens, as explained in this judgment. (Para 58)

(c) Reservations can also be provided under clause (1) of Article 16. It
is not confined to extending of preferences, concessions or exemptions alone. D
These reservations, if any, made under clause (1) have to be so adjusted and
implemented as not to exceed the level of representation prescribed for
'backward class of citizens' - as explained in this Judgment. (Para 60)

(3)(a) A caste can be and quite often is a social class in India. If it E
is backward socially, it would be a backward class for the purposes of
Article 16(4). Among non-Hindus, there are several occupational groups,
sects and denominations, which for historical reasons, are socially back-
ward. They too represent backward social collectives for the purposes of
Article 16(4). (Paras 61 to 82)
F
(b) Neither the constitution nor the law prescribes the procedure or
method of identification of backward classes. Nor is it possible or advisable
for the court to lay down any such procedure or method. It must be left to the
authority appointed to identify. It can adopt such method/procedure as it
thinks convenient and so long as its survey covers the entire populace, no
objection can be taken to it. Identification of the backward classes can G
certainly be done with reference to castes among, and along with, other
occupational groups, classes and sections of people.. One can start the
process either with the occupational groups or with castes or with some other
groujJs. Thus one can start the process with the. castes, wherever they are
found, apply the criteria (evolved for determining backwardness) and find H
694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A out whether it satisfies the criteria. If i.t does - what emerges is a "backward
class of citizens" within the meaning of and for the purposes of Article 16(4).
Similar process can be adopted in the case of other occupational groups,
communities and classes, so as to cover the entire populace. The central idea
and overall objective should be to consider all available groups, sections and
classes in society. Since caste represents an existing, identifiable social
B group/class encompassing an overwhelming majority of the country's popula-
tion, one can well begin with it and then go to other groups, sections and
classes. (Paras 83 and 84)

(c) It is not necessary for a class to be designated as a backward class
C that it is situated similarly to the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes.
(Paras 87 and 88)

(d) 'Creamy layer' can be, and must be excluded. (Para 86)

( e) It is not correct to say that the backward class of citizens con-
D templated in Article 16(4) is the some as the socially and educationally
backward classes referred to in Article 15(4). It is much wider. The accent in
Article 16(4) is on social backwardness. Of course, social, educational and
economic backwardness are closely inter-twined in lhe Indian context. (Para
85)

E (I) The adequacy of representation of a particular class in the services
under the State is a matter within the subjective satisfaction of the ap-
propriate Government. The judicial scrutiny in that behalf is the same as in
other matters within the subjective satisfaction of an authority. (Para 89)

(4) (a) A backward class of citizens cannot be identified only and
F exclusively with reference to economic criteria. (Para 90)

(b) It is, of course, permissible for the Government or other authority
to identify a backward class of citizens on the basis of occupation-cum-in-
come, without reference to caste, if it is so advised. (Para 91).
G
(5) There is no constitutional bar to classify the backward classes of
citizens into backward and more backward categories. (Para 92)

(6) (a)&(b) The reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16
should not exceed 50%. While 50% shall be the rule, it is necessary not to put
H out of consideration certain extraordinary situations inherent in the great
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.L 695
I

diversity of this country and the people. It might happen that in far-flung and A
remote areas the population inhabiting those areas might, on account of their
being out of the main-stream of national life and in view of the conditions
peculiar to and characteristic of them need to be treated in a different way,
some relaxation in this strict rule may become imperative. In doing so,
extr~me caution is to be exercised and a special case made out.
B
(c) The rule of 50% should be applied to each year. It cannot be
related to the total strength of the class, category, service or cadre, as the
case may be. (Para 96)

(d) Devadasan was wrongly decided and is accordingly over-ruled to C
the extent it is inconsistent with this judgment. (Paras 97 to 99)

(7) Article 16(4) does not permit provision for reservations in the
matter of promotion. This rule shall, however, have only prospective opera-
tion and shall not affect the promotions already made, whether made on D
regular basis or on any other basis. We direct that our decision on this
question shall operate only prospectively and shall not affect promotions
already made, whether on temporary, officiating or regular/permanent basis.
If is further directed that wherever reservations are already provided in the
matter of promotion - be it Central Services or State Services, or for that
matter services under any Corporation, authority or body falling under the E
definition of 'State' in Article 12 - such reservations may continue in opera-
tion for a period of five years from this day. Within this period, it would be
open to the appropriate authorities to revise, modify or re-issue the relevant
rules to ensure the achievement of the objective of Article 16(4). If any
authority thinks that for ensuring adequate representation of backward class F
of citizens in any service, class or category, it is necessary to provide for direct
recruitment therein, it shall be open to it do so. (Ahmadi, J. expresses no
opinion on this question upholding the preliminary objection of Union of
India). It would not be impermissible for the State to extent concessions and
relaxations to members of reserved categories in the matter of promotion
without compromising the efficiency of the administration. (Paras 100 to G
107).

(8) While the rule of reservation cannot be called anti-meritarion,
there are certain services and posts to which it may not be advisable to
apply the rule of reservation. (Paras 108 to 112) . H
696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A (9) The distinction made in the impugned Office Memorandum dated
25th September, 1991 between 'poorer sections' and others among the back-
ward classes is not invalid, if the classification is understood and operated as
based upon relative backwardness among the several classes identified as
other Backward classes, as explained in para 114 of this Judgment (Para 114).
(11) The reservation of 10% of the posts in favour of 'other economically
B backward sections of the people who are not covered by any of the existing
schemes of the reservation' made in the impugned office memorandum dated
25.9.1991 is constitutionally invalid and is accordingly struck down. {Para 115)

(12) There is no particular or special standard of jndicial scrutiny
C applicable to matters arising under Article 16(4). (Para 113)

{13) The Government of India and the State Governments have the
power to, and ought to, create a permanent mechanism - in the nature of a
Comission - for examining requests of inclusion and complaints of over-in-
clusion or non-inclusion in the list of O.B.Cs. and to advise the Government,
D which advice shall ordinarily be binding upon the Government. Where,
however, the Government does not accept the advice, it must record its
reasons therefor. {Para 117)

{14) In view of the answers given by us herein and the directions
issued herewith, it is not necessary to express any opinion on the correct-
E
ness and adequacy of the exercise done by the Manda! Commission. It is
equally unnecessary to send the matters back to the Constitution Bench of
Five Judges. (Paras 118 to 119) 122. For the sake of ready reference, we
also record our answers to questions as framed by the counsel for the
parties and set out in para 115. Our answers question-wise are:
F
(1) Article 16(4) is not an exception to Article 16(1). It is an instance of
classification inherent in Article 16(1). Article 16(4) is exhaustive of the
subject of reservation in favour of backward classes, though it may not be
exhaustive of the very concept of reservation. Reservations for other classes
G can be provided under clause (1) of Article 16.

(2) The expression 'backward class' in Article 16{4) takes in 'Other
Buckward Classes', S.Cs., S.Ts. and may be some other backward classes
as well. The accent in Article 16(4) is upon social backwardness. Social
backwardness leads to educational backwardness and economic backward-
H ness. They arc mutually contributory to each other and are inter-twined
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. 697

with low occupations in the Indian society. A caste can be and quite often A
is a social class in India. Economic criterion cannot be the sole basis for
determining the backward class of citizens contemplated by Article 16(4).

... The weaker sections referred to Article 46 do include S.E.B.Cs. referred
to in Article 340 and covered by Article 16(4) .

(3) Even under Article 16(1), reservations cannot be made on the B
basis of economic criteria alone.

(4) The reservations contemplated in Clause ( 4) of Article 16 should
not exceed 50%. While 50% shall be the rule, it. is necessary not to put out of
consideration certain extraordinary situations inherent in the great diversity C
of this country and the people. It might happen that in far-flung and remote
areas the population inhabiting those ·areas might, on account of their being
out of the main-stream of national life and in view of the conditions peculiar
to and characteristic of them need to be treated in a different way, some

- relaxation in this strict rule may become imperative. In doing so, extreme
caution is to be exercised and a special case made out.

For applying this rule, the reservations should not exceed 50% of the
appointments in a grade, cadre or service in any given year. Reservation
D

can be made in a service or category only when the State is satisfied that
representation of backward class of citizens therein is not adequate.
E
To the extent, Devadasan is inconsistent herewith, it is over-ruled.

(5) There is no constitutional bar to classification of backward classes
into more backward and backward classes for the purposes of Article 16(4).
The distinction should be on the basis of degrees of social backwardness. In
case of such classification, however, it would be advisable - nay, necessary- to F
ensure equitable distribution amongst the various backward classes to avoid
lumping so that one or two such classes do not eat away the entire quota
leaving the other backward classes high and dry.

For excluding 'creamy layer', an economic criterion can be adopted G
as an indicium or measure of social advancement.

(6) A 'provision' under Article 16(4) can be made by an executive
order. It is not necessary that it should be made by Parliament/Legislature.

·(7) No special standard of judicial scrutiny can be predicated in mat- H
698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A ters arising under Article 16(4). It is not possible or necessary to say more
than this under this question.

(8) Reservation of appointments or posts under Article 16(4) is con-
fined to initial appointment only and cannot extend to providing reservation
in the matter of promotion. We direct that our decision on this question shall
B operate only prospectively and shall not affect promotions already made,
whether on temporary, officiating or regular/permanent basis. It is further
directed that wherever reservations are already provided in the matter of
promotion - be it Central Services or State Services, or for that matter
services under any Corporation, authority or body falling under the definition
C of 'State' in Article 12 - such reservations may continue in operation for a
period of five years from this day. Within this period, it would be open to the
appropriate authorities to revise, modify or re-issue the relevant rules to
ensure the achievement of the objective of Article 16(4). If any authority
thinks that for ensuring adequate representation of 'backward class of
citizens' in any service, class or category, it is necessary to provide for direct
D recruitment therein, it shall be open to it do so.

(As pointed out at the end of the paragraph 101 of this judgment,
Ahmadi, J. having upheld the preliminary objection raised by Sri Parasaran
and others has not associated himself with the discussion on the question
E · whether reservation in promotion is permissible. Therefore, the views ex-
rressed in this judgment on the said point are not the views of Ahmadi. J.)

THE FOLLOWING DIRECTIONS ARE GIVEN TO THE
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA. THE STATE GOVTS. AND
THE ADMINISTRATION OF UNION TERRITORIES.
F
123(A). The Government of India, each of the State Governments and
the Administrations of Union Territories shall, within four months from
today, constitute a permanent body for entertaining, examining and recom-
mending upon requests for inclusion and complaints of over-inclusion and
under-inclusion in the lists of other backward classes of citizens. The advice
G tendered by such body shall ordinarily be binding upon the Government.

(B) Within four months from today the Government of India shall
specify the bases, applying the relevant and requisite socio-economic criteria
to exclude socially advanced persons/sections ('creamy layer') from 'Other
H Backward Classes'. The implementation of the impugned O.M. dated 13th
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.!. 699

September, 1990 shall be subject to exclusion of such socially advanced A
persons ('creamy layer').

This direction shall not however apply to States where the reservations
in favour of backward classes are already in operation. They can continue to
operate them. Such States shall however evolve the said criteria within six
months from today and apply the same to exclude the socially advanced B
persons/sections from the designated 'Other Backward Classes.

(C) It is clarified and directed that any and all objections to the criteria
th<tt may be evolved by the Government of India and the State Governments
in pursuance of the direction contained in clause (B) of Para 123 as well as to C
the classification among backward classes and equitable distribution of the
benefits of reservations among them that may be made in terms of and as
contemplated by clause (1) of the Office Memorandum dated 25th Septem-
ber 1991, as explained herein, shall be preferred only before this Court and
not before or in any other High Court or other Court or Tribunal. Similarly,
and pelition or proceeding questioning the validity, operation or implemen- D
talion of the lwo impugned Office Memorandums, on any grounds what-
soever, shall be be filed or instituted only before this Court and not before any
High Court or other Court or Tribunal.

124. The Office Memoranda dated August 13, 1990 impugned in these E
writ petitions is accordinagly held valid and enforceable subject to the
exclusion of the socially advanced members/sections from the notified 'Other
Backward Classes', as explained in para 123(B).

Clause (i) of the Office Memorandum dated September 25, 1991
requires - to uphold its validity - to be read, interpreted and understood as F
intending a distincation between backward and more backward classes on
"<· the basis of degrees of social backwardness and a rational and equitable
distibution of the benefits of the reservations amongst them. To be valid, the
said clause will have to be read, understood and implemented accordingly.

Clause (ii) of the Office Memorandum dated September 25, 1991 is G
held invalid and inoperative.

The writ Petitions and Transferred Cases are disposed of in the light
of the principles, directions, clarifications and orders containe.d in this
Judgment. H
700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992[ SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A No costs.

S. RATNAVEL PANDIAN, J. 'Equality of status and of oppor-
tunity ..... .' the rubric chiselled in the luminous preamble of our vibrating and
pulsating Constitution radiates one of the avowed objectives in our
Sovereign, Socialist and Secular Democratic Republic. In every free country
B which has adopted a system of governance through democratic principles,
the people have their fundamental inalienable rights and enjoy the recogni-
tion of inherent dignity and of equality analogous to the rights proclaimed in
the 'Bill of Rights' in U.S.A., the 'Rights of Man' in the French Constitution
of 1971 and 'Declaration of Human Rights' etc. Our Consititution is unques-
c tionably unique in its character and assimilation having its notable aspira-
tions contained in 'Fundamental Rights' (in Part III) through which the
illumination of Constitutional rights comes to us not through an artless
window glass but refracted with the enhanced intensity and beauty by pris-
matic interpretation of the Constitutional provisions dealing with equal dis-
tribution of justice in the social, political and economic spheres.
D
Though forty-five years from the commencement of the Indian inde-
pendence after the end of British paramountcy and forty-two years from the
advent of our Constitution have marched on, the tormenting enigma that
often nags the people of India is whether the principle of 'equality of status
and of opportunity' to be equally provided to all the citizens of our country
E
from cradle to grave is satisfactorily consummated and whether the clarion of
'equality of opportunity in matters of pulic employment' enshrined in Article
16(4) of the Constitution of India has been called into action? With a broken
heart one has to answer these questions in the negative.

F The founding fathers of our Constitution have designedly couched
Articles 14, 15 and 16 in comprehensive phraseology so that the frail and
emaciated section of the people living in proverty, rearing in obscurity,
possessing no wealth or influence, having no education, much less higher
education and suffering from social repression and oppression should not be
G denied of equality before the law and equal protection of the laws and equal
opportunity in the matters of public employment or subjected to any prohibi-
tion of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.

To achieve the above <Jbjectives, the Government have enacted in-
numerabie social welfare legislations and geared up social reformative
H measures for uplifting the social and economic development of the disad-
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [PANDIAN, J.] 701

vantaged section of people. True, a rapid societal transformation and A
profusion of other progressive changes are taking place, yet a major section
of the people living below the poverty line and suffering from social ostracism
still stand far behind and lack in every respect to keep pace with the
advanced section of the people. The undignified social status and sub-human
living conditions leave an indelible impression that their forlorn hopes for
equality in every sphere of life are only a myth rather than a reality. It is verily B
believed - rightly too - that the one and only peerless way and indeed a most
important and promising way to achieve the equal status and equal oppor-
tunity is only by means of constitutional justice so that all the citizens of this
country irrespective of their religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of
them may achieve the goal of an egalitarian society. C

This Court has laid down a series of landmark judgments in relation to
social justice by interpreting the constitutional provisions upholding the
cherished values of the Constitution and thereby often has shaped the course
of our national life. Notwithstanding a catena of expository decisions with D
interpretive semantics, the naked truth is that no streak of light or no ray of
hope of attaining the equality of status and equality of opportunity is visible.

Confining to the issue involved in this case as regards the equal oppor-
tunity in the matters of public employment, I venture to articulate without any
reservation, even on the possibility of any refutation that it is highly E
deplorable and heart-rending to note that the constitutional provision, name-
ly, namely, clause (4) of Article 16 proclaiming a "Fundamental Right"
enacted about 42 years ago for providing equality of opportunity in matters of
public employment to people belonging to any backward class has still not
been given effect to in services under the Union of India and many more F
States. A number of Backward Classes Commission have been appointed in
some of the States, the recommendations of which have been repeatedly
subjected to judicial scrutiny. Though the President of India appointed the
second Backward Classes Commission under the chairmanship of Shri B.P.
Manda! as far back as lat January, 1979 and the Report was submitted in
December, 1980, no effective steps were taken for its implementation till the G
issuance of the two impugned OMs. Having regard to this appalling situation
and the pathetic condition of the backward classes, for the first time the
Union of India has issued the Office Memorandum (hereinafter called the
'O.M.') in August 1991 and thereafter an amended O.M. in September 1991
on the basis of the recommendations of the ·Mandal Commission. H
702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Immediately after the announcement of the acceptance of the Report
of the Manda! Commission, as pointed out in Writ Petition No.930/90 and the
Annexures I & II enclosed thereto, there were nnabated pro as well as anti -
reservation agitations and violent societal disturbances virtually paralysing
!he normal life. It was unfortunate 'and painful to note that some youths who
are intransigent to recognise the doctrine of equality in matters of public
B employment and who under the mistaken impression that 'wrinkles and gray
hairs' could not do any thing in this matter, actively participated in the
agitation. Similarly, another section of people suffering from a fear psychosis
that the Manda! recommendations may not at all be implemented entered the
fray of the agitation. Thus, both the pro and anti-reservationists or being
C detonated and inflamed by the ruffled feelings that their future in public
employment is bleak raised a number of ganawing doubts which in turn
sensationalised the issue. Their pent up fury led to an orgy of violence
resulting in loss of innocent life and damaged the public properties. It is
heart-rending that some youths - particularly students - in their prime of life
D went to the extent of even self-immolating themselves. No denying the fact that
the horrible, spine - chilling md jarring piece of information that some youths
whose feelings ran high had put an an end to their lives in tragic and pathetic
manner had really caused a tremor in Indian society. My heart bleeds for them.

In fact, a three-Judges Bench of this Court comprised of Ranganath
E Misra, CJ and K.N. Singh and M.H. Kania, JJ (as the learned Chief Justices
then were) taking note of the widespread violence, by their order dated 21st
September 1990 made the following appeal to the general public and par-
ticularly the student community: .

"After we made order on 11th September, 1990, we had
F appealed to counsel and those who were in the Court
room to take note of the fact that the dispute has· now
come to the apex court and it is necessary that parties and
the people who were agitated over this question should
maintain a disciplined posture and create an atmosphere
where the question can be dispassionately decided by this
G court ................................................................................
There is no justification to be panicky over any situation
and if any one's rights are prejudiced in any manner,
certainly relief would be available at the appropriate stage
and nothing can happen in between which would deter
H this court from exercising its power in an effective manner."
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [PANDIAN, J.] 703

- Be that as it may, sitting as a Judge one cannot be swayed either way
while interpreting the Constitutional provisions pertaining to the issues
A

under controversy by the mere reflexes of the opinion of any section of the
people or by the turbulence created in the society or by the emotions of
the day. Because nothing inflicts a deeper wound on our Constitution than
in interpreting it runlling berserk regardless of human rights and dignity.
B
We are very much alive to the fact that the issues with which we are
now facing are hypersensitive, highly explosive and extremely delicate.
Therefore, the permissible judicial creativity in tune with the Constitutional
objectivity is essential to the interpretation of the Constitutional provisions
so that the dominant values may be discovered and enforced. At the same C
time, one has to be very cautious and careful in approaching the issues in
a very pragmatic and realistic manner.

Part-III dealing with 'Fundamental Rights' and Part-IV dealing with
'Directive Principles of State Policy' which represent the core of the Indian
Constitutional philosophy envisage the methodology for removal of historic D
injustice and inequalities - either inherited or artificially created - and social
and economic disparity and ultimately for achieving an egalitarian society in
terms of the basic structure of our Constitution as spelt out by the preamble.

Though all men and women created by the Almighty, whether or- E
thodox or heterodox; whether theist or atheist; whether born in the highest
class or lowest class; whether belong to 'A' religion or 'B' religion are
biologically same, having same purity of blood. In a Hindu Society they are
divided into a number of distinct sections and sub-sections known as castes
and sub-castes. The moment a child comes out of the mother's womb in a
Hindu family and takes its first breath and even before its umbilical cord F
is cut off, the innocent child is branded, stigmatized and put in a separate
slot according to the caste of its parents despite the fact that the birth of
the child in the particular slot is not by choice but by chance.

The concept of inequality is unknown in the Kingdom of God who G
creates all beings equal, but the "created" of the creator has created the
artificial inequality in the name of casteism with selfish motive and vested
interest.

Swami Vivekananda in one of his letters addressed to his disciples
in Madras dated 24.1.1894 has stated thus: H
704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R,

A "Caste or no caste, creed or no creed, .... or class, or caste, •
or nation, or institution which bars the power of free
thought and action of an individual - even so long as that ..
pow~r does not injure others - is devilish and must go
down.n '

B (Vide 'The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, Vol.
V. page 29')

A Biblical verse in New Testament says 'He denieth none that come
unto Him, black and white".
c Sura 10 Verse No. 44 of Holy Quran reads:

"Verily God will not deal unjustly with man in aught; it is
man that wrongs his own soul."

D The Hindus who form the majority, in our country, are divided into 4 .~

Varnas - namely, Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas (who are all twice born)
and lastly Shudras which V arnas are having a four tier demarcated hierarchi-
cal caste system based on religious tenets, believed to be of divine origin or
divinely ordained, othe1wise called the Hindu Varnasharma Dharma.
Beyond the 4 Varnas Hinduism recognises a community, by name Panchma
E (untouchables) though Shudras are recognised as being the lowest rung of
the hierarchical race. This system not only creates extreme forms of caste and
gender prejudices, injustices, inequalities but also divides the society into
privileged and disabled, revered and despised and so on. The perpetuation of
casteism, in the words of Swami Vivekananda "continues social tyranny of
F ages". The caste system has been religiously preserved in many ways including
by the judicial verdicts, pronounced according to the traditional Hindu Law.

On account of the caste system and the consequent inequalities
prevailing in Hinduism between person to person on the basis of Var-
nasharma Dharma new religions such as Buddhism and Jainism came into
G existence on the soil of this land. Many humanistic thinkers a11d farseeing
revolutionary leaders who stood foursquare by the down - trodden section
of the Backward Classes aroused the consciousness of the backward class
to fight for justice and join the wider struggle for social equality and
propagated various reforms. It was their campaign of waging an unending
H war against social injustice which created a new awareness. The sustained
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [PANDIAN, J.] 705

and strenuous efforts of those leaders in that pursuit have been responsible A
for bringing many new social reforms.

Recognizing and recalling the self-less and dedicated social service
carried on by those great leaders from their birth to the last breath; the
then Prime Minister while making his clarificatory statement regarding the
implementation of the Manda! Commission's Report in the Rajya Sabha B
on the 9th August 1990 paid the tributes in the following words :

"In fact this is the realisation of the dream of BHARAT
RATNA Dr. B.R. AMBEDKAR, of the great PERIYAR
RAMASWAMY and Dr. RAM MANOHAR LOHIA."
c
Harkingback, it is for the first time that the controversial issue as
regards the equality of opportunity in matters of public employment as
contemplated under Article 16(4) has come up for deliberation before a
nine-Judges Bench, on being referred to by a five-Judges Bench.

There are various Constitutional provisions such as Articles 14, 15,
D
16, 17, 38, 46, 332, 335, 338 and 340 which are designed to redress the
centuries old grievances of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes as
well as the backward classes and which have come for judicial interpreta·
tion on and off. It is not merely a part of the Constitution but also a national
commitment. E
This Court which stands as a sentinel on the quie vie over the rights
of people of this country has to interpret the Constitution in its true spirit
with insight into social values and suppleness of the adoption to the
changing social needs upholding the basic structure of the Constitution for
securing social justice, economic justice and political justice as well as F
equality of status and equality of opportunity.

The very blood and soul of our Constitutional scheme are to achieve
the objectives of our Constitution as contained in the preamble which is
part of our Constitution as declared by this Court in Kesvananda Bharti v. G
Kera/a, 1993 (Suppl.) SCR 1. So it is incumbent to lift the veil and see the
notable aspirations of the Constitution.

No one can be permitted to invoke the Constitution either as a sword
for an offence or as a shield for anticipatory defence, in the sence that no
one under the guise of interpreting the Constitution can cause irrevertible H
706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 2 S C.R

A injustice and irredeemable inequalities to any section of the people or can
protect those unethic:<" .,,,ung unquestionable dynastic monopoly over
the Constitutional benefits.

Therefore, the Judges who are entrusted with the task of fostering
an advanced social policy in terms of the Constitutional mandates cannot
B afford to sit in ivory towers keeping Olympian silence unnoticed and
uncaring of the storms and stresses that affect the society.

This Summit Court has not only to interpret the Constitution but also
sometimes to articulate the Constitutional norms, serving as a publicist for
reforms in the areas of the most pressing needs and directing the executive
C to take the needed actions. Mere verbal gymnastics or e111pty slogans and
sermons honoured more often in rhetoric than practice are cf no use.

It may be a journey of thousand miles in achieving the equality of
status and of opportunity, yet it must begin with a single step. So let the
D socially backward people take their first step in that endeavour and march
on and on.

When new societal conditions and factual situations demand the
Judges to speak they, without professing the tradition of judicial lock-jaw,
must speak out. So I speak.
E
For providing reservations for backward class of citizens, Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the public educational institutions and for
providing equal opportunity in the matters of public employment, some
States have appointed Commissions on Backward Classes. The Central
Government has also appointed two Commissions under Article 340 (1) of
F the Constitution of In.dia for identifying the backward class of citizens as
contemplated under Article 16 (4) for the purpose of making reservation
of appointments or posts in the Services under Union of India. The list of
Commissions appointed by the various States and the Central Government
is given as under:

G COMMISSIONS ON BACKWARD CLASSES

1918-1990

Andhra Pradesh Manohar Pershad Committee (1968-69) Anania
Raman Commission (1970) Muralidhara Rao Commis-
H sion (1982)
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.l. [PANDIAN, J.] 707

Bihar Mungeri Lal Commission {1971-76) A
Gujarat A.R. Bakshi Commission {1972-76) Justice C.V. Rane
Commission (1981-83)
Justice R.C. Mankad Commission (1987)

Haryana Gurnam Singh Commission {1990) B

Jarnmu and Justice Ganjendragadkar Commission (1967-68)
Kashmir Justice J.N. Wazir Commission (1969)
Justice Adarsh Anand Commission (1976-77)

Karnataka Justice L.C. Miller Committee (1918-1920; Mysore) c
Naganoa Gowda Commission (1960-61)
L.G. Havnur Commission (1972-75)
T. Venkataswamy Commission ( 1983-86)
Justice Chinnappa Reddy Commission (1989-90)
D
Kerala Justice C.D. Nokes Committee (1935; Travancore-
Cochin) V.K.Vishvanatham Commission (1%1-63)
G. Kumar Pillai Commission (1964-66)
N.P. Damodaran Commission {1%7-70)

Maharashtra O.H.B. Starte Committee {1928-30; Bombay E
Presidency) B.D. Deshmukh Committee {1961-64)

Punjab Brish Ban Committee (1%5-66)

Tamil Nadu A.N. Sattanathan Commission (1969-70)
J.M. Ambasankar Commission (1982-86) F

Uttar Pradesh Chhedi Lal Sathi Commission
(1975-77)

All India Kaka Kalelkar Commission ( 1953-55)
B.P. Manda! Commission {1979-80)
G

Note : 1. Where two dates are mentioned they refer to year of ap-
pointment and year of submission. Where only one is men-
tioned it refers to year of submission which is also the year
of appointment in some cases. H
708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A 2. The three commi3sions of the colonial period mentioned
here had an ambit wider than those groups that later came
to be known as Backward Classes.

Second Backward Classes Commission (popularly known as Manda/
Commission)
B
By a Presidential Order under Article 340 of the Constitution of
India, the first Backward Class Commission known as Kaka Kalelkar's
Commission was set up on January 29, 1953 and it submitted its report on
March 30, 1955 listing out 2399 castes as socially and educationally back-
C ward on the basis of criteria evolved by it, but the Central Government did
not accept that report and shelved it in the cold storage.

It was about twenty-four years after the F"rrst Backward Classes
Commission submitted its Report in 1955 that the President of India
D pursuant to the resolution of the Parliament appointed the second Back-
ward Classes Commission on 1st January 1979 under the Chairmanship of
Shri B.P. Manda! to investigate the conditions of Socially and Educationally
Backward Classes (for short 'SEBCs') within the territory of India. One of
the terms of reference of the Commission was to determine the criteria for
defining the SEBCs. The Commission commenced its functioning on 21st
E
March, 1979 and completed its work on 12th December 1980, during the
course of which it made an extensive tour throughout the length and
breadth of India in order to collect the requisite data for its final report.
The Commission submitted its report with a minute of dissent of one of its
members, Shri L.R. Naik on 31st December 1980. The Commission appears
F to have identified as many as 3743 castes as SEBCs and made its recom-
mendations under Chapter XIII of Volume I of its report (vide paras 13.
1 to 13.39) and finally suggested "regarding the period of operation of
Commission's recommendations, the entire scheme should be reviewed
after twenty years. (Vide para 13.40)
G
The entire Report comprises of fourteen Chapters of which Chapter
IV deals with 'Social Backwardness and Caste', Chapter XI deals with
'Socio-Educational Field Survey and Criteria of Backwardness', Chapter
XII deals with 'Identification of OBCs" and Chapter XIII gives the
H 'Recommendations'. After a thorough survey of the population, the Com-
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [PAND!AN, J.] 709

mission has arrived at the percentage of OBCs as follows: A
"12.22 From the foregoing it will be seen that excluding Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes, other Backward Classes constitute nearly
52% of the Indian population.

Percentage of Distribution of India Population by B
Caste and Religious Groups

S.No. Group Name Percentage of the
total population

I, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes c
A-1 Scheduled Castes 15.05
A-2 Scheduled Tribes 7.51

Total of 'A' 22.56
D
II. Non-Hindu Communities, Religious Groups, etc.

B-1 Muslims (other than STs) 11.19 (0.2)*
B-2 Christians (other than STs) 2.16 (0.44)*
B-3 Sikhs (other than SCs & STs) 1.67 (0.2:1)* E
B-4 Budhists (Other than STs) 0.67 (0.03)*
B-5 Jains 0.47

Total of 'B' 16.16

III. Forward Hindu Castes & Communities F
C-1 Brahmins (including Bhumihars) 5.52
C-2 Rajputs 3.90
C-3 Marathas 2.21
C-4 Jats 1.00
C-5 V aishyas-Bania etc. 1.88
G
C-6 Kayasthas 1.07
C-7 Other forward Hindu castes/groups 2.00

Total of 'C' 17.58
Total of 'A', 'B' & ic· 56.30 H

...
710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A IV. Backward Hindu Castes & Communities

D. Remaining Hindu castes/groups which come in
the category of 'Other Backward Classes' 43.70@

V. Backward Non-Hindu Communities
B
E. 52% of religious groups under Section B may
also be treated as OBCs 8.40

F. The approximate derived population of Other
Backward Classes including non-Hindu Communities
c 52%
(Aggregate of D &
E, rounded)

@ This is a derived figure
D
* Figures in brackets give the population of S.C. & S.T. among these
non-Hindu Communities.

On the basis of the Commission's Report - popularly known as
Manda! Commission's Report - (for short 'the Report'), two office
E Memoranda - one dated 13.8.1990 and the other amended one dated
25.9.1991 were issued by the Government of India. We are reproducing
those Memoranda hereunder for proper understanding and appreciation
of the significance of these two OMs and the distinctions appearing be-
tween them:
F "No. 36012/31/90-Estt (SCT)
Government of India
Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances
& Pensions
(Dept!. of Personnel & Training)
G
OFFICE MEMORANDUM

New Delhi, the 13th August, 1990

Subject : Recommendation of the Second Backward Clas-
H ses Commission (Manda! Report) - Reservation for
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [PANDIAN, J.] 711

Socially and Educationally Backward Classes in ser- A
vices under the Government of lndia.

In a multiple undulating society like ours, early
achievement of the objective of social justice as enshrined
in the Constitution is a must. The second Backward Clas-
ses Commission called the Mandal Commission was es- B
tablished by the then Government with this purpose in
view, which submitted its report to the Government of
India on 31.12.1980.

2. Government have carefully considered the report and
the recommendations 'of the Commission in the present c
context responding the benefits to be extended to the
socially and educationally backward classes as opined by
the Commission and are of the clear view that at the outset
certain weightage has to be provided to such classes in the
services of the Union and their Public Undertakings. Ac- D
cordingly orders are issued as follows:

(i) 27% of the vacancie~ in civil posts and services under
the Government of India shall be reserved for SEBC.

(ii) The aforesaid reservation shall apply to vacancies to be E
filled by direct recruitment. Detailed instructions relating
to the procedure to be followed for enforcing reservation
will be issued separately.

(iii) Candidates belonging to SEBC recruited on the basis
of merit in an open competition on the same standards F
prescribed for the general candidates shall not be adjusted
against the reservation quota of 27%.

(iv) The SEBCwould comprise in the first phase the castes
and communities which are common to both the list in the
G
report of the Manda! Commission and the State
Governments' lists. A list of such castes/communities is
being. issued separately.

(v) The aforesaid reservation shall take effect from
7.8.1990. However, this will not apply to vacancies where H
712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A the recruitment process has already been initiated prior to
the issue of these orders.

Similar instructions in respect of public sector undertak-
ings and financial institutions including public sector bank~
will be issued by the Department of Public Enterprises and
B Ministry of Finance respectively.

sd/-
(Smt. Krishna Singh)
Joint Secretary to the Govt. of India

C Amended Memorandum:

'No. 36012131/90-Estt. (SCT)
Government of India
Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances
D & Pensions
(Deptt. of Personnel & Training)

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

New Delhi, the 25th September, 1991.
E
Subject : Recommendation of the Second Backward Classes
Commission {Manda! Report) - Reservation for So-
cially and Educationally Backward Classes in service
under the Government of India.

F The undersigned is directed to invite the attention to O.M. of even
number dated the 13th August, 1990, on the above sections of the
SEBCs to receive the benefits of reservation on a preferential basis
and to provide reservation for other economically backward sec-
tions of the people not covered by any of the existing schemes of
reservations, Government have decided to amend the said
G
Memorandum ~ith immediate effect as follows:-

2. (1) Within the 27% of the vacancies in civil posts and
services under the Government of India reserved for
SEBCs, preference shall be given to candidates
H belonging to the poorer sections of the SEBCs. In case
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [PANDIAN, J.] 713

sufficient number of such candidates are not available, A
unfilled vacancies shall be filled by the other SEBC
candidates.

(ii) 10% of the vacancies in civil posts and services under
the Government of India shall be reserved for other
economically backward sections of the people who are B
not covered by any of the existing schemes of reserva-
tion.

(iii) The criteria for determining the poorer sections of the
SEBCs or the other economically backward sections C
of the people who are not covered by any of the
existing schemes of reservations are being issued
separately.

3. The O.M. of even number dated the 13th August, 1990, shall be
deemed to have been amended to the extent specified above. D

sd/-
(A.K. HARIT)
DEPUTY SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF INDIA"
E
The expression deployed in both the OMs, "Socially and Education-
ally Backward Classes" is on the strength of the Report of the Commission,
though no such expression is used in Article 16(4) whereunder the reser-
vation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens
is to be made. This expression is used as an explanatory one to the words F
'backward class' occurring in Article 16( 4). Articles 16(4) and 340 (1) were

- embodied in the Constitution even at the initial stage; but Article 15(4)
containing the same expression as in Article 340 (1) was subsequently
added by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act of 1951 to over-ride the
decision of this Court in State of Madras v. Smt. Champakam Dorairajan,
1951 SCR 525. G

Legislative History of Article 15(4) of the Constitution

A legislative historical event that warranted the introduction of
clause 4 to Article 15 may be briefly retraced. H
714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A The Government of Tamil Nadu issued a Communal G.O. in 1927.
mal<ing copartmental reservation of posts for various communities. Sub-
sequently the G.O. was revised. In 1950 one Smt. Chamµakam Dorairajan
who intended to join the Medical College, on enquiries came to know that
in respect of admissions into the Government Medical College the
authorities were enforcing and observing an order of the Government,
B
namely, notification G.0.No. 1254 Education dated 17.5.1948 commonly
known as Communal G.O. which restricted the number of seats in Govern-
ment Colleges for certain castes. It appeared that the proportion fixed in
the old Communal G.O. had been adhered to even after commencement
of the Constitution on January 26, 1950. She filed a Writ Petition on 7th
C June 1950 under Article 226 of the Constitution for issuance of a writ of
mandamus restraining the State of Madras from enforcing the said Com-
munal G.O. on the ground that the G.O. was sought or purported to be
regulated in such a manner as to infringe the violation of the fundamental
rights guaranteed under Articles 15(1) and 29(2). Similarly one Srinivasan
D who had applied for admission into the Government Engineering College
at Guindy also filed a Writ Petition praying for a writ of mandamus for the
same relief as in Champakam Dorairajan. A Full Bench of the Madras High
Court heard both the Writ Petitions and allowed them (vide Smt. Cham-
pakam Dorairajan and another v. State of Madras, AIR 38 (1951) Madras
E 120). In this connection it may be mentioned that while the Writ Petition
was pending before the High Cour~ another revised G.O. No. 2208 dated
June 16. 1950 substantially reproducing the communal proportion fixed in
the old Communal G.O. came into being. The Slate on being aggrieved by
the judgment of the Madras High Court preferred an appeal before this
F Court in State of Madras v. Smt. Champakam Dorairajan, (1951) SCR 525.

-
A seven-Judges Bench dismissed the appeal holding that "the Communal
G.O. being inconsistent with the provisions of Article 29(2) in Part III of
the Constitution is void under Article 13." This judgment necessitated the
introducation of a Bill called Constitution (First Amendment) Bill for
over-riding the decision of this Court in Cltampakam's case (supra).
G
During the Parliament Debates held on 29th May 1951 Pt. Jawahar
Lal Nehru, the then Prime Minister while moving the Bill to amend the
Constitution stated as follows:

H "We have to deal with the situation where for a variety of
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. (PANDIAN, J.] 715

causes for which the present generation is not to blame, A
the past has the responsibility, there are groups, classes,
individuals, communities, if you like, who are backward.
They are backward in many ways - economically, socially,
educationally - sometimes they are not backward in one of
these respects and yet backward in another. The fact is
therefore that if we wish to encourage them in regard to B
these matters, we .have to do something special for
them .................................. .

Therefore one has to keep a balance between the existing
fact as we find it and the objective and ideal that we aim C
at."

Thereafter, the Bill was passed and clause (4) to Article 15 was
added by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act. The object of the newly
introduced clause (4) to Article 15 was to bring Articles 15 and 29 in line
with Articles 16(4), 46 anC: 340 and to make it constitutionally valid for the D
State to reserve seats for backward class of citizens, Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes in the public educational institutions as well as to make
other special provisions as may be necessary for their advancement.

Scope of Article 16(4) of the Constitution E
Article 16(4) expressly permits the State to make any provision for
the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class
of citizens which in the opinion of the State are not adequately represented
in the services under the State. As the power conferred on the State under
F
this clause 4 is to be exercised only if 'in the opinion of the State' that there
is no adequate representation in the services under the State, a vital
question arose for consideration whether the issue of determination by the
State as to whether a particular class of citizens is backward or not is a
justiciable one? This question was answered by the Constitution Bench of
this Court in Trilok Nath Tiku & Another v. State of Jammu & Kashmir and G
Others, [1967] 2 SCR 265 holding thus:

"While the State has necessarily to ascertain whether a
particular class of citizens are backward or not, having
regard to acceptable criteria, it is not the final word on the H
716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A question; it is a justiciable issue. While ordinarily a Court
may accept the decision of the State in that regard, it is
open to be canvassed if that decision is based on irrelevant
considerations. The power under clause (4) is also condi-
ticned by the fact that in regard to any backward classes .
of citizens there is no adequate representation in the ser-
B vices under the State. The opinion of the State in this regard
may ordinarily be accepted as final, except when it is
established that there is an abuse of power.'

The words 'backward class of ciliuns' occurring in Article 16(4) are
C neither defined nor explained in the Constitution though the same words
occurring in Article 15(4) are followed by a qualifying phrase. 'Socially and
Educationally".

Though initially, Article 10(3) of the draft Constitution did not
D contain the qualifying word 'backward' preceding the words 'class of
citizens' the said qualifying word was subsequently inserted on the sugges-
tion of the Drafting Committee. Strong objection was taken for insertion
of the word 'backward' and more so for tLe introduction of Article 10(3)
of the draft Constitution. Amendments were moved by one section of the
members of the Constituent Assembly for complete deletion of clause (3)
E and by another section for the omission of the word 'backward'. The
discussion and debate took place at length for and against the introduction
of clause (3) as well as for the insertion of the word 'backward'. Before the
motions for amendments were put on vote, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar in answer-
ing the scathing criticism made in the course of the debate and explaining
F the significance of clause (3) of Article 10 with the qualifying word
'backward' and insisting the sustenance of the said clause emphatically
expressed his views as follows:

"I am not prepared to say that this Constitution will not
-
give rise to questions which will involve legal interpretation
G or judicial interpretation. In fact, I would like to ask Mr.
Krishanamachari if he can point out to me any instance of
any Constitution in the world which has not been a paradise
for lawyers. I would particularly ask him to refer to the vast
storehouse of law reports with regard to the Constitution
H of the United States, Canada and other countries. 1 am
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [PAND!AN, J.] 717

therefore not ashamed at all if this Constitution hereafter A
for purposes of interpretation is required to be taken to
the Federal Court. That is the fate of every Constitution
and every Drafting Committee. I shall therefore not labour
that point at all."

While winding up the debate he said: B

"... the Drafting Committee had to produce a formula which
would reconcile the,se three point of view, firstly, that there
shall be equality of opportunity, secondly that there shall
be reservations in favour of certain communities which have c
not so far had a 'proper look-in' so to say into the administra-
tion ................................:........................................................... .

that no better formula could be produced than the one that
is embodied in clause (3) of Article 10 of the Constitution;
D
they will find that the view of those who believe and hold
that there shall be equality of opportunity has been em-
bodied in sub-clause (1) of Article 10. It is a generic
principle ................................................................................... .
Supposing for instance, we are to concede in full the
demand of those communities who have not been so far E
employed in the public services to the fullest extent, what
would really happen is, we shall be completely destroying
the first proposition upon which we are all agreed, namely,
that there shall be an equality of opportunity ........................ .
I am sure they will agree that unless you use some such F
qualifying phrase as "backward" the exception made in
favour of reservation will ultimately eat _up the rule al-
together. Nothing of the rule will remain. That I think, if I
may say so, is the justification why the Drafting Committee
undertook on its own shoulders the responsibility of intro-
ducing the word 'backward' which, I admit, did not G
originally find a place in the fundamental right in the way
in which it was passed by this Assembly.................................. .
somebody asked me:- "Wliat is a haci<Ward c0ininuniiy":i
Wei~ I think any one who reads the language of the draft
itself will find that we have left it to be determined by each H
718 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A local Government. A backward community is a community
which is backward in the opinion of the Government. My
honourable Friend Mr. T.T. Krishnamachari asked me
whether this rule will be justiciable. It is rather difficult to
give a dogmatic answer. Personally I think it would be a
justiciable matter. If the local Government included in this
B category of reservations such a large number of seats; I
think one could very well go to the Federal Court and the
Superme Court and say that the reservation is of such a
magnitude that the rule regarding equality of opportunity
has been destroyed and the court will then come to the
c conclusion whether the local Government or the State
Govenment has acted in a reasonable and prudent man-
ner.''

(emphasis supplied)

D (Constituent Assemble Debates, Volume VII Pages 700-
703)

After the debate, two motions were put to vote but they were
negatived. The unexpurgated draft Article 10(3) corresponds to the present
E Article 16(4) of the Constitution. It has now become necessary for this
Court to interpret and explain the words 'backward class'.

There is a galaxy of decisions of this Court, explaining the words
'backward class' as occurring under Article 16(4) in relation to Articles
16(1) and 16 (2) which I shall recapitulate in my endeavour to meet the
F arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for various parties
in interpreting the words 'backward class'.

The Government both in the earlier O.M. and the subsequent
amended O.M. has used the expression 'socially and educationally back-
-
G ward classes' thereby qualifying the word 'backward' as 'socially and educa-
tionally backward' though in the second amended O.M., the 'economic
backwardness' is alone taken as a ground for providing reservation for the
economically backward section of the people not covered by the same kind
of reservation meant for 'socially and educationally backward Classes'.

H The word 'backward' is very wide bringing within its fold the social
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.l. [PAND!AN, J.] 719

backwardness, educational backwardness, economic backwardness, politi- A
cal backward and even physical backwardness.

To assimilate the expression 'class' in its legal sense, the said expres-
sion should be strictly construed and tested on the principles of agreed
criteria which throw a flood light on its true meaning. In interpreting the
words 'backward class', I am sorry to say ther~ is no uniform and consistent B·
view expressed by the Court by laying down a rigid formula exhaustively
listing out the specific criteria. The battery of tests that are recognised by
the Courts in determining 'socially and educationally backward classes' are
caste, nature of traditional occupation or trade, poverty, place of residence,
lack of education and also the sub-standard education of the candidates C
for the post in comparison to the average standard of candidates from
general category. These factors are not exhaustive.

As to the questions (1) whether 'caste' can be taken as a criterion in
determining and identifying a 'backward class' in Hindu society and (2)
whether it could be a pre-dominant factor or one of the factors in identify- D
ing the backward class, there is a cleavage of opinion.

Ray, C.J. in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Pradeep Tandon and Ors, [1975]
2 SCR 761 at 766 has gone to the extent of saying that "when Article 15(1)
forbids discrimination on grounds only of religion, race, caste - caste E
cannot be made one of the criteria for determining social and educational
backwardness. If caste or religion is recognised as a criterion of sOcial and
educational backwardness Article 15(4) will stultify Article 15(1)". The
effect of this judgment is that caste can never be a criterion. This decision
has also ruled that the place of habitation and the environment are also F
the determining factors in judging the social and educational backward-
ness.

A good deal of arguments was advanced on the question whether
caste can be the sole if not the dominant factor or at the least one of the
factors or not at all. Whilst anti-reservationists contend that the Report G
should be thrown overboard on the ground that the reservation is made on
the caste criterion, the pro-reservationists would forcibly refute that con-
tention making counter submissions stating, inter-alia, that caste can jus·
tificably be taken as an important and dominant factor if not the sole factor
in determining the social and educational backwardness for various reasons H
720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A as pointed out in the Report. Since backwardness is a direct consequence
of caste status and the discrimination perpetuated against the socially
backward people is based on the caste system, the caste criterion can never
be divested while interpreting the word 'class'. Mr. K.K. Venugopal, the
learned senior counsel while concluding his arguments has stated that caste
if it is to. be taken as one of the criteria, it must be at the end point and
B not the starting point. Therefore, even at the threshold, it has become
obligatory to decide the question whether 'caste' should be completely
excluded from being considered as one of the criteria, if not to what extent
caste would become relevant in the determination and ascertainment of
'socially and educationally backward class'. There is a galaxy of decisions
C of this Court in explaining the words 'backward class' and 'caste' which I
shall refer to at the appropriate place.

Meaning of 'Class' and 'Caste'

To identify the diversity of meanings of the words 'class' and caste'
D that constitute their inner complexity; to formulate the questions about
them that are disputed and to examine as well as to assess the opposed
voices in controversies that have ensued and to understand their semiology,
I shall first of all reproduce the meanings of those words as lexically
defined.
E The Oxford English Dictionary (Volume II):

Class:

(2) a division or order of society according to status; a rank
or grade of society; ... (6) a number of individuals (persons
F or things) possessing common attributes, and grouped
together under a general or 'class' name; a kind, sort,
division.

Caste
G (2) one of the several hereditary classes into which society
in India has from time immemorial been divided; the mem-
bers of each caste being sociilly equal, having the same
religious rites, and generally following the same occupation
or profession; those of one caste have no social intercourse

l
H with those of another; (3) the system or basis of this division
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [PANDIAN, J.J 721

among the Hindoos. A

{ \
In Webster Comprehensive Dictionary (lntemational Edition), the
meaning of the words is given as follows:

4 Class:
B
(1) A number or body of persons with common charac-
teristics: the educated class; (2) social rank, caste

Caste:

(1) one of the hereditary classes into which Hindu society C
is divided in India (2) the principle of practice of such
division or the position it confers; (3) the division of society

I
on artificial grounds; a social class

According to Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the
English Language, meanmg of the words 'class' and 'caste' is as follows: D
'" Class:

(1) a number of persons or things regarded as forming a
group by reason of corrmon attributes, characteristics,
qualities, or traits, kind, sort (2) any division of persons or. E
things according to rank or grade .... (9) Social, a social
stratum sharing basic, economic, political or cultural char-
acteristics and having the same social position ... (10) the
system of dividing society; caste ....

Caste: F

( 1) Social, an endogamous and hereditary social group
limited to persons of the same rank, occupation, economic
position etc. and having mores distinguishing it from other
such groups, (2) any rigid wealth, hereditary rank or
G
privileges, or by profession or employment, having special
significance when applied to the artificial divisions or social
classes into which the Hindus are rigidly separated.

Black Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition) Centennial Edition (1891-1991)
gives the meaning of 'class' 'thus: H
722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Class:

A group of persons, things, qualities, or activities having
-
\
common characteristics or attributes.

The word 'caste' is defined in Encyclopedia Americana (5) thus:
B
Caste:

Caste is a largely, exclusive social class, membership in
which is determined by birth and involves particular cus-
tomary restrictions and privilegs. The word di:rivi:s from
c the Portugues casta, meaning 'breed', 'race', or 'kind' and
was first used to denote the Hindu social system of social
distinctions (2) Hinduism, any of the four social divisions,
the Brahman, Kshatriya, Vaisya and Sudra, into which
Hindu society is rigidly divided, each caste having its own
privileges and limitations, transferred by inheritance from
\ \
D
one generation to the next (3) any class or group of society ...
sharing common cultural features .... (6) pertaining to char-
acterised by caste; a caste society; a caste system; a caste
structure.

E In Corpus Juris Secundum (14), the meaning of words 'class' and
'caste' is given thus:

Class

A number of objects distinguished by common characters
F from all others, and regarded as a collective unit or group,
a collection capable of general division, a number of per-
sons or things ranked together for some common purpose
or possessing some attribute in common; the order of rank
according to which persons or things are arranged or
G assorted; ............................ .

Caste

A class or grad« or division of society separated from
others by differences of classification on the Indian sub-
H continent. While this remains the basic connotation, the
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [PANDIAN, J.] 723

word 'caste' is also used to describe in whole or in part A
social system that emerged at various times in other parts
(
!
of the world ...............................................................................

The meaning of the word 'backward' is defined in lexicons as
'retarded in physical, material or intellectual development' or 'slow in
growth or development; retarded. B
A careful examination of the meaning of the words 'class' and 'caste'
as defined above by the various dictionaries, perceivably shows that these
two words are not synonymous with each other and they do not convey the
same meaning.
c
See R. Chitra/ekha and Anr. v. State of Mysore & Ors. [1964] 6 SCR
368 at 388; Triloki Nath v. J. & K. State [1969] 1 SCR 103 at 105 and K.C.

I Vasanth Kumar v. Kamataka, [1985[ Supp. 1 SCR 352.

The quintessence of the above definitions is that a group of persons
having common traits or attributes coupled with retarded social, material
D

(economic) and intellectual (educational) development in the sense not
having so much of intellect and ability will fall within the ambit of 'any
backward class of citizens' under Article 16 (4) of the Constitution.

In the course of debate in the Parliam~nt on the inlendmcnt of E
Article 16 (4), Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, the then Minister for Law expressed
his views that "backward classes which are nothing else but a collection of
certain castes."

The next important, but central point at issue is whether caste by the

r name of which a group of persons are identified, can be taken as a criterion
in determining that caste as 'socially and educationally backward class' and
F

if so, will it be the sole or dominant or one of the factors in the determina-
tion of "social and educational backwardness11 •

Before embarking upon a discussion relating to this aspect, it is G
pertinent to note the views of certain States as regards the caste criterion
and economic criterion for identifying the 'backwardness'.

In reply to a questionnaire issued by the Second Backward Classes
Commission, the State of Assam, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Kar-
nataka, Kerala, Maharastra, Punjab, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh stated H
724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A that caste should be used as one of the criterion for identifying backward-
ness. Delhi, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and
Madhya Pradesh stated that caste should not be made a criterion of
backwardness. Bihar, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Punjab, Rajas-
than and Uttar Pradesh suggested low economic status as one of the
significant tests, while Delhi, Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Haryana desired
B
the economic factor to be the sole determinant of backwardness.

Articles 15(4), 16(4) and 340(1) do not speak of 'caste' but only
'class'. The learned counsel particularly those appearing for anti-reser-
vationists have stressed that if the makers of the Constitution had really
C intended to take 'caste or castes' as conveying the meaning of socially and
educationally backward class, they would have incorporated the said word,
'caste or castes' in Articles 15( 4) and 340 (1) as 'socially and educationally

D
backward caste or castes' instead of 'class or classes' as they have adopted
the expression in the case of 'Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes'.
Similarly in Article 16( 4) also, they would have used the words as 'back-
ward caste or castes' instead of 'backward class'. It has been further urged
\
that the very fact that the framers of the Constitution in their wisdom
thought of using a wider expression 'classes' in Article 15(4) and 340(1)
and 'class' in Article 16(4) alludes that they did not have the intention of
equating classes with the castes.
E
The word 'caste' is not used in the Constitution as indicative of any
section of people or community except in relation to 'Scheduled Castes'
which is defined in Article 366(24). However, the word 'caste' in Articles
15(2), 16(2) and 29(2) does not include 'scheduled caste' but it refers to a
F caste within the ordinary meaning of caste. The word 'Scheduled Caste'
came into being only by the notification of President under Article 341. It
would be appropriate, in this connection, to recall the observation of Fazal
Ali, J. in his separate but concurring judgment in State of Kera/a and Others
v. N.M. Thomos and Others, [1976] 1 SCR 906 wherein at page 996, he has
said that "the word 'caste' appearing after 'scheduled' is really a misnomer
G and has been used only for the purpose of identifying this particular class
of citizens which has a special history of several hundred years behind it.".

Mathew, J. in his separate judgment in the same case (Thomas) has
expressed that "it is by virtue of the notification of the President that the
H 'Scheduled Castes' came into being".
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [PANDIAN, J.] 725

... Reference also may be made to the observation of Krishna Iyer, J.
in Akhil Bhartiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh v. Union of India and Others,
A

I [1981] 2 SCR 185 at 234 where he has said:

"Terminological similarities are an illusory guide and we
cannot go by verbal verisimilitude. It is very doubtful
whether the expression caste will apply to Scheduled Cas- B
tes. At any rate, Scheduled Tribes are identified by their
tribal denomination. A tribe cannot be equated with a
caste. As stated earlier, there are sufficient indications in
the Constitution to suggest that the Scheduled Castes are
not mere castes. 11
c
There is a long line of decisions dealing with the significance of the
r word 'caste' in relation to Hindus as being one of the relevant criteria, if
not the sole criterion for ascertaining whether a particular person or group

! of persons will fall within the wider connotation of 'class'.

In M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore, [1963] Suppl 1 SCR 439,
Gajendragadkar, J. observed, "Though castes in relation to Hindus may
D

be a relevant factor to consider in determining the social backwardness of
groups or classes of citizens, it cannot be the sole or the dominant test in
that behalf."
E
Subba Rao, J. speaking for the majority of the Constitution Bench in
R. Chitralekha v. State of Mysore, [1964) 6 SCR 368 at 389 has stated:

"......what we intend to emphasize is that under no cir-
r cumstances a "class" can be equated to a 11 casten, though
the caste of an individual or a group of individual may be F
considered along with other relevant factors in putting him
in a particular class. We would also like to make it clear
that if in a given situation caste is excluded in ascertaining
a class within the meaning of Art. 15( 4) of the Constitution,
it does not vitiate the classification if it satisfied other tests." G
Mudholkar, J. in his dissenting judgment in considering the caste in
determination of the backward class, has expressed his view thus:
11
it would not be in accordance either with cl. (1)
.............

of Art. 15 or cl. (2) of Art. 29 to require the consideration H
726 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A of the castes of persons to be borne in mind for determining
what are socially and educationally backward classes. It is
true that cl'. (4) of Art. 15 contains a non-obstante clause
with the result that power conferred by that clause can be
exercised despite the provisions of cl. (1) of Art. 15 and cl.
(2) of Art. 29. But that does not justify the inference that
B castes have any relevance in determining what are socially
and educationally backward communities.'

Wanchoo, C.J. speaking for the Constitution Bench in Minor P.
Rajendran v. State of Madras & Ors, [1968) 2 SCR 786 at 790 pointed out
C that "if the reservation in question has been based only on caste and had
not taken into account the social and educational backwardness of the
caste in question, it would be violative of Article 15(1). But it must not be
forgotten that a caste is also a class of citizens and if the caste as a whole ~
is socially and educationally backward, reservation can be made in favour
of such a caste on the ground that it is a socially and educationally
\
D backward class of citizens within the meaning of Article 15(4)'. (emphasis '
supplied).

The learned Chief Justice in support of his above observation has
placed reliance on Ba/aj•
E
In State of Andhra Pradesh v. P. Sagar, [1968) 3 SCR 595, it has been
observed:

"............ the expre~sion 11 class 11 means a homogeneous sec-
tion of the people grouped together because of certain
F likenesses or common traits and who are identifiable by
'
some common attributes such as status, rank, occupation,
re;idcnce in a locality, race, religion and the like. In deter-
mining whether a particular section forms a class, caste
cannot be exduded altogether. But in the determination of
a class a test solely based upon the caste or community
G cannot also be accepted."

In Triloki Nath v. J & K State, II [1969) 1 SCR 103 Shah, J. speaking
for the Constitution Bench has reiterated the meaning of the word 'class'
as defined in the case of Sagar and added that "for the purpose of Article
H 16(4) in determining whether a section forms a class, a test solely based on
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.L [PANDIAN, J.] 727

..... caste, community race religion, sex, descent, place of birth or residence
cannot be adopted, because it would directly offend the Constitution."
A

I Further, this judgment reaffirms that view in Minor P. Rajendran's
case to the effect that if the members of an entire ca~te or community at
.~
a given time are socially, economically and educationally backward that
caste on that account be treated as a backward class. This is not because B
they are members of that caste or community but because they form a class.

Hegde, J. in A. Peerikaruppan, etc. v. State of Tamil N:idu, [1971] 2
SCR 430 at 443 has observed:

11
A caste has always been recongnised as class.''
c
Vaidialingam, J. in State Andhra Pradesh and Ors. v. U.S. V. Bairam
etc, [1972] 3 SCR 447 in his conclusion uphled the list of Backward Class
in that case as they satisfied the various tests, which have been laid down
/ by this Court for asertaining the social and educational of a backwardness D
{ of a class even though the said list was exclusively based on caste. (emphasis
our)

Chief Justice Ray in Ku.marl KS. Jayasree & Anr. v. The State of
Kera/a & Anr, [1977] 1 SCR 194 was of the view that "In ascertaining social
backwardness of a class of citizens it may not be irrelevant to consider the E
caste of the group of citizens. Caste cannot however be made tb sole or
dominant test. ... n

· Speaking for the Bench in U.P. State v. Pradip Tandon Ray, the
r learned Chief Justice after stating that neither caste nor race nor religion
can be made the basis of classification for the purposes of determining
F

social and educational backwardness within the meaning of Article 15( 4)
when Article 15(1) forbids discrimination on grounds only of religion, race
caste · observed that caste cannot be made one of the criteria for deter-
mining social and educational backwardness and that if the caste or religion
is recognised as a criterion of social and educational backwardness, Article G
15(4) still stultify Article 15(1). Further, he observed that "It is true that
Article 15(1) forbids discrimination only on the ground of religion, race,
caste but when a classification taken recourse to caste as one of the criteria
in determining socially and educationally backward classes, the expression
'classes' in that case violates the rule of expressio unius est exc/usio alterius. H
728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A The socially and educationally backward classes of citizens are groups
other than groups based on caste." .;,,--

The learned Chief Justice also recognised the meaning of the expres-
sion "classes of citizens" in line with the observation made in Triloki Nath
(II)and Sagar (supra) and explained the traits of social backwardness,
B economic backwardness and educational backwardness.
~.

See also Akhil Bhartia Soshit Karamchari Sangh (supra) and KC.
Vasanth Kumar (supra).

C Though there is tremendous ambivalence in a host of judgments
rendered by this Court, not even a single judgment has held that class has
no relevance to caste at all wherever caste system is prevalent.

Collating the above sliid views expressed by this Court in a catena
of decisions as regards the relevance and significance of the caste criterion \
D in the field of identification of 'socially and educationally backward classes'
it may be stated that caste ·neither can be the sole criterion nor can it be
equated with 'class' for the purpose of Article 16(4) for ascertaining the
social and educational backwardness of any section or group of people so
as to bring them within the wider connotation of 'backward class'. Never-
E theless 'caste' in Hindu society becomes a dominant factor or primary
criterion in determining the backwardness of a class of citizens. Unless
'caste' satisfies the primary test of social backwardness as well as the
educational and economic backwardness which are the established and
accepted criteria to identify the 'backward class' a caste per se without
satisfying the agreed formulae generally cannot fall within the meaning of
F 'backward class of citizens' under Article 16(4), save in given exceptional
circumstances such as the caste itself being identifiable with the traditional
ocrnpation of the lower strata - indicating the social backwardness.

True, the caste syr.tem is predominantly known in Hindu society and
G nms through the entire fabric of the social structure. Therefore, the caste
criterion cannot be divested from the other established and agreed criteria
in identifying and ascertaining the backward classes.

It is said that the caste system is unknown to other e-0mmunities such
as Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Jews, Parsis, Jains ·etc. in whose respectiv~
H religion, the caste system is not recognised and permitted. But in practice,
INDRA SAWHNEY "· U.0.1. [PANDIAN, J.] 729

it cannot be irrefutably asserted that Islam, Christianity, Sikhism are all A
completely immune from casteism.

There are marked distinctions in one form or another among various
sections of the Mnslim community especially among converts to Islam
though Islam does not recognise such kind of divisions among Muslims and
professes only common brotherhood. B
There are various sects or separate group of people in Muslim
communities being identified by their occupation such as Pinjara in
Gugarat, Dudekula (cotton beaters) in Andhra Pradesh, Labbais, Rowthar
and Marakayar in Tamil Nadu.
c
Though Christianity does not acknowledge caste system, the evils of
caste system in some States are as prevalent as in Hindu society especially
among the converts. In Andhra Pradesh, there are Harijan Christians,
Reddy Christians, Karnma Christians etc. Similarly, in Tamil Nadu, there
are Pillai Christians, Marvar Christians, Nadar Christians and Harijan D
Christians etc. That is to say all the converts to Christianity have not
divested or set off themselves from their caste labels and crossed the caste
barrier but carry with them the banners of their caste labels. Like Hindus,
they interact and have their familiar relationship and marital alliances only
within the converted caste groups.
E
Iil Tamil Nadu, after persistent effort and agitations some of the
sections of people belonging to some castes or communities converted
either to Islam or Christianity have become successful in having them
included in the list of 'backward classes' on par with their corresponding
.Hindu caste people. F
The Government of Tamil Nadu on the basis of the report of the
Second Backward Classes Commission issued a revised list of 'backward
classes' by G.Q. Ms. No. 1564 (Social Welfare Department) dated 30th July
1985 wherein the following _castes and communities converted to Islam and
Christianity are included for the purpose of reservation under Articles G
15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution.

Serial No.

26 Converts to Christianity from Scheduled Castes irrespec-
tive of the generation of conversion for the purpose of H
730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A reservation of seats in Educational Institutional and for
seats in Public Services.

98* Labbais including Rowthar and Marakayar (whether their
spoken language is Tamil or Urdu.)

B 100 Latin Catholics ..... : in Kanyakumari district and Shenkot-
tah taluk of Tirunelveli district.

110 Meenavar, Parvatharajakularn, Pattanavar, Sembadavar
(including converts to Christianity).

c 115 Mukkuvar or Mukayar (including converts to Christianity).

118 Nadar, Shanar and Grarnani, including Christian Nadar,
Christian Shanar and Christian Grarnani.

136 Paravar including converts to Christianity (except in Kanya-
D kumari district and Shenkottah taluk of Tirunelveli district
where the community is a Scheduled Caste.)

* Item No. 98 denotes Muslim community.

By another G.O. Ms. No. 1565 dated 30th July 1985, the Government
E
of Tamil Nadu directed the reservation of seats at 50% for Backward
Classes and 18% for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in respect of
all courses in all kinds of educational institutions as well as in all Services
in the Government of Tamil Nadu. Thereafter, 'another G.O. Ms. No. 558
dated 24th February, 1986 on the representation of Christian converts was
F issued, the relevant paragraphs of which read as follows:

"(5) Accordingly, the Government declare that, in addition
to the Christian Converts mentioned in paragraph one
above, the persons belonging to the other Christian com-
munities who are converts from any Hindu community
G included in the list of Backward Classes also will be con-
sidered as socially and educationally backward for the
pruposes of Article 15( 4) of the Constitution.

(6) The Government also declare that, in addition to the
H Christian converts mentioned in paragraph one above, the
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [PANDIAN, J.] 731

persons belonging to the other Christian communities who A
are converts from any Hindu community included in the
list of Backward Classes also will be considered as Back-
ward Classes of citizens and that they are not adequately
represented in the services under the State with reference
to Article 16(4) of the Constitution."
B
The Christian converts mentioned in the above G.O. relates to the
list of Christian converts mentioned in G.0. Ms. Nci.,J564 dated 30th July
1985.

As per the statistics given in the Report of the Second Backward C
Classes Commission, in Tamil Nadu out of 27,05,960 people belonging to
Muslim minorities 25,60,195 are included in the backward list which works
out to 94.61 % of the total Muslim population of the State. Similarly, among
Christians, out of 31, 91, 988 of the total population, 25, 48, 148 are
included in the backward list which works out to 79.83%.
D
The ·Nav. Budhlsts, and Neo Budhists the majority of whom are
converts from Scheduled Castes enjoy the reservation on the ground that
their low status in that community have not become advanced equal to the
status of others and their social backwardness is not changed in spite of
change of their religion. E
Sikhism, no doubt, strictly believes in social equality and justice, '
denounces all sorts of social discrimination between man and man, strongly
advocates the equality and parity in all humanity and propagates that caste,
birth or colour cannot make one superior or inferior. All the Gurus of
Sikhism have advocated and articulated the concept of equality of man as F
the basis of egalitarian society. Notwithstanding Sikhism is violently against
casteism, some converts to Sikhism from the Scheduled Castes still retain
their caste label.

Thus even among non-Hindus, there are occupational organisations G
or social. groups or sects which are having historical backward/evolution.
They too constitute social collectives and form separate classes for the
purposes of Article 16(4).

Though in India, caste evil originated from Hindu religion that evil
has taken its root so deep in the social structure of all the Indian com- H
732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A munitjes and spread its tentacles far and wide thereby leaving no com-
munity from being influenced by the caste factor. In other words, it cannot
be authoritatively said the some of the communities belonging to any
particular religion are absolutely free from casteism or at least from its
shadow. The only difference being that the rigour of caste varies from
religion to religion and from region to region. Of course, in some of the
B communities, the influence of the caste factor may be minimal. So far as
the Hindu society is concerned, it is most distressing to note that it receives
sanction from the Hindu religion itself and perpetuated all through.

Reference may be made to paragraphs 12.11 to 12.16 of Chapter XII
C of the Report.

After identifying in paragraph 12.18, the Commission has laid down
the following tests for identifying non-Hindu OBCs:

"12.18 After giving a good deal of thought to these difficul-
D ties, the Commission has evolved the following rough and
ready criteria for identifying non-H'ndu OBCs:-

(i) All untouchables converted to any non-Hindu religion;
and

E (ii) Such occupational communities which are known by
the name of their traditional hereditary occupation and
whose Hindu counterparts have been included in the
list of Hindu OBCs. (Examples: Dhabi, Teli, Dheemar,
Nai, Gujar, Kumhar, Lobar, Darji, Badhai, etc.)"
F
Even assuming that the caste factor would not furnish a reliable
yardstick to identify 'socially and educationally backward groups' in the
communities other than Hindu community as there is no commonness since
all sections of people among Budhists, Muslims, Sikhs and Christians etc.
and as the respective religion of those communities do not recognise the·
G caste system, yet on the principle of the other agreed criteria such as
traditional occupation, trade, place of residence, poverty lack of education
or economic backwardness etc. the social and economic backwardness of
those communities could be identified independently of the caste criterion.
Once these 'casteless societies' are tested on the anvil of the established
H relevant criteria de hors the caste criterion, there may not be any difficulty
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.l. [PANDIAN, J.J 733

in identifying the social and educational backwardness of the section of the A
people of that community and classifying them as 'backward class of
citizens' within the meaning of Article 16(4).

In this connection, reference may be made tu the observation of this
Court in Chitra/ekha (supra) that "....... .if in a given situation caste is
excluded in ascertaining a class within the meaning of Article 15(4) of the B
Constitution, it does not vitiate the classification if it satisfied other tests."

More often than not, a question that is put forth is should the caste
label be accepted as a criterion in ascertaining the social and educational
backwardness of a group of persons or community. No doubt, it is felt that .C
in identifying and classifying a group of persons or community as 'socially
and educationally backward class', it should be done de hors the caste label.
But all those who address such a question turn a blind eye to the existing
stark reality that in the Hindu society ever since the caste system was
introduced, till today, the social status of Hindu is so woven or inextricably D
intertwined and fused with the caste system to such an extent that no one
in such a situation can say that the caste is not a primary indicator of social
backwardness and that social backwardness is not identifiable with refer-
ence to the caste of an individual or group of persons or community.
However, painful and distasteful, it may be, we have to face the reality that
under the hydraulic pressure of caste system in Hindu society, a major E
section of the Hindus under multiple caste labels are made ·to suffer
socially,. educationally and economically. There appears no symptoms of
early demise of this dangerous disease of caste system or getting away from
the caste factor in spite of the fact that many reformative measures have
been taken by the Government. Unless this caste system, unknown to other F
parts of the world is completely eradicated and all the socially and educa-
tionally backward classes to whichever religion they belong inclusive of
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are brought up and placed on par
with the advanced section of the people, the caste label among Hindus will
continue to serve as a primary indicator of its social backwardness.
G
Though I am not inclined to exhaustively elaborate the untold agony
and immeasurable sufferings undergone by the people in the lower strata
under the label of their respective caste, I cannot avoid but citing a jarring
piece of information appearing in the Report. The noted and renowned
Sociologist Shri J.R. Kamb/e in Rise & Awakening of Depressed Classes in H
734 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A India published by National Publishing House, New Delhi has quoted a
passage from the issue of 'Hindu' dated 24.12.1932 as an example of visual
pollution existing in Tinnevelli (Tamil Nadu) which the Manda! Commis-
sion has extracted in Chapter IV vide para 4.13 of its report:

"4.13 .............. In this (Tinnevclly) district there is a class of
B unseeables called purada vannans. They are not allowed to
come out during day time because their sigbt is considered
to be pollution. Some of these people who wash the clothes
of other exterior castes working between midnigbt and
day-break, were with difficulty persuaded to leave their
c houses to interview."

Does not the very mention of the caste named 'purada vannans'
indicate that the people belonging to that community were so backward,
both socially, economically as well as educationally beyond comprehen-
D sion? Would the children of those people who were not allowed to come
out during day time have gone to any school? Does not the very fact that
those people were treated with contempt and disgrace as if they were
vermin in the human form freeze our blood? Alas! What a terrible and
traumatic experience it was for them living in their hide-outs having oc-
casional pot-luck under pangs of misery, all througb mourning over their
E perilous predicament on account of this social ostracism. When people
placed at the base level in the hierarchical caste system are living like
mutes, licking their wounds - caused by the deadening weigbt of social
customs and mourning their fate for having been born in lower castes - can
it be said by any stretch of imagination that caste can never be the primary
criterion in identifying the social, economic and educaional backwardness?
F
Are not the social arid economic activities of Shudras and Panchamas
(untouchables) severely influenced by their low caste status?

There is no denying that many of the castes are identified even by
their traditional occupation. This is so because numerous castes arrangged
G in a hierarchical order in the Hindu social structure are tied up with their
respective particular traditional occupation consequent upon the creation
of four Varnas on the concept of divine origin of caste system based on
the Vedic principles. Can it be said that the propagation and practice on
the caste - based discrimination; the marked dividing line between upper
H caste Hindus and Shudras, and the practice of untouchability in spite of
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.l. [PAND!AN, J.] 735

the Constitutional declaration of abolition of untouchability under Article A
17 are completely eradicated and erased? Can it be said that the social
backwardness has no relation to caste status? The unchallengeable answer
for the first question would be in the negative and for the second question,
the answer would be that social backwardness does have a relation with
the caste status.
B
It is not germane for my purpose to enter into a lengthy deliberation
as to how religion and mythology were used for founding the social
institution in Hindu society containing so much of inequalities and dis-
crimination among the people professing the same Hinduism.

