Holding

A charitable society is entitled to exemption for self‑occupied portions meeting the conditions of Section 62(1), but the statutory exemption does not extend to rented portions; any exemption for such portions can only be granted, if at all, under Section 124 to a class of persons or property.

Summary

The Indian Red Cross Society owned a building in Delhi, part of which it occupied for its charitable offices and the rest it let out on rent. The New Delhi Municipal Council (NDMC) levied property tax on the entire building. The Society claimed exemption under Section 62(1) of the New Delhi Municipal Council Act, 1994, arguing that the rent received was used for charitable purposes. The NDMC granted exemption only for the self‑occupied portion and rejected it for the rented portion, citing Section 62(2). The Society appealed, contending that the exemption should apply to the whole building. The Supreme Court held that exemption under Section 62(1) is a matter of right only for self‑occupied portions that satisfy the statutory conditions and that Section 62(2) expressly bars exemption for any portion from which rent is derived, regardless of how the rent is used. No discretion exists under Section 62 to grant exemption for the rented part, but the Council may, under Section 124, grant exemption to a class of persons or property. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, with liberty granted to the Society to seek exemption for the rented portion under Section 124.

Issues considered

Whether a charitable society is entitled to exemption from property tax on rented portions of its building under Section 62(1) of the NDMC Act, 1994.
Whether Section 62(2) of the NDMC Act bars exemption for any portion from which rent is derived, even if the rent is used for charitable purposes.
Whether the authority has discretion under Section 62 to grant exemption for rented portions.
Whether exemption for the rented portion can be granted under Section 124 of the NDMC Act.
Applicability of the precedent Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Children Book Trust.

Legislation cited

Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957s. 115
New Delhi Municipal Council Act, 1994s. 124, s. 60, s. 61, s. 62, s. 72(1)(e)
Punjab Municipal Act, 1911s. 70, s. 71

Subjects

property taxexemptioncharitable purposeself‑occupiedrented portionNDMC ActSection 62Section 124municipal law

Judgment

INDIAN RED CROSS SOCIETY A
V.
NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE AND ORS.

APRIL 28, 2003

[RUMA PAL AND B.N. SRIKRISHNA, JJ.] B

New Delhi Municipal Council Act, 1994; Ss. 60, 61, 62 and 124:

Exemption from payment of property tax/house tax-Building-Uses -
Seif-occupied by the charitable organisation and a portion given on rent- C
Committee Granted exemption from payment of property tax for the self
occupied portion-Exemption was not allowed for the rented portion as not
permissible under the provisions of the Act-Challenge to-Dismissed by the
High Court-On appeal, Held: A charitable society could claim exemption
from payment of property tax as a matter of right provided it fulfils the D
stipulated conditions-Hence the exemption was rightly granted for the self
occupied portion as used for charitable purposes-Statutory exemption under
Section 62(1) of the Act not available for the rented portion of the building-
The Society could apply to the Council under the provisions of&ction 124 of
the Act to reconsider grant of exemption for rented portion of the building as
well by invoking its special power granted under the Act-Punjab Municipal E
Act, 191/;Ss. 70and71 .

. Words and Phrases:

'charitable pw71ose '-Meaning of in the context of levy of property tax.
F
The appellant-Society, a charitable organisation, owned a building
in the area falling within the jurisdiction of the respondent-New Delhi
Municipal Committee. A portion of the building was self-occupied by the
society for running its offices and remaining portion was let out on rent.
Respondent levied and demanded property tax on the building. Appellant- G
society made part payment. However, it filed a representation claiming
exemption from payment of property tax on the ground of its use for
charitable purposes since a portion of the building was self-occupied for
running its various offices and earning of rent was used for charitable
purposes. As no response was received from the respondent-Committee,
987 H
988 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] 3 S.C.R.

A the Appellant-society filed writ petitions. High Court stayed the demands
and later disposed of the writ petitions directing the appellant to make a
fresh representation before the respondent. Accordingly, the appellant-
society made a representation afresh to the respondent-Committee. The

B
concerned authority granted exemption from payment of property tax for
the self-occupied portion subject to fulfilment of certain conditions.
However, it rejected the claim for exemption with respect to the rented
...
portion of the building as not permissible under the law. Later the High
Court allowed the application for reviving the writ petitions. Writ petitions
were dismissed by the High Court.

C Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1. It is clear from the provisions of law under Section 62(1)
of the New Delhi Municipal Committee Act that if the appellant-society
fulfils the stipulated conditions it is entitled as a matter of right to be
exempted from payment of property tax. The concerned authority of
D NDMC erred in treating the right to exemption in respect of the self-
occupied portions of the appellant's building as a matter of discretion since
it was provided as a matter of right on fulfilment of certain conditions laid
down in Section 62(1) of the Act. 1994-G, HI

E 1.2. The statutory exemption under Section 62(1) of the Act is not
available to the society if the building is not self-occupied but is rented out.·
The section does not make any allowance even if the rental income is used
for charitable purposes. The phrase 'for a charitable purpose' only qualifies
self occupation under Section 62(l)(a) of the Act. The appellant's claim for
the benefit of such statutory exemption under Section 62 of the Act in
F respect of the rented portion of the building is, .therefore, untenable and
the concerned authority had rightly rejected it. 1995-B, Cl

Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Children Book Trust and Anr., 119921
3 sec 390, held inapplicable.

G 1.3. With regard to the grant of exemption in respect of the tax
lcviable on the rented portions, although the authority did not have any
other option but to consider the appellant's claim for exemption in view
of the direction of the High Court, no discretion is conferred under Section
62 of the Act on the authority for granting any exemption to the assessee
H from any portion of the taxes leviable except to the extent the statute itself
INDIAN RED CROSS SOCIETY v. N.D.M.C. IRUMA PAL. J.] 989
provides. 1997-C, DI A
1.4. The power and discretion to grant exemption under the Act has
· been.conferred on the Council under Section 124 ...n the instant case, power
of the Council must be exercised, if at all, in favour of a class of persons
or a class of property. This power may be contrasted with the Punjab
Municipal Act where exemption may have been allowed even in respect of B
an individual by the Committee under Section 70(2)(c) and the State
Government under Section 71. Hence, there is no merit in the appeal in so
far as the appellant has claimed statutory exemption under Section 62 of
the Act in respect of the rented portion of the building. However, the
appellant-Society may apply under the provisions of Section 124 of the Act C
to the Council for exemption from payment of taxes leviable in respect of
the rented portion. It would be open to the Council to resolve under the
provisions of Section 124 to exempt all persons who are similarly situated
as the appellant-society. 1997-F, H; 998-A-CI

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 5043 of D
2001.

From the Judgment and Order dated 31.5.2001 of the Delhi High Court
in C.M. No. 4912/2001 in C.W.P. No. 1581 of 1997.

N.N. Goswami, D.K. Kapur and Ms. lndu Goswami for the Appellant. E
Rakesh Kr. Khana and Surya Kant for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

RUMA PAL, J. The appellant-Society is a charitable organisation. In F
1930, it was granted a permanent lease of premises No. I, Red Cross Road,
New Delhi. Between 1975-77 the appellant constructed a building on the
premises. The building consists of a basement, ground floor and five floors
above the ground floor. A portion of the building is used by the appellant for
the purposes of its Headquarters and its various offices which include a
Blood Bank, St. John's Ambulance Brigade, Maternity and Child Welfare G
Bureau and also the Hindkusht Nivaran Sangh. The balance portion of the
building is rented out by the appellant. It is the appellant's case that the rent
is utilised wholly for charitable purposes. The appellant has claimed exemption
from payment of house tax in respect of the building for the years 1977-78
to the present day. Prior to 1994, house tax in respect of properties in Delhi H
990 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 12003] 3 S.C.R.

A was imposed under the Punjab· Municipal Act, 1911. The Punjab Act was
repealed by the New Delhi Municipal Council Act, I 994 (briefly the NDMC
Act) as far as New Delhi is concerned with effect from the day that the
respondent No. I Council was established under Section 3 read with Section
416( I) of the latter Act. According to the appellant, it had, till that time, paid
B some amounts of money towards the demands raised by the respondent No. J
on account of property tax and had also applied to the respondents for grant
of exemption. According to the appellants, there was no response to the
appellant's representation. The appellant filed a Writ Petition before the High
Court at Delhi specifically impugning two bills raised by the Municipal
Corporation dated 20. 7.90 and 31.5.91 which were for the sums of
C Rs.69, 14,792.71 and Rs.6, 13,492 respectively. Interim protection was given
to the appellant No. I by the High Court and the demands were stayed. The
appellant then filed eight more writ petitions bef?re the High Court questioning
the subsequent demands on account of property tax raised by the respondent
No. I in respect of the appellant's building. The writ petitions were heard and
disposed of by the High Court by directing the appellant to make a fresh
D representation to the Director (Tax) of the respondent No.I who was required
to consider and dispose of the same. Liberty was also granted to the appellant
to re-agitate the grounds on which the writ petitions were filed in the event
the decision of the Director (Tax) went against the appellant.

