Holding

For land acquisition proceedings to lapse under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, both conditions must be satisfied: physical possession of the land has not been taken and compensation has not been paid; the word 'or' is to be read as 'and' or 'nor'.

Summary

The Supreme Court interpreted Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, which deals with the lapse of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the repealed Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Court held that the word 'or' in Section 24(2) between 'physical possession has not been taken' and 'compensation has not been paid' must be read conjunctively as 'and' or 'nor', meaning both conditions must be satisfied for the proceedings to lapse. The proviso to Section 24(2) is part of that sub-section, not Section 24(1)(b), and provides for higher compensation under the 2013 Act if compensation for a majority of landholdings has not been deposited. The Court clarified that 'paid' in Section 24(2) refers to actual tender of compensation under Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act, while 'deposited' in the proviso refers to deposit in court; non-deposit does not cause lapse but may trigger higher compensation. Possession of acquired land is validly taken by drawing a panchnama, and once possession is taken, the land vests absolutely in the State and cannot be divested under Section 24(2). The period during which an interim order of a court prevented the authorities from taking possession or paying compensation must be excluded when computing the five-year period under Section 24(2). Section 24 does not revive stale or time-barred claims or allow reopening of concluded acquisition proceedings. The decision overruled Pune Municipal Corporation v. Harakchand Misrimal Solanki and other cases that had interpreted Section 24 differently.

Issues considered

Whether the word 'or' in Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act should be read conjunctively or disjunctively.
What is the meaning of 'paid' in Section 24(2) and 'deposited' in the proviso, and whether non-deposit of compensation in court results in lapse.
Whether the proviso to Section 24(2) forms part of Section 24(2) or Section 24(1)(b).
What is the mode of taking possession under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and the meaning of 'physical possession' in Section 24(2).
Whether the period covered by an interim order of a court should be excluded for the purpose of Section 24(2).
Whether Section 24 of the 2013 Act revives barred and stale claims.

Legislation cited

General Clauses Act, 1897s. 6
Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 11, s. 11A, s. 16, s. 17, s. 17(1), s. 17(3A), s. 31, s. 31(1), s. 31(2), s. 34, s. 48, s. 55
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013s. 101, s. 114, s. 19, s. 24, s. 24(1), s. 24(1)(a), s. 24(1)(b), s. 24(2), s. 69, s. 77, s. 80

Subjects

Land AcquisitionCompensationPossessionVestingInterpretation of StatutesLapse of AcquisitionRight to Fair CompensationRehabilitation and ResettlementSection 24Act of 2013Act of 1894General Clauses Act

Judgment

[2020] 3 S.C.R. 1 1

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY A
v.
MANOHARLAL & ORS. ETC.
(S.L.P. (C) Nos. 9036-9038 of 2016)
MARCH 06, 2020 B
[ARUN MISHRA, INDIRA BANERJEE, VINEET SARAN,
M. R. SHAH AND S. RAVINDRA BHAT, JJ.]
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: Legislative
C
history of the Act of 2013 – Purpose of its enactment – Salient
features – Departure from old Land Acquisition Act in 2013 Act
relating to Social Impact Assessment, Rehabilitation and Resettlement
Scheme – Discussed .
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
D
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: s.24(2) –
Twin requirement for the lapse – Firstly, physical possession has
not been taken and secondly compensation has not been paid –
Whether the conditions are cumulative i.e. both are to be fulfilled
for lapsing of acquisition proceedings or the conditions are in
alternative (“either/or”) – Held: s.24(2) of the Act of 2013 deals E
with a situation only where the award has been made five years or
more before the commencement of the Act, but physical possession
of the land has not been taken, nor compensation has been paid –
As regards the collation of the words used in s.24(2), two negative
conditions have been prescribed – General rule of statutory
F
interpretation of positive and negative conditions are that positive
conditions separated by ‘or’ are read in the alternative but negative
conditions connected by ‘or’ are construed as cumulative and ‘or’
is read as ‘nor’ or ‘and’ i.e. the expression ‘or’ has to be read as
conjunctive and conditions of both the clauses must be fulfilled –
Thus, the word ‘or ’ used in s.24(2) between possession and G
compensation has to be read as ‘nor’ or as ‘and’ – This would mean
that the deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings under s.24(2)
takes place where due to inaction of authorities for five years or
more prior to commencement of the Act of 2013, the possession of
land has not been taken nor compensation has been paid – Thus,
H
1
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A even if one condition is satisfied, there is no lapse – Interpretation
of statutes.
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: s.24(2) –
Interpreting “or” under s.24(2) of the Act of 2013 disjunctively –
B Effect of – Held: It would result in an anomalous situation, because,
once compensation has been paid to the landowner, there is no
provision for its refund – In case physical possession is with the
landowner; and compensation has been paid, there is no provision
in the Act for disgorging out the benefit of compensation – In the
absence of any provision for refund in the Act of 2013, the State
C cannot recover compensation paid – The landowner would be
unjustly enriched – This could never have been the legislative intent
of enacting s.24(2) of the Act of 2013 – The principle of restitution,
unless provided in the Act, cannot be resorted to by the authorities
on their own – Absence of provision for refund in the Act of 2013
D reinforces conclusion that the word “or” has to be read as
conjunctively and has to be read as “and” – Doctrine of unjust
enrichment and principle of restitution.
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: s.24(2) –
E Purpose of – Held: To punish acquiring authority for its lethargy in
not taking physical possession nor paying compensation after
making award five years or more before commencement of Act of
2013 in pending proceedings providing they would lapse.
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
F Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: s.24 – Vested
right under – Held: s.24 of the Act of 2013 does not intend to take
away vested rights – This is because there is no specific provision
taking away or divesting title to the land, which had originally vested
with the State, or divesting the title or interest of beneficiaries or
third-party transferees of such land which they had lawfully
G acquired, through sales or transfers.
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: proviso to
s.24(2) – Whether proviso is part of s.24(2) or s.24(1)(b) – Held:
The proviso is part of the scheme of s.24(2) – The entire provision
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 3

of s.24(2), including the proviso, operates when there is inaction A
for a period of five years or more, as contemplated therein.
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: s.24(2) –
Applicability to pending proceedings – Held: s.24(2) shall apply to
the proceeding which is pending as on the date on which the Act of B
2013, has been brought into force and it does not apply to the
concluded proceedings – s.24(2) is not a tool to revive concluded
proceedings and to question the validity of acquisition proceedings
due to which possession were taken decades ago, or to question
the manner of deposit of amount in the treasury – The Act of 2013
never intended revival of such claims – s.24(2) only contemplates C
lethargy/inaction of the authorities to act for five years or more.
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: s.24(2) –
Whether gives rise to fresh cause of action – Held: s.24(2) of the
Act of 2013 does not give rise to new cause of action to question D
the legality of concluded proceedings of land acquisition – s.24
does not revive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopen
concluded proceedings nor allow landowners to question the legality
of mode of taking possession to reopen proceedings or mode of
deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of court to invalidate E
acquisition.
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: s.24(2) –
Exclusion of period of interim order(s) – Held: Any court’s interim
order cannot be said to be inaction of the authorities or agencies; F
thus, time period is not to be included for counting the 5 years
period as envisaged in s.24(2).
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: s.24(2) and
its proviso – The expression ‘paid’ in the main part of s.24(2) does G
not include a deposit of compensation in court – The consequence
of non-deposit is provided in proviso to s.24(2) in case it has not
been deposited with respect to majority of land holdings then all
beneficiaries (landowners) as on the date of notification for land
acquisition under s.4 of the Act of 1894 shall be entitled to
H
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2013
– In case the obligation under s.31 of the Act of 1894 has not been
fulfilled, interest under s.34 of the said Act can be granted – Non-
deposit of compensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of
land acquisition proceedings – In case of non- deposit with respect
to the majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation
B
under the Act of 2013 has to be paid to the “landowners” as on the
date of notification for land acquisition under s.4 of the Act of
1894.
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: s.24(2) –
C When compensation, tendered, as provided in s.31(1) of the Act of
1894, but not paid/deposited in court – Whether acquisition lapse
– Held: In case a person has been tendered the compensation as
provided under s.31(1) of the Act of 1894, it is not open to him to
claim that acquisition has lapsed under s.24(2) due to non-payment
D or non-deposit of compensation in court – The obligation to pay is
complete by tendering the amount under s.31(1) – Land owners
who had refused to accept compensation or who sought reference
for higher compensation, cannot claim that the acquisition
proceedings had lapsed under s.24(2) of the Act of 2013 – Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 – s.31(1).
E
Land Acquisition: Mode of taking possession – When
possession of large area of land is to be taken, then it is permissible
to take possession by drawing Panchnama – Possession.
Possession: Concept of possession – Held: Possession
F comprises the right to possess and to exclude others, essential is
animus possidendi – Possession depends upon the character of the
thing which is possessed – If the land is not capable of any use,
mere non-user of it does not lead to the inference that the owner is
not in possession – The established principle is that the possession
follows title – Possession comprises of the control over the property
G – The element of possession is the physical control or the power
over the object and intention or will to exercise the power – Corpus
and animus are both necessary and have to co-exist.
Delay/laches: In matters of land acquisition, delay is fatal in
questioning the land acquisition proceedings – In case possession
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 5

has not been taken in accordance with law and vesting is not in A
accordance with s.16, proceedings before courts are to be initiated
within reasonable time, not after the lapse of several decades –
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – s.16.
Interpretation of Statutes: Addition or substraction of word(s)
in a statute – Power of Courts – Held: While interpreting the B
statutory provisions, addition or subtraction in the legislation is
not permissible – It is not open to the court to either add or subtract
a word – There cannot be any departure from the words of law, as
observed in legal maxim “A Verbis Legis Non Est Recedendum” –
Legal maxim.
C
Interpretation of Statutes: When two different expressions are
used in the same provision of a statute, there is a presumption that
they are not used in the same sense.
Interpretation of statutes: Proviso to a provision – The
function of the proviso is to explain or widen the scope – The proviso D
cannot travel beyond the provision to which it is attached.
Interpretation of Statutes: Colon (punctuation mark) –
Significance of its use – The use of the colon is to introduce a sub-
clause that follows logically from the text before it – Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation E
and Resettlement Act, 2013 – s.24(2).
Judicial Notice: Judicial notice is taken of the fact that in no
other Government security, rate of interest is higher on the amount
being invested under ss.32 and 33 of the Act of 1894 – Higher rate
of interest is available under s.34 to the advantage of landowners F
– Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
Repeal: Applicability of the General Clauses Act – Held: When
repeal is followed by a fresh enactment on the same subject, the
provisions of the General Clauses Act would undoubtedly require
an examination of the language of the new enactment if it expresses
G
an intent different from the earlier repealed Act – The enquiry would
necessitate the examination if the old rights and liabilities are kept
alive or whether the new Act manifests an intention to do away with
or destroy them – If the new Act manifests different intentions, the
application of the General Clauses Act will stand excluded – General
Clauses Act. H
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A Words and phrases: Word ‘paid’, tender’, ‘vesting’ – Meaning
of, discussed.
Words and phrases: Word ‘paid’ and ‘deposited’ – Distinction
between – Dictionary meaning and meaning in the context of s.24(2)
of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
B Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.
Words and phrases: Concept of vesting – Discussed.
Answering the reference, the Court
HELD: 1. The Act of 2013 repeals and replaces the Land
C Acquisition Act, 1894, a general law for acquisition of land of public
purposes, which had been in force for almost 120 years, with a
view to address certain inadequacies and/ or shortcomings in the
said Act. The Act of 2013 is prospective and saves proceedings
already initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 before its
repeal, subject to provisions of Section 24 of the Act of 2013,
D which begins with a non-obstante clause and overrides all other
provisions of the Act of 2013. [Paras 6, 7][58 B-D]
2. Scope of Section 24
2.1 Section 24 begins with a non-obstante clause, overriding
all other provisions of the Act of 2013 including Section 114 of
E
the Act of 2013, dealing with repeal and saving. In terms of Section
114 of the Act of 2013, the general application of Section 6 of the
General Clauses Act, 1897, except otherwise provided in the
Act, has been saved. Section 6(a) of the General Clauses Act,
1897 provides that unless a different intention appears, the repeal
F shall not revive anything not in force or existing at the time when
the repeal has been made. The effect of the previous operation
of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered
thereunder is also saved by the provisions contained in Section
6(b). As per Section 6(c), the repeal shall not affect any right,
privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued, or incurred.
G
[Para 94][115 E-G]
2.2 Section 24(1)(a) of the Act of 2013 read with the non-
obstante clause provides that in case of proceedings initiated

H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 7

under the Act of 1894 the award had not been made under Section A
11, then the provisions of the Act of 2013, relating to the
determination of compensation would apply. However; the
proceedings held earlier do not lapse. In terms of Section 24(1)(b),
where award under Section 11 is made, then such proceedings
shall continue under the provisions of the Act of 1894. It
B
contemplates that such pending proceedings, as on the date on
which the Act of 2013 came into force shall continue, and taken
to their logical end. However, the exception to Section 24(1) (b)
is provided in Section 24(2) in case of pending proceedings; in
case where the award has been passed five years or more prior
to the commencement of the Act of 2013, the physical possession C
of the land has not been taken, or the compensation has not been
paid, the proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed, and such
proceedings cannot continue as per the provisions of Section
24(1)(b) of the Act of 2013. [Para 95][115 G-H][116 A-C]
Principles of Statutory Interpretation (14th Edition) by Justice D
G.P. Singh – referred to
2.3 As regards the collation of the words used in Section
24(2), two negative conditions have been prescribed. Thus, even
if one condition is satisfied, there is no lapse, and this logically
flows from the Act of 1894 read with the provisions of Section 24 E
of the Act of 2013. Any other interpretation would entail illogical
results. Thus, for lapse of acquisition proceedings initiated under
the old law, under Section 24(2), if both steps have not been taken,
i.e., neither physical possession is taken, nor compensation is
paid, the land acquisition proceedings lapse. [Paras 99, 101][119
G-H][122 B-C] F

Patel Chunibhai Dajibha, etc. v. Narayanrao
Khanderao Jambekar and Anr. AIR 1965 SC 1457 :
[1965] SCR 328; Punjab Produce & Trading Co. v.
Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal, [1971] SCR
977 – relied on G
Brown & Co. v. Harrison (1927) All ER Rep 195;
Federal Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Department of
Trade and Industry 1974 (1) WLR 505 – referred to

H
8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A 2.4 Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 is a penal provision - to
punish the acquiring authority for its lethargy in not taking physical
possession nor paying the compensation after making the award
five years or more before the commencement of the Act of 2013
in pending proceedings, providing that they would lapse. The
expression “where an award has been made, then the proceedings
B
shall continue” used in Section 24(1)(b) of the Act of 1894 means
that proceedings were pending in praesenti as on the date of
enforcement of the Act of 2013 are not concluded proceedings,
and in that context, an exception has been carved out in section
24(2). [Para 112][131 A-C]
C M/s. Ranchhoddas Atmaram and Anr. v. The Union of
India and Ors. AIR 1961 SC 935 : [1961] SCR 718;
Prof. Yashpal & Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors.
(2005) 5 SCC 420 : [2005] 2 SCR 23; Joint Director
of Mines Safety v. Tandur and Nayandgi Stone Quarries
D (P) Ltd (1987) 3 SCC 308 : [1987] 2 SCR 911; Samee
Khan v Bindu Khan (1998) 7 SCC 59 : [1998] 1 Suppl.
SCR 244; State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala
[1957] 1 SCR 874; Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj
etc. v State of Rajasthan & Ors AIR 1963 SC 1638 :
[1964] SCR 561 – relied on
E
Pooran Singh v. State of M.P [1965] 2 SCR 853; Sri
Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal (1975)
2 SCC 671 : [1976] 1 SCR 505; Municipal Corporation
of Delhi v. Tek Chand Bhatia (1980) 1 SCC 158 : [1980]
1 SCR 910; State of Punjab v. Ex-Constable Ram Singh
F (1992) 4 SCC 54 : [1992] 3 SCR 634 – referred to
Marsey Docks and Harbour Board v. Coggins and
Griffith (Liverpool) Ltd. LR (AC) Vol.XIII 1888 595;
Re Hayden Pask v. Perry (1931) 2 Ch.333;
Metropolitan Board of Works v. Street Bros (1881) VIII
G QBD 445 – referred to
2.5 When considering the scheme of the Act of 1894, once
the award was made under Section 11, the Collector may,
undertake possession of the land which shall thereupon vest
absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. Section
H 16 of the Act of 1894 enables the Collector to take possession of
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 9

acquired land, when an award is made under Section 11. Clearly, A
there can be lapse of proceedings under the Act of 1894 only
when possession is not taken. The provisions in Section 11A of
the Act of 1894 states that the Collector shall make an award
within a period of two years from the date of the publication of
the declaration under Section 6 and if no award is made within
B
two years, the entire proceedings for acquisition of the land shall
lapse. The period of two year excludes any period during which
interim order granted by the Court was in operation. Once an
award is made and possession is taken, by virtue of Section 16,
land vests absolutely in the State, free from all encumbrances.
Vesting of land is automatic on the happening of the two exigencies C
of passing award and taking possession, as provided in Section
16. [Paras 114, 115][131 F-H][132 C-E]
2.6 The scheme of the Act of 1894 is clear that when the
award is passed under Section 11, thereafter possession is taken
as provided under Section 16, land vests in the State Government. D
Under Section 12(2), a notice of the award has to be issued by
the Collector. Taking possession is not dependent upon payment.
Payment has to be tendered under Section 31 unless the Collector
is “prevented from making payment,” as provided under section
31(2). In case of failure under Section 31(1) or 31(3), also Collector
is not precluded from making payment, but it carries interest E
under Section 34 @ 9% for the first year from the date it ought to
have been paid or deposited and thereafter @ 15%. Thus, once
land has been vested in the State under Section 16, in case of
failure to pay the compensation under Section 31(1) to deposit
under Section 31(2), compensation has to be paid along with F
interest, and due to non-compliance of Section 31, there is no
lapse of acquisition. The same spirit has been carried forward in
the Act of 2013 by providing in Section 24(2). Once possession
has been taken though the payment has not been made, the
compensation has to be paid along with interest as envisaged
under section 34, and in a case, payment has been made, G
possession has not been taken, there is no lapse under Section
24(2). In a case where possession has been taken under the Act
of 1894 as provided by Section 16 or 17(1) the land vests
absolutely in the State, free from all encumbrances, if
compensation is not paid, there is no divesting there will be no H
10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A lapse as compensation carries interest @ 9% or @ 15% as
envisaged under Section 34 of the Act of 1894. Proviso to Section
24(2) makes some wholesome provision in case the amount has
not been deposited with respect to majority of landholdings, in
such an event, not only those persons but all the beneficiaries,
though for minority of holding compensation has been paid, shall
B
be entitled to higher compensation in accordance with the
provisions of the Act of 2013. The expression used is “all
beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under
Section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act”, i.e., Act of 1894,
means that the persons who are to be paid higher compensation
C are those who have been recorded as beneficiaries as on the
date of notification under Section 4. The proviso gives effect to,
and furthers the principle that under the Act of 1894, the purchases
made after issuance of notification under Section 4 are void. As
such, the benefit of higher compensation under the proviso to
Section 24(2) is intended to be given to the beneficiaries
D
mentioned in the notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894.
[Para 118][133 D-H][134 A-D]
2.7 The benefits under the Act of 2013 envisage that where
the award had not been made, or award has been made, but
possession has not been taken (because once possession is taken,
E land is vests in the State) there can be lapse of acquisition. No
doubt that payment is also to be made: that issue is taken care of
by the provision of payment of interest under Section 34: also, in
case of non-deposit- in respect of majority of holdings in a given
award, higher compensation under the Act of 2013 has to be paid
F to all beneficiaries as on the date of notification under Section 4
issued under the Act of 1894. There is nothing in the Statement
of Objects and Reasons making specific reference to non-payment
of compensation where an award has been made, and possession
has been taken. While interpreting the provisions of an Act, the
court to consider the objects and reasons of the legislature, which
G the legislature had in mind also emphasised that once vesting is
complete, there is no divesting. [Para 120][134 G-H][135 A-C]
Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Management of
Dimakuchi Tea Estate [1958] SCR 1156; Mukesh K.

H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 11

Tripathi v. Senior Divisional Manager, LIC & Ors. A
(2004) 8 SCC 387 : [2004] 4 Suppl. SCR 127 – relied
on
2.8 Interpreting “or” under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013
disjunctively, would result in an anomalous situation - because,
once compensation has been paid to the landowner, there is no B
provision for its refund. In case physical possession is with the
landowner; and compensation has been paid, there is no provision
in the Act for disgorging out the benefit of compensation. In the
absence of any provision for refund in the Act of 2013, the State
cannot recover compensation paid. The landowner would be
unjustly enriched. This could never have been the legislative C
intent of enacting Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. The principle
of restitution, unless provided in the Act, cannot be resorted to
by the authorities on their own. The absence of provision for
refund in the Act of 2013 reinforces conclusion that the word
“or” has to be read as conjunctively and has to be read as “and.” D
[Para 132][150-E][151 A-B]
C. Padma & Ors. v. Dy. Secretary & Ors (1997) 2 SCC
627 : [1996] 9 Suppl. SCR 158; Northern Indian Glass
Industries v. Jaswant Singh & Ors (2003) 1 SCC 335 :
[2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 534; Milkfood Ltd. v. GMC Ice E
Cream (P) Ltd 2004 (7) SCC 288 : [2004] 3 SCR 854 –
referred to
3. In re: Vesting and divesting
Once the land vests in the State, it cannot be divested, even
if there is some irregularity in the acquisition proceedings. There F
is nothing in the Act of 1894 to show that non-compliance thereof
will be fatal or will lead to any penalty. Once vesting takes place,
and is with possession, after which a person who remains in
possession is only a trespasser, not in rightful possession and
vesting contemplates absolute title, possession in the State. G
[Paras 141, 147][160-H][161-A][163 F-G]
State of Punjab v. Sadhu Ram 1996 (7) JT 118; Star
Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana & Ors (1996) 11
SCC 698 : [1996] 7 Suppl. SCR 6; Market Committee
v. Krishan Murari (1996) 1 SCC 311 : [1995] 4 Suppl.
H
12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A SCR 787; Puttu Lal (dead) by L.Rs. v. State of U.P. &
Anr (1996) 3 SCC 99 : [1996] 2 SCR 638; The Fruit &
Vegetable Merchants Union v. The Delhi Improvement
Trust [1957] SCR 01; 147 VKNM Vocational Higher
Secondary School v. State of Kerala (2016) 4 SCC 216 :
[2016] 1 SCR 343; May George v. Special Tahsildar &
B
Ors. (2010) 13 SCC 98 : [2010] 7 SCR 204;
P. Chinnanna & Ors. v. State of A.P. & Ors. (1994) 5
SCC 486 : [1994] 2 Suppl. SCR 426; Satendra Prasad
Jain & Ors. v. State of U.P & Ors (1993) 4 SCC 369 :
[1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 336; Tika Ram and Ors. v. State
C of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2009) 10 SCC 689 : [2009]
14 SCR 905; Pratap & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan &
Ors (1996) 3 SCC 1 : [1996] 2 SCR 1088; Awadh Bihari
Yadav & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors (1995) 6 SCC 31
: [1995] 3 Suppl. SCR 197 – relied on
D Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Modi Sugar Mills
[1961] 2 SCR 189; Dattatraya Moreshwar v. The State
of Bombay and Ors., AIR 1952 SC 181 : [1952] SCR
612; State of U.P. and Ors. v. Babu Ram Upadhya, AIR
1961 SC 751 : [1961] SCR 679; Raza Buland Sugar
Co. Ltd., Rampur v. Municipal Board, Rampur, AIR 1965
E SC 895 : [1965] SCR 970; State of Mysore v. V.K.
Kangan, AIR 1975 SC 2190 : [1976] 1 SCR 369;
Sharif -Ud- Din v. Abdul Gani Lone, AIR 1980 SC 303 :
[1980] 1 SCR 1177; Balwant Singh and Ors. v. Anand
Kumar Sharma and Ors., (2003) 3 SCC 433 : [2003] 1
F SCR 653; Chandrika Prasad Yadav v. State of Bihar
and Ors., AIR 2004 SC 2036 : [2004] 3 SCR 834;
M/s. Rubber House v. Excellsior Needle Industries Pvt.
Ltd., AIR 1989 SC 1160 : [1989] 1 SCR 986; B.S.
Khurana and Ors. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi
and Ors., (2000) 7 SCC 679 : [2000] 3 Suppl.
G SCR 357; State of Haryana and Anr. v. RaghubirDayal,
(1995) 1 SCC 133 : [1994] 5 Suppl. SCR 448;
GullipilliSowria Raj v. Bandaru Pavani @ Gullipili
Pavani, (2009) 1 SCC 714 : [2008] 17 SCR 35 –
referred to
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 13

Braithwaite & Co. v. E.S.I.C [1968] 1 SCR 771 – A
referred to
4. In re: Vested rights under Section 24 of the Act of 2013
Section 24 of the Act of 2013 does not intend to take away
vested rights. This is because there is no specific provision taking
away or divesting title to the land, which had originally vested B
with the State, or divesting the title or interest of beneficiaries or
third-party transferees of such land which they had lawfully
acquired, through sales or transfers. When repeal is followed by
a fresh enactment on the same subject, the provisions of the
General Clauses Act would undoubtedly require an examination C
of the language of the new enactment if it expresses an intent
different from the earlier repealed Act. The enquiry would
necessitate the examination if the old rights and liabilities are
kept alive or whether the new Act manifests an intention to do
away with or destroy them. If the new Act manifests different
intentions, the application of the General Clauses Act will stand D
excluded. [Paras 148, 149][164 F-G][166 A-C]
State of Haryana v. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd
(2017) 9 SCC 463 : [2017] 9 SCR 482 – relied on
Zile Singh v. State of Haryana (2004) 8 SCC 01 : [2004] E
3 Suppl. SCR 400; CIT v. Sarkar Builders (2015) 7
SCC 579 : [2015] 7 SCR 56; Jawaharmal v. State of
Rajasthan [1966] 1 SCR 890; Rai Ramkrishna v. State
of Bihar [1964] 1 SCR 897; K.S. Paripoornan v. State
of Kerala & Ors (1994) 5 SCC 593 : [1994] 3 Suppl.
SCR 405 – relied on F
Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co. Ltd.v L’office
Chefifien Des Phosphates & Anr [1994] 1 A.C. 486;
Lauri v. Renad (1892) 3 Ch. 402; Gloucester Union v.
Woolwich Union (1917) 2 K.B. 374; The King v. The
General Commissioners of Income Tax for Southampton G
(1916) 2 K.B. 249 – referred to
Bennion, Statutory Interpretation, 5th Edition (2012) –
referred to

H
14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A 5. In re: Legislative History of Act of 2013
The Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill,
2011 (Bill No.77 of 2011) was introduced in the Parliament. Section
24(1), as introduced originally, contained a provision with respect
to award, which has not been made, but it was later on amended,
B and now as provided in Section 24(1)(a), there is no lapse
and only higher compensation is available in case award has not
been passed. The earlier Section 24(2) contained only the
provision with respect to possession of the land that has not been
taken. Earlier, there was no time limit prescribed, and it was
proposed that the process for acquisition of land shall lapse.
C Debates in the Lok Sabha on 29.8.2013, were referred to during
the hearings, to cite various reasons given in respect of the
question why effect should be given retrospectively in cases
where acquisition has not been completed. While replying to the
debate, the Minister concerned had stated that there would be
D lapse only if in case possession has not been taken and
compensation has not been paid. The emphasis right from the
beginning was on possession. Thus, from the perusal of debate
too, it is apparent that the word “or” had been understood as
“and”. [Paras 161, 162, 164, 165][178 D-E][179 B-D][180 B-
C][180 G-H]
E
Tinsukhia Electric Supply Company Ltd. v. State of Assam
& Ors., (1989) 3 SCC 709 : [1989] 2 SCR 544; C.I.T.
v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers, (2003) 3 SCC 57 : [2002]
5 Suppl. SCR 387; Balram Kamanat v. Union of India
(2003) 7 SCC 628 : [2003] 3 Suppl. SCR 24; New India
F Assurance Co. v. Nulli Nivelle, (2008) 3 SCC 279 :
[2007] 13 SCR 598; H.S. Vankani v. State of Gujarat,
(2010) 4 SCC 301 : [2010] 3 SCR 485; State of Gujarat
& Anr. v. Hon’ble Mr. Justice R.A. Mehta (Retd.) and
Ors., (2013) 3 SCC 1 : [2013] 1 SCR 1 – referred to
G 6. In Re: Objectives of the Act
The Act of 2013 has been enacted considering the
difficulties caused by the operation of the earlier laws and to
subserve the public interest. Thus, the Court should interpret it
in the context of the attendant circumstances. At the same time,
H the court should not, while ostensibly adopting a purposive or
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 15

liberal interpretation, affect matters which have become final, or A
stale. [Para 166][181 D-E]
Burrakur Coal Co. Ltd. v. Union of India [1962]
1 SCR 44; A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. M.
Venkatachalam Potti [1955] SCR 1196; Arnit Das v.
State of Bihar (2000) 5 SCC 488; Popat Bahiru B
Govardhane & Ors. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer
& Anr., (2013) 10 SCC 765 : [2013] 8 SCR 241 – relied
on
Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd.
& Ors., (2003) 2 SCC 111 : [2002] 4 Suppl. SCR 517 – C
referred to
7. In Re: proviso to Section 24(2): Whether the proviso is
part of section 24(2) or Section 24(1).
7.1 When reading the word “or” as ‘and’ in the main part of
section 24(2), it is clear that the proviso has to stay as part of D
section 24(2) where it has been placed by the legislature, and
only then it makes sense. If ‘or’ used in-between two negative
conditions of ‘possession has not been taken’ or ‘compensation
has not been paid,’ disjunctively, in that case, the proviso cannot
be operative and would become otiose and would make no sense E
as part of Section 24(2). In case of amount not having been paid
the acquisition has to lapse, though possession (of the land) has
been taken would not be the proper interpretation of the main
part, when “or” is read conjunctively, section 24(2) provided for
lapse in a case where possession has not been taken, nor
compensation has been paid, in such a case proviso becomes F
operative in given exigency of not depositing amount with respect
to majority of landholdings. [Para 171][184 D-F]
7.2 A reading of section 24(2) shows that in case possession
has been taken even if the compensation has not been paid, the
proceedings shall not lapse. In case payment has not been made G
nor deposited with respect to the majority of the holdings in the
accounts of the beneficiaries, then all the beneficiaries specified
in the notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 shall get the
enhanced compensation under the provisions of the Act of 2013.
Section 24(2) not only deals with failure to take physical
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16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A possession but also failure to make payment of compensation. If
both things have not been done, there is lapse of the acquisition
proceeding. Once an award has been passed and possession has
been taken, there is absolute vesting of the land, as such higher
compensation follows under the proviso, which is beneficial to
holders. In a case where both the negative conditions have not
B
been fulfilled, as mentioned in section 24(2), there is a lapse.
Thus, the proviso is a wholesome provision and is, in fact, a part
of section 24(2); it fits in the context of section 24(2) as deposit
is related with the payment of compensation and lapse is provided
due to non-payment along with not taking possession for five
C years or more whereas for non-deposit higher compensation is
provided. [Para 172][184 F-H][185 A-D]
7.3 When considering the provisions of section 24(1)(b)
where an award has been passed under section 11 of the Act of
1894, such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of
D the said Act as if it has not been repealed. The only exception
carved out is the period of 5 years or more and that too by
providing a non-obstante clause in Section 24(2) to anything
contained in section 24(1). The non-obstante clause qualifies the
proviso also to Section 24(2). It has to be read as part of Section
24(2) as it is an exception to Section 24(1)(b). Section 24(1)(b) is
E a self-contained provision, and is also a part of the non-obstante
clause to the other provisions of the Act as provided in sub-section
(1). Parliament worked out an exception, by providing a non-
obstante clause in section 24(2), to Section 24(1). Compensation
is to be paid under Section 24(1)(b) under the Act of 1894 and
F not under the Act of 2013. As such Section 24 (2) is an exception
to section 24(1)(b) and the proviso is also an exception which fits
in with non-obstante clause of Section 24(2) only. Any other
interpretation will be derogatory to the provisions contained in
Section 24(1)(b) which provides that the pending proceedings
shall continue under the Act of 1894 as if it had not been repealed,
G that would include the part relating to compensation too. Even if
there is no lapse of proceedings under section 24(1)(a), only
higher compensation follows under Section 24(1)(a). [Para
173][185 D-H][186-A]

H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 17

Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. v. Tarun Pal Singh A
& Ors. (2018) 14 SCC 161 : [2017] 14 SCR 202 171 –
relied on
Delhi Development Authority v. Virender Lal Bahri &
Ors. – referred to
7.4 Punctuation used in Section 24(2): B

Parliament has used the full stop (.) after section 24(1) and
colon (:) after section 24(2). It cannot be gainsaid that punctuation
plays a vital role, particularly when an attempt is made to relocate
any part of the provision. The use of the colon is to introduce a
sub-clause that follows logically from the text before it. Though C
as the interpretation of the provision of Section 24(2) and its
proviso needs no further deliberation regarding its placement,
the same is to be read as a proviso to Section 24(2) and not Section
24(1)
(b) Use of punctuation colon reinforces conclusion and D
punctuation mark has been an accepted method of statutory
interpretation when such a problem arises. Though sometimes
punctuation can be ignored also but not generally. The full stop
after section 24(1)(b) expresses deliberate intent to end a
particular sentence and detach it from the next part. It is clear E
that the colon (:) has a reference to the previous statement and
enlarges the same and extends the meaning of the sentence. The
colon indicates that the text is intrinsically linked to the previous
provision preceding it, i.e., Section 24(2) in this case and not
section 24(1). The colon indicates that what follows. The colon
proves, explains, defines describes or lists elements of what F
precedes it. In case the proviso is bodily lifted and placed after
section 24(1)(b), section 24(2) will end with a “colon,” which is
never done to end a provision. [Paras 174, 176][186 D-G][187
D-E]
Falcon Tyres Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (2006) 6 SCC G
530 : [2006] 3 Suppl. SCR 734; Aswini Kumar Ghosh
& Anr v Arabinda Bose & Anr [1953] SCR 1; Jamshed
Guzdar v. State of Maharastra (2005) 2 SCC 591 :
[2005] 1 SCR 223 – relied on
H
18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A State of Gujarat v. Reliance Industries Ltd. (2017) 16
SCC 28 : [2017] 13 SCR 25; State of West Bengal v.
Swapan Kumar Guha and Ors (1982) 1 SCC 561 :
[1982] 3 SCR 121 – referred to
Marshall v. Cottingham [1982] Ch 82; Dingmar v.
B Dingmar 2007 (2) All ER 382; Kennedy v Information
Commissioner and another (Secretary of State for Justice
intervening) [2012] 1 WLR 3524; Taylor v. Caribou
102 Me. 401, 67 A.2 (1907) – referred to
‘Full Stop’ and ‘Colon’, Vepa P. Sarathi in the Interpretation
C of Statutes, Fifth Edition; Bennion on Statutory Interpretation –
referred to
7.5 The provision of section 24(1)(a) is clear that if an award
has not been passed, higher compensation to follow. No lapse is
provided. In case award has been passed within the window
D period of section 24(1)(b), inter alia, the provisions for
compensation would be that of the Act of 1894. The only exception
to section 24(1) is created by the non-obstante clause in section
24(2) by providing that in case the requisite steps have not been
taken for 5 years or more, then there is lapse as a negative
condition. The proviso contemplates higher compensation, in
E case compensation has not been paid, and the amount has not
been deposited with respect to the majority of the holdings, to all
the beneficiaries under the Act of 2013, who were holding land
on the date of notification under Section 4. If the proviso is added,
section 24(1)(b) will destroy the very provision of section 24(1)(b)
F providing proceedings to continue under the Act of 1894, which
is not the function of the proviso to substitute the main Section
but to explain it. It is not to cause repugnancy with the main
provision. The function of the proviso is to explain or widen the
scope. It is a settled proposition of law that the proviso cannot
travel beyond the provision to which it is attached. The proviso
G would travel beyond the Act of 1894 as it is the intention of section
24(1)(b) the proceedings to govern by the Act of 1894. Thus, the
proviso has no space to exist with section 24(1) (b), and it has
rightly not been attached by Parliament, with Section 24(2) and
has been placed at the right place where it should have been.
H The proviso is part of the scheme of section 24(2), and the entire
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL & 19
ORS. ETC.

provision of section 24(2), including the proviso, operates when A
inaction is there for a period of 5 years or more, as contemplated
therein. [Paras 185, 186][197 D-H][198-A][198 C-D]
8. In re: Proviso to be read as part of provision it is
appended
A proviso has to be construed as a part of the clause to B
which it is appended. A proviso is added to a principal provision
to which it is attached. It does not enlarge the enactment. In
case the provision is repugnant to the enacting part, the proviso
cannot prevail. The proviso cannot nullify the provision of Section
24(1)(b) nor can it set at naught the real object of the enactment, C
but it can further by providing higher compensation, thus dealing
with matters in Section 24 (2). Therefore, in effect, where award
is not made [Section 24 (1)(a)] as well as where award is made
but compensation is not deposited in respect of majority of the
landowners in a notification (for acquisition) [i.e. proviso to Section
24 (2)] compensation is payable in terms of the new Act, i.e., Act D
of 2013. For the said reasons, considering the placement of the
proviso, semi-colon having been used at the end of section 24(2),
considering the interpretation of section 24(1)(b) and the
repugnancy which would be caused in case the proviso is lifted
which is not permissible and particularly when reading the word E
‘or’ as ‘nor’ in section 24(2), it has to be placed where the
legislature has legislated it, it has not been wrongly placed as
part of section 24(2) but is intended for beneficial results of higher
compensation for one and all where there is no lapse, but amount
not deposited as required. [Paras 190, 196, 197][200 B-C]
[207 C-F] F

State of Rajasthan v. Leela Jain & Ors [1965] 1
SCR 276; Sales-tax Officer, Circle 1, Jabalpur v.
Hanuman Prasad [1967] 1 SCR 831; Commissioner of
Commercial Taxes, Board of Revenue, Madras and Anr.
v. Ramkishan Shrikishan Jhaver etc AIR (1968) SC 59 : G
[1968] SCR 148; S. Sundaram Pillai & Ors. v. V.R.
Pattabiraman & Ors (1985) 1 SCC 591 : [1985] 2
SCR 643; Ishverlal Thakorelal Almaula v. Motibhai
Nagjibhai [1966] 1 SCR 367; Haryana State
Cooperative Land Development Bank Ltd. v. Haryana H
20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A State Cooperative Land Development Banks Employees
Union & Anr. (2004) 1 SCC 574 : [2003] 6 Suppl. SCR
1039; Shimbhu & Anr. v. State of Haryana, (2014) 13
SCC 318 : [2013] 14 SCR 136; Kedarnath Jute
Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. The Commercial Tax Officer
and Ors., [1965] 3 SCR 626; Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil
B
Mills & Ginning Factory v. Subhash Chandra Yograj
Sinha, AIR 1961 SC 1596; Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka
Das Saraf, (1976) 1 SCC 128 : [1976[ 1 SCR 277; The
Commissioner of Income-tax, Mysore, Travancore-
Cochin and Coorg, Bangalore v. The Indo Mercantile
C Bank Ltd., [1959] (Supp) 2 SCR 256; Romesh Kumar
Sharma v. Union of India and Ors. (2006) 6 SCC 510 :
[2006] 4 Suppl. SCR 227; Motiram Ghelabhai v. Jagan
Nagar & Ors (1985) 2 SCC 279 : [1985] 2 SCR 1051;
Madhu Gopal v. VI Additional District Judge & Ors.
(1988) 4 SCC 644 : [1988] 3 Suppl. SCR 276; The
D
King v. Dominion Engineering Co. Ltd. AIR (34) 1947
PC 94 – relied on
Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edn. - referred to
9. In re: What is the meaning to be given to the word “paid”
E used in section 24(2) and “deposited” used in the proviso to
section 24(2)
9.1 The provisions of Section 31 of the Act of 1894 are
attracted to the interpretation of provisions of section 24(2) to
find out the meaning of the words ‘paid’ and ‘deposited’. Section
F 31(1) makes it clear that on passing of award compensation has
to be tendered to the beneficiaries and Collector shall pay it to
them. The payment is provided only in section 31(1). The
expression ‘tender’ and pay to them in section 31(1) cannot
include the term ‘deposited.’ Section 31(2) of the Act of 1894
deals with deposit in case Collector is ‘prevented’ from making
G payment by one or more contingencies mentioned in section
31(2). The deposit follows if the Collector is prevented from
making payment. In case Collector is prevented from making
payment due to contingencies, such refusal to receive the amount,
or if there be no person competent to alienate the land, or if
H there is a dispute as to the title to receive the compensation or
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 21

as to the apportionment of it, he (i.e. the Collector) may withhold A
it or in case there is dispute as to apportionment, he may ask the
parties to get a decision from the Reference Court i.e., civil court
and to clear the title. In such exigencies, the amount of
compensation is required to be deposited in the court to which
reference would be submitted under section 18. Section 31(2)
B
requires deposit in case of reference under section 18 and not
the reference, which may be sought under section 30 or section
28A of the Act of 1894. [Paras 198, 199][208 B-F]
9.2 Section 24(2) deals with the expression where
compensation has not been paid. It would mean that it has not
been tendered for payment under section 31(1). Though the word C
‘paid’ amounts to a completed event, however, once payment of
compensation has been offered/tendered under section 31(1), the
acquiring authority cannot be penalized for non-payment as the
amount has remained unpaid due to refusal to accept, by the
landowner and Collector is prevented from making the payment. D
Thus, the word ‘paid’ used in section 24(2) cannot be said to
include within its ken ‘deposit’ under section 31(2). For that,
special provision has been carved out in the proviso to section
24(2), which deals with the amount to be deposited in the account
of beneficiaries. Two different expressions have been used in
section 24. In the main part of section 24, the word ‘paid’ and in E
its proviso ‘deposited’ have been used. [Para 200][208 F-H][209-
A]
9.3 The consequence of non-deposit of the amount has been
dealt with in section 34 of the Act of 1894. As per section 24(2),
if the amount has not been paid nor possession has been taken, F
it provides for lapse. Whereas the proviso indicates amount has
not been deposited with respect to a majority of land holdings in
a case initiated under the Act of 1894 for 5 years or more. The
period of five years need not have been specified in the proviso
as it is part of section 24(2) and has to be read with it. Two different G
consequences of non-deposit of compensation are: (i) higher
compensation in a case where possession has been taken,
payment has been made to some and amount has not been
deposited with respect to majority of the holdings, (ii) in case

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22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A there is no lapse, the beneficiaries would be entitled to interest
as envisaged under section 34 from the date of taking possession
at the rate of 9% per annum for the first year and after that @
15% per annum. [Para 201][209 B-D]
9.4 The word “paid” in Section 31(1) to the landowner
B cannot include in its ambit the expression “deposited” in court.
Deposit cannot be said to be payment made to landowners.
Deposit is on being prevented from payment. However, in case
there is a tender of the amount that is to mean amount is made
available to the landowner that would be a discharge of the
obligation to make the payment and in that event such a person
C cannot be penalised for the default in making the payment. In
default to deposit in court, the liability is to make the payment of
interest under Section 34 of Act of 1894. The concept of “deposit”
is different and quite apart from the word “paid”, due to which,
lapse is provided in Section 24 of Act of 2013. In the case of non-
D deposit for the majority of landholdings, higher compensation
would follow as such word “paid” cannot include in its ambit word
“deposited”. To hold otherwise would be contrary to provisions
contained in Section 24(2) and its proviso carrying different
consequences. [Paras 203, 204][209 G-H][210-A][210 D-E]
E 9.5 There is a breach of obligation to deposit even if it is
taken that amount to be deposited in the reference court in
exigencies being prevented from payment as provided in Section
31(2). The default will not have the effect of reopening the
concluded proceedings. The legal position and consequence
which prevailed from 1893 till 2013 on failure to deposit was only
F the liability for interest and all those transactions were never
sought to be invalidated by the provisions contained in Section
24. It is only in the case where in a pending proceeding for a
period of five years or more, the steps have not been taken for
taking possession and for payment of compensation, then there
G is a lapse under section 24(2). In case amount has not been
deposited with respect to majority of land holdings, higher
compensation has to follow. [Para 205][210 F-H][211-A]
9.6 When amount has been tendered, the obligation has
been fulfilled by the Collector. Landowners cannot be forced to
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 23

receive it. In case a person has not accepted the amount and A
wants to take the advantage of non-payment, though the amount
has remained due to his own act, it is not open to him to contend
that amount has not been paid to him, as such, there should be
lapse of the proceedings. Even in a case when offer for payment
has been made but not deposited, liability to pay amount along
B
with interest subsist and if not deposited for majority of holding,
for that adequate provisions have been given in the proviso also
to Section 24(2). The scheme of the Act of 2013 in Sections 77
and 80 is also the same as that provided in Sections 31 and 34 of
the Act of 1894. [Para 206][211 B-D]
9.7 Judicial notice is taken of the fact in no other C
Government security rate of interest is higher on the amount
being invested under sections 32 and 33 of the Act of 1894. Higher
rate of interest is available under section 34 to the advantage of
landowners. [Para 207][211 E-F]
9.8 Under the old regime, it was open to the Collector to D
fix a convenient date or dates for announcement of award, and
tender payment. In the event of refusal by the landowner to
receive, or in other cases, such as absence of the true owner, or
in case of dispute as to who was to receive it, no doubt, the statute
provided that the amount was to be deposited with the court: as E
it does today, under Section 77. Yet, neither during the time when
the Act of 1894 was in operation, nor under the Act of 2013, the
entire acquisition does not lapse for non-deposit of the
compensation amount in court. Thus, it would be incorrect to
imply that failure to deposit compensation [in court, under Section
31 (2)] would entail lapse, if the amounts have not been paid for F
five years or more prior to the coming into force of the Act of
2013. Such an interpretation would lead to retrospective
operation, of a provision, and the nullification of acquisition
proceedings, long completed, by imposition of a norm or standard,
and its application for a time when it did not exist. If the expression G
“deposited” is held to be included in the expression “paid” used
in Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, inconsistency and repugnancy
would be caused as between the proviso and the main sub-section,
which has to be avoided and the non-compliance of the provisions
of Section 31(2) is not fatal. Even if the amount has not been
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24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A deposited, higher compensation has to follow in the exigency
proviso to Section 24(2). It is apparent that “tender” of the amount
saves the party tendering it from the consequence to be visited
on non-payment of the amount. [Paras 208, 209, 211][211 G-
H][212-A-D][212-F]
B The Straw Board Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Saharanpur
v. Gobind [1962] (Supp 3) SCR 318; The Management
of Delhi Transport Undertaking v. The Industrial
Tribunal, Delhi & Anr [1965] 1 SCR 998; Indian
Oxygen Ltd. v. Narayan Bhoumik (1968) 1 PLJR 94;
The Benares State Bank Ltd. v. The Commissioner of
C Income Tax, Lucknow (1969) 2 SCC 316 : [1970] 1
SCR 669; Bharat Aluminium Company v. Kaiser
Aluminium Technical Services Inc. (2012) 9 SCC 552 :
[2012] 12 SCR 327; The Member, Board of Revenue v.
Arthur Paul Benthall [1955] 2 SCR 842; Commissioner
D of Income Tax, New Delhi v. M/s. East West Import and
Export (P) Ltd (1989) 1 SCC 760 : [1989] 1 SCR 570
– relied on
Crawford v. Spooner (1846) 6 Moore PC 1; Lord
Howard de Walden v. IRC & Anr (1948) 2 AER 825 –
E referred to
9.9 Two different expressions have been used in Section
24(2). The expression “paid” has been used in Section 24(2) and
whereas in the proviso “deposited” has been used.
“Paid” cannot include “deposit”, or else Parliament would
F have used different expressions in the main sub-section and its
proviso, if the meaning were to be the same. The Court cannot
add or subtract any word in the statute and has to give plain
meaning and when compensation has not been paid under Section
24(2), it cannot mean compensation has not been deposited as
G used in the proviso. While interpreting the statutory provisions,
addition or subtraction in the legislation is not permissible. There
cannot be any departure from the words of law, as observed in
legal maxim “A Verbis Legis Non Est Recedendum”. There is a
conscious omission of the word “deposit” in Section 24(2), which
has been used in the proviso. Parliament cannot be said to have
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 25

used the different words carrying the same meaning in the same A
provision, whereas words “paid” and “deposited” carry a totally
different meaning. Payment is actually made to the landowner
and deposit is made in the court, that is not the payment made to
the landowner. It may be discharge of liability of payment of
interest and not more than that. Applying the rule of literal
B
construction also natural, ordinary and popular meaning of the
words “paid” and “deposited” do not carry the same meaning;
the natural and grammatical meaning has to be given to them.
[Para 215][214 F-H][215 A-D]
Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh
– referred to C

9.10 When two different expressions are used in the same
provision of a statute, there is a presumption that they are not
used in the same sense. [Para 216][216 G-H][217-A]
10. In re: Rules framed under Section 55 and the Standing D
Orders issued by State Governments
10.1 Rules and the Standing Orders are binding on the
concerned Authorities and they have to follow them. They deposit
the amounts in court only when a reference (for higher
compensation) is sought, not otherwise. Even if a person refuses E
to accept it and the amount is deposited in court or even it is not
tendered, only higher interest follows under Section 34. Once
Rules have prevailed since long and even if it is assumed that
deposit in court is mandatory on being prevented from payment
as envisaged under Section 31(1), the only liability to make the
payment of higher interest is fastened upon the State. The liability F
to pay the amount with interest would subsist. When amounts
are deposited in court, there would occur a procedural irregularity
and the adverse consequence envisaged is under Section 34 of
the Act of 1894. The consequence of non-deposit in the court is
that the amount of the landowner cannot be invested in the G
Government securities as envisaged under Sections 32 and 33
of the Act of 1894, in which interest is not more 15 per cent.
Thus, no prejudice is caused to the landowners rather they stand
to gain and still payment is safe as it is kept in the court.
Acquisition cannot be invalidated, only higher compensation would
follow in case amount has not been deposited with respect to H
26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A majority of land holdings, all the beneficiaries would be entitled
for higher compensation as envisaged in the proviso to Section
24(2). [Para 229][227 G-H][228 A-D]
10.2 It is clear that once land is acquired, award passed
and possession has been taken, it has vested in the State. It had
B been allotted to beneficiaries. A considerable infrastructure could
have been developed and a third-party interest had also
intervened. The land would have been given by the acquiring
authorities to the beneficiaries from whose schemes the land had
been acquired and they have developed immense infrastructure.
Merely by deposit of amount in treasury instead of court would
C not invalidate all the acquisitions, which have taken place. [Para
241][235 G-H][236-A]
10.3 The proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, intends
that the Collector would have sufficient funds to deposit it with
respect to the majority of landholdings. In case compensation
D has not been paid or deposited with respect to majority of land
holdings, all the beneficiaries are entitled for higher compensation.
In case money has not been deposited with the Land Acquisition
Collector or in the treasury or in court with respect to majority of
landholdings, the consequence has to follow of higher
E compensation as per proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013.
Even otherwise, if deposit in treasury is irregular, then the interest
would follow as envisaged under Section 34 of Act of 1894. Section
24(2) is attracted if acquisition proceeding is not completed within
5 years after the pronouncement of award. Parliament considered
the period of 5 years as reasonable time to complete the
F acquisition proceedings i.e., taking physical possession of the
land and payment of compensation. It is the clear intent of the
Act of 2013, that provision of Section 24(2) shall apply to the
proceeding which is pending as on the date on which the Act of
2013, has been brought into force and it does not apply to the
G concluded proceedings. Section 24(2) is not a tool to revive those
proceedings and to question the validity of taking acquisition
proceedings due to which possession in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s were
taken, or to question the manner of deposit of amount in the
treasury. In case such landowners were interested in questioning
the proceedings of taking possession or mode of deposit with
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 27

the treasury, such a challenge was permissible within the time A
available with them to do so. [Para 242][236 B-H]
Jankinath Sarangi v. State of Orissa (1969) 3 SCC 392;
Sunil Kumar Banerjee v. State of West Bengal and Ors.
(1980) 3 SCC 304 : [1980] 3 SCR 179; State of Andhra
Pradesh v. Thakkidiram Reddy (1998) 6 SCC 554 : B
[1998] 3 SCR 1088; Ram Deen Maurya (Dr.) v. State
of Uttar Pradesh and Ors (2009) 6 SCC 735 : [2009] 6
SCR 703; Rai Vimal Krishna and Ors. v. State of Bihar
& Ors. (2003) 6 SCC 401 : [2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 358;
Hissar Improvement v. Smt. Rukmani Devi and Anr
(1990) Supp SCC 806; Kishan Das v. State of U.P C
(1995) 6 SCC 240 : [1995] 3 Suppl. SCR 584; D-Block
Ashok Nagar (Sahibabad) Plot Holders’ Assn. v. State
of U.P. (1997) 10 SCC 77 : [1997] 3 SCR 1096 – relied
on
Howard v. Secretary of State for the Environment, (1975) D
Q.B. 235; Belvedere Court Management Ltd. v.
Frogmore Developments Ltd. (1996) 3 W.L.R. 1008 –
referred to
11. Mode of taking possession under the Act of 1894
E
11.1 Section 16 of the Act of 1894 provided that possession
of land may be taken by the State Government after passing of an
award and thereupon land vest free from all encumbrances in the
State Government. Similar are the provisions made in the case of
urgency in Section 17(1). The word “possession” has been used
in the Act of 1894, whereas in Section 24(2) of Act of 2013, the F
expression “physical possession” is used. What was
contemplated under the Act of 1894, by taking the possession
meant only physical possession of the land. Taking over the
possession under the Act of 2013 always amounted to taking over
physical possession of the land. When the State Government G
acquires land and draws up a memorandum of taking possession,
that amounts to taking the physical possession of the land. On
the large chunk of property or otherwise which is acquired, the
Government is not supposed to put some other person or the
police force in possession to retain it and start cultivating it till
the land is used by it for the purpose for which it has been acquired. H
28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A The Government is not supposed to start residing or to physically
occupy it once possession has been taken by drawing the inquest
proceedings for obtaining possession thereof. Thereafter, if any
further retaining of land or any re-entry is made on the land or
someone starts cultivation on the open land or starts residing in
the outhouse, etc., is deemed to be the trespasser on land which
B
is in possession of the State. [Paras 244, 245][237 G-H][238-
A][238 C-F]
11.2 The concept of possession is complex one. It comprises
the right to possess and to exclude others, essential is animus
possidendi. Possession depends upon the character of the thing
C which is possessed. If the land is not capable of any use, mere
non-user of it does not lead to the inference that the owner is not
in possession. The established principle is that the possession
follows title. Possession comprises of the control over the
property. The element of possession is the physical control or
D the power over the object and intention or will to exercise the
power. Corpus and animus are both necessary and have to co-
exist. [Para 247][239 A-C]
Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs,
West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja & Ors. (1979) 4 SCC
E 274 : [1980] 1 SCR 323; Ram Dass v. Davinder (2004)
3 SCC 684; Bhinka & Ors. v. Charan Singh [1959]
(Suppl 2) SCR 798; V. Chandrasekaran & Anr. v.
Administrative Officer & Ors (2012) 12 SCC 133 :
[2012] 10 SCR 603 – relied on

F S.M. Yaqub v. T.N. Basu AIR 1949 Pat 146 – referred
to Kynoch Limited v. Rowlands (1912) 1 Ch 527 –
referred to
Mitra’s “Law of Possession and Ownership of Property”,
2nd Edn.; Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, West Publishing
G Co.; Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law, Ed. 1969 – referred to
11.3 It is apparent that vesting is with possession and the
statute has provided under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act of 1894
that once possession is taken, absolute vesting occurred. It is an
indefeasible right and vesting is with possession thereafter. The
vesting specified under section 16, takes place after various steps,
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 29

such as, notification under section 4, declaration under section A
6, notice under section 9, award under section 11 and then
possession. The statutory provision of vesting of property
absolutely free from all encumbrances has to be accorded full
effect. Not only the possession vests in the State but all other
encumbrances are also removed forthwith.
B
The title of the landholder ceases and the state becomes
the absolute owner and in possession of the property. Thereafter
there is no control of the land-owner over the property. He cannot
have any animus to take the property and to control it. Even if he
has retained the possession or otherwise trespassed upon it after
possession has been taken by the State, he is a trespasser and C
such possession of trespasser enures for his benefit and on behalf
of the owner. The word ‘vest’ has to be construed in the context
in which it is used in a particular provision of the Act. Vesting is
absolute and free from all encumbrances that includes possession.
Once there is vesting of land, once possession has been taken, D
section 24(2) does not contemplate divesting of the property from
the State. [Paras 256, 258][245 E-H][246 G-H][247-A]
Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat (1998) 4
SCC 387 : [1998] 2 SCR 339; B.R. Enterprises v. State
of U.P. and Ors., (1999) 9 SCC 700 : [1999] 2 SCR E
1111; Kailash Nath Agarwal and Ors. v. Pradeshiya
Industrial & Investment Corporation of U.P. Ltd. and
Anr., (2003) 4 SCC 305 : [2003] 1 SCR 1159; DLF
Qutab Enclave Complex Educational Charitable Trust
v. State of Haryana and Ors., (2003) 5 SCC 622 : [2003]
2 SCR 1; Sita Ram Bhandar Society, New Delhi v. F
Lieutenant Governor, Government of NCT, Delhi and
Ors., (2009) 10 SCC 501 : [2009] 14 SCR 507;
Balmokand Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust,
Amritsar v. State of Punjab & Ors (1996) 4
SCC 212 : [1996] 2 SCR 643; P.K. Kalburqi v. State of G
Karnataka and Ors. (2005) 12 SCC 489; National
Textile Corporation Ltd. v. Nareshkumar Badrikumar
Jagad & Ors 2011 (12) SCC 695 : [2011] 14 SCR 472;
M. Venkatesh and Ors. v. Commissioner,
Bangalore Development Authority, etc. (2015) 17
SCC 1 : [2015] 15 SCR 499; Ram Singh v. H
30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A Jammu Development Authority (2017) 13 SCC 474 –
relied on
Ramesh Bejoy Sharma v. Pashupati Rai (1979) 4
SCC 27 : [1980] 1 SCR 6; Maguni Charan Dwivedi v.
State of Orissa (1976) 2 SCC 134 : [1976] 3 SCR 76;
B Sri Tarkeshwar Sio Thakur Jiu v. Dar Dass Dey & Co.
(1979) 3 SCC 106; Karanpura Development Co. v.
Union of India (1988) Supp. SCC 488 – distinguished
Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay &
Corporation & Anr (2001) 8 SCC 143 : [2001] 2 Suppl.
C SCR 50; NAL Layout Residents Association v. Bangalore
Development Authority Ors. v. Hindustan Petroleum
(2018) 12 SCC 400 : [2017] 13 SCR 1053 – referred
to
Richardson v. Robertson, (1862) 6 LT 75 – referred to
D 11.4 Under the Act of 1894, when possession is taken after
award is passed under section 16 or under section 17 before the
passing of the award, land absolutely vests in the State on drawing
of Panchnama of taking possession, which is the mode of taking
possession. Thereafter, any re-entry in possession or retaining
E the possession is wholly illegal and trespasser’s possession inures
for the benefit of the owner and even in the case of open land,
possession is deemed to be that of the owner. When the land is
vacant and is lying open, it is presumed to be that of the owner.
Mere re-entry on Government land once it is acquired and vests
absolutely in the State (under the Act of 1894) does not confer,
F any right to it and Section 24(2) does not have the effect of
divesting the land once it vests in the State. [Para 272][255 G-
H][256 A-C]
Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana (2012) 1
SCC 792 : [2011] 14 SCR 1113 – Not correct law
G
Kashi Bai v. Sudha Rani Ghose (2012) 5 SCC 370 :
[2012] 3 SCR 841 – relied on
11.5 The court is alive to the fact that there are a large
number of cases where, after acquisition, land has been handed
over to various corporations, local authorities, acquiring bodies,
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 31

etc. After depositing compensation (for the acquisition) those A
bodies and authorities have been handed possession of lands.
They, in turn, after development of such acquired lands have
handed over properties; third party interests have intervened
and now declaration is sought under the cover of section 24(2) to
invalidate all such actions. As already held, section 24 does not
B
intend to cover such cases at all and such gross misuse of the
provisions of law must stop. Title once vested, cannot be
obliterated, without an express legal provision; in any case, even
if the landowners’ argument that after possession too, in case of
non-payment of compensation, the acquisition would lapse, were
for arguments’ sake, be accepted, these third party owners would C
be deprived of their lands, lawfully acquired by them, without
compensation of any sort. [Para 277][258-H][259 A-C]
Velaxan Kumar v Union of India (2015) 4 SCC 325;
Narmada Bachao Andolan v. State of M.P. (2011) 7
SCC 639 : [2011] 6 SCR 443 – overuled D
Maria Margadia Sequeria v Erasmo Jack De Sequeria
(2012) 5 SCC 370 : [2012] 3 SCR 841; National
Thermal Power Ltd v Mahesh Dutta (2009) 8 SCC
339 : [2009] 10 SCR 1084; V. Chandrasekaran & Anr.
v. Administrative Officer & Ors. (2012) 12 SCC 133 : E
[2012] 10 SCR 603 – relied on
12. The effect of interim order of Court
12.1 There are two requirements under Section 24(2), which
are to be met by the Authorities, where award has been made 5
years or more prior to the commencement of the Act of 2013, if F
the physical possession of the land has not been taken nor
compensation has been paid. If possession has been taken,
compensation has to be paid by the acquiring authorities. The
time of five years is provided for authorities to take action, not to
sleep over the matter. Lapse is provided only in case of default G
by Authorities acquiring the land, not caused by any other reason
or order of the court. When the interpretation of the provision is
clear, there was no necessity for Parliament to make such a
provision under Section 24(2) for exclusion of the period of the
interim order. Though it has excluded the period of interim order
H
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A for making declaration under the proviso to Sections 19(7) and
exclusion has also been made for computation of the period under
Section 69 of the Act of 2013, it is due to the necessity to provide
so in view of the language of the provision. The provisions of
Section 24 cast an obligation upon the Authorities to take steps
meaning thereby that it is open to them to take such steps, and
B
inaction or lethargy on their part has not been countenanced by
Parliament. Resultantly, lapse of proceedings takes place. [Para
282][261 C-H][262-A]
State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Khandaka Jain Jewellers
(2007) 14 SCC 339 : [2007] 12 SCR 105; Padma
C Sundara Rao (Dead) & Ors. v. State of T.N. & Ors.,
(2002) 3 SCC 533 : [2002] 2 SCR 383; Union of India
v. SICOM Ltd (2009) 2 SCC 121 : [2008] 17 SCR 120
– referred to
12.2 It is not the intendment of the Act of 2013 that those
D who have litigated should get benefits of higher compensation as
contemplated under Section 24 benefit is conferred on all
beneficiaries. It is not intended by the provisions that in piecemeal
the persons who have litigated and have obtained the interim
order should get the benefits of the provisions of the Act of 2013.
E Those who have accepted the compensation within 5 years and
handed over the possession too, are to be benefited, in case
amount has not been deposited with respect to majority of
holdings. There are cases in which projects have come up in part
and as per plan rest of the area is required for planned
development with respect to which interim stays have been
F obtained. It is not the intendment of the law to deliver advantage
to relentless litigants. It cannot be said hence, that it was due to
the inaction of the authorities that possession could not be taken
within 5 years. Public policy is not to foment or foster litigation
but put an end to it. In several instances, in various High Courts
G writ petitions were dismissed by single judge Benches and the
writ appeals were pending for a long time and in which, with
respect to part of land of the projects, efforts were made to obtain
the benefit of Section 24(2). Parliament did not intend to confer
benefits to such litigants for the aforementioned reasons.
Litigation may be frivolous or may be worthy. Such litigants have
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 33

to stand on the strength of their own case and in such a case A
provisions of Section 114 of the Act of 2013 and Section 6 of the
General Clauses Act, 1897, are clearly attracted and such
proceedings have to be continued under the provisions of the
old Act that would be in the spirit of Section 24(1)(b) itself of the
Act of 2013. Section 6(b) of the General Clauses Act, 1897,
B
provides that repeal will not affect the previous operation of any
enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered
thereunder. Section 6(c) states that repeal would not affect any
right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or
incurred under any enactment so repealed. When there is a
provision itself in Section 24(1)(b) of continuance of the C
proceedings where award has been passed under the Act of 1894,
for the purposes of Section 24 as provided in Section 24(b), the
provisions of Section 114 is clearly attracted so as the provisions
of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, to the extent of
non obstante clause of Section 24, where possession has not been
D
taken nor payment has been made, there is a lapse, that too by
the inaction of the Authorities. Any court’s interim order cannot
be said to be inaction of the authorities or agencies; thus, time
period is not to be included for counting the 5 years period as
envisaged in Section 24(2). [Para 287][263 F-H][264 A-G]
Union of India and Ors. v. Modi Rubber Ltd (1986) 4 E
SCC 66 : [1986] 3 SCR 587 – relied on
Syndicate Bank v. Prabha D. Naik and Anr (2001) 4
SCC 713 : [2001] 2 SCR 714 – held inapplicable
Madan Singh Shekhawat v. Union of India (1999) 6 F
SCC 459; State of U.P. and Ors. v. Hindustan Aluminium
Corpn. and Ors. (1979) 3 SCC 229 : [1979] 3
SCR 709; M. Pentiah v. Muddala Veeramallappa [1961]
2 SCR 295; Hameedia Hardware Stores v. B. Mohan
Lal Sowcar (1988) 2 SCC 513 : [1988] 3 SCR 384 –
referred to G
Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher (1949) 2 K.B. 481
– referred to

H
34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A 12.3 In cases where some landowners have chosen to take
recourse to litigation (which they have a right to) and have
obtained interim orders on taking possession or orders of status
quo, as a matter of practical reality it is not possible for the
authorities or State officials to take the possession or to make
payment of the compensation. In several instances, such interim
B
orders also impeded the making of an award. Now, so far as awards
(and compensation payments, pursuant to such proceedings were
concerned) the period provided for making of awards under the
Act of 2013 could be excluded by virtue of Explanation to Section
11A. Thus, no fault of inaction can be attributed to the authorities
C and those who had obtained such interim orders, cannot benefit
by their own action in filing litigation, which may or may not be
meritorious. Apart from the question of merits, when there is an
interim order with respect to the possession or order of status
quo or stay of further proceedings, the authorities cannot proceed;
nor can they pay compensation. Their obligations are intertwined
D
with the scheme of land acquisition. It is observed that authorities
may wait in the proceedings till the interim order is vacated. [Para
297][272-B-E]
Abhey Ram (Dead) by L.Rs. and Ors. v. Union of India
and Ors (1997) 5 SCC 421 : [1997] 3 SCR 931; Om
E Parkash v. Union of India and Ors. (2010) 4 SCC 17 :
[2010] 2 SCR 447; Suresh Chand v. Gulam Chisti
(1990) 1 SCC 593 : [1990] 1 SCR 186; Shyam Sunder
and Ors. v. Ram Kumar and Anr. (2001) 8 SCC 24 :
[2001] 1 Suppl. SCR 115 – relied on
F Union of India v. Shiv Raj (2014) 6 SCC 564 : [2014]
8 SCR 751; Karnail Kaur v State of Punjab (2015) 3
SCC 206; Rajive Chowdhrie HUF v State (NCT) of Delhi
(2015) 3 SCC 541 – distinguished
Union of India and Ors. v. North Telumer Colliery &
G Ors (1989) 3 SCC 411 : [1989] 3 SCR 455 – referred
to
12.4 There is no dispute with the proposition that casus
omissus cannot be applied by the court and in case of clear
necessity, the court has to interpret the law, if the provision of
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 35

law is misused and subjected to abuse of process of law. It is for A
the legislature to amend, modify and repeal a law, if deemed
necessary. Because of the interpretation of the provisions of
Section 24 itself, casus omissus is not applied in this case. [Para
309][281 A-B]
State of Karnataka v. D.C. Nanjudaiah (1996) 10 B
SCC 619 : [1996] 5 Suppl. SCR 222; Rana Girders
Ltd. v. Union of India (2013) 10 SCC 746 : [2013] 14
SCR 58 – referred to
12.5 There is no doubt that common law principles have to
be weighed upon the statutory provision and latter has to prevail, C
but the statutory provision itself makes it clear that in the instant
matter such period has to be excluded, thus, the principles of
common law also apply with full force. The maxim “lex non cogit
ad impossibilia” means that the law does not expect the
performance of the impossible. There are cases in which
compensation was tendered, but refused and then deposited in D
the treasury. There was litigation in court, which was pending (or
in some cases, decided); earlier references for enhancement of
compensation were sought and compensation was enhanced.
There was no challenge to acquisition proceedings or taking
possession etc. In pending matters in this Court or in the High E
Court even in proceedings relating to compensation, Section 24
(2) was invoked to state that proceedings have lapsed due to
non-deposit of compensation in the court or to deposit in the
treasury or otherwise due to interim order of the court needful
could not be done, as such proceedings should lapse. [Paras 311,
312][311 D-E][283 C-F] F

Mary Angel and Ors. v. State of T.N. (1999) 5
SCC 209 : [1999] 3 SCR 594; Chander Kishore Jha v.
Mahabir Prasad (1999) 8 SCC 266 : [1999] 2 Suppl.
SCR 754; Mohammed Gazi v. State of M.P. & Ors.
(2000) 4 SCC 342 : [2012] 3 SCR 841; Industrial G
Finance Corporation of India Ltd. v. Cannanore
Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. & Ors. (2002) 5 SCC
54 : [2002] 2 SCR 1093; HUDA and Anr. v. Dr.
Babeswar Kanhar & Anr (2005) 1 SCC 191 : [2004] 6
Suppl. SCR 282 – referred to H
36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A 12.6 Another Roman Law maxim “nemo tenetur ad
impossibilia”, means no one is bound to do an impossibility.
Though such acts of taking possession and disbursement of
compensation are not impossible, yet they are not capable of law
performance, during subsistence of a court’s order; the order
has to be complied and cannot be violated. Thus, on equitable
B
principles also, such a period has to be excluded. The maxim
actus curiae neminem gravabit is founded upon the principle that
due to court proceedings or acts of court, no party should suffer.
If any interim orders are made during the pendency of the
litigation, they are subject to the final decision in the matter. In
C case the matter is dismissed as without merit, the interim order
is automatically dissolved. In case litigation has been filed
frivolously or without any basis, iniquitously in order to delay and
by that it is delayed, there is no equity in favour of such a person.
Such cases are required to be decided on merits. It is not the
policy of law that untenable claims should get fructified due to
D
delay. Similarly, sufferance of a person who abides by law is not
permissible. The Act of 2013 does not confer the benefit on
unscrupulous litigants, but it frowns upon the lethargy of the
officials to complete the requisites within five years. [Paras 314,
318, 319][284 D-E][287 F-H][288-A][288 B-C]
E re Presidential Poll (1974) 2 SCC 33 : [1975] 1
SCR 504; Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of
Enforcement (2005) 4 SCC 530 : [2005] 1 Suppl.
SCR 49 – relied on
Superintendent of Taxes v. Onkarmal Nathmal Trust
F (1976) 1 SCC 766 : [1975] Suppl. SCR 365 –
distinguished
Neeraj Kumar Sainy v. the State of U.P. (2017) 14
SCC 136 : [2017] 4 SCR 881 – held inapplicable

G Mrutunjay Pani and Anr. v. Narmada Bala Sasmal and
Anr AIR 1961 SC 1353 : [1962] SCR 290 – referred
to
Sambasiva Chari v. Ramasami Reddi ILR (1899) 22
Mad 179; G.T.C. Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (1998)
3 SCC 376; Jaipur Municipal Corporation v. C. L.
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 37

Mishra (2005) 8 SCC 423; Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. C.I.T A
(1980) 2 SCC 191 : [1980] 2 SCR 765; Mahadeo
Savlaram Shelke v. Pune Municipal Corporation (1995)
3 SCC 33 : [1995] 1 SCR 543; Amarjeet Singh and
Ors. v. Devi Ratan and Ors (2010) 1 SCC 417 : [2009]
15 SCR 1010; Karnataka Rare Earth and Anr. v. Senior
B
Geologist, Department of Mines & Geology (2004) 2
SCC 783 : [2004] 1 SCR 965; Assistant Collector of
Central Excise v. National Tobacco Company of India
Ltd. (1972) 2 SCC 560 : [1973] 1 SCR 822; Karnataka
State v. Union of India (1977) 4 SCC 608 : [1978] 2
SCR 1 – referred to C
Colquhoun v. Brooks (1889) 21 QBD 52 – referred to
Lewis Sutherland’s Statutory Construction (2 nd ed.);
Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edition) by P. St.
J. Langon – referred to
D
13. In Re: Principle of Restitution:
The principle of restitution is founded on the ideal of doing
complete justice at the end of litigation, and parties have to be
placed in the same position but for the litigation and interim order,
if any, passed in the matter. A wrong-doer or in the present E
context, a litigant who takes his chances, cannot be permitted to
gain by delaying tactics. It is the duty of the judicial system to
discourage undue enrichment or drawing of undue advantage, by
using the court as a tool. Thus, the period for which the interim
order has operated under Section 24 has to be excluded for
counting the period of 5 years under Section 24(2). [Paras 332, F
335, 336][298 G-H][306 E-F][307 D-E]
State of Gujarat & Ors. v. Essar Oil Ltd. & Anr (2012)
3 SCC 522 : [2012] 2 SCR 1127; A. Shanmugam v.
Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu Madalaya
Nandhavana Paripalanai Sangam (2012) 6 SCC 430 : G
[2012] 4 SCR 74; Indian Council for Enviro-Legal
Action v. Union of India, (2011) 8 SCC 161 : [2011] 9
SCR 146; Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. CIT, (1980) 2
SCC 191; Ram Krishna Verma v. the State of U.P. (1992)
2 SCC 620 : [1992] 2 SCR 378; Marshall Sons & Co.
H
38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A (I) Ltd. v. Sahi Oretrans (P) Ltd. and Anr., (1999) 2
SCC 325 : [1999] 1 SCR 311; Kalabharati Advertising
v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania (2010) 9 SCC 437 :
[2010] 10 SCR 971; Krishnaswamy S. Pd. v. Union of
India (2006) 3 SCC 286 : [2006] 2 SCR 390 – relied
on
B
14. Whether Section 24 revives stale and barred claim
14.1 The legality of concluded cases cannot be questioned
under the guise of Section 24(2) as it does not envisage or confer
any such right to question the proceedings and the acquisitions
C have been concluded long back, or in several rounds of litigation,
rights of the parties have been settled. The challenge to the
acquisition proceedings cannot be made within the parameters
of Section 24(2) once panchnama had been drawn of taking
possession, thereafter re-entry or retaining the possession is that
of the trespasser. The legality of the proceedings cannot be
D challenged belatedly, and the right to challenge cannot be revived
by virtue of the provisions of Section 24(2). [Paras 340, 342][309
F-G][312 F-G]
Shiv Kumar and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors 2019
(13) SCALE 698; Mahavir and Ors. v. Union of India
E (2018) 3 SCC 588 : [2017] 11 SCR 553; Hari Singh
and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors AIR 1984 SC 1020 :
[1984] 3 SCR 417; State of T.N. and Ors. v. L. Krishnan
& Ors (1996) 1 SCC 250 : [1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 663;
Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial
F Development Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd (1996) 11 SCC
501 : [1996] 5 Suppl. SCR 551; Hindustan Zinc Ltd. v.
Bhagwan Singh Bhati and Ors., (2008) 3 SCC 462 :
[2008] 4 SCR 616; Govt. of A.P. and Ors. v. Kollutla
Obi Reddy and Ors., (2005) 6 SCC 493 : [2005] 2 Suppl.
SCR 513; Jasveer Singh and Anr. v. State of Uttar
G Pradesh & Ors. (2017) 6 SCC 787 : [2017] 3 SCR
921; Swaika Properties Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. v. State of
Rajasthan and Ors (2008) 4 SCC 695 :[2008] 2 SCR
521; Haryana State Handloom and Handicrafts
Corporation Ltd. and Ors. v. Jain School Society (2003)
H 12 SCC 538; Urban Improvement Trust, Udaipur vs.
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 39