The Manda! Commission in Chapter IV of its report under the
c
heading "Social Backwardness and Caste" has concluded its vie"( with a
query under paragraph 4.33 of its Report (Volume I) thus:

"In view of the foregoing will it be too much to say that in
the traditional Indian society social backwardness was a
1
direct consequence of caste status .......
'

Though the Government both on the Central and State level have
taken and are taking positive steps through law and other reformative
measures to eradicate this social evil, it is heart~ rendi~g to note that in
many circumstances, the caste system is being perpetuated instead of being E
banished for the reasons best known to those perpetrators.

It is common knowledge that in Hindu society, if a person merely
mentions the name of a traditional occupation, another by his empirical
knowledge can immediately identify the caste by the said traditional oc- F
cupation. To illustrate, the traditional occupation of washing clothes is
identified with washerman (Dhobi), caste, traditional occupation of hair-
cutting is identified with Barber (Nai) - caste, traditional occupation of
pottery is identified with Potter (Kumhar's caste), and so on, Of course in
modern times, persons belonging to any particular caste might have shifted
over to other occupation leaving their traditional occupation but generally G
speaking, the occupation is identified with the caste and vice-versa. Many
backward castes have taken 'agricultrure' as their profession. In such an
unquestionable situation, in my opinion, there can be no justification in
saying that caste in Hindu society cannot serve as a primary criterion even
at the starting point in ascertaining its social, economic and educational H
736 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A backwardness. To say that in the effort of ascertaining social backwardness,
caste should be considered only at the end point, is a misnomer and
fallacious. Because after identifying and classifying a group of persons
belonging to a particular caste by testing with the application of the
relevant criteria other than the caste criterian, the identification of the
caste of that class of persons is no more required as in the case of
B identification of casteless society as a backward class. In fact, this Court in
a number of decisions has held that a caste may become a 'backward class'
provided that caste satisfies the test of backwardness.

It is apposite, in this context, to make reference of the views ex-
C pressed by the Mandal Commission stating that there is "a close linkage
between caste ranking of a person and his social educational and economic
status ........... In India, therefore, the low ritual caste status of a person has
a direct bearing on his social backwardness''.

Chinnappa Reddy, J. In Vas ant K!lmar points out that the social
D investigator "............ may freely perceive those pursuing certain 'lowly'
occupation as socially and educationally backward classes."

In passing, I would like to make reference to the pith and substance
of the report of Kaka Kalelkar, according to which the relevant factors to
cosider in classifying 'backward class' would be their traditional occupation
E
or profession, the percentage of literary or the general educational advan-
cement made by them; the estimated population of the conmmunity, and
the distribution of the various communities throughout the State or their
concentration in certain areas.

F What the Expression "Backward Class" means?

In Minor P. Rajendran (supra), Wanchoo, C.J. speaking for the Con-
stitution Bench has stated that " a caste is also a 'class of citizens' and that
reservation can be made in such a case provided if that caste as a whole is
G socially and educationally backward within the meaning of Article 15(4)".

Reference may also be made to Triloki Nath (II) (supra) and Ba/aram.

The facts in Ba/aram (cited above) disclose that for the admission to
the integrated M.B.B.S. Course in the government medical colleges in
H Andhra Pradesh, the Government issued a G.O. making a reservation of
INDRA SAWHNEY i·. U.O.l. [PANDIAN, J.J 737

25% of seats in favour of 'backward classes' as recommended by the A
Andhra Pradesh Backward Classes Commission besides other reservations
inclusive of reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The
reservation for the 'backward classes' was challenged on the ground that
the Government Order violated Article 15(1) read with Article 29 and that
the reservation was not saved by Article 15(4). The High Court held that
B
the Commission had merely enumerated the various persons belonging to
a particular caste as 'backward classes' which was contrary to the decision
of this Court and violative of the constitutional provisions and consequently
struck down the G.O. The Government preferred an appeal before this
Court. Vaidialingam, J. speaking for the Bench has observed:
c
"In the determination of a class to be grouped as backward,
a test solely based upon caste or community cannot be
valid. But, in our opinion, though Directive Principles
contained in Art. 46 cannot be enforced by Courts, Art.
15(4) will have to be given effect to in order to assist the D
weaker sections of the citizens, as the State has been
charged with such a duty. No doubt, we are aware that any
provision made under this clause must be within the well
defined limits and should not be on the basis of caste alone.
But it should not also be missed that a caste is also a class
of citizens and that a caste as such may be socially and E
educationally backward. If after collecting the necessary
data, it is found that the caste as a whole is socially and
educationally backward, in our opinion, the reseNation made
of such persons will have to be upheld notwithstanding the
fact that a few individuals in that group may be both socially F
and educationally above the general average. There is no
gainsaying the fact that there are numerous castes in the
country, which are socially and educationally backward
and, therefore, a suitable provision will have to be made by
the State as charged in Art. 15(4) to safeguard their inter-
est.1' G

(emphasis supplied)

The decisions which we have referred to above support the view that
a caste is also a class of citizens and that if that caste satisfies the requisite H
738 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992J SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Lcsts of backwardness. Lhen the classification of Lhat caste as a backward
class is not opposed to Article 16(4) notwithstanding thal a few individuals
of Lhat caste arc socially and educationally above the general average. I am
in full agreement wiLh the above view.

The composition and terms of reference of the Second Bac.kward
B Classes Commission show that the Commission was appointed to inves-
tigate the conditions of socially and educationally backward classes within
the territory of India but not the socially, economically and eduationally
backward classes. The earlier O.M. issued on 13.8.90 reads that with a view
to providing certain weightage to socially and educationally backward
c classes in the services of the Union and their Public Undertakings, as
recon1mended by the Commission, the orders are issued in the terms
mentioned therein. The said O.M. also explains that "the SEBC would
comprise in the first phase the castes and communities which are common
to both the lists, in the report of the Commission and the State
D Government' list". In addition it is said that list of such castes/communities
is being issued seperately. The subsequent amended O.M. dated 25.9.91
states that in order to enable the 'poorer sections' of the SEBCs to receive
the benefits of reservation on a preferential basis and to provide reserva-
tion for other economically backward sections of the people not covered
by any of the existing schemes of reservation, the Government have decided
E to amend the earlier Memorandum. Thus this amended O.M. firstly speaks
of the 'poorer sections' of the SEBCs and secondly about the economically
backward sections of the people not covered by any of the existing schemes
of reservation. However, both the O.M.s while referring to the SEBCs, do
not include the 'econo1nic backwardness' of that class along with 'social
F and educational backwardness'. By the amended O.M., the Government
while providing reservation for the backward sections of the people not
covered by the existing schemes of reservation meant for SEBCs, classifies
that section of the people as 'economically backward', that is to say that
those backward sections of the people are to be identified only by their
economic backwardness and not by the test of social and educational
G backwardness, evidently for the reason that they are all socially and educa-
tionally well advanced.

Coming to Article 16(4) the words 'backward class' are used with a
wider connotation and without any qualification or explanation. Therefore,
H it must be construed in the wider perspective. Though the OMs speak of
INDRA SAWl-lNEY v_ U.OJ_ [PANDIAN, l[ 739

social and educational backwardness of a class, the pri1nary consideration A
in identifying a class and in ascertaining the inadequate representation of
that class in the services under the State under Article 16( 4) is the social
backwardness which results in educational backwardness, both of which
culminate in economic backwardness. The degree of importance to be
attached to social backwardness is much more than the importance to be
given to the educational backwardness and the economic backwardness,
B
because in identifying and classifying a section of people as a backward
class within the meaning of Article 16(4) for the reservation of appoint-
ments or posts, the 'social backwardness' plays a predominant role.

Ray, CJ. in Jayashree is of the view that "Social backwardness can C
contribute to educational backwardness and educational backwardness
may perpetuate social backwardness. Both are often no more than the
inevitable corollaries of the extremes of poverty and the deadening weigtht
11
of custom and tradition.

The very fact that the Commission itself has given a weightage of 12 D
points to 'social backwardness' and 6 points to 'educational backwardness'
and 4 points to 'economic backwardness' (vide paragraph 11.24 of Chapter
XI) shows in very clear terms that 'social backwardness' is taken as a
predominant factor in ascertaining the backwardness of a class under
Article 16(4). E

In M.R. Ba/aji v. State of Mysore, [1963] Suppl. 1 SCR '139 at page
454 Gajendragadkar, J. observed tha: "economic backwardness might have
contributed to social backwardness ....... " This observation tends to show
that Gajendragadkar, J. was of the view that economic backwardness may
contribute to soicial backwardness. With respect to the learned Judge, I F
am unable to agree with his view.

Desai, J. in Vasanth Kun1ar has expressed a similar view thal if
econoic criterion for compensatory discrimination or affirmative action is
accepted, it would strike at the root cause of "social and educational G
backwardness .......... " thereby holding that only criterion which can be
devised is the 'economic backwardness' for identifying 'socially and educa-
tionally backward classes' ignoring the predominance of social backward~
ness. I am unable to share this above view.

How far the Courts would be competent to identify the 'Backward H
740 SUPREME COURT REPORTS l1992J SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A class' is explained by Chinnappa Reddy, J. in Vasa11th Kumar in the
following words:

We are afraid Courts are not necessarily the most com~
11

pelenl to identify backward classes or to lay down
guidelines for their identification except in broad and very
B gt:ncral way. Wt: an; t:4uippt:<l for; that we have no legal
barometers to measure social backwardness. We are truly
removed from the people, particularly those of the back-
ward classes, by layer upon layer of gradation and degrada-
tion."
c
Let us have a glance over the Report in identifying the 'backward
classes' by testing the same on the touchstone of various established
criteria.

D In Chapter XI of the Report (Volume I part I) under the caption
'Socio-Educational Field Survey and Criteria of Backwardness' it is
categorically stated that after must comprehensive enquiries and survey in
the socio-educational fields with the association and help of top social
scientists and specialists in the country as well as experts from a number
of disciplines, the Commisoion had prepared the "Indicators (Criteria) for
E Social and Educational Backwardness" on the analysis of data and sub-
mitted its report. The relevant paragraphs 11.23, 11.24 and 11.25 showing
the criteria for identification of backwardness are as follows:

"Indicators (Criteria) for Social and Educational Backward-
F ness

11.23 As a result of the above exercise, the Commission
evolved eleven 'Indicators' or 'criteria' for determining
social and educational backwardness. These 11 'Indicators'
were grouped under three broad heads, i.e. Social, Educa-
G tional and Economic. They are:-

A. Social

(i} Castes/Classes considered as socially backward by
H others.
INDRA SAWHNEY ''· U.O.l. [PANDIAN, J.] 741

(ii) Castes/Classes which mainly depend on manual labour A
for their livelihood.

(iii) Castes/Classes where at least 25% females and 10%
males above the State average get married at an age below
17 years in rural areas and at least 10% females and 5%
males <lo so in urban areas. B

(iv) Castes/Classes where participation of females in work
is at least 25% above the State average.

B. Educational
c
(v) Castes/Classes where the number of children in the age
group of 5-15 years

who never attended school is at least 25% above the State
average. D
(vi) Castes/Classes where the rate of student drop-out in
the age group of 5-15 years is at least 25% above the State
average.

(vii) Castes/Classes amongst whom the proportion of E
matriculates is at least 25% below the State average.

C, Economic

(viii) Castes/Classes where the average value of family
assets is at least 25% below the State average. F

(ix) Castes/Classes where the number of families living in
-I Kuccha houses is at least 25% above the State average.

(x) Castes/Classes where the source of drinking water is
beyond half a kilometer for more than 50% of the
G
households.

(xi) Castes/Classes where the number of households having
taken consumption loan is at least 25% above the State
average. H
742 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A 11.24 As the above three groups are not of equal impor-
tance for our purpose, separate weightage was given to
'Indicators' in each group. All the social 'Indicators' were
given a weightage of3 points each, Educational 'Indicators'
a weightage of 2 points each and Economic 'Indicators' a
wightage of one point each. Economic, in addition to Social
B and Educational Indicators, were considered important as
they directly flowed from social and educational backward-
ness. This also helped to highlight the fact that socially and
educationally backward classes are economically backward
also.
c 11.25 It will be seen that from the values given to each
Indicator, the total score adds upto 22. All these 11 In-
dicators were applied to all the castes covered by the survey
for a particular State. As a result of this application, all
castes which had a score of 50 per cent (i.e. 11 points) or
D above were listed as socially and educationally backward
and the rest were treated as 'advanced'. (It is a sheer
coincidence that the number of indicators and minimum
point score for backwardness, both happen to be eleven).
Further, in case the number of households covered by the
E survey for any particular caste were below 20, it was left
out of consideration, as the sample was considered too
small for any dependable inference."

It is crystal clear that the Commission only on the basis of the galaxy
of facts unearthed and rnassive statistics collected it, has made its recom-
F mendations on a very scientific basis of course taki~g 'caste' as the primary
criterion in identifying the backward class in Hindu society and the occupa-
tion as the basis for identifying all those in whose societies, the caste system
is not prevalent.

It is not necessary for a class to be designated as a backward class
G that it should be situated similarly lo the Scheduled Castes and scheduled
Tribes.

Vaidalaingam, J. in Balaram while examining a similar issue after
making reference to the cases of Ba/aji, Chitra/ekha and P. Sagar stated,
H "None of the above decisions lay donw that socially and educationally
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [PANDIAN, J.] 743

backward class must be exactly similar in all respects to that of Scheduled A
Castes and Scheduled Tribes."

Chinnappa Reddy, J. in Vasanth Kumar while dealing with the ob-
servations made in Ba/aji "that the backw.,d classes for whose improve-
ment special provision is contemplated by Article 15(4) are in the matter
ot their backwardness comparable to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled B
Tribes" observed thus:

"There is no point in attempting to detrmine the social
backwardness of other classes by applying the test of near-
ness to the conditions of existence of the Scheduled Castes. C
Such a test would practically nullify the provision for reser-
vation for socially and educationally Backward Classes
other than Scheduled Castes and Tribes."

Criticism levelled against Manda/ Commission Report
D
The learned senior counsel, Mr. N. A. Palkhiwala, Mr. K.K.
Venugopal, Smt. Shyamala Pappu and Mr. P.P. Rao assisted by a battery
of layers appearing for the petitioners condemn the recommendations of
the Commissions on the various grounds. Therefore, it has become un·
avoidable to meet their challenges, it may not be necessary other\\oise to
E
express any opinion on the correctness and adequacy of the exercise done
by the Manda! Commission.

Taking pot-shots at the Manda! Report recommending exclusive
reservation for SEBCs, the belligerent anti-reservationists denigrate the F
report by making scathing criticism and indiscrininately trigger off a volley
of bullets against the Report. The first attack against the Report is that it
is perpetuating the evils of caste system and accentuating caste conscious-
ness besides impeding the doctrine of secularism, the net effect of which
would be dangerous and disastrous for the rapid development of the Indian G
society as a whole marching towards the goal of the welfare state. Accord-
ing to them, the identification of SEBCs by the Commission on the basis
of caste system is bizzare and barren of force) muchless exposing hollow-
ness. Therefore, the OMs issued on the strength of the Manda! Report
which is solely based on the caste criterion are violative of Article 16(2). H

,,
744 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A The above criticism, in my considered view, is very uncharitable and
bereft of the factual position. Hence it has to be straightaway rejected as
unmeritorious since that Report is not actually based solely on caste
criteria but on the anvil of various factors grouped under three heads i.e.
social, educational and economic backwardness but giving more impor-
tance - rightly too - to the social backwardness as having a direct conse-
B quence of caste status.

Adopting the policy of 'Running with the hare and hunting with the
hounds', a conciliatory argument was advanced saying that although it is
necessary to make provisions for providing equality of opportunity in
C matters of public employment 'in favour of any backward class' in terms
of Article 16(4), the present Report based on 1931 census can never serve
a correct basis for identifying the 'backward class', that therefore, a fresh
Commission under Article 340( 1) of the Constitution is required to be
appointed to make a fresh wide survey sumey through out the length and
D breadth of the country and submit a new list of OBCs (other backward
classes) on the basis of the present day Census and that there are million
ways of guaranteeing progress of backward classes and ensuring that it
percolates down the social scale, but the Manda! commission is the one.

E Firstly, in my view if the above argument is accepted it will result in
negation of the just claim of the SEBCs to avail the benefit of Article 16(4)
which is a fundamental right.

Secondly, this attack is based on a misconception. A perusal of the
Report would indicate that the 1931 census does not have been even a
F remote connection with the identification of OBCs. But on the other hand,
they are identified only on the basis on the country-wide socio-educational
field survey and the census report of 1961 particularly for the identification
of primitive tribes, aboriginal tribes, hill tribes, forest tribes and in-
digenous tribes personal knowledge gained through extensive touring and
G receipt of voluminous public evidence and lists of OBCs notified by various
States. It was only after the identification of OBCs, the Commission was
faced with the task of determining their population percentage and at that
stage 1931 census become relevant. It is to be further noted after 1931
census, no caste-wise statistics had been collected. In fact, the identification
H of classes by the Commission was based on the realities prevailing in 1980
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [PANDIAN, J.] 745

and not in 1931. It is brought to our notice that the same method had A
already been adopted in Section 5 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes Order (Amendment) Act, 1976.

Thirdly, the Commission cann\>t be said to have ignored this factual
'• position and found fault with for relying on 1931 census. In fact, this
position is made clear by the Commission itself in Chapter XII of its B
Report, the relevant paragraphs of which read thus:

"12.19 Systematic caste-wise enumeration of population
was introduced by the Registrar General of India in 1881
and discontinued in 1931. In view of this, figures of caste-
wise population beyond 1931 are not available. But assum-
c
ing that the inter se rate of growth of population of various
castes, communities, and religious groups over the last half
a century has remained more or less the same, it is possible
to work out the percentage that all these groups constitute
of the total populatio~ of the country. D

12.10 Working on the above basis, the Commission culled
out caste/community-wise population figures from the cen-
sus records of 1931 and, then grouped them into broad
caste-clusters and religious groups. These collectivities
E
were subsequently aggregated under five major heads i.e.
(i) Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes; (ii) Non-
Hindu communities, Religious Groups, etc.; (iii) Forward
Hindu Castes and Communities; (iv) Backward Hindu
Caste and Communities; and (v) Backward Non-Hindu
Communities . ..................................... n F

In Balaram, wherein a similar argument was addressed, this Court
after going through the Re.port of the Backward Classes Commission of
the State of Andhra Pradesh, felt the difficulty of the non-availability of the
Caste-wise statistics after 1931 census and pointed out that in Andhra, the G
figures of 1921 census were available and in Telangana area, 1931 census
of caste-wise statistics was available.

In the background of the above discussion, the anti-reservationists
cannot have any legitimate grievance and justifiabl) demand this Court to
throw the Report over-board on the mere ground that 1931 census had H
746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1!992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A been taken into consideration by the Commission.
As pointed out by this Court in Ba/ara1n that no conclusions can
always be scientifically accurate in such matters. If at all the atlack per-

.
petrated on the Report renders any remedy to the anti-reservationists, it
would be only for the purpose of putting the Report in cold storage as has
B '
happened to the Report of the First Backward Classes Commission.

Therefore, for the aforementioned reasons, I hold that the above
submission made against the Report with reference to the consideration of
Census of 1931 cannot be conuntenanced.

c After having gone through the Commission's Report very assiduously
and punctiliously, I am of the firm view that the Commission only after
deeply considering the social, educational and economic backwardness of
various classes of citizens of our country in the light of the various proposi-
tions and tests laid down by this Cour• had submitted its Report enumerat-
D ing various classes of persons who are to be treated as OBCs. The
recommendations made in the present Report after a long lull since the
submission of the Report by the First Backward Classes Commission are
supportive of affirmative action programmes holding the members of the
historically disadvantaged groups for centuries to catch up with the stand-
E ards of competition set up by a well advanced society.

As a matter of fact, the Report wanted to reserve 52% of all the posts
in the Central Government for OBCs commensurate with their ratio in the
population. However, in deference to legal limitation it has recommended
a reservation of 27% only even though the population of OBCs is almost
F twice this figure.

Yet another argument on behalf of the anti-reservationsits was ad-
dressed contending that if the recommendations of the Commission are
implemented, it would result in the sub-standard replacing the standard
G . and the reins of power passing from meritocracy to mediocrity; that the
upshot will be in demoralization and discontent and that it would revitalize
.caste.system, and cleave the nation into two - forward and backward - and
open up new vistas for internecine conflict and fissiparous forces, and make
backwardness a v~ted interest.

H The above tortuous line of reasoning, in my view is not only illogical,
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [PANDIAN, .!.] 747

inconceivable, unreasonable and unjustified but also utterly overlooks the A
stark grim reality of the SEBCs suffering from social stigma and ostracim
in the present day scenario of hierarchical caste system. The very object of
Article 16(4) is to ensure equality of opportunity in matters of public
employment and give adequate representation to those who have been
• placed in a very discontent position from time immemorial on account of
sociological reasons. To put it differently, the purpose of clause (4) is to
B
ensure the benefits flowing from the fountain of this clause on the
beneficiaries - namely the Backward Classes - who in the opinion of the
Constitution makers, would have otherwise found it difficult to enter into
public services, competing with advanced classes and who could not be
kept in limbo until they are benefited by the positive action schemes and C
who have suffered and are still suffering from historic disabilities arising
from past discrimination or disadvantage or both. However, unfortunately
all of them had been kept at bay on account of various factors, operating
against them inclusive of poverty. They continue to be deprived of enjoy-
ment of equal opportunity in matters of public employment despite there D
being sufficient statistical evidence in proof of manifest imblance in
Government jobs which evidence is sufficient to support an affirmative
action plan. If candidates belonging to SEBCs (characterised as mediocre
by anti-reservationists), are required to enter the open field competition,
along with the candidates belonging to advanced communities without any
preferential treatment in public Services in their favour and go through a E
rigid test mechanism being the highly intelligence test and professional
ability test as conditions of employment, certainly those conditions wonld
operate as 11built-in headwinds11 for SEBCs. It is, therefore, in order to
achieve equality of employment opportunity, clause 4 of Article 16 em-
powers the State to provide permissible reservation to SEBCs in the F
matters of appointments or posts as a remedy so as to set right the manifest
imbalance in the field of public employment.

The argument that the implementation of the recommendations of
the Commission would result in demoralisation and discontent has no merit
because conversely can it not be said that the non- implementation of the G
recommendalions would result in demoralisation and discontent among the
SEBCs.

Though 'equal protection' clause prohibits the State from making
unreasonable discrimination in providing prefere.nces and facilities for any H
748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A section of its people, nonetheless it requires the State to afford substantially
equal opportunities to those, placed unequally.

The basic policy of reservation is to off-set the ino4uality and remove
the manifest imbalance, the victims of which for bygone generations lag far
behind and demand equality by special preferences and their strategies.
B Therefore, a comprehensive methodological approach encompassing
jurisprudential, comparative, historical and anthropological conditions is
necessary. Such considerations raise controversial issues transcenting the
routine legal exercise because certain social groups who are inherently
unequal and who have fallen victims of societal discrimination require
c compensatory treatment. Needless to emphasise that equality in fact or
substantive equality involves the necessity of beneficial treatment in order
to attain the result which establishes an equilibrium between two sections
placed unequally.

It is more appropriate to recall that ''There is equality only among
D equals and to equate unequals is to perpetuate inequality."

Therefore, the submission that the implementation of the recommen-
dations of the Report will curtail concept of equality as enshrined under
Article 14 of the Constitution and destroy the basic structure of the
Constitution, cannot be countenanced.
E
One of the arguments criticising the Report is that the said Report
virtually rewrites the Constitution and in effect buries 50 fathoms deep the
ideal of equality and that if the recommendations are given effect to and
implemented, the efficiency of administration will come to a grinding halt.
F This submission is 'tantamount to saying that the reservation of 27% to
SEBCs as per the impugned OMs is opposed to the concept of equality.

There is no question of rewriting the Constitution, because the
Commission has acted only under the authority of the notification issued
G by the President. It has after laying down the parameters in the light of the
various pronouncements of this Court has ultimately submitted its Report
recommending the reservation in tune with the spirit of Article 16(4).

The question whether the candidates, belonging to the SEBCs should
be given a preferential treatment in matters of public employment to such
H time as it is necessary, receives a fitting reply in Devadasan wherein Subba
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.l. [PAND!AN. J.] 749

Rao, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was) has observed, by citing an A
illustration as to how the manifest imbalance and inequality will occur
otherwise, thus:

' To make my point clear, take the illustration of a horse
1

race. Two horses are set down to run a race - one is a first
class race horse and the other an ordinary one. Both arc B
made to run from the same starting point. Though theoreti-
cally they are given equal opportunity to run the race, in
practice the ordinary horse is not given an equal oppor-
tunity to compete with the race horse. Indeed that is denied
to it. So a handicap may be given either in the nature of
extra weight or a start from a longer distance. By doing so,
c
what would otherwise have been a farce of a competition
would be made a real one. The same difficulty had con-
fronted the makers of the Constitution at the time it was
made. Centuries of calculated oppression and habitual
submission reduced a considerable section of our com- D
munity to a life of serfdom. It would be well nigh impossible
to raise their standards if the doctrine of equal opportunity
was strictly enforced in their case. They would not have any
chance if they were made to enter the open field of com-
petition without adventitious aids till such time when they E
could stand on their own legs. That is why the makers .of
the constitution introduced Cl. (4) in Article 16."

It will be befitting, in my opinion, to extract a passage from the book,
Bakke, Defunis and Minority Admissions (The Quest for Equal Opportunity)
by Allan P. Sindler wherein at page 9, the unequal competition is explained F
by an analogy which is as follows:

A good way to appreciate the 11 something more 11 quandary
11

is to consider the metaphor of the shackled runner, an
analogy frequently advanced by spokesmen for minorities:
G
'Imagine two runners at the starting line, readying
for the I 00-yeard dash. One has his legs shackled,
the other not. The gun goes off and the race begins.
Not surprisingly, the unfettered runner immedi-
ately takes the lead and then rapidly increases the H
750 SUPREMF. COURT REPORTS l!992J SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A distance between himself and his shackled competi-
tion. Before the finish line is crossed, over the
judging official blows his whistle, calls off the con-
test on the grounds that the unequal conditions
between the runners made it an unfair competition,
and orders removal of the shackles.'
B
Surely few would deny that pitting a shackled runner
against an unshackled one is inequitable and does not
provide equality of opportunity. Hence, cancelling the race
and freeing the disadvantaged runner of his shackles seem
c altogether apporpriate. Once beyond thi> point, however,
agreement fades rapidly. The key question becomes: what
should be done so that the two runners can resume the
contest on a basis of fair competition? Is it enough after
removing the shackles, to place both runners back at the
starting point? Or is "something more11 needed, and if so,
D what? Should the rules of the running be altered, and if so, '
how? Should the previously shackled runner be given a
compensatory edge, or should the other runner be handi-
capped in some way? How much edge or handicap?"

To one of the queries posed by the author of the above analogy, the
E
proper reply would be that even if the shackles whether of iron chains or
silken cord, .are removed and the shackled person has become unfettered,
he must be given a compensatory adge until he realises that there is no
more shackle on his legs because even after the removal of shackles he
does not have sufficient courage to compete with the runner who has been
F all along unfettered.

Mr. Ram Awadesh Singh, an intervener demonstrably explained that
as unwatered seeds do not germinate, unprotected backward class citizens
will wither away.

G The above illustration and analogies would lead to a conclusion that
there is an ocean of difference between a well advanced class and a
backward class in a race of open competition in the matters of public
employment and they, having been placed unequally, cannot be measured
by the same yardstick. As repeatedly pointed out, it is only in order to make
H the unequals equal, this constitutional provision, namely, clause (4) of
INDRA SAWHNEY ''· U.0.1. [PANDIAN, J.] 751

Article 16 has been designed and purposely introduced providing some A
preferential treatment to the backward class. It is only in case of denial of
such preferential treatment, the very concept of equality as enshrined in
the Constitution, will get buried 50 fathoms deep.

A programme of reservation may sacrifice merit but does not in any
way sacrifice competence because the beneficiaries under Article 16( 4) B
have to possess the requisite basic qualifications and eligibility and have to
compete among themselves though not with the mainstream candidates.

As Chinnappa Reddy, J. in Vasanth Kumar has rightly observed,
Always one hears the word 'efficiency' as if it is sacrosanct and the
11

sanctorum has to be fiercely guarded. 'Efficiency' is not a mantra which is
c
whispered by the Guru in the Sishya's ear."

In yet another context, in the same decision, the learned Judge at
page 394 has firmly aud irrefutably put the merit argument at rest stating
thus: D
"The real conflict is between the class of people, who have
never been in or who have already moved out of the desert
of poverty, illiteracy and backwardness and are entrenched
in the oasis of convenient living and those who are still in
the desert and want to reach the oasis, There is no enough
E
fruit in the garden and so those who are in, want to keep
out those who are out. The disastrous consequences of the
so-called meritarian principle to the vast majority of the
under-nourished, poverty-stricken, barely literate and vul-
nerable people of our country are too obvious to be stated. F
And, what is merit? There is no merit in a system which
brings about such consequences. n

Be that as it may, the intelligence, merit, ability, competence,
meritocracy, administrative efficiency and achievement cannot be G
measured by skin-pigmentation or by the surname of an individual indicat-
ing his caste.

In this regard, the observation of Subba Rao, J. in Devadasan at page
706 may be recapitulated, which to some extent answers the doubt raised
by a section of anti-reservationists that reservation will result in deteriora- H
752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A tion in the standard of service. The said observation reads as follows:

"If the provision deals with reservation - which I hold it
does - I do not see how it will be bad because there will be
some deterioration in the standard of service. It is in-
evitable in the nature of reservation that there will be
B
lowering of standards to some extent; but on that account
the provision cannot be said to be bad. Indeed, the State
laid down the minimum qualifications and all the appoint-
ments were made from those who had the said qualifica-
tions. How far the efficiency of the administrations suffers
c by this provision is not for me to say, but it is for the State,
which is certainly interested in the maintenance of stand-
ards of its administration."

Submission on the theory of past discrimination based on the decisions of
D the Supreme Court of United States

Based on certain American decisions, it has been urged that only that
group or ~ection of people suffering from the lingering effects of past
discrimination can be classified as 'backward classes' and not others. This
E submission has to be mentioned for being simply rejected for more than
one reason. Even today, the caste discrimination is very much prevalent in
India particularly in the rural areas. Secondly, even among the Judges of
the Supreme Court of United States, there is a division of opinion on the
theory of lingering effects of past discrimination. Thirdly, this theory cannot
F be imported to the Indian conditions where the Hindu society even today
is suffering from the firm grip of discrimination based on caste system. The
vastness and richness of the materials unearthed by the various Commis-
sions inclusive of States' Commissions unambiguously and pellucidly reveal
that in our country, representation of the SEBCs in the services under the
State is grossly inadequate when compared to the representation of the
G advanced class of citizens, leave apart the complete absence of reservation
for SEBCs in the Central Services. This inadequate representation is not
confined to any specific section of the people, but all those who fall under
the group of social backwardness whether they are Shudras of Hindu
community or similarly stituated other backward classes of people in other
H communities, namely, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians etc.
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [PANDIAN, J.] 753

Drawing strength on the opinion of Powell, J in Regents of the A
University of California v. Allan Bakke, 57 L Ed 2d 750, an argument has
been advanced that Article 16 (1) permits only preferences but not reser-
vations. In the above Bakke's case, a white male who had been denied
admission to the medical school at the University of California at Davis for
two consecutive years, instituted an action for declaratory and injunctive
relief against the Regents of the University in the Superior Court of Yolo B
County, California alleging the invalidity under the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, a provision of the California Constitution,
and the prescription in racial discrimination in any programme receiving
federal financia1 assistance of the medical school's special admissions
programme. The Supreme Court announced its decision amid confusion c
and controversy. There was no clear majority, but a three-way split namely
four Judges took one view and four other Judges took a different view,
leaving Justice Powel straddling the middle. In their joint opinion partially
concurring and partially dissenting, Justices Brennan, White, Marshal and
Blackmun took issue with Powell's conclusion that the Davis programme D
11
was unconstitutional and said, We cannot ... let color blindness become
myopia which masks the reality that many 'created equal' have been treated
within our lifetimes as inferior both by the law and by their fellow citizens."

Attention was also drawn to Defunis v. Charles Odeguard [1974] 40
L. Ed. 2nd 164. E
The analytical study of American cases shows that the American-
style justification of positive discrimination is on the ground of utility
whereas the Indian-style justification is on the ground of constitutional
rights. Therefore, the decision in relation to a racial discrimination relating
to an admission to the medical school cannot be of much assistance in the F
matter of identification of 'backward classes' falling under Article 16 (4).
The dicta in Bakke and Defunis is one akin to the principle covered under
Article 15 (4) and not under Article 16 (1). or 16 (4).

Whether Article 16 (4) is an exception to Articles 16 (1) and (2)?
G
Mr Parasaran, the learned senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the
Union of India articulated that articles 16(4) and 335 are so worded as to
give a wide latitude to the State in the matter of reservation and that Article
16(4) having no-obstante clause reading "Nothing in this Article shall
prevent the State from making any provision ..... " has an over-riding effect H
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A on Article 16(2).

In support of the above argument based on the non-obstante clause,
much reliancio was placed on various decisions, namely, (1) Punjab Province
v. Dau/at Singh & Others, 1942 F.C.R. 67 at 87 and 88; (2) Orient Paper and
B Industries Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1991 SC 672 at 677 and 678; (3) In
re. Hatschek's Patents 1909 Chancery Division Vol. II 68 at 82 and 85 and
(4) Hari Vishnu Karnath v. Syed Ahmed Ishaque and others, [1955] 1 SCR
1104 at 1121.

Yet another argument placing reliance on Triloki Nath's case (I)
C (supra) was advanced contending that Article 16(4) is an enabling
provision conferring a discretionary power on the State to make a reserva-
tion of appointments in favour of backward cla5' of citizens. Placing
reliance on the view expressed by Wanchoo, J. (as the learned Chief Justice
then was) in General Manager, Southern Railways v. Rangachari, [1962) 2
D SCR 586 it was further urged that Article 16( 4) which is in the nature of
an exception or proviso to Article 16(1) cannot nullify equality of oppor-
tunity guaranteed to all citizens by that article.
!'
In my view, that clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Article
16 (1) and (2) but it is an enabling provision and permissive in character
E overriding Article 16 (1) and (2); that it is a source of reservation for
appointments or posts in the Services so far as the backward class of
citizens is concerned and that under clause (1) of Article 16 reservation
for appointments or posts can be made to other sections of the society such
as physically handicapped etc.
F
There is complete unanimity of judicial opinion of this Court that
under Article 16( 4) the State can make adequate provisions for reserva-
tions of appointments of posts in favour of any backward class of citizens, •
if in the opinion of the State such 'backward class' is not adequately
represented in the State. In fact in B. Venkataramana v. State of Madras
G AIR 1951 SC 229 a seven Judges Bench of this Court held that "reservation
of posts in favour of any backward class of citizens cannot, therefore, be
regarded as unconstitutional". Not a single decision of this Court has cast
slightest shadow of doubt on the constitutional validity of reservation.
fhcrcforc, in view of the above position of law. I am not inclined to embark
H upon an elaborate disCll';.sion on this question any further.

"""'I
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.l. [PANDIAN, l.] 755

Whether Reservation under Article 16 (4) can be made by Executive A
Order?

The next submission that the provision for reservation of appoint-
ments or posts under Article 16 (4) can be made only by a legislation and
not by an executive order is unsustainable. This contention as a matter of
fact has already been answered in (I) Ba/aji (supra) and (2), Comptroller B
& Auditor General v. Mohan Lal Mehrotra, [1992] 1 SCC 20.

In passing, it may be stated that this Court while reversing the
judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in favour of the appellant
State of Punjab v. Hirata Lal and Ors. (1971] 3 SCR 267 upheld the C
reservation which was made not by a legislation but by an
executive order.
See also Mangat Singh v. Punjab State Police, AIR 1968 Punjab 306.

Agreeing with the reasonings of Ba/aji, I hold that the prO\ision or
reservation in the "Services under the State" under Article 16 (4) can be D
made by an executive order.

Whether the power confe"ed under Art. 16 (4) is coupled with duty?

Mr. K. Parasaran put forth an argument that the enabling power
conferred under Article 16 (4) is intended for the benefit of the 'backward E
classes of citizens' who in the opinion of the State are not adequately
represented in the Services under the State and that the power is one
coupled with a duty and, therefore, has to be exercised by the state for the
benefit of those for whom it is intended. Reference was made to H. WR.
Wade Administrative Law v. Edn. Pages 228 and 229. Halsbury's Laws of F
England W Edn. Vol. V paras page 34 para 27 and page 35 para 29. He adds
that the duty caused on the State is to be exercised in keeping with the
directive principles laid down under Article 46 to promote with special
~are the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the
people and, in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled
Tribes and to protect them from social injustice and all other forms of G
exploitation. In this connection, attention was drawn to a few decisions of
this Court, namely, ( 1) Chief Controlling Revenue Authority v. Maharashtra
Sugar Mills Ltd., [1950] SCR 536; (2) Official Liquidator v. Dharti Dhan 964;
(3) Delhi Administration v. l.K. nangia (1980] 1 SCR 1016; and (4)"
Jaganathan (supra). H
756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Whether formation of opinion by State is subjective?

The expression "in the opinion of the State" would mean the formation
of opinion by the State which is purely a subjective process. It cannot be
c~allenged in a Court on the grounds of propriety, reasonableness and
sufficiency though such an opinion is required to be formed on the subjec-
B tive satisfaction of the Government whether the identified 'backward class
of citizens' are adequately represented or not in the Services under 'the
State. But for drawing such requisite satisfaction, the existence of cir-
cumstances relevant to the formation of opinion is a sine quo non. If the
opinion suffers from the vice of non-application of mind or formulation of
C collateral grounds or beyond the scope of Statute, or irrelevant and ex-
traneous material then that opinion is challengeable. See ( 1) Dr. N.B. Khare
v. The State of Delhi, (1950] SCR 519; (2) Govindji v. Municipal Corpora-
tion, Ahmedabad, (1957] Bom. 147; (3) Virendra v. The State of Punjab and
Another [1958] SCR 308; (4) The Barium Chemicals Ltd. and Anr. v. The
Company Ltd. Board and Others, (1966] Suppl. SCR 311 and (5) Rohtas
D Industries v. S.D. Agarwal and Others (1%~] 1 SCC 325.

In the present case, nothing is shown that the opinion of the Govern-
ment as regards the inadequacy of representation in the Services is vitiated
on any of the grounds mentioned above.
E Whether the policy of Government can be subjected to judicial review:

The action of the Government in making provision for the reserva-
tion of appointments or posts in favour of any 'backward class of citizens'
is a matter of policy of the Government. What is best for the 'backward class'
F and in what manner the policy should be formulated and implemented
bearing in mind the object to be achieved by such reservation is a matter
for decision exclusively within the province of the Government and such
matters do not ordinarily attract the power of judicial review or judicial
interference except on the grounds which are well settled by acatena of
decisions of this Court. Reference may be made to (1) Hindustan Zinc v.
G A.P. State Electricity Board (1991] 3 SCC 299; (2) Sitaram Sugars v. Union
of India and Others [1990] 3 SCC 233; (3) D.C.M. v. S. Paramjit Singh,
[1990] 4 SCC 723; (4) Minerva Talkies v. State of Kamataka and Others,
1988 Suppl SCC 176; (5) State of Kamataka v. Ranganath Reddy, [1978] 1
SCR 641; (6) Kerala State Electricity Board v. S.N. Govind Prabhu, (1986]
H 4 SCC; (7) Prag Ice Company v. Union of India and Others, (1978] 2 SCC
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.l. [PANDIAN, J.] 757

459; (8) Sara.swati Industries Syndicate Ltd. v. Union of India, [1975] 1 SCR A
956; (9) Murti Match Works v. Assistance Collector, Central Excise and
Others, [1974] 3 SCR 121; ( 10) 1. Govindraja Mudaliar v. State of Tamil
Nadu and Others, [1973] 3 SCR 222: and ( 11) Narender Kumarv. Union of
India and Others, (1969] 2 SCR 375.

To what eJ.tent can the reservation be niade? B

The next baffling question relates to the permissible extent of reser-
vation in appointments.

It was for the first time that this Court in Balaji has indicated broadly
that the reservation should be less than 50% and the question how much C
less than 50% would depend on the relevant prevailing circumstances in
each case. Though in Balaji, the issue in dispute related only to the
reservation prescribed for admissions in the medical college from the
educationally and socially backward classes, scheduled casted and
scheduled tribes as being violative of Article 15 (4), this Court after D
expressing its view that it should be less than 50% observed further that
"the provisions of Article 15 (4) are similar to those of Article 16 (4) ........... .
Therefore, what is true in regard to Article 15 (4) is equally true in regard
to Article 16 (4) .............. reservation made under Article 16 (4) beyond the
permissible and legitimate limits would be liable to be challenged as a fraud
on the Constitution." This decision has gone further holding that the E
reservation of 68% seats made in that case was offending Article 15 ( 4) of
the Constitution. To say in other words, Balaji has fixed that the maximum
limit of reservation all put together should not exceed 50% and if it
exceeds, it is nothing but a fraud on the Constitution. Even at the threshold,
I may emphatically state that I am unable to agree with the proposition F
fixing the reservation for SEBCs at 50% as the maximum limit.

Mr. Jethmalani strongly articulated that the observation in Ba/aji that
reservation under Article 16 (4) should not be beyond 50% is only an obiter
dicta since that question did not at all arise for consideration in that case.
Therefore, according to him, this observation is not a law declared by the G
Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. He
continued to state that unfortunately some of the subsequent decision have
mistakenly held as if the question of permissible limit has been settled in
Balaji while, in fact, the view expressed in it was an obiter dicta. According
to him, the policy of reservation is in the nature of affirmative action, firstly H
758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A to eliminate the past inhuman discrimination and secondly to ameliorate
the sufferings and reverse the genetic damage so that the people belonging
lo 'back¥<ard class' can be uplifted. When it is the main objective of clause
(4) of Article 16 any limitation on reservation would defeat the very
purpose of this Article falling under Fundamental Rights and, therefore,
reservation if the circumstances so warrant can go even uplo 100%.
B
This view of Mr. Jethmalani has been fully supported by Mr. Siva
Subramaniam appearing on behalf of the State of Tamil Nadu who poin-
tedly referred to the speech of the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu made in
the Chief Ministers' Conference held on 10th April 1992 and produced a
C copy of the printed speech of the Chief Minister, issued by the Government
of Tamil Nadu as an annexure to the written submission. It is seen from
the said annexure that the Chief Minister has categorically emphasised the
stand of the Government of Tamil Nadu stating that the total reservation
for back.vard classes, scheduled castes and scheduled tribes is 69%; that it
D is but fair and proper that socially and educationally backward classes
{alone) as a whole should be given at least 50% reservation for employment
opportunities in Central Government services and its undertakings as well
as for admission in educational institutions run by the Central Government.
It has also been pointed out that in consonance with this avowed policy,
the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly passed unanimously a resolution on
E 30.9.1991 urging the Government of India to adopt a policy of 50%
reservation for the Backward Classes instead of 27% and to apply this
reservation not only for employment opportunities in all Central Govern-
ment departments and Public Sector Undertakings, but also for admission
in all Educational Institutions run by the Central Government.
F
Mr. Rajiv Dhawan appearing in W.P. No. 1094/91 submits that the
limits to the reservation in Article 16 (4) cannot be fixed on percentage
but it must be with the ulterior objective of achieving adequate repre-
sentation for 'backward classes'.

G I m: much force in the above submissions and hold that any reser-
vation in ex~ess of 50% for 'backward classes' will not be violative of
Articles 14 and/or 16 of the Constitution. But at the same time, I am of the
view that such reservations made either under Article 16 (4) or under
Article 16 {1) and (4) cannot be extended to the totality of 100%. In fact,
H my learned brother, P.B. Sawant, J in his separate judgment has also
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.L [PANDIAN, J.] 759

expressed a similar view that "there is no legal infirmity in keeping the A
reservations under clause (4) alone or under clause (4) and clause (1) of
Article 16 together exceeding 50 per cent" though for other reasons the
learned Judge has concluded that ordinarily the reservations kept under
Article 16 (1) and 16 (4) together should not exceed 50% of the appoint-
ments in a cadre or service in any particular yt-ar, but for extraordinary
reasons this percentage may be exceeded. My learned brother, B.P. Jeevan
B
Reddy, J in his separate judgment has expressed his view that in given
circumstances, ~ome relaxation in the strict rule of reservation may become
imperative and added that in doing so extreme caution is to be exercised
and a special case made out.
c
As to what extent the proportion of reservation will be so excessive
as to render it bad must depend upon adequacy of representation in a given
case. Therefore, the decisions fixing the percentage of reservation only
upto the maximum. of 50% are unsustainable. The percentage of reserva-
tion at the maximum of 50% is neither based on scientific data nor on any
established and agreed formula. In fact, Article 16 (4) itself does not limit D
the power of the Government in making the reservation to any maximum
pecentage; but it depends upon the quantum of adequate representation
required in the Services. In this context, it would be appropriate to recall
some of the decisions of this Conrt, not agreeing with Balaji as regards the
fixation of percentage of reservation. E

The question of percentage of reservation was examined in Thomas
wherein Fazal Al~ J not agreeing with Balaji has observed thus:

"..................... clause (4) of Art. 16 does not fix any limit on F
the power of the Government to make reservation. Since
clause (4) is a part of Art. 16 of the Constitution it is
manifest that the State cannot be allowed to indulge in
excessive reservation so as to defeat the policy contained
in Article 16 (1). As to what would be a suitable reservation
within permissible limits will depend upon the facts and G
circumstances of each case and no hard and fast rule can
be laid down, nor can this matter be reduced to a mathe-
matical formula so as to be adhered to in all cases. Decided
cases of this Court have no doubt laid that.the percentage
of reservation should not exceed 50%. As I read the H
760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A authorities, this is, however, a rule of caution and does not
exhaust all categories. Suppose for instance a State has a
large number of backward classes of citizens which con-
stitute 80% of the population and the Government, in order
to give them proper representation, reserves 80% of the
jobs for them, can it be said that the percentage of reser-
B vation is bad and violates the permissible limits of clause
(4) of Article 16? The answer must necessarily be in the
negative. The dominant object of this provision is to take
steps to make in adequate representation adequate.''

C Krishna Iyer, J in the same decision has agreed with the above view
of Fazal Ali, J stating that "... the arithmetical limit of 50% in any one year
set by some earlier rullings cannot perhaps be pressed too far."

Though Mathew, J did not specifically deal with this maximum limit
of reservation, nevertheless the tenor of his judgment indicates that he did
D not favour 50% rule.

Chinnappa Reddy, J in Karamchari case [1981] 2 SCR 185 (supra)
has expressed his view on the ceiling of reservation as follows:

"...... There is no fixed ceiling to reservation or preferential
E
treatment in favour of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes though generally reservation may not be far in excess
of fifty percent. There is no rigidity about the fifty percent
rule which is only a convenient guideline laid down by
Judges. Every case must be decided with reference to the
F present practical results yielded by the application of the
particular rule of preferential treatment and not with ref-
erence to hypothetical results which the application of the
rule may yield in the future. Judged in the light of this
di>cussion I am unable to find anything illegal or uncon-
stitutional in any one of the impugned orders and cir-
G
culars ....... "

Again in Vasanth Kumar, Chinnappa Reddy, J reiterates his view
taken in Karamchari in the following words:

H '1We must repeat here, what we have said earlier, that there
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [PANDIAN, J.] 761

is no scientific statistical data or evidence of expert ad- A
ministrators who have made any study of the problem to
support the opinion that reservation in excess of 50 per
cent may impair efficiency. 11

I fully share the above views of Fazal Ali, Krishna Iyer, Chinnappa
Reddy, JJ holding that no maximum percentage of reservation can be B
justifiably fixed under Articles 15 (4) and/or 16 (4) of the Constitution.

It should not be out of place to recall the observation of Hegde, J in
Hira Lal observing," The extent of reservation to be made is primarily a
matter for the State to decided. By this we do not mean to say, that the C
decision of the State is not open to judicial review......... The length of the
leap to be provided depends upon the gap to be covered." (emphasis sup-
• plied)

Desai, J in Vasanth Kumar expressed his view that in dealing with
the question of reservation in favour of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled D
Tribes as well as other SEBCs 'Judiciary retained its traditional blindfold
on its eyes and thereby ignored perceived realities."

Whether the further arbitrary classification as 'poorer sections' from and out
of the identified SEBCs is pennissib/e under Article 16 (4) after acceptance E
and approval of the list without reseNation and whether such classification
suffers from non-application of mind?

The most important pivotal and crucial issue that I would now like
to ponder over relates to the intent of para 2 (i) of the OM dated 25th
September 1991 whereunder it is declared that 'Within the 27% of the F
vacancies in civil posts and services under the Government of India

-
reserved for SEBCs, preference will be given to the candidates belonging to
the poorer sections of the SEBCs. In case sufficient number of such can-
didates are not available, r:nfilled vacancies shall be filled by the other
SEBC candidates". (emphasis supplied)
G
To say in other words, the Government intends to prescribe an
income cPling for determination of 'poorer sectio11s' of the SEBCs who
will be eligible to avail of the preference of reservation of appointments or
posts in the Services under the State. It is an admitted fact that the
Government so far has not laid down any guideline or test for identifying H
762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992( SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A and ascertaining the 'poorer sections' among the identified SEBCs.

The OM has specifically used the expression, 'poorer seL:tior:s' but
not 'weaker sections' as contemplated under Article 46 of the Constitution.
Though the expressions 'poorer sections' and 'weaker sections' may con-
note in general 'the disadvantaged position of a section of the people' they
B do not convey one and the same meaning and they are not synonymous.
When the OM deliberately uses the expression 'pooer sections', it has
become incumbent to examine what that expression means and whether
there can be any sub-classification as 'poorer' and 'non-poorer' among the
same category of potential backward class of citizens on the anvil of
c economic criterion.

The word 'poor' lexically means "having little or no money, goods or •
other means of support" {Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary)
or "lacking financial or other means of subsistence" (Collins English Dic-
D tionary).

The OM uses the expression 'poorer' in its comparative term for the
word 'poor'. It is common knowledge that the superlative term for the word
'poor' is 'poorerst'. The very usage of the word 'poorer' is in comparison
with the positive word 'poor'. Therefore, it, necessarily follows that the OM
E firstly considers all the identified SEBCs in general as belonging to 'poor
sections' from and out of which the 'poorer sections' are to be culled out
by applying a test to be yet formulated by the Government evidently on
economic criterion or by application of poverty test based on the ceiling of
income. After the segregation of 'poorer sections' of the SEBCs, the left
F out would be the 'poor sections'. By the use of the word 'poorer', the
Government is super-imposing a relative poverty test for identifying and
determining a preferential class among the identified SEBCs. It is stated
that the preference will be given first to the 'poorer sections' and only in
case there are unfilled vacancies, those vacancies will be filled by the left
out SEBCs, namely, those other than the poorer sections. In other words,
G it means that all the identified SEBCs do not belong to affluent sections
but to poor and poorer sections, that the expression 'poorer sections'
denotes only the economically weaker sections of SEBCs compared with
the remaining same category of SEBCs and that those, other than the
'poorer sections' although socially and educationally backward are
H economically·better off compared with the 'poorer sections'. The view that
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [PANDIAN, J.J 763

all the identified SEBCs are considered as 'poor' or 'poorer' is fortified by A
the fact that there is an inbuilt explanation in the amended OM itself to
the effect that those who do not fall within the category of 'poorer sections'
also will be entitled for the benefit of reservation but of course subject to
the availability of unfilled vacancies.

An argument was advanced that for identifying 'poorer sections', the. B
'means test' signifying an imposition of outer income limit shuuld be
applied and those who are above the cut off income limit should be
excluded so that the better off sections of the SEBCs may be prevented
from taking the benefit earmarked for the less fortunate brethren! and the
only genuine and truly members of 'poorer sections' of SEBCs may avail C
the benefit of reservation. In support of this argument, an attempt has been
made to draw strength on two decisions of this Court rendered inlayashree
and Vasanth Kumar.

Chief Justice Ray in Jayashree seems to have been inclined to take
the view that reservation of seats in educational institutions should not be D
allowed to be enjoyed by the rich people suffering from the same com-
munal disabilities.

Chinnappa Reddy, J in Vasanth Kumar recognises this 'means test'
saying that "an upper income ceiling would secure the benefit of reservation
E
to such of those members of the class who really deserved it", with which
view Venkataramiah, J (as the learned Chief Justice than was) has agreed.

Thus the above argument based on 'means test' though seems to be
plausible at the first sight is, in my opinion, not well founded and must be
rejected on the ground that the identified category of SEBCs, having F

-
common characteristics or attributes - namely the potential sc>cial back-
wardness cannot be bisected or further classified by applying the economic
or poverty test.

A doubt has been created as to whether the word 'poorer' connotes G
economic status or social status or is to be understood in any other wuy.

The word 'poorer' when examined in the context in which it is
deployed both syntact<cally and etymologically, in my view, may not convey
any other meaning except relative poverty or comparative economic status.
If any other meaning is imported which the government evidently appears H

.J
764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.K.

A to have not contemplated, virtually one will be rewriting the second OM.
An order of a Constitution Bench dated 1st October 1991 dearly
spells out that that Bench was of the view that 'poorer sections' are to be
identified by the economic criterion. The relevant portion of the above
Order reads as follows:
B
"The matters are adjounred to 31st October 1991 when
learned Additional Solicitor General will tell us how and
when Government would be able to give the list of the
economic criteria referred to in the notification of 25th
September 1992."
c
(emphasis supplied)

The same view is reflected in a subsequent Order dated 4th Decem-
ber 1991 made by this nine-Judges Bench, the relevant part of which reads
D thus:

"Learned Additional Solicitor General states that the
Government definitely expects to be able to fix the
economic criteria by January 28, 1992.................... As far as
the question of stay granted by us earlier is concerned, we
E see no reason to pass any order at this stage as the petitions
are posted for hearing on January 28, 1992 and in view of
the economic criterion not being yet determined and other
relevant circumstances, no question of immediate 1m~
plementation of the notification arises."

F (emphasis supplied)

G
The above Orders of this Court support my view that the Govern-
ment has to identify the 'poorer sections' only by the economic criteria or
by the application of poverty test otherwise called 'means test'. It appears
that this Court has all along been given to understand that 'poorer sections'
-
will be tested by the Government on economic criterion.

The above view is further fortified by the very fact that the second
OM providing 10% of the reservation 'for economically backward sections
of the people not covered by any other scheme of the reservation' indicates
H that the Government has taken only the economic criteria in making the
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.l. [PANDIAN, J.] 765

classification of the various sections of the people (emphasis supplied). A
Therefore, I proceed on the basis that the second OM identifies the 'poorer
sections' only on the basis of economic status.

When the 'means test' is analysed in depth so as to explore its merits
and demerits, one would come to an inevitable conclusion that it is not a
decisive test but on the other hand it will serve as a protective umbrella B
for many to get into this segregated section by adopting all kinds of illegal
and unethical methods. Further, this test will be totally unworkable and
impracticable in the determination of "getting somebody in and getting
somebody out" from among the same identified SEBCs. If this 'means test'
argument is accepted and put into action by scanning the identified SEBCs c
by applying a super-imposition test, the very object and purpose of reser-
vation, intended for the socially backward class would reach only a cu/de
sac and the identified SEBCs would be left in a maze. In my considered
opinion, it will l:e a futile exercise for the courts to find out the reasons in
support of the division between and among the group of SEBCs and make
rule therefor, for multiple reasons, a few of which which I am emuinerating D
hereunder.

(1) The division among the identified and ascertained SEBCs having
common characteristics and attributes - the primary of which being the
potential social backwardness, as 'poorer sections' and 'non-poorer E
sections' on the anvil of economic criterion or by application of a super-
imposition test of relative poverty is impermissible as being opposed to the
scope and intent of Article 16(4).

(2) If this apex Court puts its seal of approval to para 2 (i) of the second F
OM whereunder a section of the people under the label of 'poorer sections'
is carved out from among the SEBCs, it becomes a law declared by this
Court for the entire nation under Article 141 of the Constitution and is
binding on all the Courts within the territory of India and that the decision
of this Court on a constitutional question cannot be over-ridden except by
the constitutionally recognised norms. When such is the legal position, the G
law so declared should be capable of being effectively implemented in its
applicability to some rare or freakish cases. The law should not be susceptible
of being abused or misused and leave scope for manipulation which can
remain undetected. If the law so declared by this Court is indecisive and
leaves perceivable loopholes, by the aid of which one can defeat or circum- H
7fi6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A vent or nullify that law by adopting an insidious, tricky, fraudulent and
strategic device to suit one's purpose then that law will become otiose and
remain as a dead letter.

I would like to indicate the various reasons in support of my opinion
that this process of elimination or exclusion of a section of people from
B and out of the same category of SEBCs cannot be sustained leave apart
the authority of the Government to take any decision and formulate its
policy in its discretion or opinion provided that the policy is not violative
of any constitutional or legal provisions or that discretion or opinion is not
vitiated by non-application of mind, arbitrariness, formulation of collateral
C grounds or consideraion of irrelevant and extraneous material etc.

(a) If the annual gross income of a government servant
derived from all his sources during a financial year is taken
as a test for identifying to 'poorer sections', that test could
be defeated by reducing the income below the ceciling limit
D by a Government servant voluntarily going on leave on los.
of pay for few months during that financial year so that he
could bring his annual income within the ceiling limit and
claim the benefit of reservation meant for 'poorer sections'.
Similarly, a person owning extensive land also may lay a
portion of his land fallow in any particular year or dispose
E
of a portion of his land so as to bring his agricultural income
below the ceiling limit so that he may fall within the
category of 'poorer sections'.

(b) The fluctuating fortunes or misfortunes also will play
F an important role in determining whether one gets within
the area of 'poorer sections' or gets out of it.

(c) Take a case wherein there are two brothers belonging
to the same family uf 'backward class' of whom one is
employed in Government service and another is privately
G employed or has chosen some other profession. The annual
income of the Government employee if slightly exceeds the
ceiling limit, his children will not fall within the category of
'poorer sections' whereas the other bro.ther can deceitfully
show his income within the ceiling limit so that his children
H can enjoy that benefit.
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [PANDIAN, J.] 767

( d) Among the pensioners also, the above anomaly will A
prevail as pointed out in Janaki Prasad.

( e) Any member of SEBCs who is in Government job and
is on the verge of his superannuation and whose income
exceeds the ceiling limit, will go out of the purview of
'poorer sections' but in the next financial year, he may gel B
into the 'poorer sections' if his total pensionary benefits fall
within the ceiling limit.

(I) A person who is within the definition of 'poorer sections'
may suddenly go out of its purview by any intervening
fortuitous circumstances such as getting a marital alliance
c
in a rich family or by obtaining any wind-fall wealth.

(g) If poverty test is made applicable for identifying the
'poorer sections' then in a given case wherein a person is
socially oppressed and educationally backward but D
economically slightly advanced in a particular year, he will
be deprived of getting the preferential treatment.

The above are only by way of illustrations, though this type can be
multiplied, for the purpose of showing that a person can voluntarily reduce
his income and thereby circumvent the declared law of this Court. In all E
the above illustrations, enumerated as (a) to (g), the chance of "getting into
or getting out of' the definition of 'poorer sections' will be like a see-saw
depending upon the fluctuating fortunes or misfortunes.

(3) The income-test for ascertaining poverty may severally suffer F
from the vice of corruption and also encourage patronage and nepotism.

( 4) When the Government has accepted and approved the lists of
SEBCs, identified by the test of social backwardness, educational back-
wardness and economic backwardness which lists are annexed to the
Report, there is no justification by dividing the SEBCs into two groups, G
thereby allowing one section to fully enjoy the benefits and another on a
condition only if there are unfilled vacancies.

(5) The elimination of a section of SEBCs by putting an arbitrary and
unnecessary unjustified. This process of elimination or exclusion of a H
768 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A section of SEBCs will be tentamount to pushing those persons into the
arena of open competition along with the forward class if there are no
unfilled vacancies out of the total 27% meant for SEBCs. This will cause
an irretrievable injustice to all the non-poorer sections though they are also
theoretically declared as SEBCs.

B (6) The second OM providing a scanning test is neither feasible nor
practicable. It will be perceptible and effectual only if the entire identified
backward class enjoys the benefit of reservation.

(7) The proposed 'means test' is highly impressionistic test, the result
C of which is likely to be influenced by many uncertain and imponderable
facts.

(8) It may theoretically sound well but in practice attempts may be
made in a underhanded way to get round the problem.

D What I have indicated above is only the tip of the iceberg and more
of it is likely to surface at the time when any scanning process and
super-imposition test are put into practice.

In this connection, I would .like to mention the views of the Tamil
Nadu Government as expressed by the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu in
E the Chief Ministers' Conference held in New Delhi (already referred to)
stating that the application of income limit on reservation will exclude those
people whose income is above the 'cut-off limit and literally, it means that
they will come under the open competition quota and if caste is not the
sole criterion, income limit cannot also be the decisive and determining
factor for social backwardness and that the exclusion of certain people
F from the benefits of reservation by the application of economic criterion
will not bring the desired effect for the advancement and improvement of
the backward classes who have suffered deprivation from the time im-
memorial.

G Reference also may, be made to Balaji wherein it has been ruled that
backward classes cannot be further classified into backward and more
backward and that such a sub-classification "does not appear to be justified
under Article 15(4)". This view, in my opinion, can be equally applied even
for sub-classification under Article 16(4).

H Arguing with the above view of Balaji, I hold that the further sub-
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [PANDIAN, J.] 769

classification as 'poorer sections' out of the ascertained SEBCs after ac- A
cepting that group in which the common thread of social backwardness
runs through as an identifiable unit within the meaning of the expression
'backward class', is violative of Article 16(4).

Of course, in Vasanth Kumar, Chinnappa Reddy, J. in his separate
judgment has taken a slightly contrary view, holding that there can be B
classification for providing some reservation to the more backward classes
compared to little more advanced backward classes. This view is expressed
only by the learned Judge (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) on which view other
Judges of that Bench have not expressed any opinion. However, it appears
that the learned Judge has not said that the entire reservation should go C
only to the more backward classes but only some percentage of reservation
should be provided and earmarked exclusively for the more backward
classes.

In the present case, the entire reservation of 27 per cent is given D
firstly to be enjoyed by the 'poorer sections' and only the unfilled vacancies,
if any, can be availed of by others. As I have already held, the view
expressed by the Constitution Bench in Balaji is more acceptable to me.

It may not be out of place to mention here that in Tamil Nadu, based
on one of the recommendations of the First Backward Classes Commission E
constituted in 1969 - known as 'Sattanatham Commission' - the Govern-
ment issued orders in G.D. Ms. No. 1156, Social Welfare Department,
dated 2nd July 1979, superimposing the income ceiling of Rs.9,000 per
annum as additional criterion for the backward classes to be eligible for
reservation for admission in educatinal institutions and recruitment to p
public services. This order was challenged before the High Court but the
High Court by 2:1 upheld the G.D. However, the order provoked a
considerable volume of public criticism. After an All-party meet, the
Government in G.O. Ms. No. 72, Social Welfare Department dated 1st
February 1980 revoked their orders and the position as it stood prior to
2nd July 1979 was restored. Simultaneously, by another G.D. Ms. No. 73, G
Social Welfare Department dated 1st February 1980, the Government
raised the percentage of reservation for backward classes from 31 per cent
to 50 per cent commensurate with the population of the backward classes
in the State. Both the GOs i.e. G.D. Ms. No. 72 and 73 dated 1st February
1980 were challenged in the Supreme Court in Writ Petition Nos. 4995- H
770 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A 4997 of 1980 along with W.P. No. 402 of 1981.

The Constitution Bench of this Court by its order dated 14th October
1980 directed the State Government to appoint another Commission to
review the then existing enumeration and classification of backward classes
and to take necessary steps for identifying the backward classes in the light
B of the report of the said Commission and that both the GOs "shall lapse
after January 1, 1985". However, by order dated 5.5.1981, the above writ
petitions were directed to be listed alongwith W.P. Nos. 1297-98/79 and
1497/79 (Vasanth Kumar). Thereafter, a number of CMPs in the writ
petitions for extension of time for implementation of this Court's directions
C were filed. This Court periodically extended the time upto July 1985. A
CMP for further extension of time was dismissed nn 23.7.1985 by a three- ,.
Judges Bench of this Court since the Judgment in Vasanth Kumar involving
the same question was delivered on 8.5.1985. Vide (1) Orders of Superme
Court in W.P. Nos. 4995-97/1980 and W.P. No. 402/1981, (2) Orders of
D High Court of Madras in W.P. Nos. 3069, 3292 and 3436/79 dated 20th
August 1979 and (3) Paragraph 1.01 of Chapter I of the Report of the
Tamil Nadu Second Backward Classes Commission (popularly known as
Ambasankar Commission).

We have referred to the above facts for the purpose of showing that
E the fixation of ceiling limit on economic criterion was not successful and
that for identifying the 'weaker sections', ceiling limit is not the proper test,
once the backward class is identified and ascertained.

Further, it is clear for the afore-mentioned reasons that the Executive
while making the division of sub-classification has not properly applied its
F mind to various factors, indicated above which may ultimately defeat the
very purpose of the division or sub-classification. In that view, para 2(i) not
only becomes constitutionally invalid but also suffers from the vice of non-
application of mind and arbitrariness.

For the aforementioned reasons, I am of the firm view that the division
G made in the amended. OM dividing a section of the people as 'poorer
sections' and leaving the remaining as 'non-poorer sections' on economic
criterion from and among the same unit of identified and ascertained SEBCs,
having common characteristics the primary of which is the social backward-
ness as listed in the report of the Commission, is not permissible and valid
H and such a division or sub-classification is liable to be struck down as being
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [PANDIAN, J.] 771

violative of clause (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution. A
A further submission has been made stating that the benefits of
reservation are often snatched away or eaten up by top creamy layer of
socially advanced backward class who consequent upon their social
development no longer suffer from the vice of social backwardness and
who arc in no way handicapped and who by their high professional B
qualifications occupy upper echelons in the public services and therefore,
the children of those socially advanced section of the people, termed as
'creamy layer' should be completely removed from the lists of 'Backward
Classes' and they should not be allowed to compete with the children of
socially under-privileged people and avail the quota of reservation. By way C
of illustration it is said that if a member of a designated backward class
holds a high post by getting through the qualifying examinations of !AS,
IFS, JPS or any other All India Service, there can be no justification in
extending the benefit of reservation to their children, because the social
status is will advanced and they no longer suffer from the grip of poverty.
D
On the same analogy, it has been urged that the children of other
professlonals such as Doctors, Engineers, Lawyers etc. etc. also should not
be given the benefit of reservation, since in such cases, they are not socially
handicapped.

No doubt the above argument on the face of it appears to be E
attractive and reasonable. But the question is whether those individuals
belonging to any particular caste, community or group which satisfies the
test of backward class should be segregated, picked up and thrown over
night out of the arena of backward class. One should not lose sight of the
fact that the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of 'any back- F
ward class of citizens' in the Central Government services have not yet been
put in practice in spite of the impugned 0 Ms. It is after 42 years since the
advent of our Constitution, the Government is taking the first step to
implement this scheme of reservation for OBCs under Article 16(4). In
fact, some of the States have not even introduced policy of reservation in G
the matters of public employment in favour of OBCs.

In opposition, it is said that only a very minimal percentage of BCs
have stepped into All India Civil Services or any other public services by
competing in the mainstream along with the candidates of advanced classes
despite the fact that their legs are fettered by social backwardness and H
772 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A hence it would be very uncharitable to suddently deprive their children of
the benefit of reservation under Article 16(4) merely on the ground that
their parents have entered into Government services especially when those
children are otherwise entitled to tHe preferential treatment by falling
within the definition of 'backward class'. It is· further stressed that those
children so long as they are wearing the diaper of social backwardness
B should be given sufficient time till the Government realises on reviews that
they are completely free from the shackles of social backwardness and have
equated themselves to keep pace with the advanced classes. There are a
few decisions of this Court which I have already referred to, holding the
view that even if a few individuals in a particular caste, community or group
C are socially and educationaly above the gereral average, neither that caste
nor that community or group can be held as not being socially backw;,rd.
(Vide Balaram ).

In the counter affidavit dated 30th October 1990 filed by the Union
of India sworn by the Additional Secretary to the Government of India in
D the Ministry of Welfare, the following averments with statistical figures are
given:

"Based on the replies furnished by 30 Central Ministries
and Departments and 31 attached and subordinate offices
and public sector undertakings under the administrative
E
control of 14 Ministries (which may be treated as sufficient-
ly representative of the total picture) the Commission
arrived at the following figures:-

Category of Total number Percentage Percentage
F Employees of employees of SC/ST ofOBCs
All classes 15,71,638 18.72 12.55

(Extracted from page 92 of First Part of Manda! Commis-
sion Report)"
G
The above figures clearly show that the SEBCs are inadequately repre-
sented in the Services of the Government oflndia and that the SCs and STs in
spite of reservation have not yet been able to secure representation commen-
surate with the percentage of reservation provided to them.

H Meeting an almost similar argument that the 'creamy layers' are
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. (PANDIAN, J.] 773

santching away the benefits of reservation, Chinnappa Reddy, J. observed A
in Vasanth Kumar to the following effect:

'0ne must, however, enter a caveat to the criticism that the
1

benefits of reservation are often santched away by the top
creamy layer of backward class or caste. That a few of the
seats and posts reserved for backward classes are snatched B
away by the more fortunes among them is not to say that
reservation is not necessary. This is bound to happen in a
competitive society such as ours. Are not the unreserved
seats and posts snatched away, in the same way, by the top
creamy layers amongst them on the same principle of merit c
on which the non reserved seats are taken away by the top
layers of society. How can it be bad if reserved seats and
posts are snatched away by the creamy layer of backward
classes, if such snatching away of unreserved posts by the
top creamy layer of society itself is not bad?"
D
The above observation, in my view, is an apt reply to such a criticism
with which I am in full agreement. To quote Krishna Iyer, J. "For every
cause there is a martyr 11 • I am also reminded of an adage, "One swallow
does not make the summer."
E
Reverting to the case on hand, the 0.M. does not speak of any
'creamy layer test'. It cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that the
Government was not aware of some few individuals having b come both
0

socially and educationally above the general average and entered in the All
India Services or any other Civil Services. Despite the above fact, the F
Government has accepted the listed groups of SEBCs as annexed to the
Report and it has not thought it prudent to eliminate those individuals.
Therefore, in such circumstances, I have my own doubt whether the judicial
supremacy can work in the broad area of social policy or in the great vortex
of ideological and philosophical decisions directing the exclusion of any
section of the people from the accepted list of OBCs on the mere ground G
that they are all 'creamy layers' which expression is to be tested with
reference to various factors or make suggestions for exclusion of any
section of the people who are otherwise entitled for the benefit of reser-
vation in the decision of the Government so long that decision does not
suffer from any constitutional infirmity. H
774 SUPREME COURT REPORTS IJ992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Added to the above submission, it has been urged that some pseudo
communities have smuggled into the backward classes and they should be
removed from the list of OBCs, lest those communities would be eating
away the major portion of the reservation which is meant only for the true
and genuine backward classes. There cannot be any dispute that such
pseudo communities should be weeded out from the list of backward
B classes but that exercise must be done only by the Government on proper
verificr.tion.

The identification of the backward classes by the Manda! Commis-
sion is not with a seal of perpetual finality but on the other hand it is
c subjected to reviewability by the Government. The Manda! Commission
itself in paragraph 13.40 in Chapter XIII has suggested that "the entire
scheme should be reviewed after 20 years." Mr. Jethmalani suggested that
the list may be reviewed. at the interval of 10 years. There are judicial
pronouncements to the effect that Government has got the right of
reviewability. There cannot be any controversy indeed there is none - that
D the Government which is certainly interested in the maintenance of stand-
ards of its administration, possesses and retains its soverign authority to
adopt general regulatory measures within the consitutional framework by
reviewing any of its schemes or policies. The interval of the period at which
the review is to be held is within the authority and discretion of the
E Government, but of course subject to the constitutional parametres and
well settled principles of judicial review. Therefore, it is for the Govern-
ment to review the lists at any point of time and take a decision for the
exclusion of any pseudo community or caste smuggled into the backward
class or for inclusion of any other community which in the opinion of the
Government suffers from social backwardness.
F
It may be recalled that the petitioner herself in W.P. No. 930 of 1990
has stJ.ted, 11 ......... the Courts cannot sit as a super legislature to determine
and decide the social issue as to who are socially and educationally back-
\vard .. ................... 1'
G
It will be appropriate to refer to an observation of the five-Judges
Bench of this Court (which heard initially these matters) in its order dated
8th August 1991 stating:

'The validity of the Manda! Commission Report as such is
H not in issue before us .................. "
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [PANDIAN. J.] 775

A three-Judges Bench of this Court comprising of Ranganath Mish- A
ra, K.N. Singh, M.H. Kania, JJ. (as the learned Chief Justices then were)
has observed in their order dated 21st September 1990 that the implemen-
tation of executive decisions is in the hands of the Government of the day
but constitutional validity of such action is a matter for Court's examina-
tion.
B
Thereafter, a Constitution Bench of this Court ·by their order dated
1st October 1990 explained the earlier order stating "Three out of us sitting
as a Bench on the 21st September 1990 made an order after hearing parties
wherein we had indicated that the decision to implement three aspects of
the recommendations of the Manda! Commission was a political one and C
11
ordinarily the Court would not interfere with such a decision.