E The appellant made a representation pursuant to the order of the High
Court. This was disposed of on 26.2.2001 by the Assistant Secretary (Tax).
The Assistant Secretary noted that he was examining the claim for exemption
only for the period 1991-92 to 2000-200 I. The position under the Punjab
Municipal Act, 1911 was examined and it was found that the appellant had
filed an application claiming exemption under that Act only in respect of the
F self-occupied portion of the building. The Municipal Committee which was
the competent authority under Section 70 of the Punjab Act had resolved to
grant exemption from payment ofprope11y tax under the Punjab Act in respect
of the self-occupied portion of the building. The resolution of the Committee
was approved by the State Government. The exemption was granted upto the
G year 1990-91. The order also stated that there was no application for exemption
by the appellant for 1991-92 to 1993-94 as such no resolutions had been
taken by the Committee.

The Assistant Secretary then considered Sections 60, 61 and 62 of the
NDMC Act, I 994 and noted that exemption could be granted, if at all, under
H the provisions of the NDMC Act in respect of that portion of the building
INDIAN RED CROSS SOCIETYv. N.D.M.C. [RUMA PAL, J.) 991

occupied by the appellant and used for charitable purposes. Although the A
Assistant Secretary was of the view that even the portion occupied by the
appellant did not qualify for exemption as the premises were not used
exclusively for charitable purposes, nevertheless as the Committee under the
Punjab Act had given exemption to the self-occupied portion treating the
same as used for charitable purposes, "the same intention is allowed to
continue". With respect to the appellant's claim for exemption in respect of B
the rented portion of the premises, the Assistant Secretary was of the view
that it was not permissible under Section 62(2) of the NDMC Act. It was said
that "the user of the income from the building is wholly irrelevant for the
purposes of grant to a building". The claim of the society was rejected because
it was said that to accede to the claim would have far reaching consequences. C
It was said that "although the income may get exemption in income tax but
in the Municipal Act, there is no such concept of granting exemption to the
property just because that income is being utilised for charitable purposes".
Decisions of the Delhi High Court and of this Court were considered in
coming to the conclusion that no exemption for the portion in occupation of
the tenants is available as the portions were not used for charitable purposes. D
An apprehension was expressed that if the interpretation sought to be placed
by the appellant-society were accepted, then any society could claim exemption
on the ground that rental income would be used for charitable purposes. This,
according to the Assistant Secretary, was not the intention of the legislature.
Accordingly it was held that no exemption could be granted under Section E
62(I)(a) read with Section 62(2) in respect of the portion of the building
which had been rented out by the appellant. However, exemption was to be
allowed for the self-occupied pm1ion ifthe appellant continued to be supported
through voluntary contributions and did not generate surpluses year after
year. On the basis of the statements 111ade to this effect by the appellant, the
Assistant Secretary granted exe111ption for the self-occupied portions for the F
period 1991-92 to 2000-2001. It was also stated that the society would have
to clai111 exemption every year and satisfy the conditions required for
exemption every year.

The appellant then filed an application for reviving the writ petitions G
which had been disposed of earlier by the High Court. Although this application
was allowed by the High Court, the writ petitions were dismissed with the
observation that the appellant was at liberty to discharge its liability to the
respondent No. I by instalments. The appellant has preferred this appeal by
way of a Special Leave Petition.
H
992 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 3 S.C.R.

A The appellant relied on the decision of this Court in Municipal
Corpora/ion of Delhi v. Children Book Trusl, (1992] 3 SCC 390 to contend
that since it is a charitable organisation and the entire building is used for
charitable purposes, it is not liable to pay property tax under Section 62 of
the NDMC Act, 1994 in respect of the entire building including the rented
B portion at all. In the alternative it has been submitted that if the appellant is
liable to pay property tax, the power to grant exemption had not been properly
exercised by the respondent No. I under the provisions of Section 124 read
with section 72 (e) of the NDMC Act.

