INDRA KUMAR PATODIA & ANR.versusRELIANCE INDUSTRIES LTD. AND ORS.

                     [2012] 13 S.C.R. 129


              INDRA KUMAR PATODIA & ANR.                            A
                               v.
         RELIANCE INDUSTRIES LTD. AND ORS.
          (Criminal Appeal No. 1837 of 2012 etc.)
                    NOVEMBER 22, 2012
                                                                    B
       [P. SATHASIVAM AND RANJAN GOGOi, JJ.)

      Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - ss. 138 and 142 -
Complaint under - Without signature - But verified by the
complainant - Maintainability - Held: The complaint without         C
signature is maintainable, when such complaint is verified by
the complainant and process is issued by the Magistrate after
due verification - The complaint is required necessarily to be
in writing and need not be signed - Legislative intent was that
'writing' does not pre-suppose that the same has to be signed       D
- 'Signature' within the meaning of 'writing' would be adding
words to the Section, which the legislature did not contemplate
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss. 2 (d) - General
Clauses Act, 1897 - ss. 3(56) and 3(65) - Interpretation of
Statutes.                                                           E
     Interpretation of Statutes - Interpretation of non-obstante
clause - Held: While interpreting non-obstante clause, the
Court is required to find out the extent to which the legislature
intended to exclude a provision and the context in which such
clause is used.                                                     F
      Words and Phrases - 'Complaint in writing' - Meaning
of, in the context of s. 142(a) of Negotiable Instruments Act,
1881.
                                                                    G
    The question for consideration in the present
appeals was whether the complaint u/s.138 of Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881, without signature of the
complainant is maintainable, when such complaint is
                              129                                   H
    130      SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2012] 13 S.C.R.


A verified by the complainant and the process is issued by
  the Magistrate after verification.

          Dismissing the appeals, the Court

       HELD: 1.1 The complaint u/s.138 of Negotiable
B Instruments Act, 1881, without signature, is maintainable,
  when such complaint is verified by the complainant and
  the process is issued by the Magistrate after due
  verification. The prosecution of such complaint is
  maintainable. [Para 19] [147-E-F]
c
       1.2 A non obstante clause has to be given restricted
  meaning and when the section containing the said clause
  does not refer to any particular provisions which intends
  to over-ride, but refers to the provisions of the statute
0 generally, it is not permissible to hold that it excludes the
  whole Act and stands all alone by itself. There requires
  to be a determination as to which provisions answers the
  description and which does not. WhilP. interpreting the
  non obstante clause, the Court is required to find out the
E extent to which the legislature intended to do so and the
  context in which the non obstante clause is used. [Para
  12] [141-E-G]

      1.3 Section 2(d) Cr.P .C. provides that the complaint
  needs to be oral or in writing. The non obstante clause
F in Section 142 of the Act, when it refers to Cr.P.C, only
  excludes the oral part in such definition. Thus, the non
  obstante clause in s. 142(a) is restricted to exclude two
  things only from Cr.P.C. i.e. (a) exclusion of oral
  complaints and (b) exclusion of cognizance on complaint
G by anybody other than the payee or the holder in due
  course. [Paras 12 and 13] [141-G-H; 142-A]
      1.4 Section 190 Cr.P.C. provides that a Magistrate can
  take cognizance on a complaint which constitutes such
H an offence irrespective of who had made such complaint
 INDRA KUMAR PATODIA v. RELIANCE INDUSTRIES 131
                   LTD.
or on a police report or upon receiving information from      A
any person other than a police officer or upon his own
knowledge. Non obstante clause, when it refers to the
core, restricts the power of the Magistrate to take
cognizance only on a complaint by a payee· or the holder
in due course and excludes the rest of Section 190            B
Cr.P.C. In other words, none of the other provisions of
the Cr.P.C. are excluded by the said non obstante clause,
hence, the Magistrate is therefore required to follow the
procedure under Section 200 Cr.P.C., once he has taken
the complaint of the payee/holder in due course and           c
record statement of the complainant and such other
witnesses as present at the said date. Here, Cr.P.C.
specifically provides that the same is required to be
signed by the complainant as well as the witnesses
making the statement. [Para13] [142-A-D]
                                                              D
     1.5 Mere presentation of the complaint is only the first
step and no action can be taken unless the process of
verification is complete and, thereafter, the Magistrate has
to consider the statement on oath, that is, the verification
statement under Section 200 Cr.P.C. and the statement of E
any witness, and the Magistrate has to decide whether
there is sufficient ground to proceed. Section 203 Cr.P.C.
provides that the Magistrate if is of opinion that there is
no sufficient ground for proceeding, he shall dismiss the
complaint. A person could be called upon to answer a F
charge of false complaint/perjury only on such verification
statement and not mere on the presentation of the
complaint as the same is not on oath and, therefore, need
to obtain the signature of the person. Apart from the above
Section, the legislative intent becomes clear that "writing" G
does not pre-suppose that the same has to be signed.
Various sections in Cr.P.C. viz. Sections 61, 70, 154, 164
and 281, when contrasted with Section 2(d) clarify that the
legislature was clearly of the intent that a written complaint
need not be signed. [Para 13] [143-8-G]
                                                               H
    132     SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2012) 13 S.C.R.