Therefore, when this Court is not called upon to lay a test or give
any guideline as to who arc all to be eliminated from the listed groups of
the Report, there in no necessity to lay any test muchless 'creamy layer D
test'. I find no grey area to be clarified and consequently hold that what
one is not free to do directly cannot do it indirectly by adopting any means.
Therefore, the argument of 'creamy layer' pales into insignificance.

Further I hold that all SEBCs brought in the lists of the Commission
\vhich have been accepted and approved by the Government should be E
given equal opportunity in availing the bi;;:nefits of the 27 per cent reserva-
tion. In other words, the entire 27% of the vacancies in civil posts. and
services under the Government of India shall be reserved and extended to
all the SEBCs.
F
In fact, the first OM dated 13th August 1990 docs not make any
division or sub-classification as in the amended OM. Para 2 (i) of the first
OM reads, "27o/o of the vacancies in civil posts and services in the Govern-
ment of India shall be reserved for SEBCs." In reading para 2 (i) of the
first OM in juxtaposition with para 2 (i) of the amended OM, no basic
difference in the policies of the two Government is spelt out; in that both G
the i111pugned OMs have made 27o/'o reservation in civil posts and services
under the Government of India for SEBCs" on the basis of the recommen-
dations of the Second Backward Classes Commission (Manda! Report).
The only difference between the t\VO impugned OMs is that in the amended
OM a division among the SEBCs is made as 'poorer sections' and others H
776 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A that the 'poorer sections' is firstly allowed. to avail the benefit of reservation
of only the unfilled vacancies. Therefore,.by striking down para 2 (i) of the
arnenrled OM as unconstitutional, I hold that there is no legal impediment
in implementing para 2 (i) of the first OM dated 13th August 1990 which ·
has not been supersed, rescinded or repealed hut "deemed to have been
amended."
B
Before parting with this aspect of the matter, I would like to express
my view that the 'poorer sections' of the SEBCs may be provided with
various kinds of concessions and facilities such as educational concessions,
special coaching facilities, financial assistance, relaxation of upper age
C limit, increase of number of attempts etc. for government services with a
view to give them equal opportunity to compete and keep pace with the
advanced sections of the people.

Whether 10% reservation in favour of 'other economically backward
D section' is permissible under Alticle 16?

Now I shall pass on to paragraph 2 (ii) of the amended OM which
reveals that 10 per cent of the vacancies in civil posts and services under
the Government of India shall be reserved for other economically back-
ward sections of the people who are not covered by any of the existing
E schemes of reservation.

This reservation of 10 per cent cannot be held to be constitutionally
valid as concluded by my learned brother B.P. Jeewan Reddy, J. for the
reasons, mentioned in paragraph 115 of his judgment. I am in full agree-
ment with his conclusion on this issue of 10% reservation.
F
Whether Art. 16(4) contemplates reservation in the matter of promo-
tion?

Jn Mohan Kumar Singhania v. Union of India, [1992] Supp. 1 SCC
G 594, a three-Judges Bench of this Court to which I was a party has taken
a view that once candidates even from reserved communities are allocated
and appointed to a Service based on their ranks and performance and
brought under the one and same stream of category, then they too have to
be treated on par with all other selected candidates and there cannot be
H any question of preferential treatment at that.stage on the ground that they
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.l. [PANDIAN, J.] 777

belong to reserved community though they may be entitled for all other A
statutory benefits such as the relaxation of age, the reservation etc. Reserw
vation referred to in that context is referable to the reservation at the initial
stage or the entry point as could be gathered from that judgment.

It may be recalled, in this connection, the view expressed by Chief
Justice Ray in Thomas that "efficiency has been kept in view and not B
11
sacrificed •

Hence, I share the view of my learned brother B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J.
holding that "Article 16(4) does not permit provision for reservation in the
matter of promotions and that this rule shall, however, have only prospective C
operation and shall. not affect the promotions already made, whether made
on regular basis or on any other basis" and the direction given by him that
wherever reservations are provided in the matter of promotion such reserva-
tion may continue in operation for a period of five years from this day.

In Summation D
(1) Article 16(4) ofthe Constitution is neither an exception
nor a proviso to Article 16(1). It is exhaustive of all the
reservations that can be made in favour of backward class
of citizens. It has an over-riding effect on Article 16(1) and E
(2).

(2) No Reservation can be made under Article 16(4) for

- classes other than backward classes. But under Article
16(1), reservation can be made for classes, not covered by
Article 16(4).

(3) The expression, 'backward class of citizens' occurring
F

in Article 16(4) is neither defined nor explained in the
Constitution. However, the backward class or classes can
certainly be identified in Hindu society with reference to
castes along with other criteria such as traditional occupa-
G
tion, poverty, place of residence, lack of education etc. and
in communities where caste is not recognised by the above
recognised and accepted criteria except caste criterion.

(4) In the process of identification of backward class of H
778 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A citizens and under Article 16(4) among Hindus, caste is a
primary criterion· or a dominant factor though it is not the
sole criterion.

(5) Any provision under Article 16(4) is not necessarily to
be made by the Parliament or Legislature. Such a provision
B could also be made by an Executive order.

(6) The power conferred on the State under Article 16(4)
. is one coupled with a duty and, therefore, the State has to
exercise that power for the benefit of all those, namely,
backward class for whom it is intended.
c
(7) The provision for reservation of appointments or posts
in favour of any backward class of citizens is a matter of
policy of the Government, of course subject to the constitu-
tional parametres and well settled principle of judicial
D review.

(8) The expression 'poorer sections' montioned in para 2 (i)
of the amended Office Memorandum of 1991 denotes a
division among SEBCs on economic criterion. Therefore,
no. division or sul>-classification as 'poorer sections' and
E other backward class (non poorer sections) out of the iden-
lilied SEBCs can be made by applicaion of 'means test'
based on economic criterion. Such a division in the same
identilied and ascertained unit consisting of SEBCs having
common characteristics and attributes, the primary charac-
F teristic or attribute being the social backwardness is viola-
live of clause ( 4) of Article 16 of the Coustitution. Hence,
as
the division_.of the SEBCs 'poorer sections' and others,
-·-~~
brought out in para 2(i) of the impugned amended Office
Memorandum dated 25th September 1991 is constitution-
ally invalid and impermissible. Accordingly, para 2(i) of the
G. said amended Office Memorandum is struck down.
- ..
9) No maximum ceiling of reservation can be fixed ·under
Article 16(4) of the Constitution for reservation of appoint-
ments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens
H 'in the Services under the State'. The decisions fixing the
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [PANDIAN, J.] 779

percentage of reservation only up to the maximum of 50% A
are unsustainable.

(10) As regards the reservation in the matter of promotion
under Article 16(4), I am in agreement with conclusion No.
(7) made in paragraph 121 in Part VII of the judgment of
my learned brother. B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J.. B

(11) I also agree with conclusion No.(8) of paragraph 121
ofthe judgment of my learned brother, B.P, Jeevan Reddy,
J. qua the exception to the rule of reservation to certain
Services and posts.
c
(12) The reservation of 10% of the vacancies in civil posts
and Services in favour of other economically backward
sections of the people who are not covered by any other
scheme of the reservation as mentioned in para 2(ii) of the
impugned amended Officer Memorandum dated 25th Sep- D
tember 1991 is constitutionally invalid and it is accordingly
struck down. In this regard, I acn also in agreement with
conclusion No. (11) of paragraph 121 of the judgment of
my learned brother, B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J.
E
( 13) No section of the SEBCs can be excluded on the
ground of creamy layer till the Government - Central and
State - takes a decision in this regard on a review on the
recommendations of a Commission or a Committee to be
appointed by the Government.
F

... (14) Para 2(i) and (ii) ufthe amended Office Memorandum
dated 25th September 1991 for the reasons given in my
judgment and the conclusions drawn above, are struck
down as being violative of Article 16(4).

(15) The impugned Office Memorandum dated 13th
G
August 1990 is held valid and enforceable. So there is no
legal impediment in immediately enforcing and implement-
ing this lir<t Office Memorandum of 1990.

(16) In Writ Petition No. 1094of1991 (Sree11araya11a Dhar- H
780 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A ma Paripalana Yogam v. Union of India), there is a prayer
(prayer 'b'), inter a/ia, for issuance of a writ of mandamus
directing the respondent to implement the impugned un-
amended office memorandum dated Bth August 1990. In
the light of my conclusions, striking down the amended
office memorandum dated 25th September 1991, I direct
B the Union of India to immediately implement the un-
amended office memorandum dated 13th August 1990.

(17) The Government oflndia and the State Governments
have to create a permanent machinery either by way of a
c Commission or a Committee within a reasonable time for
examining the requests of inclusion or exclusion of any
caste, community or group of persons on the advice of such
Commission or Committee, as the case may be, and also
for examining the exclusion of any pseudo community if
smuggled into the list of OBCs. The creation of such a
D
machinery in the form of a Commission or Committee does
not stand in the -vay of immediate implementation of the
office memorandum dated 13.8.1990 and the purpose of
creating such machinery is for future guidance.

E (18) I am also of the same view of my learned brother, B.P.
Jeevan Reddy, J. that it is not necessary to send the matters
back to the Constitution Bench of five-Judges.

In the result, for the reasons mentioned in my judgment and the
•
F conclusions drawn in the summation, the writ petition No. 1094 of 1991 is
partly allowed to the extent indicated above and all other Writ Petitions,
Transferred Cases and Interlocutory Applications are disposed of accord-
ingly. No costs. -
THOMMEN, J. The petitioners challenge O.M. No. 36012/31/90-
G Estt(SCT) dated 13th August, 1990 as amended by O.M. No. 36012131/90-
Estt(SCT) dated 25th September, 1991 providing in civil posts and services
under the Government of India for reservation of 27% of the vacancies for
the Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBCs) and 10% of the
vacancies for other economically backward sections of the people. The
H Office Memorandum dated 13th August, 1990, in so far as it is material,
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [TIIOMMEN, J.] 781

reads:- A

2(i) 27% of the vacancies in civil posts and services under
the Government of India shall be reserved for SEBC.

(ii) The aforesaid reservation shall apply to vacancies to B
be filled by direct recruitment. .......... .

(iii) Candidates belonging to SEBC recruited on the b~sis
of merit in an open competition on the same standard
prescribed for the general candidates shall not be adjusted
against the reservation quota of 27%. C
(iv) The SEBC would comprise in the first phase the
castes and communities which are common to both the
list in the report of the Mandal Commission and the State
Govern-ment's lists. A list of such castes/communities is
being issued separately. D
(v) .............................................................................................. .

The amended Office Memorandum dated 25th September, 1991 E
provides:-

2(i) Within the 27% of the vacancies in civil posts and
services under the Government of India reserved for
SEBCs, preference shall be given to candidates belonging F
to the poorer sections of the SEBCs. In case sufficient
number of such candidates are not available, unfilled
vacancies shall be
filled by the other SEBC candidates.

(ii) 10% of the vacancies in civil posts and services under
G
the Government of India shall be reserved for other
economically backward sections of the people who are not
covered by any of the existing schemes of reservation.

(iii) The criteria for determining the poorer sections of the
SEBCs or the other economically backward sections of the H
782 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A people who are not covered by any of the existing schemes
of reservations are being issued separately.

The reservation postulated in these orders for the socially and educa-
B tionally backward classes and also for the economically backward sections
of the people in the Central Government services to the extent of 27% and
10% respectively is in addition to the reservation already made for the
Scheduled Casks and the Scheduled Tribes to the extent of 22.5%.

c These orders are made pursuant to the Report sumitted by the
Backward Classes Commission appointed by the President of India under
Article 340 of the Constitution. This Report is generally known by the name
of the Chairman of the Commission, the Late B.P. Manda!. The petitioners
submit that the Report leading to the impugned Government Orders is not
D based on any scientific or objective study of backwardness in the country,
and any attempt to make reservation on the basis of the data supplied in
the Report is irrational, unconstitutional and invalid. They say that the
Report is conceived in caste prejudices and motivated by caste hatred. The
Report does not address itself to a proper identification of true backward-
ness for the redressal of which the Constitution permits reservation by
E
quota for the backward classes of citizens to the exclusion of all other
persons. On the other hand, the sole criterion on the basis of which
backwardness is purportedly identified is caste and nothing but caste. Any
order resulting in reservation or other affirmative action on the basis of the
wrong conclusions drawn by the Commission is bound to be the very
F antithesis of equality.

The respondents, supporting the impugned Government orders, con-
tend that the Constitution guarantees liberty, equality and fraternity for all
classes of people irrespective of their religion, community, caste, occupa-
G tion, residence or the like. Every citizen is entitled to equal opportunities.
For centuries, large sections of our countrymen have been discriminated
against on account of their birth. As a result of such inequity, they have
been steeped in poverty, ignorance and squalor. To alleviate their misery
and elevate them to positions of equality with the more fortunate, affluent
H and enlightened sections of our countrymen, the Founding Fathers of the
INDRA SAWl-INEY v_ U.0.L [Tl-IOMMEN, J.] 783

Constitution made special provisions for their uplift. These provisions are A
meant to protect the truly backward p.,ople of this country, namely, mem-
bers of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and other backward
classes. They contend that the Manda! Report is a scientific and serious
study rationally addressed to the problem of backwardness by identifying
it where it is most acutely felt and loudly present, namely, amongst the
B
lowest of the lowly citizens of this country. Those are the members of the
low castes as traditionally recognised and identified by the State and
Central Government. The various classes of people belonging to such
castes are identified as socially, educationally and economically backward
and it is in respect of those people that the Government have made the
impugned reservations. c
The 'indicators' or 'criteria' adopted in the Manda! Report are
broadly grouped as social, educational and economic on the basis of
castes/classes. The Commission has identified classes with castes and back-
wardness with particular castes. Castes which are socially, educationally D
and economically backward are characterised as backward classes entitled
to the benefit of reservation. Persons are grouped on the basis of caste
either because they are members of it by reason of their being Hindus or
because they were members of it in the past p!ior to their conversion to
other religions. Identification of backwardness is thus made with reference E
to the present or past caste affiliations of the people. The Report says:-

"12.4. In fact, caste being the basic unit of social organisa-
tion of Hindu Society, castes are the only readily and clearly
'recognisable and persistent collectivities"'.
F
"12.6 .... the Commission has also applied some other tests
like stigmas oflow occupation, criminality, nomadism, beg-
gary and untouchability to identify social backwardness.
Inadequate representation in public services was taken as
another important test11 •
G
In regard to non-Hindus, the Report says:-

"12.11 There is no doubt that social and educational back-
wardness among non-Hindu communities is more or less
of the same order as among Hindu communities. Though H
784 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A caste system is peculiar to Hindu society yet, in actual
practice, it also pervades the non-Hindu communities in
India in varying degrees ..... even after conversion, the ex-
Hindus carried with them their deeply ingrained ideas of
social hierarchy and stratification .... ".
B "12.14 ..... even after conversion, the lower caste converts
were continu.ed to be treated as Harijans by all sections of
the society......... ".

"12.18 ... the Commission has evolved the following rough
c and ready criteria for identifying non-Hindu OBCs:-

(i) All untouchables converted to any non-Hindu religion;
I
and

(ii) Such occupational communities which are known by
D the name of their traditional hereditary occupation and
whose Hindu counterparts have been included in the
list of Hindu OBCs. {Examples : Dhobi, Teli,
Dheemar, Nai, Gujar, Kumhar, Lohar, Darji, Badhai,
etc.)".
E The Report has thus treated all persons who belong, or who had once
belonged, to what had been regarded as untouchable or other traditionally
backward caste or communities or who belong to certain low occupations
as socially, educationally and economically backward.

F The particulars .of the Manda! Report and other material relied on
by the Government in making the impugned orders do not directly arise
for our consideration at this juncture as this Bench has been constituted
to examine the concept of equality of opportunity in matters of public
employment, as enshrined in Article 16 and other provisions of the Con-
G stitution, 'and settle the legal position relating to reservation' and thus lay
down the guideline by which the validity and reasonableness of Govern-
ment Orders on reservation can be tested in appropriate cases.

The Concept of Reservation:

H The fundamental question is, what is the raison d'etre of reservation
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.l. [THOMMEN, J.] 785

and what are its limits. The Constitution permits the State to adopt such A
affirmative action as it deems necessary to uplift the backward classes of
citizens to levels of equality with the rest of our countrymen. The backward
classes of citizens have been in the past denied access to Government
services on account of their inability to compete effectively in open selec-
tions on the basis of merits. It is, therefore, open to the Government to
B
reserve a certain number of seats in places of learning and public services
in favour of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and other back-
ward classes to the exclusion of all others, irrespective of merits. The
impugned Government orders, have made reservation by setting aside
quotas in Government services exclusively for backward classes of can-
didates. c
Referring to the concept of equality of opportunity in public employ-
ment, as embodied in Article 10 of the Draft Constitution, which finally
emerged as Article 16 of the Constitution, and the conflicting claims of
various communities for representation in public administration, Dr. Am- D
bedkar emphatically declared that reservation should be confined to 'a
minority of seats', lest the very concept of equality should be destroyed. In
view of its great importance, the full text of this speech delivered in the
Constituent Assembly on the point is appended to this judgment. But I
shall now read a few passages from it. Dr. Ambedkar stated: E

".... firstly, that there shall be equality of opportunity;
secondly that there shall be reservations in favour of certain
communities which have not so far had a 'poorer look- in'
so to say into the administration .......Supposing, for in-
F
stance, we were to concede in full the demand of those
communities who have not been so far employed in the
public services to the fullest extent, what would really
happen is, we shall be completely destroying the first
proposition upon which we are all agreed, nemely, that
there shall be an equality of opportunity...... Therefore the G
seats to be reserved, if the reservation is to be consistent
with sub-clause (1) of Article 10, must be confined to a
minority ofseats. It is then only that the first principle could
find its place in the Constitution and effective in opera-
tion .............we have to safeguard two things, namely, the H
786 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A pinciple of equality of opportunity and at the same time
satisfy the demand of communities which have not had so
far representation in the State ....... .''.

Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. 7, pp. 701-702 (1948- 49).

B (emphasis supplied)

These words embody the raison d'etre of reservation and its limitations.
Reservation is one of the measures adopted by the Constitution to remedy
the continuing evil effects of prior inequities stemming form discriminatory
C practices against various classes of people which have resulted in their
social, educational and economic backwardness. Reservation is meant to
be addressed to the present social, educational and economic backward-
ness caused by purposeful societal discrimination. To attaok the continuing
ill effects and perpetuation of such injustice, the Constitution permits and
empowers the State to adopt corrective devices even when they have
D discriminatory and exclusionary effects. Any such measure, in so far as one
group is preferred to the exclusion of another, must necessarily be narrowly
tailored to the achievement of the fundamental constitutional goal.

What the Constitution permits is the adoption of suitable and ap-
E propriate measures to correct the continuing evil effects of prior dis-
crimination. Over-inclusiveness in such measures by unduly widening the
net of reservation to unjustifiably protect the ill deserved at the expense of
the others would result in invidious discrimination offending the Constitu-
tional objective. Benign classification for affirmative action by reservation
must stay strictly within the narrow bounds of remedial actions. Any such
F
programme must be consistent with the fundamental objective of equality.
Classes of people saddled with disabilities rooted in history of purposeful
unequal treatment and consequently relegated to sociaL educational,
economic and political powerlessness particularly qualify to demand the
extraordinary and special protection of reservation.
G
Reservation is meant to remedy the handicap of prior discrimination
impeding the access of classes of people to public administration. It is for
the State to determine whether the evil effects of inequities stemming from
prior discrimination against classes of people have resulted in their being
H reduced to positions of backwardness .and consequent under repre-
INDRA SAWHNEY '" U.0.1. [THOMMEN, J.] 787

sentation in public administration. Reservation is a remedy or a cure for A
the ill effects of historical discrimination.

While affirmative action programmes by preferential treatment short
of reservation in favour of disadvantaged classes of citizens may be justified
as benign redressal measures based on valid classification, the more posi-
tive affirmative action adopting reservation by quota or other 'set aside'
B
measures or goals in favour of certain classes of citizens to the exclusion
of others most be narrowly tailored and strictly addressed to the problem
which is sought to be remedied by the Constitution. Any such action by the
State must necessarily be subjected to periodic administrative review by
specially constituted authorities so as to guarantee that such policies and c
actions are applied correctly and strictly to permitted constitutional ends.

Reservation is not an end in itself. It is a means to achieve equality.
The policy of reservation adopted to achieve that end must, therefore, be
consistent with the objecti«e in view. Reservation must not outlast its D
constitutional object, and must not allow a vested interest to develop and
perpetuate itself. There will be no need for reservation or preferential
treatment once equality is achieved. Achievement and preservation of
equality for all classes of people, irrespective of their birth, creed, faith or
language is one on the noble ends to which the Constitution is dedicated.
E
Every reservation founded on benign discrimination, and justifiably adopted
to achieve the constitutional mandate of equality, must necessarily be a
transient passage to that end. It is temporary in concept, limited in dura-
tion, conditional in application and specific in object. Reservation must
contain within itself the seeds of its termination. Any attempt to perpetuate
reservation and upset the constitutional mandate of equality is destructive F
of liberty and fraternity and all the basic values enshrined in the Constitu-
tion. A balance has to be maintained between the competing values and
the rival claims and interests so as to achieve equality and freedom for all.

The makers of the Constitution were fully conscious of the unfor- G
tunate position of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. To them
r.quality, liberty and fraternity are but a dream; an ideal guaranteed by the
law, but far too distant to reach; far too illusory to touch. These backward
people and others in like positions of helplessness are the favoured
children of the Constitution. It is for them that ameliorative and remedial H
788 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A measures are adopted to achieve the end of equality. To permit those who
are not intended to be so specially protected to compete for reservation is
to dilute the protection and defeat the very constitutional aim.

The victims of prior injustice are the special favourites of the laws.
Their plight is a shameful scar on the national conscience. It is a constitu-
B tional command that prompt measures are adopted by the State for the
promotion of these unfortunate classes of people specially to positions of
comparative enlightement, culture, knowledge, influence, affluence and
prestige so as to place them on levels of equality with the more fortunate
of our countrymen.
c Reservation must one day become unnecessary and a relic of an
unfortunate past. Every such action must be a transient self-liquidating
programme. That is the hope and dream cherished by the Constitution
Makers and that is the end to which the State has to address itself in
D making special provisions for the chosen classes of people for special
constittutional protection, so that "persons will be regarded as persons, and
discrimination of the type we address today will be an ugly feature of
his.tory that is instructive but that is behind us"; Per Justice T. Marshall,
Regents of the University of California v. Allan Bakke, 438 US 265, 57 L Ed.
2d 750. See also H. Earl Fullilove v. Philip M. Klutznick, 448 US 448, 65 L
E Ed. 2d 902; Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commis-
sion, 58 I.W. 5053 (DeciJed on 27.6.1990); Oliver Brown v. Board of
Education of Topeka, 347 US 483, 98 L Ed. 2d 873; City of Richmond v.
I.A. Croson Co., 488 US 469; Wendy Wygallt v. Jackson Board of Education,
476 US 267, 90 L Ed. 2d 260.
F
Reservation under the Constitution:

The Constitution seeks to secure to all its citizens Justice, Liberty,
Equality and Fraternity. These are the basic pillars on which the grand
concept of India as a Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic Republic
G rests. This splendour that is India rests on these magnificent concepts, each
of which, supporting the other, unholds the dignity and freedom of the
individual and secures the integrity and unity of the nation.

Equality is one of the magnificent cornerstones of Indian democracy:
H Smt. Indira Nehnt Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain, [1976] 2 SCR 347, 659;
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [THOMMEN, J.J 789

Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [1981] l SCR 206, 241.; A
Waman Rao & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [1981] 2 SCR 1, 19. Article
14, 15 and 16 embody facets of the many-sided grandeur of equality; The
General Manager, Southern Railway v. Rangachari, [1962] 2 SCR 586, 597;
State of Kera/a & Anr. v. N.M. Thomas & Ors., [1976] 1 SCR 906, 956.
Article 14 prohibits the State from denying to any person within the
B
territory of India equality before the law or the equal protection of the
laws. All persons in like circumstances must be treated equally. Equality is
between equals. It is parity of treatment under parity of conditions. The
Constitution permits valid classification founded on an intelligible differen-
tia distinguishing persons or things grouped together from others left out
of the group. And such differentia must have a rational relation to the c
object sought to be achieved by the law: State of Kera/a & Anr. v. NM.
T7wmas & Ors., [1976] 1 SCR 906. See also Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v.
Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar & Ors., [1959] SCR 279.

Any State action distinguishing classes of persons is liable to be D
condemned as invidious and unconstitutional unless justified as a benign
classificational rationally addressed to the legitimate aim of qualitative and
rela\jve equality by means of affirmative action programmes of protective
measures with a view to uplifting identified disadvantaged groups. All such
measures must bear a reasonable proportion between their aim and the E
means adopted and must terminate on accomplishment of their object. Any
legitimate affirmative action rationally and reasonably administered is an
aid to the attainment of equality.

In the words of Judge Tanaka of the International Court of Justice:
F
"....The principle is that what is equal is to be treated equally
and what is different is to be treated differently, namely
proportionately to the factual difference. This is what was
indicated by Aristotle as justitia commutativa and justitia
distributiva".
G
".... the principle of equality before the law does not
mean the absolute equality, namely equal treatment of
men without regard to individual, concrete circumstances,
but it means the relative equality, namely the principle to
treat equally what are equal and unequally what are une- H
790 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 119921 SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A qua!''.

".... To !real unequal mailers differently according lo their
inequality is not only permitted but required ........".

South West Africa Cases (Second Phase), 10 Rep. p. 6, 305-6.
B
While Article 14 prohibits the State from denying equality to any
person, Articles 15and16 are specially concerned with citizens. Article 15(1)
probhibits the State from discriminating against any citizen on grounds only
of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth of them. Clause ( 4) of Article 15
provides that despite the prohibition contained in Article 29(2) against
c denial of admission to any citizen into any eduational institution maintained
or aided by the State on grounds only of religion, race caste, language or any
of them, the State is nevertheless free to make 'any special provision for the
advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or
for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes'.
D These provisions of Article 15 have been construed by this Court in
a number of decisions. It is no longer in doubt that, in order to receive the
protection of clause (4), the classes of people in favour of whom special
provisions are made should necessarily be both socially and educationally
backward (and not either socially or educationally backward) or should
E have been notified by the President as the Scheduled Castes or the
Scheduled Tribes in terms of Article 341 or 342. M.R. Balaji & Ors. v. State
of Mysore, 11%3) Supp. 1 SCR 439.

Apart from the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes to whom
the special provisions, once notified by the President under Articles 341
F and 342, undoubtedly apply, the other 'backward classes' of citizens to
whom the special provisions can be extended are not merely backward but
are socially and educationally so backward as to be comparable to the
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. As stated by this Court in
M.R. Balaji & Ors. v. State of Mysore, (1%3) Supp. 1 SCR 439 at 458:-
G
".... the Backward Classes for whose improvement special
provision is contemplated by Art. 15( 4) are in the matter
of their backwardness comparable to Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes".

H See also Kumari KS. Jayasree & A11r. v. State of Kera/a & Anr., (1977] 1
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [THOMMEN, J.] 791

SCR 194, 198; Janki Prasad Parimoo & Ors. v. State of Jummu & Kashmir A
& Ors., (1973] 3 SCR 236, 252; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Pradip Tandon &
Ors., (1975] 2 SCR 761, 766; State of Kera/a & Anr. v. N.M. Thomas & Ors.,
(1976] 1 SCR 906, 997; State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. v. P. Sagar, (1968]
3 SCR 595, 600 and KC. Vasanth Kumar <f, Anr. v. State of Kamataka,
[1985] Suppl. 1 SCR 352, 376.
B
In the Constituent Assembly during the discussions on draft Article
10 (Article 16), several members belonging to the Scheduled Castes or the
Scheduled Tribes expressed serious apprehension that the expression
'backward' was not precise and large sections of people who did not belong
to the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes were likely to claim the C
benefit of reservation at the expense of the truly backward classes of
· people. They sought clarification that the expression 'backward' applied
only to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. [See B. Shiva Rao,
The Framing of India's Constitution - A Study, (1968) pp. 198-199]. K.M.
Munshi, in his reply to this criticism, pointed out: D

"..... What we want to secure by this clause are two things.
In the fundamental right in the first clause we want to
achieve the highest efficiency in the services of the State -
highest efficiency which would enable the services to func- E
tion effectively and promptly. At the same time, in view of
the conditions in our country revailing in several Provinces,
we want to see that backward classes, classes who are really
backward, should be given scope in the State services; for
it is realised that State services give a Status and an oppor-
tunity to serve the country, and this opportunity should be
F
extended to every community, even among the backward
people. That being so, we have to find out some generic
term and word 'backward class' was the best possible term.
When it is read with article 301 it is perfectly clear that the
word 'backward' signifies that class of people - does not G
matter whether you call them untouchables or touchables,
belonging to this community or that, - a class ofpeople who
are so backward that special protection is required in the
services and I see, no reason why any member should be
apprehensive of regard to the word 'backward'," H
792 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A (emphasis supplied)

Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. 7, (1948-49), p. 697

Dr. Ambedkar, in his general reply to the debate on the point, stated
thus:
B
' ... .If honourable Members understand this position that
we have to safeguard two things, namely, the principle of
equality of opportunity and at the same time satisfy the
demand of communities which have not had so far repre-
sentation in the State, then, I am sure they will agree that
c unless you use some such qualifying phrase as 'backward'
the exception made in favour of reservation will ultimately
eat up the rule a/together. Nothing of the rule will remain.. .".

(emphasis supplied)
D
Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. 7, (1948-49), p. 702.

The President of India issued the Constitution (Scheduled Castes)
the Order, 1950 relating to States, and the Constitution (Scheduled Castes)
Union Territories Order, 1951 relating to the Union Territories. Para (2)
E of the 1950 Order speaks of "castes, races or tribes which are to be deemed
Scheduled Castes in the territories of the States mentioned in the Order".
Para (3) of the Order (as amended by Act 108 of 1976 w.e.f. 27.7.1977)
provides "notwithstanding anything contained in para (2), no person
professing a religion different from the Hindu, the Sikh or the Buddhist
F religion shall be deemed to be a member of the Scheduled Castes". See
Manual of Election Law, Vol. I (1991), p. 141. 1

The 1950 Order of the President (as amended) shows that in the
territories of the States mentioned in the Order no person who is not a
G Hindu or a Sikh or a Buddhist can be regarded as a member of the
Scheduled Castes. Article 15(4) speaks of 'socially and educationally back-
ward classes of citizens' and 'the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled

(1) The 1951 Order relating to the Union Territories. however, regards only persons
professing Hindu or Sikh religion as members of the Scheduled Caste. and docs not
H include those professing Buddhist or any other religion.
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [TI-!OMMEN, J.] 793

Tribes' while Article 16(4) speaks only of 'any backward class of citizens'. A
The 'backward class' mentioned in Article 16(4) is a synonym for the
classes mentioned in Article 15(4); M.R. Ba/aji (supra); Janki Prasad
Parimoo & Ors. (supra). These two provisions read with the President's
.. Order of 1950 (as amended in 1976) show that the benefit of Article 15(4)
and Article 16(4) extends to the Scheduled Castes (which expression is
confined to those professing the Hindu, the Sikh or the Buddhist religion)
B
and the Scheduled Tribes as well as the backward classes of citizens who
must necessarily be such backward classes of citizens who would have, but
for their not professing the Hindu, the Sikh or the Buddhist religion,
qualified to be notified as members of the Scheduled Castes. This means,
all those depressed classes of citizens who su~red the odium and isolation C
of untouchability prior to their conversion to other religions and whose
backwardness continued despite their conversion come within the expres-
sion 'backward classes of citizens' in Articles 15(4) and 16(4). Un-
touchability is a humiliating and shameful malady caused by deep-rooted
prejudice which does not disappear with the change of faith. To say that it D
does would imply that faith is the ultimate cause of untouchability. This is,
of course, not true. If backwardness caused by historical discrimination and
its consequential disadvantages are the reasons for reservation thf( Con-
stitution mandates that all backward classes of citizens, who are the victims
of the continuing ill effects of prior discrimination, whatever be their faith
or religion, or whether or not they profess any religion, receive the same E
benefits which are accorded to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled
Tribes. Backward class is composed of persons whose backwardness is in
degree and nature comparable to that of the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes, whatever be their religion. There can be no doubt about
the identity of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. Nor can F
there be any doubt about the identity of backward classes other than the
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, if this identifying charac-
teristic, bearing the stamp of prior discrimination and its continuing ill
effects, is borne in mind. M.R. Ba/aji & Ors. v. State of Mysore, [1963] Supp.
l SCR 439, 458; State of Uttar Prade:;lt v. Pradip Tandon & Ors., (1975] 2
SCR 761, 766 and Janki Prasad Parimoo & Ors. v. State of Jummu & G
Kashmir & Ors., [1973] 3 SCR 236,252.

What is sought to be identified is not caste, religion and the like, but
social and educational backwardness, generally manifested by disabilities
such as illiteracy, humiliating isolation, poverty, physical and mental H
794 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A : degeneration, incurable diseases, etc. Living in abject poverty and squalor,
engaged in demeaoing occupations to keep body and soul together, and
bereft of sanitation, medical aid and other facilitieS, these wJ01tunate
classes of citizens bearing the badges of historical discrimination and naked
exploitation are generally uaceable in the midst of the lowest of the low
classes euphemistically descnoed as Harijans and in fact treated as un-
B touchables. To deny them the constitutional protection of reservation soely
by reason of change .of faith or religion is to endanger the very concept of
secularism and the raison d'eUe of reservation.

No class of citizens can be classified as backward solely by reason of
C religion, race, cast.; sex, descent, place of birth, ·resid'enc.e or any of them.
But any one or all of these factors mention~·d in Article 15(1) or Article
16{2) can be taken into account along· with other relevant factors in
identifying classes of citizens who are socially and educatio'nally backward.
What is significant is that such identification should not be made solely
D with reference to the criteria specified in Article 15(1) or Article 16(2), but
with reference to the social and educatiJnal backwardness of classes of
citizens. Referring to the words "socially and educationally backward clas-
ses of citizens" appearing in Article 15(4), this Court stated in State of Uttar
Pradesh v. Pradip Tandon & Ors., (1975) 2 SCR 761 al .767:

E "The expression 'classes of citizens' indicates a
homogeneous section of the people who are grouped
together because of certain likeliness and common traits
and who are identifiable by some common attributes. The
homogen~ity of the class of citizens is social and education-
F al backwardness. Neither caste nor religion nor place or
birth will bi.th; ~orm element of common attributes to
make them a class of citizens".

It may, however, be true that backwardness is associated specially with
people of a particular religion or race or caste or place , of birth or
G residence or any other category mentioned in Article 15(1) or Article
16(2). In that event, any .one or more of sul·l-- crih·ri~. -;ilong with other
relevant factors, may be taken into consideration to reach the conclusion
as to social and educational backwardness. Hard and primitive living
conditions in remote and inaccessible areas, where the inhabitants have
H neither the means of livelihood nor facilities for education, health service
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.l. [TI-IOMMEN, J.] 795

or other civic amenities, are some such relevant criteria. Janki Prasad A
Parimoo & Ors. v. State of Jummu & Kashmir & Ors., [1973] 3 SCR 236,
259; State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. v. P. Sagar, [1968] 3 SCR 595, 600.
. ,,
The city slum dwellers, the inhabitants of the pavements, afflicted
and disfigured in many cases by diseases like leprosy, caught in the vicious
grip of grinding penury, and making a meagre living by begging besides the
B
towering mansions of affluence, transcend all barriers of religion, caste,
race, etc. in their degradation, suffering and humiliation. They are the liviog
monument of backwardness and a shameful reminder of our national
indifference, a cruel betrayal of what the preamble to the Constitution
proclaims. No matter what caste or religion they may claim, their present c
plight of animal like existence, living on crumbs picked from garbage cans
or coins flung from moviog cars - a common painful sight in our metropolis
- entitles them to every kind of affirmative action lo redeem themselves
from the in equities of past and continuing discrimination. Rehabilitation
and resettlement of these unfortunate victims of societal indifference and D
Governmental neglect and appropriate and urgent measures for State
aided health care, education and special technical training for their por-
geny with a view to their employment in public services are the primary
responsibility of a welfare State. These are the classes of poeple specially
chosen by the law for prompt and effective affirmative action, not by reason
E
of their caste or religion, but solely by reason of their backwardness in
tracing which any relevant criterion is a useful tool.

In identifying backwardness, caste, religion, residence etc. are of
course relevant factors, but none of them is a dominant or much less an
indispensable factor. What is of ultimate elevance is the social and educa-
F
tional backwardness of a class of citiznes, whatever be their caste, religion,
etc.

Identification of the backward classes for the purpose of reservation
must be with reference to their social and educational backwardness G
resulting from the continuing ill effects of prior discrimination or exploita-
tion; and not solely with reference to any one or more of the prohibited
criteria mentioned in Article 15(1) or Article 16(2), although any one or
more of such criteria may have been the ultimate cause of such discrimina·
lion or exploitation and the resultant poverty and backwardness. As stated H
796 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A by this Court, in R. Chitralekha & Anr. v. State of Mysore & Ors., [ 1964] 6
SCR 368 at 388:

'' ... the expression 'classes' is not synonymous with cas-
tes .... caste may have some relevance, but it cannot be either
the sole or the dominant criterion for ascertaining the class
B to which he or they belong''.

What is sought to be identified for the purpose of Article 15(4) or
Article 16(4) is a socially and educationally backward class of citizens. A
class means 'a homogeneous section of the people grouped together be-
c cause of certain likeliness or common traits, and who are identifiable by
some common attributes'. Tri/oki Nath & Anr. v. State of Jummu & Kashmir
& Ors., (1969] 1 SCR 103, 105. They must be a class of people held together
by the common link of backwardness and consequential disabilities. What
binds them together is their social and educational backwardness, and not
D any one of the prohibited factors like religion, race or caste. What chains
them, what incapacitates them, what distinguishes them, what qualifies
them for favoured treatment of the law is their backwardness: their badges
of proverty, disease, misery, ignorance and humiliation. It is conceivable
that the entire caste is a backward class. In that event, they form a class of
E people for the special protection of Articles 15(4) and 16(4), not by reason
of their caste, which is merely incidental, but by reason of their social and
educational, backwardness which is identified to be the result of prior or
continuing discrimination and its ill effects and which is comparable to that
of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. It is also conceivable
that a class of people may be identified as backward without regard to their
F caste, provided backwardness of the nature and degree mentioned above
binds them as a class. M.R. Ba/aji (supra) at pp. 458, 474; Minor P.
Rajendran v. State of Madras & Ors., (1968] 2 SCR 786; State of Andhra
Pradesh & Anr. v. P. Sagar, (1968] 3 SCR 595; A. Peeriakaruppan etc. v. State
of Tamil Nadu & Ors., (1971] 2 SCR 430; State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.
G v. U.S. V. Bairam Etc., [1972] 3 SCR 247, 280, 285; Triloki Nath & Anr. v.
State of Jammu & Kashmir & Ors., (1969] 1 SCR 103; State of Uttar Pradesh
v. Pradip Tandon & Ors., (1975] 2 SCR 761; Kumari K.S. Jayasree & Anr. v.
State of Kera/a & Anr., (1977] 1 SCR 194; Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari
Sangh (Railway) v. Union of India & Ors., [1981] 2 SCR 185; R. Chitralekha
H & Anr. v. State of Mysore & Ors., [1964] 6 SCR 368.
INDRA SAWHNEY ''· U.0.1. [THOMMEN, J.] 797

Historically, backwardness has been the curse of people must of A
whom are characterised as the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.
These are not castes as such, but classes of people composed of castes,
races or tribes or ti ibal communities or parts or groups thereof and
classified as such by means of presidential notifications owing to their
extreme backwardness and other disadvantages (see Articles 341 and 342).
State of Kera/a & Anr. v. N.M. Thomas & Ors., [1976] 1 SCR 906, 932; Akhil B
Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway) v. Union of India & Ors.,
[1981] 2 SCR 185, 234. There are many other persons falling outside these
groups, but comparable to them in their backwardness.

Any identification made for the purpose of Article 15 or Article 16 c
solely with reference to caste or religion, and without regard to the real
issue of backwardness, will be an impermissible classification resulting in
invidious reverse discrimination. The fact that identification of backward-
ness may involve a reference to religion, race, caste, occupation, place of
residence or the like in respect of classes of people does not mean that any
one of these factors is the sole or the dominant or the indispensable D
criterion. Backwardness may be the result of a combination of two or more
of these factors. Persons of a particular place or occupation may have been
enslaved as bonded labourers, or otherwise held in serfdom and exploited
and discriminated against, and may have over a period of time degenerated
to such social and educational backwardness as to qualify for the special
protection of the Constitution. No matter to what caste or community or E
religion they belonged or from what place they came, their present plight
stemming from prior inequities and continuing over a period of time and
thus placing them in a state of total helplessness qualifies them for the
special protection of reservation.
F
Historically, backwardness, as stated above, has been most acute at
the lowest levels of our society and it has been invariably identified with
low castes and demeaning occupations. But if, as a matter of fact, classes
of citizens of higher castes have suffered continuously by reason of dis-
crimination or exploitation by persons having authority and power over
them and have consequently been reduced to poverty, ignorance and G
isolation resulting in social and educational backwardness, whatever be the
caste of the exploiters or of the victims, the constitutional protection has
to be extended to such classes of victims. They must be helped out of their
present plight resulting from prior or continuing discrimination or exploita-
tion. Proof of their backwardness is not in their caste or religion, ·.but in
their poverty, ignorance and consequential disabilities. H
798 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A It is generally a combination of factors such as low birth and demean-
ing occupation, or lack of any occupation, that has historically subjected
classes of people to invidious discrimination and humiliating isolation and
consequential poverty and social and educational backwardness. These are

B
questions of fact which must be ascertained before the qualifying back-
wardness is identified. To disregard any one of these factors, particularly
..
the most compelling reality of Indian life originating in low castes and
demeaning occupations generally associated with them, such as that of
scavenger, sweeper, fisherman, dhobi, barber and the like, and resulting in
abject poverty, is to ignore the relevant criteria in identifying backwardness
warranting reservation. What is sought to be identified for the purpose of
C reservation is not caste or religion, but poverty and backwardness caused
by historical discrimination and its continuing evil effects. Caste may be a
guide in this search, just as occupation or residence may be a guide, but
what is sought to be identified is none but backwardness stemming from
historical discrimination. If caste is more often than not a guide in the
D search for backwardness and if the lowest of the low castes has for
historical reasons become the indicium of backwardness of the kind attract-
ing reservation, caste in the absence of any better guide is a factor to be
taken into account along with other factors such as pove;ty, illiteracy,
physical and mental disabilities and other diseases caused by malnutrition,
unhygienic conditions and the like. What the Constitution prohibits is not
E caste or non-discriminatory and inoffensive customs and practices. based
on castes; or ameliorative measures to uplift the downtrodden poverty
stricken members oflow castes; what it prohibits is exclusionary discrimina-
tion based solely on caste or any other criterion enumerated in Article
15(1) or Article 16(2). Any one or all of such criteria along with any other
F relevant criterion, such as poverty, illiteracy, disease, etc. may be
legitimately used to identify backwardness for the purpose of reservation.

To contend that caste, and caste along, is the criterion identification
of backwardness is to disregard the innumerable reasons for backwardness.
At the same time, to ignore caste as a factor in identifying backwardness
G for the purpose of reservation is to shut one's eyes to the realities and
ignore the cause of injustice from which large sections of people in this
country have for generations suffered and still suffer, namely, naked ex-
ploitation and discrimination by those in positions of power and affluence.
The realities of life in India militate against total exclusion of consideration
H based on caste or total con~tration on caste in identifying backwardness
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [THOMMEN, J.] 799

caused by past inequities. A

The Constitution is neither caste-bli<td nor caste-prejudiced nor
caste-overcharged, but fully alive to caste as one of the relevant criteria to
be reckoned in the process of identification of backward classes of citizens.
India is not a nation of castes but of people with roots in divergent castes.
What the Constitution seeks to identify is not the backward caste, but the B
backward class of citizens who may in many cases be partly or in some
cases predominantly or even solely identified with particular caste. See
Minor P. Rajendran v. State of Madras & Ors., [1968] 2 SCR 786, 790.

The question is not whr.ther the Constitution is caste-blind or caste- C
prejudiced; the question really is who are the backward classes of citizens
intended to be protected by reservation under Article 15 or Article 16. If
reservation is limited solely to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled
Tribes and other comparably backward classes of citizens, as it must be
under the Constitution, then the Harijans, the Girijans, the Adivasis, the D
Dalits, and other like backward classes of citizens, once known as the
11
untouchables" or the "outcastes" or the 11 depressed classes" by reason of
their "low'1 birth and ndemeaning" occupation, or any other class of citizens
afflicted by like degree of degeneration deprivation caused by prior and
continuing discrimination, exploitation, neglect, poverty, disease, isolation,
bondage and humiliation, whatever be their caste, religion qr place of E
origin, will alone qualify for reservation. Call them a class or a caste or a
race or a tribe or whatever nomenclature is appropriate, they are the only
legitimately intended beneficiaries of reservation. Their roots of origin in
the lowest of the low segments of society; their affiliation with what is
traditionally regarded as demenaning occupations; their humiliating and F
inescapable segregation and chronic isolation from the rest of the popula-
tion; their social and educational deprivation and helplessness; their abys-
mal poverty and degenerating backwardness; all this and more most
humiliatingly branded them in the past as "outcastes" or "untouchables" or
"depressed classes" or whatever other nonmenclature one might ascribe to
describe them. It is their present plight of continuing poverty and back- G
wardness stemming from identified historical discrimination, .whatever be
the religion or faith they presently profess, that the Constitution entitles
them to the special protection of reservation. The fact thaithe search to
identify backwardness for the purpose of reservation will invariably lead
one to these so called outcastes or the lowest of the low castes or untouch- H
800 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A ables does not vitiate identification so long as what is sought to be iden-
tified is not caste but backwardness.

Poverty by itself is not the test of backwardness, for if it were so,
most people in this country ·would be in a position to claim reservation. ...:.._
B Janki Prasad Parimoo & Ors. v. State of Jammu & Kashmir & Ors., [1973]
3 SCR 236, 285. Reservation for all would be reservation for none, and that
would be an ideal condition if affluence, and not poverty, was its basis. But
unfortunately the vast majority of our people are not blessed by affluence
but afflicted by poverty. Poverty is a disgrace to any nation and the
resultant backwardness is a shame. But the Constitution envisages reserva-
C tion for those persons who are backward because of identified prior
victimisation and the consequential poverty. Poverty inYariably results in
social and educational backwardness. In all such cases the question to be
asked, for the purpose of reservation, is whether such poverty is the result
of identified historical or continuing discrimination. No matter what caused
D the discrimination and exploitation; the question is, did such inequity and
injustice result in poverty and backwardness.

It is possible that poverty to which classes of citizens are reduced
making them socially and educationally backward is the ultimate result of
prior discrimination and continuing exploitation on account of their
E religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth or residence. Identification
of their social and educational backwardness with reference to their
proverty is valid, if the ultimate cause of poverty is prior discrimination and
its continuing evil effects, albeit, by reason of their religion, race, caste etc.
Members of religious minorities or low castes or persons converted from
F amongst tribals or harijans to other religions, but still suffering from the
stigma of their origin, or persons of particular areas or occupations sub-
jected to discrimination rooted in religious or caste prejudices and the like
or to economic exploitation, forced labour, social isolation or other vic-
timisation may find themselves sinking deeply into inescapable and abysmal
poverty, disease, bondage and helplessness. 'The classes of citizens who are
G deplorably poor automatically become socially backward'. M.R. Balaji &
Ors. v. State of Mysore, [1963] Supp. 1 SCR 439 at 460. In all these cases,
if classes of victims afflicted by poverty and disease are identified as socially
and educationally backward, as in the case of the Scheduled Castes and
the. Scheduled Tribes, by reason of past societal or Government or any
H other kind of discrimination or exploitation, they qualify for reservation.
INDRA SAWHNEY V. U.0.1. [TIIOMMEN, l.J 801

See Janki Prasad Parimoo & Ors. v. State of Jammu & Kashmir & Ors., A
[1973] 3 SCR 236, 299.

Poverty reduces a man to a state of helplessness and ignorance. The
poor have no social status. They have no access to learning. Over the years
they invariably become socially and educationally backward. They may have B
no place in society and no education to improve their conditions. For them,
employment in services on the basis of merits is a far cry. All these persons,
along with other disadvantaged groups of citizens, are the favourites of the
law for affirmative action without recourse to reseriiation. What." required
for the further step of reservation is proof of prior discrimination resulting
in proverty and social and educational backwardness. It is not every class C
of poverty stricken persons that is chosen for reservation, but only those
whose proverty and the resultant backwardness are traceable to prior
discrimination, and whose backwardness, furthermore, is comparable to
that of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. This is a fair and
equitable ~djustment of constitutional values without. placing any undue D
burden on particular classes of citizens. State of Uttar Pradesh v.. Pradip.
Tandon & Ors., [1975] 2 SCR 761; State of Ketala & Anr. v. N.M. Thomas
& Ors., [1976] 1 SCR 906, 960, 997; Kumari K.S. Jayasree & Anr. v. State of
Kera/a &Anr., [1977] 1SCR194; K.C. Vasanth Kumarv. State of Kamataka,
[1985] Supp. 1 SCR 352, 399, 400.
E
. Article 16 deals with equality of opportunity in matters of public
employment. The kind of backwardness which is required to attract the
I special provisions protecting the backward classes of citizens under Article
16 in respect of public employment is identical to the social and educational
backwardness mentioned in Article 15(4). M.R. Balaji & Ors. v. State of F
Mysore, [1963] Supp.1SCR,439, 414;/anki Prasad Parimoo & Ors. v.State of
Jammu & Kashmir & Ors., [1973] 3 SCR 236. These two Article are facets of
equality specially guaranteed to citizens, while Article 14 prohibits the State
from denying to any person equality befote the law cir the equal protection of
the laws.State of Kera/a &Anr. v. N.M. ·Thomas & Ors., [1976] 1SCR906, 956.
Clause (1) of Article 16 guarantees equality of opportunity for all citizens in , G
matters of employment or appointment to any office under the State. The
very concept of equality implies recourse to valid classification for preferen-
ces in favour of the disadvantaged classes of citizens to improve their condi-
tions so as to enable them to raise themselves to positions of equality with the
more fortunate classes of citizens. Clause (2) prohibits discrimination against H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A any cit~ns in respect of any public employment 'on grounds only of religion,
race,. caste, sex, descent, place 'of birth, residence or any of them'. Article 16
thus guarantees equality of opportunity and prohibits discrimination of any
kind solely 'on any one or more of the grounds mentioned in clause (2).
Nevertheless, clause (4) of this Article provides that it is open to the State to .,
B make 'any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of
any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State; is. not
adequately represented in the services under the State'. It is an enabllilg
provision conferring a discretionary power on the State; an ameliorative
harmonisation of conflicting norms to stretch to the utmost extent the fron-
tiers of equalify; an emphatic assertion of equality between equals and
C inequality between unequals so as to achieve the maximum degree of qualita-
tive and relative equality by means of affirmative action even to the point of
reservation. It is in the nature of an exception or a proviso to the general rule
of equality: The General Manager, Southern Railway v. Rangachari, [1962] 2
SCR 586, 599; M.R. Balaji (supra) at p. 473; State ofAndhra Pradesh &Anr. v.
D P. Sagar, [1968] 3 SCR 595; State of Kera/a & Anr. v. N.M. Thomas & Ors.,
[1976] 1SCR906;Akhil Bhartiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway) v. Union
of India & Ors., (1981) 2 SCR 185; Triloki Nath & Anr. v. State of Jammu &
Kashmir & Ors., [1969) 1 SCR 103, 104; CA. Rajendran v. Union of India &
Ors., [1968) 1 SCR 721, 730, 733; State of Punjab v. Hiralal & Ors., [1971] 3
SCR 267, 272; T. Devadasan v. The Union of India & Anr., [1964] 4 SCR 680.
E Dr. Arnbedkar called it an exception; see Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol.
7 (1948-49) p. 702 (quoted above).

The twin conditions to warrant reservation under Article 16(4) are:
backwardness of the chosen classes of citizens and their inadequate repre-
sentation in the public services. The backwardness of the classes of citizens
F
mentioned in Article 16(4) is, as stated earlier, of the same degree and
kind of social and educational backwardness as postulated in Article 15(4).
Article 16(4) is meant for the protection of the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes and other comparably backward classes of citizens who ....
are the unfortunate victims of continuing ill effects of identified prior
G discrimination.

Whether the conditions postulated for reservation are satisfied or not
is a matter on which the State has to form an opinion. But the opinion of
the State must be foundod on reason. The satisfaction on the basis of which
H an opinion has been formed by the, State must be rationally supported by
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.L[TIIOMMEN, J.] 803

an objective consideration. The State must take into account all relevant .A
matters and eschew from its mind all irrelevant matters, and made a proper
assessment of the competing claims of classes of citizens and evaluate their
respective backwardness before it comes to the conclusion that particular
classes of citizens are so backward and so inadequately represented in the
public services as to be worthy of special protection by means of reserva- B
tion. This must be an objective evaluation of the competing claims for_
reservation. Any such conclusion must be subject to periodic administrative
review by a permanent body of experts with a view to adjustment and
readjustment of the State action in accordance with -the changing cir-
cumstances of the beneficiaries of such action. The conclusion thus peri-
odically arrived at by such administrative reviewing body must necessarily C
pass the test of judicial review whenever challenged. A. Peeriakaruppan etc.
v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., [1971) 2 SCR 430. No matter whether such
orders are regarded as legislative or executive or whichever nomenclature
one may ascribe to it, the test for judicial review laid down in Shri Sitaram
Sugar Company Ltd. & Anr. Etc. v. Union of India & Ors., '(1990) 1 'SCR D
909, must necessarily govern consideration of such questions. After an
exhaustive review of authorities on the point, a Constitution Bench of this
Court stated:
,
"The true position, therefore, is that .any act of the
repository of power, whether legislative or administrativeI
or quasi-judicial, is open to challenge if it is in conflict with
E

the Constitution or. the governing Act or
\ \
the general .prin-
ciples of the law of the land or it is so arbitrary or un-
reasonable that no fair minded authority could ever have
made it". p. 946.
F
See also the principle discussed in 'Supreme Court Employees' Welfare
Association v. Union of India & Anr., (1989] 4 SCC 187.

Identification of backwardness is- an ~ver continuing process of in-

'
• clusion and exclusion. Classes of citizens entitled to the Constitutional G
protection of reservation must be constantly and periodically identified for
their indusion and for the exclusion of those who do n\lt qualify. To allow
1
the undeserved to benefit by reservation is to deny protection to those who
are meant to. be protected. As stated by this Court in A. Peeriakaruppan
etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., [1971] 2 SCR 430 at 444: H
I

)
~
,;.--

804 SUPREME COURT REPORTS j1992J SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A "... But all the same the Government should not proceed on
the basis that once a class is considered as a backward class
it should continue to be backward class for all times. Such
an approach would defeat the very purpose of the reserva-
tion because once a class reaches a stage of progess which
some modern writers call as take off stage then competition
B is necessary for their future progress. The Government
sho'uld always keep under review the question of reserva-
tion of seats and only the classes which are really socially
and educationally backward should be allowed to have the
benefit of reservation. Reservation of seats should not be
c allowed to become a vested interest.. .. .It must be remem-
bered that the Government's decision in this regard is open
to judicial revie~" ·

Any affirmative action must be supported by a valid classification and
',D must have a rational nexus with the object of redressing backwardness. It
is much more so where such programmes totally exclude from considera-
tiori persons outside the chosen classes without regard to merits becuase
of the set aside quotas. It does not matter whether clause (4) of Article 16,
like clause (4) of Article .15, is seen as a proviso or an exception or, in the
words of Mathew, J., a legislative device to emphasise the 'extent to which
E equality of opportunity could be ~arried, viz., even up to the point of
making reservation'. State of Kera/a & Anr. v. N.M. Thomas & Ors., [1976]
1 SCR 906, 956. N.M. Thomas apart, this Court has generally treated clause
(4) as an exception or a proviso to he general rule of equality enshrined in
/ Article 16(1). Rangachari (supra); M.R. Ba/aji (supra) at P. 473; P. Sagar
•' (supra); Akhil Bhartiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway) (supra); Triloki
F
Nath (supra). CA. Rajendra~ (supra); Hira/al, (supra); T. Devadasan
(supra}; Dr. Ambedkar called'it an exception; see Constituent Assembly
Debates. Vol. 7 (1948-49) p. 702 (quoted above). Call it what one will - an
i exception or proviso· or what - and semantics apart, reservation by reason
of its exclusion of the generality of candidates competing solely on merits
G must be narrowly tailored and strictly construed so as to be consistent with
the fundamental constitutional objectives. Clause (4), seen in whatever
colour, is a very powerful and potent weapon which causes lasting ill effects
and damage unless justly and appropriately used. It is not a remedy for all ~·-

kinds of disadvantages and disabilities and for all classes of people. It is a
H special and powerful weapon to wield which with less than the very special
\
(
\
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [THOMMEN, J.] 805

care and caution and otherwise than in the inost exceptional situations, A
peculiar to extreme cases of backwardness, that the Constitution envisages
is to give rise to invidious reverse discrimination exceeding the strict
bounds of Article 16( 4) and to create hateful caste-prejudices and divisions
between classes of people.

Articles 15(4) and 16(4r refer to the same classes of backward B
citizens. But they do not refer to identical remedies. While Article 15(4)
speaks of special provisions for the advancement of backward classes,
Article 16(4) expressly permits the State to make reservation of appoint-
ments or posts in public services in favour of such classes. It is true that
both are enabling provisions allowing the State to adopt such affirmative C
action programmes as are necessary including reservation of seats or posts. .
But, unlike Article 16(4), Article 15(4) is not so worded as to suggest that
it is exclusionary in character. The 'special provision' contemplated ·in
Article' 15(4) is an emphatic reference to the affirmative action which the
State may adopt to improve the conditions of the disadvantaged members
of the backward classes of citizens. Significantly, Article 15(4) does :iot D
specifically speak of reservation, but it has been generally understood to
include that power. M.R. Ba/aji & Ors. v. State of Mysore, [1963] Supp. SCR
439. While the State may adopt all such affirmative action programmes as
it deems necessary for all disadvantaged persons, any special provision
amounting to rese,vation and consequent' exclusion from.consideration of E
all the others in respect of the reserved quota in matters falling outside
Article 16(4) must be subjected to even greater scrutiny than in the case
of those falling under it. ·

The concept of equality is not inconsistent with reservation in public F
services because the Constitution specially says so, but, in view of its
exclusion of oth'ers irrespective of merits, it can be resorted to only where
warranted by compelling State interests postulated in Article 16. The State
• must be satisfied that in order to achieve equality in given cases, reservation
is unavoidable by reason of ,the nature and degree of backwardness.
Reservation must be narrowly taifored to that end, and subjected to strict G
scrutiny.

Affirmative action to redress the conditions of backward classes of
citizens may be adopted either by a programme of preferential treatment
extending certain special advantages to them or by reservation of quotas H

'
806 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A in their favour to the total exclusion of everybody outside the favoured
groups. The validity of both these measures depends on classification
founded on intelligible differentia having rational and substantial nexus
with the object sought to be achieved, i.e., the redressal of backwardness.
And such differentiation or classification for special preference must not
be unduly unfair to the persons left out of the favoured groups.
B
While prefereniial treatment without reservation merely aids the
backward classes of citizens to compete more effectively with the more
meritorious and forward classes of citizens, the more drastic measure of
reservation totally excludes all classes of people falling outside the .back-
C ward classes of.citizens from competing in the reserved quota of seats or
posts. No matter what qualifications they posses and how superior are their
merits, these persons not belonging to the preferred groups are prevented
from competing with those of the preferred groups in respect of the
r~se;.yed seats or posts, while candidates belonging to the preferred groups
D are entitled to compete for any seat or pos~ whether in the general
category or in the reserved quota.

Preference without reservation may be adopted in favour of the
chosen classes of citizens by prescribing for them a longer period for
passing a test or by awarding additional marks or granting other advantages
E like relaxation of age or other minimum requirements. (See the preferential
treatment in State of Kera/a & Anr. v. N.M. Thomas & Ors., [1976) 1 SCR
906. Furthermore, it would be within the discretion of the State to provide
financial assistance' to such persons by way of grant, scholarships, fee
concessions etc. Such preferences or advantages are like t.emporary
F crutches for additional support to enable the members of the backward
and other disadvantaged classes to march forward and compete with the
rest of the people. T.hese preferences are extended to them because of their
inability otherwise to compete effectively in open selections on the basis of.
merits for appointment to posts in public services and the like or for
selecti"n to ~oademic courses. Such preferences can be extended to all
CJ disadvantaged classes of citizens, whether or not they are victims of prior·
discrimination. What qualifies persons for preference is backwardness or
disadvantage of any kind which the State has a responsibility to ameliorate.
The blind and the deaf, the dumb and the maimed, and other handicapped
persons qualify for preference. So do all other classes of citizens who are
H at a comparative disadvantage for whatever reason, and whether or not
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. (IBOMMEN, J.] 807

they are victims of prior discrimination. All these persons may be A
, beneficiaries of preferences short of reservation. Any such preference,
although discriminatory on its face, may be justified as a benign classifica-
tion for affirmative action warranted by a conmpelling state interest.

In addition to such p~eferences, quotas may be provided exclusively
reserving posts in public services or seats in academic institutions for B
backward people entitled to such protection. Reservation is· intended to
redress backwardness of a higher degree. Reservation prima facie is the
very antithesis of a free and open selection. It is a discriminatiory exclusion
of the disfavoured classes of meritorius candidates: M.R. Balaji (supra). It
is not a case of merely providing an advantage or a concession or c
preference in favour of the backward classes and other disadvantaged
groups. It is not even a handicap to disadvantage the forward classes-so as /

to attain a measure of qualitative or relative equality between the two
groups. Reservation which excludes from consideration all those persons
falling outside the specially favoured groups, irrespective of merits ~nd D
qualifications, is much more positive and drastic a discrimination - albeit
to achieve the same end of qualitative equality - but unless strictly and
narrowly tailored to a compelling constitutional mandate, it is unlikely to
qualify as a benign discrimination. Unlike in the case of other affirmative
action programmes, backwardness by itself is not sufficient to ,. warrant
reservation. What qualifies for reservation is backwardness which is the E
result of identified past discrimination and which is comparable to that of
the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. Reservation :s a remedial
action specially addressed to the ill effects stemming from historical dis-
crimination. To ignore this vital distinction between affirmative action .short
of reservation and reservation by a predetermined quota as a remedy for
F
past inequities is to ignore the special characteristic of the constitutional
grant of power specially addressed to the constitutional recongnised back-
wardness.

The object of the special protection guaranteed by Article 15( 4) and
16( 4) is promotion of the backward classes. Only those classes of citizens who G
are incapable of uplifting themselves in order to join the mainstream of
upward mobility insociety are intended to be protected, The wealthy and the
powerful, however socially and educationally backward they may be ·by
reason of their ignorance, do not require to be protected, for they have the
necessary strength to lift themselves out of backwardness. The rich and the H
808 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A powerful are not the special favourites of the Constitution. Backward they
may be socially and educationally, but that is a shame which they have the
steam to remove and the constitution does not extend to them the special
protection of reservation. It is not sufficient that the persons meant to be
protected are backward merely by reason of illiteracy, ignorance and social
backwardness, If they have, inspite of such handicaps, the necessary financial
B strength to raise themselves, the Constitu.tion does not extend to them the
protection of reservation. The chosen classes of persons for whom reserva-
tion is meant are those who are totally unable to join the mainstream of
upward mobility because of their utter helplessness arising from social and
educational backwardness and aggravated by economie disability.
c
Any State action resulting in reservation must, therefore, be so
tailored as to weed out and exclude all persons who have attained a certain
predetermined economic level. Only persons falling below that level must
qualify for reservation. This economic level has of course to be varied from
D time to time in accordance with the changing value of money. See the Govt.
Order upheld by this Court in Kumari K.S. Jayasree & Anr. v. State of Kera/a
& Anr., [1977] 1 SCR 194.

The directive principle contained in Article 46 emphasises the over-
riding responsibility and compelling interest of the State to promote the
E educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people,
and, in particular of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. T·hey
have to be protected form social injustice and all forms of exploitation. This
principle must necessarily guide the construction of Articles 15 and 16. All
affirmative action programmes must be inspired by that principle and
addressed to that end. Whether such action should be in the nature of
F
preferences or by recourse to reservation is a matter on which the State
must, by an objective evaluation of the degree and nature of backwardness
and with reference to other constitutional principle, .come to a conclusion.

The State has a vital interest to uphold the efficiency of administra-
G tion. To ignore efficiency is to fail the nation. Any step taken by the State
in considering the claims of members or the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes for appointment to public services and posts must be
consistent with the maintenance of efficiency of administration. This prin-
ciple, as stated in Article 335, must necessarily guide all affirmative action
H programmes for backward and other disadvantaged classes of people in
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.I. [TIIOMMEN, J.] 809

matters of appointment to public services and· posts. Likewise, efficiency A
being a compelling State interest, it must strictly guide affirmative action
in matters of admission to academic institutions, and more so in specialised
institutions of higher learning, for in the final analysis efficiency of public
administration is governed by the quality of education and the' skill of the
scholars. To weaken efficiency is to injure the nation. Any reservation made B
without due regard to the command of Article 335 is invidious itnd imper-
missible. The General Manager, Southern R:Ulway v. Ranga'Jiari, (1962) 2
SCR 586; Akhil Bhartiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway) v. Union of
India & Ors., (1981) 2 SCR 185. .

Dr. Ambedkar was unequivocal when he declared that reservation C
must be confmed to a minority of the available posts, lest it should destory
the very concept of equality and thm undermine democracy. Any excessive
reservation or any unnecessarily prolonged reservation will result in in-
vidious discrimination. What exactly is the total percentage of reservation
at a given time is a matter for the State to decide, dependent on the need
of the time. But in no case shall rese,rvation overstep the strict boundaries D
of minority of se,ats or posts or outlast the reason for it. It must remain
'
well below 50% of available seats or posts. Every reservation.must be made
with a view to its early termination on the successful accompli5hment of its
object.
E
It has been contended that reservation can be made not only at the
time of initial appointment to a service, but also at the time of promotion
to a higher post. Although this point does not directly arise from the
impugned orders, it is too vital an aspect of the concept of reservation
under Article 16(4) to be overlooked, and it requires, therefore, to be dealt
with, 'llbeit briefly, and particularly in deference to the submissions at the F
bar. This important question must be considered with reference to the
overriding principle of fairness and efficiency of administration.

To be. overlooked at the time of promotioh in favour of a person who
is junior in service and having no claim to superior merits is to cause G
frustration and passio11atc prejudice, hostility and ill will not only in the
mind of the overlooked candidate, but also in the minds of the generality
of employees. Any such discrimination is unfair and it causes· dissatisfac-
tion, indi.•ci!'line and inefficiency.

Article 335 requires that "in the making of appointments to services H
810 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State" the
claims of the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes must
be considered 'consistently with the maintenance of efficiency of
administration'. If that is the constitutional mandate with regard to the
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, the same principle must
necessarily hold good in respect of all backward classes of citizens. The
...
B requirement of efficiency is an overriding mandate of the. Constitution. An
inefficient administration betrays the present as well as the future of the
nation.

'Reservation of appointments or posts' mentioned in Article 16(4) is
C with reference· to appointments 'in favour of any backward class of citizens
which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the
services under the State'. The condition precedent to making any such
reservation is the satisfaction of the State as to the inadequate repre·
sentation of any backward class of citizens in the services under the State.
In respect of any such class, it is open to the State to make 'any provision
D for the reservation of appointments ~r posts'. '
An appointment is necessarily to a post, but every appointment need
not necessarily be to a post in a service. An appintment to an ex-cadre post
is as much as appointment to a post as it is in' the case of a cadre post.
E The words 'appointments or posts' used in the alternative, and in respect
of which reservation can be made, indicate that the appointment con-
templated in Article 16(4) is not necessarily confined to posts in the
services, but can be made to any post whether or not borne on the cadre
of a service. Inadequate representation of any backward class of citizens
enables the State to make provisions for the reservation of 'appointments
F or posts'.

The word 'post' is often used in the Constitution in the wider sense
for various purposes [see for example, Articles 309, 310(1) and 335]. It is
in that sense that the words 'appointments or posts' in Article 16(4) should
G be understood. The reasoning to the contrary in The General Manager,
Southem Railway v. Rangachari, (1%2] 2 SCR 586 was partly influenced by
certain concessions made by the respondents' counsel as to the nature of
the post contemplated in Article 16(4) and the applicability of reservation
to selection posts.

H The object of reservation is to maintain numerical and qualitative or
'
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [TIIOMMEN, J.] 811
_/
relative equality by ensuring sufficient representation for all classes of A
\ citizens. In whichever service backward class of citizens is inadequately
represented, it is open to the State to create sufficient number of post• for
direct appointments. No matter whether the appointment is maQ.e to a
cadre post or an ex-cadre post, the State action is beyond reproach so long
as the constitutional objective of numerical and qualitative equality of
"opportunity_ is maintained by making direct appointments at the ap- B
propriate levels whenever inadequate representation of any backward class
in the services is noticed by the State.

The intitial appoin1111ents may be made at various levels or grades of
the hierarchy in the service. There is no warrant in Article 16{4) to c '
conclude from the expression 'reservation ()(appointments or posts' that
reservation extends not merely to the initial ailJ>ointment, but to every stage
of promotion. Once appointed in a service, ky further discrimination in
matters relating to conditions of service, such as salary, increments, promo-·
tions, retirement benefits, etc. is constitutionally impermissible, it being the
very negation of equality, fairness and justice. D

To construr the expression 'p.ost' so as to make reservation ap-
plicable at the stage of promotion by selection or otherwise is to unduly
and unfairly .discriminate against persons who are already in the service
and are senior and no less meritorious in comparision to the reserved E
candidates. Promotion by selection, though based on merits, is nltimately
governed by seniority, for the concerned rules generally provide that, where
merits are equal, officers will be ranked according to their seniority. In the
case of promotion by seniority subject to fitness, merits are not entirely
disregarded, for even a senior officer can be overlooked in favour of a F
"junior officer, if the former is found to be urifit for promotion. In all
promoti:ins, whether by selection or otherwise, merits and seniority are

' both significantly relevant and reservation of such posts in disregard of
these two elements will result in invidious discrimination.

In whichever post that a member of a backward class is appointed, G
reservation provisftins are attracte\I. at the stage of his initial appointment and
not subsequently. Further "promotio11s mut be governed by common rules
applicable to all employees of the respective grpq~s. Reasoning to the con-
trary in decisions, such as 111e General Mantiger, Southern Railway v.' Ran-
gachari, [1962] 2 SCR 586; State of Punjab v. Hirata/ & Ors., (1971] 3 SCR 267; H

•
812 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
'-- .I
A Akhil BharatiyaSoshit Kannachari Sangh (Railway) v. Union of India & Ors.,
[1981] 2 SCR 185, is not warranted by the language of the Contitution.

The Constitution does not permit any citizens to be treated unfarily
or unequally. To maintain numerical and qualitiative equality and thus
ensure adequately effective representation of the backward classes in the
B services, it is open to the State to make direct appointments at various
levels or grades of the service, and make appropriate provisions for reser, /
vation in respect of such initial appointments. Once appointed to a post,
any further discrimination by reservation in regard to conditions of service
including promotion is impermissible. Any deviation from this golden rule
C of justice and equality is unconstitutional.

Reservation is the extreme limit to which the doctrine of affirmative
action can be extended. Beyond the strict confines of clause (4) of Article
16, reservation in public employment has no warrant .in the law for it then
becomes the very antithesis of equality. While reservation is inipermissible
D for appointment to higher posts by promotion from lower posts, any other
legitimate affirmative action in favour of disadvantaged classes of citizens
by means of valid classification is perfectly in accordance with the mandate
of Article 16(1). It is within the discretion of the State to extend to all
disadvantaged groups, including any backward class of candidates,·
E preferences or concessions such as longer period of minimum time to pass
qualifying tests etc. [see N.M. Thomas (supra)].