Learned counsel appearing for the respondents contended that Section
C 62 of the NDMC Act explicitly made buildings which were not self-occupied
by a charitable organisation, subject to house tax. It was further submitted
that the decision relied upon by the appellant was not applicable to the
appellant's case. As far as the alternative submission of the appellant is
concerned, it is the respondents' contention that there was no power under
the NDMC Act to grant exemption in an individual case. Exemption could
D only be granted to a class of similarly situated bodies or persons.

The appdlant has in the meanwhile cleared all the outstanding demands
of the respondent No. I and continued to apply for exemption from payment
of property tax in respect of the entire building. Two of the applications
dated 17th May 200 I and 20th August 200 I have been brought on record.
E An order passed by the Advisor (Revenue) of the NDMC dated 22nd March
2002 limited to the question of fixation of the rateable value of the rented
portion for the purposes of house tax has also been brought on record. The
order records that the self-occupied portion of the building has been exempted
from payment of property tax. However, it is clear from the body of the order
F that it was not passed in response to the appellant's application for grant of
exemption to the appellant under the provisions either of the Punjab Act or
the NDMC Act.

Under the Punjab Act, the tax on all property was imposed under Section
61. The statute itself did not allow for any specific exemption in respect of
G any class of property and left it to the discretion of the Committee or the
State Government to grant exemption in the circumstances prescribed. The
"Committee" has been defined in Section 3(4) as the Municipal Council or
a Nagar Panchayat, as the case may be, constituted under Section 12 of the
Act. Section 70 of the Punjab Act provided for the 'Power of the Committee
H in regard to tax.es'. Sub-section (2) of Section 70 provided:
INDIAN RED CROSS SOCIETY v. N.D.M.C. [RUMA PAL, J.) 993
"A Committee, by a resolution passed at a special meeting and A
confirmed by the State Government, may -

(a) provide that all or any persons may be allowed to compound for
taxes imposed under sub-clauses (c), (d) and (e) of clause (1) and
under clauses (2) and (3) of section 61:
(b) abolish, suspend or reduce in amount any tax imposed under the B
foregoing sections; or
(c) exempt in whole or in part from the payment of any such tax, any
person or class of persons or any property or description of
property."
c
Apart from the power of the Committee under the aforesaid provisions,
the State Government was given power under Section 71 by order to :

" ...... exempt in whole or in part from the payment of any such tax
any person or class of persons or any property description of property.
D
If at any time it appears to the State Government on complaint
made or othe1wise, that any tax imposed under the foregoing sections
is unfair in its incidence or that the levy thereof or of any part thereof
is injurious to the interests of the general public, it may require the
committee to take within a specified period measures to remove the
objection: and, if within that period the requirement is not complied E
with to the satisfaction of the State Government the State Government
may by notification suspend the levy of the tax or of such part thereof
until the objection has been removed."

As far as the NDMC Act is concerned, property tax is leviable on lands
and buildings in New Delhi under Section 60(l)(a) read with Section 61(1). F
Section 62 which has been construed in the impugned order by the Assistant
Secretary, is quoted:

"62(1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the property tax shall
be levied in respect of all lands and buildings in New Delhi except:- G
(a) lands and buildings or portions of lands and buildings exclusively
occupied and used for public worship or by a society or body for
a charitable purpose:
Provided that such society or body is supported wholly or in part
by voluntary contributions, applies its profits, if any, or other H
994. SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003) J. S.C.R.

A income in promoting its objects and does not pay any dividend or
bonus to its members. ·

Explanation - 'Charitable purpose' includes relief of the poor,
education and medical relief but does not include a purpose which
relates exclusively \o. the religious teaching.
B · (b) lands and buildings vested in the Council, in respect of which the
said tax, if levied, would under the provisions of this Act be
leviable pri~arily on the Council;'
(c) agricultural lands and buildings (other than dwelling houses).

c (2) Lands and buildings or portion thereof shall not be deemed io be ~

exclusively occupied and used for public worship or for a charitable
purpose within the meaning of clause (a) of sub-section (I) if any
trade or business is carried on in such lands and buildings or portion
thereof or ifin respect of such lands and buildings or portions thereof, ·
any rent is derived.
D
(3) Where any portion of any, land or building ·is exempt from the
property tax by reason of .its being exclusively o&:upied
. and used for
public worship or for a charitable purpose such portion shall be deemed .
to be a separate property for the purpose of municipal taxatfon."