Bheru Lal and Ors (2002) 7 SCC 712 : [2002] 2 Suppl. A
SCR 512; Vishwas Nagar Evacuee Plot Purchasers
Association & Ors. v. Under Secretary, Delhi Admn. &
Ors. (1990) 2 SCC 268; U.P. State Jal Nigam and Anr.
v. Jaswant Singh and Anr (2006) 11 SCC 464 : [2006]
8 Suppl. SCR 916; Rabindranath Bose and Ors. v.
B
Union of India and Ors (1970) 1 SCC 84 : [1970] 2
SCR 697; Dharappa v. Bijapur Coop. Milk Producers
Societies Union Ltd (2007) 9 SCC 109 : [2007] 5
SCR 729; State of Karnataka v. Laxuman (2005) 8
SCC 709 : [2005] 4 Suppl. SCR 535 – relied on
State of Assam v. Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma and Ors (2015) C
5 SCC 321 : [2014] 14 SCR 1451 – referred to
14.2 There has to be legal certainty where infrastructure
has been created or has been developed partially, and investments
have been made, especially when land has been acquired long
back. It is the duty of the Court to preserve the legal certainty. D
The doctrine of laches would always preclude an indolent party,
who chooses not to approach the court, or having approached
the court, allows an adverse decision to become final, to re-agitate
the issue of acquisition of his holding. Doing so, especially in
cases, where the title has vested with the State, and thereafter E
with subsequent interests, would be contrary to public policy.
[Para 353][322 D-G]
Vodafone International Holdings B.V. v. Union of India
and Ors (2012) 6 SCC 613 : [2012] 1 SCR 573; A.P.
State Financial Corp. v. Garware Rolling Mill (1994) 2 F
SCC 647 – relied on
Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal and Ors. v. Dossibai
N.B. Jeejeebhoy (1970) 1 SCC 613 : [1970] 3 SCR
830; Canara Bank v. N.G. Subbaraya Setty and Anr
(2018) 16 SCC 228 : [2018] 3 SCR 884; Anil Kumar G
Gupta v. the State of Bihar (2012) 12 SCC 443; Ram
Chand and Ors. v. Union of India (1994) 1 SCC 44 :
[1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 558 – referred to
British Railway Board v. Pickin (1974) AC 765 – referred to
H
40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A 14.3 Section 24 cannot be used to revive dead and stale
claims and concluded cases. They cannot be inquired into within
the purview of Section 24 of the Act of 2013. The provisions of
Section 24 do not invalidate the judgments and orders of the
Court, where rights and claims have been lost and negatived.
There is no revival of the barred claims by operation of law. Thus,
B
stale and dead claims cannot be permitted to be canvassed on
the pretext of enactment of Section 24. In exceptional cases, when
in fact, the payment has not been made, but possession has been
taken, the remedy lies elsewhere if the case is not covered by
the proviso. It is the Court to consider it independently not under
C section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. [Para 359][325 C-E]
15. Section 101 provides that in case land is not utilized for
five years from the date of taking over the possession, the same
shall be returned to the original owner or owners or their legal
heirs, as the case may be, or to the Land Bank of the appropriate
D Government by reversion in the manner as may be prescribed
by the appropriate Government. Section 24 deals with lapse of
acquisition. Section 101 cannot be said to be applicable to an
acquisition made under the Act of 1894. The provision of lapse
has to be considered on its own strength and not by virtue of
Section 101 though the spirit is to give back the land to the
E original owner or owners or the legal heirs or to the Land Bank.
Return of lands is with respect to all lands acquired under the
Act of 2013 as the expression used in the opening part is “When
any land, acquired under this Act remains unutilized”. Lapse, on
the other hand, occurs when the State does not take steps in
F terms of Section 24(2). The provisions of Section 101 cannot be
applied to the acquisitions made under the Act of 1894. [Paras
360, 361][325 E-F][326 A-C]
Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr v Harakchand
Misrimal Solanki & Ors (2014) 3 SCC 183 : [2014] 1
G SCR 783; Sree Balaji Nagar Residents Association v
State of Tamil Nadu (2015) 3 SCC 353 : [2014] 7
SCR 799 – overuled
Yogesh Neema & Ors v State of Madhya Pradesh (2016)
6 SCC 387; Entertainment Network (India) Ltd. v. Super
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 41

Cassette Industries Ltd. (2008) 13 SCC 30 : [2008] 9 A
SCR 165; Southern Electricity Supply Co. of Orissa
Ltd. v. Sri Seetaram Rice Mill (2012) 2 SCC 108 : [2011]
15 SCR 211; D. Saibaba v. Bar Council of India & Ors
(2003) 6 SCC 186 : [2003] 3 SCR 1209; Government
of Andhra Pradesh & Ors v. Smt. P. Laxmi Devi (2008)
B
4 SCC 720 : [2008] 3 SCR 330; Indore Development
Authority v Shailendra (dead) through Lrs. & Ors.
(2018) SCC Online SC 100; N. Kannadasan v. Ajoy
Khose & Ors (2009) 7 SCC 1 : [2009] 7 SCR 668;
Ram Narain v. Stte of U.P. AIR 1957 SC 18 : [1956]
SCR 664; Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India C
(2002) 3 SCC 722 : [2002] 2 SCR 369; Collector of
Central Excise v. Elphinstone Spg.&Wvg.Mills Co.Ltd.
(1971)1 SCC 337 : J.Dalmia v Commissioner of Income
Tax AIR 1964 SC 1866 : [1964] SCR 579; Mobilox
Innovations (P) Ltd v. Kirusa Software (P) L t d
D
(2018) 1 SCC 353 : [2017] 10 SCR 1006; Sri K.C
Gajapati Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa [1954]
SCR 11; Jagannath Temple Managing Committee v.
Siddha Math (2015) 16 SCC 542 : [2015] SCR 46;
Gulam Mustafa v. State of Maharashtra, (1976) 1 SCC
800 : [1977] 1 SCR 875; Chandragauda Ramgonda E
Patil and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., (1996)
6 SCC 405; Banda Development Authority v. Moti Lal
Agarwal (2011) 5 SCC 394 : [2011] 7 SCR 435;
Balwant Narayan Bhagde v. M.D. Bhagwat, (1976) 1
SCC 700 : [1975] Suppl. SCR 250; State of T.N. v.
F
Mahalakshmi Ammal, (1996) 7 SCC 269 : [1995] 5
Suppl. SCR 451; T.N. Housing Board v. A. Viswam,
(1996) 8 SCC 259 : [1996] 2 SCR 402; Om Prakash
Verma & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors,
(2010) 13 SCC 158 : [2010] 15 SCR 302; A.R. Antulay
vs R.S.Nayak & Ors [1988] Suppl 1 SCR 01; Cardio G
Vascular Diseases (2014) 2 SCC 62 : [2013] 12
SCR 674; Dau Dayal v State of U.P. [1959] Supp 1
SCR 639; South Eastern Coal Field Ltd v State of M.P.
& Ors. (2003) 8 SCC 648 : [2003] 4 Suppl. SCR 651;
Dev Sharan v State of Uttar Pradesh (2011) 4
H
42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A SCC 769 : [2011] 3 SCR 728; Radhey Shyam v State of
UP. (2011) 5 SCC 553 : [2011] 8 SCR 359; Bharat
Sewak Samaj v. Lieutnant Governor & Ors. (2012) 12
SCC 675; Madhav Rao Scindhia v. Union of India
(1971) 1 SCC 85 : [1971] 3 SCR 9 (11 Judges); Smt.
Parayankandiyal Eravath v. K. Devi (1996) 4 SCC 76
B
: [1996] 2 Suppl. SCR 1 (2 Judges); Bharat Kumar v
State of Haryana (2014) 6 SCC 586; Bimla Devi v State
of Haryana (2014) 6 SCC 583; State of Haryana v
Vinod Oil and General Mills (2014) 15 SCC 410 :
[2014] 13 SCR 524; Sita Ram v State of Haryana (2015)
C 3 SCC 597; Ram Kishan v State of Haryana (2015) 4
SCC 347; Competent Automobiles Co. Ltd v Union of
India AIR 2015 SC 3186 : [2015] SCR 237; Govt of
NCT of Delhi v Jagjit Singh AIR 2015 SC 2683 : [2015]
SCR 692; Karan Singh v State of Haryana (2014) 5
SCC 738; Shashi Gupta & Ors. v. State of Haryana
D
(2016) 13 SCC 380; Delhi Development Authority v
Sukhbir Singh (2016) 16 SCC 258 : [2016] 5 SCR 227;
Ivo Agnelo Santimano Fernandes v. State of Goa (2011)
11 SCC 506 : [2011] 2 SCR 1142; Pratap Singh v. State
of Jharkhand (2005) 3 SCC 551 : [2005] 1 SCR 1019;
E Central Railway Workshop v. Vishwanath (1969) 3
SCC 95; [1970] 2 SCR 726; M/s International Ore and
Fertilisers (india) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Employee State Insurance
(1987) 4 SCC 203 : [1987] 3 SCR 981; Seksaria Cotton
mills v. State of Bombay [1953] SCR 325;
Superintendent v. Anil Kumar (1979) 4 SCC 274 :
F
[1980] 1 SCR 323; B. Gangadhar v. Rajalingam (1995)
5 SCC 238 : [1995] 1 Suppl. SCR 535; Guruchand
Singh v. Kamla Singh (1976) 2 SCC 152 : [1976] 1
SCR 739 (67); Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan (2015)
6 SCC 222 : [2015] 5 SCR 435; The Commissioner of
G Sales Tax v. Parson Tools and Plants (1975) 4 SCC 22;
G. Narayanswami v. G. Pannerselvam (1972) 3
SCC 71; Kuldip Nayar vs Union Of India (2006) 7 SCC
1 : [2006] 5 Suppl. SCR 1; Naga People’s Movement
of Human Rights vs. Union of India (1998) 2 SCC 109 :
[1997] 5 Suppl. SCR 469; R.S. Nayak v A.R. Antulay
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 43

(1984) 2 SCC 183 : [1984] 2 SCR 495; Life Insurance A
Corporation v D. J. Bahadur (1981) 1 SCC 315 : [1981]
1 SCR 1083; B. Premanand v. Mohan Koikal (2011) 4
SCC 266 : [2011] 3 SCR 932; Martin Burn Ltd v
Corporation of Calcutta [1966] 1 SCR 543;
Commissioner of Agricultural Income Tax v Keshab
B
Chandra Mandal [1950] SCR 435; State of Maharastra
v Nanded Parbhani Sangh (2000) 2 SCC 69 : [2000] 1
SCR 357; Mohd. Kavi v. Fatmabal Ibrahim (1997) 6
SCC 71; M.V. Javali v Mahajan Borewell & Co. Ltd
(1997) 8 SCC 72 : [1997] 4 Suppl. SCR 320; SMS
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla (2005) 8 SCC 89 : C
[2005] 3 Suppl. SCR 371; State of Punjab v. Mohar
Singh [1955] 1 SCR 893; J.K.Cotton Spg. & Wvg.Mils
Ltd. v. Union of India (1987) Supp SCC 350 : [1988]
SCR 700; Bengal Immunity Co.Ltd. v. State of Bihar
[1955] 2 SCR 603; MIG Cricket Club
D
v.AbhinavSahakar Education Society, (2011) 9 SCC 97
: [2011] 11 SCR 141; Ishwar Singh Bindra & Ors v
State of UP [1969] 1 SCR 219 – referred to
Giward de Walden (Lord) v. IRS (1948) 2 ALL ER 825
(HL); Secretary of State for Social Security v Tunnicliffe
[1991] 2 All ER 712; Howard de Walden (Lord) v. IRC, E
(1948) 2 All ER 825 (HL); Green v. Premier
Glynrhonwy State Co. L.R (1928) 1 KB 561 – referred
to
Case Law Reference
F
(2016) 6 SCC 387 referred to Para 2
[2003] 3 Suppl. SCR 24 referred to Para 23
[2008] 3 SCR 330 referred to Para 23
[2010] 3 SCR 485 referred to Para 23
G
[2013] 8 SCR 849 referred to Para 31
[1956] SCR 664 referred to Para 31
[2002] 2 SCR 369 referred to Para 34
(1971)1 SCC 337 referred to Para 38 H
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A [1964] SCR 579 referred to Para 38
[2017] 10 SCR 1006 referred to Para 44
[1971] SCR 977 referred to Para 44
[1969] 1 SCR 219 referred to Para 44
B [1987] 2 SCR 911 referred to Para 44
[1955] 2 SCR 603 referred to Para 47
[1954] SCR 11 referred to Para 47
[2015] SCR 46 referred to Para 47
C
[2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 534 referred to Para 50
[1977] 1 SCR 875 referred to Para 50
[2009] 14 SCR 507 relied on Para 50
(1996) 6 SCC 405 referred to Para 50
D
[2011] 7 SCR 435 referred to Para 50
[1975] Suppl. SCR 250 referred to Para 51
[1995] 5 Suppl. SCR 451 referred to Para 51
[1996] 2 SCR 402 referred to Para 51
E
[2010] 15 SCR 302 referred to Para 51
[1988] Suppl 1 SCR 01 referred to Para 52
[2013] 12 SCR 674 referred to Para 52

F [1959] Supp 1 SCR 639 referred to Para 52
[2011] 3 SCR 728 referred to Para 53
[2011] 8 SCR 359 referred to Para 53
(2012) 12 SCC 675 referred to Para 53
G [1971] 3 SCR 9 referred to Para 55
[1996] 2 Suppl. SCR 1 referred to Para 55
(2014) 6 SCC 586 referred to Para 58
(2014) 6 SCC 583 referred to Para 58
H [2014] 13 SCR 524 referred to Para 58
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 45

(2015) 3 SCC 597 referred to Para 58 A
(2015) 4 SCC 347 referred to Para 58
[2015] SCR 237 referred to Para 58
[2015] SCR 692 referred to Para 58
(2014) 5 SCC 738 referred to Para 58 B
(2016) 13 SCC 380 referred to Para 58
[2016] 5 SCR 227 referred to Para 58
[2011] 2 SCR 1142 referred to Para 59
C
[2005] 1 SCR 1019 referred to Para 63
[1970] 2 SCR 726 referred to Para 63
[1987] 3 SCR 981 referred to Para 63
[1953] SCR 325 referred to Para 67
D
[1980] 1 SCR 323 referred to Para 67
[1995] 1 Suppl. SCR 535 referred to Para 67
[1976] 1 SCR 739 referred to Para 67
[2015] 5 SCR 435 referred to Para 67
E
[2007] 12 SCR 105 referred to Para 69
(1975) 4 SCC 22 referred to Para 70
(1972) 3 SCC 71 referred to Para 70
[2006] 5 Suppl. SCR 1 referred to Para 70 F
[1997] 5 Suppl. SCR 469 referred to Para 73
[1984] 2 SCR 495 referred to Para 73
[1981] 1 SCR 1083 referred to Para 73
[2011] 3 SCR 932 referred to Para 79 G
[1966] 1 SCR 543 referred to Para 82
[1950] SCR 435 referred to Para 82
[2000] 1 SCR 357 referred to Para 82
(1997) 6 SCC 71 referred to Para 82 H
46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A [1997] 4 Suppl. SCR 320 referred to Para 82
[2005] 3 Suppl. SCR 371 referred to Para 82
[1955] 1 SCR 893 referred to Para 84
[1988] SCR 700 referred to Para 86
B [1955]2 SCR 603 referred to Para 86
[2011] 11 SCR 141 referred to Para 87
[1965] SCR 328 relied on Para 97
(1971) 2 SCC 540 relied on Para 97
C
[1961] SCR 718 relied on Para 101
[2005] 2 SCR 23 relied on Para 101
[1987] 2 SCR 911 relied on Para 101
[1998] 1 Suppl. SCR 244 relied on Para 103
D
[1964] SCR 561 relied on Para 104
[1957] 1 SCR 874 relied on Para 104
[1965] 2 SCR 853 referred to Para 106
[1976] 1 SCR 505 referred to Para 107
E
[1980] 1 SCR 910 referred to Para 108
[1992] 3 SCR 634 referred to Para 109
[1958] SCR 1156 relied on Para 120

F [2004] 4 Suppl. SCR 127 relied on Para 121
[1994] 3 Suppl. SCR 405 relied on Para 125
[2004] 3 SCR 854 referred to Para 126
[1996] 9 Suppl. SCR 158 referred to Para 128
G [2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 534 referred to Para 128
[1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 336 relied on Para 135
[2009] 14 SCR 905 relied on Para 136
[1996] 2 SCR 1088 relied on Para 137
H [1995] 3 Suppl. SCR 197 relied on Para 138
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 47

[1994] 2 Suppl. SCR 426 relied on Para 139 A
[2010] 7 SCR 204 relied on Para 140
[1952] SCR 612 referred to Para140
[1961] SCR 679 referred to Para 140
[1965] SCR 970 referred to Para 140 B
[1980] 1 SCR 1177 referred to Para 140
[2003] 1 SCR 653 referred to Para 140
[2004] 3 SCR 834 referred to Para 140
C
[1989] 1 SCR 986 referred to Para 140
[2000] 3 Suppl. SCR 357 referred to Para 140
[1994] 5 Suppl. SCR 448 referred to Para 140
[2008] 17 SCR 35 referred to Para 140
D
[1961] 2 SCR 189 referred to Para 142
1996 (7) JT 118 relied on Para 145
[1996] 7 Suppl. SCR 6 relied on Para 146
[1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 787 relied on Para 147
E
[1996] 2 SCR 638 relied on Para 147
[1957] SCR 01 relied on Para 147
[2016] 1 SCR 343 relied on Para 148
[2017] 9 SCR 482 relied on Para 149 F
[2004] 3 Suppl. SCR 400 relied on Para 158
[2015] 7 SCR 56 relied on Para 159
[1966] 1 SCR 890 relied on Para 160
[1964] 1 SCR 897 relied on Para 160 G
[2011] 15 SCR 211 referred to Para 160
[1989] 2 SCR 544 referred to Para 160
[2002] 5 Suppl. SCR 387 referred to Para 160
[2003] 3 SCR 1209 referred to Para 160 H
48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A [2003] 3 Suppl. SCR 24 referred to Para 160
[2007] 13 SCR 598 referred to Para 160
[2008] 3 SCR 330 referred to Para 160
[2008] 9 SCR 165 referred to Para 160
B [2009] 7 SCR 668 referred to Para 160
[2010] 3 SCR 485 referred to Para 160
[2013] 1 SCR 1 referred to Para 160
[1962] 1 SCR 44 relied on Para 166
C
[1955] SCR 1196 relied on Para 166
(2000) 5 SCC 488 relied on Para 166
[2016] 5 SCR 227 referred to Para 166
[2002] 2 SCR 383 referred to Para 166
D
[2013] 8 SCR 241 relied on Para 166
[2011] 3 SCR 932 referred to Para 166
[2002] 4 Suppl. SCR 517 referred to Para 166
[2017] 14 SCR 202 referred to Para 171
E
[1953] SCR 1 relied on Para 178
[2005] 1 SCR 223 relied on Para 179
[2006] 3 Suppl. SCR 734 relied on Para 180

F [2017] 13 SCR 25 referred to Para 180
[1982] 3 SCR 121 referred to Para 181
[1965] 1 SCR 276 relied on Para 190
[1967] 1 SCR 831 relied on Para 190
G [1968] SCR 148 relied on Para 190
[1985] 2 SCR 643 relied on Para 191
[1966] 1 SCR 367 relied on Para 193
[2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 1039 relied on Para 193
H [2013] 14 SCR 136 relied on Para 193
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 49

[1965] 3 SCR 626 relied on Para 193 A
AIR 1961 SC 1596 relied on Para 193
[1976] 1 SCR 277 relied on Para 193
[1959] (Supp) 2 SCR 256 relied on Para 193
[2006] 4 Suppl. SCR 227 relied on Para 193 B
[1985] 2 SCR 1051 relied on Para194
[1988] 3 Suppl. SCR 276 relied on Para 194
AIR (34) 1947 PC 94 relied on Para 194
C
[1962] (Supp 3) SCR 318 relied on Para 212
[1965] 1 SCR 998 relied on Para 213
[1970] 1 SCR 669 relied on Para 214
[2012] 12 SCR 327 relied on Para 219
D
[1955] 2 SCR 842 relied on Para 221
[1989] 1 SCR 570 relied on Para 222
[1999] 2 SCR 1111 relied on Para 222
[2003] 1 SCR 1159 relied on Para 222
E
[2003] 2 SCR 1 relied on Para 222
(1969) 3 SCC 392 relied on Para 231
[1980] 3 SCR 179 relied on Para 232
[1998] 3 SCR 1088 relied on Para 232 F
[2009] 6 SCR 703 relied on Para 236
[2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 358 relied on Para 236
(1990) Supp SCC 806 relied on Para 237
[1995] 3 Suppl. SCR 584 relied on Para 238 G
[1997] 3 SCR 1096 relied on Para 239
[1980] 1 SCR 323 relied on Para 251
(2004) 3 SCC 684 relied on Para 252
[1959] (Suppl 2) SCR 798 relied on Para 252 H
50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A [2012] 10 SCR 603 relied on Para 254
[2011] 14 SCR 472 relied on Para 255
[2001] 2 Suppl. SCR 50 referred to Para 257
[1996] 2 SCR 643 relied on Para 263
B (2005) 12 SCC 489 relied on Para 264
[2015] 15 SCR 499 relied on Para 266
(2017) 13 SCC 474 relied on Para 267
[2017] 13 SCR 1053 referred to Para 267
C
[1976] 3 SCR 76 distinguished Para 268
(1979) 3 SCC 106 distinguished Para 268
[1980] 1 SCR 6 distinguished Para 269
(1988) Supp. SCC 488 distinguished Para 269
D
[2011] 14 SCR 1113 Not correct law Para 271
[2012] 3 SCR 841 relied on Para 272
[2012] 3 SCR 841 relied on Para 273
[2009] 10 SCR 1084 relied on Para 274
E
[2012] 10 SCR 603 relied on Para 275
[2008] 17 SCR 120 referred to Para 281
(2015) 4 SCC 325 overuled Para 277

F [2011] 6 SCR 443 overuled Para 277
[1961] 2 SCR 295 referred to Para 289
[1988] 3 SCR 384 referred to Para 289
(1999) 6 SCC 459 referred to Para 290
G [1986] 3 SCR 587 referred to Para 291
[1979] 3 SCR 709 referred to Para 292
[2001] 2 SCR 714 referred to Para 294
[1997] 3 SCR 931 relied on Para 299
H [2010] 2 SCR 447 relied on Para 300
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 51

[1990] 1 SCR 186 relied on Para 301 A
[2001] 1 Suppl. SCR 115 relied on Para 302
[2014] 8 SCR 751 distinguished Para 305
(2015) 3 SCC 206 distinguished Para 305
(2015) 3 SCC 541 distinguished Para 305 B
[2014] 7 SCR 799 overuled Para 305
[1989] 3 SCR 455 referred to Para 306
[1996] 5 Suppl. SCR 222 referred to Para 309
C
[2013] 14 SCR 58 referred to Para 310
[1999] 3 SCR 594 referred to Para 311
[1999] 2 Suppl. SCR 754 referred to Para 313
[2000] 2 SCR 871 referred to Para 313
D
[2002] 2 SCR 1093 referred to Para 314
[2004] 6 Suppl. SCR 282 referred to Para 315
[1975] 1 SCR 504 relied on Para 316
[2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 49 relied on Para 317
E
[1962] SCR 290 referred to Para 318
(1998) 3 SCC 376 referred to Para 321
(2005) 8 SCC 423 referred to Para 321
[1980] 2 SCR 765 referred to Para 321 F
[1995] 1 SCR 543 referred to Para 322
[2009] 15 SCR 1010 referred to Para 322
[2004] 1 SCR 965 referred to Para 323
[1975] Suppl. SCR 365 distinguished Para 325 G
[2017] 4 SCR 881 held inapplicable Para 326
[1978] 2 SCR 1 referred to Para 330
[2003] 4 Suppl. SCR 651 referred to Para 332
H
52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A [2012] 2 SCR 1127 relied on Para 333
[2012] 4 SCR 74 relied on Para 334
[2011] 9 SCR 146 relied on Para 334
(1980) 2 SCC 191 relied on Para 334
B [1992] 2 SCR 378 relied on Para 334
[1999] 1 SCR 311 relied on Para 334
[2010] 10 SCR 971 relied on Para 335
[2006] 2 SCR 390 relied on Para 336
C
2019 (13) SCALE 698 relied on Para 337
[2017] 11 SCR 553 relied on Para 339
[2014] 14 SCR 1451 referred to Para 341
[1984] 3 SCR 417 relied on Para 344
D
[1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 663 relied on Para 345
[1996] 5 Suppl. SCR 551 relied on Para 346
[2008] 4 SCR 616 relied on Para 346
[2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 513 relied on Para 346
E
[2017] 3 SCR 921 relied on Para 347
[2008] 2 SCR 521 relied on Para 348
[1998] 2 SCR 339 relied on Para 348

F (2003) 12 SCC 538 relied on Para 348
[2002] 2 Suppl. SCR 512 relied on Para 348
(1990) 2 SCC 268 relied on Para 348
[2006] 8 Suppl. SCR 916 relied on Para 350
G [1970] 2 SCR 697 relied on Para 350
[2007] 5 SCR 729 relied on Para 351
[2005] 4 Suppl. SCR 535 relied on Para 352
[2012] 1 SCR 573 relied on Para 353
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 53

(1994) 2 SCC 647 relied on Para 353 A
[1970] 3 SCR 830 referred to Para 355
[2018] 3 SCR 884 referred to Para 355
(2012) 12 SCC 443 referred to Para 355
[1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 558 referred to Para 355 B
[2014] 1 SCR 783 overuled Para 362
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition
(Civil) Nos. 9036-9038 of 2016.
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.11.2015 of the High Court C
of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Indore in Writ Appeal Nos. 514, 799 and
772 of 2006.
With
Civil Appeal Nos. 4835 of 2015, 19356, 19362, 19361, 19358,
19357, 19360, 19359, 19363, 19364, 19412 of 2017, S.L.P.(C) Nos. 30577- D
30580 of 2015, 9798-9799, 17088-17089, 37375, 37372, 16573-16605.
34752-34753 of 2016, 15890, 33022, 33114, 33127 of 2017, 30452 of
2018, 16051 of 2019, M.A. No. 1423 of 2017 in C.A. No. 12247 of
2016. M.A. No.1787 of 2017 in C.A. No. 10210 of 2016, M.A. No.
1786 of 2017 in C.A. No. 10207 of 2016, M.A. No. 45 of 2018 in C.A. E
No. 6239 of 2017, Diary No. 23842 of 2018, C.C. No.15967 of 2016.
Tushar Mehta, SG, Ms. Pinki Anand, ASG, B.K. Satija, Ajay
Bansal, AAGs, R. Balasubramanian, Shyam Divan, Manoj Swarup, Gopal
Sankarnarayanan, Anoop George Chaudhari, Ms. June Chaudhari, Guru
Krishna Kumar, V. Shekhar, K.S. Namdar, Shekhar Naphade, Pritesh F
Kapoor, Rameshwar Singh Malik, Dhruv Mehta, Anukul Chandra
Pradhan, K. Shashi Kiran Shetty, Mohan Parasaran, Jayanth Muthraj,
K. Radhakrishnan, Sr. Advs., Kanu Agarwal, Manan Popli, Rajeev
Ranjan, Shantnu Sharma, Ms. Hemantika Wahi, Ms. Jesal Wahi, Ms.
Puja Singh, Ashwani Kumar Dhatwalia, Ms. Garima Prashad, Sumit
Teterwal, Ms. Saudamini Sharma, Ms. Snidha Mehra, Ms. Kriti Dua, G
Hemant Arya, Ms. Tanisha Samanta, Chakitan V.S. Papta, Ms. Ashita
Goyal, Ankur Talwar, Prashant Singh, Raj Bahadur Yadav, Vinod Kumar,
Ashwani Kumar, Ms. Peeha Verma, Ravinder Nain, Aayush Agarwala,
Anuj Agarwala, Abhinav Malhotra, Sudipto Sircar, Bhav Ratan, Pramod
B. Agarwala, Siddharth Batra, Gaurav Agrawal, Avishkar Singhvi, Harsh H
54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A Parashar, Nipun Katyal, Ms. Tanvi Bhatnagar, Rahul Kaushik, Dhruv
Surana, R. Anand Padmanabhan, Aravind C., Shashi Bhushan Kumar,
Rajeev Kumar Dubey, Kamalendra Mishra, Hitesh Kumar Sharma,
S. K. Rajora, Akhileshwar Jha, Ms. Sandya Sharma, Ravindra Keshavrao
Adsure, Sagar N. Pahune Patil, Ms. S. Lakshmi Iyer, Abhikalp Pratap
Singh, Ms. Aishwarya Dash, Durgesh Gupta, A.P. Mayee, A. Rajarajan,
B
Sanjeev Kumar Choudhary,
Jitesh Malik, Ms. Beena, Satish Kumar, Siddharth Batra, Ms.
Garima Sehgal, Ms. Sugandha Sharma, Ram Sankar, Om Prakash Kumar
Srivastava, Ashish Chaubey, G. Chitrakala, Ms. Maafi, R.K.V. Suhas,
R.V. Kameshwaran, Mahesh Thakur, B.S. Srinivas, Mrs. Vipasha Singh,
C Sharan Thakur, Siddharth Thakur, Vijay Kumar Pardesi, Shailesh Madiyal,
Sudhanshu Parkash, Kartik Anand, Ms. Sheffali Chaudhary, Zoheb
Hossain, Ms. Adeeba Mujahid, Ms. Aditi Dani, Ashwin Kumar DS, Piyush
Goyal, Vivek Gurnani, Agni Sen, Sanjeev Menon, Ms. Purbita Mitra,
Ms. A. Jaswanthi, K.V. Vijayakumar, Anandh Kannan, Deepak Goel,
D Kamal Kumar Pandey, Baldev Atreya, Ajay Kumar Singh, Ms. Neelum
Goel, Gaurav Yadava, Mrs. Veena Bansal, Sanjay Kumar Visen, Prashant
Bhushan, Omanakuttan K.K., Ms. Anannya Ghosh, Abhimanue Shrestha,
Pallav Mongia, Abhisth Kumar, Ms. Jaikriti S. Jadeja, Yashraj Singh
Deora, Ashok Arora, Dr. Sushil Balwada, Vivek Mishra, Ms. Mansha
Shukla, Chandan Kumar, Madhu Prakash, Rituraj Biswas, Rituraj
E Choudhary, Hemant Kushwaha, Chand Qureshi, Rajat Verma, Hiren
Dasan, Sanjay Kapur, Ms. Megha Karnwal, Bharath Gangadharan,
Harshal Narayan, V.M. Khanna, Ms. Shubhra Kapur, Pramod Dayal,
Ms. Shashi Kiran, Dr. Satish Chandra, Ms. Usha Mishra, Manoj Jain,
Shankar Chillarge (for M/s. Lawyer’s Knit & Co.), Ms. Rachana
F Srivastava, Vishnu B. Saharya, Viresh B. Saharya (for M/s. Saharya &
Co.), Ms. Rashmi Nandakumar, Ms. Ayushma Awasthi, Shankar
Narayanan, Dr. D.V. Rao, B.V. Balaram Das, Kunal Verma, Vinay
Kumar Shailendra, Ms. Deepika V. Marawaha, Chandra Bhushan
Prasad, Siddhartha Chowdhury, Muhammad Ali Khan, Omar Hoda,
Sparsh Prasad, Anurag Singh, Gaurav Goel, S.K. Raut, R.K. Dudeja,
G Sachin Gupta, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Ms. Pratibha Jain, Vikas
Kumar, Ajay Choudhary, M. Ram Babu, Vikrant Yadav, Puneet Chugh,
Sudarsh Menon, Ravindra A. Lokhande, Samarandra Beura, Ram Gupta,
Keshav Ranjan, Manish Paliwal, Senthil Jagadeesan, Ambhoj Kumar
Sinha, R.V. Kameshwaran, Vikas Mehta, Apoorv Khator, Vasanth
H Bharani, Mithun Shashank, Abhinav Ramkrishna, Arun K. Sinha,
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 55

Paramasivam, M. Yogesh Kanna, Munawwar Naseem, C.L. Sahu, A
Satish Kumar, Rajesh Mahale, Ritesh Khatri, Mrs. Balvinder Kaur Brar,
Rajesh Kumar Jha, Dr. M.S. Verma, Ms. Ranjana Vohra, Rakesh Kumar
Yadav, Ms. Alpana Malik, Dinesh K. Mudgal, Ms. Shashi Singh, Rajnish
Kumar Jha, Yash Pal Dhingra, Divyakant Lahoti, Manish Kaushik, Ms.
Amrita Grover, Parikshit Ahuja, Kartik Lahoti, Ms. Praveena Bisht,
B
Madhur Jhavar, Rajiv Kataria, Ms. Debjani Das P. (for M/s. Delhi Law
Chambers), K. Parameshwar, P.V. Dinesh, Ms. Sindhu T.P., Mukund P.
Unny, Aniruddha Deshmukh, Rajesh Srivastava, Ms. Suresh Kumari,
Yatin M. Jagtap, Rabin Majumder, Sourav Roy, Harsh Anand, Gaurav
Majumdar, Ms. Devika Khanna, Yash Ahlawat, Mrs. V.D. Khanna,
Manish K. Bishnoi, M/s. S. Narain & Co., Shree Pal Singh, Balaji C
Srinivasan, Anupam Raina, Sunando Raha, Arindam Das, Kunal Malik,
Dr. Sumant Bharadwaj, Ms. Mridula Ray Bhardwaj, Amol Chitravanshi,
Ms. Rinchen Wangmo, Vedant Bharadwaj, Sangam Lal Pandey, Biswajit
Das, Hardeep Singh, Anamika Sharma, Abhigya, Varinder Kumar
Sharma, Varun Thakur, S. Sharma, Ms. Mandakini Singh, Ms. Sukhmani
D
Bajwa, Syed Imtiyaz Ali, Ali Safeer Farooqui, Aftab Ali Khan, M.Z.
Chaudhry, Ms. Mumtaz Alam Siddiqui, Keshav Thakur, Arvind Kumar
K., Aniruddha P. Mayee, R.M. Bhangde, Shivkant Mishra, Hara Prasad
Sahu, Vishal Arun Mishra, Pawan Kumar, Pranay Kumar M., Ms. Binu
Tamta, Dhruv Tamta, Pankaj Pandey, Advs. for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by E

ARUN MISHRA, J.
1. The correct interpretation of Section 24 of the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short, ‘the Act of 2013’), is the subject F
matter of reference to this five -Judge Bench of this Court.
2. A three- Judge Bench of this Court in Pune Municipal
Corporation & Anr v Harakchand Misrimal Solanki & Ors 1,
interpreted Section 24 of the Act of 2013. The order reported as Yogesh
Neema & Ors v State of Madhya Pradesh2, a two--judge Bench, G
however doubted the decision in Sree Balaji Nagar Residents
Association v State of Tamil Nadu 3 (which had followed Pune
Municipal Corporation (supra) and also held that Section 24 (2) of
1
(2014) 3 SCC 183
2
(2016) 6 SCC 387
3
(2015) 3 SCC 353 H
56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A the Act of 2013 does not exclude any period during which the land
acquisition proceeding might have remained stayed on account of stay
or injunction granted by any court) and referred the issue to a larger
Bench. Later, in another appeal (arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.2131 of
2016 (Indore Development Authority v Shailendra (dead) through
Lrs. & Ors.4) the matter was referred to a larger Bench on 7.12.2017;
B
the Court noticed that:
“cases which have been concluded are being revived. In spite
of not accepting the compensation deliberately and statement
are made in the Court that they do not want to receive the
compensation at any cost, and they are agitating the matter
C time and again after having lost the matters and when
proceedings are kept pending by interim orders by filing
successive petitions, the provisions of section 24 cannot be
invoked by such landowners.”
3. The Court noticed that the reference to a larger Bench was
D pending, and had been made in Yogesh Neema (supra). The Court also
felt that several other issues arose which it outlined, but were not
considered in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra). The Court
therefore, stated that the matter should be considered by a larger Bench
and referred the case to Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for appropriate
E orders. Indore Development Authority v Shailendra (hereafter, “IDA
v Shailendra”) a Bench of three Judges was of the view that the
judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) did not consider
several aspects relating to the interpretation of Section 24 of the Act of
2013. Since Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) was a judgment by
a Bench of coordinate strength, two learned judges in IDA v Shailendra
F opined prima facie that decision appeared to be per incuriam.
4. Later, in Indore Development Authority v Shyam Verma &
Ors (SLP No. 9798 of 2016) considered it appropriate to refer the matter
to Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India to refer the issues to be resolved by
a larger Bench at the earliest. Yet again in State of Haryana v Maharana
G Pratap Charitable Trust (Regd) & Anr (CA No.4835 of 2015) referred
the matter to Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India to constitute an appropriate
Bench for consideration of the larger issue. These batch appeals were
referred to a five Judge Bench, which after hearing counsel, framed the
following questions, which arise for consideration:
H 4
2018 SCC Online SC 100
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 57
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

“1. What is the meaning of the expression paid’/tender’ in A
Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013 (Act of 2013') and Section 31 of the
Land Acquisition Act, LA (Act of 1894')? Whether non-deposit
of compensation in court under section 31(2) of the Act of
B
1894 results into lapse of acquisition under section 24(2) of
the Act of 2013. What are the consequences of non- deposit
in Court especially when compensation has been tendered
and refused under section 31(1) of the Act of 1894 and section
24(2) of the Act of 2013? Whether such persons after refusal
can take advantage of their wrong/conduct? C
2. Whether the word or’ should be read as conjunctive or
disjunctive in Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013?
3. What is the true effect of the proviso, does it form part of
sub-Section (2) or main Section 24 of the Act of 2013?
D
4. What is mode of taking possession under the Land
Acquisition Act and true meaning of expression the physical
possession of the land has not been taken occurring in Section
24(2) of the Act of 2013?
5. Whether the period covered by an interim order of a Court E
concerning land acquisition proceedings ought to be excluded
for the purpose of applicability of Section 24(2) of the Act of
2013 ?
6. Whether Section 24 of the Act of 2013 revives barred and
stale claims? In addition, question of per incuriam and other F
incidental questions also to be gone into.”
5. Question nos.1 to 3 are interconnected and concern the correct
interpretation of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. Following questions
are required to be gone into to interpret the provisions of Section 24(2)
of the Act of 2013:
G
(i) Whether the word “or” in Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013
used in between possession has not been taken or
compensation has not been paid to be read as “and”?
(ii) Whether proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 has to
be construed as part thereof or proviso to Section 24(1)(b)? H
58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A (iii) What meaning is to be given to the word “paid” used in
Section 24(2) and “deposited” used in the proviso to Section
24(2)?
(iv) What are the consequences of payment not made?
(v) What are the consequences of the amount not deposited?
B
(vi) What is the effect of a person refusing to accept the
compensation?
6. The Act of 2013 repeals and replaces the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894, a general law for acquisition of land of public purposes, which
C had been in force for almost 120 years, with a view to address certain
inadequacies and/ or shortcomings in the said Act.
7. The Act of 2013 is prospective and saves proceedings already
initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 before its repeal, subject
to provisions of Section 24 of the Act of 2013, which begins with a non-
D obstante clause and overrides all other provisions of the Act of 2013.
8. On behalf of the Union, the States and various acquiring bodies
and development authorities, Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General
(who led the arguments, hereafter “SG”), Ms. Pinky Anand, learned
Additional Solicitor General (hereafter “ASG”), Mr. Anoop Chaudhary
and Mr. Jayant Muthuraj, learned Senior Counsel, Ms. Shashi Kiran,
E
Ms. Rachna Srivastava, Mr. R.M. Bhangade and Mr. Rajesh Mahale,
learned counsel, made their submissions.
9. The learned SG, arguing that this Court should overrule the
ratio in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and other judgments
which followed it, contended that the Court did not consider the various
F
interpretations of Section 31 of the (repealed) Land Acquisition Act,
(“LA Act” hereafter). He urged that the provisions of the Act of 2013,
vis-à-vis the timelines and consequences that would ensue if the
acquisition proceeding prolongs, were not examined. He highlighted that
Section 24 is a transitional provision and such provisions should be given
G an interpretation which accords with legislative intent, rather than so as
to impose hitherto absent standards, upon past proceedings, or
proceedings initiated under the previous regime, but which have not
worked themselves out. He urged that there is a presumption in favour
of restricted retrospective applicability of any provision in an enactment
unless a contrary intention appears. It is submitted that designedly, it is
H the stage of passing of award under Section 11 of the LA Act, that
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 59
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

represents the determinative factor in the segregation for the applicability A
of the provisions of the Act of 2013 or the LA Act. It is urged that the
opening part of the provision in Section 24(1) is a non-obstante clause
providing for a limited overriding effect of the Land Acquisition Act, in
case of the contingencies mentioned in Section 24 (1) (a) and (b) of the
Act of 2013.
B
10. Section 24 (1) (a) contemplates that where no award under
Section 11 of the LA Act has been made, but proceedings had been
initiated under said Act, provisions of the Act of 2013 would apply limited
to the determination of compensation. In other words, the entire exercise
de novo, under the Act of 2013, will not be required to be undertaken.
Therefore, Section 24 (1) (a) contemplates a limited applicability of the C
Act of 2013. Section 24 (1) (b) stipulates that where an award under
Section 11 of the LA Act has been made, the entire proceedings would
continue under that law and the provisions of the Act of 2013 would be
inapplicable. Section 24 (1) (b) is the larger umbrella clause under Section
24, which protects the vested rights of the parties under the LA Act if D
the stage of passing of award has been crossed. It is argued that the
umbrella clause Section 24 (1) (b), is followed by Section 24(2) - which
provides for the exclusionary clause. Section 24 (2), the learned SG
highlighted, is the only lapsing clause under the provision which
brings in the rigours of the Act of 2013 in totality by mandating the
land acquisition to be initiated de novo. E

11. It is urged that Section 24 (2) opens with a non obstante
clause carving out an exception only from Section 24 (1). It visualizes
that land acquisition proceedings which had been initiated under the LA
Act, an award under Section 11 of the LA Act had been made.
Consequently, Section 24 (2) has no relation to Section 24 (1) (a) as it F
does not contemplate an award under Section 11 of the LA Act at all. It
is, therefore, a limited exception to Section 24 (1) (b). Section 24 (2)
consequently is umbilically related to Section 24 (1) (b) as an exception,
wherein land acquisition proceedings would lapse in certain contingencies
even when an award under Section 11 of the LA Act had been made. G
12. It is submitted that the contingencies for lapsing in Section
24(2), are subject to an award under Section 11 of the LA Act being
made five years prior to the commencement of the Act of 2013 (which
is 1.1.2014). If the award is so made, two contingencies result in complete
lapse -: (a) Physical possession of the land has not been taken; or (b) H
60 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A compensation has not been “paid”. The provision for lapse, per Section
24(2) is, by its nature, a vital provision, inviting serious consequences, in
case those contingencies arise. It is the interpretation of these
“contingencies” that requires further consideration. The “contingencies”
ought to be interpreted in a manner which saves the past transactions to
the extent they can be saved as it is clearly not the intention of the Act of
B
2013 to tide over all past transactions.
13. The learned SG argued that the proviso to Section 24(2) further
carves out an exception to Section 24(2) viz, in case the award has been
made and compensation in respect of majority of landholdings has
not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, no lapsing will
C take place, but all the beneficiaries specified in the notification for
acquisition shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the
provisions of the Act of 2013.
14. Therefore, if only a minority of the claimants are disbursed
with the compensation, such claimants would get benefit of compensation
D under the Act of 2013 to a limited extent without lapsing. Thus, it is clear
that even if the acquisition does not lapse, all the beneficiaries to whom
the compensation is payable would be entitled to compensation under
the Act of 2013.
15. It is submitted that Section 24(1)(a) and Section 24(2) are
E balancing provisions controlling the extent of retrospectivity and curtailing
the effacement of rights. Such balance of protecting acquisitions under
the LA Act in some defined circumstances whilst providing the enhanced
compensation provisions under the Act of 2013 under some defined
circumstances is the “middle path” that Parliament adopted. It is
F contended that Section 24(2) is, therefore, controlled by the proviso
mandating again a further middle path consciously chosen by Parliament.
16. It is argued that while providing for a transitory provision or
situations resulting into “lapsing” of all the steps already taken under the
Act under repeal, the legislature always envisages several contingencies
G which emerge out of its day-to-day experience. The manner in which
section 24[2] and the proviso attached therewith are drafted clearly
discloses that Parliament intended certain inevitable contingencies which
frequently arose in land acquisition proceedings. It was urged illustratively,
that often, land acquired belongs to benami owners, who cannot put
forward title, or claim compensation or identify themselves. In such
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 61
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

situations, it may not be possible for an acquiring authority to “pay” A
[which, as plain language indicates, would mean setting apart for being
taken by the entitled persons as explained hereafter] to “all” land holders/
entitled persons. However, as is clear from the proviso to Section 24[2],
if it can be shown that the amount is deposited for majority of share-
holding, the acquisition would be saved and cannot lapse; the only
B
consequence would be the determination of benefits under the Act of
2013. Parliamentary intent in the proviso clearly appears to be to ascertain
the stage up to which the land acquisition proceedings under LA Act
have reached. If nobody is paid the compensation or compensation is
not taken by everyone though tendered and/or kept ready, the legislature
contemplates such a situation to be a reversible one and, therefore, C
provides for lapsing of all previous stages prior to “non-payment”.
However, if it can be demonstrated that though - (1) compensation was
tendered to all; (2) some of them [for whatever reason] did not take the
compensation; and (3) compensation is deposited in case of majority of
the land holdings [viz. setting apart the share of such persons and making
D
it available for them to take it], then, neither proceedings would lapse
nor the compensation will be required to be determined under the Act of
2013. In substance, therefore, the legal situation would be akin to the
one contemplated under Section 24[1][b] for all practical purposes.
17. It is submitted that during the drafting of the Bill, the legislative
intent and the apprehensions of the stakeholders in the acquisition process E
is clearly depicted in 31st Report of the ‘Standing Committee on Rural
Development’ while discussing the ‘The Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation
and Resettlement Bill, 2011’ which was the precursor to the Act of 2013.
The learned SG relied on extracts of the Standing Committee Reports,
the draft Bill, various comments from government and public agencies F
and departments and other stakeholders, the stage(s) during which
amendments were proposed to the draft provisions (of Section 24) and
its culmination into the present form and structure.
18. The learned SG argued that the amendments proposed by the
Minister while introducing the Bill - to incorporate an explanation, as to G
what constitutes “deposit” was not accepted in the legislative wisdom of
the Lok Sabha and the Bill so passed consciously did not incorporate the
Explanation (in the form of Proviso to Section 24(2)) providing for an
extensive and artificial meaning of the word paid. Further, reference to
“bank” account was also consciously not incorporated thereby leaving
H
62 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A the expression “to pay” and “to deposit” with its natural meaning and
leaving it to the discretion of the acquiring authorities to deposit the
compensation amount even in the treasury. It is possible that the
legislature may have considered the reality of 2012-13 where crores of
people did not have bank accounts. It was also urged that the rejection
of the amendment is in consonance with the apprehensions expressed
B
by other stakeholders and ministries at the said time. After the said Bill
was passed in the Lok Sabha, amendments were proposed and accepted
by the Rajya Sabha, giving the provision its final form. Further, it is clear
that the effort at the time was towards the drafting of a balancing
provision which protects the acquisitions from lapsing and at the same
C time provides enhanced compensation under the new Act depending
upon the stage up to which the acquisition has progressed. This was the
genesis behind Section 24(1)(a) and proviso to Section 24(2) which protect
acquisitions from lapsing whilst providing for higher compensation under
the Act of 2013 to the land owners under limited defined circumstances.
It is submitted that it is necessary to read the proviso to Section 24(2)
D
along with the same provision and not Section 24(1)(b) as the former
would be in accord with Parliamentary intent.
19. It was submitted that Section 24(2) intended a limited
retrospective operation: yet such retrospectivity operated and has to be
construed narrowly considering the nature and width of Section 24(2)
E and the drastic consequences flowing from it. It is submitted that the
field of retrospectivity to be given under Section 24 needs to be considered
in the context of legislative intention manifested from Section 114 of the
Act of 2013 and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Both Section
114 (of the Act of 2013) and Section 6 of the 1897 Act clearly point to a
F narrow interpretation of Section 24 with the object of saving on-going
acquisition proceedings as far as possible. The learned SG referred to
the provisions of UK’s Interpretation Act, 1978; he also relied on
Bennion’s Statutory Interpretation Bennion’s Fifth Edition, (2012) Indian
Reprint, which reads as under:
G “Where, on a weighing of the factors, it seems that some
retrospective effect was intended, the general presumption
against retrospectively indicates that this should be kept to
as narrow a compass as will accord with the legislative
intention”

H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 63
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

20. Reliance was placed on Secretary of State for Social Security A
v Tunnicliffe5, to the effect that:
“Parliament is presumed not to have intended to alter the law
applicable to past events and transactions in a manner which
is unfair to those concerned in them, unless a contrary
intention appears”. B
The learned SG also referred to the later judgment of the House
of Lords which dealt with the said question. It is submitted that sitting in
a combination of eight judges, in Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co.
Ltd.v L’office Chefifien Des Phosphates & Anr6, where it was held
that retrospective application of a statute can be made only when it does C
not visit anyone with unfairness. The learned SG referred to Zile Singh
v. State of Haryana7 where a three-judge Bench held that retrospectivity
should not be presumed to have been given to a provision, unless it says
so clearly, or through necessary implication. The guidance was given to
construe provisions for determining whether such intention is expressed,
in a given case. D

21. It was urged that this Court, after assessing the unintended
and absurd results that an amendment may result in, purposefully
interpreted the provisions to be prospective in operation. It was also
emphasized that Section 24(2) is retrospective in nature and cannot be
5
E
[1991] 2 All ER 712
6
[1994] 1 A.C. 486, where it was held that:
“The rule that a person should not be held liable or punished for
conduct not criminal when committed is fundamental and of long
standing. It is reflected in the maxim nullum crimen nulla poena sine
lege. It is protected by article 7 of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1953) (Cmd. F
8969). The rule also applies, but with less force, outside the criminal
sphere. It is again expressed in maxims, lex prospicit non respicit and
omnis nova constitutio futuris temporibus formam imponere debet non
praeteritis. The French Civil Code provides that “La loi ne dispose que
pour l’avenir; elle n’a point d’effet retroactif:”
…..
But both these passages draw attention to an important point, that the exception G
only applies where application of it would not cause unfairness or injustice.
This is consistent with the general rule or presumption which is itself based
on considerations of fairness and justice, as shown by the passage in Maxwell
quoted, ante, p. 494C–E, and recently emphasised by Staughton L.J in Secretary
of State for Social Security v. Tunnicliffe [1991] 2 All E.R 712, 724..”
7
(2004) 8 SCC 01 H
64 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A held to be prospective; nevertheless, the extent of retrospectivity ought
to be narrowly construed while interpreting, given the harsh consequences
that it results in particularly against projects of public interest. Reliance
was placed on CIT v. Sarkar Builders8.
22. It is submitted that apart from the above, this Court has
B consistently ruled on principles guiding the retrospective operation of
statutes. Though there is no bar against retrospective operation yet this
Court considered the practical realities before analysing the extent of
retrospective operation of the statutes. Reliance in this regard is placed
on Jawaharmal v. State of Rajasthan9 and Rai Ramkrishna v. State
of Bihar 10.
C
23. The learned SG next submitted that a spate of decisions of
this Court had followed the ratio in Pune Municipal Corporation
(supra). Emphasizing that the overall interpretation of Section 24 of the
Act of 2013 has to accord with its scheme, it was stated that the object
of that provision was not only to declare that certain acquisitions lapsed.
D Learned counsel, in this context, highlighted that Section 24 (1) (a) in
fact saves acquisition proceedings, where awards were not made before
the advent of the Act of 2013, by declaring that the award would be
made under that Act and compensation payable, in accordance with its
provisions. Section 24 (1) (b) on the other hand contemplates making of
E award, under the old (LA) Act, but significantly states that all further
“proceedings” after the award would be taken under the new Act. It
was highlighted here, that Parliament clearly intended that the
compensation determined under the old Act had to be paid in terms of
the new Act, which is under Section 77. The learned SG submitted that
given these aspects, which are expressed in Section 24 (1), the non
F obstante clause and the following provisions of Section 24 (2) have to
be interpreted contextually, and in a purposive manner. It was submitted
that Parliament did not intend that settled matters should be undone, and
whatever had attained finality, in acquisition matters, should not be re-
opened. He cited the decisions of this Court reported as Southern
G Electricity Supply Co. of Orissa Ltd. v. Sri Seetaram Rice Mill 11;
Tinsukhia Electric Supply Company Ltd v. State Of Assam & Ors12;
8
2015 (7) SCC 579
9
1966 (1) SCR 890
10
1964 (1) SCR 897
11
(2012) 2 SCC 108
H 12
(1989) 3 SCC 709 @ para 118-121
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 65
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

Commissioner of Income Tax v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers 13; D. A
Saibaba v. Bar Council of India & Ors14; Balram Kamanat v. Union
of India15; New India Assurance Co. v. Nulli Nivelle16; Government
of Andhra Pradesh & Ors v. Smt. P. Laxmi Devi 17; Entertainment
Network (India) Ltd. v. Super Cassette Industries Ltd. 18 ; N.
Kannadasan v. Ajoy Khose & Ors 19 ; H.S Vankani v. State of
B
Gujarat,20; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Narmada Bachao Andolan
& Ors. 21
24. It was submitted that hitherto, in accord with Pune Municipal
Corporation (supra) and Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. v. State of
Tamil Nadu22 most decisions had accepted that the expression “or”-
(occurring in Section 24 (2)), where an award has been made under the C
old Act, 5 years before the commencement of the Act of 2013 “but the
physical possession of the land has not been taken or the
compensation has not been paid” – is to be read disjunctively, i.e.,
that if either condition is satisfied, the acquisition would lapse. However,
submitted the learned SG, the true and correct interpretation of the term D
“or” would be that it ought to be construed as a conjunctive word.
25. Learned counsel next submitted that the expression “paid”
should be construed reasonably and not in a literal manner, as was done
in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra). Before the Act of 2013 was
brought into force, the modes of payment recognized by the law were: E
tendering payment, payment into court in the event no one entitled to
alienate the property received it and payment into court upon disputes
about the entitlement to receive payment. These three situations were
visualized in Section 31 (2) of the old Act. It was emphasized that the
consequence of lapse of acquisition was never contemplated, in the event
of refusal to accept payment, or absence of anyone entitled to receive it, F
or in the contingency of a dispute regarding entitlement to receive the
amount. This clearly meant that while payment of compensation was
13
(2003) 3 SCC 57 @ para 14-21
14
(2003) 6 SCC 186 para 16-18
15
(2003) 7 SCC 628 para 24 G
16
(2008) 3 SCC 279 @ para 51-54
17
(2008) 4 SCC 720 para 41 & 42
18
(2008) 13 SCC 30 para 132-137
19
(2009) 7 SCC 1 para 54-67
20
(2010) 4 SCC 301 para 43-48
21
(2011) 7 SCC 639 para 78-85
22
2015 (3) SCC 353 H
66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A essential and mandatory, the mode of payment was not mandatory. If,
for instance, the amount was tendered and not received, but instead, the
landowner refused it, the appropriate government could well deposit it in
the treasury, in accordance with prevailing financial rules, to facilitate
disbursement, as and when the landowner or the one entitled to receive
it, came forward and established entitlement. In such event, the only
B
consequence of non-deposit (in court, under Section 31) meant that higher
interest as mandated by Section 34 was to be paid.
26. The context of Section 24, learned counsel urged, is to provide
for a transitory provision viz. to take care of the pending land acquisition
proceedings which are ongoing under the LA Act when the Act of 2013
C is brought into force w.e.f. 1.1.2014. The purpose and object of making
this provision is to balance the competing rights of public projects vis-à-
vis holders of the land. The object and purpose was to ensure that where
acquisition proceedings under LA Act have reached an advanced stage
and investment of public money had already been made, firstly, the lapsing
D of such ongoing projects should be avoided and secondly as far as
possible, the land owners also can, without disturbing the process of
acquisition, be given the compensation under the Act of 2013.
27. It was reiterated that the legislature knows about the ground
realities faced in land acquisition proceedings. There are very few cases
E where one or two land parcels are acquired in isolation. Mostly,
acquisitions take place of bigger tracts of land involving more than one
parcel of land and more than one person “entitled to compensation”.
When Parliament provided for a transitory provision in relation to
acquisitions under the old Act, it did not contemplate the possibility of the
entire payment procedure to all being not processed given the practical
F situations arising in all such proceedings. Parliament is also presumed to
be aware of the fact that in almost all cases of acquisition, the proceedings
are stiffly opposed and in most of the cases, the tender of compensation
is also opposed under a wrong and misplaced notion that the acceptance
of the tender may be treated as acquiescence with the quantum being
G tendered.
28. The learned counsel argued that Parliament did not expect
the acquiring authority to perform an impossible task of forcing payment
to the land owners unwilling, for any reason to accept it. The legislature,
therefore, does not use the expression of the land owners having
H “accepted” the payment. It merely uses the expression “paid”. The
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 67
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

legislature clearly tries to balance the rights of land owners only in one A
contingency viz. in a post award scenario and the award having been
made five years prior to 1.1.2014, when the amount is not “deposited” in
the accounts of the majority of the beneficiaries.
29. It was urged that on a true construction and taking the literal,
natural and grammatical meaning of the provisions in the context referred B
above and keeping in mind the object it can safely be concluded that the
words “paid” and “deposit” are expressions of the same act namely
making the amount available (i.e. tendering) for being taken by those
entitled to it. It was urged that if this interpretation is not given then the
refusal by few persons or few persons being untraceable in the acquisition
of a vast tract of land would result in the drastic consequence of lapsing C
of the acquisition proceedings.
30. It was urged by the learned ASG and Mr. Muthuraj, learned
senior counsel that the legislature cannot be presumed to intend such an
anomalous situation. The only way in which the object behind section 24
can be achieved is to give natural meaning to the words and expressions D
used keeping the object in mind and treating the words “paid” and
“deposit” as connoting expression of the very same Act depending upon
the fact situation in each case. Learned counsel submitted that by using
the terms “paid” and “deposit”, Parliament consciously left a leeway to
save the drastic consequence of lapsing by dealing with a particular E
situation in light of fact situation emerging in each case. Not treating
“paid” and “deposit” as synonymous or the “deposit” so as to keep it
available being the next step after “pay”, would lead to disastrous
situations as the acquiring authority may have acquired vast tract of land
and may have put substantial portion from it to public use by constructing
infrastructural projects. Such a disastrous situation /consequence would F
never have been anticipated or envisaged by the legislature. Learned
counsel also referred to various Standing Orders, framed as part of the
financial code of several States, which provided for procedure to deposit
money in the treasury, when landowners refused to accept compensation,
or were untraceable, at the time the amount was to be tendered. G
31. It is submitted by the learned ASG that this Court should not
assume any omission or add or amend words to the statute. It is submitted
that plain and unambiguous construction has to be given without addition
and substitution of the words. It is submitted that when a literal reading
produces an intelligible result it is not open to read words or add words H
68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A to statute. In support of this proposition, reliance was placed on some
decisions23. It was therefore submitted that the word “paid” does not
and cannot mean actual de-facto payment as it would amount to adding
words which do not exist in the provision. Similarly, the word “deposit”
cannot mean “deposit in the Court” as that was never the legislative
intent nor can it be deduced from any accepted interpretive process.
B
32. It was submitted that this Court, whilst interpreting Section 24
of the Act of 2013, for the first time in Pune Municipal Corporation
[supra] and subsequent judgments, presumed that the word “paid”
occurring in Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 would have to be interpreted
as per Section 31 of the LA Act. It is submitted that the said presumption
C neither has any justification nor any such justification is examined in the
said judgments. It is submitted that the said presumption has resulted in
grave consequences without ascertaining the conscious omissions on
the part of the Legislature. The learned SG illustrated how the terms
“paid” and “deposit” have been used in different senses under the LA
D Act and in the Act of 2013.
33. Learned counsel submit that firstly, Section 31 of the LA Act
is pari materia to Section 77 of the Act of 2013. There is neither any
justification nor any requirement of interpreting Section 24 of the Act of
2013 in the shadow of Section 31 of the LA Act. It is submitted that if as
E an alternative argument it is assumed that the expressions “paid”/ “tender”
and the expression “deposited” have both been used consciously in Section
31, as is the reason of drafting Section 24(2), an anomalous situation
occurs. In the proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, expression
used is compensation has not been “deposited” “in the account of the
beneficiaries”, which is separate from the “deposit in Court” envisaged
F under Section 31(2) of the LA Act. It is submitted that the expression
“bank account” has not been used in Section 31 of the LA Act at all and
the expression “in the Court” has not been used in Section 24(2) of the
Act of 2013 at all. The said omissions carry weight and cannot be ignored.
34. It is urged that if Section 24 of the Act of 2013 intended to
G attract the rigours and technicalities of Section 31 of the LA Act, it
would have used the requisite phrase. It is submitted that the term Section
31 of the LA Act is conspicuous by its absence in Section 24 of the Act
23
BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552; Howard de
Walden (Lord) v. IRC, (1948) 2 All ER 825 (HL); V.L.S. Finance Ltd. v. Union of India,
H (2013) 6 SCC 278; and Ram Narain v. State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 18.
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 69
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

of 2013. Parliament intentionally used the phrases “paid” and “deposit” A
not in terms of their meanings under Section 31 so as to avoid the rigours
of the said provision and to keep the practical exigencies of land acquisition
in mind, more particularly when Section 24 of the Act of 2013 is merely
a transitory provision. It was argued that it is a settled canon of
interpretation that when the Legislature uses two different phrases, the
B
meaning they carry would be different. Harbhajan Singh v. Press
Council of India,24 is relied on.
35. It is submitted that Section 24(1) begins with a non-obstante
clause, providing for a limited overriding effect of the LA Act in case of
the contingencies mentioned in Section 24 (a) and (b). Section 24 (1) (a)
contemplates that where land acquisition proceedings were initiated under C
the LA Act but no award was passed till the date the new Act came into
force viz. 1.1.2014, acquisition proceedings could continue, however
compensation will have to be determined under the Act of 2013. Section
24 (1) (b) provides that where an award under Section 11 of the LA Act
has been made, the entire proceedings would continue under the Act of D
1894, as if it were not repealed. Section 24(2) provides for an exclusionary
clause which mandates the land acquisition proceedings to be lapsed
and initiated de novo.
36. It was submitted that the requirements for lapsing (of
acquisition) in Section 24(2), are subject to an award under Section 11 of E
the LA Act being made five years prior to the commencement of the
Act of 2013 viz. 1.1.2014. If the award is made and the following two
situations occurred, the proceedings will lapse; one, physical possession
has not been taken or (to be read as “and”) and two, compensation has
not been paid.
F
37. Elaborating on the expressions “paid”/”tender” it was urged
by learned counsel that the meaning of expression “tender” is that when
a person has tendered the amount and made it unconditionally available
and the landowner has refused to receive it, the person who has tendered
the amount cannot be saddled with the liability, which is to be visited for
non-payment of the amount. Reliance is placed on the meaning of the G
term in Black’s Law Dictionary.
38. It is apparent from aforesaid that “tender” may save the
tendering party from the penalty for non-payment or non-performance
24
(2002) 3 SCC 722 H
70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A if another party is unjustifiably refusing the tender. The expression “paid”
would mean in Section 31(1) of the LA Act and Section 24(2) of the Act
of 2013 as soon as it is offered and made unconditionally available.
Merely, if a landowner refuses to accept it, it cannot be said that it has
not been paid. Once amount has been tendered that would amount to
payment. Thus, the term “paid” does not mean actual payment to be
B
made but whatever is possible for an incumbent to make the payment is
only contemplated. “Paid” does not mean receipt or deposited in court.
There may be refusal to receive an amount in spite of its tender. Thus, in
view of the decisions of this Court in Benares State Bank Ltd.v.CIT, 25
Collector of Central Excise v. Elphinstone Spg.&Wvg.Mills Co.Ltd.26
C and J.Dalmia v Commissioner of Income Tax27, the provisions of Section
24(2) should be construed as tender of the amount.
39. It is submitted that the three Judge Bench in judgment in Pune
Municipal Corporation (supra), while deciding the expression
“compensation has not been paid”, held that for the purposes of
D Section 24(2), the compensation shall be regarded as “paid”:
“if the compensation has been offered to the person interested
and such compensation has been deposited in the court where
reference under Section 18 can be made on happening of
any of the contingencies contemplated under Section 31(2)
E of the Land Acquisition Act. In other words,the compensation
may be said to have been”paid”within the meaning of Section
24(2) when the Collector (or for that matter Land Acquisition
Officer) has discharged his obligation and deposited the
amount of compensation in court and made that amount
available to the interested person to be dealt with as provided
F in Sections 32 and 33.”
40. It was argued that the conclusion in Pune Municipal
Corporation (supra) that deposit of the amount of compensation in the
Government treasury cannot amount to the said sum (amount of
compensation) “paid” to the landowners or persons interested. This
G view was taken without dwelling on the legal connotation of the expression
“paid” in Section 24(2). In the process, it has also not taken into account
the binding law as held in Dalmia’s case and Benares State Bank’s
25
(1969) 2 SCC 316
26
(1971)1 SCC 337
27
H (1964) 53 ITR 83 [AIR 1964 SC 1866]
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 71
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

case. Though Section 34 of the LA Act was mentioned in passing para A
16, however it has not at all been considered. It is a very crucial provision,
which deals with the consequences of compensation not having been
deposited. Further, submit counsel, the matter relates to payment of
compensation from out of Government funds. Handling of Government
funds has to be strictly in accordance with the Standing Orders issued
B
by the States. The effect of those Standing Orders has also not been
considered in the judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra).
The said judgment, therefore, having been rendered without taking into
consideration the aforesaid judgments, Section 34 of the LA Act and the
Standing Orders is, in the submission of the counsel, per incuriam.
41. It is submitted that another aspect which arises is, whether C
prejudice or injustice would be caused in case the amount is not deposited
in the court and is deposited in the treasury, particularly when the
provision contained in Section 31 of the LA Act has to be read conjointly
with those in Section 34. By reason of Section 34, (of the LA Act) one
could claim interest - at a higher rate in case amounts were not deposited D
under Section 31(2) if the authorities were at fault.
42. Arguing about whether the expression “or” should be read as
conjunctive or disjunctive, it was argued that after the stage of section
11 under the LA Act, there are two possibilities. The requisite authority
may take possession of the land in terms of Section 16 of the LA Act or E
the said authority may proceed to tender payment under Section 31 of
the LA Act. The said two possibilities may be conducted simultaneously
or one after the other, there is no embargo in the LA Act regarding the
same.
43. It is submitted that Section 24(2), while providing for lapsing, F
uses the two phrases concerning possession of the land and the tendering
of payment with the disjunctive word “or” thereby making it mandatory
for the acquiring authority to satisfy both contingencies in order to avoid
lapsing. It is submitted that the same would be against the legislative
intention of limited lapsing. Further, the said interpretation would be
against the purport of the possession and the title “being vested” in the G
acquiring authority by virtue of the interpretation of section 16 in the LA
Act [as dealt with the latter part of the submissions]. It is submitted that
the intention of the Legislature could not have been to divest the acquiring
authority of the land after the said has been vested “free from all
encumbrances”. In line with the same, it is submitted that the word H
72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A “or” may be read as “and” so as to limit the lapsing only in cases where
both, payment has not been made (subject to proviso) and possession
has not been taken.
44. Reliance is placed on the judgments reported as Ishwar Singh
Bindra v State of UP28, where this Court approved and extracted
B passages from Maxwell on Interpretation and Stroud’s Judicial
Dictionary to the effect that generally, the conjunctive “and” is used in
a cumulative sense, requiring the fulfilment of all the conditions that it
joins together, and herein it is the antithesis of “or” and that however,
sometimes, even in such a connection, it is, by force of its contents, read
as “or”. Similarly, Maxwell accepted that “to carry out the intention
C of the legislature it is occasionally found necessary to read the
conjunctions ‘or’ and ‘and’ one for the other”. Learned counsel also
relied on Mobilox Innovations (P) Ltd v Kirusa Software (P) Ltd 29
which held that:
“38....Even otherwise ,the word “and” occurring in Section
D 8(2)(a)must be read as “or” keeping in mind the legislative
intent and the fact that an anomalous situation would arise if
it is not read as “or” if read as “and”, disputes would only
stave off the bankruptcy process if they are already pending
in a suit or arbitration proceedings and not otherwise. This
E would lead to great hardship; in that a dispute may arise a
few days before triggering of the insolvency process, in which
case, though a dispute may exist, there is no time to approach
either an Arbitral Tribunal or a court...”
Learned counsel also relied on several other decisions in support
F of the same proposition (i.e. that the disjunctive “or” has to be read
contextually, and if need arises as “and”, i.e., as a conjunctive).30

28
1969 (1) SCR 219
29
(2018)1SCC 353
30
Brown v Harrison 1927 All ER 195 @ pp. 203, 204 (CA); Ranchhodddas Atmaram
G & Anr v Union of India 1961 (3) SCR 718; State of Bombay v R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala
1957 (1) SCR 874 (hereafter “RMDC”); Patel Chunibhai Dajibha v Narayanrao, 1965
(2) SCR 328; Punjab Produce & Trading Co. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West
Bengal, 1971 SCR 977; Ishwar Singh Bindra & Ors v State of UP 1969 (1) SCR 219;
Joint Director of Mines Safety v Tandur and Nayandgi Stone Quarries (P0 Ltd 1987 (3)
SCC 308; Samee Khan v Bindu Khan 1998 (7) SCC 59. Prof. Yashpal & Ors v State of
H Chhatisgarh & Ors 2005 (5) SCC 420
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 73
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

45. Highlighting that the placement of the proviso (following Section A
24 (2)) is significant, and not accidental, it was argued that the field of
operation of the proviso is immediately preceding provision, i.e. Section
24 (2) and not Section 24 (1) (b). It is submitted that the proviso to
Section 24 (2) contemplates a situation where with respect to majority
of the holdings, compensation not deposited in the account of landowners
B
(even though there being tendering of payment to all land owners and
physical possession being taken), the benefits of the Act of 2013 qua the
compensation would follow. It is argued that if the said proviso is not
interpreted to be a proviso to Section 24(2), a valuable benefit extended
by Parliament would evaporate. Learned counsel contended that the
said proviso provides for enhanced benefit even if the twin conditions of C
Section 24 (2) are met. Therefore, the said proviso saves the land
acquisition and furthers the purpose and the object of giving benefit of
computation of compensation to all landholders. Therefore, it is evident
that the proviso is appropriately treated as a proviso to Section 24 (2)
and cannot be read as proviso to Section 24 (1) (b) of the Act of 2013. It
D
was argued that Parliamentary intent is clearly discernible, because of
the colon (a punctuation mark) occurring at the end of Section 24 (2),
which means that the proviso constitutes an exception to that provision.
Reference was made to Aswini Kumar Ghosh & Anr v Arabinda
Bose & Anr31 (where it was held that “...Punctuation is after all a
minor element in the construction of a statute and very little attention E
is paid to it by English Courts. ......When a statute is
carefully punctuated and there is doubt about its meaning, a weight
should undoubtedly be given to the punctuation.”). Reliance was
also placed on Jamshed Guzdar v State of Maharastra.32
46. It was argued by Ms. Pinky Anand, learned ASG, that payment F
of compensation is not a sine qua non for vesting in terms of Section 16
of the old LA Act. It is urged, in this context, that the old Act did not
provide any time line for depositing compensation; nor even for taking
over of possession. Ordinarily, the repeal provision under the Act of
2013 (Section 114) would prevail; however, Section 24 carves out an
important, albeit a limited scope from the repeal clause. Section 24 (2) G
freshly introduces the concept of lapsing, in relation to acquisitions
that were initiated under the old Act. Necessarily, lapsing is to be
considered as a narrow concept. Supporting the learned SG’s argument
31
1953 SCR 1
32
2005 (2) SCC 591 H
74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A that “or” is to be read conjunctively, she highlighted that by reason of
Section 16 of the old Act, title vested in the State, upon taking of
possession. Divesting under old Act was impermissible. It was urged
that were the court to accept an interpretation, that either non-payment
of compensation, or taking of possession – under Section 24 (2), would
result in lapsing of acquisition, as held in Pune Municipal Corporation
B (supra) and other decisions, land vested in the State, and conveyed to
third parties (either as allottees of housing schemes or public sector
undertakings, for one development project or another, or for public
purposes such as construction of roads, bridges and other public works)
would be divested.
C 47. Under Section 16 of the LA Act once award is made and
possession of land is taken, then the land vests absolutely with the
Government. Therefore, the word deemed to lapse in Section 24(2) should
not be interpreted to mean divesting of land from the Government which
is already vested in the Government and moreover in the absence of any
provision of divesting in the 1894 Act. In this context, the observations
D
in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar33 that the legislature is
presumed to be acquainted with the construction which the courts have
put upon the words, and when legislature repeats the same words. This
Court had, in that judgment, quoted with approval the previous decision
in Sri K.C Gajapati Narayan Deo v, State of Orissa34 that
E “Section of the Act empowers the State Government to
declare, by notification, that the estate described in the
notification has vested in the State free from all
encumbrances. ….. The consequences of vesting ether by Issue
of notification or as a result of surrender are described in
F detail in Section 5 of the Act. It would be sufficient for our
present purpose to state that the primary consequence is that
all lands comprised in the estate including communal lands,
non-ryoti lands, waste and trees orchards pasture lands,
forests, mines and minerals, quarries, rivers and streams, tanks,
water channels, fisheries, ferries, hats and bazars, and
G buildings or structures together with the land on which they
stand shall, subject to the other provisions of the Act, vest
absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances
and the intermediary shall cease to have any interest in them.”
33
(1955) 2 SCR 603
H 34
1954 SCR 11
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 75
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