Reservation ·affords backward classes of citizens a golden oppor-
tunity to serve the nation and thus gain security, status, comparative
affluence and influence in decision making process. But it is wrong to see
F · it as a mere weapon to capture power, as suggested at the bar. In a
democracy, real power lies in the ballot and it is exercised by the majority.'
Any attempt to project the concept of reservation under clause (4) as a
weapon of aggrandisement to gain power will result in the creation of a
meaningless myth and a dangerous illusion which will ultimately distort the
constitutional values.

It is possible that large segments of population enioying well
entrenched political advantages by reason of numerical strength may claim
"backward class" status, when, on correct principle, they may not qualify to
be so regarded. If such claims were to be conceded on extraneous con-
H sideration, motivated by pressures of expediency, and without due regard
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [THOMMEN, J.] 813

to the nature and degree of backwardness, the very evil of discrimination A
which is sought to be remedied by the constitution would be in danger of
being perpetuated in the reverse at the expense of merit and efficiency and
contrary to the interests of the truly backward classes of citizen; who are
the constitutionally intended beneficiaries of reservation. In the words of
Krishna Iyer, J.:·
B
'
".... To lend immortality to the reservation policy is to defeat
its raison de'etre; to politicise this provision for c::ommunal
support and Party ends is to subvert the solemD"undertak-
ing of Art. 16(1) ...... ".

Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchan Sangh (Railway) v.
c
Union of India & Ors., (1981] 2 SCR 185 at 203.

The sooner the need for reservation' is brought to an end, the better
it would be for the nation as a whole. The sooner we redressed all
disabilities and wiped out all traces of historical discrimination, and D
stopped identifying classes of citizens by the stereotyped, stigmatised and
ignominious label of backwardness, the stronger, healthier and better
united we would have emerged as a nation founded on diverse customs,
practices, religions and languages but knitted together by innumerable
binding strands of common culture and tradition.
E
General Observations:

It is wrong and unwise to see affirmative action merely as a penance
or an atonement for the sins of past discrimination. It is not .retributive
justice on wrong doers. It is corrective and remedial justice to compensate F
the victims of prior injustice. It is not merely focussed on reparation for
past inequities. It is a forward looking balancing act of reformative social
engineering; an ar_chitecture of a better future of harmonious relationshik
amongst all classes of citizens; an equitable redistribution of communitJ
· resources with a view to the greatest happiness of the greatest number of
people. G

It is true that an important aspect of State interest in initiating
affirmative action is to• correct or remedy· the evil effect of inequities
stemming from prior discrimination, but the focus in any such action must
be on the victims and not on the wrong doers. The .constitutional mandate . H
814 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A is to rescue the victims of prior discrimination and not to punish the wrong
doers. '.The sins of the past shall not visit upon the present either by allowing
its ill effects to continue or by taking retributive action as retaliation upon
the wrong doers. The task of nation building is not to open up the wounds
of the past, but to allow them to heal by negativing its ill effects and wiping
B off injustice stemming from It. Any present or contunuing discrimination
is, of course, remediable or punishable under. the law. Removal of inequi-
ties is the reison d'etre of any affirmative action\

Discrimination in any form hurts asJhere is an element of deprivation
of the legitimate expectations of classes of people upon whom the in-
C evitable consequences of any such action must necessarily fall. Any unfair
and undue deprivation of any class of people is constitutionally impermis-
sible.

Reservation of posts or seats for the benefit of some and to the
exclusion of others is inherently unjust, and unfair unless strictly brought
D within reasonable limits. The only legitimate object of excluding the
generality of people and conferring a special benefit upon the chosen
classes is to redeem the latter from their backwardness.

Reservation should be avoided except in extreme cases of acute
E backwardness resulting from prior discrimination as in the case of the
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Trlbes and other classes of persons
in comparable positions. In all other cases, preferential treatment short of
reservation can be adopted. Any such action, though in some respects
discriminatory, is permissible on the basis of a legitimate classification
rationally related to the attainment of equality in all its aspects.
F
Any attempt to view affirmative action as merely retribnties or to
unduly over-emphasise its compensatory aspect and widen the scope of
/reservation beyond minority of posts or seats is to practice excessive and
1
invidious reverse discrimination. To project particular castes as legitimate
claimants for such compensatory discrimination, without due regard to the
G nature and degree of their backwardness, is to invite the public wrath of
stigmatising prejudice against them, thereby promoting caste hatred and
. separatism. Any such stereotyped and stigmatised approach to this soul
sea~ching sociological problem is to distort the fairness of the political and
constitutional process of adjustment and readjustment amongst classes of
H people in our country.
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [THOMMEN, J.] 815

Affirmative action is not merely compensatory justice, which it is, but A
is also distributive justice seeking to ensure that community resources are
more equitably and justly shared among all classes of citiznes. Further-
more, from the point of view of social utility, affirmative action promotes
maximum well-being for the society as a whole and strengthens forces of
national integration and general economic prosperity.
B
Any benign affirmative action with a view to equality amongst classes
of citizens is a constitutionally permitted programme, but the weapon of
reservation must be carefully and sparingly used in order that, while the
victims of past" discrimination are appropriately compensated, the
generality of persons striving to progress on their own merits do not C
become victims of excessive, unfair and invidious reverse discrimination.
Affirmative action must find justification in the removal of disadvantages
and not in their impostition. See Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 2nd
edn. (1988) pp. 1521-1554; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination:
Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases. Harvard Law Review, Vol. 100, p. 78
(1986-87); Marc Galanter, Competing Equalities, (1984); Myrl L Duncan, D
The Future of Affirmative Action: A Jurisprudential/Legal Critique, Harvard
Civil Rights Civil Liberties Law Review, Vol. 17, 1982, p. 503; The Rights
of Peoples, Edited by James Crawford, Oxford (1988).

Summary:.
E
(1) It is open to the .State to adopt ·v'atid classification and make
special provisions for the protection of classes of citiznes whose compara-
tive backwardness the State has a mandate to redress by affirmative action
programmes. Any such programme must be strictly tailored to the constitu,
tional requirement that no citizens shall be excluded from being considered F

-·
on the basis of merits for any public employment except to the extent that
a valid reservation has been made in favour of backward classes of citizens.

(2) The Constitution prohibits discrimination on grounds only of
religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them.
Any discrimination sofoly on any one or more of these prohibited grounds G
will result in invidious reverse discrimination which is impermissible. None
of these grounds is the sole or the dominaiit or the indispensable criterion
to identify backwardness which qualifies for reservation. But each of them
is, in conjunction with factors such as poverty, illiteracy, demeaning oc-
cupation, malnutrition, physical and intellectual deformity and like disad- H
816 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A vantages, a relevant criterion to identify socially and educationally back-
ward classes of citizens for whom reservation is intended.

(3) Reservation contemplated under Article 16 is meant exclusively
for backward classes of citizens who are not adequately represented in the
services under the State. ·
B
{4)·0nly such·classes.of citizens who are socially and educationally
backward are qualified to be identified as backward classes. To be accepted
as backward classes for the purpose of. reservation under Article 15 or
Article 16, their backwardness must have been either recognised by means of
C a notification by the ·President under Article 341 or Article 342 declaring
them· to be Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, or; on an objective
consideration, identified by the State to be socially and educationally so
backward by reason of identified prior discrimination and its continuing ill
effects as to be comparable to· the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes.
D In the case of the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes, these conditions
are, in view of the· notifications, presumed to be'Satisfied:In the case of the
other backward classes-ofcitiznes qualified for reservation, the burden is on
the State to show that these classes have been subjected to such discrimina-
tion in the past that they are reduced to a state of helplessness, poverty and
consequential social and educational backwardness as in the case of the
E Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. In other words, reservation is.
meant exclusively for the Harijans, the Girijans, the Adivasis, the Dalits or
other like "depressed" classes or races or tribes most unfortunately referred
to in the past as the "untouchables" or the "outcastes" by reason of their being
born in what was wrongly regarded as. low easies and associated with what
F was equally wrongly treated as demeaning occupations, or any other class of
citiznes afflicted by like degree of poverty and degradation caused by prior
and continuing discrimination and exploitation, whatever be their professed
faith, religion or caste. These classes of citizens, segregated in slums and
ghettos and afflicted by grinding poverty, disease, ignorance, ill health and
backwardness, and haunted by fear and aruri0ty, are the constitutionally
G intended beneficiaries of reservation, not because of their castes or occupa-
tions, which are merely incidental facts of history, but because of their
backwardness and disabilities stemming from identified past or continuing
inequities and discrimination.

H (5) Members of the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes do
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [TIIOMMEN, J.] 817

not lose the benefits of reservation and other affirmative action program- A
mes intended for backward classes merely by reason of their conversion
from the Hindu or the Sikh or the Buddhist religion to any other religion,
and all such persons shall continue to be accorded all such benefits until
such time as they cease to be backward.

(6) Identification of backward classes for the purpose of reservation B
with reference to historical discrimination and its continuing ill effects is,
however, subject to the overriding condition that no person whose means
exceeded a predetermined economic level should be entitled to the protec-
tion of reservation, however backward he may be socially and educationally.
He may, however, be considered for the benefits of other affirmative action C
programmes, but in doing so his comparative affluence in relation to other
backward class candidates may be a relevant consideration to exclude him.

(7) Once a class of citizens is identified on correct principle as
backward for the purpose of reservation, the "means test" must be strictly
and uniformly applied to exclude all those persons in that class reaching D
above the predetermined ecomomic level.

(8) Reservation in all cases mast be confined to a minority of
available posts or seats so as not to unduly sacrifice merits. The number of
seats or posts reserved under Article 15 or Article 16 must at all times E
remain well below 50% of the total number of seats or posts.

(9) Reservation has no application to promotion. It is confined to
initial appointment, whichever be the level or grade at which such appoint-
ment is made in the administrative hierarchy, and whether or not the post
in question is borne on the cadre of the service. F

(10) Once reservation is strictly confined to the constitutionally in-
tended beneficiaries, as aforesaid, there will probably be no need to
disappoint any deserving candidate legitimately seeking the benefit of
reservation, for there will then be sufficient room well within the 50% limit
for all candidates belonging to the backward classes as properly deter- G
mined on correct principle. In that event, questions such as caste or
religion will become merely academic and the competing maddening rush
for "backward' label will vanish.

(11) A periodic administrative review of all affirmative action H
818 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A programmes, including reservation of seats or posts, must be conducted by
a specially constituted Permanent Authority with a view to adjustment and
readjustment of such programmes in proportion to the nature, degree and
extent of backwardness. All such programmes must stand the test of
. judicial review whenever challenged. Reservation being exclusionary in
character must necessarily stand the test of heightened administrative and
B judicial solicitude so as to be confined to the strict bounds of constitutional
principles.

(12) Whenever and wherever poverty and backwardness are iden-
tified, it is the constitutional responsibility of the State to initiate economic
C and other measures to ameliorate the conditions of the people residing in
those regions. But economic backwardness without more does not justify
reservation.

{13) Poverty demands affirmative action. Its eradication is a constitu-
tional mendate. The immediate target to which every affirmative action
D programme contemplated by Article 15 or Article 16 is addressed is
poverty causing backwardness. But it is only such poverty which is the •
continuing ill-effect of identified prior discrimination, resulting in back-
wardness comparable to that of the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled
Tribes, that justifies reservation.
E
(14) While reservation is a remedy for historical discrimination and
its continuing ill effects, other afirmative action programmes are intended
to redress discrimination of all kinds, whether current or historical.

(15) Any legitimate affirmative action must be supported by a valid
F classification based on an intelligible differentia distinguishing classes of
citizens chosen for the protective measures from the generality of citizens
excluded from such measures, and such differentia must bear a reasonable
nexus with the object sought to be achieved, namely, the amelioration of
the backwardness of the chosen classes of citizens, which implies a
G reasonable proportion between the aim of the action and the means
employed for its accomplishment, and its discontinuance upon the ac-
complishment of the object.

(16) In the final analysis, poverty which is the ultimate result of
inequities and which is the immediate cause and effect of backwardness
H has to be eradicated not merely by reservation as aforesaid, but by free
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [TIIOMMEN, J.] 819

medical aid, free elementary education, scholarships for higher education A
and other financial support, free housing, self-employment and settlement
schemes, effective implementation of land reforms, strict and impartial
operation of the law-enforcing machinery, industralisation, construction of
roads, bridges, culverts, canals, markets, introduction of transport, free
supply of water, electricity and other ameliorative measures particularly in B
areas densely populated by backward classes of citiznes.

CONCLUSIONS:

A. The validity of the impugned Government Orders
providing for reservation of posts depends on convinc- C
ing proof of proper identification of backward classes
of citizens by recourse to' relevant criteria, such as
poverty, illiteracy, disease, unhygienic living condi-
tions, low caste and consequential isolation, and in
accordance with correct principle, i.e., with reference D
to the continuing ill effects of historical discrimination
resulting in social and educational backwardness com-
parable to that of the Scheduled Castes m the
Scheduled Tribes, and inadequate representation of
such classes of citizens in the services under the State,
but subject to the overriding condition tbat all those E
persons whose means have exceeded a predetermined
economic level shall be denied reservation. Amongst
the aforementioned backward classes of citizens cor-
rectly identified to be qualified for reservation,
preference may be legitimately extended lo the com- F
paratively poorer or more disadvantaged sections.

B. Reservation of seats or posts solely on the basis of
economic backwardness i.e., without regard to
evidence of historical discrimination, as aforesaid,
finds no justification in the Constitution. G

C. Reservation of seats or posts for backward classes of
citizens, including tbose for the Scheduled Castes and
the Scheduled Tribes, must remain well below 50% of
the total seats or posts. H
820 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A D. Reservation is confined to initial appointment to a post
and has no application to promotion.

E. It is open to the State to adopt any valid affirmative
action programme, otherwise than by reservation, for
amelioration of the disabilities of all disadvantaged
B persons, including backward classes of citizens.

Neither the impugned orders of the Government of India (O.M. No.
36012/31/90-Estt(SCT) dated 13th August, 1990 and O.M. No. 36012/31/90-
Estt(SCT) dated 25th September, 1991) nor the material relied upon by it nor
C the affidavits filed in support of the said orders disclose proper application of
mind by the concerned authorities to the principle stated above for valid
identification of the backward classes of citizens qualified for reservation in
terms of Article 16 of the Constitution of India. The impugned orders are,
therefore, unsustainable. The respondent-Government is accordingly
directed to reconsider the question of reservation contemplated by Article
D 16(4) in the light of the aforesaid principle and pass appropriate orders.

ORDER

We have delivered onr separate judgments. In the light of the reasons
stated by us, the impugned orders [O.M. No. 36012/31/90- Estt(SCT) dated
E 13th August, 1990 and O.M. No. 36012/31/90 Estt (SCT) dated 25th
September, 1991) issued by the Government of India are declared unen-
forceable for want of valid identification of backward classes of citizens
qualified for reservation under Article 16 of the Constitution of India. In
the circumstances, we direct the Union of India to re-examine the question
of identification of the backward classes of citizens in accordance with the
F
principle and directives contained in our respective judgments and pass
appropriate orders providing for reservation under Article 16(4).

The above cases are disposed of accordingly. There shall be no order
as to costs.
G
ANNEX URE

DR. AMBEDKAR'S SPEECH IN THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMB-
LY ON 30.11.1948

H Now, Sir, to come to the other question which has been agitating the
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. (THOMMEN, J.] 821
members of this House, viz., the use of the word "backward" in clause (3) A
of Articie 10, I should like to begin by making some general reservation so
that members might be in a position to ,understand the exact import, the
significance and the neccessity for using the word "backward" in this
particular clause . If members were to try and exchange their views on this
subject, they will find that there are three points of view which it is
necessary for us to reconcile if we are to produce a workable proposition
B
which will be accepted by all. Of the three points of view, the first is that
there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens. It is the desire of many
members of this House that every individual who is qualified for a par-
ticular post should be free to apply for that post, to sit for examinations
and to have his qualifications tasted so as to determine whether he is fit c
for the post or not and that there ought to be no limitations, there ought
to be no hindrance in the operation of this principle of equality of oppor-
tunity. Another view mostly shared by a section of the House is that, if this
principle is to be operative - and it ought to be operative in their judgment
to its fullest extent - there ought to be. no reservations of any sort for any D
class or community at all, that all citizens, if therare qualified, should be
placed on the same footing of equality so far as the public services are
concerned. That is the second point of view we have. Then we have quite
a massive opinion which insists, that, although theoretically it is good to
have the principle that there shall be equality of opportunity, there must
at the same time he a provision made for the·entry of certain communities E
which have so far been outside the administration. As I said, the, Drafting
Committee had to produce a formula which would reconcile these three
points of view, firstly, that there shall be equality of opportunity, secondly
that there shall be reservations in favour of certain communities which have
not so far had a 'proper look-in' so to say into the administration. If F
honourable Members will bear these facts in mind - the three principles,
we had to reconcile, - they will see that no better formula could be
produced than the one that is embodied in sub-clause (3) of Article 10 of
the Constitution; they will find that the view of those who believe and hold
that there shall be equality of opportunity, has been embodied in sub-clause
(1) of Article 10. It is a generic principle. At lhe same time, as I said, we G
had to reconcile this formula with the demand made by certain com-
munities that the administration which has now - for historical reasons -
been controlled by one community or a few communities, that situation
should disappear and that the others also must have an opportunity of
getting into the public services. Supposing, for instance, we were to con· H
822 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A cede in full the demand of those communities who have not been so far
employed in the public services to the fullest extent, what would really
happen is, we shall be completely destroying the first proposition upon
which we are all agreed, namely, that there shall be an equality of oppor-
tunity. Let me give an illustration. Supposing, for instance, reservations
B were made for a community or a collection of communities, the total of
which came to someting like 70 per cent of the total posts under the State
and only 30 per cent are retained as the unreserved. Could anyboday say
that the reservation of 30 per cent as open to general competition would
be satisfactory from the point of view of giving effect to the first principle,
namely, that there shall be equality of opportunity? It cannot be in my
C judgment. Therefore the seats to be reserved, if the reservation is to be
consistent with sub-clause (1) of Article 10, must be confined to a minority
of seats. It is then only that the first principle could find its place in the
Constitution and effective in operation. If honourable Members understand
this position that we have to safegard two things, namely, the principle of
D equality of opportunity and at the same time satisfy the demand of com-
munities which have not had so far representation in the State, then, I am
sure they will agree that unless you use some such qualifying phrase as
''backward" the exception made in favour of reservation will ultimately eat
up the rule aliogether. Nothing of the rule will remain. That I think, if I
may say so, is the justification why the Drafting Committee undertook on
E its own shoulders the responsiblity of introducing the word "backward"
which, I admit, did not originally fmd a place in the fundamental right in
the way in which it was passed by this Assembly. But I think honourable
Members will realise that the Drafting Committee which has been ridiculed
on more than one ground for producing sometimes a loose draft, some-
F times something which is not appropriate and so on, might have opened
itself to further attack that they produced a Draft Constitution in which the
exception was so large, that it left no room for the rule to operate. I think
this is sufficient to justify why the word "backward" has been used.

With regard to the minorities, there is a special reference to that in
G Article 2%, where it has been laid down that some provision will be made
with regard to the min.orities. Of course, we did not lay down any propor-
tion. That is quite clear from the section itself, but we have not altogether
omitted the minorities from consideration. Somebody asked me: "What is
a backward c.ommunity"? Well, I think any one who reads the language of
H the draft itself will find that we have left it to be determined by each local
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [KULDIP SINGH, J.] 823

Government. A backward community is a community which is backward in A
the opinion of the Government. My honourable Friend Mr. T.T. Krish-
namachari asked me whether this rule will be justiciable. It is rather
difficult to give a dogmatic answer. Personally I think it would be a
justiciable matter. If the local Government included in this category of
reservations such a large number of seats; I think one could very well go
to the Federal Court and the Supreme Court and say that the reservation
B
is of such a magnitude that the rule regarding equality of opportunity has
been destroyed and the court will then come to the conclusion whether the
local Government or the State Government has acted in a reasonable and
prudent manner. Mr. Krishnamachari asked : "Who is a reasonable man
and who is a prudent man? These are matters of litigation". Of course, they C
are matters of litigation, but my honourable Friend, Mr. Krishnamachari
will understand that the words "reasonable persons and prudent persons"
have been used in very many laws and if he will refer only to the Transfer
of Property Act, he will find that in very many cases the words "a
reasonable person and a prudent person" have very well been defined and D
the court will not find any difficulty in defining it. I hope, therefore that
the amendments which I have accepted, will be accepted by the House.

CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES, VOL. 7
( 1948-49), pp. 701- 702.
E
**************

KULDIP SINGH, J, The Government action on the Manda! Report
evoked spontaneous reaction all over the country. The controversy brought
to the four important constitutional issues for the determination of this F
Court. Nine-Judge Banch, specially constituted, has had a marathon-hear-
ing on various aspects of Article 16 of the Constitution of India. There are
five judgments, from Brother Judges on Mandal-Bench, in circulation. I
have the pleasure of carefully reading these erudite expositions on various
facets of Article 16 of the Constitution of India. I very much wanted to
refrain from writing a separate judgment but keeping in view the impor- G
lance of the issues involved and also not being able to persuade myself to
agree fully with any of the judgments I have ventured to express myself
separately. I may, however, say that on some of the vital issues I am in
complete agreement with RM. Sahai, J. The historical background and the
factual.matrix have been succinctly narrated by Brother Judges and as such H
824 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A it is not necessary for me to cover the same.

I propose to deal with the following issues in seriatim:

A. Whether "class" in Article 16(4) of the Constitution means "caste"?
Can caste be adopted as a collectivity to identify the backward classes for
B the purposes of Article 16(4)?

B. Whether the expression "any backward class of citizens" in Article
16(4) means "socially and educationally backward classes" as it is in Article
15(4)?

c C. What is meant by the expression "any backward class of
citizens ....... not adequately represented in the Services under the State " in
Article 16(4)?

D. Whether Article 16(4) permits reservation of appointments or
D posts at the Stage of initial entry into Government Services or even in the
process of promotion?

E. Whether Article 16(4) is exhaustive of the State-power to provide
job-reservations?

E F. If Article 16(1) does not permit job-reservations, can protective
discrimination as a compensatory measure permissible, in any other form
under Article 16(1)?

G. To what extent reservations are permissible under Article 16(4)?
Below 50% or to any extent?
F
H. When a 'backward class" has been identified, can a means-test be
applied to skim-off the affluent section of the "backward class"?

I. Can poverty be the sole criterion for identifying the "backward
G class' under Article 16(4).

J. ls it mandatory to provide reservations by a legislative Act or it
can be done by the State in excercise of its executive power?

K. Whether the identification of 3743 castes as a "backward class" by
H Manda! Commission is constitutionally valid?
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.l. [KULDIP SINGH, J.] 825

A A
Mr. Ram Jethmalani appearing for the State of Bihar has advanced
.. an extreme argument that the 'class' under Article 16(4) means 'caste'. Mr .
P.P. Rao on the other had vehemently argued that the Constitution of
India, with secularism and equality of opportunity as its basic features, does
not brook an argument of the type advanced by Mr. Jethmalani. According B
to him caste is a closed door. It is not a path - even if it is - it is a prohibited
path under the Constitution.

We may pause and have a fresh-look at the socio-political history of
India prior to the independence of the country. C
Caste-system in this country is sui-generis to Hindu religion. The
Hindu-orthodoxy believes that an early hymn in the Rg-Veda (the
Purusasukta:- 10.90) and the much later Manava Dharma Sastra (law of
Manu), are the sources of the caste-system. Manu, the law-giver cites the
Purusasukta as the source and justification for the caste division of his own D
time. Among the Aryans the priestly caste was called the Brahmans, the
warriors were called the Kshatriyas, the common people divided to agricul-
ture, pastoral pursuits, trade and inuustry were called the Vaishyas and the
Dasas or non·Aryans and people of mix-blood were assigned the status of
Shudras. The Chaturvarna - system has been gradually ·distorted in shape E
and meaning and has been replaced by the prevalent caste-system in Hindu
society. The caste system kept a large section of people in this country
outside the fold of the society who were called the untouchables. Manu
required that the dwelling of the untouchables shall be outside the village
- their dress, the garments of the dead - their food given to them in a F
broken dish. We are proud of the fact that the Framers of the Constitution

-· have given a special place to the erstwhile untouchables under the Con-
stitution. The so called untouchable-caste have been named as Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes and for them reservations and other benefits
have been provided under the Constitution. Even now if a Hindu- caste
stakes its claim as high as that of Scheduled Ca.tes it can be included in G
that category by following the procedure under the Constitution.

The caste system as projected by Manu and accepted by the Hindu
society has proved to be the biggest curse for this country. The Chaturvar-
na-system under the Aryans was more of an occupational order projecting H
826 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A the division of labour. Thereafter, in the words of Professor Harold A.
Gould in his book "The Hindu Caste System'', the Brahmins "sacralized the
occupational order, and occupationalised the sacred order". Y'ith the
passage of tirr.e the caste-system become the cancer-cell of the Hindu
Society.
..-
B Before the invasions of the Turks and establishment of Muslim rule
the caste-system had brought havoc to the social order. The Kshtriyas being
the only fighters, three-fourth of the Hindu society was a mute witness to
the plunder of the country by the foreigners. Mahmud Ghazni raided and
looted India for seventeen times during 1000 AD to 1027 AD. In 1025 AD
c Mahmud Ghazni raided the famous temple of Somanath. How he
plundered the shrine is a matter of history. Thereafter between 1175 AD
and 1195 AD Mahmud Ghazni invaded India several times. According to
the historians one of the causes of the defeat of the Indians at the hands
of Turks was the prevalent social conditions especially the caste system of
Hindus.
D
Mr. L.P. Sharma in his book 'Ancient History of India' writes that the
prevalent social conditions, practice of untouchability and division of
society by the caste-system among others were the causes of defeat of
Rajputs at the hands of Turks. Mr. Sharma quotes various other historians
E in the following words:

"Dr. KA. Nizami, has also pointed out that the caste system
weakened the Rajputs militarily bacause the responsibility
of fighting was left lo a particular section of the society i.e.
F the Kshatriyas. He writes, "The real cause of the defeat of
the Indians lay in their social system and their invidious
caste distinctions, which rendered the whole military or-
ganisation rickety and weak. Caste taboos and discrimina-
....
tions killed all sense of unity-social or political." Dr. K.S.
Lal also writes that, "It was very much easy for the Muslims
G to get traitors from a society which was so unjustly divided.
This was one of the reasons why all important cities of north
India were lost to the invader (Muhammed of Gbur) within
fifteen years." Dr. R.C. Majumdar writes, "No public
upheaval greets the foreigners, nor are any organised ef-
H forts made to stop their progress. Like a paralysed body,
INDRA SAWHNEY 1·. U.0.1. [KULDIP SINGH. lj 827

the Indian people helplessly look on, while the conquerors A
march on their corpse."

The Hindus did not learn lesson from the invasions of the Turks and
continued to perpetuate the caste system. In the middle of 15th century
major part of north India including Delhi came to be occupied by the
Afghans of Lodi. Ultmately Babar establised the Moghul rule in India in B
1526. After the Mughals the Britishers came and ruled this country till
1947.

This country remained under shackles of slavery for over one
thousand years. The reason for our inability to fight the foreign-rule was C
the social de-generation of India because of the caste-system. To rule this
country it was not necessary to divide the people, the caste-system con-
veyed the message "Divided we are - come and rule us1'.

It was only in the later part of 19th century that the national move-
- '-. ment took birth in this counrty. With the advent of the 20th century D
Mahatma Gandhi, Jawahar Lal Nehru alongwith other leaders infused
national and secular spirit amongst the people of India. For the first time
in the history of India caste, creed and religion were forgotten and people
came together under one banner to fight the British rule. The caste-system
was thrown to the winds and people from all walks of life marched together E
under the slogan of 'Quit-India'. It was not the Kshatriyas alone who were
the freedom fighters - whole of the country fought for freedom. It was the
unity and the integrity of the people of India which brought freedom to
them after thousand years of slavery. The Constitution of India was drafted
in the background of the freedom struggle.
F
Secularism is the basic feature of the Indian Constitution. It envisages
a chohesive, unified and casteless society. The Constitution has completely
obliterated the caste-system and has assured equality before law. Refer-
ence to caste under Articles 15(2) and 16(2) is only to obliterate it. The
prohibition on the ground of caste is total, the mandate is that never again G
inthfo counlry caste shall raise its head. Even access to shops on the ground
of caste. is prohibited. The progress of India has been from casteism to
egnlitarianism-from feudalism I.a freedom.

The caste system which has been put in the grave by the framers of
the Constitution is trying to raise its ugly head in various forms. Caste H
828 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A possess a serious threat to the secularism and as a consequence to the
integrity of the country. Those who do nut learn from the events of history
are doomed to suffer again. It is, therefore, of utmost importance for the
people of India to adhere in letter and spirit to the Constitmion which has
moulded this country into a sovereign, socialist, secular democratic
,.
republic and has promised to secure to all its citizens justice, social
B economic and political, equality of status and of opportunity.

Caste and class are different etymologically. When you talk of caste
you never mean class or the vice-versa. Caste is an iron- frame into which
people keep on falling by birth. M. Weber in his book 'The Religion of
C India' has described India as the land of 'the most inviolable organisation
by birth'. Except the aura of caste there may not be any common thread
among the caste-fellows to give them the characteristic of a class. On the
other hand a class is a homogeneous group which must have some live and
visible common traits and attributes.
D
Professor Andre Beteille, Department of Sociology, University of
Delhi in his book "The Backward Cla::ses in Contemporary India" has
succinctly brought out the distinction ·between 'caste' and 'class' in the
following words:-

E "Whichever way we look at it, a class is an aggregate of
individuals (or, at best, of households), and, as such, quite
different from a caste which is an enduring group. This

F
distinction between an aggregate of individuals and an
enduring group is of fundamental significance to the
sociologist and I suspect, to the jurist as well. A class
derives the character it has by virtue of the characteristics
of its individual members. In the case of caste, on the other
-
hand, it is the group that stamps the individual with its own
characteristics. There are some affiliations which an in-
dividual may change, including that of his class; he cannot
G change his caste. At least in principle a caste remains the
same caste even when a majority of its individual members
change there occupation, or their income, or even their
relation to the means of production; it would be absurd
from the sociological point of view to think of a class in this
H way. A caste is a grouping sui generis, very different from
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [KULDIP SINGH, l.] 829

a class, particularly when we define class in terms of income A
or occupation. 11

Article 16(2) of the Constitution of India in clear terms states that
"no citizen shal~ on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex descent, place
·of birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible for, or descriminated
against in respect of, any employment or office under the Slate." In Jux- B
taposition Article 16(4) states that "nothing in this Article shall prevent the
state from making any provisions for the reservations of appointments or
posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of
the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State".
On a bare reading of the two sub-clauses of Article 16 it is obvious_ that c
the Constitution forbids classification on the ground of caste. No backward
class can, therefore, be identified on the basis of caste.

We may refer to some of the judgments of this Court on the subject.

In R. Chitralekha & Anr. v. State of Mysore & Ors., [1964) 6 SCR 368, D
this Court observed as under:-

"The important factor to be noticed in Art. 15(4) is that it
does not speak of castes, but only speaks of classes. If the
makers of the Constitution intended to take castes also as E
units of social and educational backwardness, they would
have said so as they have said in the case of the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Though it may be suggested
that the wider expression "classes" is used in cl.(4) of Art.
15 as there are communities without caste, if the intention
was to equate classes with castes, nothing prevented the F
makers of the Constitution from using the expression
"backward classes or castes". The juxtaposition of the ex-
11
pression "backward classes" and Scheduled Castes" in Art.
15(4) also leads to a reasonable inference that the expres-
sion nclassesn is-not synonymous with castes .......This inter-
pretation will carry out the intention of the Constitution
G
expressed in the aforesaid Articles ....... If we interpret the
expression "classes11 as "castes", the object of the Constitu-
tion will be frustrated and the people who do not deserve
any adventitious aid may get it to the exclusion of those
1

who really deserve.' This anomaly will not arise if, without H
830 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A equating caste with class, caste is taken as one of the ....
considerations to ascertain whether person belongs to a
backward class or not. On the other hand, if the entire
sub-caste, by and large, is backward, it may be included in
the Scheduled Castes by following the appropriate proce-
dure laid down by the Constitution ........ But what we intend
B 11
to emphasize is that under no circumstance a class" can
be equated to a "caste", though the caste of an individual
or a group or individual may be considered along with other
relevant factors in putting him in a particular class. We
would also like to make it clear that if in a g;Oven situation
caste is excluded in ascertaining a class within'the meaning
c of Art.15(4) of the Constitution "It does not vitiate the
classification if it satisfied other tests."

In Triloki Nath and Anr. v. State of Jummu & Kashmir & Ors., [1969]
1 SCR 103, this Court observed as under:-
D
"Article 16 in the first instance by cl.(2) prohibits dis-
crimination on the ground, inter alia, of religion, race, caste,
place of birth, residence and permits an exception to be
made in the matter of reservation in favour of backward
classes of citizens. The expression "backward class 11 is not
E used as synonymous with "backward caste" or "backward
community........ .In its ordinary connotation the expression
"class" means a homogeneous section of the people grouped
together because of certain likenesses or common traits,
and who are identifiable by some common attributes such
as status, rank, occupation, residence in a locality, race,
F religion and the like. But for the purpose of Art.16(4) in
determining whether a section forms a class, a test solely
based on caste, community, race, religion~ sex, descent,
place of birth or residence cannot be adopted, because it
would directly offend the Constitution."
G In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Pradip Tandon & Ors., [1975] 2 SCR 761,
the following observations of this Court are relevant:-

''"rhe expression 'classes of citizens' indicates a homo-
geneous section of the people who are grouped together
H because of certain likeliness and coinmon traits and who
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [KULDIP SINGH, J.] 831

are identifiable by some common attributes. The A
homogeneity of the class of citizens is social and education-
al backwardness. Neither caste nor religion not place of
birth will be the uniform element of common attributes to
make them a class of citizens."

Finally in Kumari K.S. Jayasree & Anr. v. The State of Kera/a & Anr., B
[1977] 1 SCR 194, this Court held as under:-

"It is not necessary to remember ·that special provision is
contemplated for classes of citizens and not for individual
citizens as such, and so though the caste of the group of
citizens may be relevant, its importance should not be
c
exaggerated. If the classification is based solely on caste of
the citizer.s, it may not be logical. Social backwardness is
the result of poverty to a very large extent. Caste and poverty
are both relevant for determining the backwardness."
D
It is, thus, obvious that this Court has firmly held that 'class' under
Article 16{4) cannot mean 'caste'. Chitralekha's case is an authority on the
point that caste can be totally excluded while identifying a 'backward class'.
This Court in Pradip Tandon's case has held that caste cannot be the
uniform element of common attributes to make it a class. E
Secular feature of the Constitution is its basic structure. Hinduism,
from which the caste-system flows, is not the only religion in India. Caste
is an anathema to Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains. Even
Arya Smajis, Brahma Smajis, Lingyats and various other denominations in
this country do not believe in caste-system. If all these religions have tO F
co-exist in India - can 'class' under Article 16{4) mean 'caste'? Can a caste
-( be given a gloss of a 'class'? Can even the process of identifying a 'class'
begin and end with 'caste'? One may interpret the Constitution from any
angle the answer to these questions has to be in the negative. To say that
in practice caste-system is being followed by Muslims, Christians, Sikhs and G
Buddhists in this country, is to be oblivious to the basic tenets of these
religions. The prophets of these religions fought against casteism and
founded these religions. Imputing ca;te-system in any form to these
religions is impious and sacrilegious. This Court in M.R. Ba/aji & Ors.
v.State of Mysore, [1963] Supp. 1 SCR 439, held as under:- H
832 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A ".......... :~esides, if the caste of the group of citizens was
made the sole basis for determining the social backward-
ness of the said group, that test would inevitably break
down in relation to many sections of Indian society which
do not recognise caste in the conventional sense known to
Hindu society. How is one going to decide whether Mus-
B llins, Christians or Jains, or even Lingayats are socially
backward or not? The test of castes would be inapplicable
to those groups."

I, therefore, hold that 'class' under Article 16(4) cannot be read as
C 'caste'. I further hold that castes cannot be adopted as collectivities for the
purpose of identifying the "backward class" under Article 16(4). I entirely
agree with the reasoning and conclusions reached by R.M. Sahai, J. to the
effect that occupation (plus income or otherwise) or any other secular
collectivity can be the basis for the identification of "Backward classes".
Caste-collectivity is unconstitutional and as such not permitted
D
B

The expression "--any backward class of citizens---" in Article 16( 4)
of the Constitution as understood till - date means 'socially and education-
E ally backward class'. In Janki Prasad Parimoo & Ors. etc. etc. v. State of
Jammu & Kashmir, [1973] 3 SCR 236, Palekar, J. observed as under:-

"Article 15(4) speaks about "socially and educationally
backward classes of citizens". While Article 16(4) speaks
only of "any backward class of citizens". However, it is now •
"
F settled that the expression "backward class of citizens" in
Article 16(4) means the same thing as the expression "any
socially and educationally backward classes of citizens" in
Article 15(4)" .

. Mr. N .A. Palkiwala contended that the above quoted assumption by
G Palekar, J. was without any basis and wholly unjustified. According to him
it was not settled by any judgment of this Court that the two expressions
in Article 15(4) and 16(4) mean the same thing. Far from being "settled",
no judgment of this Court had even suggested prior to 1973 that the
expressions in the two Articles meant the same thing. He further contended
H that unfortunately, in subsequent cases it was not pointed out to this Court
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [KULDIP SINGH, J.] 833

that the assumption of Palekar, J. was not correct and the womg assump- A
tion of the learned Judge passed as correct. According to him an erroneous
assumption, even by a judge of this Court, cannot and does not make the
law. This Court iu M.R. Balaji & Ors. v. State of Mysore, (1963) Supp. 1
SCR 439, speaking through Gajendra Gadkar, J. observed as under:-

"Therefore, what is true iu regard to Art. 15(4) is equally B
true iu regard to Art. 16(4). There can be no doubt that
{
the Constitutiou-makers assumed, as they were entitled to,
that while makiug adequate reservation under Art. 16(4),
care would be taken not to provide for unreasonable,
excessive or extravagant reservation, for that would, by c
elimiuatiug general competition in a large field and by
creating wide-spread di.satisfaction amongst the
employees, materially affect efficiency. Therefore, like the
special provision improperly made under Art. 15(4), reser-
vation made under Art.16(4), beyond the permissible and
D
legitimate limits would be liable to be challenged as a fraud
on the Constitution. In this connection it is necessary to
emphasise that Art. 15( 4) is an enabling provision; it does
not impose an obligation, but merely leaves it to the dis-
cretion of the appropriate government to take suitable
action, if necessary.'
1
E

Although in Ba/aji's case this Court observed "what is true in regard to
Article 15(4) is equally true in regard to 16(4)" but this was entirely in
different context. In the said case reservatigµ, made in the educational ' S
institutions under Article 15(4) were challenged on the ground that the F
same were void being violative of Articles 15(1) and 29{2) of the Constitu-
tion. In the above quoted observations this Court indicated that the reser-
vations made under Article 16{4) can also be challenged on the same or
similar grounds as the reservations under Article 15{4) of the Constitution
of India. This Court did not ·examine the question as to whether the
expression "backward class of citizens" in Article 16(4) means the same G
thing as the expression "any socially and educationally backward classes of
citizens" under Article 15{4).

Articles 340 and 16(4) were in the original Constitution. Article 15{4)
was inserted a year later by the Constitution First Amendment Act, 1951. H
834 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Article 340 refers to "socially and educationally backward classes". The
Framers of the Constitution did not, however, use the expression "socially
and educationally backward" in Article 16(4). T~e definition of 'backward
classes' as socially and educationally backward in Article 340, may have
given rise to the assumption that it was not necessary to re-define the
expression 'backward class' in Article 16(4). Be that as it may the fact
B
remains that there is no reasoned judgment of this Court holding that the
two expressions mean the same thing.

The same Constituent Assembly, which drafted the original Constitu-
tion, drafted Article 15(4) and brought it into the Constitution by way of
C Constitution First Amendment Act, 1951. Article 340 defining 'backward
classes' was already in the original constitution but in spite of that the
Constituent Assembly defined the 'backward classes' for the purposes of
Article 15(4) as "socially and educationally backward". It was, therefore,
not the intention of the Framers of the Constitution to follow the definition
D given in Article 340, where ever the expression 'backward class' occurs in
the Constitution. On the other hand it is plausible to assume that wherever
the Framer of the Constitution wanted the 'backward classes' to be defined
as "socially and educationally backward", they did so, leaving Article 16(4)
to be interpreted in its context.

E
Articles 340 and 15(4) are part of the same Constitutional-Scheme.
Socially and educationally backward classes may be identified by a com-
mission appointed under Article 340 and the said commission- after inves-
tigation - may make recommendations, including the sanctioning of grants,
for the uplift of the backward classes. Article 15(4) makes it possible to
F implement the recommendations of the commission and for that purpose
permits protective discrimination by the State. Since there is identity of
purpose between the two Article the 'backward class' in the context of
these Article has been defined identically. But that is not true of Articles
15(4) and 16(4). When these two Articles of Constitution in juxtaposition
G enacted in consecutive years - use markedly different phraseology, well
established canons of interpretation dictate that such meanings should be
assigned to the words as are indicated by the difference in phraseology.
Article 16(4) has different purpose than Article 15(4). The subject matter
of Article 16(4) is the service under the State. It is a special provision
H enabling the State to make any provision for the reservation of appoint-
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [KULDIP SINGH, J.) 835

ments or posts in favour of the backward section of any class of citizens A
which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the
services under the State. The expression "backward" in the context of
Article 16(4) is r,ntirely different than the expression "socially and educa-
tionally backward class" in Article 15(4). Under Article 16(4) the backward
class has to be culled-out from amongst the classes which are not adequate-
B
ly represented in the State Services. Any species of backwardness is
relevant in the context of Article 16(4). By contrast, any special provisions
to be made under Article 15(4) - e.g. grants out of the public exchequer -
can only be made for "socially and educationally backward classes". What
is to be identified under Article 16(4) is not the "backward class" but a
11 c
class of citizens 11 which is inadequately represented in the State-services.
On the other hand it is the "backward class" which is to be identified under
Article 15(4). When the two classes to be idenified to the two articles are
different the question of giving them the same meaning does not arise.

Constituent Assembly Debates Volume 7 (1948-1949) pages 684 to D
702 contains the speeches of stalwarts like R.M. Nalavade, Dr. Dharma
Prakash, Chandrika Ram, V.I. Muniswamy Pillai, T. Channiah, Santanu
Kumar Das, H.J. Khandakar, Mohd. Ismail Sahib, Hukum Singh, K.M.
Munshi, T.T. Krishnanichari, H.V. Kaman! and Dr. B.R. Ambedkar on the
draft Article 10(3) [corresponding to Article 16(4)]. In a nut-shell the
discussion projected the following view-points:-
E

(1) The original draft Article 10(3) did not contain the word
'backward'. The original Article only contained the expression "any class
of citizens". The word "backward" was inserted by the Drafting Committee
at a later stage. F

(2) The opinion of the members of the Constituent Assembly was
. that the word "backward" is vague, has not been defined and is liable to
different interpretations. It was even suggested that ultimately the Supreme
Court would interpret the Same. Mr. T.T. Krishnamchari even stated in
lighther-tone that the loose drafting of the chapter on fundamental rights G
would be a paradise for the lawyers.

(3) Not a single member including Dr. Ambedkar gave even a
suggestion that "backward class" in the said Article meant "socially and
educationally backward". H
836 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A (4) The purpose of Article 10(3) according to Dr. Ambedkar was
that "there must at the same time be a provision made for the entry of
certain communities which have so far been outside the Administra-
tion .......... that there shall be reservations in favour of certain communities
v:hich have not so far haci a proper "look-in" so to say into the Administra-
tion.11
B
(5) According to Dr. Ambedkar the said Article was enacted to safe-
guard two things namely the principle of equality of opportunity and to
make provision for the entry of certain communities which have so far been
outside the Administration. Dr. Ambedkar further stated:-
c "Unless you use some such qualifying phrase as "backward"
the exception made in favour of reservation will ultimately
eat up the rule altogether. Nothing of the rule will remain.
That I think, if I may say so, is the justification why the
Drafting Committee undertook on its own shoulders the
D responsibility of introducing the word ''backward" which, I
admit, did not originally find a place in the fundamental
rights in the way in which it was passed by this Assembly".

The reading of the Constituent Assembly Debates makes it clear that
the only object of enacting Article 16(4) was to give representation to the
E
classes of citizens who are inadequately represented in the services of the
State. The word "backward" was inserted later on only to reduce the num-
ber of such classes who are inadequately represented in the services of the
State. The intention of th~ Framers of the Constitution, gathered from the
Constituent Assembly Debates, leaves no manner of doubt that the two
F "classes" to be identified in the two articles are different and as such the
expressions used in the two articles carmot mean the same. Article 16(4)
enables the State to make reservations for any backward section of a class
which is inadequately represented in the services of the State. Almost every
member who spoke on the draft Article 10(3) in the Constituent Assembly
G complained that the word "backward" in the said Article was vague and
required to be defined but in spite of that. Dr. Ambedkar in his final reply
did not say that the word "backward" meant "socially and educationally
backward", rather he gave the explanation, quoted above which supports
the reasoning that the word "backward" was inserted in Article 16(4) to
H identify the backward section of any class of citizens which is not adequate-
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [KULDIP SINGH, l.J 837

ly represented in the State-Services and for no other purpose. A
11
I, therefore, hold that the expression 11 backward class of citizens
under Article 16( 4) does not mean the same thing as the expression ''any
socially and educationally backward classes of citizens" in Article 15(4).
The judgments of this Court wherein it is assumed that the two expressions
in Articles 15(4) and 16(4) mean the same thing do not lay down correct B
law and are overruled to such extent.

c
Over a period of four decades this Court under a mistaken view read
the expression "any backward class of citizens" in Article 16(4) to mean the
c
same as ''backward classes of citizens" in Article 15(4). Having held that
the two Article operate in different fields, the crucial question which falls
for consideration is what is meant by the expression "Any backward class
of citizens ...... not adequately represented in the services under the State"
in Article 16(4). D
A laymen's look at Article 16( 4) gathers the impression that the
reservation under the said Article is permissible for the backward classes
of citizens who are not adequately represented in the services under the
State. But on closer scrutiny and examination it is clear that the reserva-
tions under Ar•;cle 16(4) are provided for classes of citizens which are not
E
"
adequately represented in the State Services. The original draft Article
10(3) (corresponding to Article 16(4)] was as under:-

"10(3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from
making any provision for the reservation of appointments F
or posts in favour.of any class of citizens who, in the opinion
of the State, are not adequately represented in the services
under the State."

Reading the original draft Article 10(3) leaves no manner of doubt
that the manifest intention of the Framers of the Constitution was to G
provide reservation for those classes of citizens who are not adequately
represented in the State services. It is common knowledge that during the
British the State services were packed from amongst the persons who were
on the right side of the regime. Mass of the Indian people who were active
in the freedom struggle were kept out of State services. Article 16(4) was H
838 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1!992\ SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A enacted with the sole purpose of giving representation to the classes of
citizens who are not adequately represented therein. The sine qua non for
providing reservation is the inadequate representation of the class con-
cerned in the State services.

The word "backward" was inserted in the draft Article 10(3) by the
B Drafting Committee before the draft was finalised. The insertion of the
word "backward" at a later stage did not change the intention with which
the original draft Article 10(3) was brought into existence. Fortunately, for
the people of this country, there are lengthy deliberations in the Con-
stituent Assembly Debates which show the purpose and the object of
c adding the word "backward" in the draft Article 10(3). Dr. Ambedkar in
his speech before the Constituent Assembly gave the object and purpose
of enacting original draft Article 10(3) and also gave elaborate reasons for
inserting the word "backward" in the said Article. The said speech is
reproduced hereunder:-
D
"Then we have quite a massive opinion which insists that,
although theoretically it is good to have the principle that
there shall be equality of opportunity, there must at the
same time be a provision made for the entry of certain
E communities which have so far been outside the ad-
ministration. As I said, the Drafting Committee had to
produce a formula which would reconcile these three
points of view, firstly, that there shall be equality of oppor-
tunity, secondly that there shall be reservations in favour
of certain communities which have not so far had a 'proper
F
look-in' so to say into the administration. If honourable
Members will bear these facts in mind - the three prin-
ciples, we had to reconoile, - they will see that no better
formula could be produced than the one that is embodied
in sub-clause (3) of article 10 of the Constitution; they will
G find that the view of those who believe and hold that there
shall be equality of opportunity, has been embodied in
sub-clause (1) of Article 10. It is a generic principle. At the
same time, as I said, we had to reconcile this formula with
the demand made by certain communities that the ad-
H ministration which has now - for historical reasons - been
INDRA SAWI-!NEY v. U.OJ. [KULDIP SINGH, J.] 839

controlled by one community or a few communities, that A
situation should disappear and that the others also must
have an opportunity of getting into the public services.
Supposing, for instance, we were to concede in full the
demand of those communities who have .not been so far
employed in the public services to the fullest extent, what B
would really happen is, we shall be completely destroying
the first proposition upon which we are all agreed, namely,
that there shall be an equality of opportunity. Let me give
an illustration. Supposing, for instance, reservations were
made for a community or a collection of communities, the
total of which came to something like 70 per cent of the c
total posts under the State and only 30 per cent are retained
as the unreserved. Could anybody say that the reservation
of 30 per cent as open to general competition would be
satisfactory from the point of view of giving effect to the
first principle, namely, that there shall be equality of op- D
portunity? It cannot be in my judgment. Therefore the seats
to be reserved, if the reservation is to be consistent with
sub-clause (1) of Article 10, must be confined to a minority
of seats. It is then only that the first principle could find its
place in the Constitution and effective in operation. If E
honourable Members understand this postilion that we
have to safeguard two things, namely, the principle of
equality of opportunity and at the same time satisfy the
demand of communities which have not had so far
respresentation in the State, then, I am sure they will agree F
that unless you use some such qualifying phrase as "back-
ward11 the exception made in favour of reservation will
ultimately eat up the rule altogether. Nothing, of the rule
will remain. That I think, if I may say so, is the justification
why the Drafing Committee under~ook on its own
shoulders the responsibility of introducing the word "back-
G
ward" which, I admit, did not originally find a place in the
fundamental right in the way in which it was passed by this
Assembly." (Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. 7, 1948-
49 pages 701-702). H
840 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Dr. Ambedkar stated in clear terms that draft Article 10(3) now
Article 16( 4) was brought in by the framers of the Constitution to provide
11
reservations in favour of certain communities which have not so far had a
'proper look-in' so to say into the administration." He nowhere stated that
the reservations were meant for backward classes. According to him, the
Article was enacted with the object of providing reservation to those classes
B of citizens who are not adequately represented in the State- Services. Dr.
Ambedkar further elaborated the point when he stated "the administration
which has now - for historical reasons - been controlled by one community
or a few communities, that situation should disappear and that the others
also must have an opportunity of getting into the public services". Dr.
C Ambedkar was not referring to backward or non-backward communities,
he was only referring to the communities which were dominating the public
services and those which were not permitted to enter the said services.
While making it clear that the reservations are meant for those classes of
citizens who are inadequately represented in the State-Services, Dr. Am-
D bedkar visualised that conceding in full the demand of such communities,
reserving majority of the seats for them and leaving minority of the seats
unreserved, would render the guarantee under Article 16(1) nugatory. He
illustrated the point by giving figures and stated that a safeguard was to be
provided so that majority of the appointments/posts in the State-services
are not consumed in the process of reservation. It was for that purpose,
E according to Dr. Ambedkar, the expression "backward" was inserted in the
draft Article 10(3). The object of adding the word "backward" was only to
reduce the number of claimants for the reserve posts. Instead of the whole
class having inadequate representation in the State-services only the back-
ward section of that class is made eligible for the reserve posts. In a
nutshell, the reservation under Article 16(4) is not meant for backward
F
classes but for backward sections of the classes which are not adequately
represented in the State-services. There may be a class which is inade-
quately represented in the State-services and it may be backward as a
whole, like the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. Such a class
as a whole is eligible for the reserve posts.
G

"Not adequately represented in the services under the State" is the
only test for the identification of a class under Article 16(4). Thereafter
the 'Backward class' has to be culled-out from out of the classes which
H satisfy the test of inadequacy.
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.l. [KULDIP SINGH, J.] 841

• Under the Constitution the "backward class" which has been iden- A
tified for preferential treatment is the "socially and educationally backward"
class. The Constitutional-scheme is explicit. Articles 340 and 15( 4) make it
clear that wherever the Constitution intended to provide special compen-
satory treatment for the "backward classes" they have been defined as
'socially and educationally backward'. Article 16(4) is not in line with
B
Articles 340 and 15(4). Article 16( 4) does not provide job-reservations for
the backward classes. That is why the expression "socially and educationally
backward" has not been used therein. The classes of citizens to be iden-
tified under Article 16(4) are those who are not adequately represented in
the services under the State.
c
Examine it from another angle. If the job-reservations under Article
16(4) are meant for "any backward class" then the expression "..not ade-
quately represented .. " has to be read in relation to the said class. Can it be
done? ls it possible to classify the backward classes into those who are
adequately represented in the State-services and those who are not? Can D
a class which is adequately represented in the State-services be considered
backward? Negative is the answer to all these questions. A class which is
adequately represented in the State-services cannot be considered a back-
ward class. A class may not be backward even if it has inadequate repre-
sentation in the State-services but once it secures adequate representation E
in the State-services it no longer remains backward. It is not possible to
read the expression "not adequately represented" in Article 16(4) in elation
to "any backward class". If you do so then the said expression is rendered
redundant. To make every word of Article 16(4) meaningful and workable
the said expression can only be read in relation to "class of citizens". F

Yet another way to examine. Scheduled Castes and Scheduled tribes
are a 'class' by themselves and the Constitution permits protective dis-
crimination to compensate them. Reservation of seats in the House of
People and the Legislative Assemblies have been provided for them.
Article 335 is special provision for taking into consideration their claims in G
the appointments to State-services. Had there been an intention to provide
job- reservations in favour of weaker sections of society or for the 'socially
and educationally backward classes' then scheduled castes and scheduled
tribes would have been the first to be provided for by specific mention in
Article 16(4). It is idle to say that the expression 'backward class of citizens' H
842 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A would include them, Article 15(4) uses the expression ".... any special
provision for advancement of any socially and educationally backward
classes of citizens or for the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes".
Similar!y Article 46 provides ''The State shall promote ...... weaker soction of
the people, and, in particular, of the scheduled castes and scheduled
tribes .....". Thus where ever in the Constitution special protection has been
B provided for socially and educationally backward classes the scheduled
castes and scheduled tribes have been specifically mentioned alongwith.
Article 16(4) does not give protection to either of the two, it only provides
for those who are inadequately represented in the State services. If the
'scheduled castes and scheduled tribes' and "socially and educationally
c backward classes" qualify the test of inadequacy they are eligible for the
reserved seats under Article 16(4). The scheduled castes and scheduled
tribes being the weakest of the weak per-se satisfy the test.

The condition precedent for a class to get benefit under Article 16(4)
D is not its backwardness but its inadequacy in State-services. Once inade-
quacy is established and the classes on that test are identified then the
backward sections of those classes become eligible to the benefit of reser-
vation. Classes, which are inadequately represented, can be identified by
occupation, economic criterion, family income or from political sufferers,
border areas, backward areas, communities kept out of State-services by
E the British or by any other method which the State may adopt. Once a class
which is inadequately represented, is identified it is only the backward
section of that class which is eligible for job-reservations. Backward section
can be culled-out by adopting a means test, or on the basis of social,
educational or economic backwardness. Once the classes are identified
there can be no difficulty for the State to find out the backward-parts of
F
those classes.

Manda! has identified 52% population of this country as backward.
22% have already been identified as Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes. In a country with a population of 8.50 million people - 74% of which
G is backward - job-reservation can hardly be the source of reducing social
and economic disparities in the society. Even the Manda! Report has
characterised the job-reservations as "Palliatives". The Framers of the
Constitution - with secularism, egalitarianism, integrity and unity as their
avowed objects - could not have permitted horizontal division of the
H country into backward and non-backward for the sake of job-reservations.
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [KULDIP SINGH, J.] 843

I, therefore, hold that Article 16(4) permits reservation of appoint- A
ments/posts in favour of classes of citizens which in the opinion of the State
are not adequately represented in the services under the State. Once such
classes are identified then the reserve posts are offered to the backward
sections of those classes.

B
Before parting with the subject I may say that the successive Govern-
ments, whether in the States or at the Centre, have been re-miss in the
discharge of their obligations, under the Constitution, towards the poor and
backward people of the country. Job-reservations as a dole, has been the
vote-catching platter. Neither the job-reservations nor the reservation of
seats in the educational institutions are of material help. Unless illiteracy c
and poverty are removed, the backward classes cannot be benefited by the
reservations alone. Affirmative-Action Programme on war footing is
needed to uplift the backwards. Liberal grants and subsidised schemes
under Article 340.read with Articles 15(4) and 46 are needed to remove
illiteracy and poverty. Housing, sanitation and other necessities of life are D
to be provided. Illiteracy is the root cause of backwardness. "Free and
compulsory education" is nowher' within reach even 45 years after the
independence. The legislations enabling free education are only on paper.
A poor father, whose chaild is earning and contributing towards the family
income, may not send the child to school even if the education is free. The
State may consider compensating the father for the loss in income due to E
child's stopping work for going to school. It is not for this Court to suggest
what the Government should do, we only say that the State has not done
what it is required to do under the Constitution. Job-reservation is not the
answer to the problem. Prof. Andre Beteille in his book (supra) has
summed up the issue in the following words:- F

"What has gone wrong with our thinking on the backward
r classes is that we have allowed the problem to be reduced
largely to that of job-reservation. The problems of the
backward classes are too varied, too large and too acute to
G
be solved by job-reservation alone. The point is not that
job-reservation has contributed so little to the solution of
these problems but, rather, that it has diverted attention
from the masses of Harijans and Adivasis who are too poor
and too lowly even to be candidates for the jobs that are
reserved in their names. Job- reservation can attend only H
844 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A to the problems of middle class Harijans and Adivasis: the
overwhelming majority of Adivasis and Harijans, like the
majority of the Indian people, are outside this class and
will remain outside it for the next several generations.
Today, job reservation is less a way of solving age-old
problems than one of buying peace for the moment. It
B would be foolish to blame only the government for wanting
to buy peace in a country in which everyone wants to buy
peace. It would be foolish also to recommend an intran-
sigent attitude to a government which has neither the will
to impost its power nor the imagination to think of alter-
natives. But unless it is able to offer to something better to
c the backward classes than it has done so far, reservation
will continue to bedevil it... .. In assessing any scheme of
reservations today, we have to keep in mind the distinction
between those schemes that are directed towards advanc-
ing social and economic equality, and those that are
D directed towards maintaining a balance of power. Reser-
vations for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are,
for all their limitations, directed basically towards the goal
of greater equality overall. Reservations for the Other
Backward Classes and for religious minorities, whatever
advantages they may have, are directed basically towards
E a balance of power. The formar are in tune with the spirit
of the Constitution; the latter must lead sooner or later to
what Justice Gajendragadkar has called a 'fraud on the
Constitution'."

D
F
The next question for consideration is whether Article 16(4) provides
reservation of appointments or posts at the stage of initial entry to Govern-
ment services or even in the process of promotion. As at present the
question is not res-integra. A Constitution-Bench of this Court, in The
G General Manager, Southern Railway v. Rangachari, [1962] 2 SCR 586, by a
majority of three to two, has held that promotion to a selection post is
covered by Article 16(4) of the Constitution of India. Rangachari's case has
been followed by this Court in State of Punjanb v. Hirata/ & Ors., [1971] 3
S.C.R. 267, and Akhil Bharatitya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway) v.
H Union of India & Ors., [1981] 2 S.C.R. 185. This Court has also referred to
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [KULDIP SINGH, J.] 845

Rangachari's case in various other judgments. The reasoning of the majority A
in Rangachari's case has, however, been followed in the subsequent judg-
ments of this Court without adding any further reason. Mr. Venugopal and
Ms. Shyamla Pappu, learned counsel for the petitioners have contended
that majority judgment in Rangachari's case does not lay-down correct law.

The point in dispute in Rangachari's case was "is promotion to a B
selecion post which is included in Article 16(1) and (2) covered by Article
16( 4) or is it not?" The majority in Rangachari's case interpreted Articles
16(1), 16(2) and 16(4) as under:

(1) The matters relating to employment must include all matters in C
relation to employment both prior and subsequent to the appointment
which are incidental to the employment and form part of the terms and
conditions of such employment. Thus promotion to selection posts is
included both under Article 16(1) and (2).

(2) Article 16(4) does not cover the entire field covered by Article D
16(1) and (2). Some of the matters relating to employment in respect of
which equality of opportunity has been guaranteed by Article 16(1) and (2)
do not fall within the mischief of Article 16(4). For instance the conditions
of service relating to employment such as salary, increment, gratuity,
pension and the age of superannuation are matters relating to employment
E
and as such they do not form the subject matter of Article 16(4).

(3) Both "appointments" and "posts" to which the operative part of
Article 16(4) refers to and in respect of which the power to make reser-
vation has been conferred on the State must necessarily be appointments
and posts in the service. The word "posts" in Article 16( 4) cannot mean F
ex-cadre posts in the context.

(4) The condition precedent for the exercise of the powers conferred
by Article 16( 4) is the inadequate representation of any backward class in
the State services. The inadequacy may be numerical or qualitative. In the
context the experssion "adequately represented11 imposts considerations of G
11
"size" as well as values", numbers as well as the nature of appointments
held and so it involves not merely the numerical test but also the qualitative
one. It would not be reasonable to hold that the inadeqacy of repre-
sentation can and must be cured only by reserving a proportionately higher
percentage of appointments at th~ initial stage. In a given case the State H
846 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A may well take the view that a certain percentage of selection posts should
also be reserved.

(5) The word "posts" under Article 16(4) includes seclection posts
and as such reservation can be made not only in regard to appointments
which are initial appointments but also in regard to selection posts which
B may be filled by promotion thereafter.

The first three findings of the maionty in Rangachari's case
reproduced above are unexceptionable, however, findings 4 and 5, with
utmost respect, do not flow from the plain language of Article 16(4) of the
Constitution of India.
c
There is no doubt that the backward classes should not only have
adequate representation in the lowest cadres of services but they should
also aspire to secure adequate representation in the higher services as well.
Article 16(4) permits reservation for backward classes by way of direct
D recruitment to any of the cadres in the State services. Reservation can be
made in direct recruitment to any cadre or service from Class-IV to Class-I
of the State services. The majority in Rangachari's case has read in Article
16(4), what is not there, to support the element of qualitative repre-
sentation.

E The reservation permissible under Article 16(4) can only be "in
favour of any backward class of citizens" and not for individuals. Article
16(1) guarantees a right to an individual citizens whereas Article 16(4)
permits protective discrimination in favour of a class. It is, therefore,
mandatory that the opportunity to compete for the reserve posts has to be
F given to a class and not to the individuals. When direct recruitment to a
service is made the 'backward class' as a whole is given an opportunity to
be considered for the reserve posts. Every member of the said class has a
right to compete. But that is not true of the process of promotion. The
backward class as a collectivity is nowhere in the picture; only the in-
dividuals, who have already entered the servic~ against reserve-posts, are
G considered. In the higher echelons of State services - cadre strength being
small - there may be very few or even a single 'backward class' candidate
to be considered for promotion tci the reserve post. An individual citizen's
right guaranteed under Article 16(1) can only be curtailed by providing
reservations for a 'backward class' and not for backward individuals. The
H promotional posts are not offered to the backward class. Only the in-
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [KULDIP SINGH, J.] 847

dividuals are benefited. The object, context and the ·plain language of A
Article 16(4) make it clear that the job-reservation can be done only in the
direct recruitment and not when the higher posts are filled by way of
promotion.

Examine from another angle. Article 16(4) provides for reservation
of appointments or posts. Promotion is an incident of service .which comes B
after appointment. 'Appointment' simpliciter means initial appointment to
a service. Even the majority in Rangachari's case did not dispute this
proposition of law. But interpreting the word "posts" to include selection
posts it has been held that reservation can be made in the initial appoint-
ments as well as in regard to selection posts to be filled thereafter. With C
respect, it is not possible to construe the word "posts" in the manner the
majority judgment in Rangachari's case has done. The expression "reserva-
tion of ......... posts in favour of any backward class of citizens" only means
that the posts in any cadre or service can be reserved by the State
Government. It is not possible to read in these lines the permissibility of D
reservation even in the process of promotion. This is the only interpretation
which can be given in the context and also in conformity with the service
jurisprudence.

It has been rightly held in Rangachari's case that Article 16( 4) does
not cover the entire field covered by Article 16(1) and (2). The conditions E
of service which are matters relating to employment are protected by the
doctrine of equality of opportunity and do not form the subject matter of
Article 16(4). It is settled proposition of law that right to promotion is a
condition of service. Once a person is appointed he is governed by the
conditions of service applicable thereto. Appointment and conditions of F
service are two separate incidents of service. Conditions of service ex-
clusively come within the expression "matters relating to employment"
._.., and
_._,
are convered by Article 16(1) and not by 16(4). When all otherconditions
. of service fall out-side the purview of Article 16(4) and are exclusively
covered by Article 16(1) then where is the justification to bring promotion
within Article 16(4) by giving strained-meaning to the expression 'posts'. G
The only conclusion by reading Article 16(1), 16(2) and 16(4) which can
be drawn is that all conditions of service including promotion are protected
under Articles 16(1) and (2). Article 16(4) makes a departure only to the
extent that it permits the State Government to make any provision for the
reservation of appointments or posts at the initial stage of appointment and H
848 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A not in the process of promotion.

Constitution of India aims at equality of status and opportunity for
all citiznes including those who are socially, economiclly and educationally
backward. If members of backward classes can maintain minimum neces- .
~

. sary requirement of administrative efficiency not only representation but
B 'also preference in the shape of reservation may be given to them to achieve ,..
the goal of equality enshrined under the Constitution. Article 16(4) is a
special provision for reservation of appointments and posts for them in
Government services to secure their adequate representation. The entry of
backward class candidates to the State services through an easier ladder
C is, therefore, within the concept of equality. When two persons one belong-
ing to the backward class and another to the general category enter the
same service through their respective channels then they are brought at par
in the cadre of the service. A backward class entrant cannot be given less
privileges because he has entered through easier-ladder and similarly a
general class candidate cannot claim better rights because he has come
D through a tougher-ladder. After entering the service through their respec-
tive sources they are placed on equal footing and thereafter there cannot
be any discrimination in the matter of promotion. Both must be treated
equally in the matters of employment after they have been recruited to the
service. Any further reservation for the backward class candidate in the
E process of promotion is not protected by Article 16(4) and would be
violative of Article 16(1).

Although there is no factual material before us but it would not be
hypothetical to assume that the reservation in promotion - based on or
F roster points - can lead to various anomalies such as the person getting the
benefit of the reservation may jump over the heads of serveral of bis seniors
not only in his basic cadre but even in the higher cadres to which he is
promoted out of turn. Even otherwise when once a member of the back-
ward class has entered service via reserve post it would not be fair to keep
on providing him easier ladders to climb the higher rnngs of the State
G services in preference to the general category. Instead of reserving the
higher posts for in-service members of the backward class the same should
be filled by direct recruitment so that those members of backward class
who are not in the State services may get an opportunity to enter the same.

H For the reasons indicated above I hold that the interpretation given
..
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [KULDIP SINGH, J.] 849

by the majority in Rangachari's case to Article 16( 4), to the effect that it A
permits reservations in the process of promotion, is not permissible and as
such cannot be sustained. Rangachari's case to that extent is over-ruled. I
hold that Article 16(4) permits reservation of appointments or posts in
favour of any backward class of citizens only at the initial stage of entry
into the State services. Article 16(4) does not permit reservation either to B
" the selection posts or in any other manner in the process of promotion.

E&F

Article 16(1) provides equality of opportunity for all citizens in
matters relating to State-services. Equals have to be treated equally C
whereas the unequals ought not to be treated equally. For effective im-
plem.entation of the right guaranteed under Article 16( 1) classification is
permissible. Such classification has to be reasonable having regard ts> the
object of the right. Article 16(4) is another facet of Article 16(1). It
exclusively provides for reservation which is one of the forms of classifica- D
tion. Article 16(4) being a special provision regarding reservation it com-
pletely takes away such classification from the purview of Article 16(1).
Thus the State power to provide job reservations is wholly exhausted under
Article 16( 4). No reservation of any kind is permissible under Article 16(1).
Article 16(4) completely overrides Article 16(1) in the matter of job-reser-
vations. E

Article 16(4) thus exclusively deals with reservation and it cannot be
invoked for any other form of classification. Article 16(1), however, permits
protective discrimination, short of reservation, in the matters relating to
employment in the State-services. On these issues I entirely agree and F
adopt the reasoning and the conclusions reached by R.M. Sahai, J. and
hold as under:-

1. Article 16(1) and 16(4) operate in the-same field.

2. Article 16(4) is exhaustive of the State-power to provide G
reservations in State-Services.

3. Protective discrimination, short of resefvations, which
satisfy the tests of reasonableness, is .permitted under Ar-
ticle 16(1). H
850 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A G.

. · · I have carefully read the reasoning and the conclusions reached by .
R.M. Sahai, J. on this issue. Agreeing with him I hold as hold:-

(i) that the reservation under Article 16(4) must remain
B · below 50% and under no circumstance be permitted to go
beyond 50%. Any reservation beyond 50% is constitution-
ally invalid.

(ii) It is for the State to adopt the methodolgy of providing
reservations below 50%. The State may provide the said
c reservation in respect of the substantive vacancies arising
in a year or in the cadre or service. It would be pemussible
to carry forward the reserve vacancies of one year to the
next year. It is reiierated that the vacancies reserved in a
year including those which are carried forward shall not ·
D exceed50%.

(iii) No reservation of any kind can be made for any class
or category whether .backward or non-backward under ..
Article 16(1).
E H

The protective discrimination iii the shape of job-reservations has to
be programmed in such a manner that the most deserving section of the
backward class is benefited. Means-test ensures such a result. The process
F of identifying backward class can not be perfected to the extent that every
member of the said class is equally backward. There are bound to be
disparities in the class itself. Some of the members of the class may have
individually crossed the barriers of backWardness but while identifying the
class they lllay have come within the collectivity. It is often seen that
comparatively rich persons in the backward class-though they may not have
G •acquired any higher level of education-are .able_ to move in the society
without being discriminated socially. The members of the backward class
are differentiated into superior and inferior. The discrimination which was
practiced on them by the superior class is in turn practiced by the affluent
members of the backward class on the poorer members ·of the said class.
·H The benefits of special privileges like job-reservations are mostly chewed
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [KULDIP SINGH, J.] 851

up by the richer or more affluent sections of the backward classes and the A
poorer and the really backward sections among them keep on getting
poorer and more backwad. It is only at the lowest level of the backward
class where the standards of deprivation and the extent of backwardness
may be uniformed. The jobs are so very few in comparison to the popula-
tion of the backward classes that it is difficult to give them adequate
representation in the State-services. It is, therefore, necessary that the
B
benefit of the reservation must reach the poorer and the weakest section
of the backward class. Economic ceiling to cut off the backward class for
the purpose of job-reservations is necessary to benefit the needy-sections
of the class. I therefore, hold that means test is imperative to skim-off the
affluent sections of the backward classes. c
I

Whether a group of citizens living below poverty line or under
proverty-conditions can be considered a backward class under Article
16(4)? In other words can a class of citizens be identified as backward D
solely on the basis of economic criterion? Emphatic yes, is my answer.

Poverty is the culprit - cause of all kinds of backwardness. A poor
man has no money. He lacks ordinary means of subsistence. Indigence
keeps him away from education. Poverty breeds backwardness all around
the class into which i~ strikes. It invariably results in social, economic and
E
educational backwardness. It is difficult to per~eive on what reasoning one
can say that a class of citizens living under poverty-conditions is not a
backward class under Article 16(4). The main 'reason advanced in this
respect is that social backwardness being the mandatory criterion for the
identification of backward class under Article 16(4), poverty alone cannot F
be the basis for backwardness in relation to Article 16(4). The other reason
advanced is that in this country except for a small percentage of the
population, the people are generally poor. The argument is that reservation
for all is reservation for none. It is necessary to examine the two reasons
on the anvil of logic.
G
This Court, over a period of four decades, has been interpreting the
expression "backward class11 in 11Article 16(4)'1 to mean nsocially and educa-
tionally backward11 on the mistaken assumption that the expression 11 any
backward class of citizens" in Article 16(4) means the same thing as
"socially and educationally backward classes" in Article 15(4). H
,_
852 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 'l S.C.R.