E If one analyses the relevant clauses of Section 62(1), lands and buildings
or portions of lands and buildings are exempt from property tax if they are:

(i) exclusively occupied by a society or body for a charitable purpose;
(ii) such society or body is supporied wholly or in part by voluntary
F contributions;
(iii) the said society applies its profits, if any or other income in
promoting its objects and does not pay any dividend or bonus to
its members.

It is clear that under Section 62(1) of the NDMC Act, if the appellant-
G society fulfils these three conditions it is entitled as amatter of right to be
exempted from payment of property tax. Where the Assistant Secretary erred,
was in treating the right to exemption in respect of the self-occupied portions
of the appellant's building as a matter of discretion. It is not. It is a matter
of right provided of course of the conditions laid down in Se~tion 62(1) are
fulfilled by the society. /
H
/•

l
INDIAN RED CROSS SOCIETY v. N.D.M.C. [RUMA PAL, J.] 995
Sub-section (2) of Section 62, however, carves out two exceptions to A
this exemption, namely if (a) any trade is carried out in such lands and
buildings, or (b) in respect of any portion of such land or building or portion
thereof any rent is derived. In such a case, under sub-section (3), the portion
of the land or building exclusively occupied and used for charitable purposes
under Section 62( I) and the portion, which is excepted under sub-section (2)
are deemed to be separate properties for the purpose of municipal taxation. B
Thus the statutory exemption under Section 62(1) is not available to the
society if the building is not self-occupied but is rented out. The section does
not make any allowance even if the rental income is used for charitable
purposes. The phrase 'for a charitable purpose' only qualifies self occupation
under Section 62(1)(a). The appellant's claim for the benefit of such statutory C
exemption under Section 62 of the Act in respect of the rented portion of the
building is, therefore, untenable and the Assistant Secretary had rightly rejected
it.

The appellant's reliance on the decision of this Court in Municipal
Corporation of Delhi v. Children Book Trust and Anr., (supra) is misplaced D
although in that decision, this Court had construed Section 115(4) (5) and (6)
of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 which are verbatim the same
as Sections 62(1), (2) and (3) of the NDMC Act. There the Court had disposed
of two appeals. The first appeal was filed by the Corporation against the
Children Book Trust and the second was by the Safdarjung Enclave Education E
Society against the Corporation. As far as the appeal filed by the Children
Book Trust was concerned, a po11ion of the premises occupied by the Trust
was rented out to a Press. The Municipal Corporation had sought to levy
property tax under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 in respect of
the entire premises. The Trust filed a writ petition claiming total exemption
from payment of property tax under Section 115 (4) of the 1957 Act before F
the High Court at Delhi. The writ petition was allowed by the learned Single
Judge who held that the Trust was entitled to claim total exemption from
payment of tax under Section 115(4) of the 1957 Act except in respect of that
portion which was rented out. However, the learned Judge held that even
from the rental value, the Trust was entitled to claim exemption in the G
proportion of the income accruing to it from the publication of children's
book which was held to be a charitable purpose. The Division Bench partly
allowed the Municipal Corporation's appeal holding that in view of the
mandatory provisions of Section 115(4) of the New Delhi Corporation Act, .
exemption from the payment of property tax could not be allowed in respect
of the area which was rented out or not occupied by the Trust itself for H
996 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) 3 S.C.R.

A charitable purposes within the meaning of the 1957 Act. The further appeal
of the Municipal Corporation before this Court was dismissed. It is to be
noted that the Court was only considering the Municipal Corporation's appeal
in respect of the portion of the premises which had not been rented out by
the Trust. As far as the rented portion was concerned, the Court noted
B "Admittedly, no exemption could be claimed concerning this portion. It is the
other portions which are otherwise relevant for the purpose of this case".

