INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD.versusM/S. SPS ENGINEERING LTD.
- Citation
- 2011 INSC 99
- Decided
- 3 February 2011
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- R V RAVEENDRAN
Holding
A Section 11 application under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is confined to ascertaining the existence of an arbitration agreement and, at most, deciding if a claim is evidently long‑barred; it cannot entertain issues of res judicata or merits, so the Designate erred in dismissing the application.
Summary
The Indian Oil Corporation (IOCL) terminated a contract with SPS Engineering for delayed work and later incurred extra costs to complete the work through an alternative agency. IOCL filed a Section 11 application under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 seeking appointment of an arbitrator to decide its claim for reimbursement of those extra costs, which had been rejected in a prior arbitration award. The Designate of the Chief Justice dismissed the application, holding it was misconceived, barred by res judicata and limitation. The Supreme Court held that a Section 11 application is limited to determining the existence of an arbitration agreement and, at most, whether a claim is evidently time‑barred, but cannot adjudicate res judicata or merits. Consequently, the Designate exceeded his jurisdiction, and the Court set aside his order, allowing the Section 11 application and appointing a new arbitrator. The appeal was allowed.
Issues considered
- Whether the Chief Justice or his designate may examine the tenability of a claim, including res judicata, while considering an application under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
- Whether the Designate was justified in holding the claim barred by res judicata and deeming the Section 11 application misconceived and mala fide.
Legislation cited
Subjects
Judgment
[2011) 2 S.C.R. 512
A INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD.
V.
M/S. SPS ENGINEERING LTD.
(Civil Appeal No. 1282 of 2011)
FEBRUARY 03, 2011
B
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN AND A.K. PATNAIK, JJ.]
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - s. 11 -
Appointment of arbitrator under - Termination of contract
C alleging non-completion of work within the stipulated period
- Contractor raising claims against the Company and
invoking arbitration agreement - Appointment of arbitrator -
Counter-claim raised by the company, for the extra cost in
getting the work completed through the alternative agency -
o Passing of award - However, rejection of the counter claim -
Petition uls. 11 for appointment of an arbitrator to decide the
said counter claim - Dismissed by the Designate of the Chief
Justice of the High Court on the ground that the alternative
agency having completed its work much before the earlier
E arbitration proceedings came to an end, the claim in regard
to the actual cost ought to have been crystallized and claimed
in the first arbitration itself - Thus, the application was held
to be misconceived, ba"ed by res judicata, and ma/a fide -
Held: Not justified - Designate committed a jurisdictional error
F in dismissing the application u/s. 11, on the ground that the
claim for extra cost was barred by res judicata and by
limitation - Chief Justice or his designate cannot examine the
tenability of the claim, in particular whether the claim is barred
by res judicata, while considering an application u/s. 11 -
Such an issue would be examined by the arbitral tribunal -
G A decision on res judicata requires consideration of the
pleadings as also the claims and the award in the first round
of arbitration, in juxtaposition with the pleadings and the
issues/claims in the second arbitration - If the cause of action
H 512
·'
INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. v. SPS 513
ENGINEERING LTD.
arose after the completion of pleadings and commencement A
of hearing in the first round of arbitration, the company can
raise a separate claim by initiating a second arbitration -
Claim for reimbursement of the extra cost for getting the work
completed, is a claim for damages which is yet to be
adjudicated by an adjudicating forum - Thus, the company B
cannot adjust the amount due by it under the award, against
a mere claim for damages made by it against the contractor
- Application u/s. 11 is allowed ,;_ Res judicata.
The appellant, a public sector company, awarded a C
contract which was to be completed within 13 months
from the date of issuance of the order. The appellant
· terminated the contract after two years alleging that the
respondent contractor was unable to complete the work
within the stipulated period and notified the respondent
that according to the Clause 7 .0.9.0 of the General D ·\
Conditions of Contract the extra cost in getting the work
completed through an alternative agency would be borne
. by him. The respondent raised certain claims against the
appellant and -invoked the arbitration agreement. An
application was filed under Section 11 of the Arbitration E
and Conciliation Act, 1996 and a retired High Court Judge
was appointed as an arbitrator. The appellant made
several counter-claims. The arbitrator passed an award.
He adjusted Rs. 11, 10,662/- awarded to the appellant,
towards the sum of Rs. 91,33,844/- awarded in favour of F
the respondent and directed the appellant to pay to the
respondent, the balance of Rs. 80,23, 182/-. However, the
counter claim of the appellant in regard to the extra cost
involved in getting the work completed through an
alternative contractor was rejected. The appellant did not G
challenge the award. The appellant sent a notice to the
respondent to pay the amount specified towards the said
counter claim but the respondent did not pay the amount.