Learned counsel also relied on the judgment of this Court in A
Jagannath Temple Managing Committee v. Siddha Math35, at para
53, that “it is a settled principle of law that once a property is vested
by an Act of legislature, to achieve the laudable object, the same
cannot be divested by the enactment of any subsequent general law
and vest such property under such law.”
B
48. It was urged that serious consequences arise when condition
nos. (ii) and (iii) are to be read as not conjunctive or disjunctive. The
word used to connect these two conditions is “or”; if it is not read
conjunctively, disastrous consequence leading to absurd result would
emanate. Once possession is taken over vesting occurs under Section
16 of the LA Act. Section 24(2) contains no stipulation that such vesting C
of title of land stands nullified or divested. If the intention of Parliament
was to divest the State of its title that had to be stated in plain and clear
language. It was emphasized that the conjunctive use of “or” in Section
24 (2) would have not only momentous consequences to the State, but
innocent third parties, who would be exposed to the risk of being divested D
title to the lands and properties, perfected by them, as allottees or
subsequent purchasers. Merely because a person who has received
compensation clungs on to the possession of the land and the same shall
lead to lapsing cannot be the intention of Parliament. Similarly, one who
received compensation, is not obliged to return the money to the State in
the event of lapsing under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. It was E
urged, therefore, that absence of provision to return the compensation
received to Government convincingly points to Parliamentary intent that
“or” should be read as “and”; thus, only if neither possession is taken (of
acquired lands) nor is compensation paid, (i.e., tendered to the party or
parties) would the acquisition under the LA Act lapse. Learned counsel F
also relied on several decisions in this context.36
49. It was highlighted by M/s Bhangde, Mr. Rajesh Mahale, and
Ms. Shashi Kiran, that the consequence of literally interpreting Section
24 (2) as to mean that the conditions are disjunctive (either that “or”
should be read as such) are too drastic and severe. Learned counsel G
35
(2015) 16 SCC 542 @ para 53
36
Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh and Ors., (2003) 1 SCC 335;
Gulam Mustafa v. State of Maharashtra, (1976) 1 SCC 800; Sita Ram Bhandar Society,
New Delhi v. Lieutenant Governor, Government of NCT, Delhi and Ors., (2009) 10
SCC 501 and Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and
Ors., (1996) 6 SCC 405 H
76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A pointed out that as a result of allegations of non-payment of compensation,
lands which had been vested in the State and were subsequently made
over to the requisitioning agencies, and in respect of which title had
passed multiple times to other parties, now are exposed to the threat of
divesting of title. Learned counsel submitted that a deeming fiction cannot
be taken to this extent; such disastrous consequences could not have
B
been attributed by Parliament, because even if such were the intent,
there has to be a mechanism to restitute those likely to be affected.
Besides, the legality of such a law, divesting or taking away the title of
such innocent third-party purchasers, would be suspect, because there
is absolutely no provision for restitution or any form of compensation in
C their favour.
50. On the question relating to the mode of taking possession, it
was argued that when the State is involved in taking possession of the
property acquired, it can take possession by drawing a panchnama.
The normal rule of State possessing the land through some persons would
D not be applicable in such cases. On open land, possession is deemed to
be of the owner. The way the State takes possession of large chunk of
property acquired is by drawing a memorandum of taking possession as
State is not going to put other persons in possession or its police force or
going to cultivate it or start residing or physically occupy it after displacing
who were physically in possession as in the case of certain private persons,
E in case they re-enter in possession of open land, start cultivation or
residing in the house. Lawful possession is deemed to be of the State. A
number of decisions that accepted the mode of drawing panchnama by
the State consistently to be a mode of taking possession were cited. In
Banda Development Authority v. Moti Lal Agarwal 37 this Court
F observed that preparing a panchnama is sufficient to constitute taking
of possession. If acquisition is of a large tract of land, it may not be
possible to take physical possession of each and every parcel of the land
and it would be sufficient that symbolic possession is taken by preparing
an appropriate document in the presence of independent witnesses and
getting their signatures. Even subsequent utilisation of a portion of acquired
G land for public purpose was still sufficient to prove taking possession.
51. It is submitted that when the State acquires land and has drawn
memorandum of taking possession that is the way the State takes
possession of large tract of land acquired, it ought not necessarily to
37
(2011)5 SCC 394 (hereafter referred to as “Banda Development Authority”)
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 77
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

physically occupy such land after forcefully displacing those physically A
in possession. Possession in law is deemed to be physical possession for
the State. This Court in a number of decisions has accepted the mode of
drawing panchnama by the State consistently to be a mode of taking
possession. It is submitted that this Court in T.N. Housing Board v. A.
Viswam38 held that recording of memorandum/panchnama by the Land
B
Acquisition Officer in the presence of witnesses signed by them would
constitute taking possession of land.
Also, reliance is placed on other decisions.39
52. Dealing next with the manner by which the period covered by
an interim order of Court ought to be excluded for the purpose of C
applicability of Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013, it is argued that a
settled proposition of law is that an act of a Court should not prejudice
any party. In view of the maxim actus curae neminem gravabit or
even in its absence, any interim order granted by the court cannot prejudice
any rights of the parties. It is argued that for a proper working of the
justice delivery system, once the court passes an order staying D
dispossession, the State cannot take possession of the land. If an order
of the Court disables a person to take any action, the doctrine nemo
tentur ad impossible would be applicable that is, the law in general
excuses a party which is disabled to perform a duty and impossibility of
performance of a duty is a good excuse. Further, the Latin maxim lexnon E
cogitad impossibilia, that is, the law does not compel a man to do that
which he cannot possibly perform. Since, it becomes impossible for the
State to take possession, for the duration a stay or interim order is in
operation, the consequence of an interim order cannot be used against
the State. Reliance for this legal position is placed on the judgments in
A.R. Antulay vs R.S.Nayak & Ors40, Sarah Mathew v Institute of F
Cardio Vascular Diseases41 and in Dau Dayal v State of U.P42. In
A.R.Antulay (supra) it was held that no party is prejudiced by the court’s
mistake. Therefore, urged counsel, in cases where conduct of acquisition
38
(1996) 8 SCC 259
39
Balwant Narayan Bhagde v. M.D. Bhagwat, (1976) 1 SCC 700; State of T.N. v.
G
Mahalakshmi Ammal, (1996) 7 SCC 269; T.N. Housing Board v. A. Viswam, (1996) 8
SCC 259 and Om Prakash Verma & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors, (2010)
13 SCC 158.
40
1988 Suppl (1) SCR 01
41
2014 (2) SCC 62
42
1959 Supp (1) SCR 639 H
78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A proceedings were held up after the passing of an award, due to the
interim order of any court, in the absence of any specific provision to
that effect, a party who cannot perform its duties, and but for the order,
could have performed its stipulated task, within the time assigned, should
not be placed at a disadvantage, as that would amount to granting a
premium for one’s wrongdoing, or rank speculation. It is urged, therefore,
B
that it is imperative that the period during which the State or the acquiring
authority was prohibited/ injuncted by an interim order of the court from
taking possession has to be excluded. This principle, submit learned
counsel, is based on settled common law principles. These are in fact
rules of equity, justice and sound logic. In the absence of their being a
C prohibition in the law these principles would be attracted. The efficacy
and binding nature of such common law principles cannot be diminished
or whittled down in the absence of any express prohibition in law. Coupled
with the aforesaid principle is also a principle of restitution. An interim
order passed by the Court merges into the final decision, goes against
the party successful at the interim stage. Unless otherwise ordered by
D
the court, the successful party at the end of the litigation would be justified
in being placed in the same place in which it would have been, had the
interim order not been passed. Undoing the effect of an interim order by
resorting to the principle of restitution is in fact an obligation of the court.
The above principles have been culled out and applied by this Court in
E the judgment in South Eastern Coal Field Ltd v State of M.P. & Ors.43.
Learned counsel argued that general common law rules of equity, justice
and sound logic would certainly apply. It is submitted that similarly, the
doctrine of restitution has been discussed in several other judgments of
this Court including State of Gujarat v Essar Oil Ltd44. It is, thus,
submitted that the mere absence of an express provision under Section
F
24(2) – to exclude the period during which an interim order operates,
which prevents the making of an award, or taking over of possession of
acquired land, would not in law imply that such restitutionary and equitable
principles would be inapplicable.
Contentions on behalf of landowners
G
53. Mr. Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel, led the arguments
on behalf of landowners. He urged that the Act of 2013 is a new,
transformative and radical measure. The new law is a welfare state
43
2003 SCC 648
44
H 2012 (3) SCC 522
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 79
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

law, not a colonial law - unlike the Act of 1894. Mr. Divan submitted that A
the Act of 1894 resulted in several rounds of repeated litigation on various
aspect, such as payment of compensation, lack of legislatively mandated
timelines for completion of acquisition proceedings, etc. This also resulted
in amendments to the Act of 1894 (notably, the amendments of 1967 and
1984) which, to some extent, sought to grant relief to landowners.
B
However, these too got mired in litigation. Learned counsel relied on the
judgments, reported as Dev Sharan v State of Uttar Pradesh45 and
Radhey Shyam v State of UP46. Repeated litigation was the result of an
unfair legal regime. It was submitted that such judgments of this Court
highlighted that the Act of 1894 was enacted more than 116 years ago to
facilitate acquisition of land and immovable properties for construction C
of roads, canals, railways, etc. This law was frequently used in the post-
independence era for different public purposes like laying of roads,
construction of bridges, dams and buildings of various public
establishments/institutions, planned development of urban areas, providing
of houses to different sections of the society and for developing residential
D
colonies/sectors. In the recent years, there is acquisition of large tracts
of land in rural parts of the country in the name of development and their
transfer to private entrepreneurs, who utilize it to construction of multi-
storied complexes, commercial centres and for setting up industrial units.
Similarly, large scale acquisitions were made on behalf of companies by
invoking the provisions contained in Part VII of the Act. Resultantly, E
such acquisition led to deprivation of the source of livelihood of land
owners, engaged in agricultural operations and other ancillary activities
in rural areas. A large number of these people are unaware of, and
unable to assert their rights, and secure fair compensation. The unrest
and inequity which arose out of these deprivations, impelled the State to
F
enact a modern law, which ensured not only fair compensation, but other
rights such as rehabilitation, employment, higher solatium and a guarantee
against deprivation of certain kinds of lands. Thus, the Act of 2013 ushered
a new regime that starts from a fresh direction. Learned counsel also
relied on Bharat Sewak Samaj v. Lieutnant Governor & Ors.,47 to
say that the provisions of the Act of 1894 were outdated and were misused G
and were oppressive to the interest of the landowners. Hence, the Act
of 2013 was enacted and that this Court ought to interpret in the spirit of
45
(2011) 4 SCC 769
46
(2011) 5 SCC 553
47
2012 (12) SCC 675 H
80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A the new beneficial legislation. Learned counsel urged that the benefits
so conferred should not be taken away by this Court by narrowly
interpreting its provisions.
54. Mr. Divan relied on the Statement of Objects and Reasons of
the Act of 2013 to say that the new law was framed, in recognition of
B concerns expressed by the property owners of forcible acquisition without
following due process and without paying appropriate compensation
affecting livelihood of such owners, many times, who are small property
owners or persons having small agricultural holdings and having been
dependant on the said holdings, the new Act is made. The Act aims to
provide just and fair compensation, make adequate provision for
C rehabilitation and resettlement for the affected persons in the family,
determination of compensation package on scientific methods. It was
urged that being a welfare legislation, the Act of 2013 constitutes a
wholesome rejection of the colonial approach. Learned counsel urged
that under the new Act, unlike the Act of 1894, a Social Impact Assessment
D (SIA) report has to be prepared, under Section 7, as an integral
component of acquisition proceedings. If acquisition is not resorted to, in
a time frame, the acquisition lapses; likewise, the new Act contemplates
the preparation of a rehabilitation scheme, which would note the (a)
particulars of lands and immovable properties being acquired of each
affected family; (b) livelihoods lost in respect of landless who are primarily
E dependent on the lands being acquired; (c) a list of public utilities
Government buildings, amenities and infrastructural facilities which are
affected or likely to be affected, where resettlement of affected families
is involved and (d) details of any common property resources being
acquired.
F 55. Learned senior counsel argued that Section 24 constitutes an
exception to the general rule, i.e., lapsing of all acquisition proceedings,
by reason of repeal of the Act of 1894, and operation of Section 114.
Therefore, Section 24 has to be given effect to strictly, given that
Parliamentary intent was to ensure that acquisition proceedings did not
G result in oppression and hardship. It was argued that having regard to
this salient feature, the provision (Section 24) should be literally construed.
Learned counsel submitted that the objective of new Act must be kept in
mind to understand the scope of Sections 11, 11 (A), 12, 31 and 34 of the
1894 Act, on the one hand, and provisions of Section of 24 of the Act of
2013 on the other. Furthermore, it was argued that the non-obstante
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 81
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

clause must be allowed to operate with full vigour in its own field. It was A
stressed that such a provision is equivalent to saying that in spite of the
provision or Act mentioned in the non-obstante clause, the enactment
following it, will have its full operation of that, the provision indicated in
the non-obstante clause will not be an impediment for the operation of
the enactment. Decisions in this regard were cited by counsel.48
B
56. Mr. Divan relied upon the three stages preceding the Act of
2013 to urge that there was no doubt in the mind of Parliament, that
lapsing of acquisition proceedings was intended to ensue, in the event
compensation were not paid; or possession were not taken, in respect of
awards made five years prior to coming into force of the Act of 2013. It
was argued that Section 24 should be given a plain and literal construction, C
except to the extent that the term “paid” occurring in Section 24(2)
would also cover cases where a deposit is made before the Reference
Court in situations covered by Section 31(2) of the 1894 Act. Elaborating
on this, it is urged that the first decision of this Court, i.e., Pune Municipal
Corporation (supra) took note of Section 24(2) in the context of a pre- D
existing law. The Court was alive to the fact that under the Act of 1894,
where payment of compensation was tendered and the land owner
refused to accept the amount, the State is nevertheless obliged to ensure
that at all times, the amount should be made available, in a place or an
account, not within its control. It was urged, therefore, that actual tender
of the amount of compensation is a sine qua non for the act of payment E
to be completed. It was considered that in that event, the land owner
does not accept the amount, it should be deposited with the Court, a
neutral and independent authority to whom the land owner or anyone
claiming under him can approach and draw the amount. It was submitted
that this obligation cannot be brushed aside because aside from the F
question of acceptance of compensation without prejudice, even at a
later stage, the land owner might wish to reconsider the compensation
and avail of the amount.
57. Learned counsel submitted that the obligation to deposit the
amount in the Reference Court is an independent and absolute one in G
that it is irrespective of whether the land owner sought a reference for
higher compensation to the Court (under the Act of 1894). Learned
counsel urged this Court to accept this interpretation, which according
48
Madhav Rao Scindhia v. Union of India 1971 (1) SCC 85 (11 Judges); Smt.
Parayankandiyal Eravath v. K. Devi (1996) 4 SCC 76 (2 Judges). H
82 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A to him, would give full effect to the intention of Parliament, i.e., to save
intention of Parliament. It was again highlighted that Parliamentary
intention was firstly to repeal the previous law to a limited extent and
save ongoing acquisition proceedings – in terms of Section 24(1) and
usher a new regime, i.e. Section 24(2) whereby indolence on the part of
the State agencies either with respect to payment of compensation or
B
with respect to taking over of possession, resulting in the lapse of
acquisition proceedings itself. Learned counsel relied upon the decisions
of this Court which followed and applied the law declared in Pune
Municipal Corporation 49.
58. It was argued that the submissions on behalf of the State and
C the development authorities that “payment” included deposit with the
treasury or some other authority other than the Reference Court, could
not have been termed as compliance with the Act of 1894. Here, it was
urged that Parliament was acutely alive of the fact that the previous
land acquisition regime resulted in injurious and unconscionable delays
D in payment of compensation. Furthermore, even after awards were made,
possession was never taken. This led to a great deal of uncertainty as
far as the land owners were concerned because they could not move
ahead in their life without compensation nor could they take any steps to
acquire new lands or properties. It was precisely to address this mischief,
rather a widespread one, that the Parliament wished to enact a “bright
E line approach” whereby all acquisitions which did not culminate either in
payment of compensation or taking over of possession in respect of
awards made five or more years prior to 1.1.2014 had to lapse. It was
submitted that Section 24(1) provided a limited window in that it saved
some acquisitions, i.e., notably where awards had been made but further
F proceedings had not been taken or where awards had not been made in
49
Bharat Kumar v State of Haryana (2014) 6 SCC 586 (hereafter “Bharat Kumar”);
Bimla Devi v State of Haryana (2014) 6 SCC 583 @ para 3; Union of India v Shiv Raj
(2014) 6 SCC 564 at para 22; Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association (supra) at para
14; State of Haryana v Vinod Oil and General Mills 2014 (15) SCC 410 at para 21; Sita
Ram v State of Haryana (2015) 3 SCC 597 at paras 19, 21; Ram Kishan v State of
G Haryana (2015) 4 SCC 347 at paras 8, 9, 12; Velaxan Kumar v Union of India 2015 (4)
SCC 325 at paras 15, 16, 17 (hereafter “Velaxan”); Karnail Kaur v State of Punjab
(2015) 3 SCC 206 at paras 17, 18, 23; Rajive Chowdhrie HUF v State (NCT) of Delhi
(2015) 3 SCC 541 at para 1; Competent Automobiles Co. Ltd v Union of India AIR
2015 SC 3186 at para 4; Govt of NCT of Delhi v Jagjit Singh AIR 2015 SC 2683 at para
3; Karan Singh v State of Haryana 2014 (5) SCC 738 at para 5; Shashi Gupta & Ors.
v. State of Haryana 2016 (13) SCC 380 at para 5; Delhi Development Authority v
H Sukhbir Singh (2016) 16 SCC 258 at para 1 (hereafter “Sukhbir”).
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 83
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

both cases less than 5 years prior to 1.1.2014. It was only in these two A
limited instances that acquisition proceedings were allowed to continue
or preserved. Thus, Parliamentary intent was that in cases of all awards
made five years or more prior to the coming into force of the Act, if
compensation was not paid or possession of the acquired land not taken,
automatically, as a matter of law there was to be a lapse (of such
B
acquisitions). This legal consequence crystallised and was in consonance
with the other provisions of the Act of 2013. Arguing that if one were to
take into account this perspective, there can be no doubt that the
expression “paid” cannot mean anything other than tendering of
compensation and in the event of its refusal, or the three contingencies
contemplated under Section 31(2) of the Act of 1894, it is deposited in C
Court. If these eventualities were not fulfilled and the amounts were
merely kept back with the Government by it, any compliance with some
norms evolved as part of the treasury or financial code there could have
been no payment or deposit in the eyes of law. Learned counsel submitted
that this Court should affirm the decision in Sukhbir Singh. It was also
D
submitted that unless Section 31 of the 1894 Act which postulates the
performance of a public duty in a particular manner and (through stipulated
three eventualities), such duty could be said to be fulfilled only and only
if that procedure were followed. Learned counsel relied upon the
judgment in Bharat Kumar, which noted that Section 24(2) has a
beneficial intent and begins with a non-obstante clause. Therefore, urged E
counsel, literal meaning is to be preferred. It was highlighted that Section
24(2) achieved a two-fold purpose, i.e., to preserve acquisition
proceedings initiated before the commencement of the Act and secondly,
conferring rights upon the land owners and other parties which did not
hitherto exist. Since these rights relate to the right to property which is
F
guaranteed by Article 300A of the Constitution, full effect must be given
to them rather than the construction which would destroy its very purpose.
In support of this argument, learned counsel relied upon Union of India
v. Shivraj50.
59. Learned counsel submitted that the decision in Pune Municipal
Corporation (supra) was itself conscious of Section 31 and the G
contingencies or eventualities contemplated under Section 31(2). That
apart, it also relied upon Ivo Agnelo Santimano Fernandes v. State of
Goa51, to say that the State cannot be – in the event of non-acceptance
50
(2014) 6 SCC 564.
51
(2011) 11 SCC 506 H
84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A of the compensation by the land owner or its inability to locate the land
owner or in the event of a dispute – keep the compensation amount with
itself and claim it to be part of same general treasury amount and proceed
to utilise it. It was submitted that precisely to deal with this practice, the
appeal provided that non-payment of compensation – and in the event of
any of the contingencies accruing in Section 31(2) of the 1894 Act, the
B
failure to deposit it with the Reference Court would result in lapse of
entire acquisition itself. It was submitted that this interpretation is not
only literal but followed the objective and purpose sought to be achieved
by the Parliament through the provision. Learned counsel urged this
Court that the literal interpretation in this case would also accrue with an
C equitable interpretation and ensure that the real benefit of the new law
would accrue to land owners deprived of their properties and livelihoods
for long periods without payment of compensation. Learned counsel,
therefore, urged that the beneficial interpretation adopted by this Court
in Velaxan Kumar (supra) should be accepted. Rajive Chowdhurie
HUF (supra)52, it was argued, while interpreting Section 24 of the Act
D
of 2013 Act, the Court should not in the guise of an interpretative exercise
don the cap of a legislature. It was submitted as to the State’s argument
that the disjunctive “or” in Section 24(2) should not be read as conjunctive
“and”. It was argued in this regard that in all the three drafts that the Bill
(which ultimately culminated in the Act of 2013) went through53, the
E expression used consistently was “but the physical possession”. In
the three stages, the intent was to normally ensure that the acquisition
proceedings pending for a long time were to lapse. It was emphasised
that in the first version, i.e., the Bill introduced on 5.9.2011, all acquisitions
were deemed to have lapsed regardless of whether the award was made
or not, if possession were not taken and also in those cases where the
F
awards were not made. Therefore, this Court should be cautious in
interpreting the disjunctive “or” in any manner other than in the literal
sense.
60. The three broad situations covered under Section 24 are (i)
cases where the land acquisition process shall be deemed to have lapsed;
G
52
(2015) 3 SCC 541
53
Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill 2011 – introduced in Lok
Sabha on 05.07.2011; Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill, 2013 as passed by the Lok Sabha on 29.08.2013
and the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition Rehabilitation
H and Resettlement Act 2013 (as passed by both Houses of Parliament on 05.09.2013).
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 85
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

(ii) cases where the landholders are entitled to compensation in A
accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2013; and (iii) cases where
the land acquisition proceedings continue under the 1894 Act as if it had
not been repealed. It was urged that the first set of cases are covered
by Section 24(2). The two conditions to be fulfilled as on 1.1.2014 to
trigger the deeming provision into operation, according to Mr. Divan, are
B
firstly, there must be an award under section 11 of the 1894 Act which
has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of the
Act of 2013 (i.e., an award made on or before 1.1.2009); and secondly
either physical possession of the land has not been taken from the
landowner or compensation had not been paid as required under the Act
of 1894. C
61. It was argued that the second set of cases, where enhanced
compensation has to be paid, under the Act of 2013, are covered under
Section 24(1) and the proviso to Section 24. Section 24(1) provides that
where proceedings have not reached the stage of an award under section
11 of the 1894 Act, the provisions to determine compensation under the D
Act of 2013 apply. Further, the proviso to Section 24 provides for
compensation in terms of the Act of 2013 where the following conditions
are fulfilled, firstly an award has been made under section 11 of the
1894 Act; and secondly, compensation in respect of the majority of the
land holdings has not been paid to the landowners. It was submitted that
the “majority” is required to be reckoned with reference to the award E
passed under the Act of 1894, and that awards contemplated by the
proviso are awards made within the period of five years prior to the
commencement of the Act of 2013 i.e., awards made between 1.1.2009
and 31.12.2013.
62. Learned counsel stated that the third set of cases is where the F
land owners do not get any benefit under the Act of 2013 and the
acquisition proceeds under the provisions of the Act of 1894. It was
argued that these cases are covered by section 24(1)(b) and to which
neither section 24 (2) nor the proviso applies. This covers situations
where though an award has been passed five years prior to the G
commencement of the Act, neither of the conditions for deemed lapsing
are present. Mr. Divan urged that the provisions of the Act of 1894 will
continue to apply without any benefit in terms of increased compensation
where an award is passed within 5 years of the commencement of the
Act of 2013 but the majority of landholders have been paid.
H
86 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A 63. Mr. Divan then urged that this understanding of the provisions
of Section 24 is based on established rules of interpretation i.e., first, the
golden rule of interpretation requiring the Court to interpret statutory
provisions literally. Second, the rule of purposive interpretation was to
be used, having regard to the object of the enactment, the purpose of the
law in seeking to correct historical injustices and the legislative intent to
B
confer the benefit of the Act of 2013 on certain landholders affected by
the regime under the Act of 1894. The third rule to be employed, is the
rule of harmonious interpretation, such that all words of the provision
are given effect and no part of the provision is rendered otiose; fourth,
contemporaneous understanding of administrators responsible for
C implementing a new law. Also an interpretation in such a manner as to
avoid inserting words, subtracting words, and avoids anomalies or
absurdities was necessary. Lastly it was urged that giving a deeming
provision its natural effect, which in this case results in a rule of
interpretation that the provisions of a beneficent legislation ought to be
interpreted in the case of ambiguity in favour of the citizens. 54
D
64. It was submitted that the interpretation of Section 24 outlined
above gives the plain and natural meaning to the key expressions used in
section 24 - “physical possession”, “paid”, and “deemed to have lapsed”.
He further argued that since Section 24 of the Act of 2013 must be read
with section 31 of the Act of 1894, the expression “tender” is also relevant
E and the interpretation he has advanced is consistent with the natural
meaning of “tender”.
65. Learned counsel for the landowners urged that the words
‘paid’ and ‘deposited in the account of the beneficiaries’ are two
permissible modes of making compensation available to landowners.
F Mr. Divan contended that these are two modes of paying the money to
the landowners. ‘Paid’, it was urged, means paid. It does not mean a
deposit in treasury. He further submitted that ‘deposit in the account of
the beneficiaries’ does not mean a deposit in the treasury. He argued
that there was no reason to depart from the rule of literal interpretation,
G and the manner of payment, as held in Pune Municipal Corporation
(supra), is to be strictly in terms of Section 31 of the Act of 1894 as it is
54
Counsel cited Pratap Singh vs. State of Jharkhand (2005) 3 SCC 551 (5 Judges);
Central Railway Workshop vs. Vishwanath (1969) 3 SCC 95; and M/s International Ore
and Fertilisers (india) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Employee State Insurance (1987) 4 SCC 203 in
H support of the rule of beneficial construction of a welfare and remedial statute.
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 87
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

an expropriatory legislation. It was contended as to the learned Solicitor A
General’s submission that payment in terms of Section 24 is complied
with if the amount is tendered to the landowners, overlooks the obligation
of payment in terms of Section 24 is only met if the amount is actually
paid to the landowners. On the occurrence of the contingencies
mentioned in Section 31(2) of the Act of 1894, it ought to be deposited in
B
the Reference Court as defined under Section 3(d) of the Act of 1894.
He submitted that tendering money is not payment and Section 31(1) of
the Act of 1894 uses the words ‘tender’ and ‘paid’ to convey different
meanings and obligations. Mr. Divan argued that the judgments cited by
the learned Solicitor General in this regard essentially deal with labour
laws, and are inapplicable as these statutes did not contain a provision C
such as Section 31 of the Act of 1894, which strictly and precisely
prescribes what is to be done in the event when the payment is not
accepted.
66. It was argued that no rules under the Act of 1894 contemplate
deposit in the treasury. Learned counsel submitted that standing orders, D
which are merely administrative instructions issued for conducting
monetary transactions of the State, have in some cases been confused
to be Rules framed under Section 55 of the Act of 1894. The Rules or
the Standing Orders have not been produced and no evidence has been
furnished of compliance with the requirements of Section 55, such as
notification in the Gazette. All learned counsel submitted that in any E
case, delegated/subordinate legislation cannot be inconsistent with, or in
any manner depart from the express and precise language of the parent
enactment. Again, it was submitted that the State’s argument with respect
to deposit of compensation amounts in the treasury, is untenable, for two
strong reasons: one, that Section 31 itself directed the compensation to F
be deposited in the court. In the teeth of this express position, the State
cannot be heard to say that it could nevertheless “deposit” the amount in
the treasury, which is nothing but keeping the money with itself. It was
secondly urged, that even otherwise, the Act of 1894 visualized that in
regard to matters not provided expressly, rules could be made (Section
55). G

67. Learned counsel submitted that the State’s argument regarding
the interpretation of ‘physical possession’ to be possession as per the
ratio in Banda Development Authority (supra), is incorrect. It was
submitted that it is important to take note of the conscious inclusion of
H
88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A the word ‘physical’ in relation to possession. An important distinction is
required to be drawn in respect of de jure / constructive / deemed
possession and ‘physical’ possession. Even if it is conceded that drawing
of a Panchnama is a valid mode of initially taking possession of vast
tracts of vacant land, the intention of the legislature is that over a period
of five years, such possession must transform to evident and demonstrable
B
‘physical’ possession i.e., the manifestation of actual control and dominion
over the subject land(s). Learned counsel relied on several decisions in
support of their argument that “physical possession” should be construed
as actual physical possession, and not constructive, or de jure
possession, which in most cases is possession on paper. 55
C 68. Arguing next regarding the interpretation of the proviso to
Section 24, it was stated that the same is to be read as a proviso to
Section 24 and not Section 24 (1) (b). Mr. Divan submitted that a proviso
may in certain cases operate as an independent provision, and the proviso
to Section 24 is a stand-alone provision which operates on its own terms.
D To the extent it is linked to any provision in Section 24, it is linked to
Section 24(1)(b) since it permits enhanced compensation (in a particular
contingency of non-payment to majority of the landowners) even if an
award may have been passed as contemplated in Section 24(1)(b). Mr.
Divan placed reliance on the reasons given in the judgment of Delhi
Development Authority v. Virendra Lal Bahri, [SLP [C] No.37375/
E 2016].
69. All counsel for landowners submitted that there is no valid
reason to exclude from the period of 5 years under section 24(2), the
time during which a landowner had the benefit of an interim order of a
court. In support of this argument, it was argued firstly, that Parliament
F did not expressly exclude such a period in Section 24. Second, where in
the Act of 2013, the legislature did want to exclude the period of a stay
or injunction, it has done so by using express words such as in the proviso
to Section 19 and the explanation to Section 69 of the Act of 2013. Third,
he submitted that the maxim “actus curiae neminem gravabit” which
G means that “the act of court shall prejudice no one” has no application

55
Seksaria Cotton mills v. State of Bombay 1953 SCR 325 Para 21; Superintendent v.
Anil Kumar (1979) 4 SCC 274 (Paras11-16); B. Gangadhar v. Rajalingam (1995) 5
SCC 238 (Para 5-6) Guruchand Singh v. Kamla Singh (1976) 2 SCC 152 (Paras 21-24).
Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan (2015) 6 SCC 222 (2 Judges)
H Para 11 to 15 endorsing contextual interpretation of the term
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 89
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

here, as this is a maxim which is applied generally as a principle of A
equity in individual cases to ensure that there is no injustice. The maxim
rarely, if ever, is applied to interpret a statute. Mr. Divan submitted that
this Court has declined to rely on this maxim in at least two reported
decisions - Padma Sundar Rao v. State of Tamil Nadu56 and State of
Rajasthan & Ors. v. Khandaka Jain Jewellers57. Mr. Divan further
B
placed reliance on Snell’s Equity (33rd Edition, 2015), which states that
the maxim of equity is not a specific rule of principle of law. It is a
statement of a broad theme which underlies equitable concepts and
principles and as a result, the utility of equitable maxims is limited. It
further states that the maxim may provide some limited assistance to
court in two broad types of situation: C
“The first is when there is some uncertainty as to the scope of
a particular rule of principle, and a court has to fall back on
more basic principles to resolve that uncertainty. The second
is when a court is exercising an equitable discretion, and seeks
to structure that exercise by referring to broader, underlying D
principles.”
70. Learned counsel further placed reliance on a three-judge Bench
decision of this Court in The Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Parson
Tools and Plants58, where it was held that:
‘If the Legislature wilfully omits to incorporate something of E
an analogous law in a subsequent statute, or even if there is
a casus omissus in a statute, the language of which is otherwise
plain and unambiguous, the Court is not competent to supply
the omission by engrafting on it or introducing in it, under
the guise of interpretation, by analogy or implication, F
something what it thinks to be a general principle of justice
and equity.’
It was submitted that there is no occasion for excluding time spent
on litigation. Parliament could have specified a particular date such as
1.1.2009 as the cut-off point under section 24(2). Had a date been so G
specified, there would have been no occasion to exclude time. Instead
of specifying a particular date, the Legislature in the Act of 2013
prescribed the cut-off point with reference to the commencement of the
56
(2002) 3 SCC 533
57
(2007) 14 SCC 339
58
(1975) 4 SCC 22 H
90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A Act. This method of specifying the cut-off point would not attract the
maxim “actus curiae neminem gravabit”. It was argued that the
occasion for excluding time would arise only where there is a starting
point and a statutory period to complete the task. In such provisions, it
may be reasonable to provide for the exclusion of time by appropriate
language in the section. Here, where a cut-off date is prescribed and as
B
such there is no starting point and period for completion of the task, the
notion of excluding time spent in litigations is an alien concept. It was,
therefore, submitted that it is not the court’s business to stretch the words
used by the Legislature to fill in gaps or omit words used in the provisions
of an Act, i.e., to fill in an obvious and conscious exclusion of a
C contingency, or a casus omissus. In support of this submission, learned
counsel relied on decisions of this Court.59 It was also argued that this
Court should not also exclude any period or periods, spent in litigation,
when interim orders were operating, because, firstly, in each such
instance, the landowners were aggrieved by different kinds of arbitrary
behaviour, such as not providing opportunity of mandatory hearing (under
D
an absolutely absurd rejection of objections; failure to take note of actual
developmental needs, and taking of lands, unconnected with a public
purpose, or obvious instances of expropriation of utilities and amenities
such as schools, community assets, etc. These led the courts, on a prima
facie consideration to assess the merit in the challenge and grant interim
E orders. Such instances could not be called as frivolous litigation,
warranting exclusion of time, to deprive the benefit of lapsing, enjoined
by the new law. Secondly, it was argued that repeated attempts were
made in Parliament to amend the law, to exclude the time, in the manner
sought by the State, by use of the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit.
However, such amendment could not pass muster.
F
71. Learned counsel contended that Parliament’s intent is to confer
a benefit on landholders who were impacted by the erstwhile unfair
regime. Urging that under the old law, landholders, to protect their assets
from expropriation of their land at paltry amounts, were compelled to
use legitimate systems of securing redress by filing cases in court, counsel
G urged that the correct approach, is to view litigation as a necessity under
an unjust former regime and not exclude the period spent under litigation
in such an unfair regime. He further urged that the deeming provision
with its clear and verifiable benchmarks on the five-year cut-off period,
59
G. Narayanswami v. G. Pannerselvam (1972) 3 SCC 717 and Kuldip Nayar vs Union
H Of India (2006) 7 SCC 1- both decisions of Constitution Benches.
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 91
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

physical possession and payment is easy to operate. Introducing notions A
such as exclusion of time due to pending litigation would complicate the
working of the statute.
72. Learned counsel urged that Section 24(2) uses the expression
“or”. The Legislature intended the two conditions separated by the word
“or” to be alternative conditions. Four situations arise where the B
conditions are disjunctive: firstly, when physical possession is with the
State and compensation is with the citizen, there is no deemed lapse;
secondly, when physical possession is with the citizen and compensation
is with the State, there is no need for restitution as the State has retained
the compensation amount; thirdly, when physical possession is with the
citizen, and the compensation is also with the citizen, in such scenarios, C
the citizen must return the compensation. It was urged that where the
State has paid the money by deposit in the Reference Court and the
money was lying with the Court, the State may withdraw the money on
deemed lapsing. However, if the State were to decide to acquire the
land afresh, the compensation already paid may be adjusted; and further D
since inherent in the notion of lapsing is the requirement for restitution,
the State can recover the compensation, inter alia by framing suitable
rules. The citizen cannot retain compensation “had and received” since
this would amount to unjust enrichment. It was submitted that where the
physical possession as well as compensation are with the State, i.e.,
where the State has taken possession without paying compensation as E
required under the Act of 1894, there is no absolute vesting free from all
encumbrances as contemplated under Section 16. In the absence of
vesting, the State is required to restore possession to the citizen.
73. Learned counsel argued that having regard to the unfair
working of the Act of 1894, giving effect to the legislative intent by F
reading the expression “or” as “or” is the correct interpretation with
beneficent consequences for the landowner. The learned counsel
submitted that reading the expression “or” as “and” not only does violence
to the plain language of section 24(2) but it also reduces the deeming
provision down to vanishing point. Should a conjunctive reading of the G
conditions be combined with exclusion of the time spent in litigation or
due to a stay, then the whole of section 24(2) will be robbed of content
since it will apply to very rare cases. It was further submitted that Section
24 does not lay down any specific conditionality in terms of how far
back in time the awards contemplated under section 24(2) could have
H
92 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A been made. The deeming provision under Section 24(2) operates w.e.f.
1.1.2014 and its effect would cover all cases that fulfil the conditions
provided in the statute. Learned counsel cited decisions in support of the
interpretation that “or” should be construed disjunctively, not conjunctively
as “and”.60
B 74. Learned counsel stressed that there are no vested rights
created in the State in any case till compensation has been paid and
possession has been taken. The Act of 2013 is a beneficial legislation
and a radical departure from the previous unjust and oppressive regime.
It intends to confer significant benefits to the landowners and makes the
exercise of the power of eminent domain compatible with our
C constitutional values. It ought to therefore be given an interpretation
which favours the landowners. Finally, he argued that the decision in
Indore Development Authority (supra) erroneously upset a consistent
line of decisions which began with Pune Municipal Corporation
(supra). Subsequent decisions of this Court following Pune Municipal
D Corporation (supra) have also considered a host of arguments/issues
and there is no compelling reason to make a departure. He submitted
that even a larger Bench of this Court is bound to pay due deference to
the principle of Stare Decisis.
75. Supplementing the submissions, Mr. Dinesh Dwivedi, learned
E senior counsel for the landowners, argued that the meaning of the phrase
“compensation has not been paid” should be considered, given that in
Section 24(2) “paid” is not used. The phrase “has not been” is used in
respect of both “possession” as well as “paid”. Therefore, it must mean
the same in both respects. The important factors to be borne in mind –
and to distinguish the phrase “paid” from “deposit”, is whether in the
F court under Section 31 (2) or in the treasury under Section 31(1). It is
urged that an analysis of Sections 17 (3A) & (3B), 31 (1) & (2) and
Section 28 read with Section 34 of the Act of 1894 shows that these
provisions clearly distinguish between tender, paid or deposit whether
in the court or the treasury.
G 76. Learned counsel argued that three different words used in the
same Act, in various provisions of the Act, cannot mean the same. It
follows also from the reading of Section 19(1)(c) and (cc). In both these
60
Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights vs. Union of India (1998) 2 SCC 109 (5
Judges); R.S. Nayak v A.R. Antulay 1984 (2) SCC 183; and Life Insurance Corporation
H v D. J. Bahadur 1981 (1) SCC 315.
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 93
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

provisions word “tender” is used in contrast to word “paid” while word A
paid is used in contrast to word “deposit”. The word “deposit”,
wherever used, is in the context of “deposit in Court” only not treasury.
The expression “tender payment” under Section 17 (3A) and Section
31(1) of the Act of 1894 were followed by the words “pay it to them”.
Therefore, tender cannot mean “paid”. It is urged that these terms fall
B
in Part V of the Act, titled as “Payment”. The term “pay it to them”
under Section 31 after “tender” must mean an additional action or step.
When after “tender” an effort is made “to pay” the compensation and
the same is accepted by the beneficiary, it becomes “paid”. The
“deposit” under Section 31(2) only comes in when the beneficiary
declines payment. This clearly implies that “tender of payment” cannot C
be equated with “pay it to them” or “deposit in Court” under Section
31(1) and 31 (2). It is argued that what follows is that tender of payment
by itself is not enough. The State’s interpretation is contested as incorrect
because if tender is equal to being paid then why does legislature provide
for “deposit in court”. The amount is deemed to be paid on tender and
D
the obligation to pay is discharged then the question is why require
“deposit in Court”. Learned counsel argued that “Tender” can never
be deemed as “paid”: This is not only evident from reading of Section
19(c) where the term “paid or tendered” is depicted as alternates.
Similarly, “paid or deposited” are used alternately. Likewise, Sections
17(3)(b), 19(cc) and 34 use these words alternately. As said above if E
“tender” would amount to “paid” and then the compensation would be
deemed to be paid, resulting in discharge of obligation to pay, then why
deposit in court under Section 31(2) to make it “custodia legis”. Section
31(2) would become redundant in most of the cases.
77. Learned counsel conceded that there is no doubt that on a F
decline of payment by the beneficiary it has to be mandatorily deposited
in Court under Section 31(2). The provision uses the phrase “shall
deposit” and this gives a valuable right to the payee, not only of interest
in the event it is not “deposited in court” but also a right to seek
investment of compensation under Section 33. These statutory rights
are adversely affected if “deposit” is not in “court”. Therefore, it is G
amply clear that “deposit in treasury is not an option available. It cannot
be a substitute for “deposit in Court”. Besides Section 31(1) and 31
(2) of the Act of 1894 present a complete code for payment and there is
no gap or uncovered area to permit rules to supplement. Any deposit in
treasury was in breach of Section 31 and therefore, impermissible. Also, H
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A most of the States had no rules under Section 55. In this context,
executive instructions cannot prevail over law. Law can never be
interpreted with the aid of subordinate legislation or executive instructions.
It was further submitted that Sections 17(3A) and (3B), 28, 31, 33 and
34 of the Act of 1894 are a clear pointer that “tender” is not “paid”
and neither is “deposit”. Likewise, these provisions frequently use words
B
“paid or deposited” which shows they are different. Deposit cannot be,
therefore, equated with paid as they are more than once separated by
word ‘or’.
78. It was contended that the scheme of the Act of 1894 was
clear and categorical that the amount of compensations when accepted
C by the beneficiary is deemed to be “paid” for interest to stop running.
The running of interest under Section 34 denotes non-discharge of
obligation to pay, otherwise why pay interest? The “deposit in Court”
may stop running of interest and therefore, may for this purpose be
taken to be paid, but when it comes to actual meaning in the above
D provisions, “paid and deposit” are invariably separated by the use of
word “or” in between them. Therefore, it is submitted that when Section
24(2) of the New Act uses the phrase “compensation has not been paid”
it uses the terminology of the proviso to Section 34(proviso) and must
have the same meaning “has not been paid” cannot be read as “has not
been deposited”. If this is the right interpretation than the coverage of
E Section 24(2) also expands to cover those cases in which the
compensation has not been actually paid but has been deposited in the
Court. This would also be in keeping with the legislative policy contained
in the Preamble, to give just and fair compensation to those whose lands
have been acquired as per the Old Act. Coverage of the New Act is co-
F related to persons whose “land has been acquired”. The policy of Section
24 also reflects this expansive liberal approach of “just and fair
compensation”. Section 24 would therefore have to be seen in the light
of this liberal policy intent.
79. It was urged that these States’ arguments regarding revival of
G claims or resulting in impossible situations causing irreparable harm are
not very relevant once the legislative policy is clear. The provision has to
be interpreted in a manner that it subserves the legislative policy intent
of giving just and fair compensation to those whose lands were acquired
(possession taken) under the Act of 1894. Once the legislative policy or
intent is clear then the objections relating to harsh consequences are not
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 95
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

really relevant. It was stated that State may be put into a difficult situation, A
but the solution too is provided in the last part of Section 24(2) which
reflects the words “if it so chooses”, it can acquire afresh under Section
24. Learned counsel relied on Padma Sunder Rao (supra); Popat
Bahiru Govardhane v. Land Acquisition Officer61 and B. Premanand
v. Mohan Koikal62. It was urged that the legislative policy may cause
B
hardship or difficulties to some or the State may be put to an impossible
situation; yet cannot take away from Parliamentary intent. Parliament
has enough wisdom to know these difficulties, the law prevailing earlier
or the ground realities. It would be deemed to be not only aware of the
difficulties, but also to have assessed them while framing the liberalised
policy. The question is one of intent. The intent has to be seen primarily C
from the words used in the text. It is only if such intent is not clear that
courts have to see them with the aid of the context. The difficulties as
well as harsh consequences cannot be utilized to assess the intent
embedded in the provision if they are clear, otherwise from the text, or
the context. Not only has Parliament not provided any clause creating
D
any kind of exception, or extension of five years in cases of litigating
land oustees who may have an interim orders in their favour, stalling the
acquisition or payment of compensation. All that the provision says is
“or compensation has not been paid”. The projected policy intent is
broad and unencumbered by any exception. This is a clearest indicator
of legislative intent to cover all such cases that may cause hardship to E
the State or may be due to the fault of Court or the litigious land oustee.
The intent is clear and therefore, has to be read apart from difficulties or
hardships.
80. It is submitted that the State’s contention with regard to a
differential approach for possession and compensation is irrational and F
is against the very grain of Section 24(2) and is also unreasonable and
discriminatory. It is unreasonable because there are hardly any cases
where compensation may have been paid, yet possession may not have
been taken. Most of the cases are under Section 17(1) where possession
is invariably taken while compensation remains unpaid as award is not
made. By reading word ‘or’ as ‘and’, the words “or the compensation G
has not been paid” become otiose or redundant. Parliament could have
only said that lapsing would occur only if possession has not been taken,
because if possession is taken then there would never be lapsing and
61
2003 (10) SCC 765
62
(2011) 4 SCC 266 H
96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A there would be no need to consider “or” as “and”. Therefore, such an
interpretation (i.e., reading “or” conjunctively) is contrary to every rule
of interpretation and contrary to the Legislative policy indicated in the
Preamble of giving just and fair compensation in cases of earlier
acquisitions, which includes cases where possession has been taken.
B 81. Learned counsel urged that Section 24(2) would become
discriminatory if “or” is read as “and”. For this, it would be necessary to
analyse Section 24(1)(a). Section 24(1)(a) applies to a situation where
there is no award made till the commencement of the New Act. No
award primarily means “compensation has not been paid”. Importantly
in a case under Section 17 of the Act of 1894, which is most frequently
C utilised, possession may be taken before award is made or compensation
is paid. In other words, Section 24(1)(a) does visualize or cover cases
where possession may have been taken but “compensation has not
been paid”. It, therefore, requires re-determination of compensation
under Sections 26-30 of the New Act. The problems of who to pay the
D enhanced compensation, as referred above, would also arise in this
situation. Yet Parliament has ignored these difficulties and provided for
redetermination. Section 24(1)(a) may travel back to period of five years
or more, or may be 10-15 years as in case of Section 24(2). It would not
be reasonable to restrict the retrospectivity of Section 24(1)(a) with the
aid of Section 11A of the old Act, to 2 years before commencement. It
E would be incorrect because then one would be ignoring Explanation to
Section 11A (proviso). The said Explanation visualises indefinite extension
of the period of award from 2 years. It would not be, therefore, reasonable
to exclude such cases where though possession may have been taken,
but compensation may not have been paid for a very long period of time
F upto commencement of the new Act. Section 24(1)(a) does not contain
any provision like Section 25 (proviso), Section 19(7)(proviso) and Section
69(2)(explanation) and therefore, is wide in its coverage in the absence
of exceptions as above.
82. Learned counsel urged that Section 24(2) is a special provision
G giving higher benefit because in the cases covered by Section 24(2)
“compensation has not been paid” despite award. Would it be rational to
read Section 24(2) in such a manner that deprives it of its value and
worth and makes it ineffective. Section 24(2) would become ineffective
as a whole because there would be rarest of the rare cases, where both
the conditions would be fulfilled. The experience shows in vast majority
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 97
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

of cases of acquisition under the old Act, possession is taken while award A
& compensation come much later. This is because Sections 9 & 17(6)
of the Act of 1894 were used in vast majority of acquisitions and the
Legislature was aware of it. The law does not compel doing of an act
that is impossible. It is emphasized that the principle does not apply as
the new Act is not requiring any such performance. The new Act after
B
recognising the past, is providing new solutions, rights and benefits. Section
24(2) by itself does not compel performance of an impossible act. This
principle could have been relevant during earlier Act but is hardly relevant
for interpreting the scope of Section 24(2) of the New Act. Section 24
clearly postulates that even though the Act may be impossible of
performance, or results in undue advantage to the beneficiary despite C
his fault in declining, yet benefit of Section 24(2) may be given without
creating any exception. There is no constitutional restriction on the
Legislature that such cases or situations have to be excluded. The
legislature can provide benefit in the same manner to all, difficulties
apart. Reliance is placed on certain decisions in support of this
D
proposition.63 Therefore, such interpretation which excludes the benefits
under Section 24(2) by resorting to such arguments of difficulties is
meaningless. The giving of benefit to all by ignoring above circumstance
is neither illegal nor unjust. It is neither anomalous nor absurd. It is urged
that what the court feels is not important; what is relevant is the view of
the legislature, to be culled out from the reading of only the text or the E
context; not in any other manner. For this rule, reliance was placed on
Mohd. Kavi v. Fatmabal Ibrahim64 and other decisions.
83. Other learned senior counsel, i.e M/s Dushyant Dave, Gopal
Shankarnarayan, Siddharth Luthra, Nakul Dewan, Manoj Swaroop,
Anukul Chandra Pradhan supplemented the submissions of Mr. Divan F
and Mr. Dwivedi. It was argued by them that this Court should not
depart from the rule of literal interpretation, because that would be both
beneficial and purposive, given the oppressive nature of the Act of 1894.
In this context, it was submitted that the expressions “paid” and “or”
should be construed in the manner that Parliament intended, having regard
to the overall intent of ensuring the acquisition proceedings, where either G
63
Martin Burn Ltd v Corporation of Calcutta 1966 (1) SCR 543; Commissioner of
Agricultural Income Tax v Keshab Chandra Mandal 1950 SCR 435; and State of
Maharastra v Nanded Parbhani Sangh 2000 (2) SCC 69.
64
1997 (6) SCC 71 and M.V. Javali v Mahajan Borewell & Co. Ltd 1997 (8) SCC 72;
and Nanded Parbhani Sangh (supra); and SMS Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla
(2005) 8 SCC 89. H
98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A compensation was not paid, or possession was not taken, in respect of
awards made before 1.1.2009, should lapse. It was submitted that there
is no insurmountable difficulty or impossibility, even if possession is taken
(but compensation not paid) and even if vesting occurs, Section 24(2) of
the new Act expressly provides for lapsing. The remedy in that case, for
the appropriate Government is the option of going through the acquisition
B
again using emergency provisions. In that event, the authorities would
have to provide for rehabilitation and enhanced compensation. In any
case, the court always has the option in such cases where third party
rights have ensued to do complete justice, by duly compensating those
whose land is acquired, without disturbing the possession of third party
C who has been given the land.
84. The learned counsel submit that this Court should base itself
on the approach to interpret Section 24 of the Act of 2013 is that it is a
savings clause with an exclusionary deeming provision. It is urged that
the words “physical possession” under Section 24(2) should be read to
D reflect the actual state of affairs as on the date when the Act of 2013
came into force, i.e., there was actual physical possession of the land.
This would also be the case in relation to the term “compensation not
paid” under Section 24(2), where compensation would either have had
to be paid or deposited in court; and that use of the term “or” signifies
that the two conditions set out above are disjunctive. It is argued that
E Section 114 consists of two sections (1) a repeal clause set out in Section
114 (1); and (2) a savings clause set out in Section 114(2). It is contended
that there is a distinction in the manner in which a repealing clause is
construed as compared to the manner in which a savings clause is
construed. While a repealing clause, followed by a new legislation on
F the same subject-matter would result in a line of enquiry about what
rights are obliterated under the old Act by the new Act, a savings clause
would be construed in a manner that resurrects a provision, which would
otherwise be obliterated on account of the repeal. In relation to a repeal
clause, the effect of obliterating the provisions of the previous enactment
would be as if it never existed, except for vested rights, which would be
G protected under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Section 6 of the
General Clauses Act, thus operated as a savings clause. Learned counsel
rely on the judgment of this court in State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh65
that the effect of repealing a statute was said to be to obliterate it as

65
H (1955) 1 SCR 893
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 99
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

completely from the records of Parliament as if it had never been passed, A
except for the purpose of those actions, which were commenced,
prosecuted and concluded while it was an existing law and that:
“A repeal therefore without any saving Clause would destroy
any proceeding whether not vet begun or whether pending at
the time of the enactment of the Repealing Act and not already B
prosecuted to a final judgment so as to create a vested right”.
85. Submitting that the effect of Section 6 of the General Clauses
Act, is that unless the contrary intention appears, the repeal does not
affect the previous operation of the repealed enactment or anything duly
done or suffered under it and any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy C
may be instituted, continued or enforced in respect of any right, liability
and penalty under the repealed Act as if the Repealing Act had not been
passed. However, in case of the Act of 2013, it is urged that Parliamentary
intent was not to simply let Section 6 of the General Clauses Act operate
as the savings provision. Apart from Section 6, the intent, evident from
Section 114(2), was to set out a specific provision which would save D
proceedings. It was submitted that those would be provisions that would
otherwise not have been saved by the General Clauses Act.
86. It is in this background that Section 24 of the Act of 2013 must
be interpreted. While the Respondent accepts that Section 24 could have
been more clearly worded to reflect the legislative intent as a savings E
provision, to fully appreciate the operation of Section 24 (1)(b) as a
classical savings provision which saves proceedings under the Act of
1894 if an award had been made under Section 11, in a manner as if the
Act of 1894 had not been repealed. Section 24(1)(a) deals with a situation
where no award has been made and in providing for determination of F
compensation in terms of the Act of 2013 naturally would mean that
proceedings under the Act of 1894 would be revived, save and except
on the issue of computation of compensation. Having revived proceedings
under Section 24(1), Section 24(2) provides for a deemed lapsing through
a non-obstante provision for an award made five years or prior to the
date of the commencement of the Act of 2013. This creates a legal G
fiction which, as held by this court in J.K.Cotton Spg. & Wvg.Mils Ltd.
v. Union of India,66 is:

66
1987 Supp SCC 350 H
100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A “...an admission of the non-existence of the fact deemed...The
legislature is quite competent to enact a deeming provision
for the purpose of assuming the existence of a fact which
does not really exist.”
Learned counsel also placed reliance on the decision of the
B Constitution Bench in Bengal Immunity Co.Ltd. v. State of Bihar67 to
the following effect:
“[l] egal fictions are created only for some definite
purpose”and referred to the decision East End Dwellings
Co.Ltd.v. Finsbury Borough Council,1952 AC 109 at
C paragraph 71,which reads as follows:
“if you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as
real,you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so,also
imagine as real the consequences and incidents which,if
the putative state of affairs had in fact existed,must
D inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it.One of
these in this case is emancipation from the 1939 level of
rents.The statute says that you must imagine a certain state
of affairs;it does not say that having done so,you must
cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes
to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs.”
E (Emphasis Supplied)
87. Other decisions of this Court were also relied on, in this
context.68 Learned counsel stated that given that it is a legal fiction which
leads to a deemed lapsing of proceedings under the Act of 1894,
Parliamentary intent under Section 24(2) ought to be construed so that
F “physical possession” under Section 24(2) reflects the actual state of
affairs as on the date when the Act of 2013 came into force; similarly,
too the term compensation not paid under Section 24(2). It was stated,
that retaining amounts in the treasury, pursuant to executive rules would
not suffice for compliance with the payment condition. Learned counsel
also urged that this court should interpret “or” as signifying a disjunctive
G
reading of the two conditions. Comparing this legal fiction created under
Section 24(2) with the State’s obligations under the Act of 1894 would
be inconsistent with the decisions of this Court, under which legal fictions

67
(1955)2 SCR 603
68
H MIG Cricket Club v.AbhinavSahakar Education Society, (2011) 9 SCC 97
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 101
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

are to be read as it is i.e., the state of affairs as plainly set out in the legal A
fiction. Therefore, the effect of Section 24 (2) is that if either of the
situations are not met, the acquisition proceedings under the Act of 1894
lapse and the State can initiate proceedings afresh in accordance with
the Act of 2013. This construction, urge learned counsel is also purposive
and practical. If the State has not taken physical possession of a property
even if compensation has been paid for over 5 years prior to the B
commencement of the Act of 2013, because it no longer serves the
purpose of acquisition, it can drop the proceedings as those would have
lapsed. In such an event, the State would naturally be entitled to restitutory
recovery. However, if the State has failed to take physical possession, it
cannot be benefited by its inactions and must restart proceedings under C
the Act of 2013. In such a case, the compensation paid can always be
re-adjusted against compensation determined under the Act of 2013.
Arguendo, it is urged that even if Section 114 (2) of the Act of 2013 is
construed to keep alive the State’s vested rights by virtue of Section 6 of
the General Clauses Act, such rights are limited by Section 24(1)(a) and
Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. Thus, while ordinarily the acquisition D
proceedings that were pending in respect of awards passed under the
Act of 1894 would have continued, the legislature by way of a creating
a legal fiction, provided for the deemed lapse of these proceedings in
respect of which physical possession has not been taken or compensation
not paid. Learned counsel placed reliance on some decisions of this
Court. 69 VKNM Vocational Higher Secondary School v. State of E
Kerala,70 where it was held that:
“...a vested right can also be taken away by a subsequent
enactment if such subsequent enactment specifically provides
by express words or by necessary intendment. In other words,
in the event of the extinction of any such right by express F
provision in the subsequent enactment, the same would lose
its value.”
88. It was submitted that in order to determine the accrued rights
and incurred liabilities that have been saved under the Act of 1894, the
line of inquiry is not to enquire if the new enactment has by its new G
provisions kept alive the rights and liabilities under the repealed law, but
whether it has taken away those rights and liabilities.
69
Jayantilal Amrathlal v. Union of India,(1972) 4 SCC 174, T.S.Baliah v. Income Tax
Officer, Central Circle VI,Madras,1969 (3) SCR 65
70
2016 (4) SCC 216. H
102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A 89. All learned counsel supported the submission that the proviso
is not restricted in its operation to Section 24 (2) only and that its
placement is not determinative. It was emphasized that the proviso does
not say that higher compensation would be paid, in the contingency
provided by it, as an option to avoid lapsing. The absence of any
reference to lapsing, or the ingredients of Section 24 (2) clearly meant
B
that the benefit of higher compensation in the event a majority of the
landowners were not paid compensation (under the old Act) was to
enure to all falling in the same class, i.e., those whose lands were subjected
to acquisition, whether five years prior to or less than coming into force
of the Act of 2013.
C Relevant provisions
90. For appreciating the controversy in the present cases, it is
essential to extract certain relevant provisions of the Act of 1894 as well
as the Act of 2013. The provisions of the Act of 1894 are reproduced
below:
D
“12 Award of Collector when to be final.
(1) Such award shall be filed in the Collector’s office and
shall, except as hereinafter provided, be final and conclusive
evidence, as between the Collector and the persons interested,
E whether they have respectively appeared before the Collector
or not, of the true area and value of the land, and
apportionment of the compensation among the persons
interested.
(2) The Collector shall give immediate notice of his award to
F such of the persons interested as are not present personally
or by their representatives when the award is made.
*** ***
“17. Special powers in case of urgency. – (1) In cases of
urgency, whenever the appropriate Government, so directs,
G the Collector, though no such award has been made, may, on
the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice
mentioned in section 9, sub-section (1), take possession of
any land needed for a public purpose. Such land shall
thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all
encumbrances.
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 103
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

[(3A) Before taking possession of any land under sub-section A
(1) or sub-section (2), the Collector shall, without prejudice
to the provisions of sub-section (3)-
(a) tender payment of eighty per centum of the compensation
for such land as estimated by him to the persons interested
entitled thereto, and B
(b) pay it to them, unless prevented by some one or more of
the contingencies mentioned in section 31, sub-section (2),
and where the Collector is so prevented, the provisions of
section 31, sub-section (2) (except the second proviso thereto),
shall apply as they apply to the payment of compensation C
under that section.
(4) In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the
[appropriate Government], the provisions of sub-section (1)
or sub-section (2) are applicable, the appropriate Government
may direct that the provisions of section 5A shall not apply, D
and, if it does so direct, a declaration may be made under
section 6 in respect of the land at any time after the date of
the publication of the notification under section 4, sub-section
(1).]”
16. Power to take possession.—When the Collector has made E
an award under section 11, he may take possession of the
land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the
Government, free from all encumbrances.
*** ***
31. Payment of compensation or deposit of same in Court. - F
(1) On making an award under section 11, the Collector shall
tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the
persons interested entitled thereto according to the award,
and shall pay it to them unless prevented by some one or more
of the contingencies mentioned in the next sub-section.
G
(2) If they shall not consent to receive it, or if there be no
person competent to alienate the land, or if there be any
dispute as to the title to receive the compensation or as to the
apportionment of it, the Collector shall deposit the amount of
the compensation in the Court to which a reference under
section 18 would be submitted: H
104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A Provided that any person admitted to be interested may receive
such payment under protest as to the sufficiency of the amount:
Provided also that no person who has received the amount
otherwise than under protest shall be entitled to make any
application under section 18:
B Provided also that nothing herein contained shall affect the
liability of any person, who may receive the whole or any
part of any compensation awarded under this Act, to pay the
same to the person lawfully entitled thereto.
(3) Notwithstanding anything in this section, the Collector
C may, with the sanction of the appropriate Government instead
of awarding a money compensation in respect of any land,
make any arrangement with a person having a limited interest
in such land, either by the grant of other lands in exchange,
the remission of land revenue on other lands held under the
D same title or in such other way as may be equitable having
regard to the interests of the parties concerned.
(4) Nothing in the last foregoing sub-section shall be construed
to interfere with or limit the power of the Collector to enter
into any arrangement with any person interested in the land
E and competent to contract in respect thereof.”
*** ***
34 Payment of interest
When the amount of such compensation is not paid or deposited
on or before taking possession of the land, the Collector shall
F
pay the amount award-ed with interest thereon at the rate
of 72 [nine per centum] per annum from the time of so taking
possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited:
Provid-ed that if such compensation or any part thereof is
not paid or deposited within a period of one year from the
G date on which possession is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen
per centum per annum shall be payable from the date of expiry
of the said period of one year on the amount of compensation
or part thereof which has not been paid or deposited before
the date of such expiry.”
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 105
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

The relevant provisions of the Act of 2013 are as follows: A
“24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1984 shall
be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases.
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any
case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894,— B

(a) where no award under section 11 of the said Land
Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this
Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply;
or
C
(b) where an award under said section 11 has been made,
then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of
the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been
repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), D
in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), where an award under
the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to
the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of
the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been
paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed E
and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate
the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance
with the provisions of this Act:
Provided that where an award has been made and
compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has F
not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then,
all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition
under section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be
entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions
of this Act.”
G
*** ***
114. Repeal and saving.–(1) The Land Acquisition Act, LA (1
of LA), is hereby repealed.

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106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A (2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act the repeal under
sub-section (1) shall not be held to prejudice or affect the
general application of section 6 of the General Clauses Act,
1897 (10 of 1897) with regard to the effect of repeals.”
Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 reads as follows:
B “Section 6 - Effect of repeal
Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after
the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto
made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention
appears, the repeal shall not—
C
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which
the repeal takes effect; or
(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed
or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or
D (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired,
accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or
(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in
respect of any offence committed against any enactment so
repealed; or
E (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in
respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability,
penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid;
and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may
be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty,
F forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing
Act or Regulation had not been passed.”
Salient features of the Act of 2013
91. There can no dispute, no two opinions about the fact that
G provisions of the Act of 2013, were enacted with the object of providing
fair compensation and rehabilitating those displaced from their land. The
Introduction and Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act of 2013
are extracted hereunder:

H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 107
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

“INTRODUCTION A
The Land Acquisition Act, LA was a general law relating
to acquisition of land for public purposes and also for
companies and for determining the amount of compensation
to be made on account of such acquisition. The provisions of
the said Act was found to be inadequate in addressing certain B
issues related to the exercise of the statutory powers of the
State for involuntary acquisition of private land and property.
The Act did not address the issues of rehabilitation and
resettlement to the affected persons and their families. There
had been multiple amendments to the Land Acquisition Act,
LA not only by the Central Government but by the State C
Governments as well. However, there was growing public
concern on land acquisition, especially multi-cropped
irrigated land. There was no central law to adequately deal
with the issues of rehabilitation and resettlement of displaced
persons. As land acquisition and rehabilitation and D
resettlement were two sides of the same coin, a single
integrated law to deal with the issues of land acquisition and
rehabilitation and resettlement was necessary.
The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 E
addresses concerns of farmers and those whose livelihood
are dependent on the land being acquired, while at the same
time facilitating land acquisition for industrialization,
infrastructure and urbanization projects in a timely and
transparent manner.
F
This Act represents a change in the legislative approach to
land acquisition. It introduces for the first time provisions
for social impact analysis, recognizes non-owners as affected
persons, a mode of acquisition requiring consent of the
displaced and statutory entitlements for resettlement. In
addition, it has restricted the grounds on which land may be G
acquired under the urgency clause.
STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS
The Land Acquisition Act, LA is the general law relating to
acquisition of land for public purposes and also for companies
H
108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A and for determining the amount of compensation to be made
on account of such acquisition. The provisions of the said
Act have been found to be inadequate in addressing certain
issues related to the exercise of the statutory powers of the
State for involuntary acquisition of private land and property.
The Act does not address the issues of rehabilitation and
B
resettlement to the affected persons and their families.
2. The definition of the expression “public purpose” as
given in the Act is very wide. It has, therefore, become
necessary to re-define it so as to restrict its scope for
acquisition of land for strategic purposes vital to the State,
C and for infrastructure projects where the benefits accrue to
the general public. The provisions of the Act are also used
for acquiring private lands for companies. This frequently
raises a question mark on the desirability of such State
intervention when land could be arranged by the company
D through private negotiations on a “willing seller-willing
buyer” basis, which could be seen to be a more fair
arrangement from the point of view of the land owner. In order
to streamline the provisions of the Act causing less hardships
to the owners of the land and other persons dependent upon
such land, it is proposed repeal the Land Acquisition Act, LA
E and to replace it with adequate provisions for rehabilitation
and resettlement for the affected persons and their families.
3. There have been multiple amendments to the Land
Acquisition Act, LA not only by the Central Government but
by the State Governments as well. Further, there has been
F heightened public concern on land acquisition, especially
multi-cropped irrigated land and there is no central law to
adequately deal with the issues of rehabilitation and
resettlement of displaced persons. As land acquisition and
rehabilitation and resettlement need to be seen as two sides
G of the same coin, a single integrated law to deal with the
issues of land acquisition and rehabilitation and resettlement
has become necessary. Hence the proposed legislation
proposes to address concerns of farmers and those whose
livelihoods are dependent on the land being acquired, while
at the same time facilitating land acquisition for
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 109
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

industrialization, infrastructure and urbanization projects in A
a timely and transparent manner.
4. Earlier, the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 2007
and Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill, 2007 were introduced
in the Lok Sabha on 6th December 2007 and were referred to
the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Rural Development B
for Examination and Report. The Standing Committee
presented its reports (the 39th and 40th Reports) to the Lok
Sabha on 21st October 2008 and laid the same in the Rajya
Sabha on the same day. Based on the recommendations of
the Standing Committee and as a consequence thereof, official
amendments to the Bills were proposed. The Bills, along with C
the official amendments, were passed by the Lok Sabha on
25th February 2009, but the same lapsed with the dissolution
of the 14th Lok Sabha.
5. It is now proposed to have a unified legislation dealing
with acquisition of land, provide for just and fair D
compensation and make adequate provisions for
rehabilitation and resettlement mechanism for the affected
persons and their families. The Bill thus provides for repealing
and replacing the Land Acquisition Act, LA with broad
provisions for adequate rehabilitation and resettlement E
mechanism for the project affected persons and their families.
6. Provision of public facilities or infrastructure often
requires the exercise of powers by the State for acquisition of
private property leading to displacement of people, depriving
them of their land, livelihood, and shelter, restricting their F
access to traditional resource base and uprooting them from
their socio-cultural environment. These have traumatic,
psychological, and socio-cultural consequences on the
affected population, which call for protecting their rights,
particularly in case of the weaker sections of the society,
including members of the Scheduled Castes (SCs), the G
Scheduled Tribes (STs), marginal farmers and their families.
7. There is an imperative need to recognise rehabilitation
and resettlement issues as intrinsic to the development process
formulated with the active participation of affected persons
and families. Additional benefits beyond monetary H
110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A compensation have to be provided to families affected
adversely by involuntary displacement. The plight of those
who do not have rights over the land on which they are
critically dependent for their subsistence is even worse. This
calls for a broader concerted effort on the part of the planners
to include in the displacement, rehabilitation, and resettlement
B
process framework, not only for those who directly lose their
land and other assets but also for all those who are affected
by such acquisition. The displacement process often poses
problems that make it difficult for the affected persons to
continue their traditional livelihood activities after
C resettlement. This requires a careful assessment of the economic
disadvantages and the social impact arising out of
displacement. There must also be holistic effort aimed at
improving the all-round living standards of the affected
persons and families.
D 8. A National Policy on Resettlement and Rehabilitation
for Project Affected Families was formulated in 2003, which
came into force with effect from February 2004. Experience
gained in implementation of this policy indicates that there
are many issues addressed by the policy which need to be
reviewed. There should be a clear perception, through a
E careful quantification of the costs and benefits that will accrue
to society at large, of the desirability and justifiability of each
project. The adverse impact on affected families-economic,
environmental, social and cultural-must be assessed in
participatory and transparent manner. A national
F rehabilitation and resettlement framework thus needs to apply
to all projects where involuntary displacement takes place.
9. The National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy,
2007, has been formulated on these lines to replace the
National Policy on Resettlement and Rehabilitation for Project
G Affected Families, 2003. The new policy has been notified in
the Official Gazette and has become operative with effect
from the 31st October, 2007. Many State Governments have
their own Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policies. Many
Public Sector Undertakings or agencies also have their own
policies in this regard.
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 111
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

10. The law would apply when Government acquires land A
for its own use, hold and control, or with the ultimate purpose
to transfer it for the use of private companies for stated public
purpose or for immediate and declared use by private
companies for public purpose. Only rehabilitation and
resettlement provisions will apply when private companies buy
B
land for a project, more than 100 acres in rural areas, or
more than 50 acres in urban areas. The land acquisition
provisions would apply to the area to be acquired but the
rehabilitation and resettlement provisions will apply to the
entire project area even when private company approaches
Government for partial acquisition for public purpose. C
11. “Public purpose” has been comprehensively defined,
so that Government intervention in acquisition is limited to
defence, certain development projects only. It has also been
ensured that consent of at least 80 per cent of the project
affected families is to be obtained through a prior informed D
process. Acquisition under urgency clause has also been
limited for the purposes of national defence, security
purposes, and Rehabilitation and Resettlement needs in the
event of emergencies or natural calamities only.
12. To ensure food security, multi-crop irrigated land shall E
be acquired only as a last resort measure. An equivalent area
of culturable wasteland shall be developed if multi-crop land
is acquired. In districts where net sown area is less than 50
per cent of total geographical area, no more than 10 per cent
of the net sown area of the district will be acquired.
F
13. To ensure comprehensive compensation package for
the land owners, a scientific method for calculation of the
market value of the land has been proposed. Market value
calculated will be multiplied by a factor of two in the rural
areas. Solatium will also be increased upto 100 per cent of
the total compensation. Where land is acquired for G
urbanization, 20 per cent of the developed land will be offered
to the affected land owners.
14. Comprehensive rehabilitation and resettlement package
for land owners including subsistence allowance, jobs, house,
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112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A one acre of land in cases of irrigation projects, transportation
allowance, and resettlement allowance is proposed.
15. Comprehensive rehabilitation and resettlement package
for livelihood losers, including subsistence allowance, jobs,
house, transportation allowance, and resettlement allowance
B is proposed.
16. Special provisions for Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes have been envisaged by providing additional
benefits of 2.5 acres of land or extent of land lost to each
affected family; one-time financial assistance of
C Rs. 50,000/-; twenty-five per cent additional rehabilitation
and resettlement benefits for the families settled outside the
district; free land for community and social gathering and
continuation of reservation in the resettlement area, etc.
17. Twenty-five infrastructural amenities are proposed to
D be provided in the resettlement area including schools and
play grounds, health centres, roads, and electric connections,
assured sources of safe drinking water, Panchayat Ghars,
Anganwadis, places of worship, burial and cremation
grounds, village level post offices, fair price shops, and seed-
cum-fertilizers storage facilities.
E
18. The benefits under the new law would be available in
all the cases of land acquisition under the Land Acquisition
Act, LA, where award has not been made, or possession of
land has not been taken.

F 19. Land that is not used within ten years in accordance
with the purposes, for which it was acquired, shall be
transferred to the State Government’s Land Bank. Upon every
transfer of land without development, twenty per cent of the
appreciated land value shall be shared with the original land
owners.
G
20. The provisions of the Bill have been made fully
compliant with other laws such as the Panchayats (Extension
to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996; the Scheduled Tribes and
Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest
Rights) Act, 2006 and Land Transfer Regulations in Fifth
H Scheduled Areas.
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 113
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

21. Stringent and comprehensive penalties both for the A
companies and Government in cases of false information, mala
fide action, and contravention of the provisions of the propose
legislation have been provided.
22. Certain Central Acts dealing with the land acquisition
have been enlisted in the Bill. The provisions of the Bill are in B
addition to and not in derogation of these Acts. The provisions
of this Act can be applied to these existing enactments by a
notification of the Central Government.
23. The Bill also provides for the basic minimum
requirements that all projects leading to displacement must C
address. It contains a saving clause to enable the State
Governments, to continue to provide or put in place greater
benefit levels than those prescribed under the Bill.
24. The Bill would provide for the basic minimum that all
projects leading to displacement must address. A Social Impact D
Assessment (SIA) of proposals leading to displacement of
people through a participatory, informed and transparent
process involving all stake-holders, including the affected
persons will be necessary before these are acted upon. The
rehabilitation process would augment income levels and enrich
quality of life of the displaced persons, covering rebuilding E
socio-cultural relationships, capacity building, and provision
of public health and community services. Adequate safeguards
have been proposed for protecting rights of vulnerable
sections of the displaced persons.
25. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objects. The notes F
on clauses explain the various provisions contained in the
Bill.”
92. Section 2(2) of the Act of 2013, provides that in the event of
acquisition for private companies, consent of 80% of the affected families
has to be obtained and for the public-private partnerships, consent of G
70% of the affected families is required to be taken. In Section 3(c), the
term ‘affected family’ has been widened, which inter alia includes
members of the Schedule Tribes, forest dwellers, and families whose
livelihood is dependent on forests or water bodies. A “Social Impact
Assessment” (“SIA”) has to be prepared, as provided in Sections 4 to 9.
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114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A Special provisions to safeguard food security have been made by
prohibiting the acquisition of multi-cropped land except in exceptional
circumstances as enumerated in Section 10. Section 11 is akin to Section
4 of the Act of 1894 regarding issuance of preliminary notification. The
SIA report lapses in case preliminary notification under Section 11 is not
issued within a period of 12 months from the date of the report. A
B
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Scheme (“RR Scheme”) is provided in
Sections 16 to 18. The Collector has to pass the award under Section
23. Section 26 deals with the determination of the market value by the
Collector. Section 30 provides for Solatium at 100%. The RR award has
to be passed by the Collector under Section 31, and notice has to be
C given immediately under Section 37, which is equivalent to Section 12 of
the Act of 1894. Section 38 provides that Collector has to take possession
after full payment of compensation has been made as well as rehabilitation
and resettlement entitlements are paid or tendered to the entitled persons.
Thus, there is a departure from Section 16 Act of 1894 in the provisions
contained in Section 38 of the Act of 2013. The Collector has to ensure
D
under Section 38 of Act of 2013 that the rehabilitation and resettlement
process is complete before displacing people. Section 40 deals with urgent
cases. The Government may acquire land without making award in the
case of urgency for the defence of India or national security. In other
emergencies arising out of natural calamities or any other emergencies
E special provisions under Section 40 may be exercised with the approval
of the Parliament. In such event, the provisions of the Social Impact
Assessment and Rehabilitation and Resettlement Scheme may be
exempted. Additional compensation of 75% is payable in such cases.
Section 41 contains special provisions for Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes by prohibiting acquisition in scheduled areas as far as
F
possible. Sections 43 to 50 deal with appointment and constitution of the
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authorities and Monitoring Committees
at Project as well as National Levels. Sections 51 to 74 deal with the
establishment of Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation, and Resettlement
Authority. Sections 77 to 80 are pari materia to the provisions contained
G in Sections 31 to 34 of the Act of 1894, relating to payment, deposit, and
interest, etc. Section 93 is equivalent to Section 48 of the Land Acquisition
Act. The Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from acquisition if
possession of land has not been taken. Section 101 provides that land be
returned to the original owner or the Land Bank of the appropriate
Government if acquired land remains unutilized for a period of five years.
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 115
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

Thus, various departures have been made from the old Land Acquisition A
Act, in the Act of 2013 relating to Social Impact Assessment,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Scheme, etc. It ensures higher
compensation than the old Act; the public purpose has been defined;
consent provisions have also been made. The interest of Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes have been adequately protected. Various
B
Committees and Authorities have been constituted. The definition of
‘affected families’ has been widened.
93. Undoubtedly the Act of 2013 has provided safeguards, in the
form of higher compensation and provisions for rehabilitation, which are
necessary. In that light, the court has to interpret its provisions, to give
full and meaningful effect to the legislative intent keeping in mind the C
language and tenor of the provisions, it is not for the court to legislate.
The Court can only iron out creases to clear ambiguity. The intended
benefit should not be taken away. At the same time, since the Act of
2013, envisages lapse of acquisitions notified (and in many cases,
completed by the issuance of the award) due to indolence and inaction D
on the part of the authorities and therefore, intends acquisition at a fast
track, the full effect has to be given to the provisions contained in Section
24.
Scope of Section 24
94. Section 24 begins with a non-obstante clause, overriding all E
other provisions of the Act of 2013 including Section 114 of the Act of
2013, dealing with repeal and saving. In terms of Section 114 of the Act
of 2013, the general application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act,
1897, except otherwise provided in the Act, has been saved. Section
6(a) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides that unless a different F
intention appears, the repeal shall not revive anything not in force or
existing at the time when the repeal has been made. The effect of the
previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done
or suffered thereunder is also saved by the provisions contained in Section
6(b). As per Section 6(c), the repeal shall not affect any right, privilege,
obligation or liability acquired, accrued, or incurred. G
95. Section 24(1)(a) of the Act of 2013 read with the non-obstante
clause provides that in case of proceedings initiated under the Act of
1894 the award had not been made under Section 11, then the provisions
of the Act of 2013, relating to the determination of compensation would
H
116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A apply. However; the proceedings held earlier do not lapse. In terms of
Section 24(1)(b), where award under Section 11 is made, then such
proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the Act of 1894. It
contemplates that such pending proceedings, as on the date on which
the Act of 2013 came into force shall continue, and taken to their logical
end. However, the exception to Section 24 (1)(b) is provided in Section
B
24(2) in case of pending proceedings; in case where the award has been
passed five years or more prior to the commencement of the Act of
2013, the physical possession of the land has not been taken, or the
compensation has not been paid, the proceedings shall be deemed to
have lapsed, and such proceedings cannot continue as per the provisions
C of Section 24(1)(b) of the Act of 2013.
96. Section 24(2) carves out an exception to Section 24(1)(b),
where the award has been passed, and the proceedings are pending, but
in such proceedings, physical possession of the land has not been taken,
or compensation has not been paid, proceedings shall lapse. There are
D twin requirements for the lapse; firstly, physical possession has not been
taken and, secondly, compensation has not been paid. In case, possession
has been taken but compensation has been paid, there is no lapse of the
proceedings. The question which is to be decided is whether the conditions
are cumulative, i.e both are to be fulfilled, for lapsing of acquisition
proceedings, or the conditions are in the alternative (“either/or”).
E According to the State and acquiring agencies, in a situation where
possession has been taken, and compensation is not paid, there is no
lapse: also in case where compensation has been paid, but possession
not taken in a proceeding pending as on 1.1.2014, there is no lapse. Sine
qua non is that proceeding must be pending. They argue that the word
F “or” used in phrase ‘the physical possession of the land has been not
taken, or the compensation has not been paid’, has to be interpreted as
“and” as two negative requirements qualify it. Furthermore, argues the
State when two negative conditions are connected by “or,” they are
construed as cumulative, the word “or” is to be read as “nor” or “and.”
Naturally, the landowners argue to the contrary, i.e., that lapse of
G acquisition occurred if compensation were not paid, or possession were
not taken, 5 years before the coming into force of the Act of 2013.
97. It would be useful to notice rules of Statutory Interpretation in
this regard. Principles of Statutory Interpretation (14th Edition) by
Justice G.P. Singh, speaks of the following general rule of Statutory
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 117
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

Interpretation of positive and negative conditions whenever prescribed A
by a statute:
“…Speaking generally, a distinction may be made between
positive and negative conditions prescribed by a statute for
acquiring a right or benefit. Positive conditions separated
by ‘or’ are read in the alternative71 but negative conditions B
connected by ‘or’ are construed as cumulative and ‘or’ is
read as ‘nor’ or ‘and’72.
The above rule of Statutory Interpretation is based upon the
decision of this Court in Patel Chunibhai Dajibha, etc. vs. Narayanrao
Khanderao Jambekar and Anr.73, in which this court held: C
“(19) It may be recalled that amendments to S. 32 were made
from time to time, and the Bombay Act XXXVIII of 1957 added
to sub-s. (1)(b), cl. (iii) and the preceding “or”. It is to be
noticed that the conditions mentioned in sub-ss. (1)(a) and
(1)(b) are mutually exclusive. In spite of the absence of the D
word “or” between sub-ss. (1)(a) and (1)(b), the two sub-
sections lay down alternative conditions. The tenant must be
deemed to have purchased the land if he satisfies either of
the two conditions. The appellant is not a permanent tenant,
and does not satisfy the condition mentioned in sub-s.(1)(a).
Though not a permanent tenant, he cultivated the lands leased E
personally, and, therefore, satisfies the first part of the
condition specified in sub-s. (1)(b). The appellant’s contention
is that sub-ss. (1)(b)(i), (1)(b)(ii) and (1)(b)(iii) lay down
alternative conditions, and as he satisfies the condition
mentioned in sub-s. (1)(b)(iii), he must be deemed to have F
purchased the land on April 1, 1957. Colour is lent to this
argument by the word “or” appearing between sub-s.(1)(b)(ii)
and sub-s.(1)(b)(iii). But, we think that the word “or” between
sub-ss. (1)(b)(ii) and (1)(b)(iii) in conjunction with the

71
Star Co. Ltd. v. Commr. of Income-tax, AIR 1970 SC 1559: (1970) 3 SCC 864
G
72
Patel Chunibhai Dajibha v. Narayanrao, 1965 (2) SCR 328; Punjab Produce &
Trading Co. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal, (1971) 2 SCC 540; Brown &
Co. v. Harrison, (1927) All ER Rep 195, pp. 203, 204 (CA).
For convenience, the numbers in the extracted portion above have been
renumbered.
73
AIR 1965 SC 1457 H
118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A succeeding negatives is equivalent to and should be read as
“nor.” In other words, a tenant (other than a permanent
tenant) cultivating the lands personally would become the
purchaser of the lands on April 1, 1957, if on that date neither
an application under S.29 read with S.31 nor an application
under S.29 read with S.14 was pending. If an application
B
either under S.29 read with S.31 or under S.29 read with
S.14 was pending April 1, 1957, the tenant would become the
purchaser on “the postponed date”, that is to say, when the
application would be finally rejected. But if the application
be finally allowed, the tenant would not become the purchaser.
C The expression “an application” in the proviso means not
only an application under S.31 but also an application under
S.29 read with S.14. If an application of either type was
pending on April 1, 1957, the tenant could not become the
purchaser on that elate. Now, on April 1, 1957, the application
filed by respondent No.1 under S.29 read with S.31 was
D
pending. Consequently, the appellant could not be deemed to
have purchased the lands on April 1, 1957.”
The decision of this Court in The Punjab Produce and Trading
Co. Ltd. vs. The C.I.T., West Bengal, Calcutta74, was relied upon in
the discussion mentioned above, where provisions of Section 23A of the
E Income Tax Act, 1922 and the Explanation (b)(ii) and (iii) came up for
consideration. This Court ruled with respect to “or” and held that it had
to be read as “and” construing negative conditions thus:
“7. On behalf of the assessee a good deal of reliance has
been placed on decision of this Court in Star Company Ltd. v.
F The Commissioner of Income-tax (Central) Calcutta, (1970)
3 SCC 864. In that case, sub-clause (b)(ii) came up for
consideration, and it was held that the two parts of the
Explanation contained in that sub-clause were alternative.
In other words, if one part was satisfied it was unnecessary
G to consider whether the second part was also satisfied. Thus
the word “or” was treated as having been used disjunctively
and not conjunctively. The same reasoning is sought to be
invoked with reference to sub-clause (b)(iii).