A Based on elaborate reasoning I have held in part B of this judgment
that the expression "any backward class of citizens" in Article 16(4) cannot
be confined to "socially and educationally backward classes". The concept
of"any backward class of citizens" in Article 16(4) is much wider than the
"backward classes" defined under Article 15(4). It is not correct to say that
social backwardness is an essential characteristic of the 'backward class'
B under Article 16(4). The object of Article 16(4), as held by me in part C
of this judgment, is to provide job-reservations for the backward sections
of those classes of citizens which are not adequately represented in the
State-services. In the context of Article 16( 4) the economic criterion is
essentially relevant. On the interpretation of Article 16(4) as given by me
C in parts B and C of this judgment, social backwardness is not the sine qua
non for being a "backward class" under Article 16(4).

Even if it is assumed that a backward class under Article 16(4) means
socially backward, any class of citizens living below poverty line would
D amply qualify to be a 'backward class'. Poverty has a direct nexus to social
backwardness. It is an essential and dominant characteristic of poverty. A
rich belonging to backward caste - depending upon his disposition - may
be or may not be socially backward, but a poor Brahmin struggling for his
livelihood invariably suffers from social backwardness. The reality of
present-day life is that the economic standards confer social status on
E individuals. A poor person, however honest, has no social status around
him whereas a rich smuggler moves in a high society. No statistics can hide
the fa~t that there are millions of people, who belong to the socalled elite
castes, are as poor and often a great deal poorer than a very large
proportion of the backward classes. It is a fallacy to think that a person,
F though earning thousands of rupees or holding higher posts is still back-
ward simply because he happens to belong to a particular caste or com-
munity whereas millions of people living below poverty line are forward
because they were born in some other caste, or communities. Poverty never
discriminates, it chooses its victims from all religions, castes and creeds.
The pavement dwellers and the slum dwellers, belonging to different castes
G and religions, have a common thread of poverty around them. Are they not
the backward classes envisaged under Article 16(4)? Poverty binds them
together as a class. Classes of citizens living in chronic-cramping poverty
are per-1e socially backward. Poverty runs into generations. It may be result
of the social or economic inequality of the past. During the British regime
H several communities who fought the Britishers and those who actively
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [KULDIP SINGH, J.] 853

participated in the freedom struggle, were deliberately kept below the A
poverty line. There are vast areas in India, like Kalahandi in Orissa, which
are perennially poverty-stricken. By and large poverty in this country is a
historical factor. Looked from any angle it is not possible to hold that the
citizens of India who are living under poverty conditions or below poverty
line are not socially backward. It would be doing violence to the object,
purpose and the language of Article 16(4) to say that the poor of the
B
country are not eligible for job reservations under the said Article.

Simply because the bulk of the population of this country is poor and
there may be a large number of claimants for the reserved- jobs that is no
ground to deny the poor their right under Article 16(4). This reasoning will C
apply to the other backward classes with much more force. Manda! has
identified 52% of the population as backward. Apart from that 22% are
scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. Those who are canvassing reserva-
tions for 74% of the so called backward classes have no basis whatsoever
to say that 40% poor of the country be denied the benefit of job reserva-
tions. The poor can be classified on the basis of income, occupation, D
conditions of living. such as slum dwellers, pavement dwellers etc. and
priorities worked out. They can be operationally defined, categorised,
sub-categorised and thereafter the backward sections can be identified for
the purposes of Article 16(4). It is high time that we leave the dogmatic
approach of making reservation in public services on the basis of caste as E
a symbol of social backwardness. We must adopt a practical measure to
confining it only to low income groups of people having unremunerative
occupations whose talents and abilities are subdued under the weight of
poverty. I, therefore, hold that a backward class for the purposes of Article
16(4) can be identified solely on the basis of economic criteria.
F
J

This question has been examined by Brother Judges and they have
held that the reservations can be provided by the Parliament, State Legis-
latures, statutory rules as well as by way of Executive Instructions issued G
by the Central Government and the State Governments from time to time.
The Executive Instructions can be issued only when there are no statutory
provisions on the subject. Executive Instructions can also be issued to
supplement the statutory provisions when those provisions are silent on the
subject of reservations: These propositions of law are unexceptionable and H
854 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A I reiterate the same. I, however, make it clear that any Executive Instruc-
tion [issued under Articles 16(4), 73 or 162] providing reservations, which
goes contrary to statutory provisions or the rules under Article 309 or any
other statutory rules, shall not be operative to the extent it is contrary to
the statutory provisions/rules.

B K

Legal aspects arising out of Article 16(4) have been discussed and
decided. Finally we have to examine the process of identification of the
backward classes and test the same at the anvil of Article 16(4) as inter-
C preted by us. Manda! Commission was set up on January 1, 1979 under
Article 340 to identify the classes for the purposes of Article 16(4). The
Commission identified 3743 backward castes and submitted its report on
December 31, 1980. No action was taken on the Manda! Report by the
successive governments for a decade. The Manda! report was finally lifted
D from the Morgue by the government of the day which accepted the report
and issued Memorandum dated August 13, 1990 providing reservations for
3743 backward castes identified by the Manda! Commission. Later on the
successor government amended the reservation - policy by the Memoran-
dum dated September 25,1991. These Memoranda have been reproduced
in the judgments proposed by brother Judges. Both the Memoranda are
E based on the Manda! Report. The reservations provided under the two
Memoranda are to be extended to 3743 castes identified by the Manda!
Commission. It is, therefore, necessary to find out whether the backward
classes to which reservations under the Memoranda are being extended,
have been constitutionally and validly identified. I do not agree with the
F theory - apparently without logic - that the Memoranda can be adjudicated
de-hors Manda! Report. Elaborate arguments were addressed before us
challenging the validity of Manda! Report by Mis Palkhiwala, Venugopal,
Shyamala Pappu and other learned counsel appearing for the petitioners.
Agreeing with the learned c:mnsel, I hold that the identification of 3743
castes as the 'beneficiary-clas.i' for job reservations under Article 16(4), is
G wholly unconstitutional, invalid and cannot be acted upon. My reasons for
holding so are as under :

(i) The terms of reference require the Commission "to
determine the criteria for defining the socially and educa-
H tionally backward classes". Assume that Manda! has done
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [KULDIP SINGH, J.] 855

so. The reference and the Mandal Commission's investiga- A
tion is based on the legal fallcy that the expression "back-
ward class of citizens11 means the same thing :"5 11 socially
and educationally backward classes of citizens" in Article
15(4). That is why the Commission was asked to identify
socially and educationally backward classes. We have held
that two expressions in Article 16(4) and 15(4) do not mean B
the same thing. The classes to be identified under Article
16(4) cannot be confined only to social and educational
backwardness. The definition therein is much wider and is
not limited as under Article 15(4). It is thus, evident that
the identification of the "backward classes" under Article c
16(4) cannot be based only on the crite'ria of social and
educational backwardness. Other classes which could have
been identified on the basis of occupation, economic stand-
ards, environments, backward area residence, etc. etc. have
been left out of consideration. The identification done by
D
Manda! is thus violative of Article 16(4) and as such cannot
be sustained.

(ii) It has been held by me that the backward classes for
the purpose of Article 16(4) are the backward sections of
the classes who are inadequately represented in the State- E
services. Admittedly, this exercise was not done. Mandal
identified the castes on the criteria of social and education-
al backwardness.

(iii) The Terms of Reference further required the Com-
F
mission 'to examine the desirability or otherwise of making
1

provision for the reservation of appointments or
tests ......... .in public services". This most vital part of the
Terms of Reference was wholly ignored by the Commis-
sion. Before making its recommendations the Commission
was bound, by the Terms of Reference, to determine the G
desirability or otherwise of such reservations. The Com-
mission did not at all investigate this essential part of the
Terms of Reference.

(iv) Manda! has not done any survey to find out as to H
856 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A whether 3743 castes which according to him are the back-
ward classes, under Article 16(4), had inadequate repre-
sentation in the State services. There is no material on the
record to show that 3743 castes identified by Mandal are
not adequately represented in the State services. The con-
ditions of inadequacy is a conditions precedent under
B Article 16(4) of the Constitution. This having not been
established, the identification of the so called ''backward
classes", is wholly unconstitutional and inoperative.

(v) Para 12.7 of the report indicates that the list of back-
c ward castes was prepared from the following sources:-

1. Socio-educational field survey,

2. Census report of 1961;

3. Personal knowledge gained through extensive touring and
D from the evidence; and

4. Lists of other backward classes notified by various State
Governments.

The so called "socio-educational field survey", was an eye-wash. Only
E two villages and one urban block in each district of the country was taken
into consideration. According to the petitioners only .06% of the total
villages in the country were surveyed. Mr. Venugopal relied on a chart
showing the sources from which the list of castes was prepared by the
Mandal Commission. The contents of chart were not disputed before us by
F the Union of India. Mr. Venugopal poited out that out of 3743 castes only
406 were subjected to the socio-educational field survey. To be precise the
chart shows that only 10.85% castes were subjected to survey and the
remaining castes were picked up from other sources. The Commission set
up for the purposes of identifying backward classes is under an obligation
G to conduct cornprchensive survey. A backward class, identified on the sole
test of caste and that also with only 10.85% socio-educational survey,
cannot be constitutionally valid under Article 16(4).

Large number of castes were picked up by the Mandal Commission
from the State lists. It was illustrated before us that out of 260 castes
H identified from the Union Territory of Pondichhery only 14 were subjected
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. (KULDIP SINGH, J.] 857

to socio-educational survey. One was identified on personal assessment of A
the Commission and the remaining 245 castes were picJced up from the
State list. These facts are not denied by the Union of India in the affidavit
filed in writ petition 930/90. Similarly large number of castes were taken
from the lists of other backward classes operatn;g in the States; It was
wholly illegal for the Commission to adopt the State lists without any
investigation and survey. It is not disputed that no Commission was ever B
set-up in Pondicherry to identify the backward classes .. There is nothing in
the Manda! report to show that the State lists which were adopted were
ever prepared as a result of any survey, investigation or scrutiny. Manda!
Report in paras 2.63 and 2.64 specifically states that Haryana, Himachal
Pradesh, Assam, Pondicherry, Rajasthan, Orissa, Meghalaya and Delhi C
have notified lists of Other Backward Classes without their being any
enquiry into their conditions. In para 2.65 it is mentioned that Andaman
and Nicobar, Arunachal Pradesh, Chandigarh, Dadri and Nagar Havel~
Goa, Daman and Diu, Lakshadweep, Madhya Pradesh, Manipur, Mizoram,
Nagaland, Sikkim, Tripura and West Bengal have never prepared a list of D
OBCS. If the State lists were to be declared as Other Backward Classes by
the Central Government then no Commission under Article 340 was re-
quired - an Administrator could .do the job. When 90% of the castes
selected were not subjected to the soci J-educatinal survey it is inipermis-
sible to treat the said castes as backward classes. .
E
1961 censvs was also taken as a source for preparing the list of
backward castes. There is nothing on the record iii show as to why Manda!.
relied on 1%1 census when the 1971 census was available. A statement filed
by Mr. Venugopal after examining the government records shows that the
castes were also picked up from the Kai<~ Kalelkar Commission Report.
F
In para 1.13 Manda! condemns Kaka Kalelkar's Report, even otherwise the
said report was rejected by the Government of India in 1955 but still
Manda! adopts castes from foe said Report.

It is, thus, obvious that hardly any investigation was done by the
Manda! Commission to find out the backward classes for the purposes of G
Article 16(4). A collection of so called backward castes by a clerical-act
based on drawing-room investigation cannot be the backward classes en-
visaged under Article 16(4). If the Castes enlisted by Manda! are permitted
to avail the benefit of job-reservations, thereby depriving half the country's
population of its right under Article 16(1) the result would be nothing but H
858 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A a fraud on the Constitution.

(vi) The Manda! report virtually re-writes Article 16(4) by substitut-
ing caste for class. The caste has been made the sole and exclusive test for
determining the backward classes. Every other test-economic or non-
economic,has been wholly rejected. Para 1.21 of Manda! report states "the
B substitution of caste by economic tests will amount to ignoring the genesis
of social backwardness in the Indian societ}''. Paras 11.5 and 11.25 of the
Manda! report indicate that the caste was taken as a collectivity for the
purposes of socio-educational survey. The "indicators" for determining
social and educational backwardness were also applied to the castes alone.
c Every single piece of evidence and other material adverted to by the
Commission was only for the purpose of determining whether a caste was
backward. There was no investigation at all to find out whether a member
or family in the caste was backward. The "indicators" invoked to determine
backwardness were invariably applied to the castes and not to the in-
D dividuals. What emerges is that in the first instance only a caste was taken
as a collectivity. Thereafter no individual or a family of that caste was
subjected to the "indicators". Only the castes were tested through the
"indicators" and the result obtained. Thus the Caste has been made the
sole, paramount, overriding and decisive factor. The methodology based
on caste alone is unconstitutional as it violates Articles 16(2) and 16(4) of
E the Constitution of India.

(vii) The Manda! report invents castes even for non-Hindus. The
obsession with casteism ail.d the desire to apply the same yardstick to all
indians impelled the Commission to identifiy backward classes among
F non-Hindus also by the exclusive test of caste (paras 12.11 to 12.18)
regardless of the fact that caste is anathema to christenity, Islam and
Sikhism. There are various other denominations and religions in the
country like Buddhist, Jains, Arya Smajis, Llngyats etc. who do not believe
in casteism. The net-result is that almost 25% of the population was not
taken into consideration by the Manda! Commission. The approach was
-
G anti-secular and against the basic features of the Constitution.

(viii) The Manda! Commission has estimated the population of other
backward classes in the country as 52%. To say the least the exercise to
reach the figure of 52% is wholly imaginary. It is in the realm of conjecture.
H The conclusion arrived at in para 12.22 of the Manda! Report to the effect
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.l. [KULDIP SINGH, J.] 859

that backward classes constitute nearly 52% of the Indian population is A
based on 1931 census. It is wholly arbitrary to count the population of
backward classes in the country on the basis of census which took place
fifty years before the report was submitted. In order to reach the conclusion
of 52% Manda! has added up the population of scheduled castes,
scheduled tribes, non-Hindu communities (Muslims, Christians, Sikhs,
Buddhists, Jains) and the forward Hindu castes and communities (Brah- B
mans, Rajputs, Marathas, Jats, Vashya-Baniya etc., Kayastha, other for-
ward Hindu castes/groups) which make 56.30% of the total population.
Manda] has assumed that the residual population of 43.70% (100 minus
56.30 equivalent to 43.70%) consists of backward classes. It is difficult to
imagine how anybody can accept such an illusory and wholly arbitrary C
calculations. It is pity that half of the country is being deprived of their
fundamental right under Article 16(1) on the basis of the census exhumed
from a sixty year old grave and the calculations which are unknown to logic
and fair-play. Manda! further assumed, erron 'ously, that relative popula-
tion growth of various communities at the time of Manda! report was the D
same as at the time of 1931 census. It is absured to thiuk that there was no
change in their population growth during the long period of 50 years. It is
pertinent to observe that Irnlia of 1931 comprised of present India, Pakis-
tan, Bangladesh, Burma and Sri Lanka and as such it would be wholly
erroneous to relate the caste-based population situation of 1931 to that of
1980. E

(ix) According to Manda! Commission's own showing the materials
before the Commission were woefully inadequate. Essential data was non-
existent. "Hardly any State was able to give the desired information" (para
9.4). As regards representation of OBCs in Government services, the
information received by the Commission was "too sketchy and scrappy for
F
any meaningful inference· which may be valid for the country as a
whole"(para 9.14). "No State Government could furnish figures regarding
the level of literacy and education amongst other backward class" (para
9.30. "No lists of OBCs is maintained by the Central Government, nor their
particulars are separately compiled in Government offices" (para 9.47). G

Based on the reasoning and the conclusions reached by me in paras
'A' to 'K' of the judgment, I order and direct as under:-

(i) The identification of 3743 castes as a 11 backward class" H
860 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A by Manda! Commission is constitutionally invalid and can-
not be acted upon.

(ii) Office Memorandum dated August 13, 1990 issued by
the Government of India is unconstitutional, non-est and
as such cannot be enforced.
B
(iii) Para 2(i) of the Office Memorandum dated September
25, 1991 adopts the means - test. The adoption of means ·
test by the Government of India in principle is upheld.
Since para 2(i) is applicable to the 3743 castes identified
by the Manda! Commission, the said para shall not operate
c till the time "backward classes" for the purposes of Article
16(4) are identified by the Government of India in accord-
ance with the law laid-down in this judgement.

(iv) Para 2(ii) of the Office Memorandum dated September
D 25,1991 is upheld. Since this para is integral part of the two
Memoranda dated August 13, 1990 and September 25,
1991, it cannot operate independently. I, however, hold that
the Government of Indian can mal<e reservations solely
based on economic criterion by a separate order.

E The writ petition and all connected matters are disposed of in the
above terms with no order as to costs.

SAWANT, J. In a legal system where the Courts are vested with the
power of judical review, on occasions issues with social, political and
F economic overtones c~me up for consideration. They are commonly known
as political questions. Some of them are of transient importance while
others have portentous consequences for generations to come. More often
than not such issues are emotionally hyper-charged and raise a storm of
controversy in the society. Reason and rationalism become the first
casualities, and sentiments run high. The Courts have, however, as a part
G of their obligatory duty, to decide them. While dealing with them the courts
have to raise the issues above the contemporary dust and din, and examine
them dispassionately, keeping in view, the long term interests of the society
as a whole. Such problems cannot always be answered by the strict rules
of logic. Social realities which have their own logic have also their role to
H play in resolving them. The present is an issue of the kind.
. INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [SAWANT, J.] 861

2. It is for :he first time that a Nine-Judge Bench has been constituted A
to consider issues arising out of the provisions for reservations in the
services under the State under Article 16 of the Constitution. The obvious
purpose is to reconsider, if necessary, the propositions of law so far laid
down by this Court on the various aspects of the subject. While, therefore;
it may be true that everything is at large and the Court is not inhibited in
its approach and conclusions by the precedents, the view taken so far on
B
certain facets of the subject, may be hard to disregard on the principle of
stare decisis. This will be more so where certain situations have crystallised
and have become a part of the soc.ial psyche over a period of time. They
may be unsettled only at the risk of creating avoidable problems.
c
3. The reservation in State employment is not a phenomenon unknown
to this country. It is traceable to a deliberate policy of affirmative action or
positive discrimination adopted in some parts of the country as early as in the
begining of this cehtury. It is equally known to the employment under the
Central Government where reservations in favour of the Scheduled Castes D
and Scheduled Tribes have been in existence for a considerable time now.
The reasons why the issue has assumed agitational proportion on account of
the present reservations, may be varied. While it is true that the Court is
concerned with the interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution on the
subject and not either with the causes of the turmoil or the consequence of
the interpretation of the law, it is equally ture that the Constitution being E
essentially a political document, has to be interpreted to meet the "felt
necessities of the time". To interpret it, ignoring the social, political,
economic and cultural realities, is to interpret it not as a vibrant document
alive to the social situation but as an immutable cold letter of law uncon-
cerned with the realities. Our Constitution, unlike many others, incorporates F
in it the framework of the social change that is desired to be brought about.
"· The change has to be u!;hered in as expeditiously as possible but at the same
time with the least friction and dislocation in national life. The duty to bring
about the smooth change over is cast on all institutions including the
judiciary. A deep knowledge of social life with its multitudinous facets and
their interactions, is necessary to decide social issues like the present one. A G
superficial approach will be counter-productive.

THE GROUND REALITIES

4. Because of its pernicious caste system which may truly be H
862 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A described as its original sin, the Indian society has, for ages, remained
stratified. The origin of the caste system is shrouded in speculation, neither
the historians nor the sociologists being able to trace it in its present form
to any particular period of time or region, or to a specific cause or causes.
The fact, however, remains that it consists of mobility-tight hierarchical
social compartments. Every individual is born in and, therefore, with a
B particular caste which he cannot change. Hitherto, he had tu fulluw the
occupation assigned to his caste and he could not even think of changing
it. The mobility to upper caste is forbidden, even if to-day he pursues the
professions and occupations of the upper caste. He continues to be looked
upon as a member of the lower caste even if his achievements are higher
c than of those belonging to the higher castes. In social intercourse, he has
to take his assigned caste-place. The once casteless and unireligious Indian
society of Vedic times became multifactious and multi-religious mainly on
account of the rebellion of the lower castes against the tyranny of the caste
system and their exploitation by the higher castes. Various sects emerged
D within the Hindu fold itself to challenge the inequitous system. Distinct
religions like Buddhism, Jainism and Sikhism were born as revolts against
casteism. When, therefore, first Islam and then Christianity made their
entries here and ruled this country, many from the lower castes embraced
them to escape the tyranny and inequaity, while some from the higher
castes for pelf and power. However, the change of religion did not always
E succeed in eliminating castes. The converts carried with them their castes
and occupations to the new religions. The result has been that even among
Sikhs, Muslims and Christians casteism prevails in varying degrees in
practice, their preaching notwithstanding. Only Zoroastrianism is an excep-
tion to the rule; but that is because entry into it by conversion is impermis-
sible. Casteism has thus been the bane of the entire Indian society, the
F
difference in its rigidity being of a degree varying from religion to religion
and from region to region.

5. One of the worst effects of casteism with which we are directly
concerned in the present case, was that access to knowledge and learned
G was denied to the lower castes, for centuries. It was not till the advent of
the British Rule in this country that the doors of education were opened
to them as well as to women who were considered as much disentitled to
education as the Shudras. Naturally, all the posts in the administrative
machinery (except those of the menials) were manned by the higher castes,
H which had the monopoly of learning. The concentration of the executive
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.l. [SAWANT, J.] 863

power in the hands of the select social groups had its natural consequences. A
The most invidious and self-perpetuating consequence was the
stranglehold of a few high castes over the administration of the country
from the lower to the higher rungs, to the deliberate exclusion of others.
Consequently, all aspects of the ligh were controlled, directed and regu-
lated mostly to suit the sectional interests of a small section of the society B
which numerically did not exceed 10% of the total population of the
country. The state of the health of the nation was viewed through their eyes,
and the improvement in its health was effected according to their prescrip-
tion. It is naive to believe that the administration was carried on impartially,
that the sectional interests were subordinated to the interests of the country
and that justice was done to those who were outside the ruling fold. This C
state of affairs continues even till this day.

6. To accept that after the inauguration of the Constitution and the
introduction of adult franchise, there has been a change in the administra-
tive power balance is to be unrealistic to the point of being gullible. D
Undoubtedly, the lower castes and classes who constitute the overwhelming
majority of no less than 75% of the population have secured for the first
time in the hi,tory of this country, an advantage in terms of political
leverage on account of their voting strength. We do see today that the
political executive is not only fairly representative of the lower classes but
many times dominantly so. But that.is on account of the voting power and E
not on account of social, educational or economic advancement 'made by
them. The entry into the administrative machinery does not depend on
voting strength but on the competitive attainments requisite for the relevant
administrative field and post. Those attainments can be had only as a result
of the cumulative progress on social, educational and economic fronts.
F
Political power by itself cannot usher in such progress. It has to be
exercised to bring about the progress. The only known medium of exercis-
ing the power is the administrative machinery. If that machinery is not
sympathetic to the purpose of the exercise, the political power becomes
ineffective, and at times is also rendered impotent. The reason why, after
forty four years of Independence and of vesting of political power in the G
hands of the people, the same section which dominated the nation's affairs
earlier, continues to do so even today, lies here.

7. The paradoxical spectacle of political power being unable to
deliver the goods to whom it desires, is neither unique nor neW to this H
864 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A country. This has happened and happens whenever the implementing
machinery is at cross purposes with the political power. Faced with the
· hostility of the administrative-executive to their plans for reform, realising
the inequitous distribution of posts in the administration between different
castes and communities, and being genuinely interested in lifting the dis-
B advantaged sections of the society in their States, the enlightened Rulers
of some of the .then Princely States took initiative and introduced reserva-
tions in the administrative posts in favour of the backward easies and
communities since as early as the first quarter of this century. Mysore and
Kolhapur were among the first to do so. On accou!lt of the movement for
social justice and equality started by the Justice Party, the then Presidency
c of Madras [which then comprised the present State of Tamil Nadu, parts
of the present Andhra Pradesh and Kerala] initiated reservations in the
Government employment in 1921. It was followed by the Bomaby Presiden-
cy which then comprised the major parts of the present States of
Maharashtra, Karnataka and Gujarat. Thus the first quarter of this century
D saw reservations in Government employment in almost whole of the
Southern India. It has to be noted that these reservations were not only in
favour of the depressed classes which are today known as the Scheduled
Castes, but also in favour of other backward castes and classes including
what were then known as the intermediate castes. The policy did arouse
E hostility and resistance of the higher castes even at that time. The agitation
against reservations to-day' is only a new incarnation of the same attitude
of hostility. The resistance is understandable. It springs from the real
prospect of the loss of employment opportunities for the eligible young.
But the deeper reason of the high castes for opposing the reservation may
F be the prospect of losing the hitherto exclusive administrative power and
having to share it with others on an increasing scale. When it is realised
that in a democracy, the political executive has a limited tenure and the
administrative executive wields the real power, [they can truly be described
as the permanent politicians], the antipathy to reservation on a pitched
note, propelled by the prospective loss of power, is quite intelligible. The
G loss of employment opportunities can be made good by generating employ-
ment elsewhere and by adopting a rational economic structure with
· planned economy, planned population and planned education. That is
where all sections of the society - whether pro or anti-reservation should
concentrate. For even if all available posts are reserved or dereserved, they
H
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [SAWANT, J.] 865

will not provide employment to more than an infinitesimal number. of either A
of the sections. Unfortunately, it is not logic and sanity, but emotions and
politics which dominate the issue. The loss of exclusive political power
wielded through administrative machine, however, cannot be avoided ex-
cept by perpetuating the status quo.
B
8. The consequences of the status .quo .are s.tartling and ruinous to
the country. One of the major causes of the backwardness of the country
in all walks of life is the denial to more than 75% of the p!lpulation, !lf an
opportunity to participate in the running of the affairs of the country.
Democracy does not mean mere elections. It also means equal and effec-
tive participation in shaping the destiny of the country. Needless to say that c
where a majority of the population is denied its share in actual power, there
exists no real democracy. It is a harsh reality. It can be mended not by
running away from it or by ignoring it, but by taking effective workable
rememdial measures. Those .who point to the. past achievements and the
present progress of the country, forget that these achievements and the D
progress are by a tiny section of the society who .got an opportunity to
realise and use there talent. If all sections of the society ·had such oppor-
tunity, this country's achievements is all fields a11d.walks of life would have
been many times more. That this is a realistic .estimate and not a mere
rhetoric is proved by history. Dr. Ambedkar belongs to the very recent past.
If what is handed down to us history is to be believed, then the epic E
'Mahabharata' was penned by. Vya'a, who was born of a fisher woman;
'Ramayana' was authored by Valmiki, who belonged to a tribe forced to
live by depredations. The immortal poet Kalidasa's ancestry is not known.
These few instances demonstrate that intelligence, perception, character,
scholarship and talent are not a monopoly of any section of the society. F
Given opportunity, those who are condemned to the lowliest stations in life
can rise to the loftiest status in society. One can only guess how much this
country has lost for want of opportunities to the vast majority all these
centuries. This aspect of the present and the past history has a bearing on
11
the umerit-contention advanced against reservations.
G
In this connection, it will be worthwhile quoting what Pandit Nehru
had to say on the subject in "Discovery of India":-

"Therefore, not only must equal opportunities be given to
all, but special opportunities for educational, economic and H
866 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. ...
A cultural growth must be given to backward groups so as to
enable them to catch up with those who arc ahead of them.
Any such attempt to open the door of opportunities to all
in India will release enormous energy and ability and trans-
form the country with amazing speed."

B 9. The inequalities in Indian society are born in homes and sustained
through every medium of social advancement. Inhuman habitations, limited
and crippling social intercourse, low-grade educational institutions and
degrading occupations perpetuate the inequities in myriad ways. Those
who are fortunate to make their escape from these all-pervasive dragnets
c by managing to attain at least the minimum of attainments in spite of the
paralysing effects of the debilitating social environment, have to compete
with. others to cross the threshold of their backwardness. Are not those
attainments, however low by the traditional standards of measuring them,
in the circumstances in which they are gained, more creditable? Do they
D not show sufficient grit and determination, intelligence, diligence, poten-
tiality and inclination towards learning and scholarship? Is it fair to com-
pare these attainment> with those of one who had all the advantages of
decent accommodation with all the comforts and facilities, enlightened and
affluent family and social life, and high quality education? Can the ad-
vantages gained on account of the superior social circumstances be put in
E the scales to claim merit and flaunted as fundamental rights? May be in
many cases, tiiuse coming from the high classes have not utilised their
advantages fully and their score, though compared with others, is high, is
in fact not so when evaluated against the backdrop of their superior
advantages - may even be lower. With the same advantages, others might
have scored better. In this connection, Dr. Ambedkar's example is worth
F
citing. In his matriculation examination, he secured only 37.5% of the
marks, the minimum for passing being 35% (See: "Dr. Ambedkar" by Dr.
Dhananjay Keer]. If his potentialities were to be judged by the said marks,
the country would have lost the benefit of his talent for all times to come.

G 10. Those who advance merit contention, unfortunately, also ignore
the very basic fact - (though in other contexts, they may be the first to
accept it) - that the traditional method of evaluating merit is neither
scientific nor realistic. Marks in one-time oral or written test do not
necessarily prove the worth or suitability of an individual to a particular
H post, much less do they indicate his compartive calibre. What is more, for

'
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.I. [SAWANT, J.] 867

different posts, different tests have to be applied to judge the suitability. A
The basic problems of this country are mass-oriented. India lives in villages,
and in slums in towns and cities. To tackle their problems and to implement
measures to better their lot, the country needs personnel who have first-
hand knowledge of their problems and have personal interest in solving
them. What is needed is empathy and not mere sympathy. One of the major
reasons why during all these years after Independence, the lot of the B
downtrodden has not even been marginally improved and why majority of
the schemes for their welfare have remained on paper, is perceptibly
traceable to the fact that the implementing machinery dominated as it is
by the high classes, is indifferent to their problems. The Manda!
Commission's lament in its report, that it did not even receive replies to c
the information sought by it from various Governments, departments and
organizations on the caste-wise composition of their services, speaks
volumes on the point. A policy of deliberate reservations and recruitment
in administration from the lower classes, who form the bulk of the popula-
tion and whose problems primarily are to be solved on a priority basis by D
any administration with democratic pretensions, is therefore, not only
eminently just but essential to implement the Constitution, and to ensure
stability, unity and prosperity of the country.

11. What should further not be forgotten is that hitherto for centuries,
there have been cent per cent reservations in practice in all fields, in favour of E
the high castes and classes, to the total exclusion of others. It was a purely
caste and class-based reservation. The administration in the States where the
reservations are in vogue for about three quarters of a century now, further
cannot be said to be inferior to others in any manner. The reservations are
aimed at securing proper representation in administratiqn to all sections of
the society, intelligence and administrative capacity being not the monopoly
F
of any one class, caste or community, This would help to promote healthy
administration of the counrty avoiding sectarian approaches and securing the
requisite talent from all available sources.

11A. The assumption that the reservations lead to the appointment G
or admission of non-meritorious candidates is also not factually correct. In
the first instance, there are minimum qualifying marks prescribed for
appointment/admission. Secondly, there is a fierce competition among the
backward class candidates for the seats in the reserved quota. This has
resulted in the cut-off marks for the seats in the reserved quota reaching H
868 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A near the cut-off line for seats in the general quota as some surveys made
on .the subject show. A sample of such surveys made on the State of Tamil
Nadu by Era Sezhian and published in the issue of the "Hindu" dated 8th
October, 1990 may be reproduced here:

Selection to professional courses: Cut-off level
B Course Open Backward Most Scheduled
of Study Competition Backward Caste
Engineering
Course
[Anna
C Universty)
Computer 97.98% %.58% 93.25% 84.38%
Science
Electronics 97.74% 96.08% 92.16% 82.22%
Electrical 95.84% 95.42% 91.48% 81.98%
Machaaical 95.78% 94.10% 90.66% 79.21%
D
Engg.
Medical Course
[University of Madras)
M.B.B.S. 95.22% 93.18% 89.62% 83.98%
Agricultural Course
E [Agricultural Univesity,
Coimbatore)
B.Sc. Agri. 90.90% 90.08% 86.10% 78.04%
B.E. Agri. 92.66% 91.96% 87.46% 76.14%
Veterinary
F [Tamil Nadu Veterinary &
Animal Sciences
University]
BVSc. 94.90% 93.48% 91.18% 85.24%
BFSc. 96.96% 95.58% 95.02% 93.02%

G By what logic can it be said that the above marks secured by the
candidates from the backward classes are not meritorious?

12. 'i lie reservations by their very nature have, however, to be imagina-
tive, discriminating and gradual, if they are to achieve their desired goal. A
H dogma,ic, u:irealistic and hasty approach to any social problem proves, more
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [SAWANT, J.) 869

often than not, self-defeating. This is more so when ills spread over centuries A
are sought to remedied. It is not possible to remove the backlog in repre-
sentation at all levels of the administration in one generation. More difficult
it is to do so in all fields and all branches of administration, and at the same
pace. It will not only be destructive of the object of reservations, but will
-.:i,
positively be harmful even to those for whom it is meant - not to speak of the
society as a whole. It must be remembered that some individual exceptions B
apart, even the advanced classes have not made it to the top in one genera-
tion. Such exceptions are found in backward classes as well.

PHILOSOPHY AND OBJECTWES OF RESERVATIONS

13. The aim of any civilised society should be to secure dignity to
c
every individual. There cannot be dignity without equality of status and
opportunity. The absence of equal opportunities in any walk of social life
is a denial of equal status and equal participation in the affairs of the
society and, therefore, of its equal membership. The dignity of the in-
dividual is dented in direct proportion to his deprivation of the equal D
access to social means. The democratic foundations are missing when equal
opportunity to grow, govern, and give one's best to the society is denied to
a sizeable section of the society. The deprivation of the opportunities may
be direct or indirect as when the wherewithals to avail of them are denied.
Nevertheless, the consequences are as potent.
E
14. Inequality ill-favours fraternity, and unity remains a dream
without fraternity. The goal enumerated in the preamble of the Constitu-
tion, of fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual and the untity and
integrity of the nation must, therefore, remain unattainable so long as the
equality of opportunity is not ensured to all. F

15. Likewise, the social and political justice pledged by the Preamble
of the Constitution to be secured to all citizens, will remain a ~yth unless
first economc justice is guaranteed to all. The liberty of thought _and
expression also will remain on paper in the face of economic deprivations.
A remunerative occupation is a means not only of economic upliftment but G
also of instilling in the individual self-assurance, self-esteem and self-
worthiness. It also accords him a status and dignity as an independent and
useful member of the society. It enables him to participate in the affairs of
the society without dependence on, or domination by, others, and on an
equal plane depending upon the nature, security and remuneration of the H
870 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A occupation. Employment is an important and by far the dominant
remuneratiVe occupation, and when it is with the Government, semi·
Government or Government-controlled organisation, it has an added edge
It is coupled with power and prestige of varying degrees and nature,
depending upon the establishment and the post. The employment under
B the State, by itself, may, many times help achieve the triple goal of social,
economic and political justice. ·

16. The employment - whether private or public - thus, is a means of
social levelling and when it is public, is also a means of. directly participat-
ing in the running of the affairs of the society. A deliberate attempt to
C secure it to those who were designedly denied the same in the past, is an
attempt to do social and economic justice to them. as ordained by the
. Preamble of the Constitution. "

17. lt is no longer necessary to emphasise that equality contemplated by
D Article 14 and other cognate Article including Article 15(1), 16(1), 29(2) and
38(2) of the Constitution, is secured out only when equals are treated equally
but also when unequals are treated unequally. Conversely, when unequals are
treated equally, the mandate of equality before law is breached. To bring
about equality between the unequals, therefore, it is necessary to adopt
positive measures to abolish inequality. The equalising measure will have to
E ·use the same tools by which inequality was introduced and perpetuated.
Otherwise, equalisation will not be of the unequals. Article 14 which guaran-
. tei:s equality before law would by itself, without any other provision in the
Constitution, be enough to validate such equalising measures. The founders
of the Constitution, however, thought it advisable to incorporate another
. F provision, viz., Article 16 specifically providing for equality of opportunity in
matters of public employment. Further.they emphasised in clause (4) thereof
. that for equalisiii"'gthe employment opportunities in the services under the
State, the State may adopt positive measures for reservation of appointments
or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which in the opinion of the
· State, is not adequately represented in such services. By hind sight, the
(j foresight shown in making the provision specifi~y, instead ofleaving it only
to the equalty provision as under the U.S. Constitution, is more than vindi-
. cated. In spite of decisions of this Court on almost all aspects of the problem,
· spread over the past more than forty years now, the validity, the nature, the
co11tent and the extent of the reservation is still under debate. The absence of
H such .provision may well have led to total denial of equal opportunity in the
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [SAWANT, J.] 871

most vital sphere of the State activity. Consequently, Article 38(2) which A
requires the State in particular to strive to minimise the inequalities in
income, and endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and
opportunities, not only amongst individuals but also among groups of people
residing in different areas or engaged in different vocations, and Article 16
which enjoins upon the State to promote with special care the educational
and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and to protect
B
them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation, and Article 335 which
requires the State to take into consideration the claims of the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes in making the appointments to services and
posts under the Union or States, would have, all probably remained on paper.
c
18. The trinity of the goals of the Constitution, viz., socialism,
secularism and democracy cannot be realised unless all sections of the
society participate in the State power equally, irrespective of their caste,
community, race, religion and sex and all discriminations in the sharing of
the State power inade on those grounds are eliminated by positive D
measures.

19. Under Article 16(4), the reservation in the State employment is
11
to be provided for a nclass of people" which must be "backward" and in
the opinion of the State!! is 11 not adequately represented" in the services of
the State. Under Article 46, the State is required to "promote with special E
care11 the 11 educational and economic interests11 of the 11weaker sections" of
the people and "in particular", of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes, and "to protect" them from "social injustice" and 11 all forms of
11
exploitation Since in the present case, we are not concerned with the
•

reservations in favour of the SCs/STs, it is not necessary to refer to Article F
335 except to point out that, it is in terms provided there that the claims
of SCs/ STs in the services are to he taken into consideration, consistently
with the maintenance of efficiency of administration. It must, therefore,
mean that the claims of other backward class of citizens and weaker
sections must also be considered consistently with the maintenance of the
efficiency. For, whomsoever, therefore, reservation is made, the efficiency G
of administration is not to be sacrificed, whatever the efficiency may mean.
That is the mandate of the Constitution itself.

20. The various provisions in the Constitution relating to reservation,
therefore, acknowledge that reservation is an integral part of the principle H
872 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A · of quality where inequalities exist. Further they accept the reality of ine-
qualities and of the existence of unequal social groups in the Indian societv.
They are described variously as 'socially and educationally backward chs-
. ses' [Article 15(4} and Article 340), 'backward class' [Article 16(4)} ond
'weaker sections of the people' [Article 46). The provisions..of the Con~
stitution also direct that the unequal representation in the services be
B remedied by taking measures amied at providing employment to the dis-
criminated class, by whatever different expressions the said class is
described. ttow does one identify the discriminated class is a question of
methodology. But once it is identified, the fact that it happens to be a caste,
race, or occupational group, is irrelevant_ If the social group has hitherto
C been denied opportunity on the basis of caste, the basis of the remedial
reservation has also to be the caste_ Any other basis of reservation may
perpetuate the status quo and may be inappropriate and unjustified for
remedying the discrimination. When, in such circumstances, provision is
made for reservationS, for example, on the basis of caste, it is not a
reservation in favour of the caste as a 'caste' but in favour of a class or
D social group which has been discriminated ·against, which discrimination
cannot be eliminated, otherwise. What the Constitution forbids is dis-
criminatio!l 'only' on the basis of caste, race etc. However, when the caste
also happens to be a social group which i> 'backward' or 'socially and
educationally backward' or a 'weaker section', this discriminatory treat-
E men! in its favour, is not only on the basis of the caste.

2L The objectives of reservation may be spelt out variously. As the
U.S. Supreme Court has stated in different celebrated cases, viz., Oliver
Brown et aL v. Board of Education of Topeka et al., 347 US 483 : 98 L
F Ed. 8731, Spottswood Thomas Bolling et. al. v. C. Melvin Sharpe et. al., 347
US 497: 98 L Ed. 884, Ma;r; De[unis et. aL v. Charles Odegaard, 416 US
· 312: 40 L. Ed. 2d 164, Regents of the University of California v.Allan Bakke,
438 US 265 : 57 L Ed. 2d 750, H. Earl Fullilove et. al. v. I'hilip M. KJutznick,
448 US 443 : 65 L. Ed. 2d 902, and Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal
Crmmudc~·tons Commission, 111 L. Ed. 2d 445, rendered as late as on
G :i,,,,,, 27. 1?9!1, the res~1vation or affirmative action may be undertaken to
r~movc the 'persisting or present and continuing effects of past discrimina-
tion'; to lift the "llmitation on access to equal opportunities'; to grant
'opportunity for full participation in the governance' of the society; to
recognise and discharge 'special obligations'; towards the disadvantaged
H and discriminated scicial groups"; "to overcome substantial chronic under-
\
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.l. [SAWANT, J.] 873

representation of a social griJup"; or "to serve the important governmental A
objectives'. What applies to American society, applies er proprio vigore to -
OU'" society. The discrimination in our society is more chronic and its
Mntinuing effects more discernible and disastrous. Unlike in America, the
ail pervasive discrimination here is against a vast majority.

22. As has been pointed out earlier, our Constitution itself spells out B
the important objectives of the State Poilicy. There cannot be a more
compelling goal than to achieve the unity of the country by integration of
different social groups. Social integration cannot be achieved without giving
equal status to all. The administration of the country cannot also be carried
on impartially and efficiently without the representation in it of all the C
social groups and interests, and without the aid and assistance of all the
views and social experiences. Neither democracy nor unity will become
real, unless all sections of the society have an equal and effective_ voice in
the affairs and the goverance of the country.

23. In a society such as ours where there exist forward and backward,
D
higher and lower social groups, the first step to achieve social integration
is to bring the lower or backward social groups to the level of the forward
or higher social groups. Unless all social groups are brought on an equal
cultural plane, social intercourse among the groups will be an impos-
siblility. Inter-marriage as a matte~ of eourse and without inhibitions is by E
far the most potent means of effecting social integration. Inter-marriages
between different social groups would not be possible unless a11· groups
attain the same cultural level Even in the same social group, marriages
take place only between individuals who are on the same cultural plane.
Culture is a cumulative product of economic aiid-educational attainments F
leading to social accomp~ent and refinement of mind, morals and taste.
'Employment and particularly the governmental employment promotes·
economic and social advancement which in turn also leads to educational
advancement of the group. Though it is true that economic and educational
- advancement i• not neces.s:lrily accomranied by cultural growth, it is also
eq'.J~l!y I~<> !hi. without. thtm, r1tltur:tl advancement is difficult. Employ- G
To
rntm is. thu5 an importa'lt ;iiu for cultural grov.th. achieve total unity
and integrati,on. of the nation, rese.rvations in employment are, therefore,.
imperative, in· the present state of our society. ·

24. Under the Constitution, the reservations in employment in favour H
874 SUPREME COURT REPORTS IJ992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A of backward classes arc not intended either to be indiscriminate or per-
manent. Article 16(4) which provides for reservations, also at the same time
prescribes their limits and conditions. In the first place, the reservations
arc not lo be kept in favour of every backward class of citizens. It is only
thal backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is "nol
adequately represented" in the services under the State, which is entitled
B
to the benefit of the reservations. Secondly, and this follows from the first,
even that backward class of citizens would cease to be the beneficiary of
the reservation policy, the moment the State comes to the conclusion that
it is adequately represented in the services.

c THE IMPUGNED ORDERS OF THE GOVERNMENT

25. In order to appreciate the relevance of the questions which are
to be answered by this Court, it is necessary first to analyse the provisions
'\ of the two impugned orders. The first order dated 13th August, 1990,
D acknowledges the fact that our society is multiple and undulating, and
expressly refer& to the Second Backward Classes Commission, popularly
known as Manda! Commission and its report submitted to the Government
of India on 31st December, 1980 and the purpose for which the Commis-
sion was appointed, viz., for early achievement of 11 the objective of social
justice" enshrined in the Constitution. The order then states that the
E
Government have considered carefully, the report of the Commission and
1 11
the recommendations of the Commission in 'the present context regarding
the benefits lo be extended to the "Socially and Educationally Backward
Classes" (SEBCs) as opined by the Commission. The order further declares
that the Government are of the clear view that at the outset "certain
F weightage is to be provided to such classes in the services of the Union
and other public undertakings". With this preface, the order proceeds to-

(1) provide for reservation of 27% of the vacancies in civil
posts and services under the Union Government to
G 11
SEBCsO!;

(2] restrict the reservations to the vacancies to be filled in
by direct recruitment only (and thus by necessary im-
plication excludes reservations in recruitment by
H promotion);
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [SAWANT, l.] 875

[3] leave the procedure to be followed for enforcing reser- A
vation to be detailed in instructionc;, to be is..i:;.ued
separately;

[4] make it clear that those belonging to SEBCs who enter
into services in the open i.e., unreserved category are
not to be counted for the purpose of calculating the B
reserved quota of 27%;

[5] specify that in the first phase of reservation, it is only
SEBC castes and communities which are common to
both the lists given in the report of the Manda! Com-
mission and the list prepared by the State Government,
c
would be the beneficiaries of the reservations;

[6] state that the list of such common castes and com-
munities will be issued by the Government separately;

[7] give effect to the reservation from 7th August, 1990; D
and

[8] explain that the reservation quota will apply not only
to the services under the Government of India but also
to the services in the public sector undertakings and E
financial institutions including the public sector banks;·

26. This order was amended by the second order of 25th September,
1991. The first purpose of the amendment, as stated in the opening
paragraph of the order is to classify the SEBCs into two categories, namely,
SEBCs and the poorer sections of the SEBCs, and to give the latter the F
benefit of reservations on preferential basis. The second purpose is to carve

- out a new category of "Other Economically Backward Sections" of the
people. (OEBSs) which arc not covered by any existing schemes of reser-
vati0n, and to provide reservation in services _for them. To effectuate these
two objectives, the order pro\ides that · G
[l] out of lhe 27'?{. of the vacancie~ reserved for SEBCs,
preference shall be given to candidates belonging to
poorer sections of SEBCs. If sufficient number of
candidates belonging to poorer sections of SEBCs are
not available, the unfilled vacancies shall be filled by H
876 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A other SEBC candidates;

[2] 10% of the vacancies in civil posts and services shall
be reserved for "Other Economically Backward Sec-
tions of the people" (OEBSs);

B [3] The criteria for determining poorer sections of the
SEBCs as well as OEBSs are to be issued separately.

The effect of the second order is to increase the reservations by 10%
making the total reservations in the civil posts and services 59-1/2%,
C 22-1/2% for SCs/STs + 27% for SEBCs + 10% for OEBSs.

27. As has been pointed out earlier, Article 16(4) does not use the
expression "Socially and Economically Backward Classes". Instead it uses
the expression "Backward Classes of Citizens". It is Article 15(4) and
Article 340 which use the expression "Socially and Educationally Backward
D Classes". Since the judicial decisions have equated the expression "back-
ward class of citizens" with the expression "Socially and Educationally
Backward Classes of Citizens", it appears that the impugned order have
used the two expressions synonyrccously to mean the same class of citizens.
The second order has gone even further. It has carved out yet another class
E of beneficiaries of reservation, namely, "Other Economically Backward
Sections". As would be pointed out a little later, this new class of citizens
cannot be a beneficiary of reservations in services under clause (4) of
Article 16 nor under Clause (1) thereof.

We may now proceed to deal with the specific questions raised
F before us.

Question I

Whether Article 16(4) is an exception to Article 16(1) and
would be exhaustive of the rig~: to reservation of posts in
-
G services under the State?

28. With the majority decision of this Court in State of Kera/a & Anr.
v. N.M. Thomas & Ors., [1976) 1 SCR 906, having confirmed the minority
opinion of Subba Rao, J. in T. Devadasan v. Union of India & Anr., [1%4]
H 4 SCR 680, the settled judicial view is that clause (4) of Article 16 is not
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [SAWANT, J.] 877

an exception to clause (1) thereof, but is merely an emphatic way of stating A
what is implicit in clause (1).

29. Equality postulates not merely legal equality but also real
equality. The equality of opportunity has to be distinguished from the
equality of results. The various provisions of our Constitution and par-
ticularly those of Article 38, 46, 335, 338 and 340 together with the
B
Preamble, show that the right to equality enshrined in our Constitution is
not merely a formal right or a vacuous declaration. It is a positive right,
and the State is under an obligation to undertake measures to make it real
and effectual. A mere formal declaration of the right would not make
unequals equal. To enable all to compete with each other on equal plane, c
it is necessary to take positive measures to equip the disadvantaged and
the handicapped to bring them to the level of the fortunate advantaged.
Articles 14 ond 16 (1) no doubt would by themselves permit such positive
measures in favour of the disadvantaged to make real the equality guaran-
teed by them. However, as pointed out by Dr. Ambedkar while replying to D
the debate on the provision in the Constituent Assembly, it became neces-
sary to incorporate clause (4) in Article 16 at the insistence of the members
of the Assembly and to allay and apprehensions in that behalf. Thus, what
was otherwise clear in clause (1) where the expression "equality of oppor-
tunity" is not used in a formal but in a positive sense, was made explicit in
E
clause ( 4) so that there was no mistake in understanding either the real
import of the "right to equality" enshrined in the Constitution or the
intentions of the Constitution-framers in that behalf. As Dr. Ambedkar has
stated in the same reply, the purpose of the clause (4) was to emphasise
that "there shall be reservation in favour of certain communities which have
not so far had a proper look into, so to say, in the administration".
F

30. If, however, clause (4) is treated as an exception to clause (1), an
important but unintended consequence may follow. There would be no
other classification permissible under clause (1), and clause (4) would be
deemed to exhaust all the exceptions that can be made to clause (1). It G
would then not be open to make provision for reservation in services in
favour of say, physically handicapped, army personnel and freedom fighters
and their dependents, project affected persons, etc. The classification made
in favour of persons belonging to these categories is not hit by clause (2).
Apart from the fact that they cut across all classes, the reservation in their H
878 SUPREME CCVRT REPORTS [1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A favour are made on considerations other than that of backwardness within
the meaning of clause (4). Some C/f them may belong to the backward
classes while some may belong to forward classes or classes which have an
. adequate representation in the services. They are, however, more disad-
vantaged in their own class whether backward or forward. Hence, even on
B this ground it will have to be held that Article 16(4) carves out from various
classes for whom reservation can be made, a specific class, viz., the back-
ward class of citizens, for emphasis and to put things beyond doubt.

31. For these very reasons, it will also have to be held that so far as
"backward classes" are concerned, the reservations ~or them can only be
c made under clause (4) since they have been taken out from the classes for
which reservation can be made under Article 16(1). Hence, Article 16(4)
is exhaustive of all the reservations that can be made for the backward
classes as such, but is not exhaustive of reservations that can be made for
classes other than backward classes under Article 16(1). So also, no
D reservation can be made under Article 16(4) for classes other than "back-
ward classes" implicit in that Article. They have to look for their reserva-
tions, to Article 16(1).

32. It may be added here that reservations can take various forms
E whether they are made for backward or other classes. They may consist of
preferences, concessions, exemptions, extra facilites etc. or of an exclusive
quota in appointments as in the present case. When measures other than
an exclusive quota for appointments are adopted, they form part of the
reservation measures or are ancillary to or necessary for availing of the
reservations. Whatever the form of reservation, the backward classes have
F
to look for them to Article 16(4) and the other classes to Article 16(1).

Question II:

What would be the content of the phrase "Backward Class"
G in Article 16(4) of the Constitution and whether caste by
itself could constitute a class and whether economic
criterion hy itself could identify a class for Article 16( 4)
and whether "Backward Classes" in Article 16( 4) would
include the "weaker sections11 mentioned in Article 46 as
H well?
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [SAWANT, J.] 879

33. The courts have, as will be instantly pointed out, equated the A
expression 11 backward classts of citizens11 with the expression "Socially and
Educationally Backward Classes of citizens ["SEBCs" for short] found in
Article 15(4) and Article 340. Even the impugned orders have used the
expression "socially and educationally backward classes of citizens". As a
matter of fact, since the impugned orders have chosen to give the benefit
B
of reservation expressly to SEBCs and since it is not suggested that SEBCs
are not "backward class of citizens" within the meaning of Article 16( 4),
the discussion on the point is purely academic in the present case.

34. In this connection, a reference may first be made to Artie.le 335
of the Constitution. There is no doubt that backward classes under Article C
16( 4) would also include SCs/STs for whose entry into services, provision
is also made under Article 335. There is, however, a difference in the
language of the two Articles. Whereas the provision of Article 16(4) is
couched in an enabling language, that of Article 335 is in a mandatory cast.
It appears that it became necessary to make the additional provision of D
reservation for SCs/STs under Article 335 because for them the reserva-
tions in services were to be made as obligatory as reservations in the House
of the People and the Legislative Assemblies under Articles 310 and 332
respectively. When we remember that Articles 330, 332 and 335 belong to
the family of Article in Part XVI which makes "Special Provisions Relating E
to Certain Class'', the additional and obligatory provision for SCs/STs
under Article 335 bacomes meaningful. It is probably because of the
mandate of Article 335 and the level of backwardness of the SCs/STs - the
most backward among the backward classes - that it also became necessary
to caution and emphasise in the same vein, that the imperative claims of
F
the SCs/STs shall be taken into consideration consistent Iv with the efficien-
cy of the administration, and not by sacrificing it. It cannot, however, be
doubted that the same considerations will have to prevail while making
provisions for reservations in favour of all backward classes under Article
16(4). To hold otherwise would not only be irrational but discriminatory
between two classes of backward citizens. G

35. We may now analyse Article 16 in the light of the question. In
the first instance, it is necessary to note that neither clauses (1) and (2) of
Article 16 read together, nor clause (2) of Article 29 prohibits discrimina-
tion and, therefore classification, which is not made only on the ground of H
880 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them.
They do not prevent classification, if religion, race, caste etc. are coupled
with other grounds or considerations germane for the purpose for which it
is made. ~econdly, clauses (1) and (2) of Article 16 prevent discrimination
against individuals and not against classes of citizens. Thirdly, clause (4) of
B Article 16 ·enables the State to make special provision in favour of any
backward "class" of citizens and not in favour of citizens who can be
classified as backward. The emphasis is on "class of citizens" and not on
'citizens". Fourthly, as has already been pointed out earlier, the class of
citizens under Article 16(4) has not only to be backward but also a class
C which is not adequately represented in the services under the State. Fifthly,
when we remember that the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are
also the members of the backward classes of citizens within the meaning
of Article 16(4), the nature of backwardness of the backward class of
citizens is implicit in Article 16(4) itself. Further, Part XVI of the Constitu-
D tion which makes special provision under Article 338 for National Com-
mission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for investigating their
conditions, makes a similar provision under Article 340 for appointment of
Commission to investigate the conditions also of "socially and educationally
backward classes of citizens". The two provisions leave no doubt about the
kind of backwardness that the Constitution takes care of in Article 16(4).
E
What is more, clause (4) of Article 15 which was added after the decision
in The State of Madras v. Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan etc., [1951] SCR
525, 'pecifically mentions that nothing in Article 15 or in clause (2) of
Article 29, shall prevent the State from making any special provision for
the advancement of and "socially and educationally backward classes of
F citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes". The sig-
nificance of this amendment should not be lost sight of. It groups "socially
and educationally backward classes" with "Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes". When it is remembered that Article 341 and 342 enable the
President to specify by notification, the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
G Tribes, it can hardly be debated that such specifications from time to time
may only be from .the socially and educationally backward classes or from
classes whose economic backwardness is on account of their social and
educational backwardness.

H We may now refer to the decisions of this Court on the point.
INDRA SAWllNEY v. U.0.1. [SAWANT, J.] 881

36. In M.R. Ba/aji & Ors. v. State of Mysore, [1963] Supp. 1 SCR 439, A
what fell for consideration was Article 15(4), and on the language of the
said Article, it was held by this Court that the backwardness contemplated
by the said Article was both social and educational. It is not either social
or educational but it is both social and educational. In Janki Prasad
Parimoo & Ors. etc. etc. v. State of !ammu & Kashmir & Ors., [1973] 3 SCR
236, which was a case under Article 16(4), this Court read "backward class
B
of citizens" in Article 16(4) as "socially and educationally backward class
of citizens", although Justice Palekar who delivered the judgment for the
Court, proceeded to equate the two expressions on the assumption that "it
was well·settled that the expression "backward class" in Article 16(4) means
the same thing as the expression "any socially and educationally backward c
classes of citizens" in Article 15(4). It is true that no decision prior to this
decision had in terms sought to equate the two expressions, and to that
extent the sairl statement can be faulted as it is sought to be done before
us.
D
In KC. Vasanth Kumar & Anr. v. State of Kamataka, [1985] Supp. 1
SCR 352, this Court was called upon to express opinion on the issue of
reservation which may serve as a guideline to the Commission which the
Government of Karnataka proposed to appoint for examining the question
of affording better employment and educational opportunities to the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and other backward classses. E
Hence, the interpretation of the expression ''backward class of citizens"
under Article 16(4) and of the expression "socially and educationally
backward classes" under Article 15(4) and their co-relation, fell for con-
sideration directly. The five Judges of the Bench with the exception of
Chief Justice Chandrachud expressed their opinion on these two expres- F
sions. Desai, J. held that "Courts have more or less .........veered round to
the view that in order to be socially and educationally backward classes,
the group must have the same indicia as Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes". The learned Judge then proceeded to deal with what, according
to him, was a narrow question, viz., whether caste-table should be sufficient
to identify social and educational backwardness. However, it appears that G
the learned Judge proceeded on the footing that the expression "backward
class of citizens" was synonymous with the expression "socially and educa-
tionally backward classes of citizens". There is no discussion whether the
two expressions are in fact similar and of the reasons for the same.
Chinnappa Raddy, J. dealt with the two expressions a little extensively and H

_j
882 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A came to the conclusion as follows:
"Now, it is not suggested that the socially and educationally
backward classes of citizens and the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes for whom special provision for advance-
ment is contemplated by Article 15(4) are distinct and
B separate from the backward classes of citizens who arc
inadequately represented in the services under the State
for whom reservation of posts and appointments is con-
templated by Article 16(4). 'The backward classes of
citizens' referred to in Article 16(4), despite the short
c description, are the same as 'the socially and educationally
backward classes of citizens and the Scheduled Castes and
the Scheduled Tribes', so fully described in Art. 15 (4):
Vide Trilokinath Tiku v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, and
other cases." •

D Sen, J. also appears to have proceeded on the footing that the two
expressions, viz., 11 socially and educationally backward classes 11 under Ar~
ticle 15(4) and "backward class of citizens" under Article 16(4) are
synonymous.

Venkataramiah, J. [as he then was] held that "Article 15(4) and
E Article 16(4) are intended for the benefit of "those who belong to castes,
communities which are traditionally disfavoured and which have suffered
societal discrimination in the past". The other factors such as physical
disability, poverty, place of habitation etc. - according to the learned Judge
- were never in the contemplation of the makers of the Constitution while
F enacting these clauses." The learned Judge has held that "while relief may
be given in such cases under Article 14, 15(1) and Article 16(1) by adopting
a rational principle of classification, Article 14, Article 15(4) and Article
16(4) cannot be applied to them". The learned Judge has further held that
"it is now accepted that the expressions 'socially and educationally back-
G ward classes of citizens' and 'the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled
Tribes' in Article 15(4) of the Constitution together are equivalent to
'backward class of citizens' in Article 16(4)".

37 .• There is, therefore, no doubt that the expression "backward class
of citizens" is wider and includes in it "socially and educationally backward
H classes of citizens" and "Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes".
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [SAWANT, J.] 883

38. The next question is whether the social and educational back- A
wardness of the other backward classes has to be akin to or of the same
level as that of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. It is true
that some decisions of this Court such as Balaji [supra). and State of Andhra
Pradesh & Anr. v. P. Sagar, [1968) 3 SCR 595, have taken the view that the
backwardness of the backward class under Article 16{4) being social and B
educational, must be similar to the backwardness from which the
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes suffer. In'Balaji it is stated:

"It seems fairly clear that the backward classes of citizens
for whom special provision is authorised to be made are,
by Article 15{4) itself, treated as being similar to the C
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes which have been defined were
known to be backward and the Constitution makers felt no
doubt that special provision had to be made for their
advancement. It was realised that in the Indian society
there were other classes of citizens who were equally, or D
may be somewhat less, backward than the Scheduled Cas-
tes and Tribes and it was thought that some special
provision ought to be made even for them. 11

After referring to the provisions of Articles 338(3), 340(1), 341 and E
342, the Court proceeded to hold as follows:

'It would thus be seen that this provision contemplates that
some Backward Classes may by the Presidential order be
included in Scheduled Castes and Tribes. That helps to
bring out the point that the Backward Classes for whose F
improvement special provision is contemplated by Art.
15{4) are in the matter of their backwardness comparable
to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes".

39. The test laid down above of similarity of social and educational G
backwardness was accepted in P. Sagar [supra).

40. However, in State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. v. U.S. V. Bairam etc.,
[1972) 3 SCR 247, the earlier view has been e.xplained by pointing out that
the above decisions do not lay down th•t backwardness of the other
backward classes must be exactly similar in all respects to that of the H
884 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. Further, in Parimoo [supra]
the lest laid down in Balaji has been explained in the following words:

'Indeed all sections in the rural areas deserve encourage-
ment but whereas the former by their enthusiasm for
education can get on without speical treatment, the latter
B require lo be goaded into the social stream by positive
efforts by the Sta~e. That accounts for the raison d'etre of
the principle explained in Balaji's case which pointed out
that backward classes for whose improvement special
provision was contemplated by Article 15(4) must be com-
c parable to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes who
are standing examples of backwardness socially and educa-
tionally. If those examples are steadily kept before the mind
the difficulty in determining which other classes should be
ranked as backward classes will be considerably eased.'

D In Kumari K.S. Jayasree and Anr. v. State of Kera/a & Anr., [1977] 1
SCR 194 at 197-198, it is stated:

"Backward classes for whose improvement special
provisions are contemplated by Article 15(4) are in the
matter of their backwardness comparable to Scheduled
E
Castes and Scheduled Tribes. This Court has emphasised
in decisions that the backwardness under Article 15(4)
must be both social and educational.

xxx xx xx xx xx xx xx x
F
The Concept of backwardness in Article 15(4) is not in-
tended to be relative in the sense that classes who are
backward in relation to the most advanced classes of
society should be included in it."

G 41. These observations will also show that the test of comparable
backwardness laid down in Ba/aji has not been and is not to be, understood
to mean that backwardness of the other backward classes has to be of the
same degree as or identical in all respects to, that of the Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes. At the same time, the backwardness is not to be
H measured in terms of the forwardness of the forward classes and those who
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [SAWANT, J.] 885

are less forward than the forward are to be classified as backward. The A
expression 11backward class of citizens 11 , as stated earlier, has been used in
Article 16(4) in a particular context taking into consideration the social
history of this country. The expression is used to denote those classes in
the society which could not advance socially and educationally because of
the taboos and handicaps created by the society in the past or on account
of geographical or other similar factors. In fact, the expression "backward B
classes" could not be adequately encompassed in any particular formula
and hence even Dr. Ambedkar while replying to the debate on the point
stated as follows:

"If honourable members understand this position that we c
have to safeguard two things, namely, the principle of
equality of opportunity and at the same time satisfy the
demand of communities which have not had so far repre-
sentation in the State, then, I am sure they will agree that
unless you use some such qualifying phrase as "backward"
the exception made in favour of reservation will ultimately
D
eat up the rule altogether. Nothing of the rule will remain.
That I think, if I may say so, is the justification why the
Drafting Committee undertook on its own shoulders the
responsibility of introducing the word 'backward' which, I
admit, did not originally find a place in the fundamental E
right in the way in which it was passed by this Assembly.
But I think honourable members will realise that the Draft-
ing Committee which has been ridiculed on more than one
ground for producing sometimes a loose draft, sometimes
something which is not appropriate and so on, might have
F
opened itself to further attack that they produced a Draft
Constitution in which the exception was so large, that it left
no room for the rule to operate. I think this is sufficient to
• justify why the word 'backward' has been used.

............Somebody asked me: "What is a backward com- G
munity"? Well, I think any one who reads the language of
the draft itself will find that we have left it to be determined
by each local Government. A backward community is a
community which is backward in the opinion of the Govern-
menf'. H
886 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A 42. It will have, therefore, to be held that the backwardness of the
backward classes other than the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
who are entitled to the benefit of the reservations under Article 16(4), need
not be exactly similar in all respects to the backwardness of the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes. That it is not necessary that the social,
educational and economic backwardness of the other backward classes
B should be exactly of the same kind and degree as that of the Scheduled
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes is recognised by the various provisions of
the Constitution itself since they make difference between the Scheduled
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes on the one hand, and other "socially and
educationally backward classes" or "backward class of the citizens" on the
c other. What is further, if the other backward classes are backward exactly
in all respects as the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, the President
has the power to notify them as Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes,
and they would not continue to be the other backward classes. The nature
of their backwardness, however, will have to be mainly social resulting in
D their educational and economic backwardness as that of the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes.

43. The next important aspect of the question is whether caste can
be used for identifying socially and educationally backward classes.

E 44. There is no doubt that no classification can validly be made only
on the basis of caste just as it cannot be made only on the basis of religion,
race, sex, descent, place of birth or any of them, the same being prohibited
by Article 16(2). What is, however, required to be done for the purposes
of Article 16(4) is not classification but identification. The identification is
F of the backward classes of citizens, which have, as seen above, to be socially
and, therefore, educationally and economically backward [for short

..
described as socially and educationally backward]. Any factor - whether
caste, race, religion, occupation, habitation etc. - which may have been
responsible for the social and educational backwarJness, would naturally
also supply the basis for identifying such classes not because they belong
G to particular religion, race, caste, occupation, area etc. but because they
are socially and educationally backward classes.

45. It is, however, contended that the adoption of caste as a factor
even for identifying backwardness would perpetuate casteism. The argu-
H ment, with respect, begs the question. It presumes that the caste are

I·
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.l. [SAWANT, J.] 887

created the moment they are identified as backward classes for the pur- A
poses of Article 16( 4). One of the most damaging and perpetuating social
consequences of the caste system has admittedly been the discrimination
suffered by certain castes and communities as such castes and com-
munities. The result has been that these castes and communities as a whole
continued to remain as backward classes. If, therefore, an affirmative
action is to be taken to give them the special advantage evisaged by Article
B
16(4), it must be given to them because they belong to such discriminated
castes. It is not possible to redress the balance in their favour on any other
basis. A different basis would perpetuate the status quo and therefore the
caste system insted of eliminating it. On the other hand, by giving the
discriminated caste-groups the benefits in question, discrimination would c
in course of time be eliminated and along with it the casteism. It would
thus be seen that the contention to the contrary is counter-productive and
will in fact perpetuate, though unintentionally, the very caste system which
it seeks to eliminate.

Prime Minister Nehru while replying to the very point raised in the D
discussion on the amendment to Article 15 by insertion of clause (4),
summarised the situation in the following words:

"... But you have to distinguish between backward classes
which are specially mentioned in the Constitution that have
E
to be helped to be made to grow and not think of them in
terms of this community or that. Only if you think of them
in terms of the community you bring in communalism. But
if you deal with backward classes as such, whatever religion
or anything else they may happen to belong to, then it
becomes our duty to help them towards educational, social F
and economic advance11 •

[Lok Sabha Debates 16.5.1951 - Column 1821]

46. 'Class' is a wider term. 'Caste' is only a species of the 'class'. The G
relevant portions of the definitions of nclass11 and "caste" given in Shorter
Oxford Dictinonary may be reproduced here:

"Class, ..... 6. gen. A number of individuals [persons or
things] possessing common attributes, and grouped
together under a general or 'class' name; H
888 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A 2. Higher (Upper], Middle, Lower Classes [Mod.]."

"Caste. 1555. (ad. sp. and Pg. casta, race, lineage; orig. 'pure
(stock or breed)', f. casta, fem. of casto: - L. castus [see
CHASTE]. Formerly written cast. I. A race, stock, or breed
1774. 2. spec. One of the hereditary classes into which
B society in India has long been dhidcd. Also transf. 1613.

The members of each caste are socially equal, have the
same religious rites, and generally follow the same occupa-
tion or profession; they have no social intercourse with
those of another caste. The original castes were four: 1st,
c the Brahmans or priestly caste; 2nd, the Kshatriyas or
military caste; 3rd, the Vaisyas or merchants; 4th, the
Sudras, or artisans and labourers. Now almost every
variety of occupation has its caste.

D 3. fig. A class who keep themselves socially distinct, or
inherit exclusive privileges 1807.

4. this system among the Hindoos; also the position it
confers, as in To lose, or renounce c. 1811, Also gen. and
fig."
E
47. In view of the above meanings ascribed to the terms, it can hardly
be argued that caste is not a class. A Caste has all the attributes of a class
and can form a separate class. If, therefore, a caste is also a backward class
within the meaning of Article 16(4), there is nothing in the said Article or
in any other provision of the Constitution, to prevent the conferment of the
F special benefits under that Article on the said caste. Hence it can hardly
be argued that caste in no circumstances may form the basis of or be a
relevant consideration for identification of backward class of citizens.

It will be instructive in this connection to refer to the earlier decisions
G on the point.

48. The context in which the amendment to Article 15 was made
being sufficiently illuminating on the subject, may first be noticed. In
Champakam (supra], the Seven-Judge Bench of this Court struck down the
classification made on the basis of caste, race and religion for the purposes
H of admission to educational institutions on the ground that Article 15 did
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [SAWANT, J.] 889

not contain a clause such as clasue (4) of Article 16. The necessary A
corollary of that view is that with the clause like clause (4) Article 16, the
enumeration of backward classes on the basis of caste, race or religion
would not be bad, and that is exactly what was held by the same Bench in
a decision delivered on the same day in the case of B. Venkataramana v.
··~
The State of Madras & Anr., AIR (1951) SC 229. This was a case directly
under Article 16(4) unlike Champakam which was under Article 15. In this B
case, the Communal G.O. of the Madras Government made reservations
of posts for Harijans and backward Hindus as well as for other com-
munities, viz,, Muslims, Christians, Non-Brahmin Hindus and Brahmins.
The Court upheld the reservations in favour of Harijans and backward
Hindus holding that those reserved posts were so reserved not on the c
ground of religion, race, caste etc. but because of the necessity for making
a provision for reservation of such posts in favour of a backward class of
citizens. The Court, however, struck down the reservations in favour of
other than Harijans and backward Hindus on the ground that it was not
possible to say that those classes were backward classes. It can be seen D
from this decision that the classificaiton of the backward classes into
Harijans and backward Hindus was upheld by the Court as being permis-
sible under Article 16( 4) since it was not a classification made on the
ground of religion, race, caste etc. but because the said two groups were
backward classes of citizens.
E
In Ba/aji it was observed as follows:

"Therefore, in dealing with the question as to whether any
class of citizens is socially backward or not, it may not be
irrelevant to consider the caste of the said group of citizens.
F
In lhis connection, it is, however, necessary to bear in mind
that the special provision is contemplated for classes of
citizens and not for individual citizens as such, and so,
though the caste of the group of citizens may be relevant,
its importance should not be exaggerated. If the classifica-
tion of backward classes of citizens was based solely on the G
caste of the citizen, it may not always be logical and may
perhaps contain the vice of perpetuating the caste them-
selves."

In R. Chitra/ekha & Ors. v. State of Mysore, (1964] 6 SCR 368, the H
890 SUPREME COURT REPOR1S [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A . majority held that caste aod class are not synonymous. However, it was also
held that caste can be one of the relevaot factors though not the sole aod
dominant one to determine the social and eduational backwardness. The
social and educational backwardness cao be ascertained with the help of
factors other thao castes. The Court further held that if the entire caste is
backward, it should be included in the list of Scheduled Castes. There can
B be castes whose majority is socially and educationally backward but
minority may be more advaoced thao another small sub-caste, the total
number of which is far less thao the advaoced minority. In such cases to
give benefit to the advaoced section of the majority of the socially aod
educationally backward castes will be unjust to others. ·
c
With respect, these observations leave many things unaoswered. In the
first instance, it is difficult to understaod as to why, when the entire caste or
for that matter the majority of the caste is socially and educationally back-
ward, it could not be ca!ssified as a backward cl?ss, and why when it is done,
D the caste cannot become a class, as has been held in a later decision, i.e.,
Bairam [supra]. Secondly, if the entire caste is backward, it is not necessary to
mclude it in the list of Scheduled Castes unless it is contended that the
backwardness of the other backward castes must be of the same nature,
degree and level in all respects as that of the Seheduled Castes. The said
observations also ignore that the expression "backward class of citizens" is
E wider than the expression "Scheduled Castes" as the former expression
includes not only the Scheduled Castes but also other backward classes which
may not be as backward as the Scheduled Castes. In any case, there is no
reason, why before a backward caste is included in the list of Scheduled
Castes, it should not'be entitled to be accepted as a socially aod educationally
F backward caste. Thirdly, when a minority of a socially and educationally
backward caste is advanced, the remedy lies in denying the benefit of reserva-
tion to such minority and not neglect the majority.