The appellant then filed a petition under Section 11 of the
Act praying for appointment of an arbitrator to decide its H
~ ', '
514 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 2 S.C.R.
A claim for the extra cost in getting the work completed
through the alternative agency. The Designate of the
Chief Justice of the High Court dismissed the application
holding that the application under Section 11 of the Act
by the appellant was misconceived, barred by res
B judicata, and ma/a fide. It was held that claim with regard
to the extra cost was considered and rejected by the
arbitrator; that the claim was barred by limitation; and
that the alternative agency completed its work much
before the earlier arbitration proceedings came to an end,
c thus, the claim in regard to the actual cost ought to have
been crystallized and claimed in the first round of
arbitration. Therefore, the appellant filed the instant
appeal.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
D
HELD: 1.1 In an application under Section 11 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, it has to be decided
whether there is an arbitration agreement between
parties. The Chief Justice or his designate is not expected
E to go into the merits of the claim or examine the tenability
of the claim, in an application under Section 11 of the Act.
The Chief Justice or his Designate might however,
choose to decide whether the claim is a dead (long.
barred) claim or whether the parties have, by recording
F satisfaction, exhausted all rights, obligations and
remedies under the contract, so that neither the contract
nor the arbitration agreement survived. When it is said
that the Chief Justice or his Designate might choose to
decide whether the claim is a dead claim, it is implied that
G he would do so only when the claim is evidently and
patently a long time barred claim and there is no need for
any detailed consideration of evidence. If the distinction
between apparent and obvious dead claims, and claims
involving disputed issues of limitation is not kept in view,
H the Chief Justice or his designate would end up deciding
. \
INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. v. SPS 5.'.15
ENGINEERING LTD.
the question of limitation in all applications under Se_ction A
11 of the Act. [Para 11] [526-B-H]
1.2. An application under Section 11 of the Act is
expected to contain pleadings about the existence of a
dispute and the existence of an arbitration agreement to B-
decide ·such dispute. The applicant is not expected to
justify the claim or plead exhaustively in regard to
limitation or produce documents to demonstrate that the
claim is within time in_ a proceedings under Section 11 of
the Act. That issue should normally be left to the Arbitral
Tribunal. If the Chief Justice or his designate is of the C
view that in addition to examining whether there is an
arbitration agreement between the parties, he should
consider the issue whether the claim is a dead one (long
time barred) or whether there has been satisfaction of
mutual-rights and obligation under the contract, he should D
record his intention to do so and give an opportunity to
the parties to place their materials on such issue. Unless
parties are put on notice that such an issue would be
examined, they would be under the impression that only
questions of jurisdiction and existence of arbitration E
agreement between the parties would be considered in
such proceedings. [Para 12) [527-A-D]
1.3 The question whether a claim is barred by res
judicata, does not arise for consideration in a proceedings · F
under Section 11 of the Act. Such an issue would have
to be examined by the arbitral tribunal. A decision on res
judicata requires consideration of the pleadings as also
the claims/issues/points and the award in the first round
of arbitration, in juxtaposition with the pleadings and the
issues/points/claims in the second arbitration. The limited G
scope of Section 11 does not permit such examination
of the maintainability or tenability of a claim either on
facts or in law. It is for the arbitral tribunal to examine and
decide whether the claim was barred by res judicata. There
can be no threshold consideration and rejection of a H ·
516 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 2 S.C.R.
A claim on the ground of res judicata, while considering an
application under Section 11 of the Act. [Para 13) [527-E·
G]
2.1 On a perusal of the order of the Designate, it is
found that the Designate clearly exceeded his limited
8 jurisdiction under Section 11 of the Act, by deciding that
the claim for extra cost, though covered by the arbitration
agreement was barred by limitation and by the principle
of res judicata. He was also not justified in terming the
application under Section 11 of the Act as 'misconceived
C and malafide'. Nor could he attribute 'ma/a fides' to the
appellant, a public sector company, in filing an application
under Section 11 of the Act, without any material to
substantiate it. The findings of fact recorded by the
Designate were wholly unwarranted in a proceeding
D under Section 11 of the Act and the fallacy in such
findings: (i) Finding: The appellant did not state anywhere
in the petition the date which the final bill was settled and
did not produce any document containing such
information. The appellant was not expected or required
E to give such information in a petition under Section 11
of the Act or produce the documents showing the
settlement of final bill along with the said petition.
Therefore, the appellant could not be found fault for such
omission. In fact, the Designate noticed that the work was
F completed on 29.12.2007. The claim was in time with
reference to the date on which the work completed
(29.12.2007) by the alternative agency. (ii) Finding: As the
work was completed on 29