A     1.6 The legislature has made it clear that wherever it
  required a written document to be signed, it should be
  mentioned specifically in the section itself, which is
  missing both from Section 2(d) Cr.P.C. as well as Section
  142 of the Act. The General Clauses Act, 1897 too draws
B a distinction between writing and signature and defines
  them separately. Section 3(56) defines signature and
  Section 3(65) defines writing. Writing as defined by
  General Clauses Act requires that the same is
  representation or reproduction of "words" in a visible
c form and does not require signature. "Signature" within
  the meaning of "writing" would be adding words to the
  Section, which the legislature did not contemplate. (Para
  13 & 14) [145-B-D, G]

         1.7 In the present case, the complaint was presented
D   in person and on the direction by the Magistrate, the
    complaint was verified and duly signed by the authorized
    officer of the Company-tlhe complainant. No prejudice
    has been caused to the accused for non-signing the
    complaint. The statement made on oath and signed by
E   the complainant safeguards the interest of the accused.
    tn view of the same, the r·equirements of Section 142(a)
    of the Act is that the complaint must necessarily be in
    writing and the complaint can be presented by the payee
    or holder in due course of the cheque and it need not be
F   signed by the complainant. If the legislature intended that
    the complaint under the Act, apart from being in writing,
    is also required to be signed by the complainant, the
    legislature would have used different language and
    inserted the same at the appropriate place. The correct
G   interpretation would be that the complaint under Section
    142(a) of the Act requires to be in writing as at the time
    of taking cognizance, the Magistrate will examine the
    complainant on oath and the verification statement will
    b• signed by the complainant. [Para 15) [146-A-D]
H
 INDRA KUMAR PATODIA v. RELIANCE INDUSTRIES 133
                   LTD.

    Pankajbhai Nagjibhai Patel vs. State of Gujarat and Anr.    A
(2001) 2 SCC 595: 2001 (1) SCR 337; K. Bhaskaran vs.
Sankaran Vaidhyan Ba/an (1999) 7 SCC : 1999
(3) Suppl. SCR 271; M. M. T. C. Ltd. and Anr. vs. Medchi
Chemicals and Pharma (P) Ltd. and Anr. (2002) 1 SCC 234:
2001 (5) Suppl. SCR 265 - referred to.                          B

     2. In view of the scheme of the Act and various
provisions of Cr.P.C., the crucial date for computing the
period of limitation is the date of filing of the complaint
or initiating criminal proceedings and not the date of          C
taking cognizance by the Magistrate. In the present case,
the complaint was filed well within the time. (Para 18] (147-
8-C]
    Japani Sahoo vs. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty (2007) 7
SCC 394: 2007(8) SCR 582 - relied on.                           D
                     Case Law Reference:
    2001 (1) SCR 337             Referred to       Para 10
    1999 (3) Suppl. SCR 271      Referred to       Para 10      E
    2001 (5) Suppl. SCR 265 Referred to            Para 11
    2007 (8) SCR 582             Relied on         Para 17
    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 1837 of 2012.                                               F

     From the Judgment & Order dated 17/18.03.2010 of the
High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Criminal Appeal No. 287
of 2009.
                              WITH                              G

Crl. A. No. 1838 of 2012.