In Minor P. Rajendran v. State of Madras & Ors., [1968] 2 SCR 786,
G it is held that a caste is also a class of citizens, and if the caste as a whole
is socially and educationally backward, reservation cao be made in favour
of such caste on that ground. It is also held that once the State shows that
a particular caste is backward, it is for those who challenge it, to disprove
it. The propositions laid down in this case are directly contrary to the
H propositions laid down in Chitra/ekha [supra].
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [SAWANT, J.] 891

In P. Sagar (supra], it is observed as follows: A
1
'In the context in which it occurs the expression "class"
means a homogeneous section of the people grouped
together because of certain likenesses or common traits
and who are identifiable by some common attributes such
as status, rank, occupation, residence in a locality, race, B
religion and the like. In determining whether a particular
section forms a class, caste cannot be excluded altogether.
But in the determination of a class a test solely based upon
the caste or community cannot also be accepted."

In Tri/oki Nath & Anr. v. State of Jummu & Kashmir & Ors., [1969] 1
c
SCR 103, it is held:

"The expression 'backward classes' is not used as
synonymous with 'backward caste' or 'backward
community'. The members of an entire caste or community D
may, in the social, economic and educational scale of values
at a given time, be backward and may, on that account be
treated as a backward class, but that is not because they are
members of a caste or community, but because they form a
class. In its ordinary connotation, the expression 'class'
E
means a homogeneous section of the people grouped
together because of certain likenesses or common traits,
and who are identifiable by soni.e common attributes such
as status, rank, occupation, residence in a locality, race,
religion and the like; but for the purpose of Art. 16( 4) in
determining whether a section forms a class, a test solely F
based on caste, community, race, religion, sex, descent,
place of birth or resdence, cannot be adopted, because it
~- would directly offend the Constitution."

(emphasis supplied) G
With respect, it may be added that when the members of an entire caste
are backward and on that account are treated as a backward class, the
expressions 11backward caste" and "backward class11 become synonymous.

In Minor A. Periakaruppan etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. etc., H
892 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A AIR 1971 SC 2303 = [ 1971] 2 SCR 430, it is observed that a caste has
always been recongnised as a class. The decision refers in this connection
to what is observed in Narayan Vasudev v. Emperor, AIR 1940 Bombay 379,
which observations are as follows:

"In my opinion, the expression 'classes of His Majesty's
B subjects' in Section 153-A of the Code is used in restrictive
sense as denoting a collection of individuals or groups
bearing a common and exclusive designation and also
possessing common and exclusive characteristics which
may be associated with their origin, race or religion, and
c that the term "class' within that section carries with it the
idea of numerical strength so large is could be groued in
a single homogeneous community'.

The decision also quotes with approval from Paragraph 10, 11 and
13 of Chapter V of the Backward Classes Commission's Report [Kalelkar
D Co1111llission Report] where it is observed:

"We tried to avoid caste but we find it difficult to ignore
caste in the present prevailing conditions. We wish it were
easy to dissociate caste from social backv·:irdness at the
present juncture. In modern times anybody can take to any
E
profession. The Brahman taking to tailoring, does not
become a tailor by caste, nor is his social status lowered as
a Brahman. A Brahman may be a seller of boots and shoes,
and yet his social status is not lowered thereby. Social
backwardness, therefore, is not today due to the particular
F profession of a person, but we cannot escape caste in
considering the social backwardness in India".

"It is not wrong to assure that social backwardness has
largely contributed to the educational backwardness of a
large number of social groups."
G
"All this goes to prove that social backwardness is
mainly based on racial tribal, caste and denominational
differences 11 •
/
H The Court then observes that there is no gainsaying the fact thal.:
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [SAWANT, J.] 893

there are numerous castes in this country which are socially and education· A
ally backward. To ignore their existence is to ignore the facts of life.
However, the Court thereafter proceeds also to state that the Government
should not proceed on the basis that once a caste is considered as a
backward class, it should continue to be a backward class for all time. Such
an approach would defeat the very purpose of the reservation because once B
a class reaches a stage of progress which some modern writers call as
"take-off stage", the competition is necessary for their future progress.

In Bairam, it was held that entire caste can be socially and educa-
tionally backward and in such circumstances reservation can be on the
basis of castes not because they are castes but castes but because they are C
socially and educationlly backward classes. It was also held that reservation
can also be on the basis of the population of the different castes separately
or social and educational backward classes. It was further. held that if
candidates from social and educational backward castes secure 50 per cent
or more seats of merit in the general pool, the list of backward classes need D
not be invalidated but the Government should be asked to review it.

In Jayasree [supra], it was observed as follows:

"In ascertaining social backwardness of a class of citizens
it may.not be irrelevant to consider the caste of the group E
of citizens Caste cannot however be made the sole or
dominant test. Social backwardness is in the ultimate
analysis the result of poverty to a large extent. Social
backwardness which results from poverty is likely to be
aggravated by considerations of their caste. This shows the F
relevance of both caste and poverty in determining the
backwardness of citizens. Poverty by itself is not the deter-
mining factor of social backwardness. Poverty is relevant
in the context of social backwardness. The Commission
found that the lower income group constitutes socially and
educationally backward classes. The basis of he reservation G
is not income but social and educational backwardness
determined on the basis of relevant criteria. If any clas-
sification of backward classes of citizens is based solely on
the caste of the citizens it will perpetuate the vice of caste
system. Again, ifthe classification is based solely on poverty H
894 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A it will not be logical."

In Vasanth Kumar (supra], Chinnappa Reddy, J. stated as follows:

"Any view of the caste system, class or cursory, will at once
reveal the firm links which the caste system has with
B
economic power. Land and learning, two of the primary
sources of economic power in India, have till recently been
the monopoly of the superior castes. Occupational skills
were practised by the middle castes and in the economic
system prevailing till now they could rank in the system next
c only to the castes constituting the landed and the learned
gentry. The lowest in the hierarchy were those who were
assigned the meanest tasks, the out-castes who wielded no
eonomic power. The position of a caste in rural society is
more often than not mirrored in the economic power
D wielded by it and vice versa. Soci.tl hierarchy and economic
position exhibit an undisputable mutuality. The lower the
caste, the poorer its members. The poorer the members of
· a caste lower the caste. Caste and economic situation,
reflecting each other as they do are the Deus ex-Machina
of the social status occupied and the economic power
E wielded by an individual or class in rural society. Social
status and economic power are so woven and fused into
the caste system in Indian rural society that one may without
hesitation, say that ifpovetty be the cause, caste is the primary
index of social backwardness, so that social backwardness is
F often readily identifiable with reference to a person's caste.
Such we must recognise is the primeval force and om-
nipresence of caste in Indian Society, however, much we
· may like to wish it away. So sadly and oppressively deep-
rooted is caste in our country that it has cut across even
the barriers of religion. The caste system has penetrated
G other religious and dissentient Hindu sects to whom the
practice of caste should be anathema and today we find
that practitioner of other religious faiths and Hindu dis-
sentients are sometimes as rigid adherents to the system of
caste as the conservative Hindus. We find Christian
H Harijans, Christian Madars, Christian Reddys, Christian
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [SAWANT, J.] 895

Kammas, Majbi Sikhs, etc. etc. In Andhra Pradesh there A
is a community known as Pinjaras or Dudekulas (known in
the North as 'Rui Pinjane Wala' : Professional cotton-
beaters) who are really Muslims but are treated in rural
society, for all practical purposes, as a Hindu caste. Several
other instances may be given."
B
Venkataramiah, J. [as he then was) in the same decision observed as
follows:

"An examination of the question in the background of the
Indian social conditions shows that the expression 'back-
ward classes' used in the Constitution referred only to those
c
who were born in particular castes or who belonged to
particular races or tribes or religious minorities which were
backward."

49. It will also be useful to note the trend of the thinking of some of D
the lerarned Judges of the Supreme Court 'On measures designed to redress
the racial imbalance in that conntry in various fields. In Regents of the
University of California, [supra], Marshall, J. expressed the view that in the
light of the history of discrimination and its devastating impact on the lives
of Negroes, bringing the Negoroes into the mainstream of American life E
should be a State interest of the highest order, and that neither the history
of the Fourtecenth Amendment nor past Supreme Court decisions sup-
ported the conclusion that a University could not remedy the cumulative
effects of society's discrimination by giving consideration to race in an effort
to increase the number and percentage of Negro doctors. He also held that
affirmative action programs of the type used by the University [to reserve F
seats for theNegoroes)should not be held to be unconstitutional.

Blackmun, J. observed that it would be impossible to arrange and
affirmative action programme in a racially neutral way and have it successful.

Brennan, J. observed that the claim that the law must be "colour- G
blind" is more an aspiration rather than a description of reality and that
any claim that the use of racial criteria is barred by the plain language of
the statute must fail in light of the remedial purpose of Title VI [of the
Civil Rights Act, 1%4] and its legislative history. On the contrary, he
observed, that the prior decisions of the Court strongly suggested that Title H
896 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A VI did not prohibit the remedial use of the race where such action is
constitutionally permissible. In this connection, ir will be worthwhile to
quote two passages from the learned Judge's opinion in that case. While
dealing w:th equal protection clause in the Fourteenth Amendment, the
learned Judge observed as follows:

B "The assertion of human equality is closely associated with
the proposition that differences in colour or creed, birth
or status, are neither significant nor relevant to the way in
which person should be treated. Ncnetheless, the position
that such factors must be "constitutionally an irrelevance"
c summed up by the shorthand phrase "our Constitution is
colour-blind" has never been adopted by this Court as the
proper meaning of the Equal Protection Cause. Indeed, we
have expressly rejected this proposition on a number of
occasions. Our cases have always implied that an "overrid-
ing statutory purpose" could be found that would justify
D racial classifications ........ More recently....this Court unani-
mously reversed the Georgia Supreme Court which had
held that a desegregation plan voluntarily adopted by a
local school board which assigned students on the basis of
race, was per se invalid because it was not colour-blind. We
E conclude, therefore, that racial classification are not per se
invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, we
turn to the problem of articulating what our role should be
in reviewing state action that expressly classifies by race."

"The conclusion that state educational institutions may
F
constitutionally adopt admissions programs designed to
avoid exclusion of historically disadvantaged minorities,
even when such programs explicitly take race into account
finds direct support in our cases construing congressional
legislation designed to overcome the present effects of the
G past discrimination.''

In Fullilove (supra] where the provision in the Public Works Employ-
ment Act, 1977 requiring that at least 10 per cent of the Federal funds
granted for local public works projects, should be used by the State or the
H local granteee to procure services or supplies from businesses owned by
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.l. [SAWANT, J.] 897

minority group members, was challenged, Chief Justice Burger, speaking A
for himself, White and Powel, JJ. upheld the view expressed in the earlier
decisions that if the race was the consideration for earlier di"crimination in
remedial process, steps will almost invariably require to· be based on racial
factors and any other approach would freeze the status quo which is the very
tatget of all remedies to correct the imbalance introduced by the past racial
discriminatory measures .. lsl.
B

[All emphasis supplied]

50. It is further not correct to say that the caste system is prevalent C
only among the Hindus, and other religions are free from it. Jains have
never considered themselves as apart from Hindus. For all practical pur-
poses and from all counts, there are no socially and educationally backward
classes in the Jain community for those who embraced it mostly belonged
to the higher castes. As regards Buddhists, if we exclude those who D
embraced Buddhism along with Dr. Ambedkar in 1955, the population of
Buddhists is negligible. If, however, we include the new converts who have
come to be known as Nav-Buddhists, admittedly almost all of them are
from the Scheduled Castes. In fact, in some States, they were sought to be
excluded from the list of Scheduled Castes and denied the benefit of
reservations on the ground that they had no longer remained the lower E
castes among the Hindus qualifying to be included among the Scheduled
Castes. On account of their agitation, this perverse reasoning was set right
and today the Nav-Buddhists continue to get the benefit of reservation on
the ground that their low status in society as the backward classes did not
change with the change of their religion. As regards Sikhs, there is no doubt F
that the Sikh religion docs not recognise caste system. It was in fact a revolt
against it. However, the existence of Mazriabis, Kabirpanthis, Ramdasias,
Baurias, Sareras and Sikligars and the demand of the leaders of the Sikhs
themselves to treat them as Scheduled Castes could not be ignored and
from the beginning they have been notified as a Scheduled Caste [See: pp
768-772 of Vol. I and p. 594 of Vol. IV of the Framing ofTndia's Constitu- G
tion - Ed. B. Shiva Rao]. As far as Islam is concerned, hlarn also does not
recognise castes or caste system. However, among the Muslims, in fact
there are Ashrafs and Ajlafs, i.e., high born and low born. The Census
Report of 1901 of the Province of Bengal records the following facts
regarding the Muslims of the then Province of Bengal: H
898 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A ''the conventional division of the Mahomedans into four
tribes - Sheikh, Saiad, Moghul and Pathan - has very little
application to this province (Bengal]. The Mahomedans
themselves recognise two main social divisions, (1) Ashraf
or Sharaf and (2) Ajlaf. Ashraf means 'noble' and includes
all undoubted descendants of foreigners and converts from
B high caste Hindus. All other Mahomedans including the
occupational groups and all coverts of lower ranks, are
known by the contemptuous terms, 'Ajlaf, 'Wretches' or
'mean people' : they are also called Kamina or !tar, 'base'
or Rasil, a corruption of Rizal, 'worthless'. In some places
c a third class, called Arzal or 'lowest of all', is added. With
them no other Mahomedan would associate and they are
forbidden to enter the mosque to use the public burian
ground.

Within these groups there [sic.) castes with social
D precedence of exactly the same nature as one finds among
the Hindus.

1. Ashrat or better class Mahomedans.

(i) Saiads, (ii) Sheikhs, (iii) Patbans, (iv) Moghul, (v) Mal-
E lik, (vi) Mirza.

2. Ajlaf or lower class Mahomedans.

(i) Cultivating Sheikhs, and other who were oringinally
Hindus but who do not belong to any functional group, and
F have not gained admittance to the Ashrat Community e.g.
Pirali and Thakrai, (ii) Darzi, Jolaha, Fakir and Rangrez,
(iii) Barbi, Bhathiara, Chik, Churihar, Dai, Dhawa,
Dhunia, Gaddi, Kala, Kasai, Kula, Kunjara, Laheri,
Mahifarosh, Mallah, Naliya, Nikari, (iv) Adbad, Bako
G Bediya, Bhat, Chamba, Dafali, Dhobi, Hajjam, Mucho,
Nagarchi, Nat, Panwaria, Madaria, Tuntia.

3. Arzal or degraded class. Bhanar, Halalkhor, Hirja,
Kashi, Lalbegi, Mangta, Mehtar.

H The Census Superintendent mentions another feature of·
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [SAWANT, l.J 899

the Muslim social system, namely, the prevalence of the A
'Panchayat system.' He states :

"The authority of the Panchayat extends to social as well
as trade matters and . . . mariage with people of other
communities is one of the offences of which the governing
body takes cognizance. The result is that these groups arc B
often as strictly endogamous as Hindu castes. The prohibi-
tion on inter- marriage extends to higher as well as to lower
castes, and a Dhuma, for example, may marry no one but
a Dhuma. If this rule is transgressed, the offender is at once
hauled up before the panchayat and ejected ignominiously
from his community. A member of one such group cannot
c
ordinarily g&in admission to another, and he retains the
designation of the community in which he \Vas born even
if he abandons its distinctive occupation and takes to other
means of livelihood .... thousands of Jolahas are butchers,
yet there are still known as Jolahas ." D

[See: pp. 218-220 of Pakistan or Partition of India by Dr.
B.R. Ambedkar.]

Similar facts regarding the then other Prminces could be gathered
from their respective Census Reports. At present there are many social
E
groups among Muslims which are included in the list of Scheduled Castes
in some States. For example, in Tamil Nadu, Labbais including Rawthars
and Marakayars are in the list of Scheduled Castes. This shows that the
Muslims in India have not remained immune from the same social evils as
are prevalent among the Hindus. F
Though Christianity also does not recognise caste system, there are
upper and lower castes among Christians. In Goa, for example, there are
upper caste Catholic brahmins who do not marry christians belonging to
the lower castes. In many churches, the low caste christians have to sit apart
from the high caste christians. There are constant bickerings between G
Goankars and Gawdes who form a clear cut division in Goan Christian
society. In Andhra Pradesh there are Christian Harijans, Christian Madars,
Christians Reddys, Christians Kammas etc. In Tamil Nadu, converts to
Christianity from Scheduled Castes - Latin Catholics, Christians Shanars,
Christian Nadars and Christian Gramani are in the list of Scheduled H
900 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Castes. Such instances are many and vary from region to region.
The division of the society even among the other religious groups in
this country between the high and low castes is only to be expected. Almost
all followers of the non-Hindu religions except those of the Zoroastrianism,
are converts from Hindu religion, and in the new religion they carried with
B them their castes as well. It is unnatural to expect that the social prejudices
and biases, and the notions and feelings of superiority and inferiority,
nurtured for centuries together, would disappear by a mere change of
religion.

c low and51. the
The castes were inextricably associated with occupations and the
mean occupations belonged to the lower castes. In the new
religion, along with the castes, most of the converts carried their occupa-
tions as well. The backward classes among the Hindus and non-Hindus
can, therefore, easily be identified by their occupations also. Whether,
therefore, the backward classes are identified on the basis of castes or
D occupations, the result would be the same. For, it will lead to the iden-
tification of the same collectivities or communities. The social groups
following different occupations are known among Hindus by the castes
named after the occupations, and among non-Hindus by occupation names.
Hence for identifying the backward classes among the non-Hindus, their
occupations can furnish a valid test. It is for this reason that both Articles
E
15 (4) and 16 (4) do not use the word 'caste' and use the word 'class' which
can take within its fold both the caste and occupational groups among the
Hindus and non-Hindus.

52. The next issues arising out of this question is whether economic
F criterion by itself would identify the backward classes under Article 16 (4)
and whether the expression "backward class of citizens" in the said Article
would include "weaker sections of the people" mentioned in Article 46.

53. Article 46 enjoins upon the State to promote with special care,
the educational and economic interests of the "weaker sections" of the
G people, and in particular, of the SCs/STs and to protect them from social
11
injustice and all forms of exploitation. The expression weaker sections" of
the people is obviously wider than the expression "backward class" of
citizens in Article 16 (4) which is only a part of the weaker sections. As
has been discussed above, the expression "backward classn of citizens is
H used there in a particular context which is germane to the reservations in
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [SAWANT, J.] 901

the services under the State for which that Article has been enacted. It has A
also been pointed out that in that context, read with Articles 15 (4) and
340, the said expression means only those classes which are socially back-
ward and whose educational and economic backwardness is on account of
their social backwardness and which are not adequately represented in the
' services under the State. Hence, the expression 11backward class" of citizens
in Article 16 (4) does not comprise all the weaker sections of the people, B
but only those which are socially and, therefore, educationally and
economically backward, and which are inadequately represented in the
services. The expression "weaker sections of the people" used in Article 46,
however, is not confined to the aforesaid classes only but also includes
other backward classes as well, whether they are socially and educationally c
backward or not and whether they are adequately represented in the
services or not. What is further, the expression 11 weaker sections" of the
people does not necessarily refer to a group or a class. The expression can
also take within its compass, individu.als who constitute weaker sections or
weaker parts of the society. This weakness may be on account of factors D
other than past soda! and educational backwardness. The backwardness
.. again may be on account of poverty alone or on account of the present
impoverishment arising out of physical or social handicaps. The instances
of such weaker sections other than SCs/STs and socially and educationally
backward classes may be varied, viz., flood - earthquake - cyclone - fire -
famine and project affected persons, war and riot torn persons, physically E
handicapped persons, those without any or adequate means of livelihood,
those who live below the poverty line, slum dwellers etc. Hence the
expression "weaker sections 11 of the people is wider than the expres!'tion
"backward class" of citizens or 11 socially and educationally backward classes"
and "SCs/STs". It connotes all sections of the society who are rendered
F
weaker due to various causes. Article 46 is aimed at promoting their
educational and economic interests and protecting them from social injus-
tice and exploitation, This obligation cast on the State is consistent both
with the Preamble as well as Article 38 of the Constitution,

54. However, the provisions of Article 46 should not be confused with G
thpse of Article 16( 4) and hence the expression "weaker sections of the
pepple" in Article 46 should not be mixed up with the expression "backward
class of cit~ens" under Article 16(4). The purpose of Article 16(4) is limited.
II is to give adequate representation in the services of the State to that class
which has no such representation. Hence, Article 16( 4) carves out a par- H

_,\
I
902 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A ticular class of people and not individuals from the "weaker sections'', and the
class it carves out is the one which does not have adequate representation in
the services under the State. The concept of "weaker sections" in Article 46
has no such limitation. In the first instance, the individuals belonging to the
weaker sections may not from a class and they may be weaker as individuals I
only. Secondly, their weakness may not be the result of past social and
B educational backwardness or discrimination. Thirdly, even if they belong to
an identifiable class but that class is represented in the services of the State
adequately, as individuals forming weaker section, they may be entitled to the
benefits of the measures taken under Article 46, but not to the reservations
under Article 16(4). Thus, not only the concept of "weaker sections" unde,
c Article 46 is different from that of the "backward class" of citizens in Article
16(4), but the purpose of the two is also different. One is for the limited
purpose of the reservation and hence suffers from limitations, while the other
is for all purposes under Article 46, which purposes are other than reserva-
tion under Article 16(4). While those entitled to benefits under Article 16(4)
D may also be entitled to avail of the measures taken under Article 46, the
converse is not true. If this is borne in mind, the reasons why mere poverty or
economic consideration cannot be a criterion for identifying backward clas- '
ses of citizens under Article 16(4) would be more clear. To the consideration
of that aspect we may nov.' turn.

E 55. Economic backwardness is the bane of the majority of the people
in this country. There arc poor sections in all the castes and co1nmunities.
Poverty runs across all barriers. The nature and degree of economic
backwardness and its causes and effects, however, vary from section to
section of the populace. Even the poor among the higher castes are socially
F as superior to the lower castes as the rich among the higher castes. Their
economic backwardness is not on account of social backwardness. The
educational backwardness of some individuals among them may be on
account of their proverty in which case economic props alone may enable
them to gain an equal capacity to compete with others. On the other hand,
G those who are socially backward such as the lower castes or occupational
groups, are also educationally backward on account of their social back-
wardness, their economic backwardness being the consequence of both
their social and educational backwardness. Their educational backward-
ness is not on account of their economic backwardness alone. It is mainly
on account of their social backwardness. Hence mere economic aid will
H not enable them to compete with others and particularly with those who

I
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.l. (SA WANT, J.] 903

are socially advanced. Their social backwardness is the cause and not the A
consequence either of their economic or educational backwardness. It is
necessary to bear this vital distinction in mind to understand the true
import of the expression "backward class of citizens" in Article 16(4). If it
is mere educational baclcwardness or mere economic backwardness that
was intended to be specially catered to, there was no need to make a
provision for reservation in employment in the services under the State. B
That could be taken care of under Articles 15( 4), 38 and 46. The provision
for reservation in appointments under Article 16(4) is not aimed at
economic upliftment or alleviation of poverty. Articll' 16(4) is specifically
designed to give a due share in the State power to those who have remained
out of it mainly on account of their social and, therefore, educational and c
economic backwardness. The backwardness that is contemplated by Article
16(4) is the backwardness which is both the cause and the consequence of
non-representation in the administration of the country. All other kinds of
backwardness are irr.elevant for the purpose of the said Article. Further,
the backwardness has to be a backwardness of the whole class and not of D
some individuals belonging to the class, which individuals may be economi-
cally or edcuationally backward, but the class to which they belong may be
socially forward and adequately or even more than adequately represented
in the services. Since the reservation under Article 16( 4) is not for the
individuals but to a class which must be both backward and inadequately
represented in the services, such individuals would not be beneficiaries of E
reservation under Article 16(4). It is further difficult to come across a
"class" [not ini:livicluals] which is socially and educationally advanced but is
economically backward or which is not adequately represented in the
services of the State on account of its economic backwardness. Hence,
mere economic or mere educational backwardness which is not the result
F
of social backwardness, cannot be a criterion of backwardness for Article
16(4).

56, That only economic backwardness was not in the contemplation
of the Constinition is made further clear by the fact that at the time the
First Amendment to the Constitution which added clause (4) to Article 15 G
of the Constitution, one of the Members, Prof. K.T. Shah wanted the
elimination of the word "classes" in and the addition of the word "economi-
cally" to the qualifiers of the term "backward classes". This Amendment
was not accepted. Prime Minister Nehru himself stated that the addition
of the word "economically" would put the language of the Article at H

'
904 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A variance with that of Article 340. He added that "socially" is a much wider
term including many things and certainly including "economically''. This
shows that economic consideration alone as the basis of backwardness was
not only not intended but positively discarded.

57. The reasons for discarding economic criterion as the sole test of
B backwardness are obvious. If poverty alone is made the test, the poor from
all castes, communities, collectivities and sections would compete for the
reserved quota. In such circumstances, the rusult would be obvious, name-
ly, those who belong to socially and educationally advanced sections would
capture all the posts in the quota. This would leave the socially and
C educationally backward classes high and dry although they are not at all
represented or are inadequately represented in the services, and the so-
cially and educationally advanced classes are adequately or more than
adequately represented in the services. It would thus result in defeating the
very object of the reservations in services, under Article 16(4). It would,
D also provide for the socially and educationally advanced classes statutory
reservations in the services in addition to their traditional but non-statutory
cent per cent reservations. It will thus perpetuate the imbalance, and the
inadequate representation of the backward classes in the services. It is
naive to expect that the poor from the socially and edcuationally backward
classes would be able to compete on equal terms with the poor from the
E socially and educationally advanced classes. There may be an equality of
opportunity for the poor from both the socially advanced and backward
classes. There will, however, be no equality of resutls since the competing
capacity of the two is unequal. The economic criterion will thus lead, in
effect, to the virtual deletion of Article 16(4) from the Constitution.

F
58. We may refer to some decisions of this Court on this point.

In Chitra/ekha, which was a case under Article 15(4), it is observed:

nit is, therefore, manifest that the Government as a tem-
G porary measure, pending an elaborate study, has taken into
consideration only the economic condition and occupation
of the family concerned as the criteria for backward classes
within the meaning of Article 15(4) of the Constitution."

H (Emphasis supplied)
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [SAWANT, J.] 905

The Supreme Court upheld the said classification. However, it must be A
noted that the classification there was not only on the ground of economic
condition but was also based on the occupation of the family concerned.

Parimoo was a case under Article 16(4). On the test of backwardness,
the Court has observed there as follows:
B
"It is not merely the educational backwardness or the social
backwardness which makes a class of citizens backward;
the class identified as a class as above must be both educa-
tionally and socially backward. In India social and educa-
tional backwardness is further associated with economic c
backwardness and it is observed. in Balaji's case referred
to above that backwardness, socially and educationally is
ultimately and primarily due to poverty. But if poverty is
the exclusive test, a very large proportion of the population
in India would have to be regarded as socially and educa-
D
tionally backward, and if reservations are made only on the
ground of economic considerations, an untenable situation
may rise because even in sectors which are recognised as
socially and educatir.nally advanced there are large pockets
of poverty. In this country except for a small percentage of
the population the people are generally poor - some being E
more poor, other~ less poor. Therefore, when a social
investigator tries to identify socially and educationally
backward classes, he may do it with confidence that they
are bound to be poor. His chief concern is, therefore, to
determine whether the class or group is socially and educa- F
tionally backward. Though the two words 'socially' and
'educationally' are used cumulatively for the purpose of
describing the backward class, one may find that if a class
as a whole is educationally advanced, it is generally also
socially adva~ced because of the reformative effect of
education on that cl(!SS. The words "advanced" and 11back- G
W<l:rd11 are only relative terms - there being several layers
or strata Of classes, hovering between "advanced" and
"backward", and the difficult task is which class can be
recognised out o.f these several layers as being socially and
educationally backward." H
. . 906 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R .

A . It will be observed from the above that poverty as the sole test of w
backwardness for Article 16(4) was discarded by this Court .in ·the said
decision. On the other hand, it is emphasised there that the poverty in
question should be the result of social and edcational backwardness.

59. This point has elaborately been dealt with by Chinnappa Reddy,
B J. in Vasan th Kumar where the learned Judge has taken pains to point out
that although poverty is the dominant characteristic of all backwardness, it
is not the cause of all backwardness :

"We, therefore, see that everyone of the three dimensions
propounded by Weber is intimately and inextficably con-
c nected with economic position. However, we look at the
question of 'backwardness', whether from the angle of
clas&; status or power, we find the economic factor at the
bottom of it all and we find poverty, the culprit-cause and
the dominant characteristic. Poverty, the economic factor
D brands all backwardness just as the erect posture brands
the homosapiens and distinguishes him from all other
animals, in the eyes of the beholder from Mars. But,
whether his racial stock is Caucasian, Mongoloid, Negroid,
etc. further investigation will have to be made. So too the
further question of social and educational backwardness
E
requires further scrutiny. In India, the matter is further
aggravated, complicated and pitilessly tyrannised by the
ubiquitous caste system, a unique and devastating system
of gradation and degradation which has divided the entire
Indian and particularly Hindu sociaty horizontally into
F such distinct layers as to be desturctive of mobility, a system
which has penetrated and corrupted the mind and soul of

--
11
every Indian citizen.

60. It is, therefore, clear that economic criterion by itself will not
G identify the backward classes under Article 16(4). The economic backward-
ness of the backward classes under Article 16(4) has to be on account of
their social and educational backwardness.

Question III:

H If economic criterion by itself could not constitute a Back-
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [SAWANT, J.] 907

ward Class under Article 16(4), whether reservation of A
posts in services under the State, based exclusively on
economic criterion would be covered by Article 16(1) of
the Constitution?

61. While discussing Question No. I, it has been pointed out that so
far as "backward classes" are concerned, clause (4) of Article 16 is exhaus- B
tive of reservations meant for them. It has further been pointed out under
Question No. II that the only "backward class'' for which reservations are
provided under the said clause is the socially backward class whose educa-
tional and economic backwardness is on account of the social backward-
ness. A class which is not socially and educationally backward though c
economically or even educationally backward is not a backward class for
the purposes of the said clause. What follows from these two conclusions
is that reservations in posts cannot be made in favour of any other class
under the sail1 clause. Further, the purpose of keeping reservations even
in favour of the socially and edcuationally backward classes under clause D
(4), is not to alleviate poverty but to give it an adequate share in power.

62. Clause (1) of Article 16 may permit classification on economic
criterion. The purpose of such classification, however, can only be to alleviate
poverty or relieve unemployment. If this is so, to individual or section of the
society satisfying the criterion can be denied its benefits - and particularly E
the backward classes who are more in need of it. If, therefore, the backward
classes within the meaning of clause (4) are excluded from the reservations
kept on economic criterion under clause (1), it will amount to discrimination.
Further, the objects of reservations under the two clauses are different. While
those falling under clause (1) from other than the backward classes, will F
continue to enjoy the reservations for ever, the backward classes can get ~he
benefit of the reservation under clause (4) only so long as they are not

- adequately represented in the services. What is more, those entering the
services under clause (J.) may belong to classes which are adequately or more
than adequately represented in the services. The reservations for them alone
under Article 16(1) would virtually defeat the purpose of Article 16(4) and G
woiild be contrary to it. No different result will, further, ensue even if the
reservations are kepi for all the classes since as pointed out above, all the
seats will be captured only by the socially and educationally a\lvanced classes.
The two clauses of the Article have to be read consistently with each ot[jer so
as to lead to harmonious results. Hence, so long as the socially backward H
908 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A classes and the effects of their social backwardness continue to exist, the ..
reservations in services on economic criterion alone would be impermissible
either under clause (4) or clause (1) of Article 16.

63. Hence no reservation of posts in services ..irid.;r the State, based
exclusively on economic criterion would be valid under clause (1) of Article
B 16 of the Constitution.

Question IV:

Can the extent or reservation of posts in the services under
the State under Article 16(4) or, If permitted under Article
c 16(1) and 16(4) together, exceed 50% of the posts in a cadre
or Service under the State or exceed 50% of appointments
In a cadre or service in any particular year and can such
extent of reservation be determined without determining
the inadequacy of representation of each class in the
D different categories and grades of Services under the
State?

64. It has already been poimed out earlier that clause (4) of Article 16
is not an exception to clause (1) thereof. Even assuming that it is an excep-
tion, there is no numerical relationship between a rule and exception, and
E their respective scope depends upon the areas and situations they cover.
How large the area of the exception will be, will of course, depend upon the
circumstances in each case. Hence, legally, it cannot be insisted that the
exception will cover not more than 50 per cent of the area covered by the rule.
Whether, therefore, clause (4) is held as an exception to clause (1) or is
F treated as a more emphatic way of stating what is obvious under the said
clause, has no bearing on the percentage of reservations to be kept under it.
As Justice Hegde has stated in State of Punjab v. Hirata/ & Ors., [1971) 3 SCR
267 at 272, "the length of the leap to be provided depends upon the gap to be
covered". In Article 16(4) itself, there is no indication of the extent of
reservation that can be made in favour of the backward classes. However, the
-
G object of reservation, viz., to ensure adequacy of representation, mentioned
there, serves as a guide for the percentage of reservations to be kept. Broadly
speaking, the adequacy of representation in the services will have to be
proportionate to the proportion of the backward classes in the total popula-
tion. In this connection, a reference may be made to the U.S. decision in
H Fullilove where 10% of the business was reserved for the blacks, their
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [SAWANT, J.] 909

population being roughly 10 per cent of the total population. If the reserva- A
tion is to be on the basis of the proportion of the population in this country,
the backward classes being no less than 77 -1/2 per cent [socially and edcua-
tionally backward classes and Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes taken
together] the total reservation will have to be to that extent. It is not disputed
that at persent the reservations for the SCs/STs are roughly in proportion to
their total population. B

65. The adequacy of representation in administration is furiher to be
determined on the basis of representation at all levels or in all posts in the
administration. It is not <>nly a question of numerical strength in the ad-
ministration as a whole. It may happen that at the higher level there may be c
more representation for a class than at the lower level in terms of its popula-
tion-ratio. This mostly happens with all the advanced classes. In that case, it
cannot be said that the class in question is not represented adequately merely
because the total representation is not numerically in proportion to the
population-ratio. On the other hand, it may happen, as it does so far as the D
representation of the backward classes is concerned at the lower rungs they
may be represented adequately or more than adequately. Yet at the higher
rungs, their presence may be next to nil. In such cases, again, it cannot be said
that the class is represented adequately. To satisfy the test of adequacy,
therefore, what in necessary is an effective representation or effective voice in
the administration, and not so much the numerical presence. It is instructive E
to note in this connection that Article 16(4) speaks of "adequate" and not
proportionate representation. The practical question, therefore, is of the
manner in which the adequate representation should be secured. Whatever
the method adopted, it has also to be, consistent with the maintenance of the
efficiency of the administration.
F
66. In this connection, it will first be worthwhile to quote what Dr.
Ambedkar had to say with regard to the extent of reservations con-
templated under Article 16(4) [Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol.7
(1948-49) pp. 701-702]:
G
"As I said, the Drafting Committee had to produce a
formula which would reconcile these three points of view,
firstly, that there shall be equality of opportunity, secondly
that there shall be reservations in favour of certain com-
munities which have not so far had a 'proper look= in' so H
910 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A to say into the administration. If honourable Members will
bear these facts in the mind - the three principles, we had
to reconcile, • they will see that no better formula could be
produced than the one that is embodied in sub-clause (3)
of article 10 of the Constitution; they will find that the view
of those who believe and hold that there shall be equality
B of opportunity, has been embodied in sub-clause (1) of
Article 10. It is a generic principle. At the same time, as I
said, we had to reconcile this formula with the demand
made by certain communities that the administration which
has now · for historical reasons · been controlled by one
c community or a few communities, that situation should
disappear and that the others also must have an oppor·
tunity of getting into the public services. Supposing, for
instance, we were to concede in full the demand of those
communities who have not been so far employed in the
public servies to the fullst extent, what would really happen
D
is, we shall be completely destroying the first proposition
upon which we are all agreed, namely, that there shall be
an equality of opportunity. Let me give an illustration.
Supposing, for instance, reservations were made for a
community or a collection of communities, the total of
E which came lo something like 70 per cent of the total posts
under the State and only 30 per cent are retained as the
unreserved. Could anybody say that the reservation of 30
per cent as open to general competition would be satisfac-
tory from the point of view of giving effect to the first
principle, namely, that there shall be equality of oppor-
F
tunity? It cannot be in my judgment. Therefore the seats
to be reserved, if the reservation is to be consistent with
sub-clause (1) of Article 10 must be confined to a minority
of seats. It is then only that the first principle could find its
place in the Constitution and· effective in operation."
G
67. Article 10 and 10(3) of the Draft Constitution corresponded to
Article 16(1) and 16(4) of the Constitution. Wr.en we realise that these are
the observations of the Chairman of the Drafting Committee,. the Law
Member of the Government and the champion of the backward classes, it
H should give us an insight into the mind of the framers of the Constitution
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [SAWANT, J.] 911

on the subject. It is true that the said observations cannot be regarded as A
decisive on the point. The observations probably also proceeded on the
assumption that clause (4) of Article 16 was an exception to its clause (1),
and had a numerical relationship with the rule. Whatever the case may be,
the observations do give a perceptive and viable guidance to the policy ihat
should be followed in keeping reservations, and in particular on the extent
of reservations at any particular point of time. There is, therefore, much B
force in the contention that at least as a guide to the policy on the subject,
the observations cannot be ignored.

68. Although the view expressed in Ba/aji and Devadasan [supra],
that the reservation should not exceed 50 per cent does not refer to Dr. C
Ambedkar's aforesaid observations and is, therefore, not based on it, and
' is based on other considerations, it cannot Le said that it is not in con-
sonance with the spirit, if not the letter, of the provisions.

69. It is seen earlier that 50 per cent rule was propounded in Balaji. D
-+ The rule was propounded in the context of Art. 15(4), but, while propound-
ing it, this Court stated among other things, as follows:

".... A special provision contemplated by Art. 15(4) like
reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by
Art. 16(4) must be within reasonable limits. The interests E
of weaker sections of society which are a first charge on
the States and the Centre have to be adjusted with the
interests of the community as a whole. The adjustment of
these competing claims is undoubtedly a difficult matter,
but if under the guise of making a special provision, a State F
reserves practically all the seats available in all the colleges,
that clearly would be subverting the object of Art. 15(4).
In this matter again, we are reluctant to say definitely what
would be a proper provision to make. Speaking generally
and in a broad way a special provision should be less than
50%; how much less than 50% would depend upon the G
relevant prevailing circumstances in each case. 11

70. A reference to Article 16( 4) there, therefore, unmistakably shows
that it is presumed that the same rule will apply to Article 16(4) as well.
This rule, however, did not see uniform acceptance in all the decisions that H
912 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A ·followed. The case which immediately followed - Davadasan - applied this
rule to the "carry forward rule" and struck down the same in its entirety,
since 65 per cent of the vacancies for the year in question, came to be
reserved for the SCs/STs by virtue of that rule. With respect, even on the
application of the 50 per cent. rule, it was not necessary to strike down the
B "carry forward rule" itself. All that was necessary was to confme the carry
forward vacancies for the year in question to 50 per cent. Be that as it may.
In Thoma.i, the correctness of 50 per cent rule was questioned by Fazal
Ali, J. who stated that although clause (4) of Article 16 does not fix any

C
limit on reservations, the same being part of Article 16, the State carmot
be allowed to indulge in excessive reservation so as to defeat the policy of
Article 16(1). The learned Judge, however, added that as to what would
.
be a suitable reservation within pennissible limits will rlepend on the facts
and circumstances of each case and no hard and fast rule can be laid down
nor can this matter to reduced to a mathematical formula so as to be
adhered to in all cases. The learned Judge then went on to say that
D although the decided cases till that time, had laid down that the percentage
of reservation should not exceed 50, it was a rule of caution and did not
exhaust all categodes. He then gave an illustration of a State in which
backward classes constituted 80 per cent of the total population, and stated
that in such cases, reservation of 80 per cent of the jobs for them, can be
E justified. The learned Judge justified reservation to the said extent on the
ground that the dominant object of the provision of Article 16(4) is to take
steps to make inadequate representation of backward classes adequate. Of
the other learned Judges constituting the Bench, Krishna Iyer J. agreed
with Fazal Ali, J. and stated that the arithmetical limit of 50 per cent in
F one year set by earlier rulings cannot ''perhaps be pressed too far". He added
that over-representation in a department does not depend on recruitment
in a particular year but on the total strength of the cadre.

(Emphasis supplied)

G In Vasanth Kumar Chinnappa Reddy, J. held that Thomas had
undone the 50 per cent rule laid down in the earlier cases, while
Verikataramiah, J. disagreed with the learned Judge on that point.

71. It does not appear further that Justice lyer's support lo Justice
H Fazal Ali's view in Thomas, was unqualified or remained unchanged. For
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [SAWANT, J.] 913

in Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway) v. Union of India & A
Ors., {1981] 2 SCR 185, after referring to Balaji and Davadasan, he stated
as follows:

"All that we need say is that the Railway Board shall iake
care to issue instructions to see that in no year shall SC &
B
ST candidates be actually appointed to substantially more
than 50 per cent of the promotional posts. Some excess will
not affect as mathematical precision is different in human
affairs, but stbstantiai exceis will void the selection. Subject
to this rider or condition that the 'carry forward' rule shall
not resul~ in any given year, in the selection or appoint- c
ments of SC & ST can<tidates considerably in excess of 50
per cent, we uphold Annexure I."

The learned Judge has supported this conclusion by the observations
made by him in the earlier paragraph of his judgment which show that D
according to him the reservations made under Article 16(4) should not
have the effect of virtually obliterating the rest of the Article - clauses (1)
and (2) thereof.

72. It is necessary in this conoection, to point out that not only Article
E
16(4) but for that matter, Article 335 also does not speak of giving propor-
tional representation to the backward classes and SCsiSTs respectively.
Article 16(4), as repeatedly pointed out earlier, in terms, speaks of "ade-
quate" representation to the backward classes, while Article 335 speaks of
the "claims" of the members of the SCs/STs. However, it cannot be disputed
that whether it is the appointments of SCs/STs or other backward classes, F
both are to be made consistently with the maintenance of the efficiency in
adminsitration. Since the reservations contemplated under both the Ar-
ticles include also the giving of concessions in marks, exeffiptions etc., it is
legitimate to presume that the Constitution-framers being aware of the
level of backwardness, did envisage that the inadequacy in the repre- G
sentation of the backward classes cannot be made up in one generation
j consistently with the maintenance of efficiency in the adininistration. In
fact, as pointed out earlier, if the backward classes can provide candidates
for filling up the posts in all fields and at all levels of administration in one
generation, they wo~ld cease to be backward classes. What was in the mind H
914 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
,.
A of the Constitution-framers was the removal of the inadequacy in repre-
sentation over a period of time, on each occasion balancing the interests
of the backward classes and the forward classes so as not to affect the
provisions of equality enshrined in Articles 14 and 16(1) as also the
•
interests of the society as a whole. As pointed out earlier, Dr. Ambedkar
I " L •

was not only not in favour of proportional .repr7senta,tiop, ~\!\,:'las on the
B
contrary, of the firm view that the reservatio~. under ~i)cle,1~(4) should
be confined to the minority of the posts/appointmenl~; .In.. fl!ct, as the
debate in the Constitutent Assembly shows nobody even suggest!Xl that the
reservations under Article 16(4) should be in proportion to the population
of the backward classes.
c
73. While deciding upon a particular percentage of reservations, what
should further not be forgotten is that between the backward and the
forward classes, there exists a sizeable section of the population, who being
socially not backward are not qualified to be considered as backward. At
D the same time they have no capacity to compete with the forwards being
educationally and economically not as advanced. Most of them have only
the present generation acquaintance with education. They are, therefore,
left at the mercy of chance-crumbs that may come their way. They have
neither the benefit of the statutory nor of the traditional in-built reserva-
E tions on account of the unequal social advantag~s . .,.H .is,, tl!is.\section
sandwiched between the two which is most affected by;Jhe .re~erya~i!m
policy. The reservation-percentage has .to be adjµsted •. to"meet;, th¢ir
legitimate claims also. ·1 . 1: ,\t·,"-11 ·;[ ,;,.;.,
"1Jcup
.; ~1.11i:J·:·11q·;1

74. In this connection, one more fact nee\ls t.o b~ CQllsiderll!IJJOll!! ~
F realistic angle. A mechanical approach in keeping reservati.Qn,s.iu-.""1.. fi~\(l,s
and at all levels of administrations and that top at a unifp~njop<;1;CS'ntage,.js
unrealistic. There is no reason why the authorities conCl'rQ.e<Lslt\luld. 11\Qt
apply their mind and evolve a realistic in this bahalf. There ardi1>lds.iuid
levels of administration where either there may be no candidates ;fquh
G backward classes available or may not be available iri adequate number; lit
such cases, either no reservations should be kept or reservations kept
should be at an appropriate percentage. On the other hand, in fields and
at levels where the candidates from the backward classes are available in
suitable number, the maximum permissible reservations can be kept. The
H adjustment of the reservations and their percentages, field and grade-wise
INDRASAWHNEY v. U.0.1.[SAWANT,J.] 915

as well as from time to time, as per the availablility of the candidates from A
the backward class•s, is not only implicit in the consititutional provisions
but is also warranted for purposeful and effective implementation of the ·
spirit of those provisions.

In this connection, it is worth serious consideration whether reserva-
tions in the form of preference instead of exclusive quota should not be B
resorted to in the teaching profession in the interests of the backward
classes themselves. Education is the source of advancement of the in-
dividual in all walks of life. The teaching professiciO: therefore, holds a key
position in societal life. It is the quality of education received that deter-
mines and shapes the equipment . and the competitive capacity of the c
individual, and lays the foundation for his career in life. It is, therefore, in ·
the interests of all sections of the society - socially bac~ard and forward
- and of the nation as a whole, that they aim at securing and ensuring the
best of education. The student whethe1_. he belongs to the backward or
foreward class is also entitled to expect that he receives th~ best possible D
education that can be made available to him and correspondingly it is the
duty and the obligation of the management of every educational institution
to make sincere ·and diligent efforts to• secure the services of the best
avaliable teaching talent. In the appointments of teachers, therefore, there
should be no compromise on any gro~d For as against the few who may E
get appointments as teachers from the reserved quota, there will be over
· the years tho~ds o(students belongmg to the bac~ard classes receiving
education whose 'competitive capacity needs to be brought to the level of
the forward classes. What is more, iricompet~nt teaching would also affect
the quality of education received by the students from the other sections F
of the society. However, whereas.those coming from th~ advanced sections
of the society can make-up-their loss in the quality of education received,
~ "· by ediJ;;.tion at home or outside through private tuitions and tutorial
classes, thosero;,,mg from' the backward classes wmtld have no means for
making up the ·loss. The teachers themselves must . further command G
respect which they will do more when they do not come_ through any
reserved quota. The indiscipline in the educational campus is not a little
due to the incompetence of the teachers from whatever section they may
come, forward or backward. It is, theref~re, necessary that there should be
no exclusive quota kept in the teaching occupation for any section at all. H
'. > - •
916 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A However, if the candidates belonging to both backward and forward classes
are equal in merit, preference should be given to those belonging to the
backward classes. For one thing, they must also have a "look into" the
teaching profession as in other professions. Secondly, in this vital profes-
sion also, the talent, the social experience and the new approach and
B outlook of the members of the backward classes is very much necessary.
That will enrich the profession and the national life. Thirdly, it will also
help to meet the complaints of the alleged step-motherly treatment
received by the students from the backward classes and of the lack of
encouragement to them even when they are more meritorious. Hence in
C the teaching profession, it is preference rather than reservation, which
should be resorted to under Article 16(4) of the Constitution. A precau-
tion, however, has to be taken to see that the selection body has a
representation from the backward classes.

It must, however, be added that in judging the merits of the in-
D dividuals for the profession of teaching as for any other profession, it is not
the traditional test of marks obtained in examinations, but a scientific test
based, among other things, on the aptitude in teaching, the capacity to
express and convey thoughts, the scholarship, the character of the person,
his interest in teaching, his potentiality as a teacher judged on the con-
E siderations indicated generally at the outset, should be adopted.

What is stated with regard to the teaching profession above is only
by way of an illustration as to how the policy of reservation if it is to
subserve its larger purpose can be modulated and applied rationally to
different fields instead of clamping it mechanically in all the fields or
F
withholding it from some areas altogether. It is not meant to lay down any
proposition of law in that behalf.

75. The other aspect of the question is whether for the purposes of
the percentage-limit of the reservations under Article 16, the reservati~ns
G made under clause (1) should be taken into consideration together with
those made under clause (4) of the Article.

76. · As has already been pointed out above, the reservations on the
basis of economic criterion alone would be impermissible under clause (1).
H Assuming, however, that they are legal, they cannot cut into the reserva-
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [SAWANT, J.] 917

tions made for the backward classes under clause (4) which are for the A
specific purpose of making up the adequacy in representation in the
services.

77. However, reservations for individuals are permissible under
clause (1) on a ground other than economic, provided of course, the
ground is not hit by Article 16(2). Instances of such individuals have been
B
given earlier which need not be repeated here. There is, however, no need
to made additional reservations for such individuals over and above those
made under clause (4). The individuals can be accommodated in the quota
reserved for the backward, or in the unreserved or general category
depending upon the class to which they belong. For example, the defence C
personnel and the freedom-fighters or their dependents, physically
handicapped, etc. can be accommodated in the reserved quota under
Article 16(4) if they belong to the backward classes, and in the unreserved
posts/appointments if they belong to the unreserved categories. This is so
because in their respective classes, they will be more disadvantaged than D
others belonging to those classes. Such a classification need not hit either
clause (1) or clause (2) of Article 16 but would be justifiable. If this is done,
there would be no occasion to keep extra posts/appointments reserved for
them under clause (1).
E
It is necessary to add here a word about reservations for women.
Clause (2) ·of Article 16 bars reservation in services on the ground of sex.
Article 15(3) cannot save the situation since all reservations in the services
under the State can only be made under Article 16. Further, women come
from both backward and forward classes. If reservations are kept for
women as a class under Article 16(1), the same inequitous phenomenon F
will emerge. The women from the advanced classes will secure all the posts,
leaving those from the backward classes without any. It will amount to
indirectly providing statutory reservations for the advanced ·classes as such,
which is impermissible under any of the provisions of Article 16. However,
there is no doubt that women are a vulnerable section of the society, G
whatever the strata to which they belong. They are more disadvantaged
than men in their own social class. Hence ~eservations for them on that
ground would be fully justified, if they are kept in the quota of the
respective class, as for other categories of persons, as explained above. If
that is done, there is no need to keep a special quota for women as such H
918 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A and whatever the percentage-limit on the reservations under Article 16,
need not be exceeded.

78. Yet another aspect of the matter is whether the extent of reser-
vations should be determined [i] on the basis of the total strength of the
particular cadre or service, or on the basis of the appointments made for
B that cadre in a particular year and [ii] without, determining the inadequacy
of representation of each class in different categories and grades of the
services under the State.

79. Both to avoid arbitrariness in appointments and to ensure the
c availability of the expected number of seats every year, for the reserved as
well as the unreserved categories as per the pre-defined known norms, it
is necessary that the reservations in appointments/posts are made yearwise.
Any other practice wonld give the authorities complete freedom as to when
and at what percentage the reservations shonld be kept. It may happen that
D in some years, they may not keep reservations at all whereas in other years,
they may reserve all or majority of the posts. Secondly, the periodicity of
reservations may also vary depending upon the will of the authorities which
may be influenced by several unpredictable considerations. This would
spell out uncertainties in the matter of appointments both for the reserved
and unreserved categories. Hence the reservations will have to be kept and
E
calculated on yearwise basis [See: CA. Rajendran v. Union of India & Ors.,
[1968] 1 SCR 721 at 732-33, and better still, on the basis of the roster system
with suitable number of points to correspond the average vacancies. To
permit calculation, further, of the percentage of reservations on the basis
of the total strength of the cadre and to enable the authorities concerned,
F as stated earlier, to keep either all the posts or a majority of them reserved
from year to year till there is adequate representation of the reserved
categories, will in the process deny to the unreserved categories completely
or near completely, their due share in the appointments yearwise, thus
obliterating clause (1) of Article 16 totally over a given period of time.
G Hence as pointed out earlier, the extent of the percentage of the reserva-
tion should be calculated yearwise with due allowance to the operation of
the rule with regard to the backlog, if any. Still better method is to regulate
and calculate the appointments on the roster basis as stated earlier.

H 80. As regards point (ii), since the provisions of Article 16(4) are
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [SAWANT, J.] 919

meant for providing adequate representation in the services to the back- A
ward classes, the representation has co be in all categories and grades in
the services. The adequacy does not mean a mere proportionate numerical
or quantitative strength. It means effective voice or share in· power in
running the administration. Hence, the extent of reserv3tiOnS will have to
be estimated with reference to the representation in different grades and B
categories. (See: The General Manager, Southern Railway v. Rangachari,
[1962] 2 SCR 586).

To summarise, the question may be answered thus. There is no legal
infirmity in keeping the reservations under clause (4) alone or under clause
(4) and clause (1) of Article 16 together, exceeding 50%. However, validity C
of the extent of excess of reservations over 50% would depend upon the
facts and circumstances of each case including the field in which and the
grade or level of administration for which the reservation is kept. Although,
further, legally and theoretically the excess of reservations over 50% may
be justified, it would ordinarily be wise and nothing much would be lost, if D
the intentions of the framers of the Constitution and the observations of
Dr. Ambedkar, on the subject in particular, are kept in mind. The reser-
vations should further be kept category and gradewise at appropriate
percentages and for practical purposes the extent of reservations should be
calculated category and gradewise. E

Question V:

Does Article 16(4) permit the classification of 'Backward
Classes' into Backward Classes and Most Backward Clas-
ses or permit classification among them based on
F
economic or other considerations?

81. This question is really in two parts and the two do not mean and
refer to the same classification. The first part refers to the classification of
the backward classes .into backward and most backward classes while the G
second speaks of internal classification of each backward class, into back-
ward and more backward individuals or families. Both classifications are
to be made on economic or other considerations. Whereas the first clas-
sifi.cation will place some backward classes in their entirety above other
backward classes, the second will place some sections in each backward H
920 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A class internally above the other sections in the same class. The second
classification aims at what has popularly come to be known as weeding out
of the s0-called "creamy' or "advanced sections" from the backward clas-
ses. Although it is not that clear, the second order probably seeks to do it.
We may first deal with the second classification.
B 82. Society does not remain static. The industrialisation and the
urbanisation which necessarily followed in its wake, the advance on politi-
cal, social and economic fronts made particularly after the commencement
of the Constitution, the social-reform movements of the last several
decades, the spread of education and the advantages of the special
C provisions including reservations secured so far, have all undoubtedly seen
at least some individuals and families in the backward classes, however
small in number, gaining sufficient means to develop their capacities to
compete with others in every field. That is an undeniable fact. Legally,
therefore, they are not entitled to be any longer called as part of the
D backward classes whatever their original birth mark. It can further hardly
be argued that once a backward class, al)vays a backward class. That would
defeat the very purpose of the special provisions made in the Constitution
for the advancement of the backward/ classes, and for enabling them to
come to the level of and to compete with the forward classes, as equal
E citizens. On the other hand, to continue to confer upon such advanced
sections from the backward classes the special benefits, would amount to
treating equals unequally violating the equality provisions of the Constitu-
tion. Secondly, to rank them with the rest of the backward classes would
equally violate the right to equality of the rest in those classes, since it
F would amount to treating the unequals equally. What is more, it will lead
to perverting the objectives of the special constitutional provisions since
the forwards among the backward classes will thereby be enabled to lap
up all the special benefits to the exclusion and at the cost of the rest in
those classes, thus keeping the rest in perpetual backwardness. The object
G of the special constitutional provisions is not to uplift a few individuals and
families in the backward classes but to ensure the advancement of the
backward classes as a whole. Hence, taking out the forwards from among
the backward classes is not only permissible but obligatory under the
Constitution. However, it is necessary to add that just as the backwardness
H of the backward groups cannot be measured in terms of the forwardness
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [SAWANT, J.J. 921

of the forward groups, so also the forwardnds of the forwards among the . A
backward classes cannot be measured in terms of the backwardness of the
backward sections of the said classes. It has to be judged on the basis of
the social capacities gained by them to compete with the forward classes.
So long as the individuals belonging to the backward classes do not develop
sufficient capacities of their, own to compete with others. they can hardly
B
be classified as forward. The moment, however, they develop the requisite
capacities, they would cease to be backward. It will be a contradiction in
~

terms to call them backward and others more or J!!OSt backwards. There
will always be degrees of backwardness as therewill be degrees of forward-
ness, whatever the structure of the society. It is not the degrees of back-
wardness or forwardness which jusiify classification of the society into c
forward and backward classes. It is the capacity or the lack of it to compete
with others on equal terms which merits such classification. The remedy
therefore, does not lie in classifying each backward class internally into
backward and more backward, but in taking the forward from out of the
backward classes altogether. Either they have acquired the capacity to D
compete with others or not. They cannot be both.

83. The mere fact further that some from the backward classes who
are more advanced than the rest in that class or score more in competition
with the rest of them and thus gain all the advantages of the special E
provisions such as reservations, is no ground for classifying the backwards
into backwards and most backwards. This phenomenon is evident among
the forward classes too. The more advantaged among the forwards similarly
gain unfair advantage over others among the forwards and secure all the
prizes. This is an inevitable consequence of the present social and
economic structure. The correct criterion for judging the forwardness of F
the forwards among the backward classes is to measure their capacity not
in terms of the capacity of others in their class, but in terms of the capacity
of the members of the forward classes, as stated earlier. If they cross the
Rubicand of backwardness, they should be taken out from the backward
classes and should be made disentitletl to the provisions meant for the said G
classes. '

84. It is necessary to highlight another allied aspect of the issue, in
this connection. What do we mean by sufficient capacity to compete with
others? ls it the capacity to compete for Class-IV or Class-lll or higher H
922 . SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A class posts? A Class-IV employee's children may develop capacity to
compete for Class-III posts and in that sense, he and his children may be
forward compared to those in his class who have not secured even Class-IV
-
posts. It cannot, however, be argued that on that account, he has reached
the "creamy" level. If the adequacy of representation in the services as
B discussed earlier, is to be evaluated in terms of qualitative and not mere
quantitative representation, which means representation in the higher
rungs of administration as well, the competitive capacity should be deter-
mined on the basis of the capacity to compete for the higher level posts
also. Such capacity will be acquaired only when the backward sections
C reach those levels or at least, near those levels. Till that time, they cannot
be called forwards among the backward classes, and taken out of the
backward classes.

85. As regards the second part of the question, inBa/aji it is observed
that the backward classes cannot be further classified in backward and
D more backward classes. These observations, although made in the context
of Article 15(4) which fell for consideration there, will no doubt be equally
applicable to Article 16(4). The observation were made while dealing with
the ~ecommendations of the Nagan Gowda Committee appointed by the
State of Karnataka which had recommended the classifications of the
E backward communities into two divisions, the Backward and the More
Backward. While making those recommendations the Committee had ap-
plied one test, viz., "Was the standard of education in the community in
question less than 50% of the State average? If it was, the community was
regarded as more backward; if it was not, the community was regarded as
F backward". The Court opined that the sub-classification made by the
Repor.t and the order based thereupon was not justified under Article

-
15(4) which authorises special provision being made for 'really backward
classes'. The Court further observed that in introducing two categories of
backward classes, what the impugned order in substance purported to do
G was to devise measures for the benefit of all the tlasses of ·citizens who
11

are less advanced compared to the most advanced classes in the State".
That, according to the Court, was not the scope of Article 15(4). The result
of the method adopted by the impugned order was that nearly 90% of the
population of the State was treated as Backward and that, observed the
H Court, illustrated how the order in fact divided the population of the State
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.JJ[SAWANT, J.]

into most advanced and the rest, putting the fatter into· two ·"Categories of A
the Backward and the More Backward. Thus, the view taken there-•against
the sub-classification was on the facts· of that case·which·'.showed -that
almost 90% of the population of the State was classified as backward, the
backwardness of the Backward [as against that of the More' Backward]
being measured in comparison to the most advanced Classes in the State. B
Those who were less advanced than the .most advanced;0were all classified
as Backward. The Court held that it is the More Backward or who were
really backward who alone would be entitled to the benefit of the
provisions of Article 15(4). In other.words, while the More Backward were
classified there rightly as backward, the Backward were not classified C
rightly as backward.

86. It may be pointed out that in Vasanth Kumar, Chinnappa Reddy,
J. after referring to the aforesaid view in Balaji observed that "the propriety
of such test may be open to question on the facts of each case but there
was no reason why on principle there cannot. be a classification into D
backwards and More Backwards if both .cl.~ss~~. ,are not merely a little
• behind, but far· for behind the most adV3!l,C"._4f ~"'S~!lK· He further ·observed
that in fact, such classification wmtld, .~e .l\e.ces~ to help the More
Backward classes; otherwise those 9~.!k.e b.ac;l\w,w,4,~~~ses who might be
a little l]lpre advanc~d than the. m~r,e1b.1'skwar:d £1Af~,<;i;,i.;\VOuld walk away E
with ai!,\he seats,j_u~i as if·reservl)tio111wa~E!l~l,'W\\~9i~;\\fore Backward
classes and no resl'rvation wa,.s nia<!,y, !'l:J:~e.,~~~tly mpr5._advanced of the
backward classes, the backward classes would gain _no seats .~ce the
advanced classes would walk away with all the seats available for the
general category''. With respect, this is '.the,:correct view of the matter.
Whether the backward classes can be classified into Backward and More
F
Backward, would depend upon the facts of each case. So long as both
backward and more backward classes are not only comparatively but
substantially backward than the advanced classes, and further, between
themselves, there is a substantial difference in backwardness, not only it is
advisable but also imperative to make the sub-classification if all the G
backward classes are to gain equita!:>le benefit of the special provisions
under the Constitution. To give an instance, the Manda! Commission has,
on the basis of social, educational and economic indicators evolved 22
points by giving different values to each of the three factors, viz., social, H
924 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A educatliipal and economic. Those social groups which secured 22 points or
above 'have been listed there as "socially and educationally backward" and
the rest as ."advanced". Now, between 11 and 22 points some may secure,
say, 11 to 15 points while others may secure all 22 points. The difference
in their backwardness is, therefore, substantial. Yet another illustration
B which may be given is from Karnataka State Goverment order dated 13th
October, 1986 on reservations issued after the decision in Vasanth Kumar
where the backward classes are grouped into five categories, viz., A, B, C,
D, and E. In category A, fall such castes or communities as that of Bairagi,
Banjari and Lambadi which are nomadic tribes, and Bedaru, Ramoshi
which were formerly stigmatised as criminal tribes whereas in category D
<:; fall such castes as Kshatriya and Rajput. To lump both together would be
to deny totally the benefit of special provisions to the former, the later
t3lcing away the entire benefits. On the other hand, to deny the status of
backwardness to the latter and ask them to compete with the advanced
classes, would leave the latter without any seat or post. In such circumstan-
D ces, the sub-classification of the backward classes into backward and more
or most backward is not only desirable but essential. However, for each of
them a special quota has to be prescribed as is done in the Karnataka
-
Government order. If it is not done, as in the present case, and the reserved
posts are first offered to the more backward and only the remaining to the
E backward or less backward, the more backward may take away all the posts
leaving the backward with no posts. The backward will neither get his post
in the reserved quota nor in the general category for want of capacity to
compete with the for.ward.

87. Hence, it will have to be held that depending upon the facts of
F each case, sub-classification of the backward classes into the backward and
more or most backward would be justifiable provided separate quotas are
prescribed for each of them.

Questions VI:
G
Would making "any provision" under Article 16(4) for
reservation "by the State" necessarily have to be by law
made by the legislatures of the State or by law made by
Parliament? Or could such provisions be made by an
H executive order?
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [SAWANT, J.] 925

· 88. The language of Article 16(4) is very clear. It enables the State A
to make a "provision" for the reservation of appointments to the posts. The
provision may be made either by an Act of Legislature or by rule or
regulation made under such A<;t or in the absence of both, by executive
order. Executive order is no less a law under Article 13(3) which defines
Jaw to include, among other things, order, by-laws and notifications. The
provisions of reservation under Article 16(4) being relatable to the recruit-
B
ment and conditions of service under the State, they are also covered by
Article 309 of the Constitution. Article 309 expressly provides that until
provision in that behalf is made by or under an Act of the appropriate
Legislature, the rules regulating the recruitment and conditions of service
of persons appointed to Services under the Union or a State may be c
regulated by rules made by the President or the Governor as the case may
be. Further, wherever the Constitution requires that the provisions may be
made only by an Act of the Legislature, the Constitution has in express
terms stated sc. For example, the provisions of Article 16(3) speak of the

- Parliament making a law, unlike the provisions of Article 16 (4) which
permit the State to make "any provision''. Sllnilarly, Articles 302, 304 and
307 require a law to be enacted by the Parliament or a State Legislature
as the case may be on the subjects concerned. These are but some of the
D

provisions in the Constitution, to illustrate the point.

89. The impugned orders are no doubt neither enactments of the E
Legislature nor rules or regulations made under any Act of the Legislature.
They are also not rules made by the President under Article 309 of the
Constitution. They are undoubtedly executive orders. It is not suggested
that in the absence of an Act or rules, the Government cannot make
provisions on the subject by executive orders nor is it contended that the F
impugned orders made in exercise of the executive powers, have trans·

r
•
gressed the limits of legislative powers of the Parliament. What is con-
tended by Shri Venugopal is that power to make provisions on such vital
subject must be shared with, and can only be exercised after due delibera-
tions by, the Parliament. The contention, in essence, questions the method
of exercising the power and not the absence of it. The method should be G
left to the discretion and the policy of the Government and the exigencies
of the situation. It may be pointed out that, so far the reservations made
by the Central Governments in favour of the SCs/STs and the State
Government in favour of all backward classes, have been made by executive
instructions, or by rules made under Article 309 of the Constitution. No H
926 t · ·SUPREME COURT REPOR'IS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.c.R.

A reservati0ns have be~n made by Ai:ts of Legislatures. There is; therefore,
no illegality attached to the impugned orders merely bccau5e the Goven-
a
ment instead of enacting statute for the purpose, has chosen to make tl:e
provisions by executive orders. such
execUtive orders having been made
.under Article 73 -of the Constitution: have for their operation an equal
efficacy as an Act of the parliament or the rUJes made by the President
B under Article 309 of the Constitution. ' - ·
~ ·. ' , ' I

9o. If any authority is n~eded f~r the otherwise seJf-evident propos-
tition, one may refer to the following decisions of this Court where reser-
vations made by executive orders were upheld: See Balaji [supra), Mangat
C Singh v. l'unjab State, Chandigarh & Ors., AIR 55 1968, Punjab & Haryana
306, Comptroller & Auditor General of India & Ors. v. Mohan Lal Mahotra
& ors. [1992] 1 sec 20._ -

Question VII: ·

D Will the extent .,r judicial review be limited or restricted
in regard to the identification oC Backward Classes and
the petuntage ofCesefv3tions made for such classes, to a
demonstrably perverse identification or ·a demonstrably
unreasonable percentage? ' - .

E 91: The answer to the questio~ lies in ihe question itself. There are
no special principles of judicial review nor does .the scope of judicial review
· expand when the identification of backward classes and the percentage· rl
the reservation kept for them is called in question. So long as correct
criterion for the identification of the backward classes is applied, the result
F arrived at cannot be questioned cin the ground that other valid .criteria were
also available for such identification. It is possible thai the result so arrived
at may be defective marginally or
in marginal number of cases. That does
not invalidate the-excercise itself. No method is perfect particularly when.
-sociological findings are in issue. Hence, marginal defects when found may
G be cured in individual cases but the entire rmdllig is not rendered invalid
on that account. -- -- -
92. The corollary of the above is that when the criterion applied for
identifying the backward classes is either perve>se or per se defective or
unrelated to such identification in that it is not calculated to give the result
H or is calculated to give, by the very nature of the criterion, a contrary or

I
INDRASAWHNEY v. U.0.1.[SAWANT,J.] -927

unintended result, the criterion is open for judicial exilmination. · A

93. The validity of the percentage of reservation for backward classes
would depend upon the size of the backward classes in question. So long
as it is not so excessive as to virtually obliterate the claims of others under
clause 16 (1), itis not open to challenge. However, it is not neeessary, and B
Article 16(4) does not suggest, that the percentage of reservation should
be in proportion to the percentage of the population of the backward
classes to the total population. The only guideline laid down by Article
16(4), as pointed out elsewhere, is the adequacy of represe!ltation in the
services. Within the said limits, it is in the discretion of the State to keep
the reservation ai reasonable. level by taking into . consideration all C
legitimate claims an:d the relevant factors. In this connection, the law laid
down directly on the subject in the following decision is ~ortb recountirig:

inBa/aj~ the Court struck dawn the impugned order of reservations on
the ground that it had categorised the backward classes on the sole ba<is of · D
caste and slso on the ground that the reservations made were to the extent of
68% which_ the Court held was inconsistent with the concept of the special
provision and authorised by Article 15(4). The Court further held that for
these two reasons the impugned order was a fraud on the constitutional
power conferred on the State by Article is(4). It may be pointed out at the
cost of repetition, that the second reason was based on the premise that E
clause ( 4) was an exception to clauses (1) and (2) of Article 15, and that the
exception had a nnmerical relationship with the rule.

In Devadasan the majority held that the 'carry forward' rule which
resulted in the particular year in reserving 65% of the posts for Scheduled F
Castes and Scheduled Tribes, was unconstitutional since the reservations
exceeded 30% of_ the vacancies. ·Aec;,rding to the Court, though under
.. Article 16(4), r~servation of reasonable percentage of posts for the members
of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes was within the com~
petence of the State, the method evolved must be such as to strike reasonable G
balance between the claims of the backward classes and those of the other
employees in order to effectnate the guarantee contained in Article 16(1),
and that for this purpose each year of recruitment would have io be con-
sidered by itself. With respect, the majority decision was based on the
reasoning of Balaji to which a reference has already been made. Justice
Subba Rao dissented from this line of reasoning and it is his reasoning which H
928 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A came to be accepted later both in Thomas and Vasanth Kumar.
In P. Sagar, [1968] 3 SCR 595, the Court upheld the decision of the
High Court and dismissed the State's appeal on the ground that there was
no material placed before the Court to show that the list of backward
classes was prepared in conformity with the requirements of Article 15(4).
B The Court held that the list prepared was ex facie based on castes or
communities, and was substantially the same which was struck down by the
High Court in P. Sukhadev & Ors. v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh,
(1966) 1 Andhra W.R. 294.

C In Periakaruppan, [1971] 2 SCR 430, it was observed that the list of
. backward classes is open to judicial review and the Government should
always keep under review the question of reservations of seats, and only
those classes which are really socially and educationally backward should
be allowed to have the benefit of reservation. The reservation of seats
should not be allowed to become a vested interest and since in that case
D the candidates of backward classes had secured 50% of the seats in the
general pool, it, according to the Court, showed that the time had come
for a de novo comprehensive examination of the question. In other words,
it is laid down in this case that if some backward classes which are
advanced continue to be, or are included in the list of, backward classes,
E the list can be questioned and a judicial scrutiny of the list will be pennis-
sible.

In Hira Lal [supra], it is observed that if the reservations made under
Article 16(4) make the rule in Article 16(1) meaningless, the decision of
the State would be open to judicial review. But the burden of establishing
F that a particular reservation is offensive to Article 16(1), is on the person
who takes the plea.