74
H 1971 (2) SCC 540
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 119
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

8. It is significant that the language of sub-clauses (ii) and A
(iii) of clause (b) is different. The former relates to a positive
state of affairs whereas the latter lays down negative
conditions. The word “or” is often used to express an
alternative of terms defined or explanation of the same thing
in different words. Therefore, if either of the two negative
B
conditions which are to be found in sub-clause (b)(iii) remains
unfulfilled, the conditions laid down in the entire clause
cannot be said to have been satisfied. The clear import of the
opening part of clause (b) with the word “and” appearing
there read with the negative or disqualifying conditions in
sub-clause (b)(iii) is that the assessee was bound to satisfy C
apart from the conditions contained in the other sub-clauses
that its affairs were at no time during the previous year
controlled by less than six persons and shares carrying more
than 50 per cent of the total voting power were during the
same period not held by less than six persons. We are unable
D
to find any infirmity in the reasoning or the conclusion of the
Tribunal and the High Court so far as question 1 is
concerned.”
It was observed that if either of the two negative conditions, which
are to be found in Sub-clause (b)(iii), remains unfulfilled, the conditions
laid down in the entire clause cannot be said to have been satisfied. E

98. It would also be useful to note that in Brown & Co. v.
Harrison75, the provisions contained in Carriage of Goods by Sea Act,
1924 came up for consideration before the Court of Appeal. The Court
held that the word “or” in Article IV, R 2 (q), must be read conjunctively
and not disjunctively. It has been observed that quite commonly collation F
of the words “or” can be meant in conjunctive sense and certainly where
the disjunctive use of the word, leads to repugnance or absurdity.
99. In this Court’s considered view, as regards the collation of the
words used in Section 24(2), two negative conditions have been
prescribed. Thus, even if one condition is satisfied, there is no lapse, and G
this logically flows from the Act of 1894 read with the provisions of
Section 24 of the Act of 2013. Any other interpretation would entail
illogical results. That apart, if the rule of interpretation with respect to
two negative conditions qualified by “or” is used, then “or” should be
75
(1927) All ER Rep 195 pp. 203, 204 (CA) H
120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A read as “nor” or “and”. Brown & Co. v. Harrison (supra), ruled thus,
about the interpretation of two negative conditions connected by the
word “or”:
“…..I think it quite commonly and grammatically can have a
conjunctive sense. It is generally disjunctive, but it may be
B plain from the collation of words that it is meant in a
conjunctive sense, and certainly where the use of the word as
a disjunctive leads to repugnance or absurdity, it is quite within
the ordinary principles of construction adopted by the court
to give the word a conjunctive use. Here, it is quite plain that
the word leads to an absurdity, because the contention put
C forward by the shipowners in this matter amounts to this, as
my Lord said, that, if a shipowner himself breaks open a case
and steals the contents of it, he is exempted from liability under
r 2(q) if none of his servants stole the part of the case or
broke it open. That seems to me to be a plain absurdity. In
D addition to that, there is a repugnancy because it is plainly
repugnant to the second part of r 2(q). Therefore I say no
more about that.”
100. In Federal Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Department of
Trade and Industry76, the then House of Lords ruled as follows:
E “If all these meanings are rejected, there remains the course
of treating “or” as expressing a non-exclusionary alternative
– in modern logic symbolised by “v.” In lawyer’s terms, this
may be described as the course of substituting “and” for “or,”
rather the course of redrafting the phrase so as to read: “the
F owner and the master shall each be guilty,” or, if the phrase
of convenience were permitted “the owner and/or the master.”
To substitute “and” for “or” is a strong and exceptional
interference with a legislative text, and in a penal statute,
one must be even more convinced of its necessity. It is surgery
rather than therapeutics. But there are sound precedents for
G so doing: my noble and learned friend, Lord Morris of Borth-
y-Gest, has mentioned some of the best known: they are
sufficient illustrations and I need not re-state them. I would
add, however, one United States case, a civil case, on an Act
concerning seamen of 1915. This contained the words: “Any
76
H 1974 (1) WLR 505
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 121
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

failure of the master shall render the master or vessel or the A
owner of the vessel liable in damages.” A District Court in
Washington D.C. read “or” as “and” saying that there could
not have been any purpose or intention on the part of Congress
to compel the seamen to elect as to which to pursue and thereby
exempt the others from liability – The Blakeley, 234 Fed. 959.
B
Although this was a civil, not a criminal case, I find the
conclusion and the reasoning reassuring.”
101. In M/s. Ranchhoddas Atmaram and Anr. v. The Union of
India and Ors.77, a Constitution Bench of this Court observed that
if there are two negative conditions, the expression “or” has to be
read as conjunctive and conditions of both the clauses must be C
fulfilled. It was observed:
“(13) It is clear that if the words form an affirmative sentence,
then the condition of one of the clauses only need be fulfilled.
In such a case, “or” really means “either” “or.” In the Shorter
Oxford Dictionary one of the meanings of the word “or” is D
given as “A particle co-ordinating two (or more) words,
phrases or clauses between which there is an alternative.” It
is also there stated, “The alternative expressed by “or” is
emphasised by prefixing the first member or adding after the
last, the associated adv. EITHER.” So, even without “either,” E
“or” alone creates an alternative. If, therefore, the sentence
before us is an affirmative one, then we get two alternatives,
any one of which may be chosen without the other being
considered at all. In such a case it must be held that a penalty
exceeding Rs. 1,000 can be imposed.
F
(14) If, however, the sentence is a negative one, then the
position becomes different. The word “or” between the two
clauses would then spread the negative influence over the
clause following it. This rule of grammar is not in dispute. In
such a case the conditions of both the clauses must be fulfilled
and the result would be that the penalty that can be imposed G
can never exceed Rs. 1,000.
(15) The question then really comes to this: Is the sentence
before us a negative or an affirmative one? It seems to us
77
AIR 1961 SC 935
H
122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A that the sentence is an affirmative sentence. The substance of
the sentence is that a certain person shall be liable to a penalty.
That is a positive concept. The sentence is therefore not
negative in its import.”
(emphasis supplied)
B Thus, for lapse of acquisition proceedings initiated under the old
law, under Section 24(2) if both steps have not been taken, i.e., neither
physical possession is taken, nor compensation is paid, the land acquisition
proceedings lapse. Several decisions were cited at Bar to say that “or”
has been treated as “and” and vice versa. Much depends upon the
C context. In Prof. Yashpal & Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors.78,
the expression “established or incorporated” was read as
“established and incorporated.” In R.M.D.C (supra), to give effect
to the clear intention of the Legislature, the word “or” was read as
“and.”
D 102. In Ishwar Singh Bindra (supra) it was observed that:
“11. Now if the expression “substances” is to be taken to
mean something other than “medicine” as has been held in
our previous decision it becomes difficult to understand how
the word “and” as used in the definition of drug in S. 3(b)(i)
E between “medicines” and “substances” could have been
intended to have been used conjunctively. It would be much
more appropriate in the context to read it disconjunctively. In
Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, 3rd Edn. it is stated at page 135
that “and” has generally a cumulative sense, requiring the
fulfilment of all the conditions that it joins together, and herein
F it is the antithesis of or. Sometimes, however, even in such a
connection, it is, by force of a contexts, read as “or.” Similarly,
in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn., it has
been accepted that “to carry out the intention of the legislature
it is occasionally found necessary to read the conjunctions
G “or” and “and’ one for the other.”
103. In Joint Director of Mines Safety v. Tandur and Nayandgi
Stone Quarries (P) Ltd79, “and” was read disjunctively considering
the legislative intent. In Samee Khan (supra), the term “and” was
78
(2005) 5 SCC 420
H 79
(1987) 3 SCC 308
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 123
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

construed as “or” to carry out the legislative intention. In Mobilox A
Innovations Private Limited (supra), similar observations were made.
In Green v. Premier Glynrhonwy State Co. L.R80, it has been laid down
that sometimes word “or” read as “and” and vice versa, but does not do
so unless it becomes necessary because “or” does not generally mean
“and” and “and” does not generally mean “or”.
B
104. In R.M.D.C. (supra) the definition under Section 2(1)(d) came
up for consideration. The qualifying clause consisted of two parts
separated from each other by the disjunctive word “or”. Both parts of
the qualifying clause indicated that each of the five kinds of prize
competitions that they qualified were of a gambling nature. The court
held considering the apparent intention of the legislature, it has perforce C
to read the word “or” as “and”. In Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj
etc. v State of Rajasthan & Ors81, this Court considered the composition
of the Board prescribed under Section 5. The expressions used were
not belonging to professing the Hindu religion or not belonging to the
Pushti-Margiya Vallabhi Sampradaya. Two negative conditions were D
used. This Court has observed that “or” in clause (g) dealing with
disqualification must mean “and”. The relevant portion of the same is
extracted hereunder:
“(39) …The composition of the Board has been prescribed
by Section 5; it shall consist of a President, the Collector of E
Udaipur District, and nine other members. The proviso to the
section is important: it says that the Goswami shall be one of
such members if he is not otherwise disqualified to be a member
and is willing to serve as such. Section 5(2) prescribes the
disqualifications specified in clauses (a) to (g) – unsoundness
of mind adjudicated upon by competent court, conviction F
involving moral turpitude; adjudication as an insolvent or
the status of an undischarged insolvent; minority, the defect
of being deaf-mute or leprosy; holding an office or being a
servant of the temple or being in receipt or any emoluments
or perquisites from the temple; being interested in a subsisting G
contract entered into with the temple; and lastly, not professing
the Hindu religion or not belonging to the Pushti-
MargiyaVallabhi Sampradaya. There can be no doubt that
80
(1928) 1 KB 561
81
AIR 1963 SC 1638 H
124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A “or” in clause (g) must mean “and,” for the context clearly
indicates that way. There is a proviso to Section 5(2) which
lays down that the disqualification as to the holding of an
office or an employment under the temple shall not apply to
the Goswami and the disqualification about the religion will
not apply to the Collector; that is to say, a Collector will be a
B
member of the Board even though he may not be a Hindu and
a follower of the denomination. Section 5(3) provides that
the President of the Board shall be appointed by the State
Government and shall for all purposes be deemed to be a
member. Under Section 5(4) the Collector shall be an ex-
C officio member of the Board. Section 5(5) provides that all
the other members specified in sub-clause (1) shall be
appointed by the State Government so as to secure
representation of the Pushti-Margiya Vaishnavas from all over
India. This clearly contemplates that the other members of
the Board shall not only be Hindus, but should also belong to
D
the denomination, for it is in that manner alone that their
representation can be adequately secured.”
(emphasis supplied)
105. In Prof. Yashpal (supra), the word “or” occurring in the
E expression “established or incorporated” was read as “and” so that
the State enactment did not come in conflict with the Central legislation
and create any hindrance or obstacle in the working of the latter. This
court has observed:
“59. Shri Rakesh Dwivedi has also submitted that insofar as
F private universities are concerned, the word “or” occurring
in the expression “established or incorporated” in Sections
2(f), 22 and 23 of the UGC Act should be read as “and.” He
has submitted that the normal meaning of the word
“established” is to bring into existence. In order to avoid the
situation which has been created by the impugned enactment
G where over 112 universities have come into existence within
a short period of one year of which many do not have any
kind of infrastructure or teaching facility, it will be in
consonance with the constitutional scheme that only after
establishment of the basic requisites of a university
H (classrooms, library, laboratory, offices, and hostel facility,
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 125
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

etc.) that it should be incorporated and conferred a juristic A
personality. The word “or” is normally disjunctive and “and”
is normally conjunctive, but at times, they are read vice versa
to give effect to the manifest intentions of the legislature, as
disclosed from the context. If literal reading of the word
produces an unintelligible or absurd result, “and” maybe read
B
for “or” and “or” maybe read for “and.” (See Principles of
Statutory Interpretation by G.P. Singh, 7th Edn., p. 339 and
also State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala, AIR 1957
SC 699, AIR at p. 709 and Mazagaon Dock Ltd. v. CIT, AIR
1958 SC 861) We are of the opinion that having regard to the
constitutional scheme and in order to ensure that the enactment C
made by Parliament, namely, the University Grants
Commission Act is able to achieve the objective for which it
has been made and UGC is able to perform its duties and
responsibilities, and further that the State enactment does not
come in conflict with the Central legislation and create any
D
hindrance or obstacle in the working of the latter, it is
necessary to read the expression “established or
incorporated” as “established and incorporated” insofar as
the private universities are concerned.”
(emphasis supplied)
E
106. Reference has also been made to Pooran Singh v. State of
M.P82, in which the Court considered the scheme of the M.V. Act. The
magistrate was bound to issue summons of the nature prescribed by
sub-section (1) of Section 130. The Court held that there was nothing in
the sub-section which indicated that he must endorse the summons in
terms of both the clauses (a) and (b), that he is so commanded would be F
to convert the conjunction ‘or’ into ‘and’. There is nothing in the language
of the legislature which justifies such a conversion and there are adequate
reasons which make such an interpretation wholly inconsistent with the
scheme of the Act.
107. Reliance has been placed on Sri Nasiruddin v. State G
Transport Appellate Tribunal83. The word ‘or’ was given grammatical
meaning. The order states that the High Court shall sit as the new High
Court and the Judges and Division Bench thereof shall sit at Allahabad
82
1965 (2) SCR 853
83
1975 (2) SCC 671 H
126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A or at such other places in the United Provinces as the Chief Justice may
appoint. It was held that the word ‘or’ cannot be read as ‘and’. They
should be considered in an ordinary sense. If two different interpretations
are possible, the court will adopt that which is just, reasonable and sensible.
The Court observed thus:
B “27. The conclusion as well as the reasoning of the High
Court that the permanent seat of the High Court is at
Allahabad is not quite sound. The order states that the High
Court shall sit as the new High Court and the judges and
Division Bench thereof shall sit at Allahabad or at such other
places in the United Provinces as the Chief Justice may, with
C the approval of the Governor of the United Provinces, appoint.
The word “or” cannot be read as “and”. If the precise words
used are plain and unambiguous, they are bound to be
construed in their ordinary sense. The mere fact that the results
of a statute may be unjust does not entitle a court to refuse to
D give it effect. If there are two different interpretations of the
words in an Act, the Court will adopt that which is just,
reasonable and sensible rather than that which is none of
those things. If the inconvenience is an absurd inconvenience,
by reading an enactment in its ordinary sense, whereas if it is
read in a manner in which it is capable, though not in an
E ordinary sense, there would not be any inconvenience at all;
there would be reason why one should not read it according
to its ordinary grammatical meaning. Where the words are
plain, the Court would not make any alteration.”
108. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Tek Chand Bhatia 84,
F for interpretation of ‘and’ and ‘or’ in the context of the term ‘adulterated’
as defined in section 2(i)(f), the Court observed:
“7. We are of the opinion that the High Court was clearly
wrong in its interpretation of Section 2(i)(f). On the plain
language of the definition section, it is quite apparent that
G the words “or is otherwise unfit for human consumption” are
disjunctive of the rest of the words preceding them. It relates
to a distinct and separate class altogether. It seems to us that
the last clause “or is otherwise unfit for human consumption”

84
H (1980) 1 SCC 158
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 127
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

is residuary provision, which would apply to a case not A
covered by or falling squarely within the clauses preceding
it. If the phrase is to be read disjunctively the mere proof of
the article of food being “filthy, putrid, rotten, decomposed .
. . or insect-infested” would be per se sufficient to bring the
case within the purview of the word “adulterated” as defined
B
in sub-clause (f), and it would not be necessary in such a
case to prove further that the article of food was unfit for
human consumption.
***
11. In the definition clause, the collection of words “filthy, C
putrid, rotten, decomposed and insect-infested,” which are
adjectives qualifying the term “an article of food,” show that
it is not of the nature, substance, and quality fit for human
consumption. It will be noticed that there is a comma after
each of the first three words. It should also be noted that
these qualifying adjectives cannot be read into the last portion D
of the definition i.e., the word’ “or is otherwise unfit for human
consumption,” which is quite separate and distinct from others.
The word “otherwise” signifies unfitness for human
consumption due to other causes. If the last portion is meant
to mean something different, it becomes difficult to understand E
how the word “or” as used in the definition of “adulterated”
in Section 2(i)(f) between “filthy, putrid, rotten, etc.” and
“otherwise unfit for human consumption” could have been
intended to be used conjunctively. It would be more
appropriate in the context to read it disjunctively. In Stroud’s
Judicial Dictionary, 3rd Edn., Vol. 1, it is stated at p. 135: F

“And” has generally a cumulative sense, requiring the
fulfilment of all the conditions that it joins together, and herein
it is the antithesis of “or”. Sometimes, however, even in such
a connection, it is, by force of a context, read as “or”.
G
While dealing with the topic ‘OR is read as AND, and vice
versa’, Stroud says in Vol. 3, at p. 2009:
“You will find it said in some cases that ‘or’ means ‘and’; but
‘or’ never does mean ‘and’.
H
128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A Similarly, in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn.,
pp. 229-30, it has been accepted that “to carry out the
intention of the legislature, it is occasionally found necessary
to read the conjunctions ‘or’ and ‘and’ one for the other.”
The word “or” is normally disjunctive and “and” is normally
conjunctive, but at times they are read as vice versa. As
B
Scrutton, L.J. said in Green v. Premier Glynrhonwy State Co.,
LR (1928) 1 KB 561, 568: “You do sometimes read “or” as
“and” in a statute . . . . But you do not do it unless you are
obliged, because “or” does not generally mean “and” and
“and” does not generally mean “or.” As Lord Halsbury L.C.
C observed in Mersey Docks & Harbour Board v. Henderson,
LR (1888) 13 AC 603, the reading of “or” as “and” is not to
be resorted to “unless some other part of the same statute or
the clear intention of it requires that to be done.” The
substitution of conjunctions, however, has been sometimes
made without sufficient reasons, and it has been doubted
D
whether some of the cases of turning “or” into “and” and
vice versa have not gone to the extreme limit of interpretation.”
109. In State of Punjab v. Ex-Constable Ram Singh85, ‘or’ was
read as ‘nor’ and not as ‘and’ in the context of Section 2 of the Armed
Forces Special Powers Act, 1948. In Naga People’s Movement of
E Human Rights (supra), the Court held that the language of section 4(a)
does not support the said construction.
110. In Marsey Docks and Harbour Board v. Coggins and
Griffith (Liverpool) Ltd.86, the Court observed as follows: (at page
603)
F
“…unless the context makes the necessary meaning of “or”
“and,” as in some instances it does; but I believe it is wholly
unexampled so to read it when doing so will upon one
construction entirely alter the meaning of the sentence unless
some other part of the same statute or the clear intention of it
G requires that to be done,……It may indeed be doubted whether
some of the cases of turning “or” into “and” and vice versa
have not gone to the extreme limit of interpretation, but I think
none of them would cover this case.”
85
(1992) 4 SCC 54
H 86
LR (AC) Vol.XIII 1888 595
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 129
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

111. In Re Hayden Pask v. Perry87, the expression “or their issue” A
had been considered, and it was observed that the words “or their issue”
must be read as words of limitation and not of substitution. The word
“or” was construed to mean “and.” The learned SG placed reliance on
the Queen’s Bench decision in Metropolitan Board of Works v. Street
Bros88 to submit that the issue was whether, in terms of its grammatical
B
meaning, if two things were prohibited, both were permitted and not
merely permitted in the alternative. It would have been more strictly
grammatical to have written “nor” instead of “or.” The following
discussion was made in the decision:
“Dec.13. GROVE, J. The main question before us turns on
the meaning of the word “or,” used in 25 & 26 Vict. c. 102, C
s.98. Read shortly, s. 98 enacts that no existing road, passage
or way, shall be hereafter formed or laid out for carriage
traffic unless such road shall be forty feet wide, or for the
purposes of foot traffic, unless such road be of the width of
twenty feet, or unless such streets respectively shall be open D
at both ends. The question is whether that word “or” should
be read in the disjunctive or conjunctive, or perhaps read as
either “and” or “nor:” I think it means “nor;” that is to say,
that the two things comprised in the prohibition are both
prohibited, and not merely prohibited in the alternative. If
the sense which I attribute to the word is right, it would have E
been more strictly grammatical to have written “nor” instead
of “or.” But I think that the meaning of the enactment is that
the road must be of the width specified, and that no road
shall be allowed unless it is of the width specified, nor unless
it is open at both ends. That seems to me to be the object of F
the statute, which was passed for sanitary purposes, and also
for the purpose of comfort and traffic.
It was contended that the object of the provision is sanitary
only, and that if a street is forty feet wide, or if however
narrow, it is open at both ends, good ventilation is secured. G
But a very long narrow street would hardly be more salubrious
with both ends open than if one end were closed and the street
were a cul de sac.
87
(1931) 2 Ch.333
88
(1881) VIII QBD 445 H
130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A Our construction of the Act is according to the ordinary
use of language, although it may not be strictly grammatical.
We might have referred to authorities by good writers, shewing
that where the word “or” is preceded by a negative or
prohibitory provision, it frequently has a different sense from
that which it has when it is preceded by an affirmative
B
provision. For instance, suppose an order that “you must
have your house either drained or ventilated.” The word
“or” would be clearly used in the alternative. Suppose again,
the order was that “you must have your house drained or
ventilated,” that conveys the idea to my mind that you must
C have your house either drained or ventilated. But supposing
the order were that “you must not have your house undrained
or unventilated.” The second negative words are coupled by
the word “or,” and the negative in the preceding sentence
governs both. In s. 98 there is a negative preceding a sentence;
“no existing road” shall be formed as a street for carriage
D
traffic unless such road be widened to forty feet, or for the
purposes of foot traffic only unless such road or way be
widened to the width of twenty feet, “or” unless such streets
shall be open at both ends. Probably, if the word “or” in the
sentence, “or for purposes of foot traffic only,” had been
E written “nor,” the language there too would have been more
clear and more decidedly prohibitory; but with regard to the
sentence “or unless such streets shall be open at both ends”
I think that by reading the word “or” as “nor” we carry out
the intention of the Act, which was to have streets of a proper
width and properly opened at both ends, and that there should
F
not be incommodious and unhealthy cross streets which are
culs de sac, shut up at one end.
There have been frequently cases on the construction of
statutes where the Courts have held “or” to mean “and,”
taking the rest of the sentence in which the word “or”
G occurred, the object and intention being prohibition, and the
two things prohibited being coupled by the word “or.” I think
the prohibition in s.98 relates to both the width and open
ending of streets. The street must be both of the width
prescribed and also open at both ends.”
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 131
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

112. Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 is, in our opinion, a penal A
provision - to punish the acquiring authority for its lethargy in not taking
physical possession nor paying the compensation after making the award
five years or more before the commencement of the Act of 2013 in
pending proceedings, providing that they would lapse. The expression
where an award has been made, then the proceedings shall continue
B
used in Section 24(1)(b) under the provisions of the Act of 1894 means
that proceedings were pending in praesenti as on the date of enforcement
of the Act of 2013 are not concluded proceedings, and in that context, an
exception has been carved out in section 24(2).
113. Even if possession has been taken, despite which payment
has not been made nor deposited, (for the majority of the land-holdings), C
then all beneficiaries holding land on the date of notification under Section
4 of the Act of 1894, are to be paid compensation under the provisions of
the Act of 2013. Section 24 of the Act of 2013 frowns upon indolence
and stupor of the authorities. The expression “possession of the land
has not been taken” or “compensation has not been paid” indicates D
a failure on the part of the authorities to take the necessary steps for
five years or more in a pending proceeding under Section 24(1)(b). Section
24(2) starts with a non-obstante clause overriding what is contained in
Section 24(1). Thus, Section 24(2) has to be read as an exception to
Section 24(1)(b). Similarly, the proviso has to be read as a proviso to
Section 24(2) for the several reasons to be discussed hereafter. Parliament E
enacted a beneficial provision in case authorities delayed in taking of the
possession for more than five years nor paid compensation, meaning
thereby acquisition has not been completed. Section 24(2) clearly
contemplates inaction on the part of the authorities not as a result of the
dilatory tactics and conduct of the landowners or other interested persons. F
114. There are other reasons to read the word ‘or’ in Section 24
as ‘and.’ When we consider the scheme of the Act of 1894, once the
award was made under Section 11, the Collector may, undertake
possession of the land which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the
Government free from all encumbrances. Section 16 of the Act of 1894 G
enables the Collector to take possession of acquired land, when an award
is made under Section 11. Section 17(1) of the Act of 1894 confers
special powers in cases of urgency. The Collector could, on the expiration
of 15 days from the publication of notice under Section 9(1), take
possession of any land needed for a public purpose and such land was to
H
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances.
Under Section 17(3A) before taking possession, the Collector had to
tender payment of 80% of the compensation, as estimated by him and
also had to pay the landowners or to persons interested, unless prevented
by exigencies mentioned in Section 31(2). It is also provided in sub-
section (3B) of Section 17 of the Act of 1894 that the amount paid or
B
deposited under Section 17(3A) shall be taken into account for determining
the compensation required to be tendered under Section 31.
115. It is apparent from a plain reading of Section 16 (of the Act
of 1894) that the land vests in the Government absolutely when possession
is taken after the award is passed. Clearly, there can be lapse of
C proceedings under the Act of 1894 only when possession is not taken.
The provisions in Section 11A of the Act of 1894 states that the Collector
shall make an award within a period of two years from the date of the
publication of the declaration under Section 6 and if no award is made
within two years, the entire proceedings for acquisition of the land shall
D lapse. The period of two year excludes any period during which interim
order granted by the Court was in operation. Once an award is made
and possession is taken, by virtue of Section 16, land vests absolutely in
the State, free from all encumbrances. Vesting of land is automatic on
the happening of the two exigencies of passing award and taking
possession, as provided in Section 16. Once possession is taken under
E Section 16 of the Act of 1894, the owner of the land loses title to it, and
the Government becomes the absolute owner of the land.
116. Payment of compensation under the Act of 1894 is provided
for by Section 31 of the Act, which is to be after passing of the award
under Section 11. The exception, is in case of urgency under Section 17,
F is where it has to be tendered before taking possession. Once an award
has been passed, the Collector is bound to tender the payment of
compensation to the persons interested entitled to it, as found in the
award and shall pay it to them unless “prevented” by the contingencies
mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 31. Section 31(3) contains a
G non-obstante clause which authorises the Collector with the sanction
of the appropriate Government, in the interest of the majority, by the
grant of other lands in exchange, the remission of land revenue on other
lands or in such other way as may be equitable.
117. Section 31(1) enacts that the Collector has to tender payment
H of the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested entitled
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 133
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

thereto according to the award and shall pay such amount to a person A
interested in the land, unless he (the Collector) is prevented from doing
so, for any of the three contingencies provided by sub-section (2). Section
31 (2) provides for deposit of compensation in Court in case State is
prevented from making payment in the event of (i) refusal to receive it;
(ii) if there be no person competent to alienate the land; (iii) if there is
B
any dispute as to the title to receive the compensation; or (iv) if there is
dispute as to the apportionment. In such exigencies, the Collector shall
deposit the amount of the compensation in the court to which a reference
under Section 18 would be submitted.
118. Section 34 deals with a situation where any of the obligations
under Section 31 is not fulfilled, i.e., when the amount of compensation C
is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the
Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon at the rate
of 9% per annum from the time of so taking possession until it shall have
been so paid or deposited; and after one year from the date on which
possession is taken, interest payable shall be at the rate of 15% per D
annum. The scheme of the Act of 1894 clearly makes it out that when
the award is passed under Section 11, thereafter possession is taken as
provided under Section 16, land vests in the State Government. Under
Section 12(2), a notice of the award has to be issued by the Collector.
Taking possession is not dependent upon payment. Payment has to be
tendered under Section 31 unless the Collector is “prevented from making E
payment,” as provided under section 31(2). In case of failure under
Section 31(1) or 31(3), also Collector is not precluded from making
payment, but it carries interest under Section 34 @ 9% for the first year
from the date it ought to have been paid or deposited and thereafter @
15%. Thus, once land has been vested in the State under Section 16, in F
case of failure to pay the compensation under Section 31(1) to deposit
under Section 31(2), compensation has to be paid along with interest,
and due to non-compliance of Section 31, there is no lapse of acquisition.
The same spirit has been carried forward in the Act of 2013 by providing
in Section 24(2). Once possession has been taken though the payment
has not been made, the compensation has to be paid along with interest G
as envisaged under section 34, and in a case, payment has been made,
possession has not been taken, there is no lapse under Section 24(2). In
a case where possession has been taken under the Act of 1894 as
provided by Section 16 or 17(1) the land vests absolutely in the State,
free from all encumbrances, if compensation is not paid, there is no H
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A divesting there will be no lapse as compensation carries interest @ 9%
or @ 15% as envisaged under Section 34 of the Act of 1894. Proviso to
Section 24(2) makes some wholesome provision in case the amount has
not been deposited with respect to majority of landholdings, in such an
event, not only those persons but all the beneficiaries, though for minority
of holding compensation has been paid, shall be entitled to higher
B
compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2013. The
expression used is “all beneficiaries specified in the notification for
acquisition under Section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act”, i.e., Act of
1894, means that the persons who are to be paid higher compensation
are those who have been recorded as beneficiaries as on the date of
C notification under Section 4. The proviso gives effect to, and furthers
the principle that under the Act of 1894, the purchases made after issuance
of notification under Section 4 are void. As such, the benefit of higher
compensation under the proviso to Section 24(2) is intended to be given
to the beneficiaries mentioned in the notification under Section 4 of the
Act of 1894.
D
119. It is apparent from the Act of 1894 that the payment of
compensation is dealt with in Part V, whereas acquisition is dealt with in
Part II. Payment of compensation is not made pre-condition for taking
possession under Section 16 or under Section 31 read with Section 34.
Possession can be taken before tendering the amount except in the case
E of urgency, and deposit (of the amount) has to follow in case the Collector
is prevented from making payment in exigencies as provided in Section
31(3). What follows is that in the event of not fulfilling the obligation to
pay or to deposit under Section 31(1) and 31(2), the Act of 1894 did not
provide for lapse of land acquisition proceedings, and only increased
F interest follows with payment of compensation.
120. The terms of object clause No. 18 (of the Statement of
Objects and Reasons) to the Act of 2013 reveals that the option of taking
possession (of acquired land) upon making of an award the new law
would be available in the cases of land acquisition under the Act of 1894
G where award has not been made, or possession of land has not been
taken. It is apparent that the benefits under the Act of 2013 envisage
that where the award had not been made, or award has been made, but
possession has not been taken (because once possession is taken, land
is vests in the State) there can be lapse of acquisition. No doubt about
that payment is also to be made: that issue is taken care of by the provision
H of payment of interest under Section 34: also, in case of non-deposit- in
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 135
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

respect of majority of holdings in a given award, higher compensation A
under the Act of 2013 has to be paid to all beneficiaries as on the date of
notification under Section 4 issued under the Act of 1894. There is nothing
in the Statement of Objects and Reasons making specific reference to
non-payment of compensation where an award has been made, and
possession has been taken. While interpreting the provisions of an Act,
B
the court to consider the objects and reasons of the legislature, which
the legislature had in mind also emphasised that once vesting is complete,
there is no divesting as held in Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v.
Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate 89, thus:
“(9) A little careful consideration will show, however, that
the expression “any person” occurring in the third part of C
the definition clause cannot mean anybody and everybody in
this wide world. First of all, the subject matter of dispute must
relate to (i) employment or non-employment or (ii) terms of
employment or conditions of labour of any person; these
necessarily import a limitation in the sense that a person in D
respect of whom the employer-employee relation never existed
or can never possibly exist cannot be the subject matter of a
dispute between employers and workmen. Secondly, the
definition clause must be read in the context of the subject
matter and scheme of the Act, and consistently with the objects
and other provisions of the Act. It is well settled that E

“the words of a statute, when there is a doubt about their
meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best
harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object
which the Legislature has in view. Their meaning is found not
so much in a strictly grammatical or etymological propriety F
of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or
in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be
attained.”
(Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes, 9th Edition, p. 55).”
G
121. In Mukesh K. Tripathi v. Senior Divisional Manager, LIC
& Ors.90, the decision in Workmen of Dimakuchi Estate (supra) was
reiterated, on the issue of discerning the object of an enactment.

89
1958 SCR 1156
90
(2004) 8 SCC 387 H
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A 122. Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 deals with a situation only
where the award has been made 5 years or more before the
commencement of the Act, but physical possession of the land has not
been taken, nor compensation has been paid. It does not visualize a
situation where possession has been taken under the urgency provision
of Section 17(1), but the award has not been made. In such cases, under
B
Section 24(1)(a) of the Act of 2013, there is no lapse of entire proceedings:
but compensation is to be determined in accordance with the provisions
of the Act of 2013. In case of urgency, possession is usually taken before
the award is passed. Thus, where no award is passed, where urgency
provision under Section 17(1) of the Act of 1894 had been invoked,
C there is no lapse, only higher compensation would follow under Section
24(1)(a) even if payment has not been made or tendered under Section
17(3A) of the Act of 1894.
123. The provision for lapsing under Section 24 is available only
when the award has been made, but possession has not been taken
D within five years, nor compensation has been paid. In case word ‘or’ is
read disjunctively, proceedings shall lapse even after possession has been
taken in order to prevent lapse of land acquisition proceedings, once the
land has vested in the Government and in most cases, development has
already been made. The expressions used in Section 24(2) “possession
of the land has not been taken” and “the compensation has not
E been paid” are unrelated and carry different consequences under the
Act of 1894. As already discussed above, these conditions are merely
exclusive conditions and cannot be used as alternative conditions. There
is a catena of cases where compensation has been paid, but possession
has not been taken due to one reason or the other for no fault of authorities
F or otherwise, and there are cases where possession is taken, but
compensation has not been paid.
124. Section 24 of the Act of 2013 is to be given full effect. Section
24(2) has been carved out as an exception to the otherwise general
applicability of the provisions contained in Section 6 of the General
G Clauses Act and Section 24(1)(a) and (b) apply to the proceedings which
are pending. Sub-section (2) is an exception to sub-section (1) which
reads: “Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1)”
where an award has been made, but possession has not been taken nor
compensation has been paid, an exception has been carved in Section
24 where an award has been passed, but no steps have been taken to
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 137
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

take the possession nor payment of compensation has been made in A
pending proceedings under Section 24(1). The provision has to be
construed in the spirit behind what is saved under Section 6 (of the
General Clauses Act) as provided in Section 114 of the Act of 2013 and
the non-obstante clause in Section 24(2).
125. It was also submitted on behalf of the States that neither a B
transitory provision nor a repealing law could be interpreted so as to
take away, disturb or adversely affect rights created by operation of
law. It cannot divest the State Government of the land absolutely vested
in it. Reliance has been placed on K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala
& Ors91 thus:
C
“12. It is further necessary to bear in mind that the amending
Act has added, among others, the provisions of Section 23(1-
A) and Section 28-A and has amended the provisions of
Section 23(2). It has also made independent transitional
provision in its Section 30. The relevant provisions of Section
30 read as follows: D

30. Transitional provisions.— (1) The provisions of sub-section
(1-A) of Section 23 of the principal Act, as inserted by clause
(a) of Section 15 of this Act, shall apply, and shall be deemed
to have applied, also to, and in relation to,—
E
(a) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under
the principal Act pending on 30th day of April, 1982 [the
date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill,
1982 in the House of the People], in which no award has
been made by the Collector before that date;
F
(b) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under
the principal Act commenced after that date, whether or not
an award has been made by the Collector before the date of
commencement of this Act.
(2) The provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 23 and Section
G
28 of the principal Act, as amended by clause (b) of Section
15 and Section 18 of this Act respectively, shall apply, and
shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to,
any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order
91
1994 (5) SCC 593 H
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against
any such award under the provisions of the principal Act after
the 30th day of April, 1982 [the date of introduction of the
Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982, in the House of the
People] and before the commencement of this Act.
B The date of the introduction of the Bill of the amending Act is
30-4-1982 and the date of its commencement is 24-9-1984.
***
38. The transitional provision is by its very nature an enabling
one and has to be interpreted as such. In the present case, it
C is made to take care of the period between 30-4-1982 and
24-9-1984, i.e., between the date of the introduction of the
Bill of the amending Act and the date of the commencement
of the Act. Since some awards might have been made by the
Collector and the reference Court during the said interregnum,
D the legislature did not want to deprive the awardees concerned
either of the newly conferred benefit of Section 23(1-A) or of
the increased benefit under Sections 23(2) and 28. The second
object was to enable the Collector and the Court to give the
said benefits in the proceedings pending before them where
they had not made awards. The only limitation that was placed
E on the power of the Collector in this behalf was that he should
not reopen the awards already made by him in proceedings
which were pending before him on 30-4-1982 to give the
benefit of Section 23(1-A) to such awardees. This was as stated
earlier, for two reasons. If the said awards are pending before
F the reference Court on the date of the commencement of the
amending Act, viz., 24-9-1984, the reference Court would be
able to give the said benefit to the awardees. On the other
hand, if the awardees in question had accepted the awards,
the same having become final, should not be reopened. As
regards the increased benefit under Sections 23(2) and 28,
G the intention of the legislature was to extend it not only to the
proceedings pending before the reference Court on 24-9-1984
but also to those where awards were made by the Collector
and the reference Courts between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984.
Hence these awards could not only be reopened but if they
H were the subject-matter of the appeal before High Courts or
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 139
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

the Supreme Court, the appellate orders could also be A
reopened to extend the said benefits.
***
71. Section 30 of the amending Act bears the heading
“Transitional provisions.” Explaining the role of transitional
provisions in a statute, Bennion has stated: B

“Where an Act contains substantive, amending or repealing
enactments, it commonly also includes transitional provisions
which regulate the coming into operation of those enactments
and modify their effect during the period of transition. Where
an Act fails to include such provisions expressly, the court is C
required to draw inferences as to the intended transitional
arrangements as, in the light of the interpretative criteria, it
considers Parliament to have intended.”
(Francis Bennion: Statutory Interpretation, 2nd Edn., p. 213)
D
The learned author has further pointed out:
“Transitional provisions in an Act or other instrument are
provisions which spell out precisely when and how the
operative parts of the instrument are to take effect. It is
important for the interpreter to realise, and bear constantly
E
in mind, that what appears to be the plain meaning of a
substantive enactment is often modified by transitional
provisions located elsewhere in the Act.” (p. 213)
Similarly Thornton in his treatise on Legislative Drafting [3rd
Edn., 1987, p. 319 quoted in Britnell v. Secretary of State for
F
Social Security, (1991) 2 All ER 726, 730 Per Lord Keith],
has stated:
“The function of a transitional provision is to make special
provision for the application of legislation to the
circumstances which exist at the time when that legislation
comes into force.” G

For the purpose of ascertaining whether and, if so, to what
extent the provisions of sub-section (1-A) introduced in Section
23 by the amending Act are applicable to proceedings that
were pending on the date of the commencement of the
H
140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A amending Act it is necessary to read Section 23(1-A) along
with the transitional provisions contained in sub-section (1)
of Section 30 of the amending Act.”
(emphasis supplied)
126. For interpretation of repeal and saving clauses, reliance has
B been placed on Milkfood Ltd. v. GMC Ice Cream (P) Ltd92 thus:
“70. Section 85 of the 1996 Act repeals the 1940 Act. Sub-
section (2) of Section 85 provides for a non-obstante clause.
Clause (a) of the said sub-section provides for saving clause
stating that the provisions of the said enactments shall apply
C in relation to arbitral proceedings which commenced before
the said Act came into force. Thus, those arbitral proceedings
which were commenced before coming into force of the 1996
Act are saved and the provisions of the 1996 Act would apply
in relation to arbitral proceedings which commenced on or
D after the said Act came into force. Even for the said limited
purpose, it is necessary to find out as to what is meant by
commencement of arbitral proceedings for the purpose of the
1996 Act wherefor also necessity of reference to Section 21
would arise. The court is to interpret the repeal and savings
clauses in such a manner so as to give a pragmatic and
E purposive meaning thereto. It is one thing to say that
commencement of arbitration proceedings is dependent upon
the facts of each case as that would be subject to the
agreement between the parties. It is also another thing to say
that the expression “commencement of arbitration
F proceedings” must be understood having regard to the context
in which the same is used; but it would be a totally different
thing to say that the arbitration proceedings commence only
for the purpose of limitation upon issuance of a notice and
for no other purpose. The statute does not say so. Even the
case-laws do not suggest the same. On the contrary, the
G decisions of this Court operating in the field beginning from
Shetty’s Constructions Co. (P) Ltd. v. Konkan Rly.
Construction, (1998) 5 SCC 599 are ad idem to the effect
that Section 21 must be taken recourse to for the purpose of
interpretation of Section 85(2)(a) of the Act. There is no
92
H 2004 (7) SCC 288
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 141
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

reason, even if two views are possible, to make a departure A
from the decisions of this Court as referred to hereinbefore.
***
105. In the present matter, one is concerned with transitional
provision i.e. Section 85(2)(a) which enacts as to how the
statute will operate on the facts and circumstances existing B
on the date it comes into force and, therefore, the construction
of such a provision must depend upon its own terms and not
on the basis of Section 21 (see Singh, G.P.: Principles of
Statutory Interpretation, 8th Edn., p. 188). In Thyssen
Stahlunion GMBH v. Steel Authority of India Ltd., (1999) 9 C
SCC 334 Section 48 of the old Act and Section 85(2)(a) of
the 1996 Act came for consideration. It has been held by this
Court that there is a material difference between Section 48
of the 1940 Act, which emphasised the concept of “reference”
vis-à-vis Section 85(2)(a) of the 1996 Act which emphasises
the concept of “commencement”; that there is a material D
difference in the scheme of the two Acts; that the expression
“in relation to” appearing in Section 85(2)(a) refers to
different stages of arbitration proceedings under the old Act;
and lastly, that Section 85(2)(a) provides for limited repeal of
the 1940 Act, therefore, I am of the view that one cannot E
confine the concept of “commencement” under Section
85(2)(a) only to Section 21 of the 1996 Act which inter alia
provides for commencement of arbitral proceedings from the
date on which a request to refer a particular dispute is received
by the respondent. ….
F
***
109. To sum up, in this case, the question concerns
interpretation of transitional provisions; that Section 85(2)(a)
emphasises the concept of “commencement” whereas Section
48 of the 1940 Act emphasised the concept of “reference”; G
that Section 85(2)(a) provides for implied repeal; that the
scheme of the 1940 Act is different from the 1996 Act; that
the word “reference” in Section 48 of the old Act had different
meanings in different contexts; and for the said reasons, I am
of the view that while interpreting Section 85(2)(a) in the
H
142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A context of the question raised in this appeal, one cannot rely
only on Section 21 of the 1996 Act.”
(emphasis supplied)
127. Under Section 48 of the Act of 1894, withdrawal of the land
acquisition proceedings was permissible only if the possession has not
B been taken under Section 16 or 17(1). Section 48(1) is extracted
hereunder:
“48. Completion of acquisition not compulsory, but
compensation to be awarded when not completed. –

C (1) Except in the case provided for in section 36, the
Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the
acquisition of any land of which possession has not been
taken.
(2) Whenever the Government withdraws from any such
D acquisition, the Collector shall determine the amount of
compensation due for the damage suffered by the owner in
consequence of the notice or of any proceedings thereunder,
and shall pay such amount to the person interested, together
with all costs reasonably incurred by him in the prosecution
of the proceedings under this Act relating to the said land.
E
(3) The provisions of Part III of this Act shall apply, so far as
may be, to the determination of the compensation payable
under this section.”
In case possession has been taken, there cannot be any withdrawal
from the land acquisition proceedings under the Act of 1894.
F
128. Various decisions were referred on behalf of the State of
Haryana that once possession has been taken and land has not been
utilised, there cannot be withdrawal from the acquisition of any land.
Land cannot be restituted to the owner after the stage of possession is
over. Following decisions have been pressed into service:
G
(a). In Gulam Mustafa & Ors (supra), it was observed:
“5. At this stage Shri Deshpande complained that actually
the municipal committee had sold away the excess land
marking them out into separate plots for a housing colony.
H Apart from the fact that a housing colony is a public necessity,
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 143
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

once the original acquisition is valid and title has vested in A
the municipality, how it uses the excess land is no concern of
the original owner and cannot be the basis for invalidating
the acquisition. There is no principle of law by which a valid
compulsory acquisition stands voided because long later the
requiring authority diverts it to a public purpose other than
B
the one stated in the Section 6(3) declaration.”
Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil & Anr. (supra) when restitution
of land was sought, on the basis of some Government resolutions, after
possession had been taken, this observed thus:
“2… Since he had sought enforcement of the said government C
resolution, the writ petition could not be dismissed on the
ground of constructive res judicata. He also seeks to rely
upon certain orders said to have been passed by the High
Court in conformity with enforcement of the government
resolution. We do not think that this Court would be justified
in making direction for restitution of the land to the erstwhile D
owners when the land was taken way back and vested in the
Municipality free from all encumbrances. We are not
concerned with the validity of the notification in either of the
writ petitions. It is axiomatic that the land acquired for a public
purpose would be utilised for any other public purpose, E
though use of it was intended for the original public purpose.
It is not intended that any land which remained unutilised,
should be restituted to the erstwhile owner to whom adequate
compensation was paid according to the market value as on
the date of the notification. Under these circumstances, the
High Court was well justified in refusing to grant relief in F
both the writ petitions.”
(emphasis supplied)
Again, in C. Padma & Ors. v. Dy. Secretary & Ors93, this court
stated that: G
“4. The admitted position is that pursuant to the notification
published under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, LA
(for short “the Act”) in GOR No. 1392 Industries dated
17-10-1962, total extent of 6 acres 41 cents of land in
93
(1997) 2 SCC 627 H
144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A Madhavaram Village, Saidapet Taluk, Chengalpattu District
in Tamil Nadu was acquired under Chapter VII of the Act for
the manufacture of Synthetic Rasina by Tvl. Reichold
Chemicals India Ltd., Madras. The acquisition proceedings
had become final and possession of the land was taken on
30-4-1964. Pursuant to the agreement executed by the
B
company, it was handed over to Tvl. Simpson and General
Finance Co. which is a subsidiary of Reichold Chemicals
India Ltd. It would appear that at a request made by the said
company, 66 cents of land out of one acre 37 cents in respect
of which the appellants originally had ownership, was
C transferred in GOMs No. 816 Industries dated 24-3-1971 in
favour of another subsidiary company. Shri Rama Vilas
Service Ltd., the 5th respondent which is also another
subsidiary of the Company had requested for two acres 75
cents of land; the same came to be assigned on leasehold
basis by the Government after resumption in terms of the
D
agreement in GOMs No. 439 Industries dated 10-5-1985. In
GOMs No. 546 Industries dated 30-3-1986, the same came
to be approved of. Then the appellants challenged the original
GOMs No. 1392 Industries dated 17-10-1962 contending that
since the original purpose for which the land was acquired
E had ceased to be in operation, the appellants are entitled to
restitution of the possession taken from them. The learned
Single Judge and the Division Bench have held that the
acquired land having already vested in the State, after receipt
of the compensation by the predecessor-in-title of the
appellants, they have no right to challenge the notification.
F
Thus the writ petition and the writ appeal came to be dismissed.
5. Shri G. Ramaswamy, learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the appellants, contends that when by operation of Section
44-B read with Section 40 of the Act, the public purpose
ceased to be existing, the acquisition became bad and
G therefore, the GO was bad in law. We find no force in the
contention. It is seen that after the notification in GOR 1392
dated 17-10-1962 was published, the acquisition proceeding
had become final, the compensation was paid to the appellants’
father and thereafter the lands stood vested in the State. In
H terms of the agreement as contemplated in Chapter VII of the
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 145
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

Act, the Company had delivered possession subject to the terms A
and conditions thereunder. It is seen that one of the conditions
was that on cessation of the public purpose, the lands acquired
would be surrendered to the Government. In furtherance
thereof, the lands came to be surrendered to the Government
for resumption. The lands then were allotted to SRVS Ltd.,
B
5th respondent which is also a subsidiary amalgamated
company of the original company. Therefore, the public
purpose for which acquisition was made was substituted for
another public purpose. Moreover, the question stood finally
settled 32 years ago and hence the writ petition cannot be
entertained after three decades on the ground that either C
original purpose was not public purpose or the land cannot
be used for any other purpose.
6. Under these circumstances, we think that the High Court
was right in refusing to entertain the writ petition.”
(emphasis supplied) D

The decision in Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant
Singh & Ors94 thus:
“9…There is no explanation whatsoever for the inordinate
delay in filing the writ petitions. Merely because full enhanced E
compensation amount was not paid to the respondents, that
itself was not a ground to condone the delay and laches in
filing the writ petition. In our view, the High Court was also
not right in ordering restoration of land to the respondents
on the ground that the land acquired was not used for which
it had been acquired. It is a well-settled position in law that F
after passing the award and taking possession under Section
16 of the Act, the acquired land vests with the Government
free from all encumbrances. Even if the land is not used for
the purpose for which it is acquired, the landowner does not
get any right to ask for revesting the land in him and to ask G
for restitution of the possession. This Court as early as in
1976 in Gulam Mustafa v. State of Maharashtra, (1976) 1
SCC 800 in para 5 has stated thus: (SCC p. 802, para 5)

94
(2003) 1 SCC 335 H
146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A “5. At this stage Shri Deshpande complained that actually
the municipal committee had sold away the excess land
marking them out into separate plots for a housing colony.
Apart from the fact that a housing colony is a public necessity,
once the original acquisition is valid and title has vested in
the municipality, how it uses the excess land is no concern of
B the original owner and cannot be the basis for invalidating
the acquisition. There is no principle of law by which a valid
compulsory acquisition stands voided because long after the
requiring authority diverts it to a public purpose other than
the one stated in the Section 6(3) declaration.””
C (emphasis supplied)
Sita Ram Bhandar Society, New Delhi (supra) 95 the Court
observed that:
“28. A cumulative reading of the aforesaid judgments would
reveal that while taking possession, symbolic and notional
D possession is perhaps not envisaged under the Act but the
manner in which possession is taken must of necessity depend
upon the facts of each case. Keeping this broad principle in
mind, this Court in T.N. Housing Board v. A. Viswam, (1996)
8 SCC 259 after considering the judgment in Balwant Narayan
Bhagde v. M.D. Bhagwat, (1976) 1 SCC 700, observed that
E while taking possession of a large area of land (in this case
339 acres) a pragmatic and realistic approach had to be
taken. This Court then examined the context under which the
judgment in Narayan Bhagde case had been rendered and
held as under: (Viswam case, SCC p. 262, para 9)
“9. It is settled law by series of judgments of this Court that
F
one of the accepted modes of taking possession of the acquired
land is recording of a memorandum or panchnama by the
LAO in the presence of witnesses signed by him/them and that
would constitute taking possession of the land as it would be
impossible to take physical possession of the acquired land.
G It is common knowledge that in some cases the owner/
interested person may not be cooperative in taking possession
of the land.”
***
*************** ************
95
H (2009) 10 SCC 501
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 147
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

40. In Narayan Bhagde case one of the arguments raised by A
the landowner was that as per the communication of the
Commissioner the land was still with the landowner and
possession thereof had not been taken. The Bench observed
that the letter was based on a misconception as the landowner
had re-entered the acquired land immediately after its
B
possession had been taken by the Government ignoring the
scenario that he stood divested of the possession, under
Section 16 of the Act. This Court observed as under:
(Narayan Bhagde case, SCC p. 712, para 29)
“29. … This was plainly erroneous view, for the legal position
is clear that even if the appellant entered upon the land and C
resumed possession of it the very next moment after the land
was actually taken possession of and became vested in the
Government, such act on the part of the appellant did not
have the effect of obliterating the consequences of vesting.”
To our mind, therefore, even assuming that the appellant had D
re-entered the land on account of the various interim orders
granted by the courts, or even otherwise, it would have no
effect for two reasons,
(1) that the suits/petitions were ultimately dismissed and
E
(2) that the land once having vested in the Government by
virtue of Section 16 of the Act, re-entry by the landowner
would not obliterate the consequences of vesting.”
This court stated, in Leelawanti & Ors. v. State of Haryana &
Ors96 thus: F
“19. If Para 493 is read in the manner suggested by the
learned counsel for the appellants then in all the cases the
acquired land will have to be returned to the owners
irrespective of the time gap between the date of acquisition
and the date on which the purpose of acquisition specified in
G
Section 4 is achieved and the Government will not be free to
use the acquired land for any other public purpose. Such an
interpretation would also be contrary to the language of
Section 16 of the Act, in terms of which the acquired land
96
(2012) 1 SCC 66 H
148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A vests in the State Government free from all encumbrances and
the law laid down by this Court that the lands acquired for a
particular public purpose can be utilised for any other public
purpose.
***
B 22. The approach adopted by the High Court is consistent
with the law laid down by this Court in State of Kerala v. M.
Bhaskaran Pillai, (1997) 5 SCC 432 and Govt. of A.P. v. Syed
Akbar, (2005) 1 SCC 558. In the first of these cases, the Court
considered the validity of an executive order passed by the
C Government for assignment of land to the erstwhile owners
and observed: (M. Bhaskaran Pillai case, SCC p. 433,
para 4)
“4. In view of the admitted position that the land in question
was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, LA by operation
D of Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, it stood vested in
the State free from all encumbrances. The question emerges
whether the Government can assign the land to the erstwhile
owners? It is settled law that if the land is acquired for a
public purpose, after the public purpose was achieved, the
rest of the land could be used for any other public purpose.
E In case there is no other public purpose for which the land is
needed, then instead of disposal by way of sale to the
erstwhile owner, the land should be put to public auction and
the amount fetched in the public auction can be better utilised
for the public purpose envisaged in the Directive Principles
F of the Constitution. In the present case, what we find is that
the executive order is not in consonance with the provision of
the Act and is, therefore, invalid. Under these circumstances,
the Division Bench is well justified in declaring the executive
order as invalid. Whatever assignment is made, should be for
a public purpose. Otherwise, the land of the Government
G should be sold only through the public auctions so that the
public also gets benefited by getting a higher value.”
***
24. For the reasons stated above, we hold that the appellants
have failed to make out a case for issue of a mandamus to the
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 149
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

respondents to release the acquired land in their favour. In A
the result, the appeal is dismissed without any order as to
costs.”
(emphasis supplied)
129. Section 31 of the Act of 1894 is in pari materia with the
provisions Section 77 of the Act of 2013; Section 34 (of the Act of1894) B
is pari materia with Section 80 of the Act of 2013. Section 77 of the
Act of 2013 deals with payment of compensation or deposit of the same
in the Authority. Section 77 is reproduced hereunder:
“77. Payment of compensation or deposit of same in
Authority.–(1) On making an award under section 30, the C
Collector shall tender payment of the compensation awarded
by him to the persons interested entitled thereto according to
the award and shall pay it to them by depositing the amount
in their bank accounts unless prevented by some one or more
of the contingencies mentioned in sub-section (2).
D
(2) If the person entitled to compensation shall not consent to
receive it, or if there be no person competent to alienate the
land, or if there be any dispute as to the title to receive the
compensation or as to the apportionment of it, the Collector
shall deposit the amount of the compensation in the Authority
to which a reference under section 64 would be submitted: E
Provided that any person admitted to be interested may receive
such payment under protest as to the sufficiency of the amount:
Provided further that no person who has received the amount
otherwise than under protest shall be entitled to make any
F
application under sub-section (1) of section 64:
Provided also that nothing herein contained shall affect the
liability of any person, who may receive the whole or any
part of any compensation awarded under this Act, to pay the
same to the person lawfully entitled thereto.”
G
130. The Collector has to tender payment under Section 77(1)
and to pay the persons interested by depositing the amount in their bank
accounts unless prevented under Section 77(2) which are the same
contingencies as provided in Section 31(2) mentioned above. Section 80
of the Act of 2013 is pari materia to Section 34 of the Act of 1894, is
reproduced hereunder: H
150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A “80. Payment of interest.–When the amount of such
compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking
possession of the land, the Collector shall pay the amount
awarded with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent, per
annum from the time of so taking possession until it shall have
been so paid or deposited:
B
Provided that if such compensation or any part thereof is not
paid or deposited within a period of one year from the date
on which possession is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen
per cent, per annum shall be payable from the date or expiry
of the said period of one year on the amount of compensation
C or part thereof which has not been paid or deposited before
the date of such expiry.”
131. The provisions are identical concerning the rate of interest in
case there is a failure to make payment of compensation before taking
possession of the land. The award amount has to be paid @ 9% per
D annum for the first year and after that @ 15% per annum.
132. Since the Act of 1894 never provide for the lapse in case the
compensation amount was not deposited, non-deposit carried higher
interest. The provisions under the new Act are identical: there is no
lapse of any acquisition proceeding by non-compliance with Section 77.
E Interpreting “or” under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 disjunctively,
would result in an anomalous situation - because, once compensation
has been paid to the landowner, there is no provision for its refund.
It was fairly conceded on behalf of the landowners that they must return
the compensation in the case of lapse if possession has not been taken.
In case possession is with the landowner and compensation has been
F
paid, according to landowners’ submission, there is deemed lapse under
Section 24(2) by reading the word “or” disjunctively. It would then be
open to the State Government to withdraw the money deposited in the
Reference Court. It was also submitted that it is inherent in the notion of
lapse that the State may recover the compensation on the ground of
G restitution. In our opinion, the submissions cannot be accepted as an
anomalous result would occur. In case physical possession is with the
landowner; and compensation has been paid, there is no provision
in the Act for disgorging out the benefit of compensation. In the
absence of any provision for refund in the Act of 2013, the State cannot
recover compensation paid. The landowner would be unjustly enriched.
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 151
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

This could never have been the legislative intent of enacting Section A
24(2) of the Act of 2013. The principle of restitution, unless provided in
the Act, cannot be resorted to by the authorities on their own. The absence
of provision for refund in the Act of 2013 reinforces our conclusion that
the word “or” has to be read as conjunctively and has to be read as
“and.” The landowners’ argument about the State’s ability to recover
such amounts, in the absence of any provision, by relying on the principle B
of restitution, is without merit, because firstly such principle is without
any legal sanction. The State would have to resort to the remedy of a
suit, which can potentially result in litigation of enormous proportions;
besides, the landowners can well argue that the property (i.e. the amounts)
legally belonged to them and that the limitation for claiming it back would C
have expired. Several other potential defences would be available, each
of which would result in multifarious litigation. Therefore, the contention
is ex-facie untenable and insubstantial.
133. It was submitted that in the case State had taken possession
without paying compensation as required under the Act of 1894, there
D
cannot be absolute vesting free from all encumbrances under Section
16. It is clear that vesting under Section 16 of the Act of 1894 does not
depend upon payment of compensation. Vesting takes place as soon as
possession is taken after the passing of the award. Undoubtedly,
compensation has also to be paid. For that, provisions have been made
in Sections 31 and 34 of the Act of 1894. Section 31(1) requires tender E
and payment, which is making the money available to the landowner and
in case State is prevented: i.e., in case the landowner does not consent
to receive it for three other exigencies provided in Section 31(2), the
amount has to be deposited in the court. Deposit in the court absolves
the Government of liability to make payment of interest. However, if
payment is not tendered under Section 31(1) nor deposited in court as F
envisaged under Section 31(2) from the date of taking possession, the
interest for the first year is 9% and thereafter 15% per annum follows.
The effect of vesting, under no circumstance, is taken away due to non-
compliance of Section 31(1) or 31(2) as the case may be as the payment
is secured along with interest under the provisions of Section 34 read G
with Section 31. The State cannot be asked to restore possession once
taken but in case it fails to make deposit under Section 31(3) or otherwise
with respect to majority of the landholdings, in that exigency, all the
beneficiaries as on the date of notification under Section 4 shall be entitled
to higher compensation under the Act of 2013 and there would be no
lapse in that case. H
152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A 134. The landowners had complained that in some cases, under
various schemes, close to 80% of the compensation amount was not
handed over to the concerned Collector. It was also submitted that in
some of the schemes, 50% beneficiaries, for whose benefit the land had
been acquired, had not paid even a single rupee. Since this Court is not
deciding individual cases here, what is the effect of the interpretation of
B
the law, in the light of this decision, has to be considered in each and
every case. We refrain from commenting on the merits of the said
submissions as we are not deciding the cases on merits in the reference
made to us. Various aspects may arise on the merits of the case as the
schemes were framed at different points of time and the dates of
C notifications under Section 4 issued thereunder, whether there is one or
different notifications and various other attendant circumstances have
to be looked into like whether possession has been taken or not, to what
extent compensation has been paid and whether proviso to Section 24(2)
is attracted for the benefits of those entitled to it. In case there is failure
to deposit the compensation with respect to the majority of the holdings,
D
the facts have to be gauged in individual cases and then decided.
In re: Vesting and divesting
135. In Satendra Prasad Jain & Ors. v. State of U.P & Ors 97,
the concept of vesting under the Act of 1894 had been taken into
E consideration. The Government cannot withdraw from acquisition under
Section 48, once it has taken the possession. This Court has observed
that once possession has been taken under Section 17(1), prior to the
making of the award, the owner is divested of the title to the land, which
is vested in the Government and there is no provision by which land can
be reverted to the owner. This Court has observed thus:
F
“14. There are two judgments of this Court, which we must
note. In Rajasthan Housing Board v. Shri Kishan, (1993) 2
SCC 84 it was held that the Government could not withdraw
from acquisition under Section 48 once it had taken possession
of the land. In Lt. Governor of H.P. v. Avinash Sharma, (1970)
G 2 SCC 149 it was held that: (SCC p. 152, para 8)
“… after possession has been taken pursuant to a
notification under Section 17(1) the land is vested in the
Government, and the notification cannot be cancelled under
97
H (1993) 4 SCC 369
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 153
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, nor can the notification A
be withdrawn in exercise of the powers under Section 48 of
the Land Acquisition Act. Any other view would enable the
State Government to circumvent the specific provision by
relying upon a general power. When possession of the land is
taken under Section 17(1), the land vests in the Government.
B
There is no provision by which land statutorily vested in the
Government reverts to the original owner by mere cancellation
of the notification.”
15. Ordinarily, the Government can take possession of the
land proposed to be acquired only after an award of
compensation in respect thereof has been made under Section C
11. Upon the taking of possession the land vests in the
Government, that is to say, the owner of the land loses to the
Government the title to it. This is what Section 16 states. The
provisions of Section 11-A are intended to benefit the
landowner and ensure that the award is made within a period D
of two years from the date of the Section 6 declaration. In the
ordinary case, therefore, when Government fails to make an
award within two years of the declaration under Section 6,
the land has still not vested in the Government and its title
remains with the owner, the acquisition proceedings are still
pending and, by virtue of the provisions of Section 11-A, E
lapse. When Section 17(1) is applied by reason of urgency,
Government takes possession of the land prior to the making
of the award under Section 11 and thereupon the owner is
divested of the title to the land which is vested in the
Government. Section 17(1) states so in unmistakable terms. F
Clearly, Section 11-A can have no application to cases of
acquisitions under Section 17 because the lands have already
vested in the Government and there is no provision in the
said Act by which land statutorily vested in the Government
can revert to the owner.”
G
(emphasis supplied)
This Court further observed in Satendra Prasad Jain (supra)
that even if compensation was not paid to the appellant under Section
17(3-A), it could not be said that possession was taken illegally. Vesting
is absolute. This Court has observed thus: H
154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A “17. In the instant case, even that 80 per cent of the estimated
compensation was not paid to the appellants although Section
17(3-A) required that it should have been paid before
possession of the said land was taken but that does not mean
that the possession was taken illegally or that the said land
did not thereupon vest in the first respondent. It is, at any
B
rate, not open to the third respondent, who, as the letter of
the Special Land Acquisition Officer dated June 27, 1990
shows, failed to make the necessary monies available and
who has been in occupation of the said land ever since its
possession was taken, to urge that the possession was taken
C illegally and that, therefore, the said land has not vested in
the first respondent and the first respondent is under no
obligation to make an award.”
(emphasis supplied)
136. In Tika Ram and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.98,
D the question considered was in case possession is taken, and compensation
is not paid, what is the effect? This Court has held that there is no lapse
of acquisition and observed thus:
“91. However, the question is as to what happens when such
payment is not made and the possession is taken. Can the
E whole acquisition be set at naught?
92. In our opinion, this contention on the part of the appellants
is also incorrect. If we find fault with the whole acquisition
process on account of the non-payment of 80% of the
compensation, then the further question would be as to
F whether the estimation of 80% of compensation is correct or
not. A further controversy can then be raised by the landlords
that what was paid was not 80% and was short of 80% and
therefore, the acquisition should be set at naught. Such extreme
interpretation cannot be afforded because indeed under
G Section 17 itself, the basic idea of avoiding the enquiry under
Section 5-A is in view of the urgent need on the part of the
State Government for the land to be acquired for any
eventuality discovered by either sub-section (1) or sub-section
(2) of Section 17 of the Act.
98
H (2009) 10 SCC 689
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 155
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

93. The only question that would remain is that of the estimation A
of the compensation. In our considered view, even if the
compensation is not paid or is short of 80%, the acquisition
would not suffer. One could imagine the unreasonableness
of the situation. Now suppose, there is state of emergency as
contemplated in Section 17(2) of the Act and the compensation
B
is not given, could the whole acquisition come to a naught? It
would entail serious consequences.
***
95. Further, in a judgment of this Court in Pratap v. State of
Rajasthan, (1996) 3 SCC 1 a similar view was reported. That C
was a case under the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1987,
under which the acquisition was made using Section 17 of
the Act. The Court took the view that once the possession was
taken under Section 17 of the Act, the Government could not
withdraw from that position under Section 18 and even the
provisions of Section 11-A were not attracted. That was of D
course a case where the award was not passed under Section
11-A after taking of the possession. A clear-cut observation
came to be made in that behalf in para 12, to the effect that
the non-compliance with Section 17 of the Act, insofar as,
payment of compensation is concerned, did not result in E
lapsing of the land acquisition proceedings. The law laid down
by this Court in Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P., (1993)
4 SCC 369 was approved. The Court also relied on the decision
in P. Chinnanna v. State of A.P., (1994) 5 SCC 486 and Awadh
Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1995) 6 SCC 31 where similar
view was taken regarding the land acquisition proceedings F
not getting lapsed. The only result that may follow by the non-
payment would be the payment of interest, as contemplated in
Section 34 and the proviso added thereto by the 1984 Act. In
that view, we do not wish to further refer the matter, as
suggested by Shri Trivedi, learned Senior Counsel and Shri G
Qamar Ahmad, learned counsel for the appellants. Therefore,
even on the sixth question, there is no necessity of any
reference.”
(emphasis supplied)
H
156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A It has further been observed that the only result that may follow
by the non-payment would be the payment of interest as contemplated
in Section 34 of the Act of 1894.
137. In Pratap & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors99, this Court
held that when the possession of land is taken under Section 17(1), the
B land vests absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances
and the Government cannot withdraw from acquisition under Section 48
and provisions of Section 11-A of passing the award within two years
were not attracted. The proceedings would not lapse on failure to make
an award within the period prescribed under Section 11-A, once
possession had been taken. The part payment of compensation would
C also not render the possession illegal. This Court observed thus:
“12. The provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 52 are
somewhat similar to Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act,
LA. Just as the publication of a notification under Section
52(1) vests the land in the State, free from all encumbrances,
D as provided by Section 52(4), similarly when possession of
land is taken under Section 17(1) the land vests absolutely in
the Government free from all encumbrances. A question arose
before this Court that if there is a non-compliance with the
provisions of Section 5-A and an award is not made in respect
to the land so acquired, would the acquisition proceedings
E lapse. In Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P., (1993) 4 SCC
369 this Court held that once possession had been taken under
Section 17(1) and the land vested in the Government then the
Government could not withdraw from acquisition under
Section 48 and the provisions of Section 11-A were not
F attracted and, therefore, the acquisition proceedings would
not lapse on failure to make an award within the period
prescribed therein. It was further held that non-compliance
of Section 17(3-A), regarding part payment of compensation
before taking possession, would also not render the possession
illegal and entitle the Government to withdraw from
G acquisition. The aforesaid principle has been reiterated by
this Court in P. Chinnanna v. State of A.P., (1994) 5 SCC 486
and Awadh Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1995) 6 SCC 31.
In view of the aforesaid ratio it follows that the provisions of
Section 11-A are not attracted in the present case and even if
H 99
(1996) 3 SCC 1
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 157
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

it be assumed that the award has not been passed within the A
stipulated period, the acquisition of land does not come to an
end.
(emphasis supplied)”
138. In Awadh Bihari Yadav & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors100,
question was raised with respect to the lapse of acquisition proceedings B
in view of the provisions contained in Section 11-A as award had not
been made within 2 years from the date of commencement of the Land
Acquisition Amendment Act, 1984. Possession had been taken by the
Government under Section 17(1). It was held that it was not open to the
Government to withdraw from the acquisition. Provisions of Section C
11-A was not attracted. Following is the relevant portion of the
observations made by this Court:
“8. ..It was contended that in view of Section 11-A of the Act
the entire land acquisition proceedings lapsed as no award
under Section 11 had been made within 2 years from the date
of commencement of the Land Acquisition Amendment Act, D
1984. We are of the view that the above plea has no force. In
this case, the Government had taken possession of the land
in question under Section 17(1) of the Act. It is not open to
the Government to withdraw from the acquisition (Section 48
of the Act). In such a case, Section 11-A of the Act is not E
attracted and the acquisition proceedings would not lapse,
even if it is assumed that no award was made within the period
prescribed by Section 11-A of the Act. ….”
139. In P. Chinnanna & Ors. v. State of A.P. & Ors.101 question
again arose with respect to possession taken under Section 17(1) invoking
F
urgency clause, this Court has held that once possession is taken, there
is absolute vesting and subsequent proceedings were void. This Court
stated as follows:
“10. The said provision enables the appropriate Government
to take possession of the land concerned on the expiration of
15 days from the publication of the notice mentioned in G
Section 9 sub-section (1) notwithstanding the fact that no
award has been made in respect of it. When the possession of
the land concerned is once taken as provided for thereunder
100
(1995) 6 SCC 31
101
(1994) 5 SCC 486 H
158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A such land is made to vest absolutely in the Government free
from all encumbrances. It must be noted here that taking
possession of the land concerned and its vesting absolutely
in the Government free from all encumbrances does not
depend upon an award to be made under Section 11, making
of which award alone in the case of ordinary acquisition of
B land could have empowered the Collector to take possession
of the land under Section 16 and the taking of which
possession would have made the land vest absolutely in the
Government free from all encumbrances. As seen from the
judgment dated 23-8-1982 of the High Court in WP No. 3416
C of 1978, taking possession of the appellants’ land along with
land of others by the Collector on 10-7-1978 under Section
17(1) is, in fact, made the basis for its holding that invoking
of urgency clause to dispense with Section 5-A enquiry was
made by the Government mechanically. No doubt, when the
High Court took the view that acquisition of the land
D concerned under Section 17 of the Act was made pursuant to
an order of the Government without application of its mind in
the matter of making Section 5-A not to apply, it was open to
it to set aside or quash the subsequent acquisition proceedings
except Section 4(1) notification which had followed and
restore the ownership of the land to the appellants’ land if it
E had to order fresh enquiry on the basis of Section 4(1)
notification. Such a setting aside or quashing was inevitable
because the acquisition proceedings had been completed
under Section 17 and the land had vested in the State
Government, inasmuch as, without setting aside that vesting
F of the land in the State Government and restoring the land to
the appellant-owners, that land was unavailable for
subsequent acquisition by following the procedure under
Section 5-A, Section 6, Section 11 and Section 16. Thus in
the circumstances of the case in respect of the land of the
appellants, when publication of Section 4(1) notification was
G made on 21-7-1977, when declaration under Section 6 was
published on 21-7-1977 and taking possession of that land
under Section 17(1) by the Collector was made on 10-7-1978
and the vesting in the State Government of that land had
occurred on that day, setting aside by the judgment of the
High Court in WP No. 3416 of 1978 of merely the direction
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 159
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

given by the Government relating to non-applicability of A
Section 5-A to the land, given on 7-7-1977, in our view, did
not enable to Court to order the starting of fresh proceedings
for acquisition of the land concerned under Section 5-A,
inasmuch as, that land concerned on Section 4(1) notification
had already become the land of the Government. In this state
of facts, when the previous acquisition of the land of the B
appellants made under Section 17 of the Act did never stood
affected. Section 5-A enquiry held and subsequent declaration
made were superfluous proceedings which were
inconsequential. Hence, we feel that there is no need to set
aside the impugned declaration inasmuch as the earlier C
acquisition was complete and had resulted in vesting of the
land in the State Government and there was no land available
for acquisition in the subsequent proceedings which have been
carried pursuant to the judgment of the High Court made in
WP No. 3416 of 1978. Therefore, in the stated facts, although
we find that no need arises to declare the impugned D
declaration as void we clarify that the earlier proceedings
which had taken place in respect of the appellants’ land,
resulting in its vesting in the State Government free from
encumbrances, has stood unaffected and any award made by
the Collector or be made by him under the L.A. Act shall be
regarded as that based on earlier acquisition proceedings.” E

140. In May George v. Special Tahsildar & Ors.102, this Court
considered the question to declare a provision mandatory, test is to be
applied as to whether non-compliance of the provision could render entire
proceedings invalid or not. This Court referred to various decisions (which
are referred to in the footnote103) and summarized the position thus: F

102
(2010) 13 SCC 98
103
Dattatraya Moreshwar v. The State of Bombay and Ors., AIR 1952 SC 181; State of
U.P. and Ors. v. Babu Ram Upadhya, AIR 1961 SC 751; Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd.,
Rampur v. Municipal Board, Rampur, AIR 1965 SC 895;State of Mysore v. V.K. Kangan,
AIR 1975 SC 2190; Sharif-Ud-Din v. Abdul Gani Lone, AIR 1980 SC 303; Balwant G
Singh and Ors. v. Anand Kumar Sharma and Ors., (2003) 3 SCC 433; Bhavnagar
University v. Palitana Sugar Mill Pvt. Ltd. and Ors., AIR 2003 SC 511; Chandrika
Prasad Yadav v. State of Bihar and Ors., AIR 2004 SC 2036; M/s. Rubber House v.
Excellsior Needle Industries Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1989 SC 1160; B.S. Khurana and Ors. v.
Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Ors., (2000) 7 SCC 679; State of Haryana and
Anr. v. RaghubirDayal, (1995) 1 SCC 133; and GullipilliSowria Raj v. Bandaru Pavani
@ Gullipili Pavani, (2009) 1 SCC 714 H
160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A “24. In Gullipilli Sowria Raj v. Bandaru Pavani, (2009) 1
SCC 714, this Court while dealing with a similar issue held
as under (SCC p. 719, para 17)
“17. … The expression ‘may’ used in the opening words
of Section 5 is not directory, as has been sought to be argued,
B but mandatory and non-fulfilment thereof would not permit a
marriage under the Act between two Hindus. Section 7 of the
1955 Act is to be read along with Section 5 in that a Hindu
marriage, as understood under Section 5, could be solemnised
according to the ceremonies indicated therein.”