In the appeal of the Education Society, the Education Society claimed
an exemption in respect of premises owned by it where a school was being
run. The Society had filed a writ petition challenging an assessment order of
C the Municipal Corporation. The .writ petition was dismissed by the High
Court. The Education Society then preferred an appeal before this Court. The
contention which was raised before this Court was that the Society was
running the school which was in occupation of the premises and that the
giving of education was a charitable purpose and, therefore, the society was
entitled to exemption under the provisions of Section 115(4) of the Act. This
D Court held that the Society could not be said to be occupying the building.
"The School being a separate entity, premises occupied by the school will
belong to it and not to the society. Therefore, the society cannot claim to be
in exclusive occupation and use of the land and building in question." It was
also held that although the imparting of education may be a charitable purpose,
E the Society would have to further show that education was the primary
objective and not the making of profit. It was also held that unless the society
was supported wholly or substantially by voluntary contributions, in view of
the proviso to Section l 15(4)(a), [Section 62(l)(a) of the NDMC Act]
exemption from payment of property tax could not be claimed. None of these
findings are relevant for our present purpose. There is no dispute that the
F appellant-Society before us exclusively occupies a portion of the premises
for a charitable purpose and otherwise fulfils the conditions required for
exemption from property tax in respect of such portion. We are, in this
appeal, unlike in the appeals in the Children Book Trust, only concerned with
the balance portion of the building which has been rented out by the appellant.
G It is true that this Com1 in Children Book Trust made an observation that:
" ...................... ifthe profits or income of trade or business is devoted
to a charitable purpose and no part thereof is distributed among the
members as dividends or bonus, then that trade or business is a means
to an end. It is charity.
H But, if there is a trade or business carried on in a land or building
INDIAN RED CROSS SOCIETY v. N.D.M.C. (RUMA PAL. J.] 997
and its p·rofits are not applied to a charitable purpose, sub-section (6) A
says that that part of the land or building where a trade or business
is carried on or from which rent is derived, will be subject to tax."

However, these observations were made in the context of Section 115(4)
[Section 62(1) of the NDMC Act)] which envisages societies occupying the
subject premises, making profit or deriving income. The proviso to sub- B
Section 4, clause (a) requires such profits or income to be utilised in promoting
the objects of the society and not to be paid by way of dividend or bonus to
the members of the society. It was in that connection that the Court made the
observation quoted above. The observation would not be relevant to a situation
where property is not in occupation of the Society at all but is rented out. C
Coming to the alternative case of the appellant viz., the grant of
exemption in respect of the tax leviable on the rented portions, although, the
Assistant Secretary did not have any other option but to consider the appellant's
claim for exemption in view of the direction of the High Court, no discretion
is conferred under Section 62 of the NDMC Act on the Assistant Secretary D
for granting any exemption to the assessee from any portion of the taxes
leviable except to the extent the statute itself provides. Section 72(1)(e) on
which the appellant has relied provides:

"72( I) The chairperson may, at any time, amend the assessment list
E
(e) by making or cancelling any entry exempting any land or building
from liability to property tax; "

This section also does not confer any discretion on the Chairperson to
exempt any prope11y from payment of tax. All that it does is to empower the F
Chairperson to give effect to any exemption otherwise granted, by amending
the Assessment List. The power and discretion to grant exemption under the
NDMC Act has been conferred on the Council under Section 124.

Section 124 provides:

"The Council may, by resolution passed in this behalf, exempt either
G
wholly or in part from the payment of any tax levied under this Act,
any class of persons or any class of property or goods."

The respondents are correct in their submission that under Section 124,
as far as the present controversy is concerned, the Council's power must be H
998 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 3 S.C.R.

A exercised, if at all, in favour of a class of persons or a class of property. This
power may be contrasted with the Punjab Municipal Act where exemption
may have been allowed, even in respect of an individual by the Committee
under Section 70(2)(c) and the State Government under Section 71.

Therefore, while dismissing the appellant's appeal in so far as it has
B claimed statutory exemption under Section 62 in respect of the rented portion
of the building, we grant the liberty to the appellant-Society to apply to the
Council for exemption from payment of taxes leviable in respect of the
rented portion. It would be open to the Council to resolve under the provisions
of Section 124 to exempt all persons who are similarly situated as the appellant-
C society on the application of the appellant. The Council will dispose of. the
appellant's representation after giving the appellants an opportunity of being
heard.

There will be no order as to costs.

D S.K.S. Appeal dismissed.