94. To sum up, judicial scrutiny would be available [i] if the criterion
inconsistent with the provisions of Article 16 is applied for identifying the
classes for whom the special or unequal benefit can be given under the said
G Article; [ii] if the classes who are not entitled to the said benefit are wrongly
included in or excluded from the list of beneficiaries of the special
provisions. In such cases, it is not either the entire exercise of the entire
list which becomes invalid, so long as the tests applied for identification
are correct and the inclusion or exclusion is only marginal; and [iii] if the
H percentage of reservation,t;f!: "ither disproportionate or unreasonable so as
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.l. [SAWANT, J.] 929

to deny the equality of opportunity to the unreserved classes and A
obliterates Article 16(1). Whether the percentage is unreasonable or
results in the obliteration of Article 16(1), so far as the unreserved classes
are concerned, it will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each
case, and no hard and fast rule of general application with regard to the
percentage can be laid down for all the regions and for all times.
B
Question VIII:

Would reservation of appointments or posts "in favour of
any Backward Class" be restricted to the initial appoint-
ment to the post or would it extend to promotions as well?
c
95. None of the impugned Government memoranda provide for
reservations in promotions. Hence, the question does not fall for con·
sideration at all and any opinion expressed by this Court on the said point
would be obiter. As has been rightly contended by Shri Parasaran, it is
settled by the decisions of this Court that constitutional ·questions are D
decided only if they arise for determination on the facts, and are absolutely
necessary to be decided. The Court, does not decide questions which do
not arise. The tradition is both wise and advisable. There is a long line of
decisions of this Court on the point. The principle is so well-settled and
not disputed before us that it is not necessary to quote all the authorities
on the subject. To mention only two of them, see The Central Bank of India
E
v. Their Workmen, (1960] 1 SCR 200. and Harsharan Verma v. Union of India
& Anr., AIR 1987 SC 1969.

%. The reservations in the services under Article 16(4), except in the
case of SCs/STs, are in the discretion of the State. Whether reservations F
should at all be kept and if so, in which field and at what levels and in
which mode of recruitment - direct or promotional - and at what percent-
age, are all matters of policy. Each authority is required to apply its mind
to the facts and circumstances of the case before it and depending upon
the field, the post, the extent of the existing representation of different
classes, the need, if any, to balance the representation, the conflicting G
s' claims etc., decide upon the measures of reservations. The reservations, as
stated earlier, cannot be kept mechanically even where it is permissible to
do so. For some reasons, if Centeral Government, in the present case, has
not thought it prudent and necessary to keep reservations in promotions,
the decision of the Central Government should not be probed further. It H
930 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A is for the Government to frame its policy and not for this Court to comment
upon it when it is not called upon to do so.

97. However, if it becomes necessary to answer the question, it will
have to be held that the reservations both under Article 16(1) and 16(4)
should be confined only to initial appointments. Except in the decision in
B Rangachari [supra], there was no other occasion for this Court to deliberate
upon this question. In that decision, the Constitution Bench by a majority
of three took the view that the reservations under Article 16(4) would also
extend to the promotions on the ground that Article 16(1) and 16(2) are
intended to give effect to Articles 14 and 15(1). Hence Article 16(1) should
c be construed in a broad and general, and not pedantic and technical way.
So construed, "matters relating to employment" cannot mean merely mat-
ters prior to the act of appointment nor can 'appointment to any office'
mean merely the initial appointment but must also include all matters
relating to the employment, that are either incidental to such employment
or form part of its terms and conditicns, and also include promotion to a
D selection post. The Court further observed that:

"Although Art. 16(4), which in substance is an excep-
tion to Arts. 16(1) and 16(2) and should, therefore, be
strictly construed, the court cannot in construing it over-
E look the extreme solicitude shown by the Constitution for
the advancement of socially and educationally backward
classes of citizens.

The scope of Art. 16(4), though not as extensive as
that of Art. 16(1) and (2), - and some of the matters
F relating to . employment such as salary, increment,
gratuity, pension and the the age of superannuation, must
fall outside its non-obstante clause, there can be no doubt
that it must include apointments and posts in the services.
To put a narrower construction on the word 'posts' would
be to defeat the object and the underlying policy. Article
G
16( 4), therefore, authorises the State to provide for the
reservation of appointments as well as selection posts. '1

The majority has, however, added that in exercising the powers under
the Article, it should be the duty of the State to harmonise the claims of
H the backward classes and those of the other employees consistently with
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.l. [SAWANT, J.] 931

the maintenance of an efficieni administration as contemplated by Article A
335 of the Constitution.

Justice Wanchoo, one of the two Judge who differed with the
majority view held that Article 16(4) implies, as borne out by Article 335,
that the reservation of appointments or posts for backward classes cannot
cover all or even a majority of the appointments and posts and the words B
"not adequately represented", do not convey any idea of quality but mean
sufficiency of numerical representation in a particular service, taken not by
its grades but as a whole. Appointments, according to the learned Judge,
must, therefore, mean initial appointments and the reservation of appoint-
ments means the reservations of a percentage of initial appointments. The c
other learned Judge, viz., Ayyangar, J., forming the minority held that
Article 16(4) has to be read and construed in the light of other provisions
relating to services and particularly with reference to Article 335. So
construed1 the word 11post 11 in that Article must mean posts not in the
services but posts outside the services. Even assuming that it was not so, D
according to the learned Judge, the inadequacy of representation sought
to be redressed by Article 16( 4) meant quantitative deficiency of repre-
sentation in a particular service as a whole and not in its grades taken
separately, nor in respect of each single post in the service. By this
reasoning the learned Judge held that Article 16(4) can only refer to
appointments to the services at the initial stage and not at diffe\ent stages E
after the appointment has taken place.

98. It has been pointed out earlier that the reservations of the
backward classes under Article 16(4) have to be made consistently with the
maintenance of the efficiency of administration. It is foolhardy to ignore F
the consequences to the administration when juniors supersede seniors
although the seniors are as much or even more competent than the juniors.
When reservations are kept in promotion, the inevitable consequence is the
phenomenon of juniors, however low in the seniority list, stealing a march
over their seniors to the promotional post. When further reservations are
kept at every promotional level, the juniors not only steal march over their G
seniors in the same grade but also over their superiors at more than one
higher level. This has been witnessed and is being witr,essed frequently
wherever reservations are kept in promotions. It is naive to expect that in
such circumstances those who are superseded, (and they are many] can
work with equanimity and with the same devotion to and interest in work H
932 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A as they did defore. Men are not saints. The inevitable result, in all fields
of administration, of this phenomenon is the natural resentment, heart-
burning, frustration, lack of interest in work and indifference to the duties,
disrespect to the superiors, dishonour of the authority and an atmosphere
of constant bickerings and hostility in the administration. When, further,
the erstwhile subordinate becomes the present superior, the vitiation of the
B
atmosphere has only to be imagined. This has admittedly a deleteri_ou~
effect on the entire administration.

ll is not only the efficiency of those who are thus superseded which
deteriorates on account of such promotions, but those superseding have
C also no incentive to put ia their best in work. Since they know that in any
case they would be promoted in their reserved quota, they have no motiva-
tion to work hard. Being assured of the promotion from the beginning, their
attitude towards their duties and their colleagues and superiors is also
coloured by this complex. On that account also the efficiency of administra-
D tion is jeopardised.

99. With respect, neither the majority nor the minority in the Con-
stitution Bench has noticed this aspect of the reservations in promotions.
The latter decisions which followed Rangachari were also not called upon
to and henco have not considered this vital aspect. The efficiency to which
E the majority has referred is with respect to the qualifications of those who
would be promoted in the reserved quota.

The expression "consistently with the maintenance of efficiency of
administration" used in Article 335 is related not only to the qualifications
F of those who are appointed, it covers all consequences to the efficiency of
administration on account of such appointments. They would necessarily
include the demoralisation of those already in employment who would be
adversely affected by such appointments, and its effect on the efficiency of
adminstration. The only reward that a loyal, sincere and hard-working
employee expects and looks forward to in his service career is promotion.
G If that iiself is denied to him for no deficiency on his part, it places a
frustrating damper on his zeal to work and reduces him to a nervous wreck.
There cannot be a more damaging effect on the administration than that
caused by an unreasonable obstruction in the advancement of the career
of those who run the administration. The reservations in promotions are,
H therefore, inconsistent with the efficiency of administation and are imper-
INDRA SAWHNEY v: U.0.1. [SAWANT, J.] 933

missible under the Constitution. A

100. There is also not much merit in the argument that the adequacy
of representation in the administr~tioon has to be j~dged not only on the
basis of quantitative representation but also on the basis of qualitative
representation in the administration and, hence, the reservations in promo- B
tions are a must. There is no doubt, as stated earlier, that the adequacy of
representation in administration has also to be judged on the basis of the
qualitative representation in it. However, the qualitative representation
cannot be achieved overnight or in one generation. Secondly, such repre-
sentation cannot be secured at the cost of the efficiency of the administra-
tion which is an equally paramount consideration while keeping C
reservations. Thirdly, the qualitative representation can be achieved by
keeping reservations in direct recruitment at all levels. It is true that there
is some basis for the grievance that when reservations are kept only in
direct recruitment, on many occasions the rules for appointment to the
posts particularly at the higher level of administration, are so framed as to D
keep no room for direct recruits. However, the remedy in such cases lies
in ensuring that direct recruitment is provided for posts at all levels of the
administration and the reservation is kept in all such direct recruitments.

101. It must further be remembered that there is a qualitative dif-
ference in the conditions of an individual who has entered the sec:ices as E
against those of one who is out of it, though both belong to the backward
classes. The former joins the mainstream of all those similarly employed.
Although it is true that he does not on that account become socially advanced
at once, in some respects, he is not dissimiarly situated. The handicaps he
suffers on account of his social backwardness can be removed, once F
employed, by giving him the necessary relaxations, exemptions, concessions
and facilities to enable him to compete with the rest for the promotional posts
where the promotions are by selection or on merit-cum-seniority basis. A
provision can also be made to man the selection committees with suitable
persons including those from the backward classes and to devise methods of
assessment of merits on impartial basis. The selection committee should also G
ensure that the claims of the backward class employees are not superseded.
These measures, instead of the exclusive quota, will go a long way in instilling
self-confidence and self-respect in those coming into the service through the
reserved quotas. They may not have to face and work in a hostile and
disrespectful atmosphere since they would have won their promotional posts H
934 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A by dint of their seniority and/or merit no less commendable than those of
others. The urge to show merit and shine would also contribute to overall
efficiency of the administation.

102. There is no doubt that the meaning of the various expressions
and used in Article 16, viz., "matters relating to employment or appoint-
B 1 11 1
ment to any office any employment or office' and "appointments or posts''
',

cannot be whittled dowo to mean only initial recruitment and hence the
normal rule of the service jurisprudence of the loss of the birth-marks
cannot be applied to the appointments made under the Article. However,
as pointed out earlier, the exclusive quota is not the only form of reserva-
c tion and where the report to it such as in the promotions, results in the
inefficiency of the administration, it is illegal. But that is not the end of the
road nor is a backward class employee helpless on account of its absence.
Once he gets an equal opportunity to show his talent by coming into the
mainstream, all he needs is the facility to achieve equal results. The
facilities can be and must be given to him in the form of concessions,
D exemptions etc. such as relaxation of age, extra attempts for passing the
examinations, extra training period etc. along with the machinery for
impartial assessment as stated above. Such facilities when given are also a
part of the reservation programme and do not fall foul of the requirement
of the efficiency of the administration. Such facilities, however, are impera-
E tive if, not only the equality of opportunity but also the equality of results
is to be achieved which is the true meaning of the right to equality.

Question 9:

Whether the matter should be sent back to the Five- Judge
F Bench?

103. The attacks against the impugned orders as formulated in the
aforesaid eight questions, have been dealt with above. The only other attack
against the impugned orders is that they are based on the Manda! Com-
G mission Report which suffers in its findings on some counts.

In the first imstance, it must be remembered that the Government
could have passed the impugned orders without the assistance of any report
such as the Manda! Commission Report. Nothing prevents the Government
from providing the reservations if it is staisfied even otherwise that the
H backward classes have inadequate representation in the services undt r the
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. (SAWANT, J.] 935

State. It is however, a different matter that in the present case the Govern- A
ment had before it an investigation made by a independent Commission
appointed under Article 340 of the Constitution to enable it to come to its
conclusions that certain social groups which are socially and educationally
backward are inadequately represented in the services and thereofore,
deserved reservation therein. The Commission has given its own list of such
backward classes and that it based primarily on the lists prepared by the
B
States. It is true that in certain States, there are no lists and the Commission
has, therefore, made its own lists for such States. However, while issuing the
impugned orders the Government has taken precaution to see that the
socially and educationally backward classes would comprise in the first phase
the castes and communities which are common to the lists prepared by the c
Mandal Commission and the States. The result is that it is the State Govern-
ment lists of SEBCs which would prevail for the time being and those SEBCs
mentioned in the lists of the Manda! Commission which are not in the State
lists would not get the benefit of the impugned orders. It is not seriously
contended before u" that the State lists are prepared without application of D
mind or without any basis. It is no doubt urged that in certain States some
castes and communities have come to be introduced in the lists of backward
classes on the eve of the elections and thus the lists have been expanded from
time to time. Assuming that there is some grain of truth in this allegation, the
grievance in that behalf can be redressed by a fresh appraisal of the State lists
by an independent machinery. The further attack against the lists prepared E
by the Mandal Commission is that they are prepared without an adequate
and a proper survey with the result that some social groups which ought not
to be in the SEBC lists have been included therein whereas others which
ought to be there have been excluded. The third attack against the Commis-
sion-lists is that since there are States where there exist no lists ofSEBCs, the F
SEBCs in those States would suffer and that would be a discrimination
against them. The last attack is that the Commission has exaggerated the
number of castes. While there are allegedly only 1051 backward castes, the
Commission has given a list of about 3743 castes. Assuming that all these
contentions are correct, all that they come to is that certain social groups
which ought not to be in the SEBC lists are found there wheras others which G
ought not to be there are not there. Such defects can be expected in any
survey of this kind since it is difficult to have a cent per cent accurate result in
any socialogical survey. In any case although the Manda! Commission on its
survey has found the total population of SEBCs as 52 per cent, the reserva-
H
936 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A uon it has recommended is only 27 per cent which is almost half of the
;ioplllation of SEBCs according to its survey. The impugned orders have also
restricted.the reservations to 27 per cent. It is not suggested that the margin
of error of the survey is as high as 50 per cent popnlationwise. Assuming,
however, that the population of the SEBCs is not even 27% of the total
B population, even this defect can be cured by another independent survey. For
the present, the list as envisaged in the impugned orders may be given effect
to and in the meanwhile, a new Commission as suggested earlier may be
appointed for preparing an accurate list of the backward classes. No harm
would be done if in the meanwhile, at least half of those who are found
backward are given the benefit of the impugned orders, If, therefore, the only
C purpose of sending the matter to the Five-Judge Bench now, is to find out the
validity of the lists of the SEBCs, that purpose can hardly be fulfilled since the
Bench cannot on its own and without adequate material invalidate the lists.
The Bench would also have to direct a fresh inquiry into the matter, if it
comes to the conclusion that the grievace made in that behalf is correct. The
D purpose would be better served if this Bench itself directs that the matter be
examined afresh by a Commission newly appointed for the purpose. In any
view of the matter, it is unnecessary to send the case back to the Five-Judge
Bench.

104. The answers to the questions may now be summarised as follows:
E
Question 1:

Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to clause (1) thereof. It only
carves out a section of the society, viz., the backward class of citizens for
whom the reservations in services may be kept. The said clause is exhaustive
F of the reservations of posts in the services so far as the backward class of
citizens is concerned. It is not exhaustive of all the reservations in the services
that may be kept. The reservations of posts in the services for the other
sections of the society can be kept under clause (1) ofthat Article.

Question 2:
G
The backward class of citizens referred to in Article 16(4) is the
socially backward class of citizens whose educational and economic back-
wardness is on account of their social backwardness. A caste by itself may
constitute a class. However, in order to constitute a backward class the
H caste concerned must be socially backward and its educational and
INDRA SAWHNEY v. V.0.1. (SAWANT, J.] 937

eccnomic backwardness must be on account of its social backwardness. . A
The economic criterion by itself cannot identify a class as backward
unless the economic backwardness of the class is on account of its social
backwardness.

The weaker sections mentioned in Article 46 are a genus of which B
backward class of citizens mentioned in Article 16(4) constitute a species.
Article 16(4) refers to backward classes whlch are a part of the weaker
sections of the society and it is only for the backward classes who are not
adequately represented in the services, and not for all the weaker sections
that.the reservations in services are provided under Article 16(4). C
Question 3:

No reservations of posts can be kept in services under the State based
exclusively on economic. criterion either under Article 16(4) or under
Article 16(1). D

Question 4:

Ordinarily, the reservations kept both under Article 16(1) and 16(4)
together should not exceed 50 per cent of ,the appointments in a grade,
cadre or service in any particular year. It is only for extraordinary reasons E
that this percentage may be exceeded. However, every excess over 50 per
cent will have to be justified on valid grounds which grounds will have to
be specifically made out.

The adequacy of representation is not to be determined merely on
the basis of the over all numerical strength of the backward classes in the F
services. For determining the adequacy, their representation at different
levels of administration and in different grades has to be taken into
consideration. It is the effective voice in the administration and not the
total number which determines the adequacy of representation.
G
Question 5:

Article 16(4) permits classification of backward classes into back-
ward and more or most backward classes. However, this classification is
permitted only on the basis of the degrees of social backwardness and not
on the basis of the economic consideration alone. H
938 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A If backward classes are classified into backward and more or most
backward classes, separate quotas of reservations will have to be kept for
each of such classes. In the absence of such separate q•10tas, the reserva-
tions will be illegal.

It is not permissible to classify backward classes or a backward class
B social group into an advanced section and a backward section either on
economic or any other consideration. The test of advancement lies in the
capacity to compete with the forward classes. If the advanced section in a
backward class is so advanced as to be able to compete with the forward
classes, the advanced section from the backward class no longer belongs
c to the backward class and should cease to be considered so and denied the
benefit of reservations under Article 16(4).

Question 6:

The provisions for reservations in the services under Article 16(4)
D can be made by an executive order. ,..
Question 7:

There is no special law of judicial reivew when the reservations under
Article 16(4) are under scrutiny. The judicial review will be available only
E in the cases of demonstrably perverse identification of the backward classes
and in the cases of unreasonable percentage of reservations made for them.

Question 8:

It is not necessary to answer the question since it does not arise in
F the present case. However, if it has to be answered, the answer is as follows:

The reservations in the promotions in the services are unconstitution-
al as they are inconsistent with the maintenance of efficiency of administra·
tion.
-
G However, the backward classes may be provided with relaxations,
exemptions, concessions and facilities etc. to enable them to compete for
the promotional posts with others wherever the promotions are based on
selection or merit-cum-seniority basis.

H Further, the committee or body entrusted with the task of selection
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.l. [SAWANT, J.] 939

must be representative and manned by suitable persons including those A
from the backward classes to make an impartial assessment of the merits.

To ensure adequate representation of the backward classes which
mea11s representation at all levels and in all grades in the service, the rules
of recruitment must ensure that there is direct recruitment at all levels and
in all grades in the services. B

Question 9:

The matter should not be referred back to the Five-Judge Bench
since almost all the relevant questions have been answered by this Bench.
The grievance about the excessive, and about the wrong inclusion and
c
exclusion of social groups in and from the list of backward classes can be
examined by a new Commission which may be set up for the purpose.

105. Hence the following order:
D
ORDER

1. The benefit uf clause 2(1) of the first order dated
13th August, 1990 cannot be given to the advanced sec-
tions of the socially and educationally backward classes
because they no longer belong to the socially and educa- E
tionally backward classes although they may be members
of the caste, occupational groups or other social groups
which might have been n~med as socially and education-
ally backward classes in the lists which are issued or which
may be issued under clause 2(iv) of the said order. This
F
clause if so read down, is valid.

The rest of the said order is valid.

The Government may evolve the necessary socio-
economic criterion to define the advanced sections of the G
backward classes to give effect to the order.

2. Clause 2(i) of the second order dated 25th Septem-
ber, 1991 is valid only if it is read down as under:

[a] No distinction can be made in the backward classes as H
940 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A poor and poorer sections thereof. The 1fatinction can
be made only between the advanced and the backward
sections of the backward classes. The advanced sec-
tions are those who have acquired the capacity to
compete with the forward classes. Such advanced sec-
tions no longer belong to the backward classes and as
B such are disentitled to the reservations under Article
16(4). The reservations can be made only for the
benefit of the backward or the non-advanced sections
of the backward classes.

C [b] When backward classes are classified into backward
and more or most backward classes as stated above on
the basis of the degrees of social backwardness [and
not on the basis of the economic criterion alone],
exclusive quotas of reservations will have to be kept
separately for the backward and the more or most
D backward classes. It will be impermissible to keep a
common quota of reservation for all the backward
...
classes together and make available posts for the back-
ward classes only if they are left over after satisfying
the requirements of the more or most backward clas-
E ses. That may virtually o.mount to a total denial of the
posts from the reserved quota to the backward classes.

(c) Clause 2(i) of the order dated 25th September, 1991
is, therefore, invalid, unless it is read, interpreted and
implemented as above.
F
3. Clause 2(ii) of the said order is invalid since no reserva-
tions can be kept on economic criterion alone.

106. The writ petitions and transfer cases are disposed of in the above
G terms. No costs.

107. In view of the reasons given and the conclusions arrived at by
me above, I agree with the conclusions recorded in paragraphs 122 and 124
and the directions given in parae;aph 123 (A], (BJ aod (CJ of the judgment
bein{delivered by brother Jeevan Reddy, J. on belialf of himself, and on
H behalf of the learned Chief Justice and brothers Venkatachaliah and
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [R.M. SAHA!, J.] 941

Ahmad~ JJ. A
R.M. SAHA!, J. Constitutional enigma of identifying 'backward
classes' for 'protecting' or 'compensatory benefits' under constitutionally
permissive discrimination visualised by Article 16(4) of the Constitution,
except for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, is as elusive today as it
was when the issue was debated in the Constituent Assembly, or in Parlia- B
ment in 1951, even after appointment of two commissions by the President
under Article 340(1) of the Constitution, one, in 1953 known as Kaka
Kalelkar Commission and other in 1979 which became famous as Manda!
Commission, and furnished basis for reservation of appointment and posts
for socially and economically backward classes (SEBC) in services under C
the Union, by Office Memorandum dated 13th August, 1 1990 amended

I OFFICE MEMORANDUM
"Subject : Recommendations of the Second Backward Classes Commission (Manda!
Report) - Resctvation for Socially and Educationa11y Backward Oasses in
services under the Government of India. D
...
In a multiple undulating society like ours, early achievement of the objective of
social justice as enshrined in the Constitution is a must. The Second Backward Classes
Commission called the Manda! Commission was established by the then Government
with this purpose in view, which submitted its report to the Government of India on
31.12.1980.
E
2. Government have carefully considered the report and the recommendations of the
Commi_ssion in the present context regarding the benefits to the extended to the
socially and educationally backward classes as opined by the Commission and are of
the clear view that at the outset certain weightagc bas to be provided to ·such classes
in the services of the Union and their Public Undertakings. Accordingly orders are
issued as follows:-
(i) 27o/o of the vacancias in civil posts and services under the Government F
of India shall be reserved .for SEBC.
(ii) The aforesaid resetvation shall apply to vacancies to be filled by direct
r.
recruitment. Detailed instructions relating to the procedures to be fol-
lowed for enforcing rcsetvation will be issued separately.
(iii) Candidates belonging to SEBC recruited on the basis of merit in an
open competition on the same standards prescribed for the general can· G
didates shall not be adjusted against the rcsctvation quota of 27%.
(iv) The SEBC would comprise in the fitst phase the castes and com-
munities which arc common to both the list in the report of the Mandal
Commfasion and the State Governments' lists. A list of such castes/com-
munities is being issued separately.
(to be continued) H
942 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A further in September 19912 adding, yet, one more class of economically
backward. Nature of these orders, their constitutional validity, principle of
their issuance and legal infirmity, Manda! Commission Report, its basis and
foundation, scope of reservation, its length width and depth were subject-
matters of intensive dabate in these Public Interest Litigations by members
of the bar, representatives of various associations, and .numerous inter-
venors. Range of controversy was, both wide and narrow touching various

(v) The aforesaid reservation shall take effect from 7.8.1990. However, this will not
apply to vacancies where the recruitment process has already been initiated prior to
the issue of these orders.
3. Similar instructions in respect of public soctor undertakings and financial institutions
c including public sector banks will be issued by the Department of Public Enterprises
and Ministry of Finance respectively.
Sd/·
(Smt. Krishna Singh)
Joint Secreto.ry to the Govt. of India."

D 2 OFFICE MEMORANDUM
"Subject : Recommendation of the Second Backward Classes Commission (Manda!
Report) - Reservation for socially and Educationally Backward Classes in
service under the Government of India.

The undersigned is directed to invite the attention to O.M. of even number dated
the 13th August, 1990, on the above mentioned subject and to say that in order to
E enable the poorer sections of the SEBCs to receive the benefits of reservation on a
preferential basis and to provide reservation for other economically backward sections
of the people not covered by any of the existing schemes of reservation, Government
have decided to amend the said Memorandum with immediate effect as follows:-
(i) Within the 27% of the vacancies in civil posts and services under the
Government of India rcsetved for SEBCs, preference shall be given to
candidates belonging to the poorer sections of the SEBCs. In case suffi-
F cient number of such candidates are not available, unfilled vacancies shall
be filled by thC other SEBC candidates.·
(ii) 10% of the vacancies in civil posts and services under the Government
of India shall be reserved for other economically backward sections of the
people who arc not covered by any of the existing schemes of reservation.
(iii) ('The criteria for detennining the poorer sections of the SEBCs or the
G other economically backward sections of the people who are not covered
by any of the existing schemes of reservations are being issued separately.)
The O.M. of even number dated the 13th August, 1990, shall be deemed to have
been amended to the extent specified above.
Sd/-
(A.K. Harit)
DY. SECRETARY TO IBE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA"
H
INDRA SAWI-INEY v. U.O.l. [R.M. SAHA!, J.] 943

aspects sensible and sensitive. But before adverting to them it is imperative A
to thrash out, at the outset, if the issue of reservation of posts in services
by the State is non-justiciable either because it is a political question or a
matter of policy and even if justiciable then whether the rule of discretion
requires to leave the field open for State activity to work it out by trial and
arror.
B
'A"
(1)

Today the 'political thicket' has been entered with Baker v. Can; 369
U.S. 186 and Davis v. Sandemer, 54 l1SLW 4898 [1986] even, in America
where the English shadow of 'king can do no wrong' was most prominently
c
reflected. The test now applied is if the controversy can be decided by
'judicially discernible and manageable standards' 54 USLW 4898 [1986].
'The political questions doctrine, however, does not mean, that anything that
is tinged with politics or even that any matter that might properly fall within
the domain of the President or the Congress shall ~ot be reviewable, for that D
would end the whole constitutional function of the court' 1. Under our Con-
stitution, the yardstick is not if it is a legislative act or an executive decision on
policy matter but whether it vioJates any constitutional guarantee or has
potential of constitutional repercussions as enforcement of an assured right,
under Chepter Ill of the Constitution, by approaching courts is itself a E
fundamental right. The 'constitutional fiction' of political question, there-
fore, should not be permitted to stand in way of the court to, 'deny.the Nation
the guidance on basic democratic problems'2. Avoidance of entering into a
political question may be desirable and may not be resorted to, 'not because
of doctrine of separation of power or lack of rules but because of
expediency'3 in larger interest for public good but legislatures, too, have, F
'their authority measured by the Constitution' therefore absence of norms to
examine political question has rarely any place in the Indian Constitutional
jurisprudence. The, Constitution being, 'foremost a social document'4 the

Samuel Krislov - The Supreme Court in the Political Process p.96. G
2 C. Herman Pritchett - The American Constitution p. 154 (quoted in 'The Judicial
Review of Legislative Acts" by Dr. Chakradhar Jha p. 355).

3 Charles Gordon Post p.129-130 - The Supreme Court Questions (quoted in 'The
Judicial Review of Legislative Acts' by Dr. Chakradhar Jha p.351).

4 Granville Austin's 'The Indian Constitution Cornerstone of a Nation'. H
944 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A courts cannot, 'retreat behind' 1 whenever they are called upon to discharge
their constitutional obligation as 'if the judiciary bows to expediency and puts
question in the political rather than in the justiciable category merely bacause
they are troublesome or embarrassing or pregnant with great emotion, then
the judiciary has become a political 'instrument itseir2. Thus,

B Legislative or executive action reserving appointments or
posts in services of the State is neither a political issue nor
matter of policy. ••

*****
c
'B'
(1)

Mis-conception appears to be prevailing that the judiciary by exer-
D cising power of judicial rONiew on matters which involve political considera-
tions asserts superior capability thus violates the democratic mandate
vested by the people in elected representatives. The judiciary derive their
authority as much from 'the people' the ultimate sovereign as the legisla-
ture or the executive. Each wing is a delegate of the Constitution. Each
stand committed to be ruled under and governed by it. A legislature is
E elected by people to enact law in accordance with the Constitution, to work
under and for it. By being people representative the mandate is to act in
furtherance of ideals of democracy in accordance with provisions of the
Constitution. No legislature or executive can enact a law or frame a policy
against the dictates of the Constitution. 'Popular support expressed
F through the ballot box cannot validate an ultra vires action'. Elected repre-
sentatives are as much oath bound to uphold and obey the Constitution as

-
the judges appointed by the President. Both derive their power and
authority from, the same source. What the Constitution says, what it means,
bow it is to be understood and applied was entrusted to the judiciary as
G when, 'The People' of India resolved, to secure to all its citizens justice,
social, economic and political, 'The judiciary was seen as an extension of
the. Rights, for it was the courts that would give the Rights force'. 3 A

1&2 Tagore Law Lecture, From Marshall to Mukherjea 'Studies in American and Indian
Constitutional Law' by William C. Douglas p.38.
H 3 Supra 8.
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [R.M. SAHA!, J.] 945

declaration by a guvernment to reserve posts in services may be a matter A
of policy or even a political issue but an order issued or a Jaw made
directing reservation can be sustained, only, if it is found to be constitu-
tional. Judicial review in our Constitution has not 'grown' nor it has been
'assumed' or 'inferred' or 'implied' nor 'acquired by force' or 'stealthily'
but is was provided for by the founding fathers. The higher judiciary has B
be.en visualised as 'an arm of the social revolution' .1 When our Constitution
was framed the Wednesbury principle 2 evolved by the English Courts and
the division of power adopted by American Constitution was fully known
yet the country did not opt for vague resolutions as were adopted at
Philadelphia Convention of United States in 1787 but decided to place the c
apex court as custodian of the Constitution by declaring that any declara-
tion of law by it was binding under Article 141 of the Constitution, its
decree and orders were enforceable under Article 142 throughout the
country, and all civil and executive authorities are to act in furtherance of
it under Article 144. The range of judicial. review recognised by the D
superior judiciary in India is perhaps the widest and most extensive known
'
in the world of law'. Kahar Singh & Anr. v. Union of India & Anr., [1989] 1
SCC 204, Unlike England or America its sweep extends to all other organs
functioning under the Constitution. The Court discharged its constitutional
obligation in such sensitive but constitutional matters as President's par-
E
doning power, 3 decision of speakers of legislative assemblies, Kihota Hol-
/ohon v. Zechi/hu, (1992] 1 SCR 309, President's power of dissolution of
state legislative assemblies etc. State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Union of India,
[1977] 3 SCC 592, Reliance on American decisions for very limited scope
for interference was not of much assistance as judicial power of the United
States Supreme Court to examine race conscious measures or affirmative
F
J action either in economic field or admission programme in educational
institutions was never doubted. The only difference was that the measures
were tested either on what they described as 'close examination' or 'exact-

G
supra 8.
2 'Wednesbuty principles' is a convenient legal 'shorthand' used by lawyers to refer to
the classical review by Lord Greene MR in the Wednesbury case of the circumstances
in which the courts will intervene to quash as being illegal the exercise of administrative
discretion.' WADE - Administrative Law.
3 Supra 14. H
946 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A ing judicial scrutiny'. For instance in University of California Regents v.
Allan Bakke, 51 L. Ed. 2d 750, it was the latter test that was applied. It was
observed, 'in order to justify the use of a suspect classification a State must
show that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally pennissible and
substantial, and that its use of the classification is, 'necessary ............... to
B accomplishment of its purpose for the safeguarding of its interest'. Whereas
in Fullilove it was observed that, 'programme that employs racial or ethni-
cal criteria ....... calls for closer examination'. It was explained that whena
programme employing a benign racial classification was adopted by an
administrative agency on the explicit direction of congress, the courts were
'bound to approach' the 'task with appropriate deference to the congress,
c the co-equal branch charged by the constitution with the power to provide
for the "general welfare". H. Earl Fullilove v. Philip M. Klutznick, 65 L, Ed,
2d 902 In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission
58 LW 5053, was reiterated and it was observed that, benign race conscious
measure !!mandated by the congress11 even if these measures are not
D "remedial" in the sense of being designated to compensate victims of
past-governmental or social discrimination - are constitutionally permis-
sible to the extent that they serve important governmental objectives within
the power of congress and are substantially related to achievement of those
objectives'. Suffice it to say that the observations were made in different
E context for different purpose. The grant of broadcasting rights to minority
was upheld by the majority as 'minority ownership programmes are critical
means of promoting broadcasting diversity'. But even in this decision
Justice Stevens who concurred with majority agreed with minority in Ful-
lilove (supra) and observed, 'I remain convinced, vf course, that racial or
F ethnic characteristics provide a relevant basis for desperate treatment only
in extremely rare situations and that it is therefore "especially important \
that the reasons for any such classification be clearly identified and unques-
tionably legitimate".'

G (2)

The sweep and width of judicial power and authority exercised by
this Court is much extensive and deep as the constitutional provisions
mandate it to be so. Test for interference is constitutional violation. Due
H regard to legislative measures or executive action directed towards welfare
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [R.M. SAHA!, J.] 947

measure has never been disputed by when they are overshadowed with A
extraneous compulsions or are arbitrary then, 'judicial interpretation gives
better protection than the political branches'.1 Even the most reactionaries
of American President Thomas Jeferrson once said. 'The law of the land
administered by upright judges would protect you from any exercise of
power unauthorised by the Constitution of United States'. Faith in the
judiciary is of prime importance. Ours is a free nation. Among such prople
B
respect for law and belief in its constitutional interpretation by courts
require an extraordinary degree of tolerance and cooperation for the value
of democracy and survival of constitutionalism.

(3) c
Article 16(1) is a right created constitutionally in favour of all citizens
and anyone is entitled to approach the courts against violation of his right
by the State and assail State's latitude in remedial meausres or affirmative
action to improve conditions of weaker sections or improve, lot of the D
backward class, if they are not so, 'tailored' as not to transgress the
constitutional permissible limits. Any state action whether 'affirmative' or
'benign', 'protective' or 'competing' is constitutionally restricted first by
operation of Article 16(4) and then by interplay of Articles 16(4) and 16(1).
State has been empowered to invade the constitutional guarantee of 'all'
E
citizens under Article 16(1) in favour of 'any' backward class of citizens
only if in the opinion of the government it is inadequately represented.
Objective being to remove disparity and enable the unfortunate ones in the
society to share the services to secure equality in, 'opportunity and status'
any state action must be founded on firm evidence of clear and legitimate
identification of such backward class and their inadequate representation. F
Absence of either renders the action suspect. Both must exist in fact to
enable State to assume jurisdiction to enable it to take remedial measures.
'Power to make reservations as contemplated by Article 16( 4) can be
exercised only to make the inadequate representations in the services
adequate'. General Manager Southern Railway v. Rangachari, [1962] 2 SCR G
586, Use of expression, 'in the opinion of State' may result in greater
latitude to State in determination of either backwardness or inadequacy of
representation and sufficiency of material or mere error may not vitiate as
State may be left in such field to experiment and learn by trial and error

The Court and the Constitution by A. Cox p. 372. H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A .>lith little interference from the court but if the principle of identification
itself is illvalid or it is in violation of constitutionally permissible limits or
if instead of carefullyidentifying the characteristics which could clothe the
State with remedial action it engages in analysis which is illegal and invalid
and is adopted not for remedial purposes but due to extraneous considera-
tions than the court would be shirking in their constitutional obligation if
B they fail to apply the corrective. States' latitude is further narrowed when
no existence of the two primary, basic or jurisdictional facts it proceeds to
make reservation as the wisdom and legality of it has to be weighed in the
balance of equality pledged and guaranteed to every citizen and tested on
anvil of reasonableness to 'smoke out' any illegitimate use and restrict the
C State from crossing the clear constitutional limits. 'In framing a government
which is .to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in
this, you must firsl·.eriable the government to control the governed, and in
the next place oblige it to control itself.' 1 Judicial Review has come to be
one of the ways of obliging government to control itself. A reservation for
D a class which is not backward would be liable to be struck down. Similarly
if the class is found to be backward but it is adequately represented the
power cannot be exercised. Therefore, the exercise of power must precede
the determination of these aspects each of which is mandatory. Since the
exercise of power depends on existence of the two, its determination too
must satisfy the basic requirement of being in accordance with Constitu-
E tion, its belief and thought. Any determination of backward class in histori-
cal perspective may be legally valid and constitutionally permissible. But if
in determination or identification of the backward class any constitutional
provision is violated or it is contrary to basic feature of Constitution then
the action is rendered vulnerable.
F
(4)

Reservation being negative in content to the right of equality
gruaranteed to every citizen by Article 16{1) it has to be tested against
G positive right of a citizen and a direct restriction on State power. Judicial
review, thus, instead of being ruled out or restricted is imperative to
maintain the balance. The court has a constitutional obligation to examine
if the foundation for State'.s action was within constitutional periphery and

Federalist No.Sl (extracted in American Constitutional Law) by Alphcus T.
H Mason/D.G. Stephenson, Jr.
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [R.M. SAIW, J.] 949

even if it was, did the government prior to embarking upon solving the A
social, problem by raising, 'narrow bridge' under Article 16(4), to enable
the 'weaker sections of the people to cross the rubicon'.Chinnappa Reddy,
J. in KC. Vasantha Kumar v. State of Kamataka, AIR 1985 SC 1495 at 1529,
discharged its duty of a responsible government by constitutional method
so as to put it beyond any scrutiny by the 'eye and ear' of the Constitution. B
What comes out of the preceding discussion can ·be reduced thus:

(i) (a) Identification of backward class of persons and
their inadequate representation in ·service are the basic
or jurisdictional facts to empower the State to exercise
the power of reservation. C

(b) Either of the conditions precedent are assailable
and are subject to judicial review.

(ii) Reservation of appointments and posts under Article
16(4) can be challenged if it is constitutionally invalid D
or even if it disturbs the balance of equality guaranteed
under Article 16(1) for being unreasonable or ar-
.bitrary.

(iii) Burden to prove that reservation does not violate
E
constitutioal guarantee and is reasonable is on the
State.

***** '

F
(1)

Our Constitution like many modern constitutions was also, 'a break
with the past' and 'was framed with, 'a need for fresh look'. Centuries of
deliberate and concerted effort to deface the society by creating caste
consciousness, exploiting religious sentiments was attempted to be effaced G
by 'The People' when they resolved to constitute the country into a secular
democratic republic. Preamble of the Constitution, echoing sentiments of
nation, harrassed for centuries by foreign domination, 'to secure, to all its
citizens justice, social, economic and political; Liberty of thought, expres-
sion, belief, faith and worship; Equalit)'. of status and opportunity and to H
950 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A promote among them all Fraternity assuring dignity of the individual' was
not a mere flourish of words hut was an ideal set-up for pratice and
observance as a matter of law through constitutional mechanism. Com-
munal reservations were outlawed both from governance and administra-
tion. States and governments were prohibited from practising race, religion
B · or caste in any form by Articles 15(1), 16{2) and 29(2). Classification made
on religion, race and caste was held to be 'opposed to the Constitution and
constitutes a clear violation of the fundamental rights'. The State of Madras
v. Shrimathi Champakam Dorairajan, [1951] SCR 525. New beginning was
made by abolishing untouchability, prohibiting exploitation and guarantee-
ing equality not only before law but in public services and employment both
C substantive and protective. Concern was shown for weaker sections of the
society and backward class of citizens. Article 16(4) was in keeping with
this philosophy. Reservation for 'any' backward class of citizens in services
of the State was visualised as an integral part of equality of opportunity as
phadge during freedom struggle was, 'equality not only of opportunity to
D be given to all but special opportunities for educational, economic and
· cultural growth must be given to backward group so as to anable them to
catch up to those who are ahead of tbem' 1. Employment or appointment
to an office in the State constituted a, 'new form of wealth' on the date the
Constitution was enforced, therefore equal opportunity to all its citizens
was constitutionally provided for without any discrimination on religion,
E race or caste etc. But it would have been mere illusion if no provision was
made to ensure similar opportunity to those citizens who remained back-
ward either because of historically social reasons or economic poverty or
ooor quality of education or any other reason which could be determinative
of backwardness. How the doctrine of equality, claimed to be 'the core of
F American democratic aspiration' was twisted, 'to relegate, racial minorities
to inferior status by denying them, 'equal access to the opportunity enjoyed
by others' under, cover of, 'separate but equal 'doctrine' commented by
Justice Harlton in his dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 US 537
(1896) as 'pernicious' was well known. The American myth that it was a
'nation of equals and a classless society' 2 had been exploded. Technically
G and even legally probably the interpretation could be within provision of
constitutional guarantee of equality but it was abnoxious and destructive of

Pt. Jawahar lat Nehru.

H 2 Herbert J. Gans - 'The New Egalitarianism' (The Inequality & Justice by Rainwater)
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.l. [R.M. SAHAI, J.] 951

social equality. 'The effect of the majority decisi0n in Plessy (supra) was to A
subordinate them until than dominant anti-discrimination principle of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Court created doctrine of reasonable clas-
sification.'1 Although the doctrine of Plessy was gradually abandoned
finally but not before 1954 till Brown's case was decided. Therefore Article
16 while providing for equality of opportunity to all without any distinction B
and irrespective of forward or backward class of citizens took care to avoid
recurrence of American experience by directing State to reserve posts for
backward class if they were not adequately represented in services as,
'inequality does not harm only the unequals, it hurts the entire society'.

Thus Article 16(1) and (4) operate in same field. Both are directed C
towards achieving equality of opportunity in services under the State. One
is broader in sweep and expansive in reach. Other is limited in approach
and narrow in applicability. Former applies to 'all' citizens whereas latter
is avaibable to 'any' class of backward citizens. Use of words 'all' in 16(1)
and 'any' in 16(4) read together indicate that they are part of same scheme. D
The one is substantive equality and other is protective equality. Article
16(1) is a fundamental right of a citizen whereas 16(4) is an obligation of
the State. The former is enforceable in a court of Jaw, whereas the latter
is 'not constitutional compulsion' but an enabling pr~vision. Whether Ar-
ticle 16(4) is 'in substance, an exception' CJ Ray in State of Kara/a & Ors.
v. P.M. Thomas, [1976] 1 SCR 906, or 'a proviso' 2 or, 'emphatic way of E
putting the extent to which equality of opportunity could be carried'3 or
'presumed to exhaust all exception in favour of backward class'4 or 'ex-
pressly designed as benign discrimination devoted to lifting of backward
classes',5 but if Article 16(1) is the, 'positive aspect of equality of
opportunity' Article 16(4) is a complete code for reservation for backward F
class of citizens as it not only provides for exercise of power but also lays
down the circumstances, in which the power can be exercised, and the
purpose and extent of its exercise. One is mandatory and operates auto-
matically whereas the other comes into play on identification of backward
class of citizens and their inadequate representation.
G
The Equal Protection of the Law by P.G. Polyviou p.302.
2 Khanna, J., in S~pra (28) p.939.
3 Mathew J., in Supra (28) p.956.
4 Beg J., in Supra (28) p.960.
5 Krishna Iyer J., in Supra (28) p.969 & 978 · H
952 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A (2)

Compensatory or remedial measures for lesser fortunate are thus
not, ipso facto, violative of equal opportunity as our society was founded
not on abstract theory that all men are equal but on realism of societal
B differences created by human methodology resulting in existence of the
weak and the strog, poor and the rich. Preamble, the basic feature of the
Constitution, therefore, promises equal opportunity and status and dignity
to every citizen the actuality of which has been ensured by empowering the
State to take positive steps under Article 15(4) and 16(4). Forty years of
recount demonstrate flowering of principle of equal opportunity and en-
C courage to intensify it for the deserving, past or present. Reverse dis-
crimination, an expression coined by American courts and jurists
commented upon, 'as sharpened edge of a sword' 1 as, 'it is as much as an
evil as the discrimination it aims to overcome'2 as it violates, (a) ·formal
justice (b) consistency ( c) equality of opportunity (d) due process of
D equality,3 are expressions of one sided thinking without the grip of the
constitutional goal set out by founding fathers that, 'equality of opportunity
must be transformed into equality of results'. An enlightened society is one
which takes care of the poor, the backward, the retarded, the handicapped
as much as of the rich, the forward, the healthy and the gifted. Formal
equality transforms into real equality when the disadvantage arising out of
E social circumstances is leveUfd and the least and the best advantaged are
so paired by the State acti~m that differences and distinctions arising out
of ascribed identify get gradually lost. Various articles of the Constitution
reflect this philosophy. Article 16 is a classic example, and probably
unparaUel in the constitutional history of the world, where individualism
F advocated by West in eighteenth and nineteenth century co-exist with
States predominant role in bridging the gulf between the needy and the
affluent, the backward and the forward. It reflects modern and progressive
tliinking on Equality. As observed by Laski, 'By adequate opportunity we
cannot imply equal opportunities in a sense that implies identity of original
chance. The native endowments of men are by no means equal' .4 Accord-
G
1 Reservation Policy & Practice in India, by Anirudh Prasad.
2 Supra (34) p. 318
3 B. Sivaramayya. - lncqU:afities and the law.
4 Liberty'& Equality by Harold Laski (A Grammer of Potitics Publisbcd in 'Inequality
H and Justice' by Rainwater).
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. (R.M. SAHA!, J.] 953

ing to Ronald Dworkin, 'All human beings have a natural right to an A
eqnality of concern and respect, a right they possess not by virtue of birth,
but simply as human beings with the capacity to make plans and give
justice.' Articles 39 and 46 are extension of this belief and thought. Any
legislative measure or executive order reserving appointments or posts
-.
cannot be assailed as being beyond constitutional sanction. As far back as B
1951 it was held by a Seven Judges' Constitution Bench, of this court
'Reservation of posts in favolir of any backward class -0f citizens cannot
therefore be regarded is unconstitutional'. B. Venkataramana v. The State
of Mad!as & Anr., A.LR. 1951 SC 229. Nor did the Constitution makers
restricted the period of its continuance as was done for Anglo-Indians by
Article 336 as an enlightened and progressive state a responsible govern- C
ment of a welfare country mast decide itself periodically on prevanleilt
social and economic conditions and not on political consideration or
extraneous compulsion if the protective umbrella has to be kept opened,
for whom and for how long.
D
(3)

Before proceeding further it may be mentioned that many decisions
were cited of American Courts dealing )Vith affirmative action forNegoroes
and a parallel was attempted to be drawn from it for justifying reservation E
for other backward classes. But this ignores that unlike the United States
our Constitution itself provides for reservation for backward classes, there-
fore, it is unnecessary to derive inspiration from _decisions given by
American court on equal protection clause. They may be relevant for
classification and nexus test under Article 14 or even for judging if the
provision by being arbitr,;,,, was violative of .equality doctrine but they F
cannot furnish relevant guideline for interpreting Article 16(4). How
equality was distorted and how Blacks were made to suffer by biased an<)
narrow construction of the concept of equality for nearly hundred years is
a matter of history. To derive parallel from classification developed by
American courts to support reservation on any ground for other backward G
classes would be constitutionally unjust and legally unsure. Whether
American Constitution was or is colour blind or not but when our Con-
stitution was framed caste was in, 'bad odour'. Deliberate 'Divide and Rule'
policy of Britishers by perpetuating caste was in full glare, therefore, the
foUJtding fathers while guaranting equality prohibited discrimination on the H
954 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A ground of religion, race or caste etc. Unfortunate American experience of,
'separate but equal' doctrine legitimatised in Plessy v. Ferguson resulting in
segregating negroes and keeping them at distance from American prosper-
tiy was avoided by making the State responsible both for ameliorative
measures or affirmative action and protective steps. The doctrine of,
B' 'compelling State interest' developed by American Courts to support clas-
sification for even race conscious measures pariicularly in economic field
or business regulation have no relevance as the state'has been constitution-
-
ally empowered to re'thedy the social imbalance. From 'separate but equal?
in Plessy to, 'freedom of choice' developed by Brown v. Director Board of
Education, 347 US 483 (1954) and Brown v. Director Board of Education,
C 349 US 294 (1955) to, 'just schools' without label of white or Negr() in
Green v. Country School Board, 391 US 430 [1968} to eliminati<>n of
segregation 'root and branch' in Swann v. Charlotte, Mecklenburg Board of
Education, 402 US 1 (1970) may be a fascinating development for America
but our constitutional provisions being more pragmatic and realistic to
D problem of equality in public employment it appears unnecessary and risky
to derive any inspiration from American decision for interpreting. Article
•
16(4) as,

'In its Compensatory Programmes for depressed classes,
E India, has gone much further than the egalitatrian western
societies such as the Unites States'.1 The conclusion, thus,
is that

F
(1) Article 16(1) and 16(4) <>perate in the same field.

(2) Article 16(4) is exhaustive of reservation. -
(3) No period for reservation has been provided but every
State must keep on evaluating perilldically if it was neces- •
sary to continue reservation, and for whom.
G

l Glen M. and Johnson Sipra Bose, 'Social Mobility Among Untouchables', in Cohuion
H and Conffict;n Modern India.
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [R.M. SAHAl, J.] 955

'D' A
(1)

Thus the real issue is not reservation but identification. Who, then,
are the, 'backward class of citizens'? What is the meaning of the word,
'backward', 'class' and 'citizens' individually and taken together. How are
they to be identified. By their caste, occupation, status, economic condition B
etc. Although the issue of reservation has been agitated before this Court,
time and again, the occasion never arose to lay down any principle or test
for determination of other backward classes. C.A. Rajendran v. Union of
India & Ors., (1968) 1 SCR 721, Janaki Prasad Panmoo v. State of J. & K
(1973) 3 SCR 236, State of Kera/a & Ors. v. N.M. Thomas & Ors., (1976) 1
SCR 906, and Karamchan Sangh v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCR 185, were C
no doubt concerned with Article 16 but they were cases of SC/ST who are
constitutionally recongnised as, backward class of citizens. Champakan
(supra), Tri/okinath Tikku v. State of J & K, (1967) 2 SCR 265, and
Trilokinath & Ors. v. State of J & K, (1969) 1 SCR l031andA. Peeriakaruppan,
etc. v. State of Tamilnadu, (1971) 2 SCR 430, were concerned.with reserva· D
tion based on caste or religion. M.R. Balaji & Ors. v. State of Mysore, (1963)
Supp. 1 SCR 439, Heggade Janardhan Subborye v. State of Mysore, (1963)
Supp. 1 SCR 475, P. Rajendran v. State of Madras, (1968) 2 SCR 786, State
of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. P. Sagar, (1968] 3 SCR 595, State of A.P. v. U.S. V.
Ba/aram, (1972] 3 SCR 247, State of Uttar Pradesh v. Pradeep Tandon, (1975]
2 SCR 761, R. Chitralekha v. State of Mysore, (1964] 6 SCR 368, and Km. KS.
Jayshree v. State of Kera/a, (1977) 1 SCR 194, were concerned with reserva- E
tion under Article 15(4). Except for Vasanlha Kumar (supra) no exercise
was undertaken to lay down any principle for determination of backward
class. Reason for absence of any discussion appears to be that this Court
• while explaining the word 'backward' in Balaji observed that backward
classes intended to be covered in Article 15(4) were comparable to SC/ST F
which was accepted and applied while deciding backward class under Ar·
ticle 16(4) as well. But the kind of comparability • 'Whether of status, of
disabilities suffered, of economic or educational conditions or of repre-
sentation in government service' was not elaborated nor it was undertaken
even in Bairam when the Court extended it to, 'really backward' even
though not, 'exactly similar in all respects', as they were dealing with SC/ST. G
(2)

The expression, 'any backward class of citizens' is of very wide
import. Its width and depth shall be fully comprehended when significance
of each word and the purpose of its use is explained. To preface the H
956 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A discussion on this vital aspect, on which divergence extended to extremes
both legally and sentimentally, it may be stated that in certain decisions
given by this Court due weight was not, given to the words, 'class' and
'citizens'. Latter is explained in Chapter II of the Constitution. Any person
satisfying those conditions is a citizen of this country irrespective of race,
religion or caste. Member of every community Hindu, Muslim, Christian,
B Sikh, Budh, Jain etc. who are citizens of this country and are backward and
are not adequately represented in services are to be brought into National
stream by protective or benign measures. Provisions of the Constitution
apply to all equally and uniformly. Yardstick of backwardness must neces-
sarily, therefore, has to be of universal application.
c
'Class' has been linked with the word, 'backward' and has beelJJead
as one word, 'backward class' thus occasioning the debate thal'ii"should be
understood as 'backward caste'. Whether such reading is permissible is

..
another aspect which shall beadverted to, presently, butif the word, 'class'
D is read individually or in conjunction with words 'of citizens' then its plain
meaning and purpose is to exclude any reservation for individual. In other
words reservation contemplated is for group or collectivity of citizens who
are backward and not for any individual. The expression 'any backward
class of citizen' thus is capable of being construed as class of backwards,
backward among any class of citizens, backward class etc. depending on
E for whom the reservation is being made and why.

Backivard may be relative such 'as professional or occupational back-
wardness or it may be economic, social, eclucational or it may be racial such
as in America or caste based as in Hindu social system or it may be natural
...
F such as physically handicapped or even of sex. Article 16 of the Constitution
deals with equality of opportunity in services under.the State. The meaning of
the word 'backward' therefore, has to be understood with reference to
opportunity in public employment. Since this is a constitutional issue it
cannot be resolved by cliches founded on fictional mythological stories or
misdirected philosophies or odious comparisons without any regard to social
G and economic conditions but by pragmatic, purposive and value oriented
approach to the Constitution as it is the fundamental law which requires
careful navigation by political set up of the country and any deflection or
deviation disturbing or threatening the social balance has to be restored, as
far as possible, by the judiciary. Backwardness in such a vast country with
H divergent religions, culture, language, habits, social and economic conditions
INDRASAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [R.M. SAHA!, J.] 957

artsmg out of historical reasons, geographical locations, feudal system, A
rigidity of caste is bound to have regional flavour. For instance place of
habitation and its enviromnent_was held in Pradeep Tandon (supra) to be
. determinative for social and educational backwardness in hills ofU.P. Inter-
•· action of various forces have been responsible for backwardness.in different
parts of the country. A caste backward in one State may be advanced in
another. That is why Dr. Ambedkar while quelling misgivings of members in
B
the Constituent Assembly Debate had stated, that backwardness was being,
'left to be determined by the local government' 1, probably; with hope and
belief that once the problem was tackled by the State and backward citizens
were adequately represented in State services the problem at the National
level shall stand resolved automatically. c
Individual backwardness in social sense is primarily economic. Article
16 (4) however, is concerned with class backwardness. In technical sense as
explained by sociologists it is a problem of 'social stratification' arising out of,
as said by Max Weber, due to political, social or economic order. Class or . -D
group backwardness may arise due to exclusion of the entire collectivity as a
result of combined or individual operation of any of these reasons. For
instance in America as slavery receded after Civil War it was succeeded, 'by
a caste system embodying white supremacy. Various "Jim Crow" laws, or
segregation statutes, lent the sanction of the law to a racial ostracism found in
churches and schools, in housing facilities, in restaurants and hotels, in most E
forms of public transportation, on the job, in universities and colleges, and
ultimately in morgues and cemeteries. In addition, black Americans were
long denied the right to vote, to serve on juries, and to run for public office.'2
The SC and ST in our country bore a close parallel to it except that their
exclusion or segregation was mainly social. That is why the constitutional F
protection was provided for them. For granting similar benefit on backward-
ness to other group or collectivity the State must be satisfied, that, they were
subjected to at least similar if not same treatment or were excluded from
services foi any of the reasons social, economic or political individually or
collectively and continue to be excluded before they can be identified as
backward class for purposes of Article 16(4). Article 340 is, however, con- G
cerned with social and educational backwardness. Since the impugned or-
ders have been passed on identification of backward class by a Commission

1 Constituent Assembly Debates Vol. VII p. 701 (1948-49).
2 'Equality Justice and Rectification' by Derck L. Phillips, p.289-290.
H
958 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A appointed by the President in exercise of power under this provision it will
have to be examined if the Commission acted within the scope of its reference
and how this expression has to be understood.

(3)
B
Can the word 'class' be understood as caste? What does the word
'class' mean? According to dictionary it means 'division of society according
to status, rank, caste, merit, grace or quality'. 1 Burton defines it, as 'category,
classification, 2 breed, caste, group, order, rank'. In Webster it is defmed as,
'member or body of persons with common characteristics, social rank or
c caste'. 3 Whereas Oxford defines caste as, 'race, leinage, pure stock or breed'.
English historians have defined caste as, 'hereditary classes into which Hindu
society is divided'. Sociologists describe it as, 'ascribed status'. Class is thus
wider and may mean caste. Is it so for Article 16? In Hindi version of the
Constitution the word is 'varg' that is group and not 'jati' that is caste or
D community. The word class cannot and was not used as caste as it was
constitutionally considered to be destructive of secularism. In our country
caste system is peculiar to Hindus. It is unknown to Muslims, Christians,
Sil\hs, Buddhists and Jains. The Constitution was framed not for Hindus only.
Provision was made for a society heteregenous in character but seculiar in
outlook. 'It was a compromistic formula', a positive effort to equalise one and
E all. Even among Hindus where caste system is an, 'institution most highly
developed' the society is divided into large number of separate groups mostly
functional or tribal in origin. By 20th Century the, 'lowest classes of Hindu
society', came to be identified as depressed class' or 'untouchable - a name of
comparatively recent origin'. Regidity developed over years was partly due to
F Hindu orthodoxy and partly due to British exploitation. Whatever reason but
scheduled castes and scheduled tribes were undoubtedly, 'truly', 'relatively'
or 'really backward'. When the Constitution was framed the framers were
aware of preferential treatment on religion, race and caste. In Southern
States communal reservation in services was in vogue. Yet Dr. Ambedkar
while defending the use of word 'backward' by drafting committee explained
G that, 'it was to enable other communities to share the services which for
historical reasons, has been controlled by one community or a few

Oxford Dictionaty.
2 Legal Treasurer - William C. Burton.
H 3 Webster Dictionary.
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. (R.M. SAHA!, J.] 959

community'. The word, 'community' has been defined in Webster Com- A
prehensive Dictionary as, 'The. people who reside in one locality and are
subject to the same laws, have the same interests, the public or society at
large'. And according to Oxford it means 'the quality of appertaining to all in
common, common ownership, common character'. Class was thus used in a
wider sense and not in the restricted sense of caste.
B
(4)
Both the words 'backward' and 'class' thus are of very wide import.
Assuming the two words as one and reading it as, 'backward class' the
question is can it be understood as cluster of backward Hindu caste? Or in
the broad and wide sense as extending and including 'any' backward class of C
citizens irrespective of race, religion or caste? Which construction would be
in keeping with the constitutional purpose? Taking up the narrower con-
structipn, it may be stated that to interpret a constitutional provision its
history, circumstances in which it was adopted as well as the events immedi-
ately surrounding its adoption are necessary to be looked into to appreciate
the purpose and objective of its use. The word 'backward class' and started D
acquiring meaning at the end of 19th Century with commencement of enrol-
ment on caste basis in 1891, recognition of special treatment to some and
communal representation to others in early 20th Century. The Fort St.
'I George Gazette No. 40 of November 1985 mentions grants-in-aid to schools
for the untonchable. 1 In 1921 backward community in Mysore meant, 'all E
other communities other than Brahmins'. 2 In Bombay in 1925 backward
classes were all except, 'Brahmin, Prabhus, Marwaris, Parsis, Banias and
3
Ghirstians'. Indian Statutory Commission (Hatlong Committee) defined
Backward Classes in 1928 as 'castes or classes which are educationally
4
backward They include the depressed classes, aboriginals, hill tribes and
criminal tribes'. The United Province Hindu Backward Classes League F
founded in 1929 suggested Hindu Backward classes to be 'all of the listed
communities belonging to non-dwijya (that is twice born) or degenerate or
Sudras classes of Hindus' .5 Travancore in 1935 passed resolution on report of
Justice Nokes on communal lines including all dasses. 6 Madras Provincial
backward Classes League was founded in 1939 for securing separate treat- G
ment for 'forward non-brahmin communities' .7 It thus did not have a definite
meaning. Somewhere it was everyone except Brahmins and others for the
so-called Sudras. All depending on social and economic conditions prevail-

1 to 7 Exatracted in 'Competing Equalities' by Marc Galantcr. · H
960 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

iiiR i1' a particular State. In iµiy case it 'never acquired a definite meaning at
· tl!cj;all India level. There had been no attempt to define it or employ it one the
lliltional level1. The statement of Dr. Ambedker in the Constituent Assembly
or determination of backwardness at local or State-level was thus not casual
but an outcome of practical reality and historical truth.

B (5)

Historiqilly, therefore, what started as social upliftment measure for
the down-trodden amongst Hindus in some princely States gradually
developed into formation of various associations in different States en-
couraged by the social caste consciousness created by the Britishers to
C demonstrate backwardness for claiming preferential treatment injected in
the society by communal representation. The Constitution makers were
aware.of this background. It is vividly reflected in the Constituent Assembly
Deb~t~s: Therefore a very vital, question arises if the expression, 'backward
class' u8ed in Article 16(4) has to be read and understood as extending or
D applying to backward Hindu Castes only. Meaning of the word 'backward'
and 'class' have already been explained. Language of the expression does not
warrant reading of the expression as backward caste. When two words one
wider an import and broader in application and other narrower were avail-
able and the Constitution makers opted for one the other, on elementary
principle of construction, should be deemed to have been rejected. What was
E avoided by the framers of the Constitution, for good reasons and, to achieve
the objective they had set up for the governance of the country cannot be
brought back either by government or courts by interpretation or construc-
tion unless the consequences of accepting the literal or the normal meaning
appears to be so unreasonable that the Constitution makers would have never
F intended. 'Although the spirit of an instrument especially of a constitution is
to be respected not less than its letter yet the spirit is to be colleoted chiefly
2
from its words'. For this reason alone any suggestion of accepting the
,•
expression as interchangeable with caste cannot be accepted. Even the spirit
behind use of the expression was not to provide for cluster of castes, known
as Sudras of the Hindu hierarchy before the Constitution, but for groups or
G class of different communities following different religions, as rights fun-
damental or otherwise have been guaranteed to members of every com-
munity irrespective of religion, race, caste or birth. Article 340 empowers
I Competing Equalities by Marc Galanter.
:\ 2 Justice Marshall in Sturges v. Crowninshicld, (1819) quoted in Encyclopaedia of the
H American Constitution, Vol. 1 by Levy, Karst & Mahoney.
i
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [R.M. SAHA!, J.] ' 961

President to appoint a Commission to investigate the conditions of socially A
and educationally backward classes within the territory of India. Such classes
may belong to any community. Preferential treatment accorded to various
communities before 1950 on basis of religion, race or caste was d.one away
with. Promise was to take care of minorities as well. Article 335 ensured claim
of SC/ST in ·services. Other backward citizens irrespective of race, religion B
were to be taken care of as, 'The Constitution was framed with grand
compromise. A splendid compromise between formal equalitarian justice
and compensatory justice through benign or protective discriminatiou was
devised so beautifully that that was to serve the purpsoe of assimilation,
integration was equal partnership in national building by making equal
contribution in the main stream of life' .1 If Article 16( 4) is confined to C
backward classes of Hindu hierarchy by narrowing it down to caste it would
be doing violence to the language of the provision and the spirit in which the
expression was used leading to injustice. No provision in the Constitution
indicates that the expression has to be understood in such narrow sense.
Reading it otherwise may lead to contradiction. Normal and natural meaning D
of an expression can be, disregarded only if it is found that the framers of the
Constitution did not intend to use it in that sense and 'absurdity and injustice
of applying the provision would be so monstrous that all mankind would,
without hesitation, unite in rejecting the application'. 2 When the Constitution
was framed the founding fathers were aware of the meaning and under-
standing of the word 'backward'. They were also aware that hereinafter E
members of all community were to be treated alike. The State was made
responsible, therefore, for 'any' backward class of citizens coming from
whatever community, caste or religion. State, therefore, cannot discriminate,
while identifying backward class on race, religion, caste or birth.
F
(6)

True the discussions in the Constituent Assembly Debates centred
round caste and community. Even Dr. Ambedkar said, 'what are called
backward classes are ..............nothing but a collection of certain castes'. That G
however cannot be conclusive for construing the expression as, the historical
backgrotmd and perhaps what was accepted or what was rejected by the

Rese~tion Policy and Practice in India by Dr. Anirudh Prasad.

2 Supra (73).
H
962 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Constituent Assembly while the Constitution was being framed may be taken
into account, 'but not to interpret the Constitution', J.C. Golak Nath v. State
ofPunjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643. What emerged out of shared understanding by
consensus was not backward caste but backward class, an expression of
elasticity capable of expanding depending on the nature and purpose of its
use. Motivation for use of expression 'backward class' might have come from
B a feeling to accommodate and benefit those who were deprived of entering
into services due to social and economic conditions amongst Hindus. But
what is being interpreted is a Constitution, a document, an instrument which
is good not for a season or a session but for centuries during the course of
which even the most stable society may undergo social, economic, political
c and scientific changes resulting in transformation of values. Are the values in
the society same today as they were in 1950 or 1900? Words or expressions
remain the same but its meaning and application with passage of time
changes. When the framers of the Constitution deliberately used an expres-
sion of expansive nature then as said by Justice Frenk Purter, 'they should be
D left to gather meaning from experience. For they relate to whole domain of
social and economic fact and statesman who founded this nation knew too
well that only a stagnant society remains unchanged'. This Court is being
asked to interpret the provision in 1990. It cannot ignore the present by going
into past.

E "The law, even as sit honours the past, must reach for justice
of a kind not measured by force, by the pressures of interest
groups, nor even by votes, but only by what reason and a
sense of justice say is right. Brown was 'law' in 1954, even
though the 'separate but equal' doctrine had half a century
of precedent and practice behind it. Continuity is essential
F
to law as a whole, but the continuity must be creative."1

(7)

G 'Caste is a reality'. Undoubtedly so are religion and race. Can they
furnish basis for reservation of posts in services? Is the State entitled to
practice it in any form for any purpose? Not under a constitution wedded to
secularism. State responsibility is to protect religion of different communities
and not to practice it. Uplifting the backward class of citizens, promoting

H 1 A. Cox - The Court and the Constitution.
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [R.M. SAHA!, J.] 963

them socially and educationally talcing care of weaker sections of society by A
special programmes, and policies is the primary concern of the State. It was
visualised so by framers of the Constitution. But any claim of achieving these
objectives through race, conscious measures or religiously packed program-
mes would be uncharitable to the noble and pious spirit of the founding
fathers, legally impermissible and constitutionally ultra vires. Deriving in- B
spiration from the American philosophy that, 'just as the race of students
must be considered in determining whether a constitutional violation has
occurred so also must race be considered in formulating remedy' without any
regard to the Preamble of our Constitution and provisions like Articles 15(1),
10(2) and 29(2) would be plunging our Nation into disaster not by what was
adopted and promised as principle for governance for our people on our soil C
but from what has been laid down in a country which is yet far away from,
'equality of result' or 'substantive equality' so far Black or Brown are con-
cerned.

Brown v. Board of Education (supra) which is considered as 'turning D
the clock back' on racial discrimination was given much after
Venkataramana. Provisions like Article VI were introduced in America in
1964 only. WhenBakke (supra) was delivered Justice Harsha! lamented, 'this
Court in the Civil Rights cases and P/essy v. FeTgUson destroyed the move-
ment towards complete equality. For almost a century no action was taken,
and thus non-action was with the approval of the Court. Then we had Brown E
v. Board of Education and the Civil Rights Acts of Congress, followed by
numerous affirmative action programmes. Now, we have this Court again
stepping in, this time to stop affirmative action programs of the type used by
the University of California'. The lament was because of failure to bring the
Negroes in the mainstream, 'in light of the sorry history of discrimination and F
its devastating impact on the lives of Negroes is to ensure that America will
forever remain a divided society'. But to avoid any risk of keeping ours a
divided society, the Constitution makers provided ample safeguards for
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SC/ST) the only category of back-
ward class which could be compared to the Negroes in America. American
philosophy developed by courts that discrimination having arisen due to race G
consciousness the remedy too should be race based, appears to have been
inspired by our constitutional provisions which takes every precaution to
remedy the caste related evil of SC/ST by caste based reservation. But the
same can not be adopted for other backward classes as it would be distortion
of constitutional interpretation by importing a concept which was deliberate- H
964 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A ly and purposely avoiped. Insistence, for claiming reservation for the remain-
ing or for all others. who were in so-called broader category of Sudras not
because they were really backward without any regard to social and
economic conditions, would be unfair to history and unjust to society. What is
constitutionally provided has to be adhered to in spirit but not on assumption
B that all amongst Hindus who fell in the broader category of Sudras were
subjected to same treatment as untouchables in India or Negroes in America.
History, social or political, does not bear it out. Reservation for other back-
ward class is no doubt constitutionally pennisible, on social and economic
conditions which prevailed in the country and are still prevailing and not on
benign steps for Negroes upheld by foreign courts. Judicial activism has no
C doubt in America been remarkable in absence of any constitutional protec-
tion for the Negroes but our courts are not required to undertake the exercise
as our constitutional statesmanship has no parallel in the world where to
achieve egalitatian society truly and really it devised mechanism of treating
the backward class of citizens, 'differently' by Articles 16(4) and 15(4) to
D bring them at par with others so that they could be treated equally. The policy
of official discrimination is,

"unique in the world both in the range of benefits involved
and in the magnitude of the groups eligible for them." 1

E (8)

Caste has never been accepted by this court as exclusive or sole criteria
for determination or identification of backward class. That is why the com-
munal Government Order in Champakam and reservation, except for SC/ST
F and Hindu backward, in S. Venkatramana v. State of Madras, AIR 1951 SC
229, were invalidated. Caste based evil was so repugnant that even when
communal Government O.rder issued by the State of Madras a legacy of caste
based reservation practised in Madras since thirties and forties was struck
down and the Constitution was amended and Article 15 (4) was added the
G basic philosophy against the caste was neither eroded nor mitigated and
ameliorative steps were made state-responsibility for socially and education-
ally backward castes. Balaji adopted test of, comparability of backward
classes with Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe as a result of combined
reading of Article 340(1) and Article 338(3). Two major drawoacks were

H 1 Duskin, Lelah, MScheduled Caste Politics~, Untouchables in India.
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.I. [R.M. SAHA!, J.] 965

noticed in identifying backward class with caste, one, 'it may not always be ·A
legal and may perhaps contain the vice of perpetuating the caste', and other
'if the caste of the group of citizens was made the sole basis for determining
the social backwardness of the social group, the test would inevitably break
down in relation to many sections of Indian society which do not recognise
caste in the conventional sense known to Hindu society'. Jn Chitralekha the B
Court observed that 'caste is only a relevant circumstance in ascertaining the
backwardness of a class and there is nothing in the judgment of this Court ·
(Balaji) which precludes the authority concerned from determining the
social backwardness of a group of citizens if it can do so without reference to
caste'. P. Rajendran too did not differ with Balaji nor it carved out any new
path. The Court accepted the determination of backward class as, the ex- C
planation given by the State of Madras had not been controverted by any
rejoinder affidavit. The Court observed, 'that though the list shows certain
caste the member of those castes are classes of educationally and socially
backward citizens'. In Sagar the Court was concerned with a list where
backwardness was determined amongst others on caste taking i_t as one of the D
relevant test for determination of backwardness. Therefore, the Court agree-
ing with Ba/aji observed, 'in determining whether a particular section forms a
class caste cannot be excluded altogether. But in the determination of a class
a test solely based upon caste or a community cannot also be accepted'. In
Peeriakaruppan it was observed that, 'a caste has always been recognised as a
class'. Support for this was sought from Rajendran and it was observed that it E
was authority 'for the proposition that the classification of backward classes
on the basis of caste is within the purview of Article 15( 4) if those castes are
shown to be socially and educationally backward. But Rajendran was decided
as the caste included in the list were in fact socially and educationally
backward. Bairam, too, followed the same and relying on Rajendran, Sagar F
and Peeriakaruppan upheld the test as entire caste was found to be socially
and economically backward. 'Caste, ipso facto, is not class in secular state'
was said in Soshit Karamchari. lnJayshree it was held that caste could not be
made the sole basis for reservation. Ratio in Rajendran, Sagar, Bairam ap.d
Peeriakaruppan are wrongly understood and erroneously-.pplied. All these
decisions turned on facts as the Court in each case upheld the classification G
not because it was done on caste but those included in the list deserved the
protection. Different streams of thought may appear from various decisions
but none has accepted caste as the sole criteria for determination of back-
wardness.
H
966 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A (9)

'Backward class' in ~Article 16(4) thus cannot be read as backward
caste. What is the scope then? Is it social backwardness, educational
backwardness, economic backwardness, social and economic backward-
' ness, natural backwardness etc.? In absence of any indication expressly or
B impliedly any group or collectivity which can be legitimately considered as,
'backward' for purposes of representation in service would be included in
the expression 'backward class'. Word 'any' is indicative of that the back-
ward class was not visualised in singular. When Constitution was framed
the anxiety was to undo the historical backwardness. Yet a• Word of wider
c import was used to avoid any close-door policy. For instance, backwardness
arising out of natural reasons was never contemplated. But today with
developments of human rights effort is being made to encourage those to
whom nature has not been so kind. Do such persons not form a class? Are
they not backward? They cannot, obviously compete on equal level with
others. Backwardness which the Constitution makers had to tackle by
D making special provision, due to social and economic condition, was dif-
ferent but that does not exclude backwardness arising due to different
reasons in new set up.