C 25. The law on this issue can be summarised to the effect that
in order to declare a provision mandatory, the test to be
applied is as to whether non-compliance with the provision
could render the entire proceedings invalid or not. Whether
the provision is mandatory or directory, depends upon the
intent of the legislature and not upon the language for which
D the intent is clothed. The issue is to be examined having regard
to the context, subject-matter and object of the statutory
provisions in question. The Court may find out as to what
would be the consequence which would flow from construing
it in one way or the other and as to whether the statute provides
for a contingency of the non-compliance with the provisions
E and as to whether the non-compliance is visited by small
penalty or serious consequence would flow therefrom and as
to whether a particular interpretation would defeat or frustrate
the legislation and if the provision is mandatory, the act done
in breach thereof will be invalid.
F ***
27. In G.H. Grant (Dr.) v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 237,
this Court has held that if a “person interested” is aggrieved
by the fact that some other person has withdrawn the
compensation of his land, he may resort to the procedure
G prescribed under the Act or agitate the dispute in suit for
making the recovery of the award amount from such person.”
(emphasis supplied)
141. This Court opined, therefore, that once the land vests in the
State, it cannot be divested, even if there is some irregularity in the
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 161
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

acquisition proceedings. There is nothing in the Act of 1894 to show that A
non-compliance thereof will be fatal or will lead to any penalty.
142. Now, coming back to the main issue, the legal fiction of lapsing
(under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013) cannot be extended to denude
title which has already vested in the beneficiaries of the acquisition
Corporation/Local Bodies, etc., and who, in turn, have also conveyed B
title and transferred the land to some other persons after development.
In Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Modi Sugar Mills104 the Court
has held that “A legal fiction must be limited to the purpose for which
it has been created and cannot be extended beyond its legitimate
field.” Similarly, in Braithwaite & Co. v. E.S.I.C105 , this Court held
that a legal fiction is adopted in law for a limited and definite purpose C
only and there is no justification for extending it beyond the purpose for
which the legislature has adopted. Lapsing is provided only where
possession has not been taken nor compensation has been paid, divesting
of vested land is not intended nor specifically provided.
143. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “vested” as follows: D
“vested, adj. (18c) Having become a completed, consummated
right for present or future enjoyment; not contingent;
unconditional; absolute a vested interest in the estate.
“Unfortunately, the word ‘vested’ is used in two senses. Firstly,
an interest may be vested in possession, when there is a right E
to present enjoyment, e.g. when I own and occupy Blackacre.
But an interest may be vested, even where it does not carry a
right to immediate possession if it does confer a fixed right of
taking possession in the future.” George Whitecross Paton, A
Textbook of Jurisprudence 305 (CW. Paton & David P.
F
Derham eds., 4th ed. 1972).
“A future interest is vested if it meets two requirements: first,
that there be no condition precedent to the interest’s becoming
a present estate other than the natural expiration of those
estates that are prior to it in possession; and second, that it
be theoretically possible to identify who would get the right G
to possession if the interest should become a present estate at
any time.” Thomas F. Bergin 8. Paul C. Haskell, Preface to
Estates in Land and Future Interests 66-67 (2d ed. 1984).”
104
1961 (2) SCR 189
105
1968 (1) SCR 771 H
162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A 144. In Webster’s Dictionary, ‘vested’ is defined as:
“vested adj. [pp. of vest] 1. Clothed; robed, especially in
church vestments. 2. in law, fixed; settled; absolute; not
contingent upon anything: as, a vested interest.”
145. In State of Punjab v. Sadhu Ram106, it has been observed
B that once possession is taken and the award has been passed, no title
remains with the landowner and the land cannot be de-notified under
Section 48(1) and observed thus:
“3. The learned Judge having noticed the procedure
prescribed in disposal of the land acquired by the Government
C for public purposes, has held that the said procedure was not
followed for surrendering the land to the erstwhile owners.
The respondent having purchased the land had improved upon
the land and is, therefore, entitled to be an equitable owner
of the land. We wholly fail to appreciate the view taken by the
D High Court. The learned Judge had net referred to the relevant
provisions of the Act and law. It is an undisputed fact that
consequent upon the passing of the award under Section 11
and possession taken of the land, by operation of Section 16
of the Act, the right, title and interest of the erstwhile owner
stood extinguished and the Government became absolute
E owner of the property free from all encumbrances. Thereby,
no one has nor claimed any right, title and interest in respect
of the acquired land. Before the possession could be taken,
the Government have power under Section 48(1) of the Act
to denotify the land. In that event, land is required to be
F surrendered to the erstwhile owners. That is not the case on
the facts of this case. Under these circumstances, the
Government having become the absolute owner of the property
free from all encumbrances, unless the title is conferred on
any person in accordance with a procedure known to law, no
one can claim any title much less equitable title by remaining
G in possession. The trial Court as well as the appellate Court
negative the plea of the respondent that he was inducted into
possession as a lessee for a period of 20 years. On the other
hand, the finding was that he was in possession as a lessee
on yearly basis. Having lawfully come into possession as a
106
H 1996 (7) JT 118
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 163
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

lessee of the Government, Session 116 of Evidence Act estops A
him from denying title of the Government and set it up in third
party. By disclaiming Government title, he forfeited even the
annual lease. Under these circumstances, having come into
possession as a lessee, after expiry and forfeiture of the lease,
he has no right. Illegal and unlawful possession of the land
B
entails payment of damages to the Government.”
146. In Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana & Ors107, it
was observed that once the award has been passed and possession has
been taken, the land vests in the State free from all encumbrances. This
Court held thus:
C
“2. This special leave petition arises from the judgment of the
Punjab and Haryana High Court made on 25-4-1996 in LPA
No. 437 of 1996. Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land
Acquisition Act, LA (for short, ‘the Act’) was published on
1-6-1976. Declaration under Section 6 of the Act was
published on 16-2-1977. The award was passed on 3-7-1981. D
Thereafter, the reference also become final. The petitioner
has challenged the notification, the declaration, and the award
as illegal. It contends that the award does not come in the
way of the petitioner in filing the writ petition on 21-1-1994.
The High Court has dismissed the writ petition on the grounds E
of laches.”
147. A similar view has been taken in Market Committee v.
Krishan Murari108 and Puttu Lal (dead) by L.Rs. v. State of U.P. &
Anr109. The concept of ‘vesting’ was also considered in The Fruit &
Vegetable Merchants Union v. The Delhi Improvement Trust110. Once F
vesting takes place, and is with possession, after which a person who
remains in possession is only a trespasser, not in rightful possession and
vesting contemplates absolute title, possession in the State. This court
observed thus:
“(19) That the word “vest” is a word of variable import is G
shown by provisions of Indian statutes also. For example, S.

107
(1996) 11 SCC 698
108
(1996) 1 SCC 311
109
(1996) 3 SCC 99
110
1957 SCR 01 H
164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A 56 of the Provincial Insolvency Act (5 of 1920) empowers the
Court at the time of the making of the order of adjudication
or thereafter to appoint a receiver for the property of the
insolvent and further provides that “such property shall
thereupon vest in such receiver”. The property vests in the
receiver for the purpose of administering the estate of the
B
insolvent for the payment of his debts after realising his assets.
The property of the insolvent vests in the receiver not for all
purposes but only for the purpose of the Insolvency Act and
the receiver has no interest of his own in the property. On the
other hand, Ss. 16 and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act (Act 1
C of LA), provide that the property so acquired, upon the
happening of certain events, shall “vest absolutely in the
Government free from all encumbrances”. In the cases
contemplated by Ss. 16 and 17 the property acquired becomes
the property of Government without any conditions or
limitations either as to title or possession. The legislature has
D
made it clear that the vesting of the property is not for any
limited purpose or limited duration. It would thus appear that
the word “vest” has not got a fixed connotation meaning in
all cases that the property is owned by the person or the
authority in whom it vests. It may vest in title, or it may vest in
E possession, or it may vest in a limited sense, as indicated in
the context in which it may have been used in a particular
piece of legislation. The provisions of the Improvement Act,
particularly Ss. 45 to 49 and 54 and 54-A when they speak
of a certain building or street or square or other land vesting
in a municipality or other local body or in a trust, do not
F
necessarily mean that ownership has passed to any of them.”
In re: Vested rights under Section 24 of the Act of 2013
148. This Court is of opinion that Section 24 of the Act of
2013 does not intend to take away vested rights. This is because
G there is no specific provision taking away or divesting title to the
land, which had originally vested with the State, or divesting the
title or interest of beneficiaries or third-party transferees of such
land which they had lawfully acquired, through sales or transfers.
There is a specific provision made for divesting, nor does the Act of
2013 by necessary intendment, imply such a drastic consequence.
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 165
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

Divesting cannot be said to have been intended. Here, the decision A
in VKNM Vocational Higher Secondary School v. State of Kerala111
is relevant; it was observed as follows by this Court:
“21. In our considered view, the above principles laid down
by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Garikapati case
will have full application while considering the argument of B
the learned Senior Counsel for the fifth respondent claiming
a vested right by relying upon unamended Rule 7-A(3).
Principles (i), (iii), (iv) and (v) of the said judgment are
apposite to the case on hand. When we make a comprehensive
reference to the above principles, it can be said that for the
legal pursuit of a remedy it must be shown that the various C
stages of such remedy are formed into a chain or rather as
series of it, which are connected by an intrinsic unity which
can be called as one proceeding, that such vested right, if
any, should have its origin in a proceeding which was
instituted on such right having been crystallised at the time D
of its origin itself, in which event all future claims on that
basis to be pursued would get preserved till the said right is
to be ultimately examined. In the event of such preservation
of the future remedy having come into existence and got
crystallised, that would date back to the date of origin when
the so-called vested right commenced, that then and then only E
it can be held that the said right became a vested right and it
is not defeated by the law that prevails at the date of its
decision or at the date of subsequent filing of the claim. One
other fundamental principle laid down which is to be borne
in mind, is that even such a vested right can also be taken F
away by a subsequent enactment if such subsequent enactment
specifically provides by express words or by necessary
intendment. In other words, in the event of the extinction of
any such right by express provision in the subsequent
enactment, the same would lose its value.”
G
149. The decision in State of Haryana v. Hindustan
Construction Co. Ltd112, is relied upon to contend that the line of
enquiry is not to enquire if the new enactment has by its new
111
(2016) 4 SCC 216
112
(2017) 9 SCC 463 H
166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A provisions kept alive the rights and liabilities under the repealed
law or whether it has taken away those rights and liabilities. When
repeal is followed by a fresh enactment on the same subject, the
provisions of the General Clauses Act would undoubtedly require
an examination of the language of the new enactment if it expresses
an intent different from the earlier repealed Act. The enquiry would
B
necessitate the examination if the old rights and liabilities are kept
alive or whether the new Act manifests an intention to do away with
or destroy them. If the new Act manifests different intentions, the
application of the General Clauses Act will stand excluded.
150. We have examined the provisions of Section 24 of the
C Act of 2013 in the light of the said pleas and thereafter arrived at
our conclusions as to when and to what extent proceedings lapsed
or/and were saved and what liabilities have been taken away and
to what extent there is obliteration of the rights acquired and
liabilities incurred earlier under the Act of 1894 and what is done
D away or destroyed by the new Act.
151. The Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 is to be interpreted
consistent with the legislative intent, particularly when it has provided
for the lapse of the proceedings. It has to be interpreted in the light of
provisions made in Sections 24 and 114 of the Act of 2013 and Section 6
E of the General Clauses Act, what it protects and to what extent it takes
away the rights of the parties. Undoubtedly, Section 24(2) has retroactive
operation with respect to the acquisitions initiated under the Act of 1894
and which are not completed by taking possession nor compensation
has been paid in spite of lapse of 5 years and proceedings are kept
pending due to lethargy of the officials. The drastic consequences follow
F by the provisions contained in Section 24(2) in such cases.
152. For considering the legislative intent, Bennion, Statutory
Interpretation, 5th Edition (2012) has been referred to, in which it has
been observed:

G “Where, on a weighing of the factors, it seems that some
retrospective effect was intended, the general presumption
against retrospectively indicates that this should be kept to
as narrow a compass as will accord with the legislative
intention.

H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 167
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

Principle against doubtful penalisation. It is a general A
principle of legal policy that no one should suffer detriment
by the application of a doubtful law. The general presumption
against retrospectivity means that where one of the possible
opposing constructions of an enactment would impose an ex
post facto law, that construction is likely to be doubtful.
B
….
If the construction also inflicts a detriment, that is a second
factor against it. A retrospective enactment inflicts a detriment
for this purpose ‘if it takes away or impairs a vested right
acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, or C
imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in regard to
events already past. The growing propensity of the courts to
relate legal principle to the concept of fairness was shown by
Staughton LJ when he said:
“In my judgment the true principle is that Parliament is D
presumed not to have intended to alter the law applicable to
past events and transactions in a manner which is unfair to
those concerned in them, unless a contrary intention
appears.””
(emphasis supplied) E
th
It has been observed in Bennion, Statutory Interpretation, 5
Edition (2012) that when Parliament is presumed not to have intended to
alter the law applicable to past events and transactions, which is unfair
to those concerned in them unless the contrary intention appears.
153. Another decision in Lauri v. Renad113, has been referred to F
in which it was observed that a statute is not to be construed so as to
have a greater retrospective operation than its language renders
necessary. Following observations have been relied upon:
“It certainly requires very clear and unmistakable language
in a subsequent Act of Parliament to revive or recreate an G
expired right. It is a fundamental rule of English law that no
statute shall be construed so as to have a retrospective
operation unless its language is such as plainly to require
such a construction; and the same rule involves another and
113
(1892) 3 Ch. 402 H
168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A subordinate rule to the effect that a statute is not to be
construed so as to have a greater retrospective operation than
its language renders necessary.”
(emphasis supplied)
154. In Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co. Ltd. (supra) the
B House of Lords has observed that question of the extent of retrospectivity
would also be dependent upon the degree of unfairness it causes to the
parties. It has been observed:
“The rule that a person should not be held liable or punished
for conduct not criminal when committed is fundamental and
C of long standing. It is reflected in the maxim nullum crimen
nulla poena sine lege. It is protected by article 7 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (1953) (Cmd. 8969).
The rule also applies, but with less force, outside the criminal
D sphere. It is again expressed in maxims, lex prospicit non
respicit and omnis nova constitutio futuris temporibus formam
imponere debet non praeteritis. The French Civil Code
provides that “La loi ne dipose que pour l’avenir; elle n’a
point d’effet retroactif:”
E …..
But both these passages draw attention to an important point,
that the exception only applies where application of it would
not cause unfairness or injustice. This is consistent with the
general rule or presumption which is itself based on
F considerations of fairness and justice, as shown by the
passage in Maxwell quoted, ante, p. 494C-E, and recently
emphasised by Staughton LJ in Secretary of State for Social
Security v. Tunnicliffe [1991] 2 All E.R. 712, 724:
“In my judgment the true principle is that Parliament is
G presumed not to have intended to alter the law applicable to
past events and transactions in a manner which is unfair to
those concerned in them, unless a contrary intention appears.
It is not simply a question of classifying an enactment as
retrospective or not retrospective. Rather it may well be a
matter of degree – the greater the unfairness, the more it is to
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 169
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

be expected that Parliament will make it clear if that is A
intended.”
The distinction between rights and procedure, and unfairness
and fairness, may well overlap. Thus, if a limitation period is
shortened but a plaintiff has time to sue before expiry of the
shortened period, he is likely to be statute-barred if he does B
not sue within the shortened period (see The Ydun [1899] P.
236.); but if a limitation period is extended after a previous
shorter limitation period has already expired, the plaintiff will
be unable to take advantage of the new period because an
absolute defence has by then accrued to the defendant and it
would not be fair to deprive him of it: See Yew Bon Tew v. C
Kenderaan Bas Mara [1983] 1 A.C. 553 and Maxwell v.
Murphy (1957) 96 C.L.R. 261.
Further, Lord Griffiths, Lord Goff of Chieveley and Lord Slynn of
Hadley, held as under:
D
“The principle governing the proper approach to a statutory
provision alleged to have retrospective effect has been stated
in a number of different ways, but no difference of substance
is revealed by the authorities. Thus:
(1) the principle has been described as “a prima facie rule of E
construction” (Yew Bon Tew [1983] 1 A.C 553, 558F), “an
established principle in the construction of statutory
provisions” (Pearce v. Secretary of State for Defence [1988]
A.C 755, 802C) or “a fundamental rule of English law” (Lauri
v. Renad [1892] 3 Ch. 402, 421, Maxwell on the Interpretation
of Statutes, 12th ed., p. 215, cited with approval in Carson v. F
Carson and Stoyek [1964] 1 W.L.R 511, 516-517).
(2) The principle is that a statute or statutes will not be
interpreted so as to have a retrospective operation unless (i)
“that result is unavoidable on the language used” (Yew Bon
Tew, at pp. 558F, 563D-E) or “that effect cannot be avoided G
without doing violence to the language of the enactment: (In
re Athlumney, Ex parte Wilson [1898] 2 Q.B 547, 552) or “its
language is such as plainly to require such a construction”
(Lauri v. Renad, at p. 421); or (ii) “they expressly or by
necessary implication to provide: see Yew Bon Tew, at p. 558F”
H
170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A (Pearce v. Secretary of State for Defence [1988] A.C 755,
802C-D) or “such a construction appears very clearly in the
terms of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct
implication” (Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 12th
ed., p.215]
B (3) “if the enactment is expressed in language which is fairly
capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as
prospective only” (In re Athlumney, at p. 552).
(4) If the statute does have some retrospective operation on
the basis of the above principles, it is not to be construed as
C having greater retrospective operation “than its language
renders necessary” (Lauri v. Renad, at p. 421) or “than is
necessary to give effect either to its clear language or to its
manifest purpose” (Arnold v. Central Electricity Generating
Board [1988] A.C 228, 275.
D The absence of express limiting words cannot be used as a
basis for implying retrospective operation. That would reverse
the true presumption. A necessary and distinct implication
typically arises in the context of a statute that, by repealing a
previous statute, would leave a “lacuna” in the law if the
new statute were not to be construed as having retrospective
E effect: see, e.g., Food Corporation of India v. Marastro
Compania Naviera S.A. [1987] 1 W.L.R. 134, 152. The
particular problem in the present case is a transitional problem
only, applicable only to those arbitrators that are stale as at
1 January 1992, in respect of which applications to strike
F out are made shortly thereafter. In the future, such claimants
will either continue to be dilatory or not, in which case the
references will proceed to a conclusion. The concern of the
legislature, and the mischief at which the section was aimed,
was not a limited number of existing stale arbitrations but
future arbitrations. Moreover, although the mischief at which
G the section was aimed is not to be ignored, one should start
by looking at the words themselves: see Chebaro v. Chebaro
[1987] Fam. 127, 130, 134-135.
It would be unfair to a claimant to give a retrospective
operation to section 13A. So far as claimants in existing
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 171
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

arbitrations are concerned, they may well have been A
(correctly) advised prior to 1 January 1992 that they could
proceed slowly with the claim without risk of having their
claims dismissed by reason of such delay. A retrospective
application of the statute would expose him to a penalty on
the strength of conduct not susceptible to penalty when
B
committed. It would not, however, be unfair to a respondent
to limit section 13A to delay occurring after 1 January 1992.
Even if such delay were causative of prejudice or the risk of
an unfair resolution of the dispute, under the existing law
laid down in Bremer Vulkan a respondent should have been
aware that it was a respondent’s obligation (as well as a C
claimant’s) to seek directions from the arbitrator to ensure a
speedy resolution of disputes: see the Hannah Blumenthal
case [1983] 1 A.C. 854, 923H. A retrospective alteration to
the legitimate expectations of the parties as to the
consequences of their conduct at the time it occurred would
D
be contrary to the principles of legal and commercial certainty
that formed part of the grounds on which the House of Lords
declined in Hannah Blumenthal to depart from Bermer Vulkan:
see pp. 913C, 917D, 922H.”
(emphasis supplied)
E
155. Reliance was placed on Gloucester Union v. Woolwich
Union114, with respect to effect on existing rights wherein following
observations have been made:
“Before considering the legal effect of art. xxxi. of this Order
it is necessary, we think, to bear in mind that by the common F
law, upon such a division of the parish of Upton St. Leonard’s,
any settlement already acquired in that parish would have
been lost: see Reg v. Tipton Inhabitants 3; Dorking Union v.
St. Saviour’s Union. The purpose and effect of par. 1 of art.
xxxi is to get rid of this difficulty and preserve the settlements
that have been already acquired before the commencement G
of the Order. The purpose and effect of par. 2 is in like manner
to preserve a status of irremovability that has been acquired
at that date; and the question raised in this case is whether
par. 3 of the article is to be construed in all its generality as
114
(1917) 2 K.B. 374 H
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A applicable to acts or circumstances which have been done or
occurred completely in the past and before the commencement
of the Order, so as to create or confer a settlement where
none existed before, or whether, as the appellants contend, it
is to be construed as supplemental to pars. 1 and 2 and limited
to the cases where persons are in process of acquiring a
B
settlement or status of irremovability so as to preserve their
inchoate rights. If the words in par. 3 are construed without
limitation, then, the residence of the pauper at Chequer’s Row
in Upton St. Leonard’s between 1893 and 1897 being deemed
to be residence in Gloucester, a settlement in Gloucester is
C conferred upon him and the respondents succeed. We think
this paragraph should be so construed subject to the general
principle that a statute is prima facie prospective and does
not interfere with existing rights unless it contains clear words
to that effect, or unless, having regard to its object, it
necessarily does so, and that a statute is not to be construed
D
to have a greater to retrospective operation than its language
renders necessary – see per Lindley LJ in Lauri v. Renad –
whatever view may be entertained of the probably intention
of the Legislature, unless some manifest absurdity or
inconsistency results from such construction; but we have
E come to the conclusion that the construction of the paragraph
contended for by the respondents produces such a practical
inconsistency with par. 1 of the same article that it is necessary
to put some limitation upon it. If a person had resided before
the commencement of the Order for two years in that portion
of the parish of Upton St. Leonards’ which has been added to
F
Gloucester and for one year following in the portion which
remains the parish of Upton St. Leonard’s, he would by the
latter part of par.1 be deemed to have acquired a settlement
in the parish of Upton St. Leonard’s, but if par.3 is to be
applied to such a case his residence in the added portion of
G Upton St. Leonard’s is to be deemed to have been residence
in the parish of Gloucester; and if so deemed, then he has
not had three years’ consecutive residence in any one parish
and has no settlement – in other words, the effect of par.3 in
such a case is to destroy the settlement which is preserved by
par.1 and to restore the common law rule which is intended to
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 173
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

be abolished. The same result would follow in the converse A
case where the later period of residence completing the three
years in the old parish of Upton St. Leonard’s is in the area
which has been added to the parish of Gloucester.”
(emphasis supplied)
156. In The King v. The General Commissioners of Income B
Tax for Southampton115 it was observed:
“The language of the section shows clearly that Parliament
intended it to have a retrospective effect. The object was to
prevent loss to the revenue when Commissioners had acted
who were not, under the statutes, the right Commissioners to C
make the charge, provided that it was made by the
Commissioners for the parish or place in which the person
charged ordinarily resided. That the section was retrospective
in effect was not disputed by Sir Robert Finlay, but he argued
that the retrospective operation is limited by the language of D
the section and does not extend to a charge made in respect
of profits derived from foreign possessions or securities under
s.108 of the Income Tax Act, 1842. In support of this argument
he relied upon the express reference in the first sub-section
of s.32 to s.106, and s.146 of the Income Tax Act, 1842, upon
the omission of any reference in this sub-section to s.108, E
and upon the repeal in sub-s.2 of s.32 of s.108. He contended
that if the Legislature had meant to include s.108 in the first
sub-section it would have referred to it in express berms and
would not merely have repealed it by the second sub-section.
In the first sub-section mention is made of other sections of F
the Income Tax Acts, but not of s.108. It must be taken, he
argued, that Parliament had in mind the difficulties created
by s. 108, which were pointed out in Aramayo’s Case by the
House of Lords, and that Parliament intended to remove these
difficulties by the repeal of s.108 so as to prevent its operation
in future, but did not mean to change the law as regards acts G
done before passing of the statute. The question must depend
upon the construction of the language of s.32. The rules to
be applied are well settled. It is a fundamental rule of English
law that enactments in a statute are generally to be construed
115
(1916) 2 K.B. 249, (1917) 2 K.B. 374 H
174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A as prospective and intended to regulate future conduct, but
this rule is one of construction only and must yield to the
intention of the Legislature: Moon v. Durden, per Parke B. It
is also the law that a statute is not to be construed to have
greater retrospective operation than its language renders
necessary: Lauri v. Renad, per Lindley LJ to ascertain the
B
intention regard should be had to the general scope and
purview of the enactment, to the remedy sought to be applied,
to the former state of the law, and to what was in the
contemplation of the Legislature: Pardo v. Bingham per Lord
Hatherly L.C”
C (emphasis supplied)
157. In K.S. Paripoornan (supra), it was observed that in the
case of retrospective operation the Court has to consider the effect on
existing rights and obligations and for that purpose, the intention of the
legislature has to be ascertained as indicated in the statute itself. This
D court observed that:
“66. The dictum of Lord Denman, C.J. in R. v. St. Mary,
Whitechapel, (1848) 12 QB 120, 127 that a statute which is
in its direct operation prospective cannot properly be called
a retrospective statute because a part of the requisites for its
E action is drawn from time antecedent to its passing, which
has received the approval of this Court, does not mean that a
statute which is otherwise retrospective in the sense that it
takes away or impairs any vested right acquired under existing
laws or creates a new obligation or imposes a new duty or
F attaches a new disability in respect to transactions or
considerations already past, will not be treated as
retrospective. In Alexander v. Mercouris, (1979) 3 All ER 305
Goff, L.J., after referring to the said observations of Lord
Denman, C.J., has observed that a statute would not be
operating prospectively if it creates new rights and duties
G arising out of past transactions. The question whether a
particular statute operates prospectively only or has
retrospective operation also will have to be determined on
the basis of the effect it has on existing rights and obligations,
whether it creates new obligations or imposes new duties or
H levies new liabilities in relation to past transactions. For that
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 175
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

purpose it is necessary to ascertain the intention of the A
legislature as indicated in the statute itself.”
158. In Zile Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors., (supra), this
Court has observed that the rule against retrospectivity does not extend
to protect from the effect of a repeal, a privilege which did not amount
to the accrued right. This court, while dealing with retrospectivity of a B
statute, observed that retrospectivity must be reasonable and not
excessive or harsh; otherwise, it runs the risk of being struck down for
being unconstitutional. Following observations have been made:
“15. Though retrospectivity is not to be presumed and rather
there is presumption against retrospectivity, according to Craies C
(Statute Law, 7th Edn.), it is open for the legislature to enact
laws having retrospective operation. This can be achieved by
express enactment or by necessary implication from the
language employed. If it is a necessary implication from the
language employed that the legislature intended a particular
section to have a retrospective operation, the courts will give D
it such an operation. In the absence of a retrospective
operation having been expressly given, the courts may be
called upon to construe the provisions and answer the question
whether the legislature had sufficiently expressed that
intention giving the statute retrospectivity. Four factors are E
suggested as relevant: (i) general scope and purview of the
statute; (ii) the remedy sought to be applied; (iii) the former
state of the law; and (iv) what it was the legislature
contemplated. (p. 388) The rule against retrospectivity does
not extend to protect from the effect of a repeal, a privilege
which did not amount to accrued right. (p. 392) F

***
18. In a recent decision of this Court in National Agricultural
Coop. Marketing Federation of India Ltd. v. Union of India,
(2003) 5 SCC 23 it has been held G
that there is no fixed formula for the expression of legislative
intent to give retrospectivity to an enactment. Every legislation
whether prospective or retrospective has to be subjected to
the question of legislative competence. The retrospectivity is
liable to be decided on a few touchstones such as: (i) the
H
176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A words used must expressly provide or clearly imply
retrospective operation; (ii) the retrospectivity must be
reasonable and not excessive or harsh, otherwise, it runs the
risk of being struck down as unconstitutional; (iii) where the
legislation is introduced to overcome a judicial decision, the
power cannot be used to subvert the decision without removing
B
the statutory basis of the decision. There is no fixed formula
for the expression of legislative intent to give retrospectivity
to an enactment. A validating clause coupled with a
substantive statutory change is only one of the methods to
leave actions unsustainable under the unamended statute,
C undisturbed. Consequently, the absence of a validating clause
would not by itself affect the retrospective operation of the
statutory provision, if such retrospectivity is otherwise
apparent.”
159. This Court has considered the harsh consequences of
D retrospective operation of the statute in Commissioner of Income Tax-
19, Mumbai v. Sarkar Builders116 and observed thus:
“25. Can it be said that in order to avail the benefit in the
assessment years after 1-4-2005, balconies should be
removed though these were permitted earlier? Holding so
E would lead to absurd results as one cannot expect an assessee
to comply with a condition that was not a part of the statute
when the housing project was approved. We, thus, find that
the only way to resolve the issue would be to hold that clause
(d) is to be treated as inextricably linked with the approval
and construction of the housing project and an assessee
F cannot be called upon to comply with the said condition when
it was not in contemplation either of the assessee or even the
legislature, when the housing project was accorded approval
by the local authorities.
26. Having regard to the above, let us take note of the special
G features which appear in these cases:
26.1. In the present case, the approval of the housing project,
its scope, definition and conditions, are all decided by and
are dependent on the provisions of the relevant DC Rules. In

H 116
(2015) 7 SCC 579
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 177
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

contrast, the judgment in Reliance Jute and Industries Ltd. v. A
CIT, (1980) 1 SCC 139 was concerned with income tax only.
26.2. The position of law and the rights accrued prior to
enactment of the Finance Act, 2004 have to be taken into
account, particularly when the position becomes irreversible.
26.3. The provisions of Section 80-IB(10) mention not only a B
particular date before which such a housing project is to be
approved by the local authority, even a date by which the
housing project is to be completed, is fixed. These dates have
a specific purpose which gives time to the developers to
arrange their affairs in such a manner that the housing project C
is started and finished within those stipulated dates. This
planning, in the context of facts in these appeals, had to be
much before 1-4-2005.
26.4. The basic objective behind Section 80-IB(10) is to
encourage developers to undertake housing projects for D
weaker sections of society, inasmuch as to qualify for
deduction under this provision, it is an essential condition
that the residential unit be constructed on a maximum built-
up area of 1000 sq ft where such residential unit is situated
within the cities of Delhi and Mumbai or within 25 km from
the municipal limits of these cities and 1500 sq ft at any other E
place.
26.5. It is the cardinal principle of interpretation that a
construction resulting in unreasonably harsh and absurd
results must be avoided.
F
26.6. Clause (d) makes it clear that a housing project includes
shops and commercial establishments also. But from the day
the said provision was inserted, they wanted to limit the built-
up area of shops and establishments to 5% of the aggregate
built-up area or 2000 sq ft, whichever is less. However, the
legislature itself felt that this much commercial space would G
not meet the requirements of the residents. Therefore, in the
year 2010, Parliament has further amended this provision by
providing that it should not exceed 3% of the aggregate built-
up area of the housing project or 5000 sq ft, whichever is
higher. This is a significant modification making complete
H
178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A departure from the earlier yardstick. On the one hand, the
permissible built-up area of the shops and other commercial
shops is increased from 2000 sq ft to 5000 sq ft. On the other
hand, though the aggregate built-up area for such shops and
establishment is reduced from 5% to 3%, what is significant
is that it permits the builders to have 5000 sq ft or 3% of the
B
aggregate built-up area, “whichever is higher”. In contrast,
the provision earlier was 5% or 2000 sq ft, “whichever is
less”.”
(emphasis supplied)
C 160. This Court in Jawarharmal (supra) and Rai Ramkrishna
(supra), has considered the practical realities before analysing the extent
of retrospective operation of the statute. Several decisions were cited in
regard to conflict of interest (which are referred to in the footnote
hereafter117) and it was urged that the rule of construction that is to be
adopted is one of purposive interpretation.
D
In re: Legislative History of Act of 2013
161. The Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill,
2011 (Bill No.77 of 2011) was introduced in the Parliament. The provisions
of Section 24, as introduced in the said Bill, read as under:
E “24. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in
any case where a notification under section 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act, LA was issued before the commencement of
this Act but the award under section 11 thereof has not been
made before such commencement, the process shall be deemed
F to have lapsed and the appropriate Government shall initiate

117
Southern Electricity Supply Co. of Orissa Ltd. v. Sri Seetaram Rice Mill, (2012) 2
SCC 108 @ 19-21; Tinsukhia Electric Supply Company Ltd. v. State of Assam & Ors.,
(1989) 3 SCC 709 @ para 118-121; C.I.T. v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers, (2003) 3 SCC 57
@ para 14-21; D. Saibaba v. Bar Council of India & Ors., (2003) 6 SCC 186 @ para 16-
18; Balram Kamanat v. Union of India, (2003) 7 SCC 628 para 24; New India Assurance
G Co. v. Nulli Nivelle, (2008) 3 SCC 279 @ Para 51-54; Government of Andhra Pradesh
&Ors. v. Smt. P. Laxmi Devi, (2008) 4 SCC 720 Para 41 & 42.; Entertainment Network
(India) Ltd. v. Super Cassette Industries Ltd., (2008) 13 SCC 30 para 132-137; N.
Kannadasan v. Ajoy Khose and Ors., (2009) 7 SCC 1 para 54-67; H.S. Vankani v. State
of Gujarat, (2010) 4 SCC 301 para 43-48; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Narmada
Bachao Andolan & Ors., (2011) 7 SCC 639 para 78-85; State of Gujarat & Anr. v.
H Hon’ble Mr. Justice R.A. Mehta (Retd.) and Ors., (2013) 3 SCC 1: para 96-98).
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 179
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

the process for acquisition of land afresh in accordance with A
the provisions of this Act.
(2) Where possession of land has not been taken, regardless
of whether the award under section 11 of the Land Acquisition
Act, LA Act has been made or not, the process for acquisition
of land shall also be deemed to have lapsed and the B
appropriate Government shall initiate the process of
acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this
Act.”
162. It is apparent from Section 24(1), as introduced originally,
contained a provision with respect to award, which has not been made, C
but it was later on amended, and now as provided in Section 24(1)(a),
there is no lapse and only higher compensation is available in case award
has not been passed. The earlier Section 24(2) contained only the
provision with respect to possession of the land that has not been taken.
Earlier, there was no time limit prescribed, and it was proposed that the
process for acquisition of land shall lapse. D

Clause 24 of Notes on clauses of Bill read thus:
“Clause 24 seeks to provide that land acquisition process
under the Land Acquisition Act, LA shall be deemed to have
lapsed in certain cases where the award has not been made E
and possession of land has not been taken before the
commencement of proposed legislation.”
163. After considering the various suggestions of the State
Government, the Committee made some recommendations, which are
extracted hereunder: F
“16.5 The Committee note that Clause 24 of the Bill provides
that land acquisition cases/process shall be invalid on
enactment of the new Act in cases where Collector has not
given award or possession of the land has not been taken
before the commencement of the proposed legislation. Some
G
of the representatives of the industry and also the Ministries
like Railways and Urban Development submitted before the
Committee that land acquisition proceedings already initiated
under the existing Land Acquisition, LA should not lapse as it
would lead to time and cost over-run in many infrastructural
projects. However, in such cases land compensation and R&R H
180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A benefits could be allowed as per the provisions of LARR Bill.
The Committee would like the Government to re-examine the
issue and incorporate necessary provisions in the Rules to be
framed under the new Act with a view to ensuring that the
land owners/farmers/affected families get enhanced
compensation and R & R package under the provisions of
B
the LARR Bill, 2011 and at the same time, the pace of
implementation of infrastructural projects is not adversely
impacted.”
164. Debates in the Lok Sabha on 29.8.2013, were referred to
during the hearings, to cite various reasons given in respect of the question
C why effect should be given retrospectively in cases where acquisition
has not been completed. Shri Jairam Ramesh, Minister concerned at the
relevant time, replied to debate about the retrospective part with respect
to Section 24 thus:
“… The hon’ble member has also raised question about
D retrospective clause. This is about section 24 under which it
has been provided that if the award has not been passed under
the previous law than the new law will be applicable. Secondly,
if the award has been passed and no compensation has been
given and no physical possession has been taken the new
E law will be applicable. The third situation where this clause
will be applicable is when award has been passed but farmer
has not been given more than 50 per cent compensation which
will entail enforcement of this law. The hon’ble member and
several others have raised this apprehension that this Act will
ultimately give vast powers to the bureaucracy. In regard to
F this apprehension I would like to say that we have fixed time
limit at every level of the procedure and I hope that the states
will adhere to these timelines.”
(emphasis supplied)

G 165. It is clear that while replying to the debate, the Minister
concerned has stated that there would be lapse only if in case possession
has not been taken and compensation has not been paid. The emphasis
right from the beginning was on possession. Thus, from the perusal of
debate too, it is apparent that the word “or” had been understood as
“and”.
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 181
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

In Re: Objectives of the Act A
166. It was submitted on behalf of the landowners that the
consideration of difficulties, harsh consequences, the importance of
performance, time lost during litigation, revival of stale claims would not
permit deviation from the mandate of the law of Section 24. If obligations
are mandatory, then also intendment of the Act cannot be defeated. As B
such, it is the duty of the court to disregard such factors and to give
contextual interpretation to the intendment. The language of the statute,
wherever the context requires, its objects and reasons, the Preamble, its
legislative history as well as the accompanying provisions (including the
relevant provisions of the old Act) are to be considered by the court. In
Arnit Das v. State of Bihar118, the court observed that the ambiguity in C
the definition of “juvenile” is to be resolved by taking into consideration
the Preamble and the statement of objects and reasons. Burrakur Coal
Co. Ltd. v. Union of India119 and A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. M.
Venkatachalam Potti120. During the hearing, the State had also relied
on other decisions to say that where the issue had attained finality, relief D
ought not to be granted.121 The Act of 2013 has been enacted considering
the difficulties caused by the operation of the earlier laws and to subserve
the public interest. Thus, the Court should interpret it in the context of
the attendant circumstances. At the same time, the court should not,
while ostensibly adopting a purposive or liberal interpretation, affect
matters which have become final, or stale. In Popat Bahiru Govardhane E
& Ors. (supra) this aspect, in the context of limitation provisions, was
highlighted in the following terms:
“16. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may
harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with
all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no F
power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.
The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience
to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce
118
2000 (5) SCC 488 G
119
1962 (1) SCR 44
120
1955 SCR 1196
121
Delhi Development Authority v. Sukhbir Singh, (2016) 16 SCC 258, Padma Sundara
Rao (Dead) & Ors. v. State of T.N. & Ors., 2002 (3) SCC 533; Popat Bahiru Govardhane
& Ors. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer & Anr., 2013 (10) SCC 765; B. Premanand
& Ors. v. Mohan Koikal & Ors., (2011) 4 SCC 266 and Bhavnagar University v.
Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. & Ors., (2003) 2 SCC 111 H
182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed
lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands
attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held
that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered
while interpreting a statute. “A result flowing from a statutory
provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore
B
that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting
from its operation.”
In Re: proviso to Section 24(2)
167. In reference to the question whether the proviso is part of
C section 24(2) or Section 24(1), it was submitted on behalf of the acquiring
authorities and the States that the proviso needs to be read along with
the main provision of section 24(2) and cannot be read with section
24(1)(b). It was pointed out that this Court has taken the view in Delhi
Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. v. Tarun Pal Singh & Ors., (2018) 14
SCC 161 that the proviso should be read as part of section 24(2) of the
D Act of 2013, cannot be construed as proviso to section 24(1)(b) whereas
in Delhi Development Authority v. Virender Lal Bahri & Ors. (supra),
a different view has been taken while referring the matter, and it has
been observed that it should be treated as a proviso to section 24(1)(b)
and not to section 24(2). As the interpretation of section 24(2) is involved
E in the matter, it is absolutely necessary to socio-justice and whether the
proviso is part of section 24(2) or has to be read as an independent
provision or it has to be treated as part of the proviso to section 24(1)(b),
the question is required to be decided as it arises for the purpose of the
very provisions of section 24(2).

F 168. It was submitted that the statutory provisions are to be read
as they exist. Relocation of a proviso by the interpretive process, resulting
in its placement at a different place is a drastic judicial measure which
can be adopted in rarest of rare cases, and such an exercise may amount
to encroaching upon the legislative field or causing violence to the plain
language used by the legislature. By the proviso, Parliament has tried to
G balance the competitive new rights, and the proviso cannot be lifted and
bodily placed at a different place. It was also submitted on behalf of the
acquiring authorities that as the Section 24(1(b) ends with a ‘full stop’ (.)
Section 24 (2) ends with a colon (:). These punctuation marks leave no
room for any doubt that Parliament consciously used the proviso as an
H exception to section 24(2). The placement of the proviso needs no further
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 183
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

comparative rules of interpretation. There is a very clear indication of A
legislative intent in section 24(2) itself. Punctuation plays a vital role in
interpretation if some ambiguity is there in its interpretation. It is argued
that punctuations play a very important role in interpreting statutes if
some ambiguity is raised in its interpretation. Considering the use of a
particular punctuation mark is an accepted method of statutory
B
interpretation.
169. Considering the use of punctuation marks, as a statutory mode
of interpretation, full stop means the particular sentence ends and stands
detached from the next part. It was also submitted that the proviso is to
be read together with the main provision to which it is attached.
C
170. On the other hand, it was submitted on behalf of the
landowners that the proviso does not refer to the main factors of lapse
under section 24(2). The proviso is not an exemption from lapsing if it is
read as part of Section 24(2), then the absurd consequences would follow.
The proviso is in accord with section 24(1)(b) and has to be read as part
of it. Reliance has been placed on D.D.A. v. Virendra Lal Bahri & D
Ors. (supra). It was submitted that the proviso could not have been
intended to be part of section 24(2) dealing with lapsing of acquisition
where the subject-matter of the proviso is wholly unrelated to physical
possession of the land, but only relating to compensation not being
deposited. It was also submitted that if the proviso is read with section E
24(2), arbitrary results will follow. The proviso would be arbitrary and
liable to be struck down under Article 14 of the Constitution. In case
notification under section 4 applies only to a single plot of land or single
owner, the conditions of section 24(2) are not fulfilled acquisition would
lapse, and in a case where several pieces of land have been acquired, if
compensation in respect of majority landholdings has not been deposited, F
such acquisition will not lapse, but only higher compensation under the
Act of 2013 would be paid. The words “award being made five years
or more prior to the commencement of the Act” are absent in the
proviso. Reading these words to proviso would do violence to the literal
language, and its plain meaning proviso and being a beneficial provision G
must be construed in the way which furthers its performance. It was
also submitted that in respect of large chunks of land carved out by the
same notification, the compensation in respect of the majority of
landholdings has been deposited. In such a case no lapse will take place
because the proviso in such a case will not apply and whether in respect
H
184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A of the majority of landholdings, compensation has or has not been
deposited, would have no bearing on the issue whether lapsing does or
does not take place under section 24(2).
With respect to the proviso, various questions arise for
consideration.
B (a) Interpretation:
171. The main question is whether under the scheme of section
24 the proviso is treated as part of Section 24(1)(b) or it is part of the
exception carved out in section 24(2) particularly in view of the fact that
the word ‘or’ has been interpreted by us as ‘and.’ In that context, when
C Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. v. Tarun Pal Singh & Ors122 as
well as when the question was considered in Delhi Development
Authority v. Virender Lal Bahri & Ors., [SLP [C] No.37375/2016],
the question did not come up for consideration in any of the matters
whether ‘or’ in two negative conditions in Section 24(2) has to be read
D conjunctively or disjunctively. When we read the word “or” as ‘and’ in
the main part of section 24(2), it is clear that the proviso has to stay as
part of section 24(2) where it has been placed by the legislature, and
only then it makes sense. If ‘or’ used in-between two negative conditions
of ‘possession has not been taken’ or ‘compensation has not been
paid,’ disjunctively, in that case, the proviso cannot be operative and
E would become otiose and would make no sense as part of Section 24(2).
In case of amount not having been paid the acquisition has to lapse,
though possession (of the land) has been taken would not be the proper
interpretation of the main part as mentioned above, when “or” is read
conjunctively, section 24(2) provided for lapse in a case where possession
F has not been taken, nor compensation has been paid, in such a case
proviso becomes operative in given exigency of not depositing amount
with respect to majority of landholdings.
172. A reading of section 24(2) shows that in case possession has
been taken even if the compensation has not been paid, the proceedings
G shall not lapse. In case payment has not been made nor deposited with
respect to the majority of the holdings in the accounts of the beneficiaries,
then all the beneficiaries specified in the notification under Section 4 of
the Act of 1894 shall get the enhanced compensation under the provisions
of the Act of 2013. Section 24(2) not only deals with failure to take
122
H (2018) 14 SCC 161
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 185
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

physical possession but also failure to make payment of compensation. A
If both things have not been done, there is lapse of the acquisition
proceeding. But where payment has been made though possession has
been taken or payment has been made to some of the persons but not to
all, and it has also not been deposited as envisaged in the proviso, in that
event all beneficiaries (under the same award) shall get higher
B
compensation. This is because once possession is been taken, there can
be no lapse of the proceedings, and higher compensation is intended on
failure to deposit the compensation. Once an award has been passed
and possession has been taken, there is absolute vesting of the land, as
such higher compensation follows under the proviso, which is beneficial
to holders. In a case where both the negative conditions have not been C
fulfilled, as mentioned in section 24(2), there is a lapse. Thus, the proviso,
in our opinion is a wholesome provision and is, in fact, a part of section
24(2); it fits in the context of section 24(2) as deposit is related with the
payment of compensation and lapse is provided due to non-payment
along with not taking possession for five years or more whereas for
D
non-deposit higher compensation is provided. Thus, when one of the
conditions has been satisfied in case payment has been made, or
possession has not been taken, there is no lapse of the proceedings as
both the negative conditions must co-exist.
173. When we consider the provisions of section 24(1)(b) where
an award has been passed under section 11 of the Act of 1894, then E
such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Act as if
it has not been repealed. The only exception carved out is the period of
5 years or more and that too by providing a non-obstante clause in Section
24(2) to anything contained in section 24(1). The non-obstante clause
qualifies the proviso also to Section 24(2). It has to be read as part of F
Section 24(2) as it is an exception to Section 24(1)(b). In our opinion,
Section 24(1)(b) is a self-contained provision, and is also a part of the
non-obstante clause to the other provisions of the Act as provided in
sub-section (1). Parliament worked out an exception, by providing a
non-obstante clause in section 24(2), to Section 24(1). Compensation
is to be paid under Section 24(1)(b) under the Act of 1894 and not under G
the Act of 2013. As such Section 24 (2) is an exception to section 24(1)(b)
and the proviso is also an exception which fits in with non-obstante
clause of Section 24 (2) only. Any other interpretation will be derogatory
to the provisions contained in Section 24(1)(b) which provides that the
pending proceedings shall continue under the Act of 1894 as if it had not H
186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A been repealed, that would include the part relating to compensation too.
Even if there is no lapse of proceedings under section 24(1)(a), only
higher compensation follows under Section 24(1)(a). Section 24(2) deals
with the award having been made five years or before the
commencement of the new Act. The legislative history also indicates/it
was intended that five years’ period should be adequate to make payment
B
of compensation and to take possession. In that spirit, the proviso has
been carved out as part of section 24(2). Thus when Parliament has
placed it at a particular place, by a process of reasoning, there can be no
lifting and relocation of the provision. To bodily lift it would be an
impermissible exercise. Unless it produces absurd results and does not
C fit in the scheme of the Act and the provisions to which it is attached
such an interpretation, doing violence to the express provision, is not a
legitimate interpretative exercise. There is no need to add it as the proviso
to Section 24(1)(b) as it has not been done by the legislature, and it
makes sense where it has been placed. It need not be lifted.
D (b) Punctuation used in Section 24(2):
174. Parliament has used the full stop (.) after section 24(1) and
colon (:) after section 24(2). It cannot be gainsaid that punctuation plays
a vital role, particularly when an attempt is made to relocate any part of
the provision. The use of the colon is to introduce a sub-clause that
E follows logically from the text before it. We are examining this aspect of
the colon, additionally. Though as the interpretation of the provision of
Section 24(2) and its proviso needs no further deliberation regarding its
placement, the same is to be read as a proviso to Section 24(2) and not
Section 24(1)(b). Use of punctuation colon reinforces our conclusion
and punctuation mark has been an accepted method of statutory
F interpretation when such a problem arises. Though sometimes punctuation
can be ignored also but not generally. The full stop after section 24(1)(b)
expresses deliberate intent to end a particular sentence and detach it
from the next part. With regard to the meaning of the punctuation colon,
the University of Oxford Style Guide states as under:
G “Use a colon to introduce a subclause which follows logically
from the text before it, is not a new concept and depends
logically on the preceding main clause. Do not use a colon if
the two parts of the sentence are not logically connected.”

H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 187
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

175. The note of the University of England “Writing Correctly” A
has also been relied upon on behalf of the State of Haryana. Following
discussion has been made:
“Colons have a number of functions in a sentence. If you use
colons in your writing, use them sparingly, and never use a
colon more than once in any sentence. B
Rule 1: Colons can be used to introduce a list, but they must
follow a complete sentence (independent clause).
Rule 2: Colons can be used to explain, summarise or extend
the meaning in a sentence by introducing a word, phrase or
clause that enlarges on the previous statement. C

Rule 3: Colons are used to separate the title from the subtitle.
Rule 4: Colons can be used to introduce a quotation in formal
academic writing.”
(emphasis supplied) D
176. It is clear that the colon (:) has a reference to the previous
statement and enlarges the same and extends the meaning of the
sentence. The colon indicates that the text is intrinsically linked to the
previous provision preceding it, i.e., Section 24(2) in this case and not
section 24(1). The colon indicates that what follows. The colon proves, E
explains, defines describes or lists elements of what precedes it. In case
the proviso is bodily lifted and placed after section 24(1(b), section 24(2)
will end with a “colon,” which is never done to end a provision. Certain
decisions have been referred to saying that importance and weightage
are to be given to punctuation marks. The earlier view was that
F
punctuations were added by the proof readers, and the Acts passed by
Parliament did not contain any punctuation. However, it was submitted
that in the past century, the English courts realised that the drafts placed
before the Parliament also carry punctuations and, thus, it is important to
give meaning to the same. Bennion on Statutory Interpretation has
this to say regarding punctuation marks: G
“16.8 Punctuation is a part of an Act and may be considered
in construing a provision. It is usually of little weight, however,
since the sense of an Act should be the same with or without
its punctuation.
… H
188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A Although punctuation may be considered, it will generally be
of little use since the sense of an Act should be the same with
or without it. Punctuation is a device not for making meaning,
but for making meaning plain. Its purpose is to denote the
steps that ought to be made in oral reading and to point out
the sense. The meaning of a well-crafted legislative
B
proposition should not turn on the presence or absence of a
punctuation mark.”
177. In Marshall v. Cottingham123 [1982] Ch 82 at 88, at 12
while referring to the change of position and establishing that punctuation
may be used in interpretation, it was held that:
C
“the day is long past when the courts would pay no heed to
punctuation in an Act of Parliament.”
In Hanlon v Law Society124 it was held as under :
“… not to take account of punctuation disregards the
D reality that literate people, such as parliamentary draftsmen,
punctuate what they write, if not identically, at least in
accordance with grammatical principles. Why should not other
literate people, such as judges, look at the punctuation in
order to interpret the meaning of the legislation as accepted
E by parliament?”
Yet again in Houston v Burns125, it was held that:
“Punctuation is a rational part of English composition and is
sometimes quite significantly employed. I see no reason for
depriving legal documents of such significance as attaches
F to punctuation in other writings.”
178. Other decisions were also cited.126 On similar lines, the
American approach to the interpretation of punctuations is different. In
Taylor v. Caribou127 , it was held as under:

G
123
[1981] 3 All ER 8
124
[1981] AC 124 at 197
125
[1910] AC 337 at 348
126
Dingmar v. Dingmar 2007 (2) All ER 382; Kennedy v Information Commissioner
and another (Secretary of State for Justice intervening) [2012] 1 WLR 3524
127
H 102 Me. 401, 67 A.2 (1907)
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 189
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

“We are aware that it has been repeatedly asserted by courts A
and jurists that punctuation is no part of a statute, and that it
ought not to be regarded in construction. This rule in its origin
was founded upon common sense, for in England until 1849
statutes were entrolled upon parchment and enacted without
punctuation …. Such a rule is not applicable to conditions
B
where, as in this State, a bill is printed and is on the desk of
every member of the Legislature, punctuation and all, before
its final passage. There is no reason why punctuation, which
is intended to and does assist in making clear and plain the
meaning of all things else in the English language, should be
rejected in the case of the interpretation of statutes. “Cessante C
ratione legis cessat ipso lex.” Accordingly we find that it has
been said that in interpreting a statute punctuation may be
resorted to when other means fail …; that it may aid its
construction …; that by it the meaning may often be
determined; that it is one of the means of discovering the
D
legislative intent …; that it may be of material assistance in
determining the legislative intention….”
(emphasis supplied)
In Aswini Kumar Ghose (supra) stated that:
“Punctuation is after all a minor element in the construction E
of a statute, and very little attention is paid to it by English
courts. Cockburn, C.J. said in Stephenson v. Taylor: “On the
Parliament Roll there is no punctuation and we therefore are
not bound by that in the printed copies.” It seems, however,
that in the Vellum copies printed since 1850 there are some F
cases of punctuation, and when they occur they can be looked
upon as a sort of contemporanea expositio. When a statute is
carefully punctuated and there is doubt about its meaning, a
weight should undoubtedly be given to the punctuation. I need
not deny that punctuation may have its uses in some cases,
but it cannot certainly be regarded as a controlling element G
and cannot be allowed to control the plain meaning of a text.
********* *******
“77. The High Court has rejected the contention of the
petitioner Aswini Kumar Ghosh on two grounds. In the first
H
190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A place it has been said that the comma was no part of the Act.
That the orthodox view of earlier English Judges was that
punctuation formed no part of the statute appears quite clearly
from the observations of Willes, J. in Claydon v. Green.
Vigorous expression was given to this view also by Lord Esher,
M.R. in Duke of Devonshire v. Connor where he said:
B
“In an Act of Parliament there are no such things as brackets
any more than there are such things as stops.”
This view was also adopted by the Privy Council in the matter
of interpretation of Indian statutes as will appear from the
C observations of Lord Hobhouse in Maharani of Burdwan v.
Murtunjoy Singh, namely, that “it is an error to rely on
punctuation in construing Acts of the legislature”. Same
opinion was expressed by the Privy Council in Pugh v.
Ashutosh Sen. If, however, the Rule regarding the rejection
of punctuation for the purposes of interpretation is to be
D regarded as of imperfect obligation and punctuation is to be
taken at least as contemporanea expositio, it will nevertheless
have to be disregarded if it is contrary to the plain meaning
of the statute. If punctuation is without sense or conflicts with
the plain meaning of the words, the court will not allow it to
E cause a meaning to be placed upon the words which they
otherwise would not have. This leads me to the second ground
on which mainly the High Court rejected the plea of the
petitioner Aswini Kumar Ghosh, namely, that the word “other”
in the phrase “any other law” quite clearly connects the Indian
Bar Councils Act with other laws as alternatives and subjects
F both to the qualification contained in the adjectival clause. I
find myself in complete agreement with the High Court on
this point. If the intention was that the adjectival clause should
not qualify the Indian Bar Councils Act, then the use of the
word “other” was wholly in apposite and unnecessary. The
G use of that word unmistakably leads to the conclusion that
the adjectival clause also qualifies something other than
“other law”. If the intention were that the Indian Bar Councils
Act should remain unaffected by the qualifying phrase and
should be superseded in toto for the purposes of this Act the
legislature would have said “or in any law regulating the
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 191
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

conditions etc.” It would have been yet simpler not to refer to A
the Indian Bar Councils Act at all and to drop the adjectival
clause and to simply say “Notwithstanding anything contained
in any law”. In the light of the true meaning of the title of the
Act as I have explained above and having regard to the use
of the word “other” I have no hesitation in holding,
B
in agreement with the High Court, that what the non obstante
clause intended to exclude or supersede was not the whole of
the Indian Bar Councils Act but to exclude or supersede that
Act and any other law only insofar as they or either of them
purported to regulate the conditions subject to which a person
not entered in the roll of advocates of a High Court might be C
permitted to practise in that High Court and that the comma,
if it may at all be looked at, must be disregarded as being
contrary to this plain meaning of the statute.”
179. In Jamshed N. Guzdar (supra) this court held that:
D
“42. The general jurisdiction of the High Courts is dealt with
in Entry 11-A under the caption “administration of justice”,
which has a wide meaning and includes administration of
civil as well as criminal justice. The expression “administration
of justice” has been used without any qualification or
limitation wide enough to include the “powers” and E
“jurisdiction” of all the courts except the Supreme Court.
The semicolon (;) after the words “administration of justice”
in Entry 11-A has significance and meaning. The other words
in the same entry after “administration of justice” only speak
in relation to “constitution” and “organisation” of all the F
courts except the Supreme Court and High Courts. It follows
that under Entry 11-A the State Legislature has no power to
constitute and organise the Supreme Court and High Courts.
It is an accepted principle of construction of a Constitution
that everything necessary for the exercise of powers is
included in the grant of power. The State Legislature being G
an appropriate body to legislate in respect of “administration
of justice” and to invest all courts within the State including
the High Court with general jurisdiction and powers in all
matters, civil and criminal, it must follow that it can invest the
High Court with such general jurisdiction and powers H
192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A including the territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction and also
to take away such jurisdiction and powers from the High
Court except those, which are specifically conferred under
the Constitution on the High Courts. It is not possible to say
that investing the City Civil Court with unlimited jurisdiction,
taking away the same from the High Court, amounts to dealing
B
with “constitution” and “organisation” of the High Court.
Under Entry 11-A of List III the State Legislature is empowered
to constitute and organise City Civil Court and while
constituting such court the State Legislature is also empowered
to confer jurisdiction and powers upon such courts inasmuch
C as “administration of justice” of all the courts including the
High Court is covered by Entry 11-A of List III, so long as
Parliament does not enact law in that regard under Entry 11-
A. Entry 46 of the Concurrent List speaks of the special
jurisdiction in respect of the matters in List III. Entry 13 in
List III is “… Code of Civil Procedure at the commencement
D
of this Constitution …”. From Entry 13 it follows that in respect
of the matters included in the Code of Civil Procedure and
generally in the matter of civil procedure Parliament or the
State Legislature, as provided by Article 246(2) of the
Constitution, acquire the concurrent legislative competence.
E The 1987 Act deals with pecuniary jurisdiction of the courts
as envisaged in the Code of Civil Procedure and as such the
State Legislature was competent to legislate under Entry 13
of List III for enacting the 1987 Act.
68. A Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in
F Rajinder Singh v. Kultar Singh AIR 1980 P&H 1, touching
the same topic stated thus: (AIR p. 1)
“So far as the High Courts are concerned, the topic of
jurisdiction and powers in general is not separately mentioned
in any of the entries of List I, but ‘administration of justice’
G as a distinct topic finds a place in Entry 3 of List II (now
Entry 11-A of List III).
The expression ‘administration of justice’ occurring in Entry
3 of List II of the VIIth Schedule has to be construed in its
widest sense so as to give power to the State Legislature to
H legislate on all matters relating to administration of justice.
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 193
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

After the words ‘administration of justice’ in Entry 3 there is A
a semicolon, and this punctuation cannot be discarded as
being inappropriate. The punctuation has been put with a
definite object of making this topic as distinct and not having
relation only to the topic that follows thereafter. Under Entry
78 of List I, the topic of jurisdiction and powers of the High
B
Courts is not dealt with. Under Entry 3 of List II the State
Legislature can confer jurisdiction and powers or restrict or
withdraw the jurisdiction and powers already conferred on
any of the courts except the Supreme Court, in respect of any
statute. Therefore, the State Legislature has the power to make
a law with respect to the jurisdiction and powers of the High C
Court.”
180. There are several other decisions, which support the
proposition that punctuation marks, especially colons have a significant
role in the interpretation of words in a statute. These judgments include
Falcon Tyres Ltd. v. State of Karnataka128. It was submitted that the D
semicolon after the word “cotton” did not mean that the first part of the
section was disjunctive from “such produce” as has been subjected to
any physical, chemical or other process. It was further submitted that
punctuation is not a safe tool in construction of statute and if the first
part of the section is read as disjunctive from the other part it conflicts
with Sl. No. 2 in the Second Schedule. Further it was submitted that E
definition section which is the interpretation clause to the statute begins
with the expression “unless the context otherwise requires”. This court
held that:
“11. We do not find any substance in the submission of the
learned counsel for the appellant that the semicolon after the F
word “cotton” does not mean that the first part of the section
is disjunctive from “such produce” as has been subjected to
any physical, chemical or other process. Section 2(A)(1) is in
two parts, it excludes two types of food from agricultural
produce. According to us, the definition of the agricultural G
and horticultural produce does not say as to what would be
included in the agricultural or horticultural produce, in
substance it includes all agricultural or horticultural produce
but excludes, (1) tea, coffee, rubber, cashew, cardamom,
128
(2006) 6 SCC 530 H
194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A pepper and cotton from the definition of the agricultural or
horticultural produce though all these products as per
dictionary meaning or in common parlance would be
understood as agricultural produce; and (2) “such produce
as has been subjected to any physical, chemical or other
process for being made fit for consumption”, meaning thereby
B
that the agricultural produce other than what has been
excluded, which has been subjected to any physical, chemical
or other process for making it fit for consumption would also
be excluded from the definition of the agricultural or
horticultural produce except where such agricultural produce
C is merely cleaned, graded, sorted or dried. For example, if
the potatoes are cleaned, graded, sorted or dried, they will
remain agricultural produce but in case raw potato is
subjected to a process and converted into chips for human
consumption it would cease to be agricultural produce for
the purposes of the Entry Tax Act. The words “such produce”
D
in the second part do not refer to the produce which has
already been excluded from the agricultural or horticultural
produce but refer to such other agricultural produce which
has been subjected to any physical, chemical or other process
for being made fit for human consumption.”
E The other judgment cited was State of Gujarat v. Reliance
Industries Ltd.129 With respect to ‘Full Stop’ and ‘Colon’, Vepa P. Sarathi
in the Interpretation of Statutes, Fifth Edition discussed the issue thus:
“The Stop. – The most important punctuation mark is the
period or full stop. It has to be placed at the end of a complete
F sentence which is neither exclamatory nor interrogatory. Of
course, in legislative drafting exclamatory or interrogative
sentences will not occur. An incomplete sentence should
however end with a dash. It should be noticed carefully
whether the final stop should be inside or outside the quotes.
G One can tell easily by the sense.
Colon. – It implies that what follows explains and amplifies
the sentence that comes before it. It is generally used before
a quotation, or to take the place of some word such as
“namely”.”
129
H (2017) 16 SCC 28
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 195
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

181. Aswini Kumar Ghose & Anr (supra) also dealt with full A
stops and held that as long as punctuation does not detract from the
meaning of the words in the text, it can be a controlling factor in
interpretation. In State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha and
Ors130, this court observed that grammar and punctuation are hapless
victims of the pace of life and sometimes are used both as a matter of
B
convenience and of meaningfulness. Besides, how far a clause which
follows upon a comma governs every clause that precedes the comma
is a matter not free from doubt. This Court observed that:
“5. Since the sole question for consideration arising out of
the FIR, as laid, is whether the accused are conducting a
money circulation scheme, it is necessary to understand what C
is comprehended within the statutory meaning of that
expression. Section 2(c) of the Act provides:
“2. (c) ‘money circulation scheme’ means any scheme, by
whatever name called, for the making of quick or easy money,
or for the receipt of any money or valuable thing as the D
consideration for a promise to pay money, on any event or
contingency relative or applicable to the enrolment of members
into the scheme, whether or not such money or thing is derived
from the entrance money of the members of such scheme or
periodical subscriptions;” E
Grammar and punctuation are hapless victims of the pace of
life, and I prefer in this case not to go merely by the commas
used in clause (c) because, though they seem to me to have
been placed both as a matter of convenience and of
meaningfulness, yet, a more thoughtful use of commas and F
other gadgets of punctuation would have helped make the
meaning of the clause clear beyond controversy. Besides, how
far a clause which follows upon a comma governs every clause
that precedes the comma is a matter not free from doubt. I,
therefore, consider it more safe and satisfactory to discover
the true meaning of clause (c) by having regard to the G
substance of the matter as it emerges from the object and
purpose of the Act, the context in which the expression is
used and the consequences necessarily following upon the

130
(1982) 1 SCC 561 H
196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A acceptance of any particular interpretation of the provision,
the contravention of which is visited by penal consequences.”
182. The present case involves placement of colon preceding to
the Proviso to Section 24 (2) and not Section 24 (1), which ends with a
full stop, and it makes sense and the true meaning where Parliament has
B placed it. The proviso is part of section 24(2). It is not permissible to
alter the provision and to read it as a proviso to section 24(1)(b), mainly
when it makes sense where Parliament so placed it. To read the proviso
as part of section 24(1)(b), will create repugnancy which the provisions
contained in section 24(1)(b). The window period of 5 years is provided
to complete the acquisition proceedings where the award has been
C passed, and the provisions of the Act of 1894 shall be applied as if it has
not been repealed. Section 24(2) starts with a non-obstante clause; it
plainly is notwithstanding Section 24 (1), and the proviso to section 24(2)
enlarges the scope of section 24(2). When the window period has been
provided under section 24(1)(b), i.e., section 24(2) and its proviso, higher
D compensation cannot follow in case of an award which has been passed
within 5 years of the enactment of the Act of 2013 otherwise anomalous
results shall accrue. In case proviso is read as a part of section 24(1)(b),
it would be repugnant to the consideration of the provision which has
been carved out saving acquisition and providing window period of 5
years to complete the acquisition proceedings. There were cases under
E the Act of 1894, in which award may have been made in December
2013, a few days before the Act was enforced on 1.1.2014. As the
provisions of the Act of 1894 are applicable to such awards, obviously
notice of the award has to be given under Section 12 of the said Act.
There is no question of outright deposit. In such event as the deposit is to
F be made when the Collector is prevented by the exigencies specified in
Section 31(2) from making payment. The deposit is not contemplated
directly either in the court or the treasury, as the case may be as provided
in section 31(2), corresponding to section 77(2) of the Act of 2013.
183. The proviso relates to the non-payment. Compensation is
G deposited when the Collector is prevented from making payment. It is
the obligation made under section 31(1) to tender the amount and pay
unless prevented by the contingencies specified in section 31(2). Thus,
the deposit has a co-relation with the expression “payment has not been
made,” and the proviso makes sense with Section 24 (2) only. In case of
non-payment or prevention from payment, compensation is required to
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 197
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

be deposited as the case may be in the Reference Court or otherwise in A
Treasury, if permissible.
184. The proviso uses the expression that the amount is to be
deposited in the account of beneficiaries. Earlier under the Act of 1894,
there was no such provision for depositing the amount in the bank account
of beneficiaries but the method which was used as per the forms which B
were prescribed to deposit the amount, it was credited to the Reference
Court or in the Treasury in the names of the beneficiaries and as against
the award. It was not a separate account but an account of the Reference
Court or set apart in the treasury. The proviso has to be interpreted and
given the meaning with Section 24(2) as an amount was required to be
paid and on being prevented had to be deposited as envisaged under the C
Act of 1894.
185. If we hold that even if the award has been passed within 5
years and the compensation amount has not been deposited with respect
to such an award passed in the window period, higher compensation to
follow if it is not deposited with respect to the majority of the holdings D
would amount to re-writing the statute. The provision of section 24(1)(a)
is clear if an award has not been passed, higher compensation to follow.
No lapse is provided. In case award has been passed within the window
period of section 24(1)(b), inter alia, the provisions for compensation
would be that of the Act of 1894. The only exception to section 24(1) is E
created by the non-obstante clause in section 24(2) by providing that in
case the requisite steps have not been taken for 5 years or more, then
there is lapse as a negative condition. The proviso contemplates higher
compensation, in case compensation has not been paid, and the amount
has not been deposited with respect to the majority of the holdings, to all
the beneficiaries under the Act of 2013, who were holding land on the F
date of notification under Section 4. If the proviso is added, section
24(1)(b) will destroy the very provision of section 24(1)(b) providing
proceedings to continue under the Act of 1894, which is not the function
of the proviso to substitute the main Section but to explain it. It is not to
cause repugnancy with the main provision. The function of the proviso G
is to explain or widen the scope. It is a settled proposition of law that the
proviso cannot travel beyond the provision to which it is attached. The
proviso would travel beyond the Act of 1894 as it is the intention of
section 24(1)(b) the proceedings to govern by the Act of 1894. Thus, the
proviso has no space to exist with section 24(1)(b), and it has rightly not
H
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A been attached by Parliament, with Section 24(2) and has been placed at
the right place where it should have been.
186. It is in the cases where there is no lapse under section 24(2)
if either step has been taken proviso operates to provide higher
compensation. In the cases where possession has been taken, but the
B amount has not been deposited as required under the proviso, higher
compensation to all the beneficiaries has to follow as once possession
has been taken, the land is vested in the State and payment is necessary
for any acquisition. As such, Parliament has provided in such cases higher
compensation to follow as envisaged in the proviso to section 24(2).
Lapse of acquisition is provided only in the exigencies where possession
C has not been taken, nor compensation has been paid in the proceedings
for acquisition pending as on the date on which the Act of 2013 came
into force, then the State Government has to initiate fresh proceedings if
it so desires. The proviso is part of the scheme of section 24(2), and the
entire provision of section 24(2), including the proviso, operates when
D inaction is there for a period of 5 years or more, as contemplated therein.
187. The fundamental consideration is that the proviso cannot
supersede the main provision of section 24(1)(b) and destroy it. The
function of the proviso is to except out the pressing provisions to which
it is attached. In case possession has been taken, but only a few
E beneficiaries have been paid, there is no lapse. Even if nobody has been
paid, there is no lapse once possession has been taken. In case
compensation has not been deposited with respect to the majority of the
holdings, there is no lapse, but higher compensation to all the beneficiaries
has to follow. The provision provides equal treatment to all, not only to a
few- and, in effect, is similar to Section 28A of the Act of 1894- in case
F the obligation to pay or deposit has not been discharged and there is no
arrangement of money to discharge the obligation either by paying or
depositing in the Reference Court and, if permissible, in the treasury.
Section 24(2) saves land which has been vested in the State, once award
has been passed and possession of land. However, in case compensation
G has not been deposited with respect to majority of landowners, in any
given award, all beneficiaries have to be paid higher compensation under
the new Act.
188. It was urged that section 24(1) and 24(2) deal with different
subjects. It was submitted that Section 24(1) deals with compensation,
H whereas section 24(2) deals with the lapsing of the acquisition. We are
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 199
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

unable to accept the submission. Section 24(2) also deals with payment A
of compensation and taking of possession. Section 24(1)(a) is concerning
a situation where no award has been made, higher compensation under
the new Act to follow. In section 24(1)(b) where the award is made (at
the time of coming into force of the new Act) further proceedings would
be under the new law; subject to Section 24(2), the provisions of the Act
B
of 1894 would apply to such an award. Thus, the main part of section
24(2) deals with payment of compensation; also the proviso which
provides for higher compensation to be paid to all is in the context of
section 24(2) and cannot be lifted and added to Section 24(1)(b) in the
aforesaid circumstances. What would be the majority of the landholdings
has to be seen in the context, what has been acquired in the case of a C
single plot being acquired, and in case compensation has not been
deposited with respect to that, it will constitute the majority. The majority
does not depend upon the number of holdings acquired, but what
constitutes the majority as per the acquired area under the notification.
189. Section 24(1)(a) operates where no award is made in a D
pending acquisition proceeding; in such event all provisions of the new
Act relating to determination of compensation would apply. Section 24
(1) (b) logically continues with the second situation, i.e. where the award
has been passed, and states that in such event, proceedings would
continue under the Act of 1894. Section 24 (2) – by way of an exception,
states that where an award is made but requisite steps have not been E
taken for five years or more to take possession nor compensation has
been paid then there is lapse of acquisition. If one of the steps has been
taken, then the proviso can operate. Time is the essence. It is on the
basis of time-lag that the lapse is provided and in default of payment for
five years as provided on failure to deposit higher compensation is to be F
paid. It is based on that time-lag higher compensation has to follow. It is
not the mere use of colon under section 24(2) but the placement of the
proviso next to Section 24 (2) and not below Section 24(1)(b). Thus, it is
not permissible to alter a placement of proviso more so when it is fully in
consonance with the provisions of section 24(2). Section 24(2) completely
obliterates the old regime to the effect of its field of operation. Under G
section 24(1)(a), there is a partial lapse of the old regime because all
proceedings, till the stage of award are preserved. The award, in such
proceedings, made after coming into force of the Act of 2013 has to
take into account its provisions, for determination of compensation. Thus,
proceedings upto the stage of the award are deemed final under the old
H
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A Act. In the case under section 24(1)(b), the old regime prevails. The
proviso is an exception to section 24(2) and in part the new regime for
payment of higher compensation in case of default for 5 years or more
after award.
In re: Proviso to be read as part of provision it is appended
B 190. A proviso has to be construed as a part of the clause to
which it is appended. A proviso is added to a principal provision to which
it is attached. It does not enlarge the enactment. In case the provision is
repugnant to the enacting part, the proviso cannot prevail. Though in
absolute terms of a later Act. Its placement has been considered, and
C purpose has been considered in the following decisions. It was observed
in State of Rajasthan v. Leela Jain & Ors that131:
“14. . . . So far as a general principle of construction of a
proviso is concerned, it has been broadly stated that the
function of a proviso is to limit the main part of the section
and carve out something which but for the proviso would have
D been within the operative part. ….”
(emphasis supplied)
Similarly, this court in Sales-tax Officer, Circle 1, Jabalpur v.
Hanuman Prasad132 stated that:
E “5. …. It is well-recognised that a proviso is added to a
principal clause primarily with the object of taking out of the
scope of that principal clause what is included in it and what
the Legislature desires should be excluded. ….”
(emphasis supplied)
F In Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Board of Revenue,
Madras and Anr. v. Ramkishan Shrikishan Jhaver etc 133 it was
observed:
“8. … Generally speaking, it is true that the proviso is an
exception to the main part of the section; but it is recognised
G that in exceptional cases a proviso may be a substantive
provision itself. ….”
(emphasis supplied)
131
1965 (1) SCR 276
132
1967 (1) SCR 831
133
H AIR (1968) SC 59
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 201
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

191. In S. Sundaram Pillai & Ors. v. V.R. Pattabiraman & A
Ors134 , the scope of a proviso was clarified. The relevant discussion is
quoted as under:
“27. The next question that arises for consideration is as to
what is the scope of a proviso and what is the ambit of an
Explanation either to a proviso or to any other statutory B
provision. We shall first take up the question of the nature,
scope and extent of a proviso. The well established rule of
interpretation of a proviso is that a proviso may have three
separate functions. Normally, a proviso is meant to be an
exception to something within the main enactment or to qualify
something enacted therein which but for the proviso would C
be within the purview of the enactment. In other words, a
proviso cannot be torn apart from the main enactment nor
can it be used to nullify or set at naught the real object of the
main enactment.”
*** D
“29. Odgers in Construction of Deeds and Statutes (5th Edn.)
while referring to the scope of a proviso mentioned the
following ingredients:
“P. 317. Provisos —These are clauses of exception or
qualification in an Act, excepting something out of, or E
qualifying something in, the enactment which, but for the
proviso, would be within it.
P. 318. Though framed as a proviso, such a clause may
exceptionally have the effect of a substantive enactment.”
F
30. Sarathi in Interpretation of Statutes at pages 294-295 has
collected the following principles in regard to a proviso:
(a) When one finds a proviso to a section the natural
presumption is that, but for the proviso, the enacting part of
the section would have included the subject-matter of the
proviso. G
(b) A proviso must be construed with reference to the
preceding parts of the clause to which it is appended.