     Bhagwati Prasad, Vijay Kumar, Bharat L. Gandhi, Shaith
A. Jabbar, Vasu Sharma for the Appellants.
                                                                H
    134        SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2012] 13 S.C.R.


A      Uday U. Lalit, K.R. Sasiprabhu, Bindu K. Nair, Asha
    Gopalan Nair, Sangeeta Kumar for the Respondents.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          P. SATHASIVAM, J. 1. Leave granted.
B
        2. These appeals are filed against the common final
    judgment and order dated 17/18.03.2010 passed by the High
    Court of Judicature at Bombay in Criminal Appeal Nos. 287
    and 288 of 2009 whereby the Division Bench held that the
c   complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
    1881 (in short "the Act") without signature is maintainable when
    $UCh complaint was subsequently verified by the complainant.

          3. Brief facts:

D      (a) Indra Kumar Patodia and Mahendra Kumar Patodia -
  the appellants herein are accused in Criminal Complaint being
  CC No. 1866/SS of 2007 (1866/MISC/1998) filed before the
  16th Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, Ballard Estate, Bombay,
  for the offence punishable under Section 138 read with
E Sections 141 and 142 of the Act. Respondent No.3 herein is
  a Company duly registered under the Companies Act, 1956,
  presently under liquidation and official liquidator has been
  appointed by the High Court, which has alleged to have issued
  the cheques to respondent No.1.
F
       (b) Respondent No.1 is the complainant and the
  manufacturers of Partially Oriented Yarn (POY) and other textile
  goods. From time to time, Respondent No. 3 used to place
  orders for the supply of POY to Respondent No. 1 and had
G issued 57 cheques between 02.12.1997 to 09.03.1998 for the
  payment of the same.

       (c) The aforesaid cheques were deposited by the
  complainant on 05.04.1998 and were returned by the Bank on
  06.04.1998 with the remark "exceeds arrangement". Pursuant
H to the same, Respondent No.1 issued a notice dated
INDRA KUMAR PATODIA v. RELIANCE INDUSTRIES 135
          LTD. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
16.04.1998 to the appellants and demanded the aforesaid             A
amount for which they replied that they have not received any
statement of accounts maintained by the complainant regarding
the transactions with the accused. In addition to the same,
Respondent No.3, vide letter dated 29.05.1998, made various
claims for the rate difference, discounts etc., in respect of the   B
transactions, however, Respondent No.1 filed a complaint on
03.06.1998 being Complaint No. 1866/SS of 2007 ( 1866/
MISC/1998) under Section 138 read with Sections 141 and 142
of the Act. On 30.07.1998, the Metropolitan Magistrate
recorded the verification statement and issued summons              c
against the appellants and respondent No.3 herein.

     (d) The appellants preferred an application being C.C. No.
1332/9/1999 before the Metropolitan Magistrate, 33rd Court,
Ballard Pier, Mumbai for recalling the process issued against
them. By order dated 28.08.2003, the Metropolitan Magistrate,       D
dismissed the said application.

     (e) Challenging the said order, the appellants and
respondent No.3 herein filed an application in the Court of
Sessions for Greater Bombay at Bombay bearing Criminal              E
Revision Application No. 749 of 2003. By Order dated
08.10.2004, the Sessions Judge dismissed the said
application as not maintainable.