Although dictionarily the word 'any' may mean one or few and even
E all yet the meaning of a word has to be understood in the context it has
been used. In Article 16(4) it cannot mean all as it would render the whole
Article unworkable. The only, reasonable, meaning that can be attributed
to it is that it should be the States' discretion to pick out one or more than
one from amongst numerous groups or collectivity identified or accepted
as backward class for purposes of reservation. Whether such picking is
F reasor.able and satisfies the test of judicial review is another matter. That
explains the rationale for the non-obstante clause being discretionary and
not mandatory. A State is not bound to grant reservation to every backward
class. In one State or at one place or at one point of time it may be
historical and social backwardness or geographical and habitational back-
(; wardness and at another it may be social and educational or backwardnes>
arising out of natural cause.

(10)

From out of various backward class of citizens who could be
H provided protection under Article 16(4) the President has been em-
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [R.M. SAHAl, J.] 967

powered by Article 340 to appoint a Commission to investigate the condi- A
tions of socially and educationally backward classes within the territory of
India. What does the expression 'socially and educationally backward
classes' connote? How it should be understood? Is it social backwardness
only? Is the educational backwardness surplus-age?. Article 340(1) of the
Constitution reads as under:
B
"The President may by order appoint a Commission con-
sisting of such persons as he thinks fit to investigate the
conditions of socially and and educati0nally backward clas-
ses within the territory of India and the difficulties under
which they labour and to make recommendations as to the c
steps that should be taken by the Union or any State to
remove such difficulties and to improve their condition and
as to the grants that should be made for the purpose by the
Union or any State and the conditions subject to which
such grants should be made, and the order appointing such
Commission shall define the procedure to be followed by D
the Commission. n

A bare reading of the Article indicates that the avowed objective of this
provision is to empower the President to appoint a Commission to ascerM
tain the difficulties and the problems of the socially and educationally E
backward classes and to make recommendations so that steps may be taken
by the Union and the States to solve their problems, remove their difficul-
ties and improve their conditions. Since backwardness has been qualified
by the words 'social and educational' the ambit of the expression is not as
wide as backward class in Article 16(4). What does it mean then? A social
class, 'is an aggregate of persons within a society possessing about the same F
status'. 1 How to determine backwardness of such a class. The yardstick of
backwardness in any society is, primarily, economic. But Indian society,
'has made caste as the sole hierarchy of social ranking and uses the caste
system as the basic frame of reference'.2 Expert Panel of Manda\ Commis-
sion described it as ascribed status, that is, stauts of a person determined G
by his birth. The social backwardness in pre-independence period, no
doubt, arose because of caste stratification. Members of castes other than

1 The New Encyclopaedia 'Britannica, Micropaedia Vol. 10 p.919.

2 'The Case System in India' by Dr. Rajendra Pandey. H
968 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Brahmans, Thakurs and Vaishyas were socially backward. But with foreign
domination, enlightened movements both social and religious, acquisition
of wealth and power a gradual caste mobility took place not only to
consolidate but even to assert a higher social status. 'The struggle launched
by these backward castes as a subaltern in the pre-independence period,
changed its course in the post independence period'1 due to vested interest
B
in reservation, 'It is well known that up to year 1931, the last census year
for which castes are recorded, there were several castes applying for
changing their names to those indicative of higher caste status. In that
period name indicated status. The trend now is to claim backwardness both
among the Hindus and Muslims by claiming the same caste status by
c various devices as those who are legally considered as backward caste,2 are
the beneficiaries of reservation. While determining social backwardness,
therefore, one cannot loose sight of the type of society, the social mobility,
the economic conditions, the political power. Even the Expert Panel
noticed few of these but then it got lost in ascribed status. The social
D backwardness in 1990 for purposes of employment in services cannot be
status by birth but backwardness arising out of other elements such as class,
power etc. Dr. Pandey in his book [The Caste System in India) after an
elaborate study has concluded,

ul. Class, independent of caste, determines social ranking
E in Indian Society in certain domains;

2. Analysis of caste alone is not sufficient to provide the
real picture of stratification in India to-day;

3. A proper study of stratification in modern India must
F concern with other dimensions, viz., class, status and
power."

While explaining power be has observed in, 'past power was located in the
dominant caste'. But it is now changing in two senses, 'first, power is
shifting from one caste (or group of castes) to another. Secondly, power is
G shifting from caste itself and comes to be located in more differentiated

1 Pradeep Kumar Bose - Mobility & Conflict published in Caste, Conflict and Reser-
vation.

2 Should the caste be the basis for recognising the backwardness - l.P. Desai (extracted
H from Caste, Conflic~ and Reseivation).
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [R.M. SAHA!, J.] 969

political organs and institutions. This has been empirically found by A
Beteille, ~nd others on the basis of his studies of Kammas and Reddis of
Andhra Pradesh. Harrison writes: "This picture of political competition
between the two caste groups is only a modern recurrence of an historic
pattern dating back to the fourteenth century. Srinivas' analysis of politics
in Mysore gives a central place to rivalries between the dominant castes:
"As in Andhra, the Congress is dominated by two leading peasant castes,
B
one of which is Lingayat and the other Okkaliga. Lingayat Okkaliga rivalry
is colouring every issue, whether it be appointment to government posts or
reservation of seats in colleges, or election to local bodies and legislatures.'
Both - Harrision's study in Andhra Pradesh and Srinivas 'in Mysore -
depict the rise to power of the two pairs of non-Brahman dominant castes C
followed by the decline of the Brahmans".' Any determination of social
backwardness, therefore, cannot be valid unless thes.e important aspects
are taken into consideration.

Educational backwardness too was not added just for recitation. No
word in Statute, more so in a Constitution, can be read as surplus-age. In D
II none of the decisions of this Court under Article 16(4) it has been held
that educational backwardness was irrelevant. In Balaji declaration of
minor community as educationally backward was not accepted as correct
since the student community of 5 per thousand was not below the State
average. In Bairam the Court approved acceptance by the government of E
criteria adopted by the Commission for determining social and edcuational
backwardness of the citizen, namely,

"(i) the general poverty of the class or community as a whole;

(ii) Occupations pursued by the classes of citizens, the F
nature of which must be inferior or unclean or undignified
and unremunerative or one which does not carry influence

- or power;

(iii) Caste in relation to Hindus; and
G
(iv) Educational backwardness."

In the hoary past the education amongst Hindus was confined to a par-
ticular class, that is, the Brabmins, but with advent of Muslim rule and
British regime this barricading fell down, considerably, and the education H
970 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A spread amongst other classes as well. But even in those times there was a
section of society which was kept away, deliberately, from education as they
were not permitted to enter the schools and colleges. That has been done
away with by the Coostitution. Yet the educational with all efforts has not
filtered to certain classes particularly in rural areas and many traditionally
educationally backward still suffer from it. At the same time many groups
B or collectivity did not opt for education for various reasons, personal or
otherwise. Therefore, a Commission appointed under Article 340 cannot
determine only social backwardness. Any class to be backward under
Article 340 must be both socially and educationally backward.

C Two things emerge from it, one, that the backward class in Article
16(4) and socially and educatinally in Article 340, being expressions with
different connotations they cannot be understood in one and same sense. The
one is wider and includes the other. A socially and educationally backward
class may be backward class bui not vice versa. Other is that such investigation
D cannot be caste based. Meaning of expression 'socially and educationally
backward' class of citizens was explained in Pradeep Tandon as under:

1
'The expression 'classes of citizens' indicates a homogen-
ous section of the people who are grouped together be-
cause of (a) certain likeness and common traits and who
E are identified by some common attributes. The homo-
geneity of the class of citizen is social and educational
backwardness. Neither caste nor religion nor place of birth
will be uniform element or common attributes to make
them a class of citizens1'.
F
Even when the report of first Backward Class Commission was
submitted to the Government of India the memorandum prepared by it,

-
and presented to the Parliament, emphasised that, efforts should be made,
'to discover some criteria other than caste, which could be of practical
G application in determining the backward classes'. Three of the members of
the Commission, 'were opposed to one of the most crucial recommenda-
tions of the Report, that is, the acceptance of caste as a criteria for social
backwardness and reservations of posts in government service on that
basis'. One of the reasons given for it by the Chairman in his letter was
that adopting of caste criteria was, 'going to have a most unhealthy effect
H on the Muslim and Christian sections of the nation'.
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [R.M. SAHAI, J.] 971

When Second Backward Class Commission was appointed by the A
President under Article 340 it was required, 'to determine the criteria for
determining the socially and educationally backward classes' and,

11
to examine the desirability or otherwise of making
provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in
favour of such backward classes of citizens which are not B
adequately represented in puhlic services and posts in
connection with the affair; of the Union or of any State".

The order further outlined the procedure to be followed by the Commis-
sion as required by Art. 340 by directing it to C

"examine .the recommendations of the Backwan:l Classes
Commission appointed earlier and the considerations
which stood in the way .of the acceptance of its recommen-
dations by Government".
D
The Commission thus was required to undertake the exercise so as to avoid
repetition of those failings of due to which the report of first Commission
could not be implemented. The Commission was not oblivious of it as in
paragraph 1.17 of the report it observed,
E
"Though the above failings are serious, yet the real weak-
ness of the Report lies in its internal contradictions. As
stated in para 1.5 of this Chapter, three of the Members

.. were opposed to one of the most crucial recommendations
of.the Report, that is, the acceptance of caste as a criterion
for social backwardness and the reservation of posts in F
Government services on that basis. 11

Yet the Commission undertook extensive exercise for ascertaining social
system and opined t~at,

"12.4 In fact, caste being the basic unit of social organisa-
G
tion of Hindu society, castes are the only readily and clearly
"recognisable and persistent collectivities".

Having done so it determined social and educational backwardness in
paragraph 11.23 as under : H
m SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A "11.23 As a result of the above exercise, the Co!l1lllission
evolved eleven 'Indicators' or 'criteria' for determining •
social and educational backwardness. These 11 'Indicators'
were grouped under three broad beads, i.e., Social, Educa-
tional and Economic. They are:
B A. Social

(i) Castes/Classes considered as socially backward by
others.

(ii) Castes/Classes which mainly depend on manual labour
c for their livelihood. ·

(iii) Castes/Cla.sses where at least 25% females and 10%
males above the State average get inarried at an age
below 17 years in rural areas and at least 10% females
and 5% males do so in urban areas.
D
(iv) Castes/Classes where participation of females in work
is at least 25% above the State average.

B. Educational
E (v) Castes/Classes where the number of children in the
age group of 5-15 years who never attended school is
at least 25% above the State average.

(vi) Castes/Classes where the rate of student drop-out in
the age group of 5-15 years is at least 25% above the ....
F
State average.

(vii) Castes/Classes amongst whom the proportion of
matriculates is at least 25% below the State average.

G C.Economic

(viii) Castes/Classes where the average value of family
assets is at least 25% below the State average.

(ix) Castes/Classes where the number of families living in
H Kuccha houses is at least 25% above the State average.
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.L (R.M. SAHA!, J.) 973

(x) Castes/Classes where the source ·of drinking water is A
beyond half a kilometer for .more than 50% of the
households. ·

(xi) Castes/Classes where the number of households
having taken consumption loan is at least 25% above
. the State average. · B

11.24 As the above tlllee groups are not of equal impor-
tance for our purp.ose separate weightase was j!iven to
'Indicators' in each group. All the Social 'Indicators' were
j!iven a weightage of 3 points each, Educational 'Indicators'
a weightage of 2 points each and Economic 'Indicators' a
c
weightage of one point each. Economic, in addition to
Social and Educational Indicators, were considered impor'
tan! as they directly flowed from social and educational
backwardness. This also helped to highlight one fact that
socially and educationally backward classes are economi- D
cally backward also.

11.25 It well be seen that from the values j!iven to each
Indicator, the total score adds up to 22. All these 11 In-
dicators were applied to all the castes covered by the survey
for a particular State. As a result of this aplication, all castes E
which had a score of 50 per cent (i.e., 11 points) or above
were listed as socially and educationally backward and the
rest were treated as 'advanced'.

(Emphasised supplied) F
In paragraph 12.2 of the Report the Commission observed,

"As the unit of identification in the above survey is caste,
and caste is a peculiar feature of Hicdu society only, the
results of the su..Vey cannot have much validity for non- G
Hindu communities. Criteria for their identification have
been given separately."

The Commission, thus, on own showing identified socially and education·
ally backward class amongst Hindus on caste. The criteria for identifying
non-Hindus backward classes was stated in paragraph 12.18: H
974 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A "(i) All untouchables converted to any non-Hindu religion;
and

(ii) Such occupational communities which are known by
the name of their traditional hereditary occupation and
whose Hindu counterparts have been included in the list
B of Hindu OBCs. (Examples : Dhobi, Tell, Dheemar, Nai,
Gujar, Kumhar, Lohar, Darji, Badhai, etc.)"

Caste was thus adopted as the sole criteria for determining social and
educational backwardness of Hindus. For members of other communities
C test of conversion from Hinduism was adopted. The Commission, even,
though noticed that the first Commission suffered from inherent defect of
identifying on caste proceeded, itself, to do the same.

In preceding discussion it has been examined, in detail, as to why
caste cannot be the basis of identification of backward class. The constitu-
D tional constraint in such identification does not undergo any change be-
cause different gro~ps or collectivity identified on caste are huddled
together and described as backward class. By grouping together, the clustre
of castes does not loose its basic characteristic and continues to be caste.

No further need be said as whether the Commission acted in terms
E of its reference and whether the identification was constitutionally permis-
sible and legally sound, before it could furnish for any exercise, legislative
or executive, was to be undertaken by the government.

Use of expression, 'nothing in this Article shall prevent Parliament'
F in Article 16(4) cannot be read as empowering the State to make reserva-
tion under Article 16(4) on race, religion or caste. It would result in
regenerating the communal representation in services infused by Britishers
by different orders issued from 1924 to 1946. How such an expression
should be interpreted need not be elaborated. Both the text books and
judicial decisions are full of it. To comprehend the real meaning the
G provision itself, the setting or context in which it has been used, the purpose
and background of its enactment should be examined, and interpretational
exercise may be resorted to only if there is a compelling necessity for it. In
earlier decisions rendered by the Court till sixties Article 16(4) was held
to be exception to Article 16(1). But from 1976 onwards it has been
H understood differently. Today Article 16(1) and 16(4) are understood as
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [R.M. SAHA!, J.] 'l75

part of one and same scheme directed towards promoting equality. There- A
fore what is destructive of equality for Article 16(1) would apply equally
to Article 16(4). The non-obstante clause was to take out absolutism of
Article 16(1) and not to destroy the negatism of Article 16(2).

Rule of statutory construction explained by jurists is to adopt a B
construction which may not frustrate the objective of enactment and result
in negation oft¥' objective sought to be achieved. Rigour of its application
is even more severe in constitutional interpretation as ulllike statute its
provisions cannot be amended or repealed easily. Accepting race, religion
and caste as the remedy to undo the past evil would be against constitu-
tional spirit, purpose and objectives. As stated earlier this remedy was C
adopted by the framers of the Constitution for SC/ST. What was not
provided for others should be deemed, on principle of interpretation, not
to have been approved and accepted. Even if two constructions of the
provisions could have been possible, 'the Court must adopt that which will
ensure smooth and harmonious working of the Constitution and eschew D
the other which will lead to absurdity and given rise to practical
incovenience'. Since acceptance of caste, race or religion would be destruc-
tive of the entire constitutional philosophy and would be contrary to the
Preamble of the Constitution it cannot be accepted as a legal method of
identification of backward classes for Article 16(4).
E
Would the consequences be different if race, religion or caste etc.
are coupled with some other factors? In other words, what is the effect of
the word, 'only' in Article 16(2). In the context it has been used it operates,
both, as permissive and prohibitive. It is permissive when State action,
legislative or executive, is founded on any ground other than race, religion F
or caste. Whereas it is prohibitive if it is based exclusively on any of the
grounds mentioned in Article 16(2). Javed Niaz Beg & Anr. v. Union of
India & Anr., AIR 1981 SC 794, furnishes best illustration of the former. A
notification discriminating between candidates of North Eastern States,
Ttipura, Manipur etc. on the one hand and others for !AS examination and
exempting them from offering lanr '.e paper compulsory for everyone was G
uphled on linguistic concession. When it comes to any State action on race,
religion or caste etc. the word, 'only' mitigates the constitutional prohibi-
tion. That is if the action is not founded, exclusively, or merely, on that
which is prohibited then it may not be susceptible to challenge. What does
it mean? Can a State action founded on race, religion, caste etc. be saved H
976 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A under Article 16(2) if it is coupled with any factor relevant or irrelevant.
What is to be remembered is that the basic concept pervading the Con·
stitution cannot be permitted to be diluted by talcing cover under it. Use
of word, 'only' was to avoid any attack on legitimate legislative action by
giving it colour of race, religion or caste. At the same time it cannot be
B utilised by the State to escape from the prohibition by taking recourse to
such measures which are race, religion or caste based by sprinkling it with
something other as well. For instance, in State of Rajasthan v. Pradip Singh,
AIR 1960 SC 1208, where. exemption granted to Muslims and Harijans
from levy of cost for stationing additional police force was attempted to be
defended because the notification was not based, 'only' on caste or religion
C but because persons belonging to these communities were found by the
State not to have been guilty of the conduct which necessitated stationing
of the police. force it was struck down as discriminatory since it could not
be shown by the State that there were no law abiding persons in other
communities. Similarly identification of backward class by such factors as
D dependence of group or collectivity on manual labour, lower age of mar·
riage, poor schooling, living in kuccha house etc. and applying it to caste
would be violative of Article 16(2) not only for being caste based but also
for violation of Article 14 because it, excludes other communities in which
same factors exist only because they are not Hindus. Further the group or
collectivity, thus, determined would not be caste coupled with other but on
E caste and caste alone.

Today if Article 16(2) is construed as justifying identification of
backward class by equalizing them with those castes in which the customary
marriage age is lower or majority of whom are living in kuccba houses or
a sizeable number is working as manual labour then tomorrow the iden-
F
tification of backward class amongst other communities where caste does
not exist on race or religion coupled with these very considerations cannot
be avoided That would result in malcing re.<ervation in public services on
communal considerations. An interpretation or construction resulting in
such catastrophical consequences must be avoided.
G
(12)

Backward used in Article 16(4) is wider than socially and education·
ally used in Article 15( 4) and wealcer sections used in Article 46. SC/ST
}{ · .•e covered }n either expression. But same cannot be said for others.
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [R.M. SAHAl, J.] 977

Backward, cannot be defined as was, wisely, done by the Constitution A
makers. It has to emerge as a result of interaction of social and economic
forces. It cannot be static. Many of those who were Sudras in 17th and 18th
Centuries ceased to be so in 19th and 20th Centurey due to their educa-
tional advancement and social acceptablity. Members of various backward
communities, both, in South and North who were moving upwards even
B
before 1950 compare no less in education, status, economic advancement
or political achievement with any other class in society. The average lower
middle class of Muslims or Christians may not be better educationally or
economically and in many cases even socially than the intermediate class
of backward class of Sri Paik's list. For instance the bhisties (the water
carriers in leather bags) among Muslims. Does Article 340 empowering c
?resident to ascertain educational and social backwardness of citizens of
this country not include those poor socially degraded and educationally
backward. Are they not citizens of this counrty? Could backwardness of
Muslims, Christians and Buddhists be recognised for purposes of Article
16(4) only if they were converts from Hinduism or such backwardness for D
preferential treatment be recognised only if a group or class was Hindu at
some time. or was occupationaHy comparable to Hindus. That is if members
of other community carry on occupation which is not practised by Hindus,
for instance bhisties. amongst Muslims, then they cannot be regarded as
backward class even if it has been their hereditary occupation and they are
socially, educationally and economiclly backward. A Commission ap- E
pointed under Article 340 by the President is not to identify Hindu,
backwards only but the backward class within the territory of India which
includes Hindu, Muslim, Sikh or Christian etc. born and residing in India
within meaning of Article 5 of the Constitution. The expression is not only
backward class but backward class of citizens. And citizens means all those
F
who are mentioned in Articles 5 and 10 of the Constitution.

Thus neither from the language of Article 16(4) nor the literal test
of interpretation nor from the spirit or purpose of interpretation nor the
present - day social setting, warrants construction of the expression back- G
ward class as backward caste. Consequently what comes out of the ex-
amination from different aspects leads to conclusion that:

(1) Backward class in Article 16(4) cannot be read as
backward caste. H
978 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A (2) Expression 'backward class' is of wider import and
there being no ambiguity or danger of unintended
injustice in giving it its natural meaning it should be
understood in its broader and normal sense.

(3) Backward class nnder Article 16( 4) is not confined to
B erstwhile sudras or depressed classes or intermediate
backward classes amongst Hindus only.

( 4) Width of the expression includes in its fold any com-
munity Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Sikh, Budha, or Jain
etc. as the expression is 'backward class of citizens'.
c
*****
·'E'

Reason for backwardness or inadequate representation in services of
D backward Hindus prior to 1950 were caste division, lack of education,
poverty, feudalistic frame of society, and occupational helplessness. All
these barriers are disappearing. Industrialisation has taken over. Educa-
tion, through State effort and due to awareness of its importance, both,
statistically and actually has improved. Feudalism died in fifties itself. Even
E the Manda! Commission accents, this reality. 1 Any identification of back-
ward class for purposes of reservation, therefore, has to be tested keeping
in view these factors as the exercise of power is in presenti. Importance of
word 'is' in Article 16(4) should not be lost of. Backwardness and inade-
quacy should exist on the date the reservation is made. Reservation for a
group which was educationally, economically and socially backward before
F 1950 shall not be valid unless the group continues to be backward today.
The group should not have suffered only but it should be found to be
suffering with such disabilities. If a class or community ceases to be
economically and socially backward or even if it is so but is adequately
represented then no reservation can be made as it no more continues to
G be backward even though it may not be adequately represented in service
or it may be backward but adequately represented.

"5.2 Caste restrictions have loosened considerably as a result of the rule of law
introduced by the British, urbanisation, industrialisation, spread of mass education and,
H above all, the attainment of Independence and the introduction of adult franchise.~
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [R.M. SABAi, J.] 979

Ethical justification for reverse discrimination or protective benefits A.
or ameliorative measures emanates from the moral of compensating such
class or group for the past injustices inflicted on it and for promoting social
values. Both these aspects are fully borne out from the Constitutional
Assembly Debates. Anxiety was to uplift the backward classes by enabling
them to participate in administration as they had been excluded by few who
B
had monopolised the services. Objective was to change the social face as
it shall advance public welfaro, by demolishing rigidity of caste, promoting
representation of those who till now were kept away thus providing status
to them, restoring balance in the society, reducing poverty and increasing
distribution of benefits and advantages to one and all. The compensatory
principle implies that like an individual a group or class that has remained c
backward for whatever reason, should be provided every help to overcome
the shortcomings but once disadvantage disappears the basis itself must go.
For instance there may be four groups of different nature deserving such
protection. Some of it may improve and come up in the social stream within
short time. Can it be said that since they were kept excluded for hundred D
years the compensation by way of protective benefits should continue for
hundred years. That would be mockery of protective discrimination. The
compensation principle, 'makes little sense unless it is involved in connec-
tion with assertion that the malignant effects of prior deprivation are still
continuing'. 1 The social untility of preferential lreament ex1ended to the
disadvantage and weaker too should not be pushed too far on what E
happneed in the past without looking to the present. Such construction of
Article 16(4) arises not because of what has been said by some of the
American judges but on plain and simple reading of the word, 'is' in the
Article.

An egalitarian society or welfare state wedded to secularism does not F
and cannot mean a social order in which religion or caste ceases to exist.
'India is a seculiar but not an anti-religious state. 2 Article 25 is pride of
our democracy. But that cannot be basis of state activities. May be caste is
being exploited for political ends. Chinnappa Reddy, J. has very graphically
described it in Karnatka Third Backward Class Commission Report {1990). G

"And, we have political parties and politicians who, if

'Equal Protection of the Laws' by Polyvious G. Polyviou.

2 Seetvai - Constitutional Law of India p. ~97. H
980 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A anything, are realists, fully aware of the deep roots of caste
in Indian society and who, far from ignoring it, feed the fire
as it were and give caste great importance in the choice of
their candidates for election and flaunt the caste of the
candidates before the electorate. They preach against caste
in public and thrive on it in private".
B
Even Manda! Commission observed that what, 'caste lost on ritual
front it gained on political front'.- In politics caste may or may not play an
important role but politics and constitutional exercise are not the same. A
candidate may secure a ticket on caste considerations but if he or his agent
C or any person with his consent or his agent's consent appeals to vote or
refrain from voting on ground of religion, race or caste then he is guilty of
corrupt practice under Scetion 123(3) of the Representation of People Act
and his election is liable to be set aside. Thus caste, race or religion are
prohibited even in political process. What cannot furnish basis for exercise
D of electoral right and is constitutionally prohibited from being exercised by
the State cannot furnish valid basis for constitutional functioning under
Article 16(4). Utilization of caste as the basis for purpose of determination
of backward class of citizens is thus constitutionally invalid and even
ethically and morally not permissible. Existence of caste in the past and
present, its continuance in future cannot be denied but insistence that since
E
it is being practised or observed for political purpose even though unfor-
tunately it should be the basis for identification of backwardness in services
is not only robbing the Constitutuion of the fresh look it promised and
guaranteed but would result in perpetuating a system under ugly weight of
which the society had bent earlier.
F
Thus, (i) backwardness and inadequacy of representation
in service must exist on the date the reservation is being
rnade.

G (ii) Any past injustice which entitles a group for protective
discrimination must on principle of compensation or social
justice be continuing on the date when reservation is being
made.

H *****
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [R.M. SAHA!, J.] 981

'F' A

(1)

'It is easier to give power but difficult to give wisdom'. Dr. Ambedkar
quoted this Burke's thought in the Constituent Assembly Debate and ex-
horted 'let us prove by our conduct that we have not only the power but also
B
the wisdom to carry with us all sectors of the country which is bound to lead
us to unity'. How to effectuate this wisdom? For Article 16(4} how to
determine who can be legally considered to be backward class of citizens?
The answer is simple. By adopting, constitutionally permissible methodology
of identification irrespective of their race, religion or caste. The difficulty, c
however, arises in finding out the criteria. Although the work should normally
be left to be undertaken by the State as the courts are ill equipped for such
exercise due to lack of data, necessary expertise and relevant material but
with development of role of courts from mere, 'superintend and supervise' to
legitimate constitutional affirmative decision, this Court is not only duty D
bound but constitutionally obliged to lay down principles for guidance for
those who are entrusted with this responsibility, with a sense of duty towards
the country as the occasion demands never more than now, but with remotest
intention to interfere with legislative, or executive process. What the Nation
should remember is that the basic values of constitutionalism guaranting
judicial independence is to enable the courts to discharge their duty without E
being guided by any philosophy as judicial interpretation,

"gives better protection than the political branches to the
weak and outnumbered, to minorities and unpopular in-
dividuals, to the inadequately represented in the political F
process." 1

Before doing so it is necessary to be stated, at the outset, that
identification of backward classes for purposes of different States may not
furnish safe and sound basis for including all such groups or collectivities
for reservation in services under the Union. Reason is that local conditions G
play major part in such exercise. For instance habitation in hills of U.P.
was upheld as valid basis for identifying backwardness. Same may not be
true of residents of hills in other States. Otherwise entire population of

A. Cox - The Court and the Constitution. H
982 SUPREME! COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Kashmir may have to be treated as backward. In Kerala State most of the
Muslims are identified as backward. Can this be valid basis for other States.
Even the Manda! Commission noticed that some castes backward in one
State are forward in others. If Stale list of every State is adopted as valid
for central services it is bound to create confusion. One of the apparent
B abuse inherent in such inclusion is that it is apt to encourage paper mobility
of citizens from a Slate where such class or caste is not backward to the
State where it is so identified. This apart such inclusion may suffer from
constitutional infirmity. Many groups or collectivities in different States are
continuing or have been included in the State list due to various considera-
tions political or otherwise. State of Karnataka is its best example. Com-
c mission after commission beginning from Gowda Commission, Venkata-
swamy Commission and Havanur Commission despite having found that
some of the castes ceased to be backward they continue in the list due to
their political pressure and economic power. Ghanshyarn Shah 1 in 'Social
Backwardness and Politics of Reservations', has pointed out, 'Among the
D sudras there are peasant castes, artisan castes and nomadic castes. Subjec-
tive perception of one's position in the 'varna' system varies and changes
from time to time, place to place and context to context. For instance, the
Paridars of Gujarat were confidered sudras a few decades ago, but not they
call themselves vaishyas, a ·• are acknowledged as such by others. It is
E significant that they are not .. ave-nots. Similar is the case of Vokkaligas
and Lingayats of Karnataka, Reddies and Kammas of Andhra Pradesh,
Marathas of Maharashtra and to some extent Yadavas of Bihar.' Yet these
castes or group have been identified as backward class in their State.
Whether such inclusion on political, economic and social condition is
F justified in State list or not but inclusion of a group or collectivity in list of
socially and educationlly backward classes, which is a term narrower and
different than backward class for services under the Union without proper
identification only on State list may not be valid. For services under the
Union, therefore, some principle may have to be evolved which may be of
G universal application to members of every community and which may be
adopted by State, as well, after adjusting it with prevalent local conditions.

Ours is a country comprising of various communities. Each com~

H ·Economic and Political Weekly" Vol. 26 (1991) p. 601.
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [R.M. SAHAI, J.] 983

munity follows different religion. Centuries of historical togetherness has A
influenced each other. Caste system which is peculiar to Hindus infiltrated
even amongst Muslims, Christians, Sikhs or others although it has no place
in their religion. The Encyclopedia Americana International Edition
describes the development thus,

"All important communities, including the Muslims., Chris-
B
tians, and Sikhs, have some sort of caste scheme. These
schemes are patterned after the Hindu system, since most
of these people originally came from Hindu stock. The
large-scale conversions that have been going on for cen-
turies have modified Indian caste society. Thus traditional c
Hindu commensal and connubial rituals and emphasis on
inherited social status or rank though generally rejected in
the Islamic or Christian religious ethic, nevertheless
operate on social plain in these societies in India. In India
social rites and customs very from region to region rather
D
than from religion to religion. Among the Muslims, the
Sayids, Sheikh, Pathan, and Momin, among others, func-
tion as exclusive endogamous caste groups. The Christians
are divided into a number of groups, including the Chal-
dean Syrians, Jacobite Syrians, Latin Catholics, Marthom
Syrians, Syrian Catholics, and Protestants. Each of these E
groups practices endogamy. Among the Catholics, the
Syrian Romans and the Latin Romans generally do not
intermarry. The Christians have not wholly discarded the
idea of food restrictions and pollution by lower caste mem-
bers. When lower caste Hindus were converted to Chris-
F
tianity a generation or two ago, they were not allowed to
sit with high caste christians in Church, and separate chur-
ches were erected for them. 1'

On the social plain therefore there has been lack of mobility from
one group to other. Amongst Hindus it has been more marked. fnter-se G
discrimination has been worse. Untouchables prior to 1950 have been
victims of social persecutions not ony by the twice born but even the so-
called intermediate backward classes. But what appears to be common in
each community is that the caste divide is more or less occupational based.
A washerman or a barber, a milkman or an agriculturist, are all known H
984 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A :':amon~ Hindus by castes and amongst others by occupation. In fact they
are. all occupational. Very genesis of Chatur Varna was occupational.

"According to Kroeber, castes are special form of social
classes, 'which in tendency at least are present in every
society. Castes differ from social· classes, however, in that
B they have emerged into social consciousness to the point
that custom and law attempt their rigid and permanent_
separation from one another' .......... 'The jatis which
developed later and which continued to grow in number
have their economic significance; they are for t\le most part
c occupational groups and, in the traditional village
economy, the caste system largely provides the machinery
for the exchange of goods and services."1

But these "rigid stratifications are breaking today. The social inter-se bar-
D riers are rapidly disappearing. Values are fast changiog. In fact many of
the b&ckward classes as observed by Sri Naik in his separate note to the
Manda! Commission Report 'co-existed since times immemorial with upper
castes and had therefore some scope to imbibe better association and what
all its connotes'. Take for instance the list of the 'Intermediate Backward
Class' where traditional occupation, according to Sri Naik has been,
E 'agriculture, market gardening, betal leaves, grovers, pastoral activities,
village industries like artisans, tailors, dyers and weavers, petty business-
cum-agricultural activities, heralding, temple service, toddy selling, oil
mongering, combating, astrology etc. etc.'. Their backwardness has been
primarily economic or educational. Mobility, too, occupational or profes-
F sional has not been very rigid. An agriculturist or an artisan, a dyer or
weaver had the occupational freedom of moving in any direction. Con-
sideration for marriage or social customs may be different. But that prevails
in every strata of society. One sect of a caste or community Hindu or
Muslim, or even Christian, forward or backward does not prefer marrying
G in another sect what to say of caste. But these considerations are not
relevant for identifying backward class for public employment. Lack of
eclucation, at least among so~called intermediate backward classes, was
more due to personal volition than social ostracisation. Historical social
backwardness has already been taken care of by providing reservatkm to

H The Caste System in India hy Rajendra Pandey, page 8.
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [R.M. SAHA!, J.] 985

SC/ST and empowering President to include any group or collectivity found A
to be suffering from such disability. Same yardstick cannot be applied for
socially and educationally backward class for whom the President has been
empowered to appoint· a Commission and who only after identification are
to be deemed to be included as SC and ST by virtue of Article 338(10).
From the preceding discussion it is clear that identification of such class
cannot be caste based. Nor it can be founded, only, on economic considera-
B
1
tions as 'Mere poverty' cannot be the test of backwardness. With these
two negative considerations stemming out of constitutional constraints two
positive considerations, equally important and basic in nature flow from
principle of constitutional construction one that the effort should, primari-
ly, be directed towards finding out a criteria which must apply uniformly C
to citizens of every community, second that the benefit should reach the
needy. Various combinations excluding and including caste as relevant
consideration have been discussed in different decisions which need not be
mentioned as occasion to examine social and educational backwardness in
public services and that also in union services never arose.
D
In sub-paragraph (ii) of paragraph 12.8 e>.tracted earlier the Manda!
Commission recommended occupational identification for non-Hindus if
the community was traditionally known to carry on the hereditary occupa-
tion of their counterpart amongst Hindus and included in the test of OBC.
The Commission thus recognised occupational divide among Hindus. If E
occupation amongst Hindus can be basis for identification of backwardness
among non-Hindus then why cannot it furnish basis for identification
amongst Hindus itself.

F
Ideal and wise method, therefore, would be to mark out various
occupations, which on the lower level in many cases amongst Hindus would
be the caste itself. Find out their social acceptability and educational
standard. Weight them in the balance of economic conditions. Result
would be backward class of citizens needing genuine protective umbrella.
Group or collectivity which may thus emerge may be members of one or G
the other community. Advantage of occupational based identification
would be that it shall apply uniformly irrespective of race, religion and
caste. Reason for accepting occupation based identification is that prior to

Supra (45). H
986 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A 1950 Sudras amongst Hindus were all those who were not twice born.
Amongst them there was vertical and occupational divisions. No similar to
hierarchy existed amongst Muslims. 1 Same is true of other communities. 2
Sri Naik narrated a list of, 'intermediate backward classes' and 'depressed
backward classes'. It may not be exhaustive. But it is indicative that
B different categories of persons are, normally, known by occupation they
carry. 'Castes, therefore, are special form of classes which in tendency are
present in every society'. 3 It was said by Lord Bryce long back for America
that classes way not be divided, for political purposes into upper and lower
and ric)ier and poorer, 'but according to their respective occupation they
follow'. 4 Class according to Tawney may get formed due to various reasons,
c 'war, the institution of private property, biological characteristic, the
division of labour'. And, 'Even today, indeed though less regularly than in
the past class tends to determine occupation rather than occupational class.
So is the case in our society. It is immaterial if caste has given rise to
occupation or vice versa. In either case occupation can be the best starting
D point constitutionally permissible and legally valid for determination of
backwardness.

For instance, priests either in Hindus or Mullahs in Muslims or
Bishops or Padris amongst Christians or Granthi in Sikhs are considered
to be at the top of hierarchal system. They cannot be considered to be
E
backward in any community not because of their religion but the nature of
occupation. Similarly the untouchables became outcaste due to nature of
the job they performed. On lower level whether it is barber or tailor,

F
washerman or milkman, agricultural class or artisan they are a group or
class who can be identified in any community. Identifying them by caste
-
"12.13 There is a notion of hierarchy among the Muslims, though it is hard to say how
far the criterion of the ranking among them can be said to conform to the Hindu model
..... lt is clear that castes exist as a basis of social relations amongst them (Muslims)
but its form has been greatly weakened and modified as it differs from the Hindu
model in certain 1'~•,~ils." - Dr. Imtiaz Ahmed.
G
2 "12.11 There is no doubt that social and educational backwardness among non-Hindu
communities is more or less of the same order as among Hindu communities. Though
caste system is peculiar to Hindu society yet, in actual practice, it also pervades the
non-Hindp communities in India in varying degrees."
3 Encyclopaedia of Social sciences Vol. 3.
H 4 'Equality' by R.H. Tawney.
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [R.M. SAHA!, J.] 987

may mean that a Muslim or Christian who for generations has been A
carrying on same occupation as his counterpart amongst Hindus cannot be
identified as backward class. And if it is done then for Hindus it would be
caste based whereas for others occupational. How far that would be legal
and constitutional is one matter but if the yardstick of occupation is applied
to every community the identification would be uniform without exclusion
of any. For instance weavers or washerman. They may be both Hindus and
B
Muslims. It would be unfair to include Hindu washerman and exclude
Muslim washerman.

Having adopted occupation as the starting point next step should be to
ascertain the social acceptability. A lawyer, a teaching and a doctor of any C
community whether he is a teacher of primary school or University, a Vaid or
Hakim practising in the village or a professor in Medical college always
commands social respect. Similarly social status amongst those who perform
lower job depends on the nature of occupation. A person carrying on
scavenging became an untouchable whereas others who were as lower as D
untouchable in the order became depressed. For instance coboler. Sarne did
not apply to those who carried on better occupation. A person having landed
property and carrying on agricultural occupation did not in social hierarchy
command lesser respect than the one carrying on same occupation belonging
to higher caste. But backwardness should be traditional. For instance only
those washerman or tailor should be considered backward who have been E
carrying on this occupation for generations and not the modern dry cleaner
or fashion tailors. ··the collectivity satisfies both the tests then apply the test
of education. What standard of education should be adopted should be
concern of the State. Existence of, both, that is social and educational
backwardness for a group or collectivity is indicated by Article 15(4) itself. F
Use of such expression was purposive. Mere educational or social backwardM
ness would not have been sufficient as it would have enlarged the field thus
frustrating the very purpose of the amendment. That is why it was observed in
Ba/aji that the concept of backwardness was intended, 'to be relative in the
sense that any class who is backward in relation to the most advanced classes G
should be included in it. And the purpose of amendment could be achieved if
backwardness under Article 15(4) was understood as comprising of social
and educational backwardness. It is not either social or educational, but it is
both social and educational'. Reading the expression disjunctively and per-
mitting inclusion of either socially or educationally backward class of citizens
would defeat the very purpose. For instance some of the so-called higher H
988 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A castes who by nature of their occupation or caste have been accepted by
society to be socially advanced may enter because of the group or collectivity
having been educationally backward. Many agricultural occupationists both
in South and North have chosen to remain educationally backward even
though by virtue of their landed property they have always been compared to
any higher class. Can such persons be permitted to take benefit of such
B benign measures. Nol on the language, purpose and objective of these
provisions.

After applying these tests the economic criteria or the means test
should be applied. Poverty is the prime cause of all backwardness. It
C generates social and educational backwardness. But wealth or economic
affluence cuts across all. A wealthy man irrespective of caste or community
needs no crutches. Not in 1990 when money more than social status and
education have become the index. Therefore, even if a group or collectivity
is not educated or even socially backward but otherwise rich and affluent
D then it cannot be considered backward. There is no derth of class or group
who by the nature of the occupation they have been pursuing are economi-
cally well off. Including such groups would be doing injustice to others.
Thus occupation should furnish the starting point of determination of
backward class. And if in ultimate analysis any Hindu caste is found to be
occupationally, socially, educationally and economically backward it should
E be regarded as eligible for benefit under Article 16(4) because it would be
within constitutional sanction.

(2)

F Identification alone does not entitle a group or class to be entitled
for protective benefits. Such group or collectivity should be inadequately
represented. Use of such words as a equate or inadequate are no doubt
wide and vague and their meaning has to be gathered, 'largely on the point
of view from which the facts may be proved are reconsidered' .1 Bu.t from
G the purpose and objective of Article 16(4) a collectivity or group which is
found to be backward cannot qualify for being included if it is adequately
represented. Word 'any' has great significance. In wider sense it extends to
and includes all group or collectivity, which is as much 'any' backward dass
as any singularity. In the larger sense c~mprising of entire plurality it

HI Re lJatschek's Patents, ex Pzcrennex, (1909) 2 ch. 68.
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [R.M. SAHA!, J.] 989

continues and may continue but in the limited sense the group may keep A
on getting in and out depending on continuance of those conditions which
entitled it to be determined as backward. A government of a State or the
Central Government may on evaluation after five or ten years direct a
group or collectivity to be excluded from the list of backward classes if it
finds it adequately represented. What is adequate representation is of B
course the primary concern of the government. But the exercise should be
objective. For instance in some States it was found by Commissions ap-
pointed by their governments that certain castes were adequately repre-
sented. Yet because of extraneous reasons the government had to bow and
include them in the list of backward classes. Such inclusion is a fraud of
constitutional power. Any citizen has a right to challenge and court has C
obligation to strike it down by directing exclusion of such group from the
backward class. Inadequacy provides jurisdiction not only for exercise of
power but its continuance as well. If that itself ceases to exist the power
cannot be continued to be exercised. Where power is coupled with duty
the condition precedent must exist for valid exercise of power. Mere D
identification of collectivity or group by a Commission cannot clothe the
government to exercise the power unless it further undertakes the exercise
of determining if such group or collectivity is adequately or inadequately
represented. The exercise is mandatory not in the larger sense alone but
in the narrower sense as well.
E
*****

• 'G'
(1)
F
More important that deiermination of backward class is the proportion

r in which reservation can be done as it is not only a social or economic
problem or the question of empowering but a constitutional and legal issue

I which calls for serious deliberation. Although political statemanship of the
framers of the constitution intended to confine it to 'minority of seats' the
judicial pragmatism raised it 'broadly and generally' to less than 50% in G
Balaji and not beyond that in T. Devadason v. Union of India [1964] 4 SCR
680. Effect of these two decisions was that the reserved and non-reserved
seats both for purposes of admission in educational institution under Article
15(4) and for appointment and posts in Article 16(4) were divided in half and
half. But once the reservation climate spread in the country's environment it H
990 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A took over the political set up of different States to provide for reservation for
different groups for different reasons. And legal justification for such reser-
vation was provided for by the courts, either on the touchstone of Article 14
being a reasonable classification or under Article 16(1) as preferential treat-
ment for disadvantaged groups. If in Chiera Ghosh & Anr. v. Union of India,
B AIR 1970 SC 35, the provision for government nominees in medical colleges
was upheld, 'as the government which bears the financial burden of running
medical colleges' could not be, 'denied the right to decide from what sources
the admission will be made' then D.N. Chanchala v. State of Mysore, AIR 1971
SC 1762, did not find it unreasonable to extend the principle of preferential
treatment, of socially and educationally backward in Article 15( 4), to
C children of political sufferers as 'it would not in any way be improper if that
principle were to be applied to those who are handicapped but do not fall
under Article 15(4)'. The reservation in favour of wards of defence personnel
was upheld as a reasonable classification in Subhashini v. State of Mysore,
AIR 1966 Mysore 40 as the reservJtion was in national interest. Result of
D such extensions and justification was multiplication of categories and
withdrawal of more and more seats and posts from open competition. And
when observations were made in Thomas that 50% was, 'a rule of caution'
and, 'percentage of reservation in proportion to population did not violate
Article 16(4)', a virtual go by was given by various states to the balancing
equality created by courts and reservations were made much beyond 50%
E and the High Courts had no option but to uphold them. Thus the combined
effect of these principles, developed by Balaji and Davadason, on the one
hand and Chiera Ghosh, Chanchala and Thomas on the other was that
reservation up to 50% under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) and up to, 'reasonable
extent' under Article 16(1). Under one it became SC/ST and RC and under
the other wards of Military and Defence personnel, Jagdish Rai v. State of
F
Haryana AIR 1977 Haryana 56, Political, 1 sufferers, sportsman,2 Children of
MISA, State of Kamataka v. Jacob Maltew ILR (1964) 2 Kerala p.53 and
DSIR, Chhotey Lal v. State of U.P. AIR (1979) Allahabad 135, detenue etc. Is
this sound either constitutionally or legally or socially?

G (2)

Article 16(1), (2) and (4) is extracted below:

I Supra (94).
H 2 Subhashini (supra).
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.L [R.M. SAHA!, J.] 991

"16. Equality of opportunity in matters ·of public A
employment--

(1) There shall be equality of opportunity for all
citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment
to any office under the State.
B
(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race,
caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of
them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect
of, any employment or office under the State.
I (4) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from
c
) making any provision for the reservation of appointments
or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which,
in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented
in the services under the State.'
D
-· Originally this Article as introduced in the Constituent Assembly was
Article 10 and its sub-article (3) identical to sub-article (4) of Article 16
provided for reservation, 'in favour of any class of citizens'. It was the
Drafting Committee which qualified the expression, 'class of citizens' by
adding the word 'backward' before it. Effect of this addition was that clause E
got narrowed and the reservation could be made only for those class of
citizens who could be grouped as backward. Putting it the other way the
framers of the Constitution decided against expansive reservation which
under original proposal could have extended to any class of citizens. What
was thus consciously and deliberately given up by exercising the option in
favour of only those class of citizens who could be identified as backward F
then reservation in favour of any other class of citizens cannot legitimately
and legally be accepted as valid. Extending it to other class of citizens
under cover of reasonable classification would be constitutional distortion.
What should be deemed to be prohibited in the light of historical back-
ground cannot be brought back from the backdoor on principle developed G
by the American courts under Equal Protection Clause as they had to rise
to the occasion due to absence of a provision like Article 16(4), and the
fractured interpretation put in the Slaughter house cases, 1 which eroded
the very foundation of Equal Protective clause 'mainly intended for the

Slaughterhouse Cases 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 36, 21 In Ed. 394 (1873). H
992 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992[ SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A benefit of Negro freedom'.

Reservation co-related with population was not accepted even by the
Constituent Assembly. On plain construction inadequacy of representation
cannot be the measure of reservation. That is creative of jurisdiction only.
In fact Dr. Ambedkar's illustration while persuading all sections to accept li'
B the drafting committee proposal is very instructive. •
t
'Supposing, for instance, reservations were made for a
community or a collection of communities, the total of
which came to something like 70 per cent of the total posts
c under the State and only 30 per cent are retained as the
unreserved. Could anybody say that the reservation of 30
per cent as open to general competition would be satisfac-
tory from the point of view of giving effect to the first
principle, namely, that there shall be equality of oppor-
tunity? It cannot be in my judgment. Therefore the seats
D to be reserved, if the reservation is to be consistent with
sub-c]ause (1) Article 10, must l--e confined to a minority
of seats. It is then only that the first principle could find its
place in the Constitution and effective in operation."

Even otherwise if the framers would have intended to provide for reserva-
E
tion to extent of backwardness of the population it would have been simpler
to use the expression, 'in proportion to it' after the word 'backward class
i
of citizens' and before 'is not' adequately represented. Article 16(4) then
would have read as under: -

F "Nothing in this Article shall prevent the State from making
any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts
in favour of any backward class of citizens in proportion tv ~·-
it is not adequately represented in the services under the
State 11 •
G
No rule of interpretation in absence of express or implied indication
permits such substituted reading.

In Thomas, (supra 46) Mathew J., introduced concept of proportion-
al equality from two American decisions Griffin v. fllionois 351 US (12)
H and Harper v. Virginia Board of Educations, 383 US 66311966[. None of the
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.I. [R.M. SAHAf, J.] 993

decisions were coocerned with affirmative action. The one related to A
payment of charges for translation of manuscript in appeal and other with
levy of poll tax at uniform rate indiscriminately. In view of clear phraseol·
ogy and the background of enactment of Article 16(4) any interpretation
of it on ratio of American decisions cannot be of any help. Our constitution
does not approve of proportional representation either in services or even B
in Parliament as is illustrated by Article 331 of the Constitution which
i empowers the President to nominate not more than two members of the
! Anglo-Indian community to the House of People, irrespective of their
population, if the)r'lfe not adequately represented. Same is the theme of
Dr. Ambedkar's speech, in Constituent Assembly, extracted earlier. For
the same reasons the observation of Fazal Ali, J. in Thomas (supra), C

' ....... Decided eases of this Court have no doubt -laid down
that the percentage of reservation should not exceed 50%.
As I read the authorities, this is, however, a rule of caution
and does not exhaust all categories. Suppose for instance D
a State has a large number of backward classes of citizens
which constitute 80% of the population and the Govern-
ment, in order to give them proper representation, reserves
80% of the jobs for them, can it be said that the percentage
of reservation is bad and violates the permissible limits of
clause (4) of Article 16 . The ans we; must necessarily be E
in the negative."

cannot be accepted as correct construction of Article 16(4). True as
observed by Krishna Iyer, J., in Soshit Karamchari {Supra) and Chinnappa
Reddy, J., in Vasantha Kumar (supra) that there is no consitutional F
provision restricting reservation to 50% but with profound respect, the
debates in the Constituent Assembly, the provisions in the Constitution do
not support the construction of Article 16(4) as empowering government
to reserve posts for backward class of citizens in proportion to their
population. Any construction of Article 16{4) cannot be divorced without G
taking into account Article 16{1). Equality in services has been balanced
by providing equal opportunity to every citizen at the same time empower-
ing the State to take protective measure for the backward class of citizens
who are not adequately represented. This balancing of equality cannot be
lost sight of while interpreting these provisions. Since there is no clear
indication either way the role of the courts become both important and H
994 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A ' responsible, by interpreting the provision reasonably and with common
sense so as to carry out the objective of its enactment. And the purpose
was to enable the backward class of citizens to share the power if they were
not adequately represented but not to grant proportional representation, a
typical British concept rejected by our Bounding Fathers.

B (4)

Equality has various shades. Its understanding and application have
been shaped by social, economic and political conditions prevailing in the
society. The reigning philosophy since 18th century has been the State's
c responsibility to reduce disparities amongst various sections of the .popula-
tion and promoting a just and social order in which benefits and advantages
are evenly distributed. To achieve this basic objective various theories have
been advanced from time to time. The formal equality advanced by Aris-
totle that equals should be treated equally and unequals unequally was as
D much result of social and economic .conditions as the Rawls theory of
justice or the Dworkin's concepts of right of all to treatment as equals.
Liberty and right to equality taken individually may appear to pull in
different directions. But viewed as part of justice and fairness the two are
the primary tenets of modern egalitarian society. The real difficulty is
translating them into practical working. The American concept of 'equal
E but separate' doctrine is the best illustration of distance between theory
and practice of equal protection. The recognition and realisation that
neither all men are equal nor are the circumstances in which they are born
or grow are same gave rise to classification and grouping of persons
similarly situated and extending them equal or same treatment. But the
F classification has to be reasonable and rational bearing a just relation with
the legislative purpose and should not be invidous or arbitrary. In our
constitutional scheme the classification in matters of employment or ap-
pointment in the services has been done constitutionally. From the entire
class of all citizens any backward class has been classified for beneficial or
G benign treatment. The legislature or executive therefore cannot transgress
it. Since the Constitution treats all citizens alike for purposes of employ-
ment except those who fall under Article 16(4) any further classification of
grouping for reservation would be constitutionally invalid. No legislative
exercise can transcendent the constitutional barrier. For valid classification
legislature or executive measures must be co-related with legislative pur-
H pose or objective. Once the Constitution itself unfolded the purpose of
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [R.M. SAHA!, J.J 995

achieving the goal of equality by permitting reservation for backward A
classes, only, any further reservation being beyond constitutional purpo1e
would be impermissible and per se invalid.

Abstract equality is neither the theme nor philosophy of our Con-
stitution. Real equality through practical means is the avowed objective.
Atoning for the past injustices on backward classes through Constitutional
B
mechanism was.morality raised to legal plain. Admonition to State not to
deny equality before law or equal protection of laws found on sound public
policy, is in reality the measure of fundamental right which every person
enjoys. But, principle of the equal protection of law does nor mean that,
'every law must have universal application to all persons who are not by C
nature, attainment or circumstance, in the same position', Dhirendra Kun1ar
Manda/ v. 77ie Supdt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs to the Govt. of West
Bengal & Anr. [1955] J SCR 224 and the varying needs of different classes
of persons require special treatment. Principle of reasonable clas~ification
was developed by theorists and courts to enable State to function effectively
by classifying reasonably. But the theory developed by Tllssman and Breck 1 D
that equal Protection clause really dealt \vith the problem with the reiation
of two classes to each other one of individuals possessing the definite trait
and the other of individuals tainted by the mischief at which the law aims
said to be, 'the first con1prehcnsivc analysis of the Equal Protection Clause'
may be applicable while collsidering the scope of Article 14 but once the E
constitution n1akers treated cn1ployment in services separately by creating
fundamental right in favour of all citizcn5 in pursuance of the ideal of
Preamble to secure to a!I its citizens equality in oportunitY. and status then
it has to be understood in its O\Vn perspective. Various sub-articles of
Article 16 specia!Iy clause 4 indicates constitutional classification and
F
creation of two classes one dealt with in Article 16(1) and the other in
Article 16(4). Principle of reasonable classification for purposes of creating
another class or planting one class in another would he constitutionally
infirm.

All the same the legislative anxiety of affirmative acti~n by preferen- G
tial treatment to disadvantaged group lagging behind may not be doubted.
Difference bet\veen reservation and preferential treatment is that in one a •
group or class or collectivity is separately provided for and the competition

"l'ht: Equal Protection of the Laws". 37 California Rev. 341.
H
996 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A is amongst them only. Whereas in preferential treatment the collectivity is
part of the same group but it is permitted some weightage due to social,
economic or any justifiable reason. For purposes of achieving equality by
result Article 16 creates two compartments, one general and the other
reserved and then both are paired together. But preference is available in
B the same compartment. Validity of one depends on constitutional sanction
whereas the second has to stand on test of reasonableness. For instance
the reservation of backward class cannot be assailed as being violative ~f
constitutional guarantee whereas preferential treatment can be upheld only
if it is reasonable with the nexus it seeks to achieve. Article 16 unlike
Article 14 is a positive right of equal opportunity. Therefore, any preferen-
c tial treatment shall have to be tested in the light of the constitutional
objective the Article seeks to achieve. That is what is its natural, operation
and effect. Reservation made for backward class of citizens achieves the
constitutional goal of achieving equality of opportunity of all. Same cannot
be said for others. Any reservation for any other class would be, as already
D ·explained, contrary to constitutional objective thus invalid. Wards of
military personnel or political sufferers or any other class cannot be
extended the benefit of benign discrimination as that would be violative of
eqllality of opportunity. In absence of any objective or purpose discernible
from the Constitution the State action would be liable to be struck down
E for absence of necessary co-relation between constitutional purpose and its
means. Nexus such as national purpose or principle contained in Article
15(4) would not justify such action. Even preferential treatment by way of
weightage may be permissible in very limited cases and any such measure
would be liable to strict judicial scrutiny. Principle of Article 14 of
F reasonable classification may be relevant only to limited extent as to
whether it is backed by reason and is justified but since it has to be tested
further on touchstone on Article 16(1) the reasonable classification must
be sc tailored as not to contravene the right to equal opportunity.

No provision of reservation or preference can be so vigorously pur-
G sued as to destroy the very concept of equality. Benign discrimination or
protection cannot under any constitutional system itself become principle
clause. Equality is the rule. Protection is the exception. Exception cannot
exhaust the rule itself. True no restriction was placed on size of reservation.
But reason was the consensus understanding that it was for minority of
H
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [R.M. SAHAf, J.] 999

to be specific the forward group is not as a result of any historiCal injustice or A
undue advantage earned by his forefather or discrimination against the
backward class, but because of the years of service that are put by an
employee, in his individµal capacity. This entitlement cannot be curtailed by
bringing in again the concenpt of victimisation.

Equality either as propagated by theorists or as applied by courts B
seeks to remove inequality by, 'parity of treatment under parity of
condition' .1 But once in 'order to treat some persons equally, we must treat
them differently2 has been done and advantaged and disadvantaged are
made equal and are brought in one class or group then any further benefit
extended for promotion on the inequality existing prior to be brought in c
the group would be treating equals unequally. It would not be eradicating
the effects of past discrimination but perpetuating it.

Constitutional sanction is to reserve for backward class of persons.
That is class or group interest has been preferred over individual. But
promotion from a class or group of employees is not promoting a group D
or class but an individual. It is one against other. No forward class versus
backward cla:ss or majority against minority. It would, thus, be contrary to
the Constitution. Brother Kuldip Singh, for good and sound reasons has
rightly opined, that, Rangachri cannot be held to be laying donw good law.
E
* * * * *
'!'

Reservation, for, 'economically backward sections of the people who
are not covered by any of the existing schemes of reservation', again, raises F
an important issue. De facto difficulties in determining such backwardness
stands established by failure of the government to evolve any workable
criteria even aftor lapse of one year since, 25th September, 1991, the date
on which the order dated 23th August 1990 directing reservation for
backward class was amended and it was announced that, 'the criteria for
determining the poorer sections of the SEBCs or the other economically G
backward sections of the people who are not covered by any of the existing
schemes of reservations are being issued separately.' But the de jure hurdles

C. J. Ray in Thomas (Supra).

2 Justice Black Burn in Bakke (supra) page 844. H
1000 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A appear, even, greater. Any reservation resulting in curtailing right of equal
opportunity is to withstand the test of equal protection or benign dis·
criminatioo. Latter has been permitted for a class which had suffered
injustices in the past and is suffering even now. It is an atonement of past
segregation and discrimination such as Negroes in America and SC/ST of
our country. And is being extended even to those who could legitimately
B
be considered to be backward class. Since Article 16(4) has a constitutional
purpose and is to operate only so long the goal is not achieved economic
backwardness does not qualify for such protective measure. As even if such
a class or collectivity is held to fall in the broader concept of the expression
· backward class of citizens it would not be eligible for the benefit as it would
c be incapable of satisfying the other mandatory requirement of being inade-
quately represented in services without which the State cannot have any
jurisdiction to exercise the power. Art. 16(4) thus by its nature, and
purpose cannot be applicable to economically backward•, except probably
when a proper methodology is worked out to determine inadequacy of
D representation of such class.

Is it possible to reserve under Art. 16(1)? Detailed reasons have been
given, earlier, against any reservation under cover of doctrine of reasonable
classification. Eradication of poverty which, 'is not to be exalted or praised,
but is an evil thing which must be fought and stamped out' • is one of the
E ideals set out in the Preamble of the Constitution as it postulates to achieve
economic justice and exhorts the State under Article 38(2) to, 'minimise the
inequality of income'. All the same can the State for this purpose reserve
posts for the economically backwards in service. Right to equal protection of
laws or equality before law in, 'benefits, and burdens' by operation of law,
F equally, amongst equals and unequally amongst unequals is firmly rooted in
concept of equality developed by courts in this country and in America. But
any reservation or affirmative action on economic criteria or wealth dis-
crimination cannot be upheld under doctrine of reasonable classification.
Reservation for backward class seeks to achieve the social purpose of sharing
G in services which had been monopolised by few of the forward classes. To
bridge the gap, thus, created the affirmative actions have been upheld as the
social and educational difference between the two classes furnished
reasonable basis for classification. Same cannot be said for rich and poor.
Indigence cannot be rational basis for classification for public employment.

H Jawaharlal Nehru, quoted from Dorothy, Forman (ed.) Nehru.
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.0.1. [R.M. SAHA!, J.] 1001

Any legislative measure or executive action operating unequally be- A
tween rich and poor has been held to be suspect. A provision requiring a
person to pay for trial manuscript before filing criminal appeal was struck
down in Griffin v. Illinois 351US12 (195) as it amounted to denial of right
of appeal to poor persons. In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections 383 US
663 (1966] Poll tax for voting was invalidated as, 'wealth, like race, creed
or colour, is not germane to one's ability to participate intelligently in the
B
electoral process'. Protection was given to the appellants in effect or
consequence of equal protection clause. Duty of State to protect against
deprivation due to poverty should not be confused with States obligation
to treat everyone uniformly and equally without discrimination. Protection
against application of law due to difference in economic condition, cannot c
) be equated with classification based on disproportion in wealth. Former is
in realm of justice and fairplay whereas latter is equal protection to which
every one is entitled. In the former unjust application of law may be cured
by removing the offending part and thus apply the law uniformly to rich
and poor. Whereas in latter the classification has to be justified on the D
' nexus test. Poverty may have relevance and may furnish valid justification
while dealing with social and economic measure. Any legislation or execu-
tive measure undertaken to remove disparity in wealth cannot be suspect
but a classification based on economic conditions for purposes of Article
16(1) would be violative of equality doctrine.
E
More backward and backward is an illusion. No constitutional exer-
cise is called for it. What is required is practical approach to the problem.
The collectivity or the group may be backward class but the individuals
from that class may have achieved the social status or economic affluence.
Disentitle them from claiming reservation. Therefore, while reserving posts F
for backward classes, the departments should make a condition precedent
that every candidate must disclose the annual income of the parents beyond
which one could not be considered to be backward. What should be that
limit can be determined by the appropriate State. Income apart provision
should be made that wards of those backward classes of persons who have
achieved a particular status in society either political or social or economic G
or if their parents are in higher services then such individuals should be
precluded to avoid monopolisation of the services reserved for backward
classes by a few. Creamy layer, thus, shall stand eliminated. And once a
group or collectivity itself is found to have achieved the constitutional
objective then it should be excluded from the list of backward class. H
1002 SuPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A ·Therefore,
(1) No reservation can be made on economic criteria.

(2) It may be under Article 16{4) if such class satisfies the
test of inadequate representation.
B
{3). Exclusion of creamy layer is a· social purpose. Any
legislative or executive action to remove such persons in-
. dividually or collectively cannot be constitutionally invalid.

•••••
c
'J'

Various infirmities were highlighted in the report of the Second
Backward Class Commission and the consequent invalidity of the govem-
D ment order issued on it. Attack on the report varied from the reference
being beyond Article 340 to manner and method of ascertaining backward-
ness by issning questionnaire to hardly one per cent of the population,
interviewing interested and biased persons only, relying on obsolete
material such as caste census of 1931, importing personal knowlege, re-
writing Hindu Varna by adding intermediate or middle caste between twice
E born and sudra, working out backward population erroneously as in 1931
only 67% of the population was Hindu and if 22% were SC and 43%
backward then the remaining were 20% inflating backward ·classes by
conjectures and assnmptions as Frrst Commission identified 2399 whereas
the Second determined it at 3743 and the Anthropological Survey of India
F _ pnblished a project report identifying only 1057 backward classes, and
- adopting i:aste as the sole and the only criteria for identifying backwardness
etc. Action of the Govt. in accepting the report and issning the Government •
Order 'YllS challenged for exhibition of sudden alarcity not on· objective
consideration but for extraneous reasons, acceptance of the report without
any discussion or debate in the Parliament which was the least considering
G the far-reaching consequences of st.di report, acting by executive order
instead of legislative measure, when reservation for bad vard class was
being:made in Union services for the first time, propriety of basing the
action on a report rendered 10 years earlier without any regard to social
and economic changes in the meantime .when such period is normally
l{ considered sufficient for re>iew and re- assessment of continuance of such
INDRA SAWI-!NEY v. U.0.1. [R.M. SAHA!. J:] 1003

actions, etc. A
Many of these challenges appear to be well founded but any discus-
sion on it is unnecessary for two reasons, one failure of any objective
consideration of the report by the Government before issuing the orders
and others some of the basic infirmities have been dealt with while dealing
with the issue of identification of backward classes. Above all what is not B
provided in the Constitution, whuc was not accepted by the Government in
1956 what has not been approved by this Court even for backward classes
in Article 16{4) was adopted by the Commission as the basis in its report
submitted in 1978 for 'socially and educationally backward classes', an
expression narrower and different than 'backward classes' and imple- C
mented in 1990 by the Government without even placing it before the
Parliament or any objective consideration by it. An order reserving posts
can no doubt be made even by the executive but the decision being of
utmost importance as reservation was being made in services under the
Union for the first time the propriety demanded that it should have been D
placed before the Parliament. For growth and development of healthy
conventions and traditions no provision in the Constitution or statute is
needed. It may, however, not be out of place to mention that where rules
framed under rule 309 exist no executive order in violation of it can be
passed.
E
Vital issues, by agreement of both sides, relating to reservation and
preferential treatment in services have been. diiieJlss.ed. On many of these
this Court, to use the words of the Constitution Bench, has not spoken with,
'one voice'. Therefore, these public interest petitions, filed in unfortunate
circumstances which are not necessary to be narrated, were referred to be F
heard by a larger bench of nine judges, 'to finally settle the legal positions
relating to reservations'.
·--
Finality, is necessary not only for courts or tribunal but for th 0 •
guidance of the affirmative action ameliorative or preferential by the
Legislature or the Executive. What should not be lost sight of is if history G
of discrimination and segregations of the SC/ST and the socially, educa-
tionally and economically backward in the darkest chapter of our social
history, with no parallel any where in the world, then constitutional therapy
to eradicate it root and branch too is unparalleled and even most
developed and democratically advanced democracies, cannot match the H
1004 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A socially oriented effort to achieve an egalitarian society. Practical equality
or equality by result is the approach. Effort is to usher in a progressive
society by bridging the gap between the forward and backward by
demolishing the social barriers and enabling the lowest to share the power
, to remove inferiority and infuse feeling of equality. But without sacrificing
efficiency and disturbing the equality equilibrium by confining it to minority
B of posts and treating them preferentially for such length of time, as a self
operating mechanism, coming to an end once the constitutional objective
of enabling them to stand on their own is fulfilled. Why reservation policy
in services or the benefits of welfare measures pursued by different States
for the weaker sections of the society have not percolated to the needy and
c deserving at the rock bottom is more a political issue than constitutional
or legal. But no effort can succeed unless the policy makers eschew
extraneous considerations and tackle the problem sincerely and with UD·
derstanding. So long the identification of the backward class is not made
properly and practically it would serve the vested interest only. And the
D 'halves' among Sudra or the intermediate backward classes shall not permit
it to reach the halve-nots the real and gen~ine backward classes.

No exception can be taken to the recommendations of the Manda!
Commission for reservation for backward class of citizens in services by the
Union. But commissions are only fact finding b Jdies. The constitutional
E responsibility of reserving posts rests with the government. Unfortunately
neither in 1990 nor in 1991 this duty was discharged constitutionally or even
}egally. Whether the report was within the term of reference and if the
Commission in identifying socially and educationally backward class
repeated the same mistake as was done by the first Commission and if the
F Commission could adopt two different yardsticks for determining back-
wardness among Hindus and non-Hindus were aspects which were re·
quired to be gone into by the Government before issuing any order. The
exercise of power to reserve is coupled with duty to determine backward '
class of citizens and if they were adequately represented. If the Govern·
ment failed to discharge its duty then the exercise of power stands vitiated.
G No further need be said except to extract following words of William 0.
Douglas-

"Judicial Review gives time for the sober second thought"

H * * * "' "'
INDRA SAWHNEY I'. U.0.1. [R.M. SAHA!, J.j 1005

CONCLUSIONS A
Both the impugned orders issued by the respective governments in
1990 and 1991 reserving appointments and posts for socially and educa-
tionally backward classes of citizens, without discharging their constitution-
al obligation of examining if the identification of backward class by the
Commission was in consonance with constitutional principle and B
philosophy of the basic feature of the constitution and if the group or
collectivity so identified was ade4uately represented or not which is the
sine qua non for the exercise of the power under Article 16(4), are declared
to be unenforceable.

(1) Reservation in public services either by legislative or executive
c
action is neither a matter of policy nor a political issue. The higher courts
in the country are constitutionally obliged to exercise the power of judicial
review in every matter which is constitutional in nature or has potential of
constitutional repercussions.
D
,; (2) (a) Constitutional bar under Article 16(2) against state for not
' discriminating on race, religion or caste is as much applicable to Article
16(4) as to Article 16(1) as they are part of the same scheme and serve
same constitutional purpose of ensuring equality. Identification of back-
ward class by caste is against the Constitutional. E

(b) The prohibition is not mitigated by using the word, 'only' in
Article 16(2) as a cover and evolving certain socio-economic indicators and
then applying it to caste as the identification then suffers from the same
vice. Such identification is apt to become arbitrary as well as the idicators
evolved and applied to one commu.nity may be equally applicable to other F
community which is excluded and the backward class of which is denied
similar benefit.

Identification of a group or collectivity by any criteria other than
caste, such as, occupation cum social cum educational cum economic G
criteria ending in caste may not be invalid.

(c) Social and educational backward class under Article 340 being
narrower in import than backward class in Article 16( 4) it has to be
construed in restricted manner. And the words educationally backward in
this Article cannot be disregarded while determining backwardness. H
1006 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A (3) Reservation under Article 16(4) being for any class of citizens
and citizen having been defined in Chapter II of the Constitution includes
not only Hindus but Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists Jains etc. the
principle of identificat;on has to be of universal application so as to extend
to every community and not only to those who are either converts from
Hinduism or some of who carry on the same occupation as some of the
B
Hindus.

(4) Reservation being extreme form of protective measure or affirm-
ative action it should be confined to minority of seats. Even though the
Constitution does not lay down any specific bar but the constitutional
C philosophy being against proportional equality the principle of balancing
equality ordains reservation, of any manner, not to exceed 50%.

(5) Article 16(4) being part of the scheme of equality doctrine it is
exhaustive of reservation, therefore, no reservation can be made under
Article 16(1).
D
(6) Reservation in promotion is constitutionally impermissible as, •
once the advantaged and disadvantaged are made equal and are brought
in one class or group then any further benefit extended for promotion on
the inequality existing prior to be brought in the group would be treating
E equals unequally. It would not be eradicating the effects of past discrimina-
tion but perpetuating it.

(7) Economic backwardness may give jurisdication to state to reserve
provided it can find out mechanism to ascertain inadequacy of repre-.
sentation of such class. But such group or collectivity does not fall under ....
F Article 16(1).

(8) Creamy layer amongst backward class of citizens must be ex-
cluded by fixation of proper income, property or status criteria.

Reservation by executive order 1nay not be invalid but siJ?-ce it was
·G being made for the first time in services under the Union propriety
demanded that it should have been laid before Parliament not only lo lay
down healthy convention but also to consider the change in social,
economic and political conditions of the country as nearly ten years had
elapsed from the date of submissions of the report, a period considered
H sufficient for evaluation if the reservation may be continued or not.
INDRA SAWHNEY v. U.O.l. [R.M: SAfIAI, J.] 1007

***** A
Valuable assistance was rendered by Shri KK Venugopal and Shri
N.A. Palkhiwala the learned senior counsel, who led the arguments and
placed one view. They were ably supported by Shri P.P. Rao and Smt.
Shyamala Pappu, senior advocates. Arguments were also a,dvanced by Smt.
Hingorani, Mr. Mehta, Mr. K.L. Sharma, Mr. S.M. Ashri, Mr. Vishal Jeet. B
Shri K.N. Rao and Col. Dr. D.M. Khanna appeared in person as inter-
veners and were of assistance.

Shri Ram J ethmalani, the learned senior advocate appearing for the
State of Bihar was equally helpful in projecting the other view. Shri K.
Parasaran, the learned senior counsel for the Union of India while sup- C
porting. Shri Jethmalani placed a very dispassionate view of the entire
matter. Shri Rajiv Dhawan was also very helpful. Shri R.K. Garg, Shri Shiv
Pujan Singh, Shri J. Siva Subramaniarn, Shri Pot~ Smt. Rani Jethmalani
· also made submissions. Shri Ram Avadhesh Singh argued in person.

V.P.R. Petitions disposed of.