134
(1985) 1 SCC 591 H
202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A (c) Where the proviso is directly repugnant to a section, the
proviso shall stand and be held a repeal of the section as the
proviso speaks the latter intention of the makers.
(d) Where the section is doubtful, a proviso may be used as a
guide to its interpretation: but when it is clear, a proviso cannot
B imply the existence of words of which there is no trace in the
section.
(e) The proviso is subordinate to the main section.
(f) A proviso does not enlarge an enactment except for
compelling reasons.
C
(g) Sometimes an unnecessary proviso is inserted by way of
abundant caution.
(h) A construction placed upon a proviso which brings it into
general harmony with the terms of section should prevail.
D (i) When a proviso is repugnant to the enacting part, the proviso
will not prevail over the absolute terms of a later Act directed
to be read as supplemental to the earlier one.
(j) A proviso may sometimes contain a substantive provision.
***
E
35. A very apt description and extent of a proviso was given
by Lord Loreburn in Rhondda Urban District Council v. Taff
Vale Railway Co., 1909 AC 253, where it was pointed out that
insertion of a proviso by the draftsman is not always strictly
adhered to its legitimate use and at times a section worded as
F a proviso may wholly or partly be in substance a fresh
enactment adding to and not merely excepting something out
of or qualifying what goes before. To the same effect is a
later decision of the same Court in Jennings v. Kelly, 1940
AC 206, where it was observed thus:
G “We must now come to the proviso, for there is, I think, no
doubt that, in the construction of the section, the whole of it
must be read, and a consistent meaning, if possible, given to
every part of it. The words are:... ‘provided that such licence
shall be granted only for premises situate in the ward or district
H electoral division in which such increase in population has
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 203
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

taken place...’ There seems to be no doubt that the words “such A
increase in population” refer to the increase of not less than
25 per cent of the population mentioned in the opening words
of the section.”
36. While interpreting a proviso care must be taken that it is
used to remove special cases from the general enactment and B
provide for them separately.
37. In short, generally speaking, a proviso is intended to limit
the enacted provision so as to except something which would
have otherwise been within it or in some measure to modify
the enacting clause. Sometimes a proviso may be embedded C
in the main provision and becomes an integral part of it so as
to amount to a substantive provision itself.
***
43. We need not multiply authorities after authorities on this
point because the legal position seems to be clearly and D
manifestly well established. To sum up, a proviso may serve
four different purposes:
(1) qualifying or excepting certain provisions from the main
enactment:
E
(2) it may entirely change the very concept of the intendment
of the enactment by insisting on certain mandatory conditions
to be fulfilled in order to make the enactment workable:
(3) it may be so embedded in the Act itself as to become an
integral part of the enactment and thus acquire the tenor and
F
colour of the substantive enactment itself; and
(4) it may be used merely to act as an optional addenda to the
enactment with the sole object of explaining the real intendment
of the statutory provision.”
(emphasis supplied) G
th
192. Craies on Statute Law, 7 Edn., has observed, with respect
to the construction of provisos thus:
“The effect of an excepting or qualifying proviso, according
to the ordinary rules of construction, is to except out of the
H
204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A preceding portion of the enactment, or to qualify something
enacted therein, which but for the proviso would be within it;
and such a proviso cannot be construed as enlarging the scope
of an enactment when it can be fairly and properly construed
without attributing to it that effect.”
B (emphasis supplied)
R. v. Dibdin, 1910 P 57 (CA), held as under:
“The fallacy of the proposed method of interpretation is
not far to seek. It sins against the fundamental rule of
construction that a proviso must be considered with relation
C to the principal matter to which it stands as a proviso. It
treats it as if it were an independent enacting clause instead
of being dependent on the main enactment. The courts … have
refused to be led astray by arguments such as those which
have been addressed to us, which depend solely on taking
words absolutely in their strict literal sense, disregarding the
D fundamental consideration that they are appearing in the
proviso.”
(emphasis supplied)
193. Ishverlal Thakorelal Almaula v. Motibhai Nagjibhai135,
E considered the effect of a proviso and said that its function is “to except
or qualify something enacted in the substantive clause, which but
for the proviso would be within that clause. It may ordinarily be
presumed in construing a proviso that it was intended that the
enacting part of the section would have included the subject-matter
of the proviso.” Similar observations and considerations weighed in
F Haryana State Cooperative Land Development Bank Ltd. v.
Haryana State Cooperative Land Development Banks Employees
Union & Anr.136 and other decisions noted below.137 In Subhaschandra
Yograj Sinha (supra) it was observed that :
135
1966 (1) SCR 367
G 136
(2004) 1 SCC 574
137
Shimbhu & Anr. v. State of Haryana, (2014) 13 SCC 318; Kedarnath Jute
Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. The Commercial Tax Officer and Ors., 1965 (3) SCR 626.
Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills & Ginning Factory v. Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha,
AIR 1961 SC 1596; Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf, 1976 (1) SCC 128; The
Commissioner of Income-tax, Mysore, Travancore-Cochin and Coorg, Bangalore v.
The Indo Mercantile Bank Ltd., 1959 (Supp 2) SCR 256 In Romesh Kumar Sharma v.
H Union of India and Ors., (2006) 6 SCC 510.
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 205
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

“(9) The law with regard to provisos is well settled and well A
understood. As a general rule, a proviso is added to an
enactment to qualify or create an exception to what is in the
enactment, and ordinarily, a proviso is not interpreted as
stating a general rule. But, provisos are often added not as
exceptions or qualifications to the main enactment but as
savings clauses, in which cases they will not be construed as B
controlled by the section. The proviso which has been added
to Section 50 of the Act deals with the effect of repeal. The
substantive part of the section repealed two Acts which were
in force in the State of Bombay. If nothing more had been
said, Section 7 of the Bombay General clauses Act would have C
applied, and all pending suits and proceedings would have
continued under the old law, as if the repealing Act had not
been passed. The effect of the proviso was to take the matter
out of Section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act and to
provide for a special saving. It cannot be used to decide
whether Section 12 of the Act is retrospective. It was observed D
by Wood, V.C., in Fitzgerald v. Champneys, (1861) 70 ER 958
that saving clauses are seldom used to construe Acts. These
clauses are introduced into Acts which repeal others, to
safeguard rights which, but for the savings, would be lost.
The proviso here saves pending suits and proceedings, and
further enacts that suits and proceedings then pending are to E
be transferred to the courts designated in the Act and are to
continue under the Act and any or all the provisions of the
Act are to apply to them. The learned Solicitor-General
contends that the savings clause enacted by the proviso, even
if treated as substantive law, must be taken to apply only to F
suits and proceedings pending at the time of the repeal which,
but for the proviso, would be governed by the Act repealed.
According to the learned Attorney-General, the effect of the
savings is much wider, and it applies to such cases as come
within the words of the proviso, whenever the Act is extended
to new areas.” G
(emphasis supplied)
194. In Motiram Ghelabhai v. Jagan Nagar & Ors138, the view
taken in Bhojraj (supra) was affirmed and applied. It was observed
138
(1985) 2 SCC 279 H
206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A that provisos are often added not as exceptions or qualifications to the
main enactment but as savings clauses, in which case they will not be
construed as controlled by the section. In Madhu Gopal v. VI Additional
District Judge & Ors.139 this Court has laid down that in any event, it is
a well-settled principle of construction that unless clearly indicated, a
proviso would not take away substantive rights given by the section or
B the sub-section. In The King v. Dominion Engineering Co. Ltd.140, it
was held that where a section of an enactment contains two provisions
and the second proviso is repugnant in any way to the first, the
second proviso must prevail for it stands last in the enactment and
speaks the last intention of the makers. The following observations
C were made:
“(7) Proviso 2 qualifies the main enactment in the matter of
delivery no less than does proviso 1 and it also qualifies proviso
1 itself. For it provides “further” that “in any case where
there is no physical delivery of the goods,” the tax is to be
D payable when the property in the goods passes to the
purchaser. Thus where there is no physical delivery the
notional delivery which proviso 1 introduces is rendered
inapplicable. Anger J. found in proviso 2 an alternative
ground for his decision against the Crown and it is the main
ground of Hudson J.’s judgment in the Supreme Court. In
E their Lordships’ view this proviso presents an insuperable
obstacle to the Crown’s claim. There has been no physical
delivery of the goods by the Dominion Company to the Pulp
Company. The proviso enacts that “in any case” where there
has been no physical delivery the tax is to be payable when
F the property passes. The property in the goods in question
has never passed to the Pulp Company. Consequently the
tax has nevern become payable. If proviso 2 is repugnant in
any way to proviso 1 it must prevail for it stands last in the
enactment and so to quote Lord Tenterden C.J., “speaks the
last intention of the maker” ((1831), 2 B. & Ad. 818 at p.821).
G The word is with the respondent, the Dominion Company, and
must prevail.”

139
1988 (4) SCC 644
140
H AIR (34) 1947 PC 94
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 207
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

195. The proviso thus, is not foreign to compensation to be paid A
under section 24(2). It provides what is dealt with in Section 24(2) and
takes to its logical conclusion, and provides for higher compensation,
where there is and can be no lapsing of acquisition proceedings. The
rule of construction- as is clear from the preceding case law discussed,
is that the proviso should be limited in its operation to the subject-matter
B
in a clause. A proviso is ordinarily a proviso and has to be harmoniously
construed with the provisions. In our opinion, the proviso is capable of
being harmoniously construed with Section 24(2) and not with section
24(1)(b), once we interpret the word ‘or’ as ‘nor’ in section 24(2).
196. In keeping with the ratio in the aforesaid decisions, this court
is of the considered view that the proviso cannot nullify the provision of C
Section 24(1)(b) nor can it set at naught the real object of the enactment,
but it can further by providing higher compensation, thus dealing with
matters in Section 24 (2). Therefore, in effect, where award is not made
[Section 24 (1)(a)] as well as where award is made but compensation is
not deposited in respect of majority of the landowners in a notification D
(for acquisition) [i.e. proviso to Section 24 (2)] compensation is payable
in terms of the new Act, i.e., Act of 2013.
197. For the aforesaid reasons, considering the placement of the
proviso, semi-colon having been used at the end of section 24(2),
considering the interpretation of section 24(1)(b) and the repugnancy E
which would be caused in case the proviso is lifted which is not permissible
and particularly when we read the word ‘or’ as ‘nor’ in section 24(2), it
has to be placed where the legislature has legislated it, it has not been
wrongly placed as part of section 24(2) but is intended for beneficial
results of higher compensation for one and all where there is no lapse,
but amount not deposited as required. Higher compensation is F
contemplated by the Act of 2013, which intention is fully carried forward
by the placement and interpretation.
In re: What is the meaning to be given to the word “paid”
used in section 24(2) and “deposited” used in the proviso to
section 24(2) G
198. Connected with this issue are questions like what is the
consequence of payment not being made under section 31(1) and what
are the consequences of amount not deposited under section 31(2). The
provision of section 24(2) when it provides that compensation has not
H
208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A been paid where award has been made 5 years or more prior to the
commencement of the Act of 2013. In contradistinction to that, the proviso
uses the expression “an award has been made and compensation in
respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the
account of the beneficiaries”. We have to find out when an amount is
required to be deposited under the Act of 1894 and how the payment is
B
made under the Act of 1894. The provisions of Section 31 of the Act of
1894 are attracted to the interpretation of provisions of section 24(2) to
find out the meaning of the words ‘paid’ and ‘deposited’. Section 31(1)
makes it clear that on passing of award compensation has to be tendered
to the beneficiaries and Collector shall pay it to them. The payment is
C provided only in section 31(1). The expression ‘tender’ and pay to them
in section 31(1) cannot include the term ‘deposited.’
199. Section 31 (2) of the Act of 1894 deals with deposit in case
Collector is ‘prevented’ from making payment by one or more
contingencies mentioned in section 31(2). The deposit follows if the
D Collector is prevented from making payment. In case Collector is
prevented from making payment due to contingencies such refusal to
receive the amount, or if there be no person competent to alienate the
land, or if there is a dispute as to the title to receive the compensation or
as to the apportionment of it, he (i.e. the Collector) may withhold it or in
case there is dispute as to apportionment, he may ask the parties to get
E a decision from the Reference Court i.e., civil court and to clear the title.
In such exigencies, the amount of compensation is required to be deposited
in the court to which reference would be submitted under section 18.
Section 31(2) requires deposit in case of reference under section 18 and
not the reference, which may be sought under section 30 or section 28A
F of the Act of 1894.
200. Section 24(2) deals with the expression where compensation
has not been paid. It would mean that it has not been tendered for
payment under section 31(1). Though the word ‘paid’ amounts to a
completed event however once payment of compensation has been
G offered/tendered under section 31(1), the acquiring authority cannot be
penalized for non-payment as the amount has remained unpaid due to
refusal to accept, by the landowner and Collector is prevented from
making the payment. Thus, the word ‘paid’ used in section 24(2) cannot
be said to include within its ken ‘deposit’ under section 31(2). For that
special provision has been carved out in the proviso to section 24(2),
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 209
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

which deals with the amount to be deposited in the account of A
beneficiaries. Two different expressions have been used in section 24.
In the main part of section 24, the word ‘paid’ and in its proviso ‘deposited’
have been used.
201. The consequence of non-deposit of the amount has been
dealt with in section 34 of the Act of 1894. As per section 24(2), if the B
amount has not been paid nor possession has been taken, it provides for
lapse. Whereas the proviso indicates amount has not been deposited
with respect to a majority of land holdings in a case initiated under the
Act of 1894 for 5 years or more. The period of five years need not have
been specified in the proviso as it is part of section 24(2) and has to be
read with it, particularly in view of the colon and placement by the C
legislature as held above. Two different consequences of non-deposit of
compensation are: (i) higher compensation in a case where possession
has been taken, payment has been made to some and amount has not
been deposited with respect to majority of the holdings, (ii) in case there
is no lapse, the beneficiaries would be entitled to interest as envisaged D
under section 34 from the date of taking possession at the rate of 9%
per annum for the first year and after that @ 15% per annum.
202. The word “paid” has been defined in the Oxford Dictionary
to mean thus:
“paid past and past participle of pay”; Give a sum of money E
thus owned.”
Cambridge English Dictionary, defines “paid” as follows:
“being given money for something.”
P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s Advance Law Lexicon, 3rd Edition, 2005, F
uses the following definition of “paid”:
“applied; settled: satisfied.”
203. The word “paid” in Section 31(1) to the landowner cannot
include in its ambit the expression “deposited” in court. Deposit cannot
be said to be payment made to landowners. Deposit is on being prevented G
from payment. However, in case there is a tender of the amount that is
to mean amount is made available to the landowner that would be a
discharge of the obligation to make the payment and in that event such a
person cannot be penalised for the default in making the payment. In
default to deposit in court, the liability is to make the payment of interest H
210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A under Section 34 of Act of 1894. Sections 32 and 33 (which had been
relied upon by the landowners’ counsel to say that valuable rights inhere,
in the event of deposit with court, thus making deposit under Section 31
mandatory) provide for investing amounts in the Government securities,
or seeking alternative lands, in lieu of compensation, etc. Such deposits,
cannot fetch higher interest than the15 per cent contemplated under
B
Section 34, which is pari materia to Section 80 of Act of 2013. Section
34 is pari materia to section 80 of Act of 2013 in which also the similar
rate of interest has been specified. Even if the amount is not deposited in
Reference Court nor with the treasury as against the name of the person
interested who is entitled to receive it, if Collector has been prevented to
C make the payment due to exigencies provided in Section 31(2), interest
to be paid. However, in case the deposit is made without tendering it to
the person interested, the liability to pay the interest under section 34,
shall continue. Even assuming deposit in the Reference Court is taken to
be mandatory, in that case too interest has to follow as specified in section
34. However, acquisition proceeding cannot lapse due to non-deposit.
D
204. The concept of “deposit” is different and quite apart from
the word “paid”, due to which, lapse is provided in Section 24 of Act of
2013. In the case of non-deposit for the majority of landholdings, higher
compensation would follow as such word “paid” cannot include in its
ambit word “deposited”. To hold otherwise would be contrary to
E provisions contained in Section 24(2) and its proviso carrying different
consequences. It is provided in Section 34 of Act of 1894, in case payment
has not been tendered or paid, nor deposited the interest has to be paid
as specified therein. In Section 24(2) also lapse is provided in case amount
has not been paid and possession has not been taken.
F 205. In our considered opinion, there is a breach of obligation to
deposit even if it is taken that amount to be deposited in the reference
court in exigencies being prevented from payment as provided in Section
31(2). The default will not have the effect of reopening the concluded
proceedings. The legal position and consequence which prevailed from
G 1893 till 2013 on failure to deposit was only the liability for interest and
all those transactions were never sought to be invalidated by the provisions
contained in Section 24. It is only in the case where in a pending
proceeding for a period of five years or more, the steps have not been
taken for taking possession and for payment of compensation, then there
is a lapse under section 24(2). In case amount has not been deposited
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 211
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

with respect to majority of land holdings, higher compensation has to A
follow. Both lapse and higher compensation are qualified with the
condition of period of 5 years or more.
206. It was submitted that mere tender of amount is not payment.
The amount has to be actually paid. In our opinion, when amount has
been tendered, the obligation has been fulfilled by the Collector. B
Landowners cannot be forced to receive it. In case a person has not
accepted the amount wants to take the advantage of non-payment, though
the amount has remained due to his own act. It is not open to him to
contend that amount has not been paid to him, as such, there should be
lapse of the proceedings. Even in a case when offer for payment has
been made but not deposited, liability to pay amount along with interest C
subsist and if not deposited for majority of holding, for that adequate
provisions have been given in the proviso also to Section 24(2). The
scheme of the Act of 2013 in Sections 77 and 80 is also the same as that
provided in Sections 31 and 34 of the Act of 1894.
207. It was urged that landowners can seek investment in an D
interest bearing account, there is no doubt about that investment can be
sought from the court under Sections 32 and 33 of Act of 1894, but
interest in Government securities is not more than what is provided in
section 34 at the rate of 9 percent from the date of taking possession for
one year and thereafter, at the rate of 15 percent. We take judicial notice E
of the fact in no other Government security rate of interest is higher on
the amount being invested under sections 32 and 33 of the Act of 1894.
Higher rate of interest is available under section 34 to the advantage of
landowners. It was submitted that in case the amount is deposited in the
court, it is on behalf of the beneficiary. The submission overlooks the
form in which it used to be deposited in the treasury too, that amount is F
also credited in the treasury payable to the beneficiary specified in his
name with land details, date of award, etc.
208. There is another reason why this court holds that such an
interpretation is reasonable and in tune with Parliamentary intent. Under
the old regime, it was open to the Collector to fix a convenient date or G
dates for announcement of award, and tender payment. In the event of
refusal by the landowner to receive, or in other cases, such as absence
of the true owner, or in case of dispute as to who was to receive it, no
doubt, the statute provided that the amount was to be deposited with the
court: as it does today, under Section 77. Yet, neither during the time H
212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A when the Act of 1894 was in operation, nor under the Act of 2013, the
entire acquisition does not lapse for non-deposit of the compensation
amount in court. This is a significant aspect which none of the previous
decisions have noticed. Thus, it would be incorrect to imply that failure
to deposit compensation [in court, under Section 31 (2)] would entail
lapse, if the amounts have not been paid for five years or more prior to
B
the coming into force of the Act of 2013. Such an interpretation would
lead to retrospective operation, of a provision, and the nullification of
acquisition proceedings, long completed, by imposition of a norm or
standard, and its application for a time when it did not exist.
209. If the expression “deposited” is held to be included in the
C expression “paid” used in Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, inconsistency
and repugnancy would be caused as between the proviso and the main
sub-section, which has to be avoided and the non-compliance of the
provisions of Section 31(2) is not fatal. Even if the amount has not been
deposited, higher compensation has to follow in the exigency proviso to
D Section 24(2).
210. In Black’s Law Dictionary, the word “tender” has been
defined to mean thus:
“tender, n. (16c) 1. A valid and sufficient offer of
performance; specific, an unconditional offer of money or
E performance to satisfy a debt or obligation a tender of
delivery. The tender may save the tendering party from a
penalty for non-payment or non-performance or may, if the
other party unjustifiably refuses the tender, place the other
party in default. Cf. OFFER OR
F PERFORMANCE; CONSIGNATION.”
211. It is apparent that “tender” of the amount saves the party
tendering it from the consequence to be visited on non-payment of the
amount. The obligation to make the payment has been considered in
various other laws and decisions. When obligation to payment is fulfilled
G as to the scheme in the context of a particular act, for that purpose,
decisions under various other laws are relevant and cannot be said to be
irrelevant.
212. In The Straw Board Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Saharanpur
v. Gobind141 , this Court considered the provisions requiring payment of
141
H 1962 (Supp 3) SCR 318
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 213
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

one month’s wage under Section 33 of Industrial Disputes Act for making A
a valid discharge or dismissal. This Court has held that the employer has
tendered the wages and that would amount for payment, otherwise a
workman can make the provision unworkable by refusing to take the
wages. This Court has observed thus:
“(8) Let us now turn to the words of the proviso in the B
background of what we have said above. The proviso lays
down that no workman shall be discharged or dismissed unless
he has been paid wages for one month and an application
has been made by the employer to the authority before which
the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken
by the employer. It will be clear that two kinds C
of punishment are subject to the conditions of the proviso,
namely, discharge or dismissal. Any other kind
of punishment is not within the proviso. Further
the proviso lays down two conditions, namely, (i) payment of
wages for one month and (ii) making of an application by the D
employer to the authority before which the proceeding is
pending for approval of the action taken. It is not disputed
before us that when the proviso lays down the conditions as
to payment of one month’s wages, all that the employer is
required to do in order to carry out that condition is to tender
the wages to the employee. But if the employee chooses not to E
accept the wages he cannot come forward and say that there
has been no payment of wages to him by the employer.
Therefore, though S. 33 speaks of payment of one month’s
wages it can only mean that the employer has tendered the
wages and that would amount to payment, for otherwise a F
workman could always make the section unworkable by
refusing to take the wages. So far as the second condition
about the making of the application is concerned, the proviso
requires that the application should be made for approval of
the action taken by the employer.”
G
(emphasis supplied)
213. In The Management of Delhi Transport Undertaking v.
The Industrial Tribunal, Delhi & Anr142, a three-Judge Bench of this
Court has laid down the law to the similar effect. It is not actual payment,
142
1965 (1) SCR 998 H
214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A but tender of amount which is necessary to fulfil obligation to pay. This
Court observed thus:
“4. …The proviso does not mean that the wages for one month
should have been actually paid, because in many cases the
employer can only tender the amount before the dismissal but
B cannot force the employee to receive the payment before
dismissal becomes effective. In this case the tender was
definitely made before the order of dismissal became effective
and the wages would certainly have been paid if Hari Chand
had asked for them. There was no failure to comply with the
provision in this respect.”
C
(emphasis supplied)
214. In Indian Oxygen Ltd. v. Narayan Bhoumik143, it was held
that the “the condition as to payment in the proviso does not mean
that wages have to be actually paid but if wages are tendered or
D offered, such a tender or offer would be sufficient compliance”
with the statute. The Benares State Bank Ltd. v. The Commissioner of
Income Tax, Lucknow144, was decided in the context of Section 14(2)(c)
of the Income Tax Act, 1922. It was observed that “paid” under Section
16 does not contemplate actual receipt of the dividend by the Member
of the community. It is to be made unconditionally available to the
E members entitled to it. It observed thus:
“5. …This Court observed in J. Dalmia v. Commissioner of
Income-tax, Delhi, 53 ITR 83 that the expression “paid” in
Section 16(2) does not contemplate actual receipt of the
dividend by the member: in general, dividend may be said to
F be paid within the meaning of Section 16(2) when the company
discharges its liability and makes the amount of dividend
unconditionally available to the member entitled thereto. …”
215. Two different expressions have been used in Section 24(2).
The expression “paid” has been used in Section 24(2) and whereas in
G the proviso “deposited” has been used. “Paid” cannot include “deposit”,
or else Parliament would have used different expressions in the main
sub-section and its proviso, if the meaning were to be the same. The
Court cannot add or subtract any word in the statute and has to give
143
(1968) 1 PLJR 94
144
H (1969) 2 SCC 316
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 215
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

plain and literal meaning and when compensation has not been paid under A
Section 24(2), it cannot mean compensation has not been deposited as
used in the proviso. While interpreting the statutory provisions, addition
or subtraction in the legislation is not permissible. It is not open to the
court to either add or subtract a word. There cannot be any departure
from the words of law, as observed in legal maxim “A Verbis Legis Non
B
Est Recedendum”. In Principles of Statutory Interpretation (14th Edition)
by Justice G.P. Singh, plethora of decisions have been referred. There is
a conscious omission of the word “deposit” in Section 24(2), which has
been used in the proviso. Parliament cannot be said to have used the
different words carrying the same meaning in the same provision, whereas
words “paid” and “deposited” carry a totally different meaning. Payment C
is actually made to the landowner and deposit is made in the court, that
is not the payment made to the landowner. It may be discharge of liability
of payment of interest and not more than that. Applying the rule of literal
construction also natural, ordinary and popular meaning of the words
“paid” and “deposited” do not carry the same meaning; the natural and
D
grammatical meaning has to be given to them, as observed in Principles
of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh (at page 91) thus:
“… Natural and grammatical meaning. The words of a statute
are first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense
and phrases and sentences are construed according to their
grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or E
unless there is something in the context, or in the object of
the statute to suggest the contrary.” “The true way”,
according to LORD BROUGHAM is, “to take the words as
the Legislature have given them, and to take the meaning which
the words given naturally imply, unless where the construction F
of those Words is, either by the preamble or by the context of
the words in question, controlled or alter “; and in the words
of VISCOUNT HALDANE, L.C., if the language used “has a
natural meaning we cannot depart from that meaning unless
reading the statute as a whole, the context directs us to do
so. In an oft-quoted passage, LORD WENSLEYDALE stated G
the Rule thus: “In construing wills and indeed statutes and
all written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sense
of the word is adhered to, unless that would lead to some
absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest
of the instrument in which case the grammatical and ordinary H
216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that
absurdity, and inconsistency, but no further”. And stated
LORD ATKINSON: “In the construction of statutes, their words
must be interpreted in their ordinary grammatical sense unless
there be something in the context, or in the object of the statute
in which they occur or in the circumstances in which they are
B
used, to show that they were used in a special sense different
from their ordinary grammatical sense”.
28 VISCOUNT SIMON, L.C., said: “The golden Rule is that
the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary
meaning”. Natural and ordinary meaning of words should
C not be departed from “unless it can be shown that the legal
context in which the words are used requires a different
meaning”. Such a meaning cannot be departed from by the
judges “in the light of their own views as to policy” although
they can “adopt a purposive interpretation if they can find in
the statute read as a whole or in material to which they are
D
permitted by law to refer as aids to interpretation an expression
of Parliament’s purpose or policy”. For a modern statement
of the rule, one may refer to the speech of LORD SIMON OF
GLAISDALE in a case where he said: “Parliament is prima
facie to be credited with meaning what is said in an Act
E of Parliament. The drafting of statutes, so important to a
people who hope to live under the Rule of law, will never be
satisfactory unless courts seek whenever possible to apply ’the
golden rule’ of construction, that is to read the statutory
language, grammatically and terminologically, in the ordinary
and primary sense which it bears in its context, without
F
omission or addition. Of course, Parliament is to be credited
with good sense; so that when such an approach produces
injustice, absurdity, contradiction or stultification of statutory
objective the language may be modified sufficiently to avoid
such disadvantage, though no further”. The Rules stated
G above have been quoted with approval by the Supreme
Court.......”
(emphasis supplied)
216. The same work also notes that when two different expressions
are used in the same provision of a statute, there is a presumption that
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 217
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

they are not used in the same sense. The following passage is relevant A
(Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh at page
395):
“.......When in relation to the same subject matter, different
words are used in the same statute, there is a presumption
that they are not used in the same sense. B
In construing the words ‘distinct matters’ occurring in
Section 5 of the Stamp Act, 1899, and in concluding that these
words have not the same meaning as the words ‘two or more
of the descriptions in Schedule I’ occurring in Section 6,
VENKATARAMA AIYAR, J., observed: “When two words of C
different import are used in a statute in two
consecutive provisions, it would be difficult to maintain that
they are used in the same sense.” Similarly, while construing
the word ‘gain’ Under Section 3(ff) of the Bombay
Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, which used the words
‘profit or gain’, the Supreme Court relied on the dictionary D
meanings of the words to hold that the word ‘gain’ is not
synonymous with the word ‘profit’ as it is not restricted to
pecuniary or commercial profits, and that any advantage or
benefit acquired or value addition made by some activities
would amount to ‘gain’.......” E
***14. Brighton Parish Guardians v. Strand Union
Guardians, (1891) 2 QB 156, p. 167 (CA); Member, Board
of Revenue v. Arthur Paul Benthall AIR 1956 SC 35, p. 38 :
1955 (2) SCR 842; CIT v. East West Import & Export (P.) Ltd.,
Jaipur AIR 1989 SC 836, p. 838 : (1989) 1 SCC 760; B.R. F
Enterprises v. State of U.P. AIR 1999 SC 1867, p. 1902: (1999)
9 SCC 700 (‘trade and business’ in Article 298 have different
meaning from ‘trade and commerce’ in Article 301); ShriIshal
Alloy Steels Ltd. v. JayaswalasNeco Ltd., JT 2001 (3) SC 114,
p. 119: (2001) 3 SCC 609 : AIR 2001 SC 1161 (The words ‘a
bank’ and ‘the bank’ in Section 138 N.I. Act, 1881 do not G
have the same meaning); The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. V.
Hansrajbhai v. Kodala AIR 2001 SC 1832, p. 1842 : (2001)
5 SCC 175; Kailash Nath Agarwal v. Pradeshiya Indust and
Inv. Corporation of U.P., 2003 AIR SCW 1358, p. 1365:
(2003) 4 SCC 305, p. 313. (The words ‘proceeding’ and ‘suit’ H
218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A used in the same Section construed differently); But in
Paramjeet Singh Pathak v. ICDS Ltd., (2006) 13 SCC 322:
AIR 2007 SC 168 different view was taken therefore in Zenith
Steel Tubes v. Sicom Ltd., (2008) 1 SCC 533: AIR 2008 SC
451 case referred to a larger Bench; D.L.F. Qutab Enclave
Complex Educational Charitable Trust v. State of Haryana,
B
2003 AIR SCW 1046, p. 1057: AIR 2003 SC 1648 : (2003) 5
SCC 622 (The expressions ‘at his own cost’ and ‘at its cost,’
used in one Section given different meanings)”
217. In Privy Council decisions in Crawford v. Spooner145 and
Lord Howard de Walden v. IRC & Anr146 following observations have
C been made:
“… we cannot aid the legislature’s defective phrasing of an
Act, we cannot add or mend and, by construction, makeup
deficiencies which are left there.
D …
It is contrary to all rules of construction to read words into
an Act unless it is necessary to do so. Similarly, it is wrong
and dangerous to proceed by substituting some other words
for words of the statute. Speaking briefly the court cannot
E reframe the legislation for the very good reason that it has no
power to legislate.”
218. In V.L.S. Finance Ltd. (supra) this Court observed that:
“17. Ordinarily, the offence is compounded under the
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the power
F to accord permission is conferred on the court excepting those
offences for which the permission is not required. However,
in view of the non-obstante clause, the power of composition
can be exercised by the court or the Company Law Board.
The legislature has conferred the same power on the Company
Law Board which can exercise its power either before or after
G
the institution of any prosecution whereas the criminal court
has no power to accord permission for composition of an
offence before the institution of the proceeding. The legislature
in its wisdom has not put the rider of prior permission of the
145
(1846) 6 Moore PC 1
H 146
(1948) 2 AER 825
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 219
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

court before compounding the offence by the Company Law A
Board and in case the contention of the appellant is accepted,
same would amount to addition of the words “with the prior
permission of the court” in the Act, which is not permissible.
18. As is well settled, while interpreting the provisions of a
statute, the court avoids rejection or addition of words and B
resorts to that only in exceptional circumstances to achieve
the purpose of the Act or give purposeful meaning. It is also
a cardinal rule of interpretation that words, phrases, and
sentences are to be given their natural, plain, and clear
meaning. When the language is clear and unambiguous, it
must be interpreted in an ordinary sense, and no addition or C
alteration of the words or expressions used is permissible. As
observed earlier, the aforesaid enactment was brought in view
of the need of leniency in the administration of the Act because
a large number of defaults are of technical nature, and many
defaults occurred because of the complex nature of the D
provision.
(emphasis supplied)
219. In Bharat Aluminium Company v. Kaiser Aluminium
Technical Services Inc.147 , this Court observed thus:
E
“65. Mr. Sorabjee has also rightly pointed out the
observations made by Lord Diplock in Duport Steels Ltd. v.
Sirs, (1980) 1 WLR 142. In the aforesaid judgment, the House
of Lords disapproved the approach adopted by the Court of
Appeal in discerning the intention of the legislature; it is
observed that: (WLR p. 157 C-D) F
“… the role of the judiciary is confined to ascertaining from
the words that Parliament has approved as expressing its
intention what that intention was, and to giving effect to it.
Where the meaning of the statutory words is plain and
unambiguous, it is not for the Judges to invent fancied G
ambiguities as an excuse for failing to give effect to its plain
meaning because they themselves consider that the
consequences of doing so would be inexpedient, or even
unjust or immoral. In controversial matters such as are
147
(2012) 9 SCC 552 H
220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A involved in industrial relations, there is room for differences
of opinion as to what is expedient, what is just and what is
morally justifiable. Under our Constitution it is Parliament’s
opinion on these matters that is paramount.”
(emphasis supplied)
B In the same judgment, it is further observed: (WLR p. 157 F)
“… But if this be the case it is for Parliament, not for the
judiciary, to decide whether any changes should be made to
the law as stated in the Acts….”

C (emphasis supplied)
***
67. We are unable to accept the submission of the learned
counsel for the appellants that the omission of the word “only”
from Section 2(2) indicates that applicability of Part I of the
D Arbitration Act, 1996 is not limited to the arbitrations that
take place in India. We are also unable to accept that Section
2(2) would make Part I applicable even to arbitrations which
take place outside India. In our opinion, a plain reading of
Section 2(2) makes it clear that Part I is limited in its
application to arbitrations which take place in India. We are
E
in agreement with the submissions made by the learned counsel
for the respondents, and the interveners in support of the
respondents, that Parliament by limiting the applicability of
Part I to arbitrations which take place in India has expressed
a legislative declaration. It has clearly given recognition to
F the territorial principle. Necessarily therefore, it has enacted
that Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996 applies to arbitrations
having their place/seat in India.
***
82. Another strong reason for rejecting the submission made
G by the learned counsel for the appellants is that if Part I were
to be applicable to arbitrations seated in foreign countries,
certain words would have to be added to Section 2(2). The
section would have to provide that “this part shall apply where
the place of arbitration is in India and to arbitrations having
H its place out of India.” Apart from being contrary to the
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 221
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

contextual intent and object of Section 2(2), such an A
interpretation would amount to a drastic and unwarranted
rewriting/alteration of the language of Section 2(2). As very
strongly advocated by Mr Sorabjee, the provisions in the
Arbitration Act, 1996 must be construed by their plain
language/terms. It is not permissible for the court while
B
construing a provision to reconstruct the provision. In other
words, the court cannot produce a new jacket, whilst ironing
out the creases of the old one. In view of the aforesaid, we
are unable to support the conclusions recorded by this Court
as noticed earlier.”
(emphasis supplied) C

220. In Harbhajan Singh (supra) the following observations were
made:
“7. …. Ordinary, grammatical and full meaning is to be
assigned to the words used while interpreting a provision to D
honour the rule — the legislature chooses appropriate words
to express what it intends, and therefore, must be attributed
with such intention as is conveyed by the words employed so
long as this does not result in absurdity or anomaly or unless
material — intrinsic or external — is available to permit a
departure from the rule.” E

(emphasis supplied)
221. In The Member, Board of Revenue v. Arthur Paul
Benthall148 this Court held as under:
“4. We are unable to accept the contention that the word F
“matter” in S. 5 was intended to convey the same meaning as
the word “description” in S. 6. In its popular sense, the
expression “distinct matters” would connote something
different from distinct “categories”. Two transactions might
be of the same description, but all the same, they might be
G
distinct.
If A sells Black-acre to X and mortgages White-acre to Y,
the transactions fall under different categories, and they are
also distinct matters. But if A mortgages Black-acre to X and
148
1955 (2) SCR 842 H
222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A mortgages White-acre to Y, the two transactions fall under
the same category, but they would certainly be distinct matters.
If the intention of the legislature was that the expression ‘distinct
matters’ in S. 5 should be understood not in its popular sense but
narrowly as meaning different categories in the Schedule, nothing
B would have been easier than to say so. When two words of different
import are used in a statute in two consecutive provisions, it would
be difficult to maintain that they are used in the same sense, and the
conclusion must follow that the expression “distinct matters” in S. 5
and “descriptions” in section 6 have different connotations.”

C (emphasis supplied)
222. In Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi v. M/s. East
West Import and Export (P) Ltd149, it was observed as under:
“7. The Explanation has reference to the point of time at two
places: the first one has been stated as “at the end of the
D previous year” and the second, which is in issue, is “in the
course of such previous year”. Counsel for the revenue has
emphasised upon the feature that in the same Explanation
reference to time has been expressed differently and if the
legislative intention was not to distinguish and while stating
“in the course of such previous year” it was intended to
E convey the idea of the last day of the previous year, there
would have been no necessity of expressing the position
differently. There is abundant authority to support the stand
of the counsel for the revenue that when the situation has
been differently expressed the legislature must be taken to
have intended to express a different intention.”
F
(emphasis supplied)
Several other decisions have reiterated the same proposition, i.e
that when the legislature uses two different expressions in the same
statute, they must be given different meanings, to carry out legislative
G intent.150
149
(1989) 1 SCC 760
150
B.R. Enterprises v. State of U.P. and Ors., (1999) 9 SCC 700; Kailash Nath Agarwal
and Ors. v. Pradeshiya Industrial & Investment Corporation of U.P. Ltd. and Anr.,
(2003) 4 SCC 305 (which interpreted “proceeding” and “suit” differently; In DLF
Qutab Enclave Complex Educational Charitable Trust v. State of Haryana and Ors.,
(2003) 5 SCC 622 (where “at his cost” and “at its cost” were interpreted to mean
H different situations.
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 223
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

223. The land owners had argued that the obligation to pay gets A
discharged only when compensation is actually paid and/or deposited.
Even if it is received under protest under Section 31(1), it is finally
accepted by the landowners post-settlement by the Reference Court.
We are not able to accept the submission as Section 34 of the Act of
1894, is clear even if the amount is not paid or deposited, it carries interest.
The logic behind this is that if the State is retaining the amount with B
peace and its liability to pay does not cease, but it would be liable to
make the payment with interest as envisaged therein. Once tender is
made, obligation to pay is fulfilled so that the amount cannot be said to
have been paid, but obligation to pay has been discharged and if a person
who has not accepted it, cannot penalise the other party for default to C
pay and non-deposit carries only interest as money had been retained
with the Government.
224. Thus, in our opinion, the word “paid” used in Section 24(2)
does not include within its meaning the word “deposited”, which has
been used in the proviso to Section 24(2). Section 31 of the Act of 1894,
D
deals with the deposit as envisaged in Section 31(2) on being ‘prevented’
from making the payment even if the amount has been deposited in the
treasury under the Rules framed under Section 55 or under the Standing
Orders, that would carry the interest as envisaged under Section 34, but
acquisition would not lapse on such deposit being made in the treasury.
In case amount has been tendered and the landowner has refused to E
receive it, it cannot be said that the liability arising from non-payment of
the amount is that of lapse of acquisition. Interest would follow in such a
case also due to non-deposit of the amount. Equally, when the landowner
does not accept the amount, but seeks a reference for higher
compensation, there can be no question of such individual stating that he
was not paid the amount (he was determined to be entitled to by the F
collector). In such case, the landowner would be entitled to the
compensation determined by the Reference court.
In re: Rules framed under Section 55 and the Standing
Orders issued by State Governments
G
225. It was urged on behalf of acquiring Authorities that various
State Governments have framed rules under Section 55 of the Act of
1894 and/or have issued the Standing Orders/instructions with respect
to the Government money under Article 283 of the Constitution of India.
These Standing Orders and Rules have remained in force from time
immemorial; their provisions require the amount to be tendered, notice H
224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A to be issued to the landowners to collect the amount of compensation
awarded to them. If they do not appear and apply to the reference under
Section 18, the officer shall cause the amounts due to be paid into the
treasury as revenue deposits payable to the persons to whom they are
respectively due and vouched for in the accompanying form (marked
E). When the payee ultimately claims the payment, they shall be paid in
B the same manner as ordinary revenue deposits. The Land Acquisition
(Bihar and Orissa) Rules were framed under Section 55 of the Act of
1894. Rule 10 thereof is extracted hereunder:
“10. In giving notice of the award under Section 12(2) and
tendering payment Under Section 31(1), to such of the persons
C interested as were not present personally or by their
representatives when the award was made, the officer shall
require them to appear personally or by representatives by a
certain date to receive payment of the compensation awarded
to them, intimating also that no interest will be allowed to
D them if they fail to appear. If they do not appear, and do not
apply for reference to the Civil Court Under Section 18, the
officer shall after any further endeavour to secure their
attendance that may seem desirable, cause the amounts due
to be paid into the Treasury as Revenue deposits payable to
the persons to whom they are respectively due and vouched
E for in the accompanying form (marked E). The officer shall
also give notice to the payees of such deposits, the Treasury
in which the deposits specifying have been made. When the
payees ultimately claim payment of sums placed in deposit,
the amounts will be paid to them in the same manner as
F ordinary revenue deposits. The officer should, as far as
possible, arrange to make the payments due in or near the
village to which the payees belong, in order that the number
of undisbursed sums to be placed in deposit on account of
non-attendance may be reduced to a minimum. Whenever
payment is claimed through a representative whether before
G or after deposit of the amount awarded, such representative,
must show legal authority for receiving the compensation on
behalf of his principal.”
(emphasis supplied)

H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 225
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

226. In the State of Assam, rules have also been framed under A
Section 55 of the Act of 1894, dealing with the deposit. Rule 9 provides
that in case reference is not sought under Section 18, the amount has to
be deposited in treasury. Rule 9 is extracted hereunder:
“9. In giving notice of the award Under Section 12(2) and
tendering payment Under Section 31(1), to such of the persons B
interested as were not present personally or by their
representatives when the award was made, the Collector shall
require them to appear personally or by representatives by a
certain date, to receive payment of the compensation awarded
to them intimating also that no interest will be allowed to them,
if they fail to appear. If they do not appear and do not apply C
for a reference to the Civil Court Under Section 18, he shall,
after any further endeavour to secure their attendance or
make payment that may seem desirable, cause the amounts
due to be paid into the WW as revenue deposits payable to
the persons to whom they are respectively due, and vouched D
for in the form prescribed or approved by Government from
time to time. He shall also give notice to the payees of such
deposits, specifying the Treasury in which the deposits have
been made. When the payees ultimately claim payment of sums
placed in deposit, the amount will be paid to them in the same
manner as ordinary revenue deposits. The Collector should, E
as far as possible, arrange to make the payment due in or
near the village to which the land pertains in order that the
number of undisbursed sum to be placed in deposit on account
of nonattendance may be reduced to a minimum. Whenever
payment is claimed through a representative, such F
representative, must show legal authority for receiving the
compensation on behalf of the principal.”
(emphasis supplied)
227. In the State of Karnataka too similar rules were framed in
1965 under Section 55 of the Act of 1894. Similarly, in the State of G
Kerala also Rule 14(2) of the Land Acquisition (Kerala) Rules, 1990
were framed under Section 55 of the Act of 1894, provided that payment
relating to award shall be made or the amount shall be credited to the
court or revenue deposit (treasury) within one month from the date of
the award. Similar rules were framed in the State of Bihar and Orissa. H
226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A 228. Standing Order No.28 was issued in 1909 by the State of
Punjab and was applicable to Delhi also, which provided five modes of
payment in para 74 and 75 thus:
“74. Methods of making payments.—There are five methods
of making payments:
B (1) By direct payments, see Para 75(I) infra
(2) By order on treasury, see Para 75(II) infra
(3) By money order, see Para 75(III) infra
(4) By cheque, see Para 75(IV) infra
C
(5) By deposit in a treasury, see Para 75(V) infra

75. Direct payments.— * * *
(V) By treasury deposit.— In giving notice of the award under
D Section 12(2) and tendering payment under Section 31(1) to
such of the persons interested as were not present personally
or by their representatives when the award was made, the
officer shall require them to appear personally or by
representatives by a certain date to receive payment of the
E compensation awarded to them, intimating also that no interest
will be allowed to them if they fail to appear, if they do not
appear and do not apply for a reference to the civil court
under Section 18, the officer shall after any further
endeavours to secure their attendance that may seem
desirable, cause the amounts due to be paid to the treasury
F as revenue deposits payable to the persons to whom they are
respectively due and vouched for in the form marked E below.
The officer shall also give notice to the payees of such
deposits, specifying the treasury in which the deposit has been
made. When the payees ultimately claim payment of sums
G placed in deposit, the amounts will be paid to them in the
same manner as ordinary revenue deposit. The officer should,
as far as possible, arrange to make the payments due in or
near the village to which the payee belong in order that the
number of undisbursed sums to be placed in deposits on
account of non-attendance may be reduced to a minimum.
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 227
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

Whenever payment is claimed through a representative A
whether before or after deposit of the amount awarded, such
representative, must have legal authority for receiving the
compensation on behalf of his principal.”

B

C

D

E

Sub-para (V) of the above made it clear that payment is credited
to the treasury when a person who is served with a notice under Section
12(2) of the Act of 1894, is not present and the award is passed. When
a notice is given to receive the payment of compensation and in case F
they fail to appear, the amount has to be paid to the treasury as revenue
deposit payable to the landowner.
229. Rules and the Standing Orders are binding on the concerned
Authorities and they have to follow them. They deposit the amounts in
court only when a reference (for higher compensation) is sought, not G
otherwise. Even if a person refuses to accept it and the amount is
deposited in court or even it is not tendered, only higher interest follows
under Section 34. Once Rules have prevailed since long and even if it is
assumed that deposit in court is mandatory on being prevented from
payment as envisaged under Section 31(1), the only liability to make the
H
228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A payment of higher interest is fastened upon the State. The liability to
pay the amount with interest would subsist. When amounts are deposited
in court, there would occur a procedural irregularity and the adverse
consequence envisaged is under Section 34 of the Act of 1894. The
consequence of non-deposit in the court is that the amount of the
landowner cannot be invested in the Government securities as envisaged
B
under Sections 32 and 33 of the Act of 1894, in which interest is not
more 15 per cent. Thus, no prejudice is caused to the landowners rather
they stand to gain and still payment is safe as it is kept in the court. We
have already held that there is a distinction between the expression “paid”
and “deposited”, thus the amount being deposited as per Rules in the
C treasury or as per the Standing Orders considering the scheme of Section
31 read with Section 34 of the Act of 1894, which are pari materia to
Sections 77 and 80 of the Act of 2013. We are of the considered opinion
that acquisition cannot be invalidated, only higher compensation would
follow in case amount has not been deposited with respect to majority of
land holdings, all the beneficiaries would be entitled for higher
D
compensation as envisaged in the proviso to Section 24(2).
230. Deposit in treasury in place of deposit in court causes no
prejudice to the landowner or any other stakeholder as their interest is
adequately safeguarded by the provisions contained in Section 34 of the
Act of 1894, as it ensures higher rate of interest than any other
E Government securities. Their money is safe and credited in the earmarked
quantified amount and can be made available for disbursement to him/
them. There is no prejudice caused and every infraction of law would
not vitiate the act.
231. In Jankinath Sarangi v. State of Orissa 151, this Court
F observed that every infraction of law would not vitiate the act. It has
further been observed that test is actual prejudice has been caused to a
person by the supposed denial to him of a particular right. Following
observations have been made:
“5. From this material it is argued that the principles of natural
G justice were violated because the right of the appellant to
have his own evidence recorded was denied to him and further
that the material which was gathered behind his back was
used in determining his guilt. In support of these contentions
a number of rulings are cited chief among which are State of
H 151
(1969) 3 SCC 392
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 229
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

Bombay v. Narul Latif Khan, (1965) 3 SCR 135; State of Uttar A
Pradesh v. Sri C.S. Sharma, (1967) 3 SCR 848 and Union of
India v. T.R. Varma, (1958) SCR 499. There is no doubt that if
the principles of natural justice are violated, and there is a
gross case, this Court would interfere by striking down the
order of dismissal, but there are cases and cases. We have to
B
look to what actual prejudice has been caused to a person
by the supposed denial to him of a particular right. Here the
question was a simple one, viz. whether the measurement book
prepared for the contract work had been properly scrutinised
and checked by the appellant or not. He did the checking in
March 1954 and immediately thereafter in May 1954 the C
Executive Engineer re-checked the measurements and found
that the previous checking had not been done properly.
Between March and May there could not be much rainfall, if
at all, and the marks of digging according to the witnesses
could not be obliterated during that time. It is however said
D
that at the 6th and 7th mile the checking was done in July
and by that time rains might have set in. Even so the witnesses
at the sites of the pits could not be so considerably altered as
to present a totally wrong picture. If anything had happened
the earth would have swollen rather than contracted by reason
of rain and the pits would have become bigger and not smaller. E
Anyway the questions which were put to the witnesses were
recorded and sent to the Chief Engineer and his replies were
received. No doubt the replies were not put in the hands of
the appellant but he saw them at the time when he was making
the representations and curiously enough he used those replies
F
in his defence. In other words, they were not collected behind
his back and could be used to his advantage and he had an
opportunity of so using them in his defence. We do not think
that any prejudice was caused to the appellant in this case by
not examining the two retired Superintending Engineers whom
he had cited or any one of them. The case was a simple one G
whether the measurement book had been properly checked.
The pleas about rain and floods were utterly useless and the
Chief Engineer’s elucidated replies were not against the
appellant. In these circumstances a fetish of the principles of
natural justice is not necessary to be made. We do not think
H
230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A that a case is made out that the principles of natural justice
are violated. The appeal must fail and is accordingly dismissed,
but we will make no order as to costs.”
(emphasis supplied)
232. In Sunil Kumar Banerjee v. State of West Bengal and
B Ors.,152 the Court observed:
“3. There is no substance in the contention of the appellant
that the 1955 Rules and not the 1969 Rules were followed. As
pointed out by the High Court, in the charges framed against
the appellant and in the first show cause notice the reference
C was clearly to the 1969 Rules. The appellant himself mentioned
in one of his letters that the charges have been framed under
the 1969 Rules. The enquiry report mentions that Shri
Mukherjee was appointed as an Enquiry Officer under the
1969 Rules. It is, however true that the appellant was not
D questioned by the Enquiry Officer under Rule 8(19) which
provided as follows:
“The enquiring authority may, after the member of the
services closes his case and shall if the member of the service
has not examined himself generally question him on the
E circumstances appearing against him in the evidence for the
purpose of enabling the member of the service to explain any
circumstances appearing in the evidence against him.”
It may be noticed straight away that this provision is akin to
Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898 and
F Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973. It is
now well established that mere non-examination or defective
examination under Section 342 of the 1898 Code is not a
ground for interference unless prejudice is established, vide,
K.C. Mathew v. State of Travancore-Cochin, AIR 1956 SC
24; Bibhuti Bhusan Das Gupta v. State of W.B., AIR 1969 SC
G 381 We are similarly of the view that failure to comply with
the requirements of Rule 8(19) of the 1969 Rules does not
vitiate the enquiry unless the delinquent officer is able to
establish prejudice. In this case the learned Single Judge the
High Court as well as the learned Judges of the Division Bench
H 152
(1980) 3 SCC 304
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 231
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

found that the appellant was in no way prejudiced by the A
failure to observe the requirement of Rule 8(19). The appellant
cross-examined the witnesses himself, submitted his defence
in writing in great detail and argued the case himself at all
stages. The appellant was fully alive to the allegations against
him and dealt with all aspects of the allegations in his written
B
defence. We do not think that he was in the least prejudiced
by the failure of the Enquiry Officer to question him in
accordance with Rule 8(19).
(emphasis supplied)”
A similar view has been taken in the State of Andhra Pradesh v. C
Thakkidiram Reddy153 and other decisions.
233. There is a dual obligation, namely, part mandatory and part
directory. In Howard v. Secretary of State for the Environment, (1975)
Q.B. 235, Lord Denning has cited a portion from the speech of Lord
Penzance, which is extracted hereunder: D
“Now the distinction between matters that are directory and
matters that are imperative is well known to us all in the
common language of the courts at Westminster … A thing has
been ordered by the legislature to be done. What is the
consequence if it is not done? In the case of statutes that are E
said to be imperative, the courts have decided that if it is not
done the whole thing fails, and the proceedings that follow
upon it are all void. On the other hand, when the courts hold
a provision to be mandatory or directory, they say that,
although such provision may not have been complied with,
the subsequent proceedings do not fail.” F
Later Lord Denning M.R. said, at pp. 242-243:
“The section is no doubt imperative in that the notice of appeal
must be in writing and must be made within the specified time.
But I think it is only directory as to the contents. Take first the
G
requirement as to the ‘grounds’ of appeal. The section is either
imperative in requiring ‘the grounds’ to be indicated, or it is
not. That must mean all or none. I cannot see any justification
for the view that it is imperative as to one ground and not
153
(1998) 6 SCC 554 H
232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A imperative as to the rest. If one was all that was necessary, an
appellant would only have to put in one frivolous or hopeless
ground and then amend later to add his real grounds. That
would be a futile exercise. Then as to ‘stating the facts.’ It
cannot be supposed that the appellant must at all cost state
all the facts on which he bases his appeal. He has to state
B
the facts, not the evidence: and the facts may depend on
evidence yet to be obtained, and may not be fully or sufficiently
known at the time when the notice of appeal is given. All
things, considered, it seems to me that the section, in so far as
the ‘grounds’ and ‘facts’ are concerned, must be construed
C as directory only: that is, as desiring information to be given
about them. It is not to be supposed that an appeal should
fail altogether simply because the grounds are not indicated,
or the facts stated. Even if it is wanting in not giving them, it
is not fatal. The defects can be remedied later, either before
or at the hearing of the appeal, so long as an opportunity is
D
afforded of dealing with them.”
(emphasis supplied)
234. In Belvedere Court Management Ltd. v. Frogmore
Developments Ltd.154, a distinction was made between essential and
E supportive provisions. The following observations are pertinent:
“By way of final comment I would add that I am strongly
attracted to the view that legislation of the present kind should
be evaluated and construed on an analytical basis. It should
be considered which of the provisions are substantive and
F which are secondary, that is, simply part of the machinery of
the legislation. Further, the provisions which fall into the
latter category should be examined to assess whether they
are essential parts of the mechanics or are merely supportive
of the other provisions so that they need not be insisted on
regardless of the circumstances. In other words, as in the
G construction of contractual and similar documents, the status
and effect of a provision has to be assessed having regard to
the scheme of the legislation as a whole and the role of that
provision in that scheme – for example, whether some
provision confers an option properly so called, whether some
H 154
(1996) 3 W.L.R. 1008 at p. 1032
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 233
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

provision is equivalent to a condition precedent, whether some A
requirement can be fulfilled in some other way or waived.
Such an approach when applied to legislation such as the
present would assist to enable the substantive rights to be
given effect to and would help to avoid absurdities or
unjustified lacunae.”
B
(emphasis supplied)
235. In Sharif-ud-Din (supra) the difference between mandatory
and directory rules was pointed out thus:
“9. The difference between a mandatory rule and a directory
rule is that while the former must be strictly observed, in the C
case of the latter substantial compliance may be sufficient to
achieve the object regarding which the rule is enacted. Certain
broad propositions which can be deduced from several
decisions of courts regarding the rules of construction that
should be followed in determining whether a provision of law D
is directory or mandatory may be summarised thus: The fact
that the statute uses the word “shall” while laying down a
duty is not conclusive on the question whether it is a
mandatory or directory provision. In order to find out the
true character of the legislation, the court has to ascertain
the object which the provision of law in question has to E
subserve and its design and the context in which it is enacted.
If the object of a law is to be defeated by non-compliance
with it, it has to be regarded as mandatory. But when a provision
of law relates to the performance of any public duty and the
invalidation of any act done in disregard of that provision F
causes serious prejudice to those for whose benefit it is
enacted and at the same time who have no control over the
performance of the duty, such provision should be treated as
a directory one. Where, however, a provision of law prescribes
that a certain act has to be done in a particular manner by a
person in order to acquire a right and it is coupled with G
another provision which confers an immunity on another when
such act is not done in that manner, the former has to be
regarded as a mandatory one. A procedural rule ordinarily
should not be construed as mandatory if the defect in the act
done in pursuance of it can be cured by permitting H
234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A appropriate rectification to be carried out at a subsequent
stage unless by according such permission to rectify the error
later on, another rule would be contravened. Whenever a
statute prescribes that a particular act is to be done in a
particular manner and also lays down that failure to comply
with the said requirement leads to a specific consequence, it
B
would be difficult to hold that the requirement is not mandatory
and the specified consequence should not follow.”
(emphasis supplied)
236. Similarly, in Ram Deen Maurya (Dr.) v. State of Uttar
C Pradesh and Ors155 this Court observed that non-compliance with the
directory provision does not affect the validity of the act done in breach
thereof. In Rai Vimal Krishna and Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors. 156,
this Court considered the mode of publication and held that publication in
a newspaper was the only effective mode and that the provision was
mandatory.
D
237. This Court also considered the effect of non-deposit of the
amount in Hissar Improvement v. Smt. Rukmani Devi and Anr157 and
held that in case compensation has not been paid or deposited, the State
is liable to pay interest as provided in Section 34. The Court held thus:

E “5. It cannot be gainsaid that interest is due and payable to
the landowner in the event of the compensation not being
paid or deposited in time in court. Before taking possession
of the land, the Collector has to pay or deposit the amount
awarded, as stated in Section 31, failing which he is liable to
pay interest as provided in Section 34.
F
6. In the circumstances, the High Court was right in stating
that interest was due and payable to the landowner. The High
Court was justified in directing the necessary parties to
appear in the executing court for determination of the
amount.”
G
238. In Kishan Das v. State of U.P158, this Court observed that
where land owners themselves delayed the acquisition proceedings, it is
155
(2009) 6 SCC 735
156
(2003) 6 SCC 401
157
1990 Supp SCC 806
158
H (1995) 6 SCC 240
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 235
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

discretionary for the court to award the interest and they cannot get the A
premium on their dilatory tactics. This Court stated that:
“4. In the light of the operation of the respective provisions
of Sections 34 and 28 of the Act, it would be difficult to direct
payment of interest. In fact, Section 23(1-A) is a set-off for
loss in cases of delayed awards to compensate the person B
entitled to receive compensation; otherwise a person who is
responsible for the delay in disposal of the acquisition
proceedings will be paid premium for dilatory tactics. It is
stated by the learned counsel for the respondents that the
amount of interest was also calculated and total amount was
deposited in the account of the appellants by the Land C
Acquisition Officer after passing the award, i.e., on
15-11-1976 in a sum of Rs 20,48,615. Under these
circumstances, the liability to pay interest would arise when
possession of the acquired land was taken and the amount
was not deposited. In view of the fact that compensation was D
deposited as soon as the award was passed, we do not think
that it is a case for us to interfere at this stage.”
(emphasis supplied)
239. In D-Block Ashok Nagar (Sahibabad) Plot Holders’ Assn.
v. State of U.P.159, it was observed that liability to pay interest under E
Section 34 arises from the date of taking possession.
240. It was argued that in fact in many cases, reference was
sought as such the amounts being deposited in the treasury were not
valid. Reference was sought for higher compensation and landowners
had declined to accept the compensation for no good reason they could F
have received it under protest reserving their right to seek the reference
and in case compensation was not paid or deposited, they could have
claimed it along with interest as envisaged under Section 34.
241. It is clear that once land is acquired, award passed and
possession has been taken, it has vested in the State. It had been allotted G
to beneficiaries. A considerable infrastructure could have been developed
and a third-party interest had also intervened. The land would have been
given by the acquiring authorities to the beneficiaries from whose
schemes the land had been acquired and they have developed immense
159
(1997) 10 SCC 77 H
236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A infrastructure. We are unable to accept the submission that merely by
deposit of amount in treasury instead of court, we should invalidate all
the acquisitions, which have taken place. That is not what is contemplated
under Section 24(2). We are also not able to accept the submission that
when law operates these harsh consequences need not be seen by the
court. In our opinion, that submission is without merit in as such
B
consequences are not even envisaged on proper interpretation of Section
24(2), as mentioned above.
242. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, intends that
the Collector would have sufficient funds to deposit it with respect to the
majority of landholdings. In case compensation has not been paid or
C deposited with respect to majority of land holdings, all the beneficiaries
are entitled for higher compensation. In case money has not been
deposited with the Land Acquisition Collector or in the treasury or in
court with respect to majority of landholdings, the consequence has to
follow of higher compensation as per proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act
D of 2013. Even otherwise, if deposit in treasury is irregular, then the interest
would follow as envisaged under Section 34 of Act of 1894. Section
24(2) is attracted if acquisition proceeding is not completed within 5
years after the pronouncement of award. Parliament considered the
period of 5 years as reasonable time to complete the acquisition
proceedings i.e., taking physical possession of the land and payment of
E compensation. It is the clear intent of the Act of 2013, that provision of
Section 24(2) shall apply to the proceeding which is pending as on the
date on which the Act of 2013, has been brought into force and it does
not apply to the concluded proceedings. It was urged before us by one
of the Counsel that lands in the Raisina Hills and Lutyens’ Zones of
F Delhi were acquired in 1913 and compensation has not been paid. The
Act of 2013 applies only to the pending proceedings in which possession
has not been taken or compensation has not paid and not to a case
where proceedings have been concluded long back, Section 24(2) is not
a tool to revive those proceedings and to question the validity of taking
acquisition proceedings due to which possession in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s
G were taken, or to question the manner of deposit of amount in the treasury.
The Act of 2013 never intended revival such claims. In case such
landowners were interested in questioning the proceedings of taking
possession or mode of deposit with the treasury, such a challenge was
permissible within the time available with them to do so. They cannot
H wake from deep slumber and raise such claims in order to defeat the
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 237
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

acquisition validly made. In our opinion, the law never contemplates -nor A
permits- misuse much less gross abuse of its provisions to reopen all the
acquisitions made after 1984, and it is the duty of the court to examine
the details of such claims. There are several litigations before us where
landowners, having lost the challenge to the validity of acquisition
proceedings and after having sought enhancement of the amount in the
B
reference succeeding in it nevertheless are seeking relief arguing about
lapse of acquisition after several rounds of litigation.
243. The expression used in Section 24(1)(b) is ‘where an award
under Section 11 has been made”, then ‘such proceedings shall
continue’ under the provisions of the said Act of 1894 as if the said Act
has not been repealed’. The expression “proceedings shall continue” C
indicates that proceedings are pending at the time; it is a present perfect
tense and envisages that proceedings must be pending as on the date on
which the Act of 2013 came into force. It does not apply to concluded
proceedings before the Collector after which it becomes functus officio.
Section 24 of the Act of 2013, does not confer benefit in the concluded D
proceedings, of which legality if question has to be seen in the appropriate
proceedings. It is only in the pending proceedings where award has
been passed and possession has not been taken nor compensation has
been paid, it is applicable. There is no lapse in case possession has been
taken, but amount has not been deposited with respect to majority of
land holdings in a pending proceeding, higher compensation under the E
Act of 2013 would follow under the proviso to Section 24(2). Thus, the
provision is not applicable to any other case in which higher compensation
has been sought by way of seeking a reference under the Act of 1894 or
where the validity of the acquisition proceedings have been questioned,
though they have been concluded. Such case has to be decided on their F
own merits and the provisions of Section 24(2) are not applicable to
such cases.
In re: Issue no.4: mode of taking possession under the Act
of 1894
244. Section 16 of the Act of 1894 provided that possession of G
land may be taken by the State Government after passing of an award
and thereupon land vest free from all encumbrances in the State
Government. Similar are the provisions made in the case of urgency in
Section 17(1). The word “possession” has been used in the Act of 1894,
whereas in Section 24(2) of Act of 2013, the expression “physical H
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A possession” is used. It is submitted that drawing of panchnama for
taking over the possession is not enough when the actual physical
possession remained with the landowner and Section 24(2) requires actual
physical possession to be taken, not the possession in any other form.
When the State has acquired the land and award has been passed, land
vests in the State Government free from all encumbrances. The act of
B
vesting of the land in the State is with possession, any person retaining
the possession, thereafter, has to be treated as trespasser and has no
right to possess the land which vests in the State free from all
encumbrances.
245. The question which arises whether there is any difference
C between taking possession under the Act of 1894 and the expression
“physical possession” used in Section 24(2). As a matter of fact, what
was contemplated under the Act of 1894, by taking the possession meant
only physical possession of the land. Taking over the possession under
the Act of 2013 always amounted to taking over physical possession of
D the land. When the State Government acquires land and drawns up a
memorandum of taking possession, that amounts to taking the physical
possession of the land. On the large chunk of property or otherwise
which is acquired, the Government is not supposed to put some other
person or the police force in possession to retain it and start cultivating it
till the land is used by it for the purpose for which it has been acquired.
E The Government is not supposed to start residing or to physically occupy
it once possession has been taken by drawing the inquest proceedings
for obtaining possession thereof. Thereafter, if any further retaining of
land or any re-entry is made on the land or someone starts cultivation on
the open land or starts residing in the outhouse, etc., is deemed to be the
F trespasser on land which in possession of the State. The possession of
trespasser always inures for the benefit of the real owner that is the
State Government in the case.
246. It was urged on behalf of acquiring authorities and the states
that there is no conflict of opinion with respect to the mode of taking
G possession in IDA v Shailendra and Pune Municipal Corporation &
Anr (supra), and that the latter is not a decision as to the aspect of
possession. A two-Judge Bench decision in Shree Balaji Nagar
Residential Association (supra) has been overruled in the Indore
Development Authority case (supra). The view taken in Indore
Development Authority (supra) has to prevail as the decision in Velaxan
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 239
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

Kumar (supra), was rendered by a two judge Bench of this court. This A
court, however, proceeds to examine the matter afresh as issues have
been framed.
247. The concept of possession is complex one. It comprises the
right to possess and to exclude others, essential is animus possidendi.
Possession depends upon the character of the thing which is possessed. B
If the land is not capable of any use, mere non-user of it does not lead to
the inference that the owner is not in possession. The established principle
is that the possession follows title. Possession comprises of the control
over the property. The element of possession is the physical control or
the power over the object and intention or will to exercise the power.
Corpus and animus are both necessary and have to co-exist. Possession C
of the acquired land is taken under the Act of 1894 under Section 16 or
17 as the case may be. The government has a right to acquire the property
for public purpose. The stage under Section 16 comes for taking possession
after issuance of notification under Section 4(1) and stage of Section
9(1). Under section 16, vesting is after passing of the award on taking D
possession and under section 17 before passing of the award.
248. Mitra’s “Law of Possession and Ownership of Property”,
2nd Edn., expressions ‘trespass’ and ‘trespasser’ have been dealt with
by the learned Author with the help of Words and Phrases, Permanent
Edition, West Publishing Co. which has also been quoted with respect to E
who is a trespasser:
“A “trespasser” is a person who enters or remains upon land
in the possession of another without a privilege to do so
created by the possessor ’s consent or otherwise. In re
Wimmer’s Estate, 182 P.2d 119, 121, 111 Utah 444.” F
“A “trespasser” is one entering or remaining on land in
another’s possession without a privilege to do so created by
possessor’s consent, express or implied, or by law. Keesecker
v. G.M. Mckelvey Co., 42 N.E. 2d 223, 226, 227, 68 Ohio
App. 505.” G
249. One who enters or remains in possession on land of another
without a privilege to do so, is also treated as a trespasser. On the strength
of Full Bench decision of Patna High Court in S.M. Yaqub v. T.N.
Basu160, Mitra, has referred to the observation that the possession should
160
AIR 1949 Pat 146 H
240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A not be confused with occupation. A person may be in actual possession
of the property without occupying it for a considerable time. The person
who has a right to utilise the whole in any way he likes. Possession in
part is good enough to infer that the person is in possession of the rest.
Learned Author has referred to Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law,
Ed. 1969, so as to explain what constitutes possession.
B
“There are three requisites of possession. First, there must
be actual or potential physical control. Secondly, the physical
control is not possession unless accompanied by intention
hence if a thing is put into the hand of a sleeping person he
has no possession of it. Thirdly, the possibility and intention
C must be visible or evidence by external signs for if the thing
shows no signs of being under the control of anyone, it is not
possession.”
250. In order to constitute possession, a person should be in physical
control. The same is not possession unless and until the intention is there
D and thirdly, possibility and intention must be visible; otherwise, it is not
possession. Mitra has further dealt with how to determine possession.
The relevant extract is quoted hereunder:
“36. Who is in possession – Determination of.—In Jones v.
Chopman, (1849) 2 Ex. 803: 18 LJ Ex. 456: 76 PR 794;
E Maule, J, expounded the doctrine thus:
“If there are two persons in a field, each asserting that the
field is his, and each doing some act in the assertion of the
right of possession, and if the question is, which of these two
is in actual possession, I answer, the person who has the title
is in actual possession and the other person is a trespasser.
F
In such a case who is in possession is to be determined by the
fact of the title and having the same apparent actual
possession;
The question as to which of the two really is in possession is
G determined by the fact of the possession; following the title,
that is by the law, which makes it follow the title.”
In Kynoch Limited v. Rowlands, (1912) 1Ch 527; LJ Ch 340;
106 LT 316; per Joyce, J, where his Lordship says:

H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 241
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

“It is a well settled principle with reference to land at all A
events …… that where possession in fact is underterminate
or the evidence is undecisive, possession, in law follows the
right to possess. As far back as the time of Littleton it was
said, “Where two be in one house or other tenements together
to claim the said lands and tenements, and the one claimeth
by one title, and the other by another title, the law shall B
adjudge him in possession that has right to have the possession
of the same tenements.”
(emphasis supplied)
251. A person with title is considered to be in actual possession. C
The other person is a trespasser. The possession in law follows the right
to possess as held in Kynoch Limited v. Rowlands161. Ordinarily, the
owner of the property is presumed to be in possession and presumption
as to possession is in his favour. In Superintendent and Remembrancer
of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja & Ors.,162, this
Court observed that possession implies a right and a fact; the right to D
enjoy annexed to the right of property and the fact of the real intention.
It involves the power of control and intent to control. Possession is
annexed to right of property.
“13. “Possession” is a polymorphous term which may have
different meanings in different contexts. It is impossible to E
work out a completely logical and precise definition of
“possession” uniformally applicable to all situations in the
contexts of all statutes. Dias and Hughes in their book on
Jurisprudence say that if a topic ever suffered from too much
theorising it is that of “possession.” Much of this difficulty
and confusion is (as pointed out in Salmond’s Jurisprudence, F
12th Edn., 1966) caused by the fact that possession is not
purely a legal concept. “Possession,” implies a right and a
fact; the right to enjoy annexed to the right of property and
the fact of the real intention. It involves power of control and
intent to control. (See Dias and Hughes, ibid.)
G
14. According to Pollock and Wright,
“when a person is in such a relation to a thing that, so far as
regards the thing, he can assume, exercise or resume manual
161
(1912) 1Ch 527
162
(1979) 4 SCC 274 H
242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A control of it at pleasure, and so far as regards other persons,
the thing is under the protection of his personal presence, or
in or on a house or land occupied by him or in any receptacle
belonging to him and under his control, he is in physical
possession of the thing.”
B 15. While recognising that “possession” is not a purely legal
concept but also a matter of fact, Salmond (12th Edn., p. 52)
describes “possession, in fact”, as a relationship between a
person and a thing. According to the learned Author the test
for determining “whether a person is in possession of anything
is whether he is in general control of it”.
C
252. In Ram Dass v. Davinder163, this Court stated that possession
and occupation in common parlance may be used interchangeably, but in
law possession amounts to holding property as an owner, while to occupy
is to keep possession by being present in it. In Bhinka & Ors. v. Charan
Singh, Bhinka & Ors. v. Charan Singh164, this court considered the
D dichotomy between taking and retaining possession. They are mutually
exclusive expressions and apply to two different situations. The word
‘taking’ applies to a person taking possession of a land otherwise than in
accordance with the provisions of the law, while the word ‘retaining’
applies to a person taking possession in accordance with the provisions
E of the law, but subsequently retaining the same illegally. In Bhinka &
Ors. (supra), as to retaining possession, it was observed:
“14. If the appellants did not take possession of the disputed
lands, did they retain possession of the same in accordance
with the provisions of the law for the time being in force? The
F dichotomy between taking and retaining indicates that they
are mutually exclusive and apply to two different situations.
The word “taking” applies to a person taking possession of
a land otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of
the law, while the word “retaining” to a person taking
possession in accordance with the provisions of the law but
G subsequently retaining the same illegally. So construed, the
appellants’ possession of the lands being illegal from the
inception, they could not be described as persons retaining
possession of the said lands in accordance with the provisions
163
(2004) 3 SCC 684
164
H 1959 (Suppl 2) SCR 798
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 243
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

of any law for the time being in force, so as to be outside the A
scope of Section 180 of the Act.”
253. Under section 16 of the Act of 1894, vesting of title in the
Government, in the land took place immediately upon taking possession.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act of 1894, the acquired land became
the property of the State without any condition or limitation either as to B
title or possession. Absolute title thus vested in the State.
254. This Court in V. Chandrasekaran & Anr. v. Administrative
Officer & Ors165 dealt with the concept of vesting under the Act of
1894. The facts of the said case indicated that the appellants and the
officials of the State and Development Board connived with each other C
to enable the appellant to grab/encroach upon the public land, which
was acquired and falsified the documents so as to construct flats thereon.
Considering the gravamen of the fraud, the Chief Secretary of the State
was directed to trace out such officials and to take suitable action against
each of them. It was also held by this Court that alienation of land
subsequent to notification under Section 4(1) is void and no title passes D
on the basis of such sale deed. This Court held that once land vested in
the State free from all encumbrances, it cannot be divested. Once land
has been acquired, it cannot be restored to tenure-holders/persons
interested, even if it is not used for the purpose for which it is so acquired.
Once possession of land has been taken, it vests in the State free from E
all encumbrances. Under sections 16 and 17, the acquired property
becomes the property of the Government without any limitation or
condition either as to title or possession. Reliance has been placed on
Fruit and Vegetable Merchants Union (supra):
19. That the word “vest” is a word of variable import is shown F
by provisions of Indian statutes also. For example, Section
56 of the Provincial Insolvency Act (5 of 1920) empowers the
court at the time of the making of the order of adjudication
or thereafter to appoint a receiver for the property of the
insolvent and further provides that “such property shall
thereupon vest in such receiver”. The property vests in the G
receiver for the purpose of administering the estate of the
insolvent for the payment of his debts after realising his assets.
The property of the insolvent vests in the receiver not for all
purposes but only for the purpose of the Insolvency Act and
165
(2012) 12 SCC 133 H
244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A the receiver has no interest of his own in the property. On the
other hand, Sections 16 and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act
(Act 1 of LA), provide that the property so acquired, upon the
happening of certain events, shall “vest absolutely in the
Government free from all encumbrances”. In the cases
contemplated by Sections 16 and 17 the property acquired
B
becomes the property of Government without any conditions
or limitations either as to title or possession. The legislature
has made it clear that the vesting of the property is not for
any limited purpose or limited duration. It would thus appear
that the word “vest” has not got a fixed connotation, meaning
C in all cases that the property is owned by the person or the
authority in whom it vests. It may vest in title, or it may vest in
possession, or it may vest in a limited sense, as indicated in
the context in which it may have been used in a particular
piece of legislation. The provisions of the Improvement Act,
particularly Sections 45 to 49 and 54 and 54-A when they
D
speak of a certain building or street or square or other land
vesting in a municipality or other local body or in a trust, do
not necessarily mean that ownership has passed to any of
them.”
(emphasis supplied)
E
255. In National Textile Corporation Ltd. v. Nareshkumar
Badrikumar Jagad & Ors166, the concept of vesting was considered.
This court observed that vesting means an absolute and indefeasible
right. Vesting, in general sense, means vesting in possession. Vesting
may include vesting of interest too. This Court observed thus:
F
“38. “Vesting” means having obtained an absolute and
indefeasible right. It refers to and is used for transfer or
conveyance. “Vesting” in the general sense, means vesting in
possession. However, “vesting” does not necessarily and
always means possession but includes vesting of interest as
G well. “Vesting” may mean vesting in title, vesting in possession
or vesting in a limited sense, as indicated in the context in
which it is used in a particular provision of the Act. The word
“vest” has different shades, taking colour from the context in

166
H 2011 (12) SCC 695
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 245
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

which it is used. It does not necessarily mean absolute vesting A
in every situation and is capable of bearing the meaning of a
limited vesting, being limited, in title as well as duration. Thus,
the word “vest” clothes varied colours from the context and
situation in which the word came to be used in the statute.
The expression “vest” is a word of ambiguous import since it
B
has no fixed connotation and the same has to be understood
in a different context under different sets of circumstances.
[Vide Fruit & Vegetable Merchants Union v. Delhi Improvement
Trust, AIR 1957 SC 344, Maharaj Singh v. State of U.P. AIR
1976 SC 2602, Municipal Corpn. of Hyderabad v. P.N. Murthy
AIR 1987 SC 802, Vatticherukuru Village Panchayat v. Nori C
Venkatarama Deekshithulu 1991 Supp (2) SCC 228, M. Ismail
Faruqui v. Union of India AIR 1995 SC 605, SCC p. 404,
para 41, Govt. of A.P. v. Nizam, Hyderabad (1996) 3 SCC
282, K.V. Shivakumar v. Appropriate Authority (2000) 3 SCC
485, Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Hindustan
D
Petroleum Corpn. AIR 2001 SC 3630 and Sulochana
Chandrakant Galande v. Pune Municipal Transport (2010)
8 SCC 467.]”
(emphasis supplied)
256. Thus, it is apparent that vesting is with possession and the E
statute has provided under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act of 1894 that
once possession is taken, absolute vesting occurred. It is an indefeasible
right and vesting is with possession thereafter. The vesting specified
under section 16, takes place after various steps, such as, notification
under section 4, declaration under section 6, notice under section 9, award
under section 11 and then possession. The statutory provision of vesting F
of property absolutely free from all encumbrances has to be accorded
full effect. Not only the possession vests in the State but all other
encumbrances are also removed forthwith. The title of the landholder
ceases and the state becomes the absolute owner and in possession of
the property. Thereafter there is no control of the land-owner over the G
property. He cannot have any animus to take the property and to control
it. Even if he has retained the possession or otherwise trespassed upon
it after possession has been taken by the State, he is a trespasser and
such possession of trespasser enures for his benefit and on behalf of the
owner.
H
246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A 257. After the land has vested in the State, the total control is of
the State. Only the State has a right to deal with the same. In Municipal
Corporation of Greater Bombay & Ors. v. Hindustan Petroleum
Corporation & Anr167, this Court discussed the concept of vesting in
the context of Section 220 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act. It
has referred to various decisions including that of Richardson v.
B
Robertson, (1862) 6 LT 75 thus:
“8. It is no doubt true that Section 220 provides that any
drain which vests in the Corporation is a municipal drain
and shall be under the control of the Corporation. In this
context, the question arises as to what meaning is required to
C assign to the word “vest” occurring in Section 220 of the
Act? In Richardson v. Robertson 6 LT at p. 78, it was observed
by Lord Cranworth as under: (LT p. 78)
“The word ‘vest’ is a word, at least, of ambiguous import.
Prima facie ‘vesting’ in possession is the more natural
D meaning. The expressions ‘investiture’ — ‘clothing’ — and
whatever else be the explanation as to the origin of the
word, point prima facie rather to the enjoyment than to
the obtaining of a right. But I am willing to accede to the
argument that was pressed at the Bar, that by long usage
E ‘vesting’ originally means the having obtained an absolute
and indefeasible right, as contradistinguished from the not
having so obtained it. But it cannot be disputed that the
word ‘vesting’ may mean, and often does mean, that which
is its primary etymological signification, namely, vesting
in possession.”
F
15. We are, therefore, of the view that the word “vest” means
vesting in title, vesting in possession or vesting in a limited
sense, as indicated in the context in which it is used in a
particular provision of the Act.”