    (f) By order dated 26.11.2008, the Metropolitan Magistrate
dismissed the complaint and acquitted the accused persons.          F

     (g) Challenging the acquittal of the accused persons.
respondent No.1 herein-the complainant, filed appeals being
Criminal Appeal Nos. 287 and 288 of 2009 before the learned
single Judge of the High Court. The learned single Judge, by        G
order dated 09.07.2009, referred two points for consideration
by the larger Bench, viz., (1) In the matter of complaint for the
offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act whether the
complaint without the signature of the complainant, inspite of
verification of complaint, is "non-entia" and whether no            H
    136       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 13 S.C.R.

A prosecution can lie on such complaint?; and (2) If answer to
  point No.1 is negative then whether it is a mere irregularity and
  it can be cured subsequently and whether such subsequent
  amendment would relate back to the date of filing of the
  complaint or whether it would hit by the Law of Limitation.
B
        (h) By impugned common judgment dated 17/18.03.2010,
  the Division Bench of the High Court, disposed of the matter
  by answering point No.1 in the affirmative holding that the
  complaint under Section 138 of the Act is maintainable and
  when such complaint is subsequently verified by the
C complainant and the process is issued by the Magistrate after
  verification, it cannot be said that the said complaint is "non-
  entia" and the prosecution of such complaint is maintainable.
  Further, it was held that since the answer to point No.1 was in
  affirmative, it was not necessary to decide point No.2 and
0 directed to place the appeals for deciding the same on merits.
         (i) Aggrieved by the said decision, the appellants have filed
    the above appeals by way of special leave before this Court.

E        4. Heard Mr. Bhagwati Prasad, learned senior counsel for
    the appellants and Mr. Uday U. Lalit, learned senior counsel for
    respondent No.1, Ms. Asha Gopalan Nair, learned counsel for
    respondent No.2 and Ms. Sangeeta Kumar, learned counsel
    for respondent No.3.
F      5. Mr. Bhagwati Prasad, learned senior counsel for the
  appellants after taking us through the relevant provisions of the
  Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881, the Code of Criminal
  Procedure, 1973 (in short 'the Code') and the order of the
  learned single Judge as well as the reference answered by the
G Division Bench raised the following contentions:
         i) the complaint under Section 141 in respect of dishonour
    of cheque under Section 138 of the Act without signature of the
    complainant is not maintainable;
H         ii) there is no provision in the Act regarding verification.
 INDRA KUMAR PATODIA v. RELIANCE INDUSTRIES 137
           LTD. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
Even otherwise, the verification was signed by the complainant       A
after expiry of the limitation period, hence, the impugned
complaint is liable to be rejected; and

    iii) inasmuch as the Act is a special Act, it must prevail
over procedures provided in the Code.                                B
      On the other hand, Mr. Lalit, learned senior counsel for the
contesting first respondent-the complainant contended that in
the light of the language used in Section 2(d) read with various
provisions of the Code and Section 142 of the Act, the
complaint, as filed and duly verified before the Magistrate and      C
putting signature therein, satisfies all the requirements. He
further submitted that the conclusion of the Division Bench
upholding the complaint and the issuance of summons for
appearance of the accused are valid and prayed for dismissal
of the above appeals.                                                D

    6. We have carefully considered the rival submissions and
perused all the relevant materials.

      7. From the rival contentions, the only question for
consideration before this Court is that whether the complaint        E
without signature of the complainant under Section 138 of the
Act is maintainable when such complaint is verified by the
complainant and the process is issued by the Magistrate after
verification.
                                                                     F
     8. The word "complaint" has been defined in Section 2(d)
of the Code which reads thus:

    "2 (d) "complaint" means any allegation made orally or in
    writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action        G
    under this Code, that some person, whether known or
    unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include
    a police report."

Keeping the above definition in mind, let us see the scheme
of the statute and the legislative intent in bringing the Act.       H
    138       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 13 S.C.R.


A        9. The Act was amended by Banking, Public Financial
   Institutions and Negotiable Instruments Laws (Amendment Act)
  1988 wherein new Chapter XVI I was incorporated for penalties
  In case of dishonour of cheques due to insufficiency of funds
  in the account of the drawer of the cheque. These provisions
B were incorporated in order to encourage the culture of use of
  cheques and enhancing the credibility of the instrument. The
  :insertion· of the new Chapter and amendments in the Act are
  aimed at early disposal of cases relating to dishonour of
  cheques, enhancing punishment for offenders, introducing
c ·electronic image of a truncated cheque and a cheque in the
  electronic form as well as exempting an official nominees
  1director from prosecution under the Act. For our purpose,
  Section 142 of the Act is relevant which reads thus:

          "142. Cognizance of offences.- Notwithstanding anything
D         contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of
          1974)-

          (a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence
          punishable under section 138 except upon a complaint, in
E         writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the
          holder in due course of the cheque;

          (b) such complaint is made within one month of the date
          on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the
          proviso to section 138:
F
                Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be
          taken by the Court after the prescribed period, if the
          complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause
          for not making a complaint within such period.
G
          (c) no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or
          a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence
          punishable under section 138."

  As pointed out, the controversy in our case, concentrates on
H construction of Section 142(a) of the Act and in particular
 INDRA KUMAR PATODIA v. RELIANCE INDUSTRIES 139
           LTD. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
phrase "a complaint in writing" employed therein. It provides         A
that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no Court
shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Section
138 of the Act except upon a "complaint in writing" made by
the payee or as the case may be the holder in due course of
the cheque. The important question in the instant case is what        B
is meant by 'complaint in writing'. Whether complaint should be
in writing simpliciter or complaint being in writing requires
signature below such writing.

       10. The object and scope of Sections 138 and 142 of the
Act has been considered by this Court in Pankajbhai Nagjibhai         C
 Patel vs. State of Gujarat and Another, (2001) 2 SCC 595. In
that case, Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, after convicting
an accused for an offence under Section 138 of the Act
sentenced him to imprisonment for six months along with a fine
 of Rs.83,000/- The conviction and sentence were confirmed by         D
 the Sessions Judge in appeal and the revision filed by the
 convicted person was dismissed by the High Court. When the
 SLP was moved, the counsel confined his contention to the
 question whether a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class could
 have imposed sentence of fine beyond Rs. 5,000/- in view of          E
the limitation contained in Section 29(2) of the Code. Learned
counsel for the respondent contended the decision of this Court
 in K. Bhaskaran vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Ba/an, (1999) 7 SCC
510 to the effect that power of Judicial Magistrate of First Class
is limited in the matter of imposing a sentence of fine of Rs.        F
5,000/- is not correct in view of the non obstante clause
contained in Section 142 of the Act. After hearing both the
parties, this Court held that Section 138 of the,Act provides
punishment as imprisonment for a term which may extend to
one year or fine which may extend to twice the amount of              G
cheque or with both. Section 29(2) of the Code contains
limitation for a Magistrate of First Class in the matter of
imposing fine as a sentence or as part of sentence. After
quoting Section 29(2) of the Code as well as Section 142 of
the Act, this Court has concluded thus:                               H
    140       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2012) 13 S.C.R.

A         "6. It is clear that the aforesaid non obstante expression
          is intended to operate only in respect of three aspects, and
          nothing more. The first is this: Under the Code a
          Magistrate can take cognizance of an offence either upon
          receiving a complaint, or upon a police report, or upon
B         receiving information from any person, or upon his own
          knowledge except in the cases differently indicated in
          Chapter XIV of the Code. But Section 142 of the NI Act
          says that insofar as the offence under Section 138 is
          concerned no court shall take cognizance except upon a
c         complaint made by the payee or the holder in due course
          of the cheque.
          7. The second is this: Under the Code a complaint could
          be made at any time subject to the provisions of Chapter
          XXXVI. But so far as the offence under Section 138 of the
D         NI Act is concerned such complaint shall be made within ·
          one month of the cause of action. The third is this: Under
          Article 511 of the First Schedule of the Code, if the offence
          is punishable with imprisonment for less than 3 years or
          with fine only under any enactment (other than the Indian
E         Penal Code) such offence can be tried by any Magistrate.
          Normally Section 138 of the NI Act which is punishable with
          a maximum sentence of imprisonment for one year would
          have fallen within the scope of the said Article. But Section
          142 of the NI Act says that for the offence under Section
F         138, no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate
          or Judicial Magistrate of the First Class shall try the said
          offence.
          8. Thus, the non obstante limb provided in Section 142 of
          the NI Act is not intended to expand the powers of a
G         Magistrate of the First Class beyond what is fixed in
          Chapter Ill of the Code. Section 29, which falls within
          Chapter Ill of the Code, contains a limit for a Magistrate
          of the First Class in the matter of imposing a sentence as
          noticed above i.e. if the sentence is imprisonment it shall
H
INDRA KUMAR PATODIA v. RELIANCE INDUSTRIES 141
          LTD. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
    not exceed 3 years and if the sentence is fine (even if it is     A
    part of the sentence) it shall not exceed Rs 5000. •

      11. It is also relevant to refer a decision of this Court in
M.M. T.C. Ltd. and Another vs. Medchl Chemicals and
Pharma (P) Ltd. and Another, (2002) 1 SCC 234. The question B
in that decision was whether a complaint filed in the name and
on behalf of the company by its employee without necessary
authorization is maintainable. After analyzing the relevant
provisions and language used in Sections 138 and 142(a) of
the Act, this Court held that such complaint is maintainable and C
held that want of authorization can be rectified even at a
subsequent stage. This Court further clarified that the only
eligibility criteria prescribed by Section 142 is that the complaint
must be by the payee or the holder in due course. This Court
held that this criteria is satisfied as the complaint is in the name
and on behalf of the appellant-Company. It was further held that D
even presuming, that initially there was no authority, still the
company can, at any stage, rectify the defect. It was further held
that at a subsequent stage the company can send a person
who is competent to represent the company and concluded that
the complaint could thus not have been quashed on this ground. E
      12. It is clear that the non obstante clause has to be given
restricted meaning and when the section containing the said
clause does not refer to any particular provisions which intends
to over ride but refers to the provisions of the statute generally,   F
it is not permissible to hold that it excludes the whole Act and
stands all alone by itself. In other words, there requires to be a
determination as to which provisions answers the description
and which does not. While interpreting the non obstante clause,
the Court is required to find out the extent to which the             G
legislature intended to do so and the context in which the non
obstante clause is used. We have already referred to the
definition of complaint as stated in Section 2(d) of the Code
which provides that the same needs to be in oral or in writing.
The non obstante clause, when it refers to the Code only              H
excludes the oral part in such definition.
    142       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2012] 13 S.C.R.


A       13. According to us, the non obstante clause in Section
  142(a) is restricted to exclude two things only from the Code
  i.e. (a) exclusion of oral complaints and (b) exclusion of
  cognizance on complaint by anybody other than the payee or
  the holder in due course. Section 190 of the Code provides that
B a Magistrate can take cognizance on a complaint which
  constitutes such an offence irrespective of who had made such
  complaint or on a police report or upon receiving information
  from any person other then a police officer or upon his own
  knowledge. Non obstante clause, when it refers to the core,
c restricts the power of the Magistrate to take cognizance only
  on a complaint by a payee or the holder in due course and
  excludes the rest of Section 190 of the Code. In other words,
  none of the other provisions of the Code are excluded by the
  said non obstante clause, hence, the Magistrate is therefore
  required to follow the procedure under Section 200 of the Code
0
  once he has taken the complaint of the payee/holder in due
  course and record statement of the complainant and such other
  witnesses as present at the said date. Here, the Code
  specifically provides that the same is required to be signed by
E the complainant as well as the witnesses making the statement.
  Section 200 of the Code reads thus:

          "200. Examinatiion of complainant.- A Magistrate taking
          cognizance of an offence on complaint shall examine upon
          oath the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, and
F         the substance of such examination shall be reduced to
          writing and shall be signed by the complainant and the
          witnesses, and also by the Magistrate:
                Provided that, when the complaint is made in writing,
          the Magistrate need not examine the complainant and the
G
          witnesses-
          (a) if a public servant acting or purporting to act in the
          discharge of his official duties or a Court has made the
          complaint; or
H
INDRA KUMAR PATODIA v. RELIANCE INDUSTRIES 143
          LTD. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
     (b) if the Magistrate makes over the case for inquiry or trial    A
     to another Magistrate under section 192:

     Provided further that if the Magistrate makes over the case
     to another Magistrate under section 192 after examining
     the complainant and the witnesses, the latter Magistrate          8
     need not re-examine them."

Mere presentation of the complaint is only the first step and no
action can be taken unless the process of verification is
complete and, thereafter, the Magistrate has to consider the
statement on oath, that is, the verification statement under           C
Section 200 and the statement of any witness, and the
Magistrate has to decide whether there is sufficient ground to
proceed. It is also relevant to note Section 203 of the Code
which reads as follows:
                                                                       D
     "203. Dismissal of complaint.- If, after considering the
     statements on oath (if any) of the complainant and of the
     witnesses and the result of the inquiry or investigation (if
     any) under section 202, the Magistrate is of opinion that
     there is no sufficient ground for proceeding, he shall            E
     dismiss the complaint, and in every such case he shall
     briefly record his reasons for so doing."

It is also clear that a person could be called upon to answer a
charge of false complaint/perjury only on such verification
statement and not mere on the presentation of the complaint            F
as the same is not on oath and, therefore, need to obtain the
signature of the person. Apart from the above section, the
legislative intent becomes clear that "writing" does not pre-
suppose that the same has to be signed. Various sections in
the Code when contrasted with Section 2(d) clarify that the            G
legislat.ure was clearly of the intent that a written complaint need
not be signed. For example, Sections 61, 70, 154, 164 and 281
are reproduced below:

                                                                       H
    144       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 13 S.C.R.


A         "61. Form of summons.

          Every summons issued by a court under this Code shall
          be in writing, in duplicate, signed by the presiding officer
          of such court or by such other officer as the High Court
          may, from time to time, by rule direct, and shall bear the
B
          seal of the court.

          70. Form of warrant of arrest and duration.

          (1) Every warrant of arrest issued by a court under this
c         Code shall be in writing, signed by the presiding officer of
          such court and shall bear the sea] of the court.

          (2) Every such warrant shall remain in force until it is
          cancelled by the Court which issued it, or until it is
          executed.
D
          154. Information in cognizable cases.

          (1) Every information relating to the commission of a
          cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in charge
          of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or
E         under his direction, and be read over to the informant; and
          every such information, whether given in writing or reduced
          to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving
          it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to
          be kept by such officer in such form as the State
F         Government may prescribe in this behalf......

          164. Recording of confessions and statements.

          Xxxxxxx
G         (4) Any such confession shall be recorded in the manner
          provided in section 281 for recording the examination of
          an accused person and shall be signed by the person
          making the confession; and the Magistrate shall make a
          memorandum at the foot of such record to the following
H         effect-
INDRA KUMAR PATODIA v. RELIANCE INDUSTRIES 145
          LTD. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

    281. Record of examination of accused.                         A
    (1) Whenever the accused is examined by a Metropolitan
    Magistrate, the Magistrate shall make a memorandum of
    the substance of the examination of the accused in the
    language of the court and such memorandum shall be             8
    signed by the Magistrate and shall form part of the
    record .... ."

A perusal of the above shows that the legislature has made it
clear that wherever it required a written document to be signed,
it should be mentioned specifically in the section itself, which   C
is missing both from Section 2(d) as well as Section 142.

      14. The General Clauses Act, 1897 too draws a distinction
between writing and signature and defines them separately.
Section 3(56) defines signature and Section 3(65) defines          D
writing which reads thus:

    "In this Act, and in all Central Acts and Regulations made
    after the commencement of this Act, unless there is
    anything repugnant in the subject or context,-
                                                                   E
    56. "Sign" with its grammatical variations and cognate
    expressions, shall, with reference to a person who is
    unable to write his name, include, "mark", with its
    grammatical variation and cognate expressions,
                                                                   F
    65. Expressions referring to "writing" shall be construed
    as including references to printing, lithography,
    photography and other modes of representing or
    reproducing words in a visible form,"

Writing as defined by General Clauses Act requires that the        G
same is representation or reproduction of "words" in a visible
form and does not require signature. "Signature" within the
meaning of "writing" would be adding words to the section
which the legislature did not contemplate.
                                                                   H
    146     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 13 S.C.R.


A        15. In the case on hand, the complaint was presented in
   person on June 3, 1998 and on the direction by the Magistrate,
   tile complaint was verified on July 30, 1998 and duly signed
   by the authorized officer of the Company-the complainant. As
   rightly pointed out by tre Jivision Bench, no prejudice has been
B caused to the accused for non-signing the complaint. The
   statement made on oath and sigr:ed by the complainant
   safeguards the interest of the accused. In view of the same, we
   hold that the requirements of Section 142(a) of the Act is that
   the complaint must necessarily be in writing and the complaint
C can be presented by the payee or holder in due course of the
   cheque and it need not be signed by the complainant. In other
   words, if the legislature intended that the complaint under the
   Act, apart from being in writing, is also required to be signed
   by the complainant, the legislature would have used different
D language and inserted the same at the appropriate place. In
   our opinion, the correct interpretation would be that the
   complaint under Section 142(a) of the Act requires to be in
   writing as at the time of taking cognizance, the Magistrate will
   examine the complainant on oath and the verification statement
EE will be signed by the complainant.

       16. It is the contention of Mr. Bhagwati Prasad, learned
  senior counsel for the appellant that the limitation period
  expired on the date of verification and the complaint cannot be
  entertained. In view of the above discussion, we are unable to
F accept the said contention.
       17. In Japani Sahoo vs. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty,
  (2007) 7 SCC 394, in para 48, this Court held that "so far as
  the complainant is concerned, as soon as he files a complaint
G in a competent court of law, he has done everything which is
  required to be done by him at that stage. Thereafter, it is for
  the Magistrate to consider the matter to apply his mind and to
  take an appropriate decision of taking cognizance, issuing
  process or any other action which the law contemplates". This
  Court further held that "the complainant has no control over those
H
INDRA KUMAR PATODIA v. RELIANCE INDUSTRIES 147
          LTD. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
proceedings". Taking note of Sections 468 and 473 of the A
Code, in para 52, this Court held that "for the purpose of
computing the period of limitation, the relevant date must be
considered as the date of filing of the complaint or initiating
criminal proceedings and not the date of taking cognizance by
a Magistrate or issuance of process by a Court".                B

     18. In the light of the scheme of the Act and various
provisions of the Code, we fully endorse the above view and
hold that the crucial date for computing the period of limitation
is the date of filing of the complaint or initiating criminal C
proceedings and not the date of taking cognizance by the
Magistrate. In the case on hand, as pointed out earlier, the
complaint was filed on June 3, 1998 which is well within the time
and on the direction of the Magistrate, verification was recorded
by solemn affirmation by authorized representatives of the
complainant and after recording the statement and securing his D
signature, the learned Magistrate passed an order issuing
summons against the accused under Sections 138/142 of the
Act.

     19. In the light of the above discussion, taking note of      E
various provisions of the Act and the Code which we have
adverted above, we hold that the complaint under Section 138
of the Act without signature is maintainable when such
complaint is verified by the complainant and the process is
issued by the Magistrate after due verification. The prosecution   F
of such complaint is maintainable and we agree with the
conclusion arrived at by the Division Bench of the High Court.
Consequently, both the appeals fail and are dismissed.

K.K.T.                                    Appeals dismissed.