G (emphasis supplied)
258. The word ‘vest’ has to be construed in the context in which
it is used in a particular provision of the Act. Vesting is absolute and free
from all encumbrances that includes possession. Once there is vesting

167
H 2001 (8) SCC 143
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 247
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

of land, once possession has been taken, section 24(2) does not A
contemplate divesting of the property from the State as mentioned above.
259. Now, the court would examine the mode of taking possession
under the Act of 1894 as laid down by this Court. In Balwant Narayan
Bhagde (supra) it was observed that the act of Tehsildar in going on the
spot and inspecting the land was sufficient to constitute taking of B
possession. Thereafter, it would not be open to the Government or the
Commission to withdraw from the acquisition under Section 48(1) of the
Act. It was held thus:
“28. We agree with the conclusion reached by our brother
Untwalia, J., as also with the reasoning on which the C
conclusion is based. But we are writing a separate judgment
as we feel that the discussion in the judgment of our learned
Brother Untwalia, J., in regard to delivery of “symbolical”
and “actual” possession under Rules 35, 36, 95 and 96 of
Order 21of the Code of Civil Procedure, is not necessary for
the disposal of the present appeals and we do not wish to D
subscribe to what has been said by our learned Brother
Untwalia, J., in that connection, nor do we wish to express
our assent with the discussion of the various authorities made
by him in his judgment. We think it is enough to state that
when the Government proceeds to take possession of the land E
acquired by it under the Land Acquisition Act, LA, it must
take actual possession of the land since all interests in the
land are sought to be acquired by it. There can be no question
of taking “symbolical” possession in the sense understood
by judicial decisions under the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor
would possession merely on paper be enough. What the Act F
contemplates as a necessary condition of vesting of the land
in the Government is the taking of actual possession of the
land. How such possession may be taken would depend on
the nature of the land. Such possession would have to be
taken as the nature of the land admits of. There can be no G
hard and fast rule laying down what act would be sufficient
to constitute taking of possession of land. We should not,
therefore, be taken as laying down an absolute and inviolable
rule that merely going on the spot and making a declaration
by beat of drum or otherwise would be sufficient to constitute
H
248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A taking of possession of land in every case. But here, in our
opinion, since the land was lying fallow and there was no
crop on it at the material time, the act of the Tehsildar in
going on the spot and inspecting the land for the purpose of
determining what part was waste and arable and should,
therefore, be taken possession of and determining its extent,
B
was sufficient to constitute taking of possession. It appears
that the appellant was not present when this was done by the
Tehsildar, but the presence of the owner or the occupant of
the land is not necessary to effectuate the taking of possession.
It is also not strictly necessary as a matter of legal requirement
C that notice should be given to the owner or the occupant of
the land that possession would be taken at a particular time,
though it may be desirable where possible, to give such notice
before possession is taken by the authorities, as that would
eliminate the possibility of any fraudulent or collusive
transaction of taking of mere paper possession, without the
D
occupant or the owner ever coming to know of it.”
260. In Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. A. Viswam (supra) it was
held that drawing of Panchnama in the presence of witnesses would
constitute a mode of taking possession. This court observed:
E “9. It is settled law by series of judgments of this Court that
one of the accepted modes of taking possession of the acquired
land is recording of a memorandum or Panchnama by the
LAO in the presence of witnesses signed by him/them and that
would constitute taking possession of the land as it would be
impossible to take physical possession of the acquired land.
F It is common knowledge that in some cases the owner/
interested person may not cooperate in taking possession of
the land.”
(emphasis supplied)

G 261. In Banda Development Authority (supra) this Court held
that preparing a Panchnama is sufficient to take possession. This Court
has laid down thus:
“37. The principles which can be culled out from the above
noted judgments are:
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 249
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

(i) No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to what act A
would constitute taking of possession of the acquired land.
(ii) If the acquired land is vacant, the act of the State authority
concerned to go to the spot and prepare a panchnama will
ordinarily be treated as sufficient to constitute taking of
possession. B
(iii) If crop is standing on the acquired land or building/
structure exists, mere going on the spot by the authority
concerned will, by itself, be not sufficient for taking
possession. Ordinarily, in such cases, the authority concerned
will have to give notice to the occupier of the building/ C
structure or the person who has cultivated the land and take
possession in the presence of independent witnesses and get
their signatures on the panchnama. Of course, refusal of the
owner of the land or building/structure may not lead to an
inference that the possession of the acquired land has not
been taken. D

(iv) If the acquisition is of a large tract of land, it may not be
possible for the acquiring/designated authority to take
physical possession of each and every parcel of the land and
it will be sufficient that symbolic possession is taken by
preparing appropriate document in the presence of E
independent witnesses and getting their signatures on such
document.
(v) If beneficiary of the acquisition is an agency/
instrumentality of the State and 80% of the total compensation
is deposited in terms of Section 17(3-A) and substantial F
portion of the acquired land has been utilised in furtherance
of the particular public purpose, then the court may
reasonably presume that possession of the acquired land has
been taken.”
262. In State of Tamil Nadu and Anr. v. Mahalakshmi Ammal G
and Ors., (supra), this court dealt with the effect of vesting on possession
and mode of taking it and opined thus:
“9. It is well-settled law that publication of the declaration
under Section 6 gives conclusiveness to public purpose. Award
was made on 26-9-1986 and for Survey No. 2/11 award was H
250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A made on 31-8-1990. Possession having already been
undertaken on 24-11-1981, it stands vested in the State under
Section 16 of the Act free from all encumbrances and thereby
the Government acquired absolute title to the land. The initial
award having been made within two years under Section 11
of the Act, the fact that subsequent award was made on 31-8-
B
1990 does not render the initial award invalid. It is also to be
seen that there is stay of dispossession. Once there is stay of
dispossession, all further proceedings necessarily could not
be proceeded with as laid down by this Court. Therefore, the
limitation also does not stand as an impediment as provided
C in the proviso to Section 11-A of the Act. Equally, even if
there is an irregularity in service of notice under Sections 9
and 10, it would be a curable irregularity and on account
thereof, award made under Section 11 does not become
invalid. Award is only an offer on behalf of the State. If
compensation was accepted without protest, it binds such
D
party but subject to Section 28-A. Possession of the acquired
land would be taken only by way of a memorandum,
Panchnama, which is a legally accepted norm. It would not
be possible to take any physical possession. Therefore,
subsequent continuation, if any, had by the erstwhile owner
E is only illegal or unlawful possession which does not bind
the Government nor vested under Section 16 divested in the
illegal occupant. Considered from this perspective, we hold
that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the
award.”
F 263. In Balmokand Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust,
Amritsar v. State of Punjab & Ors168, this Court ruled that under
compulsory acquisition it is difficult to take physical possession of land.
The normal mode of taking possession is by way of drafting the
Panchnama in the presence of Panchas. This Court observed thus:
G “4. It is seen that the entire gamut of the acquisition
proceedings stood completed by 17-4-1976 by which date
possession of the land had been taken. No doubt, Shri Parekh
has contended that the appellant still retained their possession.
It is now well-settled legal position that it is difficult to take
168
H (1996) 4 SCC 212
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 251
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

physical possession of the land under compulsory acquisition. A
The normal mode of taking possession is drafting the
panchnama in the presence of panchas and taking possession
and giving delivery to the beneficiaries is the accepted mode
of taking possession of the land. Subsequent thereto, the
retention of possession would tantamount only to illegal or
B
unlawful possession.
5. Under these circumstances, merely because the appellant
retained possession of the acquired land, the acquisition
cannot be said to be bad in law. It is then contended by Shri
Parekh that the appellant-Institution is running an educational
institution and intends to establish a public school and that C
since other land was available, the Government would have
acquired some other land leaving the acquired land for the
appellant. In the counter-affidavit filed in the High Court, it
was stated that apart from the acquired land, the appellant
also owned 482 canals 19 marlas of land. Thereby, it is seen D
that the appellant is not disabled to proceed with the
continuation of the educational institution which it seeks to
establish. It is then contended that an opportunity may be
given to the appellant to make a representation to the State
Government. We find that it is not necessary for us to give
any such liberty since acquisition process has already been E
completed.”
264. In P.K. Kalburqi v. State of Karnataka and Ors.,169, with
respect of mode of possession, this Court laid down as under:
“6. Moreover, the Hon’ble Minister who passed the order of F
denotification of the lands in question sought to make a
distinction between symbolic possession and actual possession
and proceed to pass the order on the basis of his
understanding of the law that symbolic possession did not
amount to actual possession, and that the power to withdraw
from the acquisition could be exercised at any time before G
“actual possession” was taken. This view appears to be
contrary to the majority decision of this Court in Balwant
Narayan Bhagde v. M.D. Bhagwat, wherein this Court
observed that how such possession would be taken would
169
(2005) 12 SCC 489 H
252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A depend on the nature of the land. Such possession would have
to be taken as the nature of the land admits of. There can be
no hard-and-fast rule laying down what act would be sufficient
to constitute taking of possession of land. In the instant case
the lands of which possession was sought to be taken were
unoccupied, in the sense that there was no crop or structure
B
standing thereon. In such a case only symbolic possession
could be taken, and as was pointed out by this Court in the
aforesaid decision, such possession would amount to vesting
the land in the Government. Moreover, four acres and odd
belonging to the appellant was a part of the larger area of
C 118 acres notified for acquisition. We are, therefore, satisfied
that the High Court has not committed any error in holding
that possession of the land was taken on 6-11-1985. Even
the order of the Minister on which considerable reliance has
been placed by the appellant indicates that possession of the
lands was taken, though symbolic.”
D
265. In Sita Ram Bhandar Society, New Delhi (supra) this Court
held that when possession of large area of land is to be taken, then it is
permissible to take possession by drawing Panchnama. A similar view
was expressed in Om Prakash Verma & Ors (supra) which stated that:
E “85. As pointed out earlier, the expression “civil appeals are
allowed” carry only one meaning i.e. the judgment of the
High Court is set aside and the writ petitions are dismissed.
Moreover, the determination of surplus land based on the
declaration of owners has become final long back. The
notifications issued under Section 10 of the Act and the
F panchnama taking possession are also final. On behalf of
the State, it was asserted that the possession of surplus land
was taken on 20-7-1993 and the panchnama was executed
showing that the possession has been taken. It is signed by
the witnesses. We have perused the details which are available
G in the paper book. It is settled law that where possession is to
be taken of a large tract of land then it is permissible to take
possession by a properly executed panchnama. [Vide Sita Ram
Bhandar Society v. Govt. (NCT of Delhi) (2009) 10 SCC 501.]
86. It is not in dispute that the panchnama has not been
H questioned in any proceedings by any of the appellants.
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 253
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

Though it is stated that Chanakyapuri Cooperative Society A
was in possession at one stage and Shri Venkateshawar
Enterprises was given possession by the owners and
possession was also given to Golden Hill Construction
Corporation and thereafter it was given to the purchasers,
the fact remains that the owners are not in possession. In
B
view of the same, the finding of the High Court that the
possession was taken by the State legally and validly through
a panchnama is absolutely correct and deserves to be
upheld.”
266. In M. Venkatesh and Ors. v. Commissioner, Bangalore
Development Authority, etc.170, a three-Judge Bench of this Court has C
opined that one of the modes of taking possession is by drawing
panchnama. The Court observed:
“17. To the same effect are the decisions of this Court in Ajay
Krishan Shinghal v. Union of India (1996) 10 SCC 721,
Mahavir v. Rural Institute (1995) 5 SCC 335, Gian Chand v. D
Gopala (1995) 2 SCC 528, Meera Sahni v. Lt. Governor of
Delhi (2008) 9 SCC 177 and Tika Ram v. State of U.P. (2009)
10 SCC 689 More importantly, as on the date of the suit, the
respondents had not completed 12 years in possession of the
suit property so as to entitle them to claim adverse possession E
against BDA, the true owner. The argument that possession
of the land was never taken also needs notice only to be
rejected for it is settled that one of the modes of taking
possession is by drawing a panchnama which part has been
done to perfection according to the evidence led by the
defendant BDA. Decisions of this Court in T.N. Housing Board F
v. A. Viswam (1996) 8 SCC 259 and Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v.
State of Gujarat (1998) 4 SCC 387, sufficiently support BDA
that the mode of taking possession adopted by it was a
permissible mode.”
267. In Ram Singh v. Jammu Development Authority171, this G
Court stated that the mode of taking possession is by drawing a
Panchnama. Concerning the mode of taking possession in any other
land, law to a similar effect has been laid down in NAL Layout Residents
170
(2015) 17 SCC 1
171
2017 (13) SCC 474 H
254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A Association v. Bangalore Development Authority172. Certain decisions
were cited with respect to other statutes regarding coalfields etc. and
how the possession is taken and vesting is to what extent. Those have to
be seen in the context of the particular Act. Possession comprises of
various rights, thus it has to be couched in a particular statute for which
we have a plethora of decisions of this Court. Hence, we need not fall
B
back on the decisions in other cases. The decision in Burrakur Coal
Co. Ltd. (supra) held that a person can be said to be in possession of
minerals contained in a well-defined mining area even though his actual
physical possession is confined to a small portion. Possession in part
extends to the whole of the area. The decision does not help the cause
C of the petitioner. Once possession has been taken by drawing a
Panchnama, the State is deemed to be in possession of the entire area
and not for a part. There is absolute vesting in Government with possession
and control free from all encumbrances as specifically provided in Section
16 of the Act of 1894.
D 268. Maguni Charan Dwivedi v. State of Orissa173, dealt with
the provision of land laws requiring actual cultivating possession with
which we are not concerned here. Sri Tarkeshwar Sio Thakur Jiu v.
Dar Dass Dey & Co.174, it was again a case relating to mining. The
decision is of no avail. The decision in Ramesh Bejoy Sharma v.
Pashupati Rai175 related to khas possession and physical possession of
E the tenant with which we are not concerned in the instant case, and the
decision has no relevance so as to determine the expression. In the
instant case, we are not dealing with the question, what are the rights to
be conferred on the actual cultivators under revenue laws?
269. Karanpura Development Co. v. Union of India176, was
F again a case of mines. In Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat177,
this Court relied upon Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. A. Viswam, (supra),
Balmokand Khatri Educational & Industrial Trust (supra) and held
that drawing of Panchnama is sufficient to take possession and
acquisition was held to be valid.
G
172
(2018) 12 SCC 400
173
1976 (2) SCC 134
174
1979 (3) SCC 106
175
(1979) 4 SCC 27
176
(1988) Supp. SCC 488
H 177
(1998) 4 SCC 387
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 255
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

270. The decision in Velaxan Kumar (supra) cannot be said to be A
laying down the law correctly. The Court considered the photographs
also to hold that the possession was not taken. Photographs cannot
evidence as to whether possession was taken or not. Drawing of a
Panchnama is an accepted mode of taking possession. Even after re-
entry, a photograph can be taken; equally, it taken be taken after
B
committing trespass. Such documents cannot prevail over the established
mode of proving whether possession is taken, of lands. Photographs can
be of little use, much less can they be a proof of possession. A person
may re-enter for a short period or only to have photograph. That would
not impinge adversely on the proceedings of taking possession by drawing
Panchnama, which has been a rarely recognised and settled mode of C
taking possession.
271. In the decision in Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of
Haryana178, the observation made was that it is not possible to take the
possession of entire land in a day on which the award was declared,
cannot be accepted as laying down the law correctly and same is contrary D
to a large number of precedents. The decision in Narmada Bachao
Andolan v. State of M.P179, is confined to particular facts of the case.
The Commissioner was appointed to find out possession on the spot.
DVDs. and CDs were seen to hold that the landowners were in
possession. The District Judge, Indore, recorded the statements of the
tenure-holder. We do not approve the method of determining the E
possession by appointment of Commissioner or by DVDs and CDs as
an acceptable mode of proving taking of possession. The drawing of
Panchnama contemporaneously is sufficient and it is not open to a court
Commissioner to determine the factum of possession within the purview
of Order XXVII, Rule 9 CPC. Whether possession has been taken, or F
not, is not a matter that a court appointed Commissioner cannot opine.
However, drawing of Panchnama by itself is enough and is a proof of
the fact that possession has been taken.
272. It was submitted on behalf of landowners that under Section
24 the expression used is not possession but physical possession. In our G
opinion, under the Act of 1894 when possession is taken after award is
passed under section 16 or under section 17 before the passing of the
award, land absolutely vests in the State on drawing of Panchnama of

178
(2012) 1 SCC 792
179
(2011) 7 SCC 639 H
256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A taking possession, which is the mode of taking possession. Thereafter,
any re-entry in possession or retaining the possession is wholly illegal
and trespasser’s possession inures for the benefit of the owner and even
in the case of open land, possession is deemed to be that of the owner.
When the land is vacant and is lying open, it is presumed to be that of the
owner by this Court as held in Kashi Bai v. Sudha Rani Ghose180.
B
Mere re-entry on Government land once it is acquired and vests
absolutely in the State (under the Act of 1894) does not confer, any right
to it and Section 24(2) does not have the effect of divesting the land
once it vests in the State.
273. In Maria Margadia Sequeria v Erasmo Jack De
C Sequeria181, approving a decision of this Court, this court clarified what
amounts to “possession” in law and held:
“Possession is flexible term and is not necessarily restricted
to mere actual possession of the property. The legal
conception of possession may be in various forms. The two
D elements of possession are the corpus and the animus. A
person though in physical possession may not be in possession
in the eye of law, if the animus be lacking. On the contrary, to
be in possession, it is not necessary that one must be in actual
physical contact. To gain the complete idea of possession,
E one must consider
(i) the person possessing, (ii) the things possessed and, (iii)
the persons excluded from possession. A man may hold an
object without claiming any interest therein for himself. A
servant though holding an object, holds it for his master. He
F has, therefore, merely custody of the thing and not the
possession which would always be with the master though
the master may not be in actual contact of the thing. It is in
this light in which the concept of possession has to be
understood in the context of a servant and master.”

G ************** ***** **************
Principles of law which emerge in Maria Margadia Sequeria
(supra) are crystallized as under:-

180
AIR 1958 SC 434
H 181
2012 (5) SCC 370
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 257
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

“1. No one acquires title to the property if he or she was A
allowed to stay in the premises gratuitously. Even by long
possession of years or decades such person would not acquire
any right or interest in the said property.”
274. In the decision reported as National Thermal Power Ltd v
Mahesh Dutta182 this court held that: B
“28. When possession is to be taken over in respect of the
fallow or Patit land, a mere intention to do so may not be
enough. It is, however, the positive stand by the appellant
that the lands in question are agricultural land and crops
used to be grown therein. If the lands in question are C
agricultural lands, not only actual physical possession had
to be taken but also they were required to be properly
demarcated. If the land had standing crops, as has been
contended by Mr. Raju Ramachandran, steps in relation
thereto were required to be taken by the Collector. Even in
the said certificate of possession, it had not been stated that D
there were standing crops on the land on the date on which
possession was taken. We may notice that delivery of
possession in respect of immoveable property should be taken
in the manner laid down in Order XXI Rule 35 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. E
29. It is beyond any comprehension that when possession is
purported to have been taken of the entire acquired lands,
actual possession would be taken only of a portion thereof.
The certificate of possession was either correct or incorrect.
It cannot be partially correct or partially incorrect. Either F
the possession had actually been delivered or had not been
delivered. It cannot be accepted that possession had been
delivered in respect of about 10 acres of land and the
possession could not be taken in respect of the rest 55 acres
of land. When the provisions of Section 17 are taken recourse
to, vesting of the land takes effect immediately. G
30. Another striking feature of the case is that all the actions
had been taken in a comprehensive manner. The Collector in
his certificate of possession dated 16th November, 1984 stated
182
2009 (8) SCC 339 H
258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A that the possession had been taken over in respect of the
entire land; the details of the land and the area thereof had
also been mentioned in the certificate of possession; even
NTPC in its letter dated 24th February, 1986 stated that
possession had not been delivered only in respect of land
situated in four villages mentioned therein. Indisputably NTPC
B
got possession over 10.215 acres of land. It raised
constructions thereover. It is difficult to comprehend that if
the NTPC had paid 80% of the total compensation as provided
for under sub-section (3A) of Section 17 of the Act, out of
65.713 acres of land it had obtained possession only in
C respect of about 10.215 acres of land and still for such a
long time it kept mum. Ex-facie, therefore, it is difficult to
accept that merely symbolic possession had been taken.”
275. In V. Chandrasekaran & Anr. v. Administrative Officer &
183
Ors. , the land was acquired and possession was handed over to the
D authorities. Later on the land was sold, documents were manipulated,
and flats were constructed in an illegal manner. It was held that the land
once acquired, cannot be restored. The State has no right to reconvey
the land and no person can claim such a right nor derive an advantage.
Sale of land after a notification under section 4 of the LA Act was held
to be void. It was held in the facts of the case that the judicial process
E cannot be used to subvert its way. Such persons must not be permitted
to profit from the frivolous litigation, and they must be prevented from
taking false pleas by relying on forged documents or illegal action.
276. We have seen the blatant misuse of the provisions of section
24(2). Acquisitions that were completed several decades before even to
F say 50-60 years ago, or even as far back as 90 years ago were questioned;
cases filed were dismissed. References were sought claiming higher
compensation and higher compensation had been ordered. Now, there is
a fresh bout of litigation started by erstwhile owners even after having
received the compensation in many cases by submitting that possession
G has not been taken and taking of possession by drawing a Panchnama
was illegal and they are in physical possession. As such, there is lapse of
proceedings.
277. The court is alive to the fact that are a large number of cases
where, after acquisition land has been handed over to various corporations,
183
H (2012) 12 SCC 133
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 259
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

local authorities, acquiring bodies, etc. After depositing compensation A
(for the acquisition) those bodies and authorities have been handed
possession of lands. They, in turn, after development of such acquired
lands have handed over properties; third party interests have intervened
and now declaration is sought under the cover of section 24(2) to
invalidate all such actions. As held by us, section 24 does not intend to
B
cover such cases at all and such gross misuse of the provisions of law
must stop. Title once vested, cannot be obliterated, without an express
legal provision; in any case, even if the landowners’ argument that after
possession too, in case of non-payment of compensation, the acquisition
would lapse, were for arguments’ sake, be accepted, these third party
owners would be deprived of their lands, lawfully acquired by them, C
without compensation of any sort. Thus, we have no hesitation to overrule
the decisions in Velaxan Kumar (supra) and Narmada Bachao Andolan
(supra), with regard to mode of taking possession. We hold that drawing
of Panchnama of taking possession is the mode of taking possession in
land acquisition cases, thereupon land vests in the State and any re-
D
entry or retaining the possession thereafter is unlawful and does not
inure for conferring benefits under section 24(2) of the Act of 2013.
In Re Question No.5: the effect of interim order of Court
278. On behalf of acquiring authorities, it was submitted that period
spent during the interim stay or injunction by which Authorities have not E
been able to take possession or to make payment, has to be excluded
from computing the period of 5 years or more as provided in Section
24(2). It was submitted that in case authorities are restrained by interim
order passed by the court in a pending litigation, the land acquisition
cannot lapse by including the period for which interim stay order
preventing the Authorities from taking action has operated. Reliance F
has been placed on the principles contained in maxim “actus curiae
neminem gravabit”. It was also submitted even in the absence of the
provisions specifically excluding the period of interim stay/injunction
having been made in Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013, the aforesaid
principles are attracted and the period has to be excluded. G
279. The landowners, on the other hand argued that there is no
valid reason to exclude the period spent during the interim order by the
court from the prescribed period of 5 years under Section 24(2) of the
Act of 2013. For the main reason that the legislature has not specially
provided for exclusion of such period in Section 24 and secondly, where H
260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A Parliament has desired to exclude the period of interim order has made
provision for exclusion of such period in proviso to Section 19 and
explanation to Section 69 of the Act of 2013. In the Act of 1894, there
was a similar provision made in Section 6 and explanation to Section
11A. During the process of consultation of the stakeholders while enacting
the Act of 2013, the Government of NCT of Delhi had suggested that an
B
explanation be added in the provisions of Section 24 to exclude the period
of interim order passed by the court. The suggestion was not accepted
by the Department of Land Reforms on the ground that same would be
in conflict with the retrospective effect of the clause. Ultimately, in the
final recommendation, the period of interim order of the court was not
C made. Thus, it is “casus omissus” which cannot be applied by the court.
The maxim “actus curiæ neminem gravabit” is not applied and is rare if
ever applied to interpret the statute.
280. In Padma Sundar Rao (supra), a Constitution Bench of this
Court has declined to rely on the maxim and similarly in Khandaka
D Jain Jewellers, (supra), the maxim was not applied. It was urged that
in Snell’s Equity (33rd Edition), 2015 with respect to the maxim, it has
been observed that maxim of equity is not a specific rule of principle of
law. It is a statement of a broad theme which underlies equitable concepts
and principles. As a result, the utility of equitable maxim is limited. It can
provide some support to the court when there is some uncertainty as to
E the scope of a particular rule of principle and a court in exercising an
equitable discretion may apply the same.
281. Reference was also made to decision of Parson Tools and
Plants (supra) to contend that court cannot supply the omission by
engrafting on it or introducing in it under the guise of interpretation. To
F do so, it would be entrenching upon the preserves of the legislature.
Where under Section 24 cut-off date is prescribed and there is no starting
point and period for completion of task, the notion of excluding time
spent in litigations is an alien concept to the provisions. The court must
assume that the old law was oppressive and unjust and such introduction
G of exclusion of time may create complication in the working of the statute.
It was also submitted that common law principles can be excluded by
the legislature by express or implied implication in the statute itself. In
this regard, reliance has been placed upon Union of India v. SICOM
Ltd184. It was submitted on behalf of landowners that no provision had
184
H (2009) 2 SCC 121
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 261
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

been enacted by issuing any ordinance and later amending the law, for A
providing for exclusion of the time spent on interim order under Section
24(2), but Ordinance lapsed. The legislature could have amended the
provisions as such the court cannot exclude the period.
282. Before we go to various rival submissions, the pivotal question
for consideration is the interpretation of Section 24 and aims and B
objectives of the Act of 2013. Section 24 contemplates that the
proceedings initiated under the Act of 1894, are pending as on the date
on which Act of 2013 has been enacted and if no award has been passed
in the proceedings, then there is no lapse and only determination of
compensation has to be made under the Act of 2013. Where an award
has been passed, it is provided under Section 24(1)(b), the pending C
proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the Act of 1894 as if
the old Act has not been repealed. The provisions totally exclude the
applicability of any provision of Act of 2013. There are two requirements
under Section 24(2), which are to be met by the Authorities, where award
has been made 5 years or more prior to the commencement of the Act D
of 2013, if the physical possession of the land has not been taken nor
compensation has been paid. If possession has been taken, compensation
has to be paid by the acquiring authorities. The time of five years is
provided for authorities to take action, not to sleep over the matter. In
case of lethargy or machinery and default on the part of the Authorities
and for no other reason the lapse is provided. Lapse is provided only in E
case of default by Authorities acquiring the land, not caused by any
other reason or order of the court. When the interpretation of the provision
is clear, there was no necessity for Parliament to make such a provision
under Section 24(2) for exclusion of the period of the interim order.
Though it has excluded the period of interim order for making declaration F
under the proviso to Sections 19(7) and exclusion has also been made
for computation of the period under Section 69 of the Act of 2013. It is
due to the necessity to provide so in view of the language of the provision.
Under section 69 of the Act of 2013, additional compensation at the rate
of 12 per cent has to be given on market value for the period commencing
from the date of the publication of the preliminary notification under G
Section 11. The additional compensation at the rate of 12 per cent has
been excluded for the period acquisition proceedings have been held up
on account of the interim injunction order of any court. The provisions of
Section 24 cast an obligation upon the Authorities to take steps meaning
thereby that it is open to them to take such steps, and inaction or lethargy H
262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A on their part has not been countenanced by Parliament. Resultantly, lapse
of proceedings takes place. It is by the very nature of the provisions if it
was not possible for authorities for any reason not attributable to them
or the Government to take requisite steps, the period has to be excluded.
The Minister concerned Shri Jairam Ramesh in answer to the debate
quoted above has made it clear that time limit of five years has been
B
fixed for the Authorities to take action. If we do not exclude the period
of interim order, the very spirit of the provision will be violated.
283. With respect to fixation of period is five years for the
executive Authorities to take the requisite steps, Delhi Development
Authority v. Sukhbir Singh and Ors. (supra) observed that what the
C legislature is in effect telling the executive is that they ought to have put
their house in order and completed the acquisition proceedings within a
reasonable time after the pronouncement of award. Not having done so
even after a leeway of five years, would cross the limits of legislative
tolerance, after which the whole proceeding would be deemed to have
D lapsed. Thus, it is apparent from the decision of Delhi Development
Authority v. Sukhbir Singh and Ors. (supra), which is relied upon by
the landowners, that time limit is fixed for the executive authorities to
take steps. In case they are prevented by the court’s order, obviously, as
per the interpretation of the provisions is that such period has to be
excluded. In case such a provision would have been made, it would
E have been “ex abundanti cautela”. There was no necessity of making
such a provision even if this proposition has been discussed during the
formulation of legislation. However, the provision providing exclusion
has been enacted. It casts an obligation upon the Authorities to take
requisite steps within five years, that by itself excludes such period of
F interim order.
284. It was pointed out that in certain States, amendments have
been incorporated in Section 24(2), excluding the period of interim order
passed by the Court. In our opinion, there is no such necessity for providing
exclusion of time and it has been done by the States “ex abundanti
G cautela” and there is no doubt about it that Central Government has
also tried to introduce the provision of the exclusion of time by issuance
of ordinances, however, they lapsed. It was due to the interpretation
and the decision rendered by this Court in Shree Balaji Nagar Residential
Association (supra), which cannot be said to be laying down the law
correctly.
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 263
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

285. The intent of the Act of 2013, is not to benefit litigants only. A
It has introduced a new regime which is beneficial to the landowners.
The provisions of Section 24 by itself do not intend to confer the benefits
on litigating parties, while as per Section 114 of the Act of 2013 and
section 6 of the General Clauses Act, has to be litigated as per the
provisions of the Act of 1894.
B
286. Section 24 treats land acquisition proceedings as one and
prescribes the transition mechanism for the said proceedings. Possession
of the land holdings in normal course is to be taken at one go, not in
piecemeal by the Authorities. Once award is made, possession can be
taken and on that the land vests in State under section 16, and under
Section 17(1) of the Act of 1894, the possession of any land can be C
taken for public purposes in cases of urgency without passing of the
award. The expression “acquisition proceedings” is referred to in
sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 24 and its proviso makes it clear that
in case in majority of the landholdings compensation has not been
deposited, all the beneficiaries as on the date of notification under Section D
4 (of the Act of 1894) shall be entitled to compensation in accordance
with the provisions of the Act of 2013. That also intends to give benefits
to all the concerned. Payment of compensation too has to be made.
Possession of land holdings is to be taken in terms of the notification
under Section 4 and declaration under section 6 and payment has to be
made to the beneficiaries. In case payment has not been made to the E
landowners nor is possession taken, there is a lapse. In case compensation
has not been deposited within 5 years with respect to majority of land
holdings, then all the beneficiaries are entitled for higher compensation
under the Act of 2013.
287. In the opinion of this court it is not the intendment of the Act F
of 2013 that those who have litigated should get benefits of higher
compensation as contemplated under Section 24 benefit is conferred on
all beneficiaries. It is not intended by the provisions that in piecemeal the
persons who have litigated and have obtained the interim order should
get the benefits of the provisions of the Act of 2013. Those who have G
accepted the compensation within 5 years and handed over the possession
too, are to be benefited, in case amount has not been deposited with
respect to majority of holdings. There are cases in which projects have
come up in part and as per plan rest of the area is required for planned
development with respect to which interim stays have been obtained. It
H
264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A is not the intendment of the law to deliver advantage to relentless litigants.
It cannot be said hence, that it was due to the inaction of the authorities
that possession could not be taken within 5 years. Public policy is not to
foment or foster litigation but put an end to it. In several instances, in
various High Courts writ petitions were dismissed by single judge
Benches and the writ appeals were pending for a long time and in which,
B
with respect to part of land of the projects, efforts were made to obtain
the benefit of Section 24(2). Parliament in our view did not intend to
confer benefits to such litigants for the aforementioned reasons. Litigation
may be frivolous or may be worthy. Such litigants have to stand on the
strength of their own case and in such a case provisions of Section 114
C of the Act of 2013 and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, are
clearly attracted and such proceedings have to be continued under the
provisions of the old Act that would be in the spirit of Section 24(1)(b)
itself of the Act of 2013. Section 6(b) of the General Clauses Act, 1897,
provides that repeal will not affect the previous operation of any enactment
so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder. Section 6(c)
D
states that repeal would not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability
acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed. When
there is a provision itself in Section 24(1)(b) of continuance of the
proceedings where award has been passed under the Act of 1894, for
the purposes of Section 24 as provided in Section 24(b), the provisions
E of Section 114 is clearly attracted so as the provisions of Section 6 of the
General Clauses Act, 1897, to the extent of non obstante clause of Section
24, where possession has not been taken nor payment has been made,
there is a lapse, that too by the inaction of the Authorities. Any court’s
interim order cannot be said to be inaction of the authorities or agencies;
thus, time period is not to be included for counting the 5 years period as
F
envisaged in Section 24(2). As per proviso to Section 24(2), where
possession has been taken, but compensation has not been paid or
deposited with respect to majority of land holdings, all the beneficiaries
would be entitled for higher compensation only to that extent, the
provisions of Section 114 of the Act of 2013, would be superseded but it
G would not obliterate the general application of Section 6 of the General
Clauses Act, 1897, which deals with effect of repeal except as provided
in section 24(2) and its proviso.
288. It was submitted on behalf of acquiring authorities that
principle of casus omissus is not necessarily applicable in all the cases.
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 265
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

Reliance has been placed on Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher185, in A
which following observations have been made:
“The question for decision in this case is whether we are at
liberty to extend the ordinary meaning of “burden” so as to
include a contingent burden of the kind I have described.
Now this court has already held that this sub-section is to be B
liberally construed so as to give effect to the governing
principles embodied in the legislation (Winchester Court Ld.
v. Miller); and I think we should do the same. Whenever a
statute comes up for consideration it must be remembered that
it is not within human powers to foresee the manifold sets of
facts which may arise, and, even if it were, it is not possible to C
provide for them in terms free from all ambiguity. The English
language is not an instrument of mathematical precision. Our
literature would be much the poorer if it were. This is where
the draftsmen of Acts of Parliament have often been unfairly
criticized. A judge, believing himself to be fettered by the D
supposed rule that he must look to the language and nothing
else, laments that the draftsmen have not provided for this or
that, or have been guilty of some or other ambiguity. It would
certainly save the judges trouble if Acts of Parliament were
drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity. In the
absence of it, when a defect appears a judge cannot simply E
fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work
on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament,
and he must do this not only from the language of the statute,
but also from a consideration of the social conditions which
gave rise to it, and of the mischief which it was passed to F
remedy, and then he must supplement the written word sc as
to give “force and life” to the intention of the legislature.
That was clearly laid down by the resolution of the judges in
Heydon’s case, and it is the safest guide to-day. Good practical
advice on the subject was given about the same time by
Plowden in his second volume Evston v. Studd. Put into homely G
metaphor it is this: A judge should ask himself the question:
If the makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck
in the texture of it, how would they have straightened it out?

185
(1949) 2 K.B. 481 H
266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A He must then do as they would have done. A judge must not
alter the material of which it is woven, but he can and should
iron out the creases.
Approaching this case in that way, I cannot help feeling that
the legislature had not specifically in mind a contingent burden
B such as we have here. If it had, would it not have put it on the
same footing as an actual burden? I think it would. It would
have permitted an increase of rent when the terms were so
changed as to put a positive legal burden on the landlord. If
the parties expressly agreed between themselves the amount
of the increase on that account the court would give effect to
C their agreement. But if, as here, they did not direct their minds
to the point, the court has itself to assess the amount of the
increase. It has to say how much the tenant should pay “in
respect of” the transfer of this burden to the landlord. It
should do this by asking what a willing tenant would agree to
D pay and a willing landlord would agree to accept in respect
of it. Just as in the earlier cases the courts were able to assess
the value of the “fair wear and tear” clause, and of a
“cooker.” So they can assess the value of the hot water clause
and translate it fairly in terms of rent; and what applies to
hot water applies also to the removal of refuse and so forth. I
E agree that the appeal should be allowed, and with the order
proposed by Asquith LJ.”
(emphasis supplied)
289. Reliance was also placed on M. Pentiah v. Muddala
F Veeramallappa186, in which this Court observed that where the language
of a statute in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads
to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment or
to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, which is not
intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning
of the words and even the structure of the sentence. In Hameedia
G Hardware Stores v. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar187, it was held that absurdity
has to be avoided. In that decision reliance was placed on the decision in
Seaford Court Estates Ltd. (supra), wherein it was observed that when
a defect or omission appears, a judge cannot simply fold his hands and
186
(1961) 2 SCR 295
187
H (1988) 2 SCC 513
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 267
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

blame the draftsman. It is the duty to give force and life to the intention A
of the legislature. The court has to construe the words of the statute in
a reasonable way having regard to the context.
290. Again, in Madan Singh Shekhawat v. Union of India188,
the decision in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. (supra) has been followed.
Following observations have been made: B
“18. Applying the above rule, we are of the opinion that the
rule-makers did not intend to deprive the army personnel of
the benefit of the disability pension solely on the ground that
the cost of the journey was not borne by the public exchequer.
If the journey was authorised, it can make no difference C
whether the fare for the same came from the public exchequer
or the army personnel himself.”
291. There cannot be any dispute with the above propositions.
However, in the present case, when we construe the provisions of Section
24, it clearly ousts the period spent during the interim stay of the court. D
Five years’ period is fixed for the purpose to take action, if they have not
taken the action for 5 years or more, then there is lapse, not otherwise.
Even if there had been a provision made with respect to the exclusion of
time spent in the court proceedings with respect to interim stay due to
court’s order, it could have been ex abundanti cautela, which has been
considered by this Court in Union of India and Ors. v. Modi Rubber E
Ltd 189. It would have been superfluous to make such a provision.
Following observations were made in Modi Rubber Ltd. (supra):
“7. Both these notifications, as the opening part shows, are
issued under Rule 8(1) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 and
since the definition of ‘duty’ in Rule 2, clause (v) must F
necessarily be projected in Rule 8(1) and the expression “duty
of excise” in Rule 8(1) must be read in the light of that
definition, the same expression used in these two notifications
issued under Rule 8(1) must also be interpreted in the same
sense, namely, duty of excise payable under the Central G
Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and the exemption granted under
both these notifications must be regarded as limited only to
such duty of excise. But the respondents contended that the
expression “duty of excise” was one of large amplitude and
188
(1999) 6 SCC 459
189
(1986) 4 SCC 66 H
268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A in the absence of any restrictive or limitative words indicating
that it was intended to refer only to duty of excise leviable
under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, it must be held
to cover all duties of excise whether leviable under the Central
Excises and Salt Act, 1944 or under any other enactment.
The respondents sought to support this contention by pointing
B
out that whenever the Central Government wanted to confine
the exemption granted under a notification to the duty of
excise leviable under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944,
the Central Government made its intention abundantly clear
by using appropriate words of limitation such as “duty of
C excise leviable ... under Section 3 of the Central Excises and
Salt Act, 1944” or “duty of excise leviable ... under the Central
Excises and Salt Act, 1944” or “duty of excise leviable ...
under the said Act” as in the Notification No. CER-8(3)/55-
C.E. dated September 17, 1955, Notification No. 255/77-C.E.
dated July 20, 1977, Notification No. CER-8(1)/55-C.E. dated
D
September 2, 1955, Notification No. CER-8(9)/55-C.E. dated
December 31, 1955, Notification No. 95/61-C.E. dated April
1, 1961, Notification No. 23/55-C.E. dated April 29, 1955
and similar other notifications. But, here said the respondents,
no such words of limitation are used in the two notifications
E in question and the expression “duty of excise” must,
therefore, be read according to its plain natural meaning as
including all duties of excise, including special duty of excise
and auxiliary duty of excise. Now, it is no doubt true that in
these various notifications referred to above, the Central
Government has, while granting exemption under Rule 8(1),
F
used specified language indicating that the exemption, total
or partial, granted under each such notification is in respect
of excise duty leviable under the Central Excises and Salt
Act, 1944. But, merely because, as a matter of drafting, the
Central Government has in some notifications specifically
G referred to the excise duty in respect of which exemption is
granted as “duty of excise” leviable under the Central Excises
and Salt Act, 1944, it does not follow that in the absence of
such words of specificity, the expression “duty of excise”
standing by itself must be read as referring to all duties of
excise. It is not uncommon to find that the legislature
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 269
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

sometimes, with a view to making its intention clear beyond A
doubt, uses language ex abundanti cautela though it may not
be strictly necessary and even without it the same intention
can be spelt out as a matter of judicial construction and this
would be more so in case of subordinate legislation by the
executive. The officer drafting a particular piece of
B
subordinate legislation in the Executive Department may
employ words with a view to leaving no scope for possible
doubt as to its intention or sometimes even for greater
completeness, though these words may not add anything to
the meaning and scope of the subordinate legislation. Here,
in the present notifications, the words duty of excise leviable C
under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944’ do not find a
place as in the other notifications relied upon by the
respondents. But, that does not necessarily lead to the
inference that the expression “duty of excise” in these
notifications was intended to refer to all duties of excise
D
including special and auxiliary duties of excise. The absence
of these words does not absolve us from the obligation to
interpret the expression “duty of excise” in these notifications.
We have still to construe this expression — what is its meaning
and import — and that has to be done bearing in mind the
context in which it occurs. We have already pointed out that E
these notifications having been issued under Rule 8(1), the
expression “duty of excise” in these notifications must bear
the same meaning which it has in Rule 8(1) and that meaning
clearly is — excise duty payable under the Central Excises
and Salt Act, 1944 as envisaged in Rule 2 clause (v). It cannot
F
in the circumstances bear an extended meaning so as to
include special excise duty and auxiliary excise duty.”
(emphasis supplied)
292. Relying on State of U.P. and Ors. v. Hindustan Aluminium
Corpn. and Ors.,190 it was submitted that whether a piece of legislation G
has spent itself or exhausted in operation are matters of law and no such
rights exist in a citizen to ask for a declaration that the law has been
impliedly repealed on any such ground. In extreme and clear cases, no
doubt, an antiquated law may be said to have become obsolete and,
190
(1979) 3 SCC 229 H
270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A more so, if it is a penal law and has become incapable of user by a
drastic change in the circumstances. Craies on Statute Law, Seventh
Edition, has discussed about different classes of enactments such as
expired, spent, repealed in general terms, virtually repealed, superseded
and obsolete.
B 293. The Act of 2013 operates prospectively. Section 114 of the
Act of 2013, effects a repeal, but with certain savings, in accordance
with Section 24. Thus, acquisition proceedings are preserved under the
Act of 1894, till the stage of making of award; where award is not made,
the provisions of compensation under the Act of 2013 apply; where award
is made, further proceedings would be under the new Act (of 2013). In
C case possession has been taken by the authorities concerning awards
which were made 5 years or before, under the Act of 1894 and such
proceedings are pending, that would be due to inaction of the authorities
on the date on which the Act of 2013 came into force. The lapse (of
acquisition) and higher compensation to follow only under Section 24(2),
D where compensation is not paid, nor possession of lands is taken. A
period of 5 years or more has been provided under Section 24. In the
case, however, where possession is taken, but compensation is not
deposited in respect of majority landholdings, compensation under the
Act of 2013 is payable to all- including those who received compensation
earlier.
E
294. Reliance has been placed on the decision in Syndicate Bank
v. Prabha D. Naik and Anr 191, in which it was observed that the
legislature is supposed to be conscious of the needs of the society at
large and the prevalent laws. It was held that there is no reason for
assuming that the legislature was not aware of the difficulties and the
F prevailing situation. There is no dispute with the aforesaid proposition;
however, it does not espouse the cause of the landowners.
295. The correctness of the decision of Shree Balaji Nagar
Residential Association (supra) was doubted in Yogesh Neema and
Ors. (supra), and the matter was referred to a larger Bench. In Shree
G Balaji Nagar Residential Association (supra) following observations
were made:
“11. From a plain reading of Section 24 of the 2013 Act, it is
clear that Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not exclude any

H 191
(2001) 4 SCC 713
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 271
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

period during which the land acquisition proceeding might A
have remained stayed on account of stay or injunction granted
by any court. In the same Act, the proviso to Section 19(7) in
the context of limitation for publication of declaration under
Section 19(1) and the Explanation to Section 69(2) for
working out the market value of the land in the context of
B
delay between preliminary notification under Section 11 and
the date of the award, specifically provide that the period or
periods during which the acquisition proceedings were held
up on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any
court be excluded in computing the relevant period. In that
view of the matter, it can be safely concluded that the C
legislature has consciously omitted to extend the period of
five years indicated in Section 24(2) even if the proceedings
had been delayed on account of an order of stay or injunction
granted by a court of law or for any reason. Such casus
omissus cannot be supplied by the court in view of law on the
D
subject elaborately discussed by this Court in Padma Sundara
Rao v. State of T.N (2002) 3 SCC 533.
12. Even in the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, the legislature
had brought about amendment in Section 6 through an
Amendment Act of 1984 to add Explanation 1 for the purpose
of excluding the period when the proceeding suffered stay by E
an order of the court, in the context of limitation provided for
publishing the declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act. To
a similar effect was the Explanation to Section 11-A, which
was added by Amendment Act 68 of 1984. Clearly, the
legislature has, in its wisdom, made the period of five years F
under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act absolute and unaffected
by any delay in the proceedings on account of any order of
stay by a court. The plain wordings used by the legislature
are clear and do not create any ambiguity or conflict. In such
a situation, the court is not required to depart from the literal
rule of interpretation.” G

296. This Court held that the conscious omission by Parliament in
Section 24(2) to exclude the period, an interim order operates is to be
given effect and that the court should not fill in the gap. In Indore
Development Authority (supra), the decision rendered in Shree Balaji
H
272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A Nagar Residential Association (supra) was overruled with consensus
and it was not the subject matter in Pune Municipal Corporation
(supra). However, the learned counsel for the parties had urged that this
question arises as such it should be framed and considered by the present
larger Bench. Hence, we have examined the matter afresh.
B 297. In cases where some landowners have chosen to take
recourse to litigation (which they have a right to) and have obtained
interim orders on taking possession or orders of status quo, as a matter
of practical reality it is not possible for the authorities or State officials to
take the possession or to make payment of the compensation. In several
instances, such interim orders also impeded the making of an award.
C Now, so far as awards (and compensation payments, pursuant to such
proceedings were concerned) the period provided for making of awards
under the Act of 2013 could be excluded by virtue of Explanation to
Section 11A.192 Thus, no fault of inaction can be attributed to the
authorities and those who had obtained such interim orders, cannot benefit
D by their own action in filing litigation, which may or may not be
meritorious. Apart from the question of merits, when there is an interim
order with respect to the possession or order of status quo or stay of
further proceedings, the authorities cannot proceed; nor can they pay
compensation. Their obligations are intertwined with the scheme of land
acquisition. It is observed that authorities may wait in the proceedings till
E the interim order is vacated.
298. In our considered opinion, litigation which initiated by the
landowners has to be decided on its own merits and the benefits of
Section 24(2) should not be available to the litigants. In case there is no
interim order, they can get the benefits they are entitled to, not otherwise
F as a result of fruit of litigation, delays and dilatory tactics and some time
it may be wholly frivolous pleas and forged documents as observed in V.
Chandrasekaran (supra) mentioned above.
192
“11-A. Period within which an award shall be made
The Collcctor shall make an award under section 11 within a period of two years
from the date of the publication of the declaration and ifno award is made within that
G period. the entire proceedings for the acquisition ofthc land shall lapse:
Provided that in a case where thc said declaration has been published
before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act. 1984 the award
shall be made within a period oftwo years from such commencements.
Explanation: In computing the period of two years referred to in this section. the
period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the s..’lid
H declaration is stayed by an order ofa court shall be excluded.
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 273
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

299. In Abhey Ram (Dead) by L.Rs. and Ors. v. Union of India A
and Ors193., this Court considered the extended meaning of words “stay
of the action or proceedings”. It was observed that any type of orders
passed by this Court would be an inhibitive action on the part of the
Authorities to proceed further. This Court observed thus:
“9. Therefore, the reasons given in B.R. Gupta v. Union of B
India, 37 (1989) DLT 150 (Del) DB, are obvious with reference
to the quashing of the publication of the declaration under
Section 6 vis-à-vis the writ petitioners therein. The question
that arises for consideration is whether the stay obtained by
some of the persons who prohibited the respondents from
publication of the declaration under Section 6 would equally C
be extendible to the cases relating to the appellants. We
proceed on the premise that the appellants had not obtained
any stay of the publication of the declaration but since the
High Court in some of the cases has, in fact, prohibited them
as extracted hereinbefore, from publication of the declaration, D
necessarily, when the Court has not restricted the declaration
in the impugned orders in support of the petitioners therein,
the officers had to hold back their hands till the matters were
disposed of. In fact, this Court has given extended meaning
to the orders of stay or proceeding in various cases, namely,
Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat, (1991) E
4 SCC 531, Hansraj H. Jain v. State of Maharashtra, (1993)
3 SCC 634, Sangappa Gurulingappa Sajjan v. State of
Karnataka, (1994) 4 SCC 145, Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari
Samiti Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, (1993) 2 SCC 662, G.
Narayanaswamy Reddy v. Govt. of Karnataka, (1991) 3 SCC F
261 and Roshnara Begum v. Union of India, (1986) 1 Apex
Dec 6. The words “stay of the action or proceeding” have
been widely interpreted by this Court and mean that any type
of the orders passed by this Court would be an inhibitive
action on the part of the authorities to proceed further. When
the action of conducting an enquiry under Section 5-A was G
put in issue and the declaration under Section 6 was
questioned, necessarily unless the Court holds that enquiry
under Section 5-A was properly conducted and the declaration
published under Section 6 was valid, it would not be open to
193
(1997) 5 SCC 421 H
274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A the officers to proceed further into the matter. As a
consequence, the stay granted in respect of some would be
applicable to others also who had not obtained stay in that
behalf. We are not concerned with the correctness of the
earlier direction with regard to Section 5-A enquiry and
consideration of objections as it was not challenged by the
B
respondent Union. We express no opinion on its correctness,
though it is open to doubt.”
300. In Om Parkash v. Union of India and Ors. 194, it was
observed that interim order of stay granted in one of the matters of the
landowners would put complete restraint on the respondents to proceed
C further to issue declaration under Section 6 of the Act. It was observed
as under:
“72. Thus, in other words, the interim order of stay granted
in one of the matters of the landowners would put complete
restraint on the respondents to have proceeded further to issue
D notification under Section 6 of the Act. Had they issued the
said notification during the period when the stay was
operative, then obviously they may have been hauled up for
committing contempt of court. The language employed in the
interim orders of stay is also such that it had completely
E restrained the respondents from proceeding further in the
matter by issuing declaration/notification under Section 6 of
the Act.”
301. In Suresh Chand v. Gulam Chisti195, this Court considered
the provision where tenant would not be entitled to the protection of
F Section 39. If the suit had prolonged beyond ten years, then the tenant
would be entitled to such protection. The interpretation suggested was
not accepted by this Court as that would encourage the tenant to protract
the litigation. This Court frowned upon obtaining of fruits by protracting
the litigation on the ground of public policy. This Court observed thus:

G “17. It was argued that the words ‘commencement of this Act’
should be construed to mean the date on which the moratorium
period expired and the Act became applicable to the demised
building. Such a view would require this Court to give different
meanings to the same expression appearing at two places in
194
(2010) 4 SCC 17
H 195
(1990) 1 SCC 593
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 275
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

the same section. The words ‘on the date of commencement of A
this Act’ in relation to the pendency of the suit would mean
July 15, 1972 as held in Om Prakash Gupta v. Dig Vijendrapal
Gupta, (1982) 2 SCC 61, but the words ‘from such date of
commencement’ appearing immediately thereafter in relation
to the deposit to be made would have to be construed as the
B
date of actual application of the Act at a date subsequent to
July 15, 1972. Ordinarily, the rule of construction is that the
same expression where it appears more than once in the same
statute, more so in the same provision, must receive the same
meaning unless the context suggests otherwise. Besides, such
an interpretation would render the use of prefix ‘such’ before C
the word ‘commencement’ redundant. Thirdly such an
interpretation would run counter to the view taken by this
Court in Atma Ram Mittal case, (1988) 4 SCC 284, wherein it
was held that no man could be made to suffer because of the
court’s fault or court’s delay in the disposal of the suit. To put
D
it differently, if the suit could be disposed of within the period
of 10 years, the tenant would not be entitled to the protection
of Section 39, but if the suit is prolonged beyond ten years,
the tenant would be entitled to such protection. Such an
interpretation would encourage the tenant to protract the
litigation, and if he succeeds in delaying the disposal of the E
suit till the expiry of 10 years, he will secure the benefit of
Section 39, otherwise not. We are, therefore, of the opinion
that it is not possible to uphold the argument.”
302. In Shyam Sunder and Ors. v. Ram Kumar and Anr. 196, a
Constitution Bench of this Court observed that substantive rights of the F
parties are to be examined on the date of the suit unless the legislature
makes such rights retrospective. The Court made following observations:
“28. From the aforesaid decisions the legal position that
emerges is that when a repeal of an enactment is followed by
a fresh legislation, such legislation does not affect the G
substantive rights of the parties on the date of the suit or
adjudication of the suit unless such a legislation is
retrospective and a court of appeal cannot take into
consideration a new law brought into existence after the
196
(2001) 8 SCC 24 H
276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A judgment appealed from has been rendered because the rights
of the parties in an appeal are determined under the law in
force on the date of the suit. However, the position in law
would be different in the matters which relate to procedural
law, but so far as substantive rights of parties are concerned,
they remain unaffected by the amendment in the enactment.
B
We are, therefore, of the view that where a repeal of provisions
of an enactment is followed by fresh legislation by an
amending Act, such legislation is prospective in operation
and does not affect substantive or vested rights of the parties
unless made retrospective either expressly or by necessary
C intendment. We are further of the view that there is a
presumption against the retrospective operation of a statute
and further a statute is not to be construed to have a greater
retrospective operation than its language renders necessary,
but an amending Act which affects the procedure is presumed
to be retrospective unless the amending Act provides otherwise.
D
We have carefully looked into the new substituted Section 15
brought in the parent Act by the Amendment Act, 1995 but do
not find it either expressly or by necessary implication
retrospective in operation which may affect the rights of the
parties on the date of adjudication of the suit and the same is
E required to be taken into consideration by the appellate court.
In Shanti Devi v. Hukum Chand, (1996) 5 SCC 768, this Court
had occasion to interpret the substituted Section 15 with which
we are concerned and held that on a plain reading of Section
15, it is clear that it has been introduced prospectively and
there is no question of such section affecting in any manner
F
the judgment and decree passed in the suit for pre-emption
affirmed by the High Court in the second appeal. We are
respectfully in agreement with the view expressed in the said
decision and hold that the substituted Section 15 in the
absence of anything in it to show that it is retrospective, does
G not affect the right of the parties which accrued to them on
the date of the suit or on the date of passing of the decree by
the court of the first instance. We are also of the view that the
present appeals are unaffected by the change in law insofar
it related to the determination of the substantive rights of the
parties and the same are required to be decided in the light of
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 277
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

the law of pre-emption as it existed on the date of passing of A
the decree.”
(emphasis supplied)
303. In Sarah Mathew (supra), it was observed that delay caused
by the court in taking cognizance cannot deny justice to the litigant. A
court of law would interpret and make the reasonable construction rather B
than applying a doctrine which would make the provision unsustainable
and ultra vires the Constitution. This Court observed thus:
“37. We are inclined to take this view also because there has
to be some amount of certainty or definiteness in matters of
limitation relating to criminal offenses. If, as stated by this C
Court, taking cognizance is the application of mind by the
Magistrate to the suspected offense, the subjective element
comes in. Whether a Magistrate has taken cognizance or not
will depend on facts and circumstances of each case. A diligent
complainant or the prosecuting agency which promptly files
D
the complaint or initiates prosecution would be severely
prejudiced if it is held that the relevant point for computing
limitation would be the date on which the Magistrate takes
cognizance. The complainant or the prosecuting agency would
be entirely left at the mercy of the Magistrate, who may take
cognizance after the limitation period because of several E
reasons; systemic or otherwise. It cannot be the intention of
the legislature to throw a diligent complainant out of the court
in this manner. Besides, it must be noted that the complainant
approaches the court for redressal of his grievance. He wants
action to be taken against the perpetrators of crime. The courts
functioning under the criminal justice system are created for F
this purpose. It would be unreasonable to take the view that
delay caused by the court in taking cognizance of a case
would deny justice to a diligent complainant. Such an
interpretation of Section 468 CrPC would be unsustainable
and would render it unconstitutional. It is well settled that a
G
court of law would interpret a provision which would help to
sustain the validity of the law by applying the doctrine of
reasonable construction rather than applying a doctrine which
would make the provision unsustainable and ultra vires the
Constitution. (U.P. Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Ayodhya Prasad
Mishra. (2008) 10 SCC 139)” H
278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A 304. When the authorities are disabled from performing duties
due to impossibility, would be a good excuse for them to save them from
rigour of provisions of Section 24(2). A litigant may be right or wrong.
He cannot be permitted to take advantage of a situation created by him
of interim order. The doctrine “commodum ex-injuria sua Nemo habere
debet” that is convenience cannot accrue to a party from his own wrong.
B
Provisions of Section 24 do not discriminate litigants or non-litigants and
treat them differently with respect to the same acquisition, otherwise,
anomalous results may occur and provisions may become discriminatory
in itself.
305. In Union of India v. Shiv Raj197, this Court did not consider
C the question of exclusion of the time. In Karnail Kaur and Ors. v.
State of Punjab and Ors., (supra) and in Shree Balaji Nagar
Residential Association (supra), various aspects including the
interpretation of provisions of Section 24 were not taken into
consideration. Thus, the said rulings cannot be said to be laying down
D good law.
306. In Union of India and Ors. v. North Telumer Colliery &
Ors198, this Court observed that delaying tactics should not be permitted
to fructify. By causing delay, the owner would get huge amount of interest,
but he may not get a penny out of the principal amount. It would amount
E to conferring unjust benefit on the owners which can never be the intention
of the Parliament. This Court observed:
“8. The High Court’s conclusions are primarily based on the
interpretation of Section 18(5) of the Coal Act. The High Court
has quoted the meaning of words “enure” and “benefit” from
F various dictionaries. No dictionary or any outside assistance
is needed to understand the meaning of these simple words in
the context and scheme of the Coal Act. The interest has to
enure to the benefit of the owners of the coal mines. The claims
before the Commissioner under the Coal Act are from the
creditors of the owners, and the liabilities sought to be
G discharged are also of the owners of the coal mines. When
the debts are paid and the liabilities discharged, it is only the
owners of coal mines who are benefited. Taking away the
interest amount by the owners without discharging their debts
197
2014 (6) SCC 564
198
H 1989 (3) SCC 411
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 279
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

and liabilities would be unreasonable. They have only to adopt A
delaying tactics to postpone the disbursement of claims and
consequently earn more interest. Due to such delay, the owner
would get huge amount of interest though ultimately, he may
not get a penny out of principal amount on the final settlement
of claims. It would amount to conferring unjust benefit on
B
the owners which can never be the intention of the Parliament.
We do not agree with the interpretation given by the High
Court and hold that the interest accruing under the Coal Act
is the money paid to the Commissioner in relation to the coal
mine and the same has to be utilized by the Commissioner in
meeting the claims of the creditors and discharging other C
liabilities in accordance with the provisions of the Coal Act.”
307. It may not be doubtful conduct to file frivolous litigation and
obtain stay; but benefit of Section 24 (2) should not be conferred on
those who prevented the taking of possession or payment of compensation,
for the period spent during the stay. D
308. In Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) & Ors. (supra), this Court
considered the question of casus omissus and observed thus:
“12. The rival pleas regarding rewriting of statute and casus
omissus need careful consideration. It is a well-settled
principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a E
statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute
is an edict of the legislature. The language employed in a
statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. The
first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of
the legislation must be found in words used by the legislature F
itself. The question is not what may be supposed and has been
intended, but what has been said. “Statutes should be
construed, not as theorems of Euclid,” Judge Learned Hand
said, “but words must be construed with some imagination of
the purposes which lie behind them.” (See Lenigh Valley Coal
Co. v. Yensavage, 218 FR 547) The view was reiterated in G
Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De
Gama (1990) 1 SCC 277.
13. In D.R. Venkatchalam v. Deputy Transport Commissioner
(1977) 2 SCC 273, it was observed that Courts must avoid
H
280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A the danger of a priori determination of the meaning of a
provision based on their own preconceived notions of
ideological structure or scheme into which the provision to
be interpreted is somewhat fitted. They are not entitled to usurp
legislative function under the disguise of interpretation.
B 14. While interpreting a provision, the court only interprets
the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused
and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the
legislature to amend, modify, or repeal it, if deemed necessary.
(See Rishabh Agro Industries Ltd. v. P.N.B. Capital Services
Ltd., (2000) 5 SCC 515) The legislative casus omissus cannot
C be supplied by the judicial interpretative process. The
language of Section 6(1) is plain and unambiguous. There is
no scope for reading something into it, as was done in
Narasimhaiah’s case. In Nanjudaiah’s case, the period was
further stretched to have the time period run from the date of
D service of the High Court’s order. Such a view cannot be
reconciled with the language of Section 6(1). If the view is
accepted, it would mean that a case can be covered by not
only clause (i) and/or clause (ii) of the proviso to Section
6(1), but also by a non-prescribed period. The same can never
be the legislative intent.
E
16. The plea relating to the applicability of the stare decisis
principles is clearly unacceptable. The decision in K.
Chinnathambi Gounder v. Government of T.N., AIR 1980 Mad
251 was rendered on 22-6-1979, i.e., much prior to the
amendment by the 1984 Act. If the legislature intended to give
F a new lease of life in those cases where the declaration under
Section 6 is quashed, there is no reason why it could not have
done so by specifically providing for it. The fact that the
legislature specifically provided for periods covered by orders
of stay or injunction clearly shows that no other period was
G intended to be excluded and that there is no scope for
providing any other period of limitation. The maxim actus
curiae neminem gravabit highlighted by the Full Bench of
the Madras High Court has no application to the fact situation
of this case.”

H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 281
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

309. There is no dispute with the aforesaid proposition that casus A
omissus cannot be applied by the court and in case of clear necessity,
the court has to interpret the law, if the provision of law is misused and
subjected to abuse of process of law. It is for the legislature to amend,
modify and repeal a law, if deemed necessary. Because of the above-
mentioned interpretation of the provisions of Section 24 itself, we are
B
unable to accept the submission made. We are not applying casus
omissus as urged. In Padma Sundara Rao (supra), this Court considered
the period of limitation for issuances of declaration under Section 6 of
the Act of 1894. The period has been stretched further in the case of
State of Karnataka v. D.C. Nanjudaiah199. Few expressions in the
aforesaid decision were held to be incorrect. In Padma Sundara Rao C
(supra), this Court held that when a period, which the legislature has
specifically provided, is covered by orders of stay and injunction, no
other period could be intended to be excluded by providing time period to
run from the date of service of the High Court’s order and it would not
be open to court to add to that period. The question in Padma Sundara
D
Rao (supra) was totally different and it was of counting the period over
and above excluded in the provisions, inter alia, from the very
interpretation of Section 24.
310. As regards application of the maxim to a statute, in Rana
Girders Ltd. v. Union of India200, this Court observed that the statutory
provision would prevail upon the common law principles. The decision E
in Rana Girders Ltd. (supra) was considered in Union of India (supra)
where this Court observed thus:
“9. Generally, the rights of the Crown to recover the debt
would prevail over the right of a subject. Crown debt means
the “debts due to the State or the King; debts which a F
prerogative entitles the Crown to claim priority for before all
other creditors.” [See Advanced Law Lexicon by P.
Ramanatha Aiyar (3rd Edn.), p. 1147.] Such creditors,
however, must be held to mean unsecured creditors. The
principle of Crown debt as such pertains to the common law G
principle. A common law, which is law within the meaning of
Article 13 of the Constitution, is saved in terms of Article 372
thereof. Those principles of common law, thus, which were
199
(1996) 10 SCC 619
200
2013 (10) SCC 746 H
282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A existing at the time of coming into force of the Constitution of
India, are saved by reason of the aforementioned provision.
A debt that is secured or which by reason of the provisions of
a statute becomes the first charge over the property having
regard to the plain meaning of Article 372 of the Constitution
of India must be held to prevail over the Crown debt, which is
B
an unsecured one.
10. It is trite that when Parliament or a State Legislature makes
an enactment, the same will prevail over the common law.
Thus, the common law principle which was existing on the
date of coming into force of the Constitution of India must
C yield to a statutory provision. To achieve the same purpose,
Parliament as also the State Legislatures inserted provisions
in various statutes, some of which have been referred to
hereinbefore, providing that the statutory dues shall be the
first charge over the properties of the taxpayer. This aspect
D of the matter has been considered by this Court in a series of
judgments.”
311. There is no doubt that common law principles have to be
weighed upon the statutory provision and latter has to prevail, but the
statutory provision itself makes it clear that in the instant matter such
E period has to be excluded, thus, the principles of common law also apply
with full force. In Mary Angel and Ors. v. State of T.N.201, the maxim
“expressio unius est exclusio alterius” came to be considered by this
Court. It was held that maxim needs to be applied when its application
having regard to the subject matter to which it is to be applied, leads to
inconsistency or injustice. This Court observed:
F
“19. Further, for the rule of interpretation on the basis of the
maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alterius,” it has been
considered in the decision rendered by the Queen’s Bench in
the case of Dean v. Wiesengrund, (1955) 2 QB 120. The Court
considered the said maxim and held that after all, it is no
G more than an aid to construction and has little if any, weight
where it is possible to account for the “inclusio unius” on
grounds other than the intention to affect the “exclusio
alterius.” Thereafter, the Court referred to the following
passage from the case of Colquhoun v. Brooks, (1887) 19
201
H 1999 (5) SCC 209
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 283
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

QBD 400, QBD at 406 wherein the Court called for its A
approval—
“… ‘The maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alterius” has
been pressed upon us. I agree with what is said in the court
below by Wills, J., about this maxim. It is often a valuable
servant, but a dangerous master to follow in the construction B
of statutes or documents. The exclusio is often the result of
inadvertence or accident, and the maxim ought not to be
applied, when its application, having regard to the subject-
matter to which it is to be applied, leads to inconsistency or
injustice.’ In my opinion, the application of the maxim here
would lead to inconsistency and injustice, and would make C
Section 14(1) of the Act of 1920 uncertain and capricious in
its operation.”
312. The maxim “lex non cogit ad impossibilia” means that the
law does not expect the performance of the impossible. Though payment
is possible but the logic of payment is relevant. There are cases in which D
compensation was tendered, but refused and then deposited in the
treasury. There was litigation in court, which was pending (or in some
cases, decided); earlier references for enhancement of compensation
were sought and compensation was enhanced. There was no challenge
to acquisition proceedings or taking possession etc. In pending matters E
in this Court or in the High Court even in proceedings relating to
compensation, Section 24 (2) was invoked to state that proceedings have
lapsed due to non-deposit of compensation in the court or to deposit in
the treasury or otherwise due to interim order of the court needful could
not be done, as such proceedings should lapse.
F
313. In Chander Kishore Jha v. Mahabir Prasad202, an election
petition was to be presented in the manner prescribed in Rule 6 of Chapter
XXI-E of the Patna High Court Rules. The rules stipulated that the
election petition, could under no circumstances, be presented to the
Registrar to save the period of limitation. The election petition could be
presented in the open court upto 4.15 p.m. i.e., working hours of the G
court. The Chief Justice had passed the order that court shall not sit for
the rest after 3.15 p.m. Thus, the petition filed the next day was held to
be within time. In Mohammed Gazi v. State of M.P. & Ors203., the
202
1999 (8) SCC 266
203
2000 (4) SCC 342 H
284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A maxim “actus curiae neminem gravabit” came up for consideration
along with maxim “lex non cogit ad impossibilia” – the law does not
compel a man to perform act which is not possible. Following observations
had been made:
“7. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the maxim of
B equity, namely, actus curiae neminem gravabit — an act of
the court shall prejudice no man, shall be applicable. This
maxim is founded upon justice and good sense, which serves
a safe and certain guide for the administration of law. The
other maxim is, lex non cogit ad impossibilia — the law does
not compel a man to do what he cannot possibly perform.
C The law itself and its administration are understood to disclaim
as it does in its general aphorisms, all intention of compelling
impossibilities, and the administration of law must adopt that
general exception in consideration of particular cases. The
applicability of the aforesaid maxims has been approved by
D this Court in Raj Kumar Dey v. Tarapada Dey, (1987) 4 SCC
398 and Gursharan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee,
(1996) 2 SCC 459.”
314. Another Roman Law maxim “nemo tenetur ad
impossibilia”, means no one is bound to do an impossibility. Though
E such acts of taking possession and disbursement of compensation are
not impossible, yet they are not capable of law performance, during
subsistence of a court’s order; the order has to be complied and cannot
be violated. Thus, on equitable principles also, such a period has to be
excluded. In Industrial Finance Corporation of India Ltd. v.
Cannanore Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. & Ors. 204, this Court
F observed that where law creates a duty or charge and the party is disabled
to perform it, without any default and has no remedy over, there the law
will in general excuse him. This Court relying upon the aforesaid maxim
observed as under:
“30. The Latin maxim referred to in the English judgment lex
G non cogit ad impossibilia also expressed as impotentia excusat
legem in common English acceptation means, the law does
not compel a man to do that which he cannot possibly perform.
There ought always thus to be an invincible disability to
perform the obligation, and the same is akin to the Roman
204
H 2002 (5) SCC 54
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 285
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

maxim nemo tenetur ad impossible. In Broom’s Legal Maxims, A
the state of the situation has been described as below:
“It is, then, a general rule which admits of ample
practical illustration, that impotentia excusat legem;
where the law creates a duty or charge, and the party is
disabled to perform it, without any default in him, and B
has no remedy over, there the law will in general excuse
him (t): and though impossibility of performance is, in
general, no excuse for not performing an obligation
which a party has expressly undertaken by contract,
yet when the obligation is one implied by law,
impossibility of performance is a good excuse. Thus in C
a case in which consignees of a cargo were prevented
from unloading a ship promptly by reason of a dock
strike, the Court, after holding that in the absence of
an express agreement to unload in a specified time there
was implied obligation to unload within a reasonable D
time, held that the maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia
applied, and Lindley, L.J., said: ‘We have to do with
implied obligations, and I am not aware of any case in
which an obligation to pay damages is ever cast by
implication upon a person for not doing that which is
rendered impossible by causes beyond his control.’ “ E

315. In HUDA and Anr. v. Dr. Babeswar Kanhar & Anr205, this
Court considered the general principle that a party prevented from doing
an act by some circumstances beyond his control, can do so at the first
subsequent opportunity as held in Sambasiva Chari v. Ramasami
Reddi206. In Dr. Babeswar Kanhar (supra), it was observed thus: F

“5. What is stipulated in clause 4 of the letter dated
30-10-2001 is a communication regarding refusal to accept
the allotment. This was done on 28-11-2001. Respondent 1
cannot be put to a loss for the closure of the office of HUDA
on 1-12-2001 and 2-12-2001 and the postal holiday on G
30-11-2001. In fact, he had no control over these matters.
Even the logic of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897,
can be pressed into service. Apart from the said section and
205
(2005) 1 SCC 191
206
ILR (1899) 22 Mad 179 H
286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A various provisions in various other Acts, there is the general
principle that a party prevented from doing an act by some
circumstances beyond his control, can do so at the first
subsequent opportunity (see Sambasiva Chari v. Ramasami
Reddi, (1898) 8 MLJ 265). The underlying object of the
principle is to enable a person to do what he could have done
B
on holiday, on the next working day. Where, therefore, a period
is prescribed for the performance of an act in a court or
office, and that period expires on holiday, then the act should
be considered to have been done within that period if it is
done on the next day on which the court or office is open.
C The reason is that the law does not compel the performance
of an impossibility. (See Hossein Ally v. Donzelle, ILR (1880)
5 Cal 906.) Every consideration of justice and expediency
would require that the accepted principle, which underlies
Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, should be applied in
cases where it does not otherwise in terms apply. The principles
D
underlying are lex non cogit ad impossibilia (the law does
not compel a man to do the impossible) and actus curiae
neminem gravabit (the act of court shall prejudice no man).
Above being the position, there is nothing infirm in the orders
passed by the forums below. However, the rate of interest fixed
E appears to be slightly on the higher side and is reduced to
9% to be paid with effect from 3-12-2001, i.e., the date on
which the letter was received by HUDA.”
316. In re Presidential Poll 207 , this Court made similar
observations. When there is a disability to perform a part of the law,
F such a charge has to be excused. When performance of the formalities
prescribed by a statute is rendered impossible by circumstances over
which the persons concerned have no control, it has to be taken as a
valid excuse. The Court observed:
“15. The impossibility of the completion of the election to fill
G the vacancy in the office of the President before the expiration
of the term of office in the case of death of a candidate as
may appear from Section 7 of the 1952 Act does not rob Article
62(1) of its mandatory character. The maxim of law impotentia
excusat legam is intimately connected with another maxim of
207
H (1974) 2 SCC 33
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 287
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

law lex non cogit ad impossibilia. Impotentia excusat legam A
is that when there is a necessary or invincible disability to
perform the mandatory part of the law that impotentia excuses.
The law does not compel one to do that which one cannot
possibly perform. “Where the law creates a duty or charge,
and the party is disabled to perform it, without any default in
B
him and has no remedy over it, there the law will in general
excuse him.” Therefore, when it appears that the performance
of the formalities prescribed by a statute has been rendered
impossible by circumstances over which the persons interested
had no control, like the act of God, the circumstances will be
taken as a valid excuse. Where the act of God prevents the C
compliance of the words of a statute, the statutory provision
is not denuded of its mandatory character because of
supervening impossibility caused by the act of God. (See
Broom’s Legal Maxims 10th Edn. At pp. 162-163 and Craies
on Statute Law 6th Edn. at p. 268).”
D
317. In Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of
Enforcement208, the legal maxim “impotentia excusat legem” has been
applied to hold that law does not compel a man to do that which cannot
possibly be performed. Though the maxim with respect to the impossibility
of performance may not be strictly applicable, however, the effect of
the court’s order, for the time being, made the Authorities disable to E
fulfill the obligation. Thus, when they were incapable of performing,
they have to be permitted to perform at the first available opportunity,
which is the time prescribed by the statute for them, i.e., the total period
of 5 years excluding the period of the interim order.
318. The maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit is founded upon F
the principle due to court proceedings or acts of court, no party should
suffer. If any interim orders are made during the pendency of the litigation,
they are subject to the final decision in the matter. In case the matter is
dismissed as without merit, the interim order is automatically dissolved.
In case the matter has been filed without any merit, the maxim is attracted G
commodum ex injuria sua nemo habere debet, that is, convenience
cannot accrue to a party from his own wrong. No person ought to have
the advantage of his own wrong. In case litigation has been filed frivolously
or without any basis, iniquitously in order to delay and by that it is delayed,
208
(2005) 4 SCC 530
H
288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A there is no equity in favour of such a person. Such cases are required to
be decided on merits. In Mrutunjay Pani and Anr. v. Narmada Bala
Sasmal and Anr209, this Court observed that:
“(5) X x x The same principle is comprised in the latin maxim
commodum ex injuria sua nemo habere debet, that is,
B convenience cannot accrue to a party from his own wrong.
To put it in other words, no one can be allowed to benefit
from his own wrongful act. …”
319. It is not the policy of law that untenable claims should get
fructified due to delay. Similarly, sufferance of a person who abides by
C law is not permissible. The Act of 2013 does not confer the benefit on
unscrupulous litigants, but it aims at and frowns upon the lethargy of the
officials to complete the requisites within five years.
320. The States urge that by refusal to accept compensation, one
cannot take advantage of own conduct. This idea is explained in Maxwell
D on the Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edition) by P. St. J. Langon,
wherein following observations have been made:
“On the principles of avoiding injustice and absurdity, any
construction will, if possible, be rejected (unless the policy of
the Act requires it) if it would enable a person by his own act
E to impair an obligation which he has undertaken, or otherwise
to profit by his own wrong. He may not take advantage of his
own wrong. He may not plead in his own interest a self created
necessity” (Kish v. Taylor, (1911) 1 K.B. 625, per Fletcher
Moulton I.J. at page 634).

F Thus an Act which authorised justices to discharge apprentice
from his indenture in certain circumstances “on the master’s
appearance” before them justified a discharge in his wilful
absence. It would have been unreasonable to have construed
the Act in such a way that the master derived an advantage
from his own obstinacy (Ditton’s Case (1701) 2 Salk. 490)”
G
321. In G.T.C. Industries Ltd. v. Union of India 210, it was
observed that while vacating stay, it is the court’s duty to account for the
period of delay and to settle equities. It is not the gain which can be
209
AIR 1961 SC 1353
210
(1998) 3 SCC 376
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 289
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

conferred. In Jaipur Municipal Corporation v. C. L. Mishra211, it has A
been observed that interim order merges in the final order, and it cannot
have an independent existence, cannot survive beyond final decision. In
Ram Krishna Verma v. the State of U.P212, reliance was placed on
Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. C.I.T213. It was held that no one could be
permitted to suffer from the act of the court and in case an interim order
B
has been passed and ultimately petition is found to be without merit and
is dismissed, the interest of justice requires that any undeserved or unfair
advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court must
be neutralized.
322. In Mahadeo Savlaram Shelke v. Pune Municipal
Corporation214, it has been observed that the Court can under its inherent C
jurisdiction ex debito justitiae has a duty to mitigate the damage suffered
by the defendants by the act of the court. Such action is necessary to
put a check on abuse of process of the court. In Amarjeet Singh and
Ors. v. Devi Ratan and Ors215, and Ram Krishna Verma (supra), it
was observed that no person can suffer from the act of court and unfair D
advantage of the interim order must be neutralized. In Amarjeet Singh
(supra), this Court observed:
“17. No litigant can derive any benefit from mere pendency
of the case in a court of law, as the interim order always
merges in the final order to be passed in the case, and if the E
writ petition is ultimately dismissed, the interim order stands
nullified automatically. A party cannot be allowed to take
any benefit of its own wrongs by getting an interim order and
thereafter blame the court. The fact that the writ is found,
ultimately, devoid of any merit, shows that a frivolous writ
petition had been filed. The maxim actus curiae neminem F
gravabit, which means that the act of the court shall prejudice
no one, becomes applicable in such a case. In such a fact
situation, the court is under an obligation to undo the wrong
done to a party by the act of the court. Thus, any undeserved
or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the G
jurisdiction of the court must be neutralized, as the institution
211
(2005) 8 SCC 423
212
(1992) 2 SCC 620
213
(1980) 2 SCC 191
214
(1995) 3 SCC 33
215
(2010) 1 SCC 417 H
290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A of litigation cannot be permitted to confer any advantage on
a suitor from delayed action by the act of the court. (Vide
Shiv Shankar v. U.P. SRTC, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 726, GTC
Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (1998) 3 SCC 376 and Jaipur
Municipal Corpn. v. C.L. Mishra, (2005) 8 SCC 423.)
B 18. In Ram Krishna Verma v. the State of U.P. (1992) 2 SCC
620, this Court examined a similar issue while placing reliance
upon its earlier judgment in Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. ITO, (1980)
2 SCC 191 and held that no person can suffer from the act of
the court and in case an interim order has been passed, and
the petitioner takes advantage thereof, and ultimately the
C petition is found to be without any merit and is dismissed, the
interest of justice requires that any undeserved or unfair
advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the
court must be neutralized.”
323. In Karnataka Rare Earth and Anr. v. Senior Geologist,
D Department of Mines & Geology216, this Court observed that maxim
actus curiae neminem gravabit requires that the party should be placed
in the same position but for the court’s order which is ultimately found to
be not sustainable which has resulted in one party gaining advantage
which otherwise would not have earned and the other party has suffered
E but for the orders of the court. The successful party can demand the
delivery of benefit earned by the other party, or make restitution for
what it has lost. This Court observed:
“10. In x x x x the doctrine of actus curiae neminem gravabit
and held that the doctrine was not confined in its application
F only to such acts of the court which were erroneous; the
doctrine is applicable to all such acts as to which it can be
held that the court would not have so acted had it been
correctly apprised of the facts and the law. It is the principle
of restitution that is attracted. When on account of an act of
the party, persuading the court to pass an order, which at the
G end is held as not sustainable, has resulted in one party
gaining advantage which it would not have otherwise earned,
or the other party has suffered an impoverishment which it
would not have suffered, but for the order of the court and
the act of such party, then the successful party finally held
216
H (2004) 2 SCC 783
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 291
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

entitled to a relief, assessable in terms of money at the end of A
the litigation, is entitled to be compensated in the same manner
in which the parties would have been if the interim order of
the court would not have been passed. The successful party
can demand: (a) the delivery of benefit earned by the opposite
party under the interim order of the court, or (b) to make
B
restitution for what it has lost.
11. In the facts of this case, in spite of the judgment of the
High Court, if the appellants would not have persuaded this
Court to pass the interim orders, they would not have been
entitled to operate the mining leases and to raise and remove
and dispose of the minerals extracted. But for the interim C
orders passed by this Court, there is no difference between
the appellants and any person raising, without any lawful
authority, any mineral from any land, attracting applicability
of sub-section (5) of Section 21. As the appellants have lost
from the Court, they cannot be allowed to retain the benefit D
earned by them under the interim orders of the Court. The
High Court has rightly held the appellants liable to be placed
in the same position in which they would have been if this
Court would not have protected them by issuing interim orders.
All that the State Government is demanding from the appellants
is the price of the minor minerals. Rent, royalty or tax has E
already been recovered by the State Government and,
therefore, there is no demand under that head. No penal
proceedings, much less any criminal proceedings, have been
initiated against the appellants. It is absolutely incorrect to
contend that the appellants are being asked to pay any F
penalty or are being subjected to any penal action. It is not
the case of the appellants that they are being asked to pay
the price more than what they have realized from the exports
or that the price appointed by the respondent State is in any
manner arbitrary or unreasonable.”
G
(emphasis supplied)
324. In A.R. Antulay (supra), this Court observed that it is a settled
principle that an act of the court shall prejudice no man. This maxim
actus curiae neminem gravabit is founded upon justice and good sense
and affords a safe and certain guide for the administration of the law. H
292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A No man can be denied his rights. In India, a delay occurs due to
procedural wrangles. In A.R. Antulay (supra), this Court observed:
“102. This being the apex court, no litigant has any
opportunity of approaching any higher forum to question its
decisions. Lord Buckmaster in Montreal Street Railway Co. v.
B Normadin, 1917 AC 170 (sic) stated:
“All rules of court are nothing but provisions intended to secure
the proper administration of justice. It is, therefore, essential
that they should be made to serve and be subordinate to that
purpose.”
C This Court in State of Gujarat v. Ramprakash P. Puri, (1970)
2 SCR 875, reiterated the position by saying: [SCC p. 159:
SCC (Cri) p. 31, para 8]
“Procedure has been described to be a handmaid and not a
mistress of law, intended to subserve and facilitate the cause
D of justice and not to govern or obstruct it. Like all rules of
procedure, this rule demands a construction which would
promote this cause.”
Once judicial satisfaction is reached that the direction was
not open to be made and it is accepted as a mistake of the
E court, it is not only appropriate but also the duty of the court
to rectify the mistake by exercising inherent powers. Judicial
opinion heavily leans in favour of this view that a mistake of
the court can be corrected by the court itself without any
fetters. This is on principle, as indicated in (Alexander) Rodger
F case (1869-71) LR 3 PC 465. I am of the view that in the
present situation, the court’s inherent powers can be exercised
to remedy the mistake. Mahajan., J. speaking for a Four
Judge Bench in Keshardeo Chamria v. Radha Kissen Chamria,
1953 SCR 136 at Page 153 stated:
“The judge had jurisdiction to correct his own error without
G
entering into a discussion of the grounds taken by the decree-
holder or the objections raised by the judgment-debtors.”
325. In Superintendent of Taxes v. Onkarmal Nathmal Trust217,
this Court considered the conduct of the State Government in not
H 217
(1976) 1 SCC 766
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 293
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

questioning the interim order at any stage in seeking variation or A
modification of the order of injunction. It was held that the State could
not take advantage of its own wrong and lack of diligence and could not
contend it was impossible to issue notice within the purview of Section
7(2) of the new Act. The decision is distinguishable and turns on its own
facts. Though the act is possible to be performed but not as per the
B
public policy which frowns upon violation of the court’s interim order.
The decision cannot be applied, particularly in view of the provisions
contained in Section 24(2), and on facts, it has no application.
326. Reliance was placed on Neeraj Kumar Sainy v. the State
of U.P.218. There, this Court observed that no one should suffer any
prejudice because of the act of the court; the legal maxim cannot operate C
in a vacuum. It has to get the sustenance from the facts. As the appellants
resigned to their fate and woke up to have control over the events
forgetting that the law does not assist the non-vigilant. One cannot indulge
in the luxury of lethargy, possibly nurturing the feeling that forgetting is a
virtue. If such is the conduct, it is not permissible to take shelter under D
the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit. There is no dispute with
the aforesaid principle. Party has to be vigilant about the right, but the
ratio cannot be applied. In the opinion, the ratio in the decision cannot
be applied for the purpose of interpretation of Section 24(2).
327. There can be no doubt that when parties are before court, E
the final decision has to prevail, and they succeed or fail based on the
merits of their relative cases. Neither can be permitted to take shelter
under the cover of court’s order to put the other party in a disadvantageous
position. If one has enjoyed under the court’s cover, that period cannot
be included towards inaction of the authorities to take requisite steps
under Section 24. The State authorities would have acted but for the F
court’s order. In fact, the occasion for the petitioners to approach
the court in those cases, was that the State or acquiring bodies
were taking their properties. Ultimately case had to stand on its merit
in the challenge to the acquisition or compensation, and no right or
advantage could therefore be conferred (or accrue) under Section 24(2) G
in such situations.
328. The argument of the landowners was that on the one hand,
the court should not discern a casus omissus and in effect, the absence
of provision to exclude the time during which an interim order operated,
218
(2017) 14 SCC 136 H
294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A means that Parliament intended such omission. The maxim ‘expressio
unius est exclusio alterious’ means that express mention of one or
more persons or things of a particular class may be regarded as by
implication excluding all others of that class. The maxim, however, does
not apply when the provisions of the legislation in question show that the
exclusion could not have been intended. In Colquhoun v. Brooks219,
B
the House of Lords opined that:
“The maxim ‘expressio unius est exclusio alterious’ has been
pressed upon us. I agree with what is said in the court below
by Wills, J. about this maxim. It is often a valuable servant,
but a dangerous master to follow in the construction of statutes
C or documents. The ‘exclusio’ is often the result of inadvertence
or accident, and the maxim ought not to be applied when its
application, having regard to the subject matter to which it is
to be applied, leads to inconsistency or injustice.”
Lewis Sutherland’s Statutory Construction (2nd ed.), Section 491,
D applies the rule as follows:
“Expressio unius est exclusio alterious - The maxim, like all
rules of construction, is applicable under certain conditions
to determine the intent of the lawmaker when it is not otherwise
manifest. Under these conditions, it leads to safe and
E satisfactory conclusions; but otherwise the expression of one
or more things is not a negation or exclusion of other things.
What is expressed is exclusive only when it is creative, or in
derogation of some existing law, or of some provisions in the
particular act. The maxim is applicable to a statutory provision
F which grants originally a power or right.”
329. In a case before the United States Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals decided on 5th November, 1934, Yardley & Co. Ltd. V.
United States, the court considered the question of classification and
assessment with duty of certain merchandise consisting of empty glass
G jars and lids, and whether these could be considered as ‘entireties’ that
would be dutiable under paragraph 33 of the Tariff Act of 1930. The
court in that case relied on the observations in Colquhoun v. Brooks
(supra) and held that the glass jars with their lids would be dutiable as
entireties, despite there not being an express legislative provision to that
219
H (1889) 21 QBD 52
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 295
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

effect. It was held that the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterious A
would not be applicable in the context of the legislative provision in the
Tariff Acts of 1909, 1913 and 1922, as the relevant provision therein (in
the 1930 Act) was merely declaratory in nature and not in derogation of
existing law. In Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. National
Tobacco Company of India Ltd.220, this Court held that the rule of
B
expressio unius est exclusio alterious:
“is subservient to the basic principle that courts must
endeavour to ascertain the legislative intent and purpose,
and then adopt a rule of construction which effectuates rather
than one that may defeat these.”
C
330. In Karnataka State v. Union of India221, the Court observed
that:
“Before the principle can be applied at all the Court must
find an express mode of doing something that is provided in a
statute, which, by its necessary implication, could exclude D
the doing of that very thing and not something else in some
other way. Far from this being the case here, as the discussion
above has shown, the Constitution makers intended to cover
the making of provisions by Parliament for inquiries for
various objects which may be matters of public importance
without any indications of any other limits except that they E
must relate to subjects found in the Lists. I have also indicated
why a provision like Section 3 of the Act would, in any case,
fall under entry 97 of List I of Schedule VII read with Articles
248 and 356 of the Constitution even if all subjects to which
it may relate are not found specified in the lists. Thus, there is F
express provision in our Constitution to cover an enactment
such as Section 3 of the Act, hence, there is no room
whatsoever for applying the “Expressio Unius” rule to exclude
what falls within an expressly provided legislative entry. That
maxim has been aptly described as a “useful servant but a
dangerous master “ (per Lopes L.J. in Colquhoun v. Brooks G
[1888] 21 Q.B.D. The limitations or conditions under which
this principle of construction operates are frequently
overlooked by those who attempt to apply it.
220
(1972) 2 SCC 560
221
(1977) 4 SCC 608 H
296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A To advance the balder and broader proposition that what is
not specifically mentioned in the Constitution must be deemed
to be deliberately excluded from its purview, so that nothing
short of a Constitutional amendment could authorise
legislation upon it, is really to invent a “Cams Omissus” so as
to apply the rule that, where there is such a gap in the law,
B
the Court cannot fill it. The rule, however, is equally clear
that the Court cannot so interpret a statute as “to produce a
casus omissus” where there is really none (see: The Mersey
Docks and Harbour Board v. Penderson Brothers [1888] 13
A.C. 595). If our Constitution itself provides for legislation to
C fill what is sought to be construed as a lacuna, how can
legislation seeking to do this be held to be void because it
performs its intended function by an exercise of an expressly
conferred legislative power? In declaring the purpose of the
provisions so made and the authority for making it, Courts
do not supply an omission or fill up a gap at all. It is Parliament
D
which can do so and has done it. To hold that parliament is
incompetent to do this is to substitute an indefensible theory
or a figment of one’s imagination- that the Constitution stands
in the way somehow-for that which only a clear Constitutional
bar could achieve.”
E In Mary Angel (supra) this Court observed as follows:
“…The rule of interpretation on the basis of the maxim
“expressio unius est exclusio alterius”, … has been considered
in the decision rendered by the Queen’s Bench in the case of
Dean v. Wiesengrund (1955) 2 QBD 120. The Court
F considered the said maxim and held that after all it is more
than an aid to construction and has little, if any, weight where
it is possible to account for the “exclusio unius” on grounds
other than intention to effect the “exclusio alterius”.
Thereafter, the Court referred to the following passage from
G the case of Colquhoon v. Brooks (1887) 19 QBD 400 wherein
the Court called for its approval – “The maxim ‘expressio
unius est exclusio alterius’ has been pressed upon us. I agree
with what is said in the Court below by Wills J, about this
maxim. It is often a valuable servant, but a dangerous master
to follow in the construction of statutes of documents. The
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 297
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

exclusio is often the result of inadvertence or accident, and A
the maxim ought not to be applied, when its application having
regard to the subject matter to which it is to be applied, leads
to inconsistency or injustice. In my opinion, the application
of the maxim here would lead to inconsistency and injustice,
and would make Section 14(1) of the Act of 1920 uncertain
B
and capricious in its operation.”
The aforesaid maxim was referred to by this Court in the case
of Asst. Collector, Central Excise v. National Tobacco Co.
1978 (2) ELT 416 (SC), the Court in that case considered the
question whether there was or was not an implied power to
hold an inquiry in the circumstances of the case in view of C
the provisions of the Section 4 of the Central Excise Act read
with Rule 10(A) of the Central Excise Rules and referred to
the aforesaid passage “the maxim” is often a valuable servant,
but a dangerous master ...’ and held that the rule is subservient
to the basic principle that Courts must endeavour to ascertain D
the legislative intent and purpose, and then adopt a rule of
construction which effectuates rather than one that may
defeat these. Moreover, the rule of prohibition by necessary
implication could be applied only where a specified procedure
is laid down for the performance of a duty. In the case of
Parbhani Transport Co-op Society Ltd. v. R.T.A. Aurangabad E
[1960] 3 SCR 177, this Court observed that the maxim
‘expressio unius est exclusio alterius’ is a maxim for
ascertaining the intention of the legislature and where the
statutory language is plain and the meaning clear, there is no
scope for applying. Further, in Harish Chander Vajpai v. F
Triloki Singh, [1957] 1 SCR 370, the Court referred to the
following passage from Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes,
10th Edition, pages 316-317:
“Provisions sometimes found in statutes, enacting
imperfectly or for particular cases only that which was G
already and more widely the law, have occasionally
furnished ground for the contention that an intention to
alter the general law was to be inferred from the partial or
limited enactment, resting on the maxim expressio unius,
exclusio alterius. But that maxim is inapplicable in such
H
298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A cases. The only inference which a court can draw from
such superfluous provisions (which generally find a place
in Acts to meet unfounded objections and idle doubts), is
that the Legislature was either ignorant or unmindful of
the real state of the law, or that it acted under the influence
of excessive caution.
B
Lastly, we would state that in the case of Pampathy v. State of
Mysore (supra), the Court has specifically observed that no
legislative enactment dealing with the procedure can provide for
all cases and that Court should have inherent powers apart from
the express provisions of law which are necessary for the proper
C discharge of duties.”
331. For all these reasons, it is held that the omission to expressly
enact a provision, that excludes the period during which any interim
order was operative, preventing the State from taking possession of
acquired land, or from giving effect to the award, in a particular case or
D cases, cannot result in the inclusion of such period or periods for the
purpose of reckoning the period of 5 years. Also, merely because timelines
are indicated, with the consequence of lapsing, under Sections 19 and 69
of the Act of 2013, per se does not mean that omission to factor such
time (of subsistence of interim orders) has any special legislative intent.
This Court notices, in this context, that even under the new Act (nor was
E it so under the 1894 Act) no provision has been enacted, for lapse of the
entire acquisition, for non-payment of compensation within a specified
time; nor has any such provision been made regarding possession.
Furthermore, non-compliance with payment and deposit provisions (under
Section 77) only results in higher interest pay-outs under Section 80.
F The omission to provide for exclusion of time during which interim orders
subsisted, while determining whether or not acquisitions lapsed, in the
present case, is a clear result of inadvertence or accident, having regard
to the subject matter, refusal to apply the principle underlying the maxim
actus curae neminem gravabit would result in injustice.
In Re: Principle of Restitution:
G
332. The principle of restitution is founded on the ideal of doing
complete justice at the end of litigation, and parties have to be placed in
the same position but for the litigation and interim order, if any, passed in
the matter. In South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. State of M.P. & Ors.222,
222
H (2003) 8 SCC 648
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 299
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

it was held that no party could take advantage of litigation. It has to A
disgorge the advantage gained due to delay in case lis is lost. The interim
order passed by the court merges into a final decision. The validity of an
interim order, passed in favour of a party, stands reversed in the event of
a final order going against the party successful at the interim stage.
Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not the fountain source of
restitution. It is rather a statutory recognition of the rule of justice, equity B
and fair play. The court has inherent jurisdiction to order restitution so as
to do complete justice. This is also on the principle that a wrong order
should not be perpetuated by keeping it alive and respecting it. In exercise
of such power, the courts have applied the principle of restitution to
myriad situations not falling within the terms of section 144 CPC. What C
attracts applicability of restitution is not the act of the court being wrongful
or mistake or an error committed by the court; the test is whether, on
account of an act of the party persuading the court to pass an order held
at the end as not sustainable, resulting in one party gaining an advantage
which it would not have otherwise earned, or the other party having
suffered an impoverishment, restitution has to be made. Litigation cannot D
be permitted to be a productive industry. Litigation cannot be reduced to
gaming where there is an element of chance in every case. If the concept
of restitution is excluded from application to interim orders, then the
litigant would stand to gain by swallowing the benefits yielding out of the
interim order. This Court observed in South Eastern Coal Field (supra)
thus: E

“26. In our opinion, the principle of restitution takes care of
this submission. The word “restitution” in its etymological
sense means restoring to a party on the modification, variation
or reversal of a decree or order, what has been lost to him in
execution of decree or order of the court or in direct F
consequence of a decree or order (see Zafar Khan v. Board
of Revenue, U.P., 1984 Supp SCC 505) In law, the term
“restitution” is used in three senses: (i) return or restoration
of some specific thing to its rightful owner or status; (ii)
compensation for benefits derived from a wrong done to G
another; and (iii) compensation or reparation for the loss
caused to another. (See Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th Edn., p.
1315). The Law of Contracts by John D. Calamari & Joseph
M. Perillo has been quoted by Black to say that “restitution”
is an ambiguous term, sometimes referring to the disgorging
H
300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A of something which has been taken and at times referring to
compensation for the injury done:
“Often, the result under either meaning of the term would
be the same. … Unjust impoverishment, as well as unjust
enrichment, is a ground for restitution. If the defendant is
B guilty of a non-tortious misrepresentation, the measure of
recovery is not rigid but, as in other cases of restitution,
such factors as relative fault, the agreed-upon risks, and
the fairness of alternative risk allocations not agreed upon
and not attributable to the fault of either party need to be
weighed.”
C
The principle of restitution has been statutorily recognized in
Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Section
144 CPC speaks not only of a decree being varied, reversed,
set aside or modified but also includes an order on a par with
a decree. The scope of the provision is wide enough so as to
D include therein almost all the kinds of variation, reversal,
setting aside or modification of a decree or order. The interim
order passed by the court merges into a final decision. The
validity of an interim order, passed in favor of a party, stands
reversed in the event of a final decision going against the
E party successful at the interim stage.
xxx
27. x x x
This is also on the principle that a wrong order should not be
F perpetuated by keeping it alive and respecting it (A. Arunagiri
Nadar v. S.P. Rathinasami, (1971) 1 MLJ 220). In the exercise
of such inherent power, the courts have applied the principles
of restitution to myriad situations not strictly falling within
the terms of Section 144.
28. That no one shall suffer by an act of the court is not a
G
rule confined to an erroneous act of the court; the “act of the
court” embraces within its sweep all such acts as to which
the court may form an opinion in any legal proceedings that
the court would not have so acted had it been correctly
apprised of the facts and the law. x x x the concept of restitution
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 301
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

is excluded from application to interim orders, then the litigant A
would stand to gain by swallowing the benefits yielding out
of the interim order even though the battle has been lost at
the end. This cannot be countenanced. We are, therefore, of
the opinion that the successful party finally held entitled to a
relief assessable in terms of money at the end of the litigation,
B
is entitled to be compensated by award of interest at a suitable
reasonable rate for the period for which the interim order of
the court withholding the release of money had remained in
operation.”
(emphasis supplied)
C
333. In State of Gujarat & Ors. v. Essar Oil Ltd. & Anr223, it
was observed that the principle of restitution is a remedy against unjust
enrichment or unjust benefit. The Court observed:
“61. The concept of restitution is virtually a common law
principle, and it is a remedy against unjust enrichment or D
unjust benefit. The core of the concept lies in the conscience
of the court, which prevents a party from retaining money or
some benefit derived from another, which it has received by
way of an erroneous decree of the court. Such remedy in
English Law is generally different from a remedy in contract
or in tort and falls within the third category of common law E
remedy, which is called quasi-contract or restitution.
62. If we analyze the concept of restitution, one thing emerges
clearly that the obligation to restitute lies on the person or
the authority that has received unjust enrichment or unjust
benefit (see Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 9, p. F
434).”
334. In A. Shanmugam v. Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu
Madalaya Nandhavana Paripalanai Sangam224, it was stated that
restitutionary jurisdiction is inherent in every court, to neutralize the
advantage of litigation. A person on the right side of the law should not G
be deprived, on account of the effects of litigation; the wrongful gain of
frivolous litigation has to be eliminated if the faith of people in the judiciary
has to be sustained. The Court observed:
223
(2012) 3 SCC 522
224
(2012) 6 SCC 430 H
302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A “37. This Court, in another important case in Indian Council
for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India (of which one of
us, Dr. Bhandari, J. was the author of the judgment) had an
occasion to deal with the concept of restitution. The relevant
paragraphs of that judgment dealing with relevant judgments
are reproduced hereunder: (SCC pp. 238-41 & 243-46, paras
B
170-76, 183-88 & 190-93)
“170. x x x
171. In Ram Krishna Verma v. the State of U.P. this Court
observed as under: (SCC p. 630, para 16)
C ‘16. The 50 operators, including the appellants/private
operators, have been running their stage carriages by blatant
abuse of the process of the court by delaying the hearing as
directed in Jeewan Nath Wahal’s case and the High Court
earlier thereto. As a fact, on the expiry of the initial period of
D the grant after 29-9-1959, they lost the right to obtain renewal
or to ply their vehicles, as this Court declared the scheme to
be operative. However, by sheer abuse of the process of law,
they are continuing to ply their vehicles pending the hearing
of the objections. This Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. ITO
held that the High Court, while exercising its power under
E Article 226, the interest of justice requires that any undeserved
or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the
jurisdiction of the court must be neutralized. It was further
held that the institution of the litigation by it should not be
permitted to confer an unfair advantage on the party
F responsible for it. In the light of that law and in view of the
power under Article 142(1) of the Constitution this Court,
while exercising its jurisdiction would do complete justice and
neutralize the unfair advantage gained by the 50 operators
including the appellants in dragging the litigation to run the
stage carriages on the approved route or area or portion
G thereof and forfeited their right to hearing of the objections
filed by them to the draft scheme dated 26-2-1959.’
172. This Court in Kavita Trehan v. Balsara Hygiene
Products Ltd. observed as under: (SCC p. 391, para 22)

H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 303
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

‘22. The jurisdiction to make restitution is inherent in A
every court and will be exercised whenever the justice of the
case demands. It will be exercised under inherent powers,
where the case did not strictly fall within the ambit of Section
144. Section 144 opens with the words:
“144. Application for restitution.—(1) Where and insofar as B
a decree or an order is varied or reversed in any appeal,
revision or other proceeding or is set aside or modified in
any suit instituted for the purpose ….”
The instant case may not strictly fall within the terms of
Section 144, but the aggrieved party in such a case can C
appeal to the larger and general powers of restitution inherent
in every court.’
173. This Court in Marshall Sons & Co. (I) Ltd. v. Sahi
Oretrans (P) Ltd. observed as under: (SCC pp. 326-27, para
4) D
‘4. From the narration of the facts, though it appears
to us, prima facie, that a decree in favor of the appellant is
not being executed for some reason or the other, we do not
think it proper at this stage to direct the respondent to deliver
the possession to the appellant since the suit filed by the E
respondent is still pending. It is true that proceedings are
dragged on for a long time on one count or the other and, on
occasion, become highly technical accompanied by unending
prolixity at every stage, providing a legal trap to the unwary.
Because of the delay, unscrupulous parties to the proceedings
take undue advantage, and the person who is in wrongful F
possession draws delight in delay in disposal of the cases by
taking undue advantage of procedural complications. It is
also a known fact that after obtaining a decree for possession
of the immovable property, its execution takes a long time. In
such a situation, for protecting the interest of the judgment- G
creditor, it is necessary to pass appropriate orders so that
reasonable mesne profit which may be equivalent to the market
rent is paid by a person who is holding over the property.
Inappropriate cases, the court may appoint a Receiver and
direct the person who is holding over the property to act as
H
304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A an agent of the [Receiver with a direction to deposit the royalty
amount fixed by the] Receiver or pass such other order which
may meet the interest of justice. This may prevent further injury
to the plaintiff in whose favor the decree is passed and to
protect the property, including further alienation.’
B 174. In Padmawati v. Harijan Sewak Sangh decided
by the Delhi High Court on 6-11-2008, the Court held as
under: (DLT p. 413, para 6)
‘6. The case at hand shows that frivolous defenses and
frivolous litigation is a calculated venture involving no risks
C situation. You have only to engage professionals to prolong
the litigation so as to deprive the rights of a person and enjoy
the fruits of illegalities. I consider that in such cases where
the court finds that using the courts as a tool, a litigant has
perpetuated illegalities or has perpetuated an illegal
possession, the court must impose costs on such litigants which
D should be equal to the benefits derived by the litigant and
harm and deprivation suffered by the rightful person so as to
check the frivolous litigation and prevent the people from
reaping a rich harvest of illegal acts through the courts. One
of the aims of every judicial system has to be to discourage
E unjust enrichment using courts as a tool. The costs imposed
by the courts must in all cases should be the real costs equal
to deprivation suffered by the rightful person.’
We approve the findings of the High Court of Delhi in the
case mentioned above.
F 175. The High Court also stated: (Padmawati case, DLT
pp. 414-15, para 9)
‘9. Before parting with this case, we consider it necessary
to observe that one of the [main] reasons for overflowing of
court dockets is the frivolous litigation in which the courts
G are engaged by the litigants and which is dragged on for as
long as possible. Even if these litigants ultimately lose the lis,
they become the real victors and have the last laugh. This
class of people who perpetuate illegal acts by obtaining stays
and injunctions from the courts must be made to pay the
sufferer not only the entire illegal gains made by them as costs
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 305
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

to the person deprived of his right but also must be burdened A
with exemplary costs. The faith of people in judiciary can
only be sustained if the persons on the right side of the law
do not feel that even if they keep fighting for justice in the
court and ultimately win, they would turn out to be a fool
since winning a case after 20 or 30 years would make the
B
wrongdoer as real gainer, who had reaped the benefits for
all those years. Thus, it becomes the duty of the courts to see
that such wrongdoers are discouraged at every step, and even
if they succeed in prolonging the litigation due to their money
power, ultimately, they must suffer the costs of all these years’
long litigation. Despite the settled legal positions, the obvious C
wrongdoers, use one after another tier of judicial review
mechanism as a gamble, knowing fully well that dice is always
loaded in their favour since even if they lose, the time gained
is the real gain. This situation must be redeemed by the
courts.’
D
176. Against this judgment of the Delhi High Court,
Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 29197 of 2008 was
preferred to this Court. The Court passed the following order:
(SCC p. 460, para 1)
‘1. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for E
the parties. We find no ground to interfere with the well-
considered judgment passed by the High Court. The special
leave petition is, accordingly, dismissed.’
* * *
183. In Marshall Sons & Co. (I) Ltd. v. Sahi Oretrans F
(P) Ltd. this Court in para 4 of the judgment observed as
under: (SCC pp. 326-27)
‘4. … It is true that proceedings are dragged on for a
long time on one count or the other and, on occasion, become
highly technical accompanied by unending prolixity at every G
stage, providing a legal trap to the unwary. Because of the
delay, unscrupulous parties to the proceedings take undue
advantage, and a person who is in wrongful possession draws
delight in delay in disposal of the cases by taking undue
advantage of procedural complications. It is also a known
H
306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A fact that after obtaining a decree for possession of immovable
property, its execution takes a long time. In such a situation,
for protecting the interest of the judgment-creditor, it is
necessary to pass appropriate orders so that reasonable
mesne profit which may be equivalent to the market rent is
paid by a person who is holding over the property. In
B
appropriate cases, the court may appoint a Receiver and direct
the person who is holding over the property to act as an agent
of the Receiver with a direction to deposit the royalty amount
fixed by the Receiver or pass such other order which may
meet the interest of justice. This may prevent further injury to
C the plaintiff in whose favour the decree is passed and to protect
the property, including further alienation.’
184. In Ouseph Mathai v. M. Abdul Khadir, this Court
reiterated the legal position that: (SCC p. 328, para 13)
‘13. … [the] stay granted by the court does not confer
D a right upon a party and it is granted always subject to the
final result of the matter in the court and at the risks and
costs of the party obtaining the stay. After the dismissal of the
lis, the party concerned is relegated to the position which
existed prior to the filing of the petition in the court which
E had granted the stay. Grant of stay does not automatically
amount to extension of a statutory protection.”
There are other decisions as well, which iterate and apply the
same principle.225
335. A wrong-doer or in the present context, a litigant who takes
F his chances, cannot be permitted to gain by delaying tactics. It is the
duty of the judicial system to discourage undue enrichment or drawing
of undue advantage, by using the court as a tool. In Kalabharati
Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania226, it was observed that
courts should be careful in neutralizing the effect of consequential orders
G passed pursuant to interim orders. Such directions are necessary to check
the rising trend among the litigants to secure reliefs as an interim measure
225
Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India, (2011) 8 SCC 161,
Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. CIT, (1980) 2 SCC 191, Ram Krishna Verma v. the State of U.P.,
(1992) 2 SCC 620. Also Marshall Sons & Co. (I) Ltd. v. Sahi Oretrans (P) Ltd. and
Anr., (1999) 2 SCC 325.
226
(2010) 9 SCC 437
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 307
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

and avoid adjudication of the case on merits. Thus, the restitutionary A
principle recognizes and gives shape to the idea that advantages secured
by a litigant, on account of orders of court, at his behest, should not be
perpetuated; this would encourage the prolific or serial litigant, to approach
courts time and again and defeat rights of others- including undermining
of public purposes underlying acquisition proceedings. A different
B
approach would mean that, for instance, where two landowners (sought
to be displaced from their lands by the same notification) are awarded
compensation, of whom one allows the issue to attain finality- and moves
on, the other obdurately seeks to stall the public purpose underlying the
acquisition, by filing one or series of litigation, during the pendency of
which interim orders might inure and bind the parties, the latter would C
profit and be rewarded, with the deemed lapse condition under Section
24 (2). Such a consequence, in the opinion of this Court, was never
intended by Parliament; furthermore, the restitutionary principle requires
that the advantage gained by the litigant should be suitably offset, in
favour of the other party.
D
336. In Krishnaswamy S. Pd. v. Union of India 227, it was
observed that an unintentional mistake of the Court, which may prejudice
the cause of any party, must and alone could be rectified. Thus, in our
opinion, the period for which the interim order has operated under Section
24 has to be excluded for counting the period of 5 years under Section
24(2) for the various reasons mentioned above. E

In Re Question no.6: Whether Section 24 revives stale and
barred claim
337. Before proceeding further, in our opinion, Section 24
contemplates pending proceedings and not the concluded ones in which F
possession has been taken, and compensation has been paid or deposited.
Section 24 does not provide an arm or tool to question the legality of
proceedings, which have been undertaken under the Act of 1894 and
stood concluded before five years or more. It is only in cases where
possession has not been taken, nor compensation is paid, that there is a
lapse. In case possession has been taken, and compensation has not G
been deposited with respect to majority of landholdings, the beneficial
provision of the statute provides that all beneficiaries shall be paid
compensation as admissible under the Act of 2013. The beneficiaries,
i.e., landowners contemplated under the proviso to Section 24(2), are
227
(2006) 3 SCC 286 H
308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A the ones who were so recorded as beneficiaries as on the date of issuance
of notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894. The provision is not
meant to be invoked on the basis of void transactions, and by the persons
who have purchased on the basis of power of attorney or otherwise,
they cannot claim the benefit under Section 24 as is apparent from proviso
to Section 24(2) and the decision in Shiv Kumar and Ors. v. Union of
B
India and Ors 228.
338. This Court is cognizant that Section 24 is used for submitting
various claims, by way of filing applications in the pending proceedings
either before the High Court or this Court. There are cases in which in
the first round of litigation where the challenge to acquisition proceedings
C has failed, validity has been upheld, and possession has been taken after
passing of the award. It is contended that drawing of panchnama was
not the permissible mode to take possession, and actual physical
possession remains with such landowners/purchasers/power of attorney
holders as such benefit of Section 24 should be given to them
D notwithstanding the fact that they have withdrawn the compensation
also.
339. This Court is cognizant of cases where reference was sought
for enhancement of compensation, money was deposited in the treasury,
enhancement was made, and possession was taken. Yet, acquisitions
E have been questioned, and claims are being made under Section 24, that
acquisition has lapsed, as the deposit (of compensation amount) in the
treasury was not in accordance with the law, the amount should have
been deposited in reference court. Further, this Court also notes that
there have been cases in which after taking possession, when
development is complete, infrastructure has developed despite which
F claims are being made under Section 24, on the ground that either the
possession has not been taken in accordance with law or compensation
has been deposited in the treasury, thus questioning the acquisitions. The
decision in Mahavir and Ors. v. Union of India229 was an instance in
which a claim was made that acquisition was made more than a century
G ago, and compensation has not been paid as such acquisition has lapsed
relating to the land of Raisina Hills in New Delhi. The importance of
Raisina Hills is well-known to everybody. The grossest misuse of Section
24 has been sought to be made, which is intended to confer benefit. It
228
2019 (13) SCALE 698
229
H (2018) 3 SCC 588
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 309
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

was never intended to revive such claims and be used in the manner in A
which it has been today, where large numbers of acquisitions and
development projects, such as construction of roads, hospitals, townships,
housing projects, etc., are sought to be undone, though such acquisitions
have been settled in several rounds of litigation. In several matters, the
validity has been questioned under the guise as if the right has been
B
conferred for the first time under the Act of 2013, claiming that such
acquisitions have lapsed. There are also cases in which the claims for
release of land under Section 48 of the Act of 1894 have been dismissed.
Now, claims are made that as land is open and landowners/intermediaries/
POA holders continue to be in physical possession, thus, it should be
returned to them, as the acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2). C
Before us also arguments have been raised to grant relief in all such
cases by making purposive interpretation of benevolent provisions. It
was urged that this Court is bound to give relief as Section 24 is
retrospective in operation, and the authorities have not cared to take
possession for more than five years or more, and they have not paid the
D
compensation and deposited it in treasury which cannot be said to be
legal. It is declared that the acquisition has lapsed, and the land is given
back to them. In case any infrastructure is existing, the State Government
should acquire the land afresh after following the process of Act of
2013. Earlier, injustice was done to landowners, as observed in various
decisions mentioned above. We should not disturb the decisions of this E
Court and are bound to follow the law laid down in Pune Municipal
Corporation (supra) and the principle of stare decisis.
340. By and large, concluded cases are being questioned by way
of invoking the provisions contained in Section 24. In our considered
opinion, the legality of concluded cases cannot be questioned under the F
guise of Section 24(2) as it does not envisage or confer any such right to
question the proceedings and the acquisitions have been concluded long
back, or in several rounds of litigation as mentioned above, rights of the
parties have been settled.
341. In this context, it is noteworthy that the Urban Land (Ceiling G
and Regulation) Act, 1976, was repealed in the year 1999; thereafter,
claims were raised. After repeal, it was claimed that actual physical
possession has not been taken by the State Government as such repeal
has the effect of effacing the proceedings of taking possession, which it
was alleged, was not in accordance with the law. In State of Assam v.
H
310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma and Ors230, submission was raised by the State
of Assam that physical possession has been taken over by the competent
authority and it was submitted on behalf of landowner that procedure
prescribed under Section 10(5) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation)
Act, 1976, was not followed. It was before taking possession under
Section 10(6) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, the
B
notification under Section 10(5) was necessary; thus, no possession can
be said to have been taken within the meaning of Section 3 of the Repeal
Act. The question this Court had to consider was whether actual physical
possession was taken over in that case by the competent authority. The
State of Assam submitted that though possession was taken over in the
C year 1991, may be unilaterally and without notice to the landowner. It
was urged that mere non-compliance with Section 10(5) would be
insufficient to attract the provisions of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. This
Court repelled the submission of the landowner and held as under:
“15. The High Court has held that the alleged dispossession
D was not preceded by any notice under Section 10(5) of the
Act. Assuming that to be the case all that it would mean is that
on 7-12-1991 when the erstwhile owner was dispossessed
from the land in question, he could have made a grievance
based on Section 10(5) and even sought restoration of
possession to him no matter he would upon such restoration
E once again be liable to be evicted under Sections 10(5) and
10(6) of the Act upon his failure to deliver or surrender such
possession. In reality therefore unless there was something
that was inherently wrong so as to affect the very process of
taking over such as the identity of the land or the boundaries
F thereof or any other circumstance of a similar nature going
to the root of the matter hence requiring an adjudication, a
person who had lost his land by reason of the same being
declared surplus under Section 10(3) would not consider it
worthwhile to agitate the violation of Section 10(5) for he
can well understand that even when the Court may uphold
G his contention that the procedure ought to be followed as
prescribed, it may still be not enough for him to retain the
land for the authorities could the very next day dispossess
him from the same by simply serving a notice under Section
230
(2015) 5 SCC 321
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 311
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

10(5). It would, in that view, be an academic exercise for any A
owner or person in possession to find fault with his
dispossession on the ground that no notice under Section
10(5) had been served upon him.
16. The issue can be viewed from another angle also. Assuming
that a person in possession could make a grievance, no matter B
without much gain in the ultimate analysis, the question is
whether such grievance could be made long after the alleged
violation of Section 10(5). If actual physical possession was
taken over from the erstwhile landowner on 7-12-1991 as is
alleged in the present case, any grievance based on Section
10(5) ought to have been made within a reasonable time of C
such dispossession. If the owner did not do so, forcibly taking
over of possession would acquire legitimacy by sheer lapse
of time. In any such situation, the owner or the person in
possession must be deemed to have waived his right under
Section 10(5) of the Act. Any other view would, in our opinion, D
give a license to a litigant to make a grievance not because
he has suffered any real prejudice that needs to be redressed
but only because the fortuitous circumstance of a Repeal Act
tempted him to raise the issue regarding his dispossession
being in violation of the prescribed procedure.
E
17. Reliance was placed by the respondents upon the decision
of this Court in Hari Ram case. That decision does not, in our
view, lend much assistance to the respondents. We say so
because this Court was in State of UP v. Hari Ram, (2013) 4
SCC 280 considering whether the word “may” appearing in
Section 10(5) gave to the competent authority the discretion F
to issue or not to issue a notice before taking physical
possession of the land in question under Section 10(6). The
question of whether the breach of Section 10(5) and possible
dispossession without notice would vitiate the Act of
dispossession itself or render it non-est in the eye of the law G
did not fall for consideration in that case. In our opinion,
what Section 10(5) prescribes is an ordinary and logical
course of action that ought to be followed before the
authorities decided to use force to dispossess the occupant
under Section 10(6). In the case at hand, if the appellant’s
H
312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A version regarding dispossession of the erstwhile owner in
December 1991 is correct, the fact that such dispossession
was without a notice under Section 10(5) will be of no
consequence and would not vitiate or obliterate the Act of
taking possession for the purposes of Section 3 of the Repeal
Act. That is because Bhabadeb Sarma, erstwhile owner, had
B
not made any grievance based on breach of Section 10(5) at
any stage during his lifetime, implying thereby that he had
waived his right to do so.”
This Court held that provisions of the Repeal Act could not be
extended in such a case where possession has been taken without
C following the procedure, and the landowner cannot retain the land. This
Court also observed that once possession has been taken over in the
year 1991, any grievance as to non-compliance of Section 10(5) ought
to have been made within a reasonable time of such dispossession. By
sheer lapse of time, the possession would acquire legitimacy. Thus, the
D owner or the person in possession must be deemed to have waived his
right under Section 10(5) of the Act. This Court also observed that only
because of the fortuitous circumstance of a Repeal Act, which confers
certain rights, the litigation had tempted the landowner to raise the issue
regarding his dispossession being in violation of the prescribed procedure.
It is clear from the aforesaid decision that such claims cannot be
E entertained, and any such dispute raised belatedly was repelled by this
Court.
342. Section 24(2) is sought to be used as an umbrella so as to
question the concluded proceedings in which possession has been taken,
development has been made, and compensation has been deposited, but
F may be due to refusal, it has not been collected. The challenge to the
acquisition proceedings cannot be made within the parameters of Section
24(2) once panchnama had been drawn of taking possession, thereafter
re-entry or retaining the possession is that of the trespasser. The legality
of the proceedings cannot be challenged belatedly, and the right to
G challenge cannot be revived by virtue of the provisions of Section 24(2).
Section 24(2) only contemplates lethargy/inaction of the authorities to
act for five years or more. It is very easy to lay a claim that physical
possession was not taken, with respect to open land. Yet, once vesting
takes place, possession is presumed to be that of the owner, i.e., the
State Government and land has been transferred to the beneficiaries,
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 313
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

Corporations, Authorities, etc., for developmental purposes and third- A
party interests have intervened. Such challenges cannot be entertained
at all under the purview of Section 24(2) as it is not what is remotely
contemplated in Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013.
343. In matters of land acquisition, this Court has frowned upon,
and cautioned courts about delays and held that delay is fatal in questioning B
the land acquisition proceedings. In case possession has not been taken
in accordance with law and vesting is not in accordance with Section 16,
proceedings before courts are to be initiated within reasonable time, not
after the lapse of several decades.
344. In Hari Singh and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors231, there C
was a delay of two and a half years in questioning the proceedings. This
Court held that the writ petition was liable to be dismissed on the ground
of laches only.
345. In State of T.N. and Ors. v. L. Krishnan & Ors232, this
Court held that petitioners could not raise their claim at a belated stage. D
Following observations were made:
“45. There remains the last ground assigned by the High Court
in support of its decision. The High Court has held that the
non-compliance with sub-rules (b) and (c) of Rule 3 of the
Rules made by the Government of Tamil Nadu pursuant to E
Section 55(1) of the Land Acquisition Act vitiates the report
made under Section 5-A and consequently the declarations
made under Section 6. The said sub-rules provide that on
receipt of objections under Section 5-A, the Collector shall
fix a date of hearing to the objections and give notice of the
same to the objector as well as to the department. It is open to F
the department to file a statement by way of answer to the
objections filed by the landowners. The submission of the
writ petitioners was that in a given case, it might well happen
that in the light of the objections submitted by the landowners,
the department concerned may decide to drop the acquisition. G
Since no such opportunity was given to the department
concerned herein, it could not file its statement by way of
answer to their objections. This is said to be prejudice. We do

231
AIR 1984 SC 1020
232
(1996) 1 SCC 250 H
314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A not think it necessary to go into the merits of this submission
on account of the laches on the part of the writ petitioners.
As stated above, the declaration under Section 6 was made
sometime in the year 1978, and the writ petitioners chose to
approach the Court only in the years 1982-83. Had they raised
this objection at the proper time and if it were found to be
B
true and acceptable, the opportunity could have been given
to the Government to comply with the said requirement.
Having kept quiet for a number of years, the petitioners cannot
raise this contention in writ petitions filed at a stage when the
awards were about to be passed.”
C 346. In Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial
Development Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd233, this Court observed, with
respect to delay and laches that:
“29. It is thus well-settled law that when there is inordinate
delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in
D the acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court
should be loath to quash the notifications. The High Court
has, no doubt, discretionary powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution to quash the notification under Section 4(1) and
declaration under Section 6. But it should be exercised by
E taking all relevant factors into pragmatic consideration. When
the award was passed, and possession was taken, the Court
should not have exercised its power to quash the award which
is a material factor to be taken into consideration before
exercising power under Article 226. The fact that no third
party rights were created in the case is hardly a ground for
F interference. The Division Bench of the High Court was not
right in interfering with the discretion exercised by the learned
Single Judge dismissing the writ petition on the ground of
laches.
***
G
S.B. MAJUMDAR, J. (concurring)—I have gone through the
judgment prepared by my esteemed learned brother K.
Ramaswamy, J. I respectfully agree with the conclusion to the
effect that Respondents 1 and 2 had missed the bus by
233
H (1996) 11 SCC 501
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 315
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

adopting an indolent attitude in not challenging the A
acquisition proceedings promptly. Therefore, the result is
inevitable that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the
ground of gross delay and laches.
35. x x x The acquired land got vested in the State Government
and the Municipal Corporation free from all encumbrances B
as enjoined by Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act. Thus
right to get more compensation got vested in diverse claimants
bypassing the award, as well as the vested right, was created
in favor of the Bombay Municipal Corporation by virtue of
the vesting of the land in the State Government for being
handed over to the Corporation. All these events could not C
be wished away by observing that no third party rights were
created by them. The writ petition came to be filed after all
these events had taken place. Such a writ petition was clearly
stillborn due to gross delay and laches. I, therefore,
respectfully agree with the conclusion to which my learned D
brother Ramaswamy, J., has reached that on the ground of
delay and laches the writ petition is required to be dismissed,
and the appeal has to be allowed on that ground.”
(emphasis supplied)
There are several other decisions of this Court, where delay E
was held, to disentitle litigants any relief.234
347. In Jasveer Singh and Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh &
235
Ors. , the writ petition was filed in which High Court had directed the
redetermination of the compensation. In that case the matter was
remanded by this Court to consider the additional compensation under F
Section 23-(1A). Thereafter a submission was raised in the High Court
under Section 24. This Court held that the challenge could not have been
entertained. This Court observed thus:

G
234
In Hindustan Zinc Ltd. v. Bhagwan Singh Bhati and Ors., (2008) 3 SCC 462, there
was a fatal delay of 10 years in the filing of the writ petition. In Govt. of A.P. and Ors.
v. Kollutla Obi Reddy and Ors., (2005) 6 SCC 493, the writ petition was filed after six
years of the land acquisition. The writ petition was dismissed on the ground of delay
and laches.
235
(2017) 6 SCC 787
H
316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A “2. On 19-12-2005 the appellants filed a writ petition
before the High Court seeking quashing of the acquisition
proceedings which was decided by the High Court on 3-12-
2010 directing redetermination of compensation. The said
order was set aside by this Court on 16-10-2012 in State of
U.P. v. Jasveer Singh [Civil Appeal No.7535 of 2012, order
B
dated 16-10-2012 (SC)]. It was observed that:
“After considering the pros and cons, without entering
into serious controversies and making any comment on the
merit of the case, we are of the considered opinion that in
view of the judgment and order of this Court dated 26-11-
C 2010, which was passed in the presence of the counsel for
both the parties, the High Court ought not to have heard the
matter at all. Thus, the judgment and order impugned before
us have lost its sanctity. Therefore, the same is hereby set
aside.
D However, in order to meet the ends of justice, we remand
the case to the High Court to hear the writ petition afresh
expeditiously, preferably within a period of six months from
the date of production of the certified copy of the order before
the Hon’ble Chief Justice. The matter may be assigned to any
E particular Bench by the Hon’ble Chief Justice for final
disposal. The parties shall be at liberty to raise all factual
and legal issues involved in the case. The High Court is
requested to deal with the relevant issues in detail.
More so, if the respondents are so aggrieved regarding
F withdrawal of their appeals, which had been remanded by
this Court for determining the entitlement of interest under
Section 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 and an
application is made by the respondent to revive the same, the
High Court may consider and decide the said application in
accordance with law. All the matters shall be heard
G simultaneously by the same Bench if the appeals are restored.”
3. Thereafter, the High Court considered the contention
of the appellants that the award in respect of compensation
was no award in the eye of the law and though the possession
was taken long back and railway line had been laid out, the
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 317
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

acquisition proceedings were liable to be set aside, and A
compensation was liable to be awarded at present market rate.
The High Court rejected the said plea vide judgment dated
30-5-2014 in Jasvir Singh v. the State of U.P., 2014 SCC
OnLine All 8465. It was observed that objection of the
appellants against the award had already been considered
B
and remand by the Supreme Court on 12-9-2005 was only in
respect of statutory benefits. For the first time plea was sought
to be raised in the writ petition against validity of acquisition
which was impermissible in view of the law laid down by this
Court in Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, (1975) 4 SCC
285, Swaika Properties (P) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, (2008) C
4 SCC 695, Sawaran Lata v. State of Haryana, (2010) 4 SCC
532 and Banda Development Authority v. Moti Lal Agarwal,
(2011) 5 SCC 394. The judgment of this Court in Royal Orchid
Hotels v. G. Jayarama Reddy, (2011) 10 SCC 608, was
distinguished as that case related to the fraudulent exercise
D
of power of an eminent domain. The High Court concluded:
(Jasvir Singh case, 2014 SCC OnLine All 8465 (SCC OnLine
paras 45-47)
“45. Taking into consideration the entire facts and
circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the writ
petition is highly barred by laches and deserves to be dismissed E
on the ground of laches alone.
46. As has been observed above, the petitioners’ main
grievance is for enhancement of compensation, for which the
petitioner has already filed First Appeal No. 880 of 1993
and First Appeal No. 401 of 1998 which appeals are being F
allowed by order of the date, we see no reason to entertain
the writ petition.
47. Although various submissions on merits challenging
the entire acquisition proceedings have been raised by the
learned counsel for the petitioners, we have taken the view G
that the writ petition is highly barred by laches, we do not
find it necessary to enter into the submissions raised by the
learned counsel for the petitioners on merits.”

H
318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A 348. In Swaika Properties Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. v. State of
Rajasthan and Ors236, the writ petition was filed after taking possession
and award has become final. The writ petition was dismissed on the
ground of delay and laches. In Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat
and Ors.237, in the absence of a challenge to the acquisition proceedings
within a reasonable time, the challenge was repelled. Delay was also
B
fatal in Haryana State Handloom and Handicrafts Corporation Ltd.
and Ors. v. Jain School Society238. The writ petition was filed after
two years to question the declaration under Section 6 and was dismissed
on the ground of delay in Urban Improvement Trust, Udaipur vs. Bheru
Lal and Ors 239. A Delay of 5 to 10 years was held to be fatal in
C questioning the acquisition proceedings as held in Vishwas Nagar
Evacuee Plot Purchasers Association & Ors. v. Under Secretary,
Delhi Admn. & Ors.240
349. There is a plethora of decisions where, owing to delay of 6
months or more, this Court has repelled the challenge to the acquisition
D proceedings. In our opinion, Section 24 does not revive the right to
challenge those proceedings which have been concluded. The legality
of those judgments and orders cannot be reopened or questioned under
the guise of the provisions of Section 24(2). By reason of our reasoning
in respect of that provision (which we have held that under Section
24(2) that word “or” is to be read as ‘and’ or as ‘nor,’ even if one of the
E requirements has been fulfilled, i.e., either possession taken or
compensation paid), there is no lapse unless both conditions are fulfilled,
i.e., compensation has not been paid nor has possession been taken; the
legality of the concluded proceedings cannot be questioned. It is only in
the case where steps have not been taken by the Authorities. The lapse
F or higher compensation is provided under Section 24(2) and its proviso
under the Act of 2013.
350. In U.P. State Jal Nigam and Anr. v. Jaswant Singh and
241
Anr , this Court has observed that if a claimant is aware of the violation
of his rights and does not claim his remedies, such inaction or conduct
G tantamounts a waiver of the right. In such cases, the lapse of time and
236
(2008) 4 SCC 695
237
(1998) 4 SCC 387
238
(2003) 12 SCC 538
239
(2002) 7 SCC 712
240
(1990) 2 SCC 268
241
H (2006) 11 SCC 464
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 319
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

delay are most material and cannot be ignored by the Court. In A
Rabindranath Bose and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors 242, the
Constitution Bench of this Court has observed that the Court cannot go
into the stale demands after a lapse of several years. This Court observed
thus:
“32. The learned counsel for the petitioners strongly urges B
that the decision of this Court in Tilokchand Motichand case
needs review. But after carefully considering the matter, we
are of the view that no relief should be given to petitioners
who, without any reasonable explanation, approach this
Court under Article 32 of the Constitution after inordinate
delay. The highest Court in this land has been given original C
jurisdiction to entertain petitions under Article 32 of the
Constitution. It could not have been the intention that this
Court would go into stale demands after a lapse of years. It
is said that Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right. So it is, but
it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the D
Constitution-makers that this Court should discard all
principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate
delay.”
351. In Dharappa v. Bijapur Coop. Milk Producers Societies
Union Ltd243, this Court observed that if delay has resulted in material E
evidence relevant to adjudication being lost or rendered unavailable, would
be fatal. It was held that the time limit of 6 months prescribed under
Section 10(4A) of the I.D. Act, 1947 and should not be interpreted to
revive stale and dead claims, it would not be possible to defend such
claims due to lapse of time and due to material evidence having been
lost or rendered unavailable. The lapse of time results in losing the remedy F
and the right as well. The delay would be fatal. It will be illogical to hold
that the amendment to the Act inserting Section 10(4A) should be
interpreted as reviving all stale and dead claims. This Court observed
thus:
“29. This Court while dealing with Sections 10(1)(c) and (d) G
of the I.D. Act, has repeatedly held that though the Act does
not provide a period of limitation for raising a dispute under
Section 10(1)(c) or (d), if on account of delay, a dispute has
become stale or ceases to exist, the reference should be
242
(1970) 1 SCC 84 H
243
(2007) 9 SCC 109
320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A rejected. It has also held that lapse of time results in losing
the remedy and the right as well. The delay would be fatal if
it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication
being lost or rendered unavailable (vide Nedungadi Bank Ltd.
v. K.P. Madhavankutty, (2000) 2 SCC 455; Balbir Singh v.
Punjab Roadways, (2001) 1 SCC 133; Asstt. Executive
B Engineer v. Shivalinga, (2002) 10 SCC 167 and S.M. Nilajkar
v. Telecom Distt. Manager, (2003) 4 SCC 27). When belated
claims are considered as stale and non-existing for the
purpose of refusing or rejecting a reference under Section
10(1)(c) or (d), in spite of no period of limitation is prescribed,
C it will be illogical to hold that the amendment to the Act
inserting Section 10(4-A) prescribing a time-limit of six
months, should be interpreted as reviving all stale and dead
claims.
***
D 31. Section 10(4-A) does not, therefore, revive non-existing
or stale or dead claims but only ensures that claims which
were life, by applying the six-month rule in Section 10(4-A)
as on the date when the section came into effect, have a
minimum of six months’ time to approach the Labour Court.
That is ensured by adding the words “or the date of
E commencement of the Industrial Disputes (Karnataka
Amendment) Act, 1987, whichever is later” to the words
“within six months from the date of communication to him of
the order of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or
termination.” In other words, all those who have communicated
F orders of termination during a period of six months prior to
7-4-1988 were deemed to have been communicated such orders
of termination as on 7-4-1988 for the purpose of seeking a
remedy. Therefore, the words “within six months from the date
of commencement of the Industrial Disputes (Karnataka
Amendment) Act, 1987, whichever is later” only enables those
G who had been communicated order of termination within six
months prior to 7-4-1988, to apply under Section 10(4-A).”
352. In State of Karnataka v. Laxuman244, this court held that
stale claims should not be entertained even if no time limit is fixed by the
statute. This court observed as follows:
H 244
(2005) 8 SCC 709
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 321
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

“9. As can be seen, no time for applying to the Court in terms A
of sub-section (3) is fixed by the statute. But since the
application is to the Court, though under a special enactment,
Article 137, the residuary article of the Limitation Act, 1963,
would be attracted and the application has to be made within
three years of the application for making a reference or the
B
expiry of 90 days after the application. The position is settled
by the decision of this Court in Addl. Spl. Land Acquisition
Officer v. Thakoredas, (1997) 11 SCC 412. It was held: (SCC
p. 414, para 3)
“3. Admittedly, the cause of action for seeking a reference
had arisen on the date of service of the award under Section C
12(2) of the Act. Within 90 days from the date of the service
of the notice, the respondents made the application requesting
the Deputy Commissioner to refer the cases to the civil Court
under Section 18. Under the amended sub-section (3)(a) of
the Act, the Deputy Commissioner shall, within 90 days from D
1-9-1970, make a reference under Section 18 to the civil Court,
which he failed to do. Consequently, by operation of
subsection 3(b) with the expiry of the aforestated 90 days,
the cause of action had accrued to the respondents to make
an application to the civil Court with a prayer to direct the
Deputy Commissioner to make a reference. There is no period E
of limitation prescribed in subsection (3)(b) to make that
application, but it should be done within the limitation
prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act. Since no
article expressly prescribed the limitation to make such an
application, the residuary article under Article 137 of the F
Schedule to the Limitation Act gets attracted. Thus, it could
be seen that in the absence of any special period of limitation
prescribed by clause (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 18 of
the Act, the application should have been made within three
years from the date of expiry of 90 days prescribed in Section
18(3)(b), i.e., the date on which cause of action had accrued G
to the respondent claimant. Since the application had been
admittedly made beyond three years, it was clearly barred by
limitation. Since the High Court relied upon the case in
Municipal Council, (1969) 1 SCC 873 which has stood
overruled, the order of the High Court is unsustainable.” H
322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A This position is also supported by the reasoning in Kerala
SEB v. T.P. Kunhaliumma, (1976) 4 SCC 634. It may be seen
that under the Central Act sans the Karnataka amendment,
there was no right to approach the Principal Civil Court of
original jurisdiction to compel a reference, and no time-limit
was also fixed for making such an approach. All that was
B required of a claimant was to make an application for
reference within six weeks of the award or the notice of the
award, as the case may be. But obviously, the State Legislature
thought it necessary to provide a time-frame for the claimant
to make his claim for enhanced compensation and for
C ensuring an expeditious disposal of the application for
reference by the authority under the Act fixing a time within
which he is to act and conferring an additional right on the
claimant to approach the civil Court on satisfying the condition
precedent of having made an application for reference within
the time prescribed.”
D
353. We are of the opinion that courts cannot invalidate acquisitions,
which stood concluded. No claims in that regard can be entertained and
agitated as they have not been revived. There has to be legal certainty
where infrastructure has been created or has been developed partially,
and investments have been made, especially when land has been acquired
E long back. It is the duty of the Court to preserve the legal certainty, as
observed in Vodafone International Holdings B.V. v. Union of India
and Ors245. The landowners had urged that since the Act of 2013 creates
new situations, which are beneficial to their interests, the question of
delay or laches does not arise. This Court is of the opinion that the said
contention is without merits. As held earlier, the doctrine of laches would
F always preclude an indolent party, who chooses not to approach the
court, or having approached the court, allows an adverse decision to
become final, to re-agitate the issue of acquisition of his holding. Doing
so, especially in cases, where the title has vested with the State, and
thereafter with subsequent interests, would be contrary to public policy.
G In A.P. State Financial Corp. v. Garware Rolling Mill246, this Court
observed that equity is always known to defend the law from crafty
evasions and new subtleties invented to evade the law. There is no dearth
of talent left in longing for the undue advantage of the wholesome
provisions of Section 24(2) on the basis of wrong interpretation.
245
(2012) 6 SCC 613
H 246
(1994) 2 SCC 647
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 323
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

354. In British Railway Board v. Pickin 247, the following A
observations were made:
“… equity, when faced with an appeal to a regulatory public
statute, which requires compliance with formalities, will not
allow such statute (assumedly passed to prevent fraud) to be
used to promote fraud and will do so by imposing a trust or B
equity upon a legal right. …”
355. We are unable to accept the submission on behalf of the
landowners that it is by operation of law the proceedings are deemed to
have lapsed and that this Court should give full effect to the provisions.
It was submitted that lapse of acquisition proceedings was not C
contemplated under the Act of 1894, and there is departure made in
Section 24 of the Act of 2013. Thus, Section 24 gives a fresh cause of
action to the landowners to approach the courts for a declaration that
the acquisition lapsed, if either compensation has not been paid or the
physical possession has not been taken. The decision of this Court in the
Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal and Ors. v. Dossibai N.B. D
Jeejeebhoy 248 was relied upon to contend that there cannot be res
judicata in the previous proceedings when the cause of action is different;
reliance is also placed on Canara Bank v. N.G. Subbaraya Setty and
Anr249, where the decision of Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal and
Ors. (supra) was followed as to belated challenges. Reliance was further E
placed on Anil Kumar Gupta v. the State of Bihar250 in which it was
held that vesting of land in the Government can be challenged on the
ground that possession had not been taken in accordance with the
prescribed procedure. The invocation of the urgency clause in Section
17, can be questioned on the ground that there was no real urgency.
The notification issued under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 F
can be challenged on the ground of non-compliance of Section 5-A(1).
Notice issued under Section 9 and the award passed under Section 11
can also be questioned on permissible grounds. Reliance has also been
placed on Ram Chand and Ors. v. Union of India 251 to contend that
inaction and delay on the part of the acquiring authority would also give G
rise to a cause of action in favour of the landowner.
247
(1974) AC 765
248
(1970) 1 SCC 613
249
(2018) 16 SCC 228
250
(2012) 12 SCC 443
251
(1994) 1 SCC 4 H
324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A 356. The entire gamut of submissions of the landowners is based
on the misinterpretation of the provisions contained in Section 24. It
does not intend to divest the State of possession (of the land), title to
which has been vested in the State. It only intends to give higher
compensation in case the obligation of depositing of compensation has
not been fulfilled with regard to the majority of holdings. A fresh cause
B
of action in Section 24 has been given if for five years or more possession
has not been taken nor compensation has been paid. In case possession
has been taken and compensation has not been deposited with respect
to the majority of landholdings, higher compensation to all incumbents
follows, as mentioned above. Section 24 does not confer a new cause of
C action to challenge the acquisition proceedings or the methodology adopted
for the deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of reference
court, in that case, interest or higher compensation, as the case may be,
can follow. In our considered opinion, Section 24 is applicable to pending
proceedings, not to the concluded proceedings and the legality of the
concluded proceedings, cannot be questioned. Such a challenge does
D
not lie within the ambit of the deemed lapse under Section 24. The lapse
under section 24(2) is due to inaction or lethargy of authorities in taking
requisite steps as provided therein.
357. We are also of the considered opinion that the decision in an
earlier round of litigation operates as res judicata where the challenge
E to the legality of the proceedings had been negatived and the proceedings
of taking possession were upheld. Section 24 does not intend to reopen
proceedings which have been concluded. The decision in Mathura
Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal and Ors. (supra) is of no avail. Similar is the
decision in Anil Kumar Gupta v. State of Bihar (supra). No doubt
F about it that proceedings (i.e., the original acquisition, or aspects relating
to it) can be questioned but within a reasonable time; yet once the
challenge has been made and failed or has not been made for a reasonable
time, Section 24 does not provide for reopening thereof.
358. So far as the proposition laid down in Ram Chand and Ors.
G v. Union of India (supra) is concerned, inaction and delay on the part
of acquiring authorities have been taken care of under Section 24. The
mischief rule (or Heydon’s Mischief Rule) was pressed into service on
behalf of landowners relying upon the decision in Bengal Immunity Co
v. the State of Bihar (supra), it was submitted that Act of 1894 did not
provide for lapse in the case of inordinate delay on the part of acquiring
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 325
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

Authorities to complete the acquisition proceedings. Mischief has been A
sought to be cured by the legislature by introducing the Act of 2013 by
making provisions in Section 24 of the lapse of proceedings. The
submission is untenable. The provisions made under section 24 have
provided a window of 5 years to complete the acquisition proceedings,
and if there is a delay of 5 years or more, there is a lapse and not
B
otherwise. The provision cannot be stretched any further, otherwise, the
entire infrastructure, which has come up, would have to go and only the
litigants would reap the undeserving fruits of frivolous litigation, having
lost in several rounds of litigation earlier, which can never be the
intendment of the law.
359. We are of the considered opinion that Section 24 cannot be C
used to revive dead and stale claims and concluded cases. They cannot
be inquired into within the purview of Section 24 of the Act of 2013.
The provisions of Section 24 do not invalidate the judgments and orders
of the Court, where rights and claims have been lost and negatived.
There is no revival of the barred claims by operation of law. Thus, stale D
and dead claims cannot be permitted to be canvassed on the pretext of
enactment of Section 24. In exceptional cases, when in fact, the payment
has not been made, but possession has been taken, the remedy lies
elsewhere if the case is not covered by the proviso. It is the Court to
consider it independently not under section 24(2) of the Act of 2013.
E
360. It was submitted that Section 101 provides for return of
unutilized land under the Act of 2013. Section 101 provides that in case
land is not utilized for five years from the date of taking over the
possession, the same shall be returned to the original owner or owners
or their legal heirs, as the case may be, or to the Land Bank of the
appropriate Government by reversion in the manner as may be prescribed F
by the appropriate Government. Section 101 reads as under:
“101. Return of unutilized land.— When any land, acquired
under this Act remains unutilized for a period of five years
from the date of taking over the possession, the same shall be
returned to the original owner or owners or their legal heirs, G
as the case may be, or to the Land Bank of the appropriate
Government by reversion in the manner as may be prescribed
by the appropriate Government.
Explanation.— For the purpose of this section, “Land Bank”
means a governmental entity that focuses on the conversion H
326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A of Government-owned vacant, abandoned, unutilized
acquired lands and tax-delinquent properties into productive
use.”
361. Section 24 deals with lapse of acquisition. Section 101 deals
with the return of unutilized land. Section 101 cannot be said to be
B applicable to an acquisition made under the Act of 1894. The provision
of lapse has to be considered on its own strength and not by virtue of
Section 101 though the spirit is to give back the land to the original owner
or owners or the legal heirs or to the Land Bank. Return of lands is with
respect to all lands acquired under the Act of 2013 as the expression
used in the opening part is “When any land, acquired under this Act
C remains unutilized”. Lapse, on the other hand, occurs when the State
does not take steps in terms of Section 24(2). The provisions of Section
101 cannot be applied to the acquisitions made under the Act of 1894.
Thus, no such sustenance can be drawn from the provisions contained
in Section 101 of the Act of 2013. Five years’ logic has been carried into
D effect for the purpose of lapse and not for the purpose of returning the
land remaining unutilized under Section 24(2).
362. Resultantly, the decision rendered in Pune Municipal
Corporation & Anr. (supra) is hereby overruled and all other decisions
in which Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) has been followed, are
E also overruled. The decision in Shree Balaji Nagar Residential
Association (supra) cannot be said to be laying down good law, is
overruled and other decisions following the same are also overruled. In
Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra (Dead) through L.Rs.
and Ors., (supra), the aspect with respect to the proviso to Section
24(2) and whether ‘or’ has to be read as ‘nor’ or as ‘and’ was not
F placed for consideration. Therefore, that decision too cannot prevail, in
the light of the discussion in the present judgment.
363. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer the questions
as under:

G 1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case the award is
not made as on 1.1.2014 the date of commencement of Act of 2013,
there is no lapse of proceedings. Compensation has to be determined
under the provisions of Act of 2013.
2. In case the award has been passed within the window period
of five years excluding the period covered by an interim order of the
H
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 327
[ARUN MISHRA, J.]

court, then proceedings shall continue as provided under Section 24(1)(b) A
of the Act of 2013 under the Act of 1894 as if it has not been repealed.
3. The word ‘or’ used in Section 24(2) between possession and
compensation has to be read as ‘nor’ or as ‘and’. The deemed lapse of
land acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013
takes place where due to inaction of authorities for five years or more B
prior to commencement of the said Act, the possession of land has not
been taken nor compensation has been paid. In other words, in case
possession has been taken, compensation has not been paid then there is
no lapse. Similarly, if compensation has been paid, possession has not
been taken then there is no lapse.
C
4. The expression ‘paid’ in the main part of Section 24(2) of the
Act of 2013 does not include a deposit of compensation in court. The
consequence of non-deposit is provided in proviso to Section 24(2) in
case it has not been deposited with respect to majority of land holdings
then all beneficiaries (landowners) as on the date of notification for land
acquisition under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 shall be entitled to D
compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2013. In
case the obligation under Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894
has not been fulfilled, interest under Section 34 of the said Act can be
granted. Non-deposit of compensation (in court) does not result in the
lapse of land acquisition proceedings. In case of non-deposit with respect E
to the majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation under
the Act of 2013 has to be paid to the “landowners” as on the date of
notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the Act of 1894.
5. In case a person has been tendered the compensation as
provided under Section 31(1) of the Act of 1894, it is not open to him to F
claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due to non-payment
or non-deposit of compensation in court. The obligation to pay is complete
by tendering the amount under Section 31(1). Land owners who had
refused to accept compensation or who sought reference for higher
compensation, cannot claim that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed
under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. G
6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 is to be treated
as part of Section 24(2) not part of Section 24(1)(b).
7. The mode of taking possession under the Act of 1894 and as
contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquest report/
H
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

A memorandum. Once award has been passed on taking possession under
Section 16 of the Act of 1894, the land vests in State there is no divesting
provided under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, as once possession has
been taken there is no lapse under Section 24(2).
8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a deemed lapse
B of proceedings are applicable in case authorities have failed due to their
inaction to take possession and pay compensation for five years or more
before the Act of 2013 came into force, in a proceeding for land
acquisition pending with concerned authority as on 1.1.2014. The period
of subsistence of interim orders passed by court has to be excluded in
the computation of five years.
C
9. Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not give rise to new
cause of action to question the legality of concluded proceedings of land
acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceeding pending on the date of
enforcement of the Act of 2013, i.e., 1.1.2014. It does not revive stale
and time-barred claims and does not reopen concluded proceedings nor
D allow landowners to question the legality of mode of taking possession
to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of compensation in the treasury
instead of court to invalidate acquisition.
Let the matters be placed before appropriate Bench for
consideration on merits.
E

Devika Gujral Reference answered.

F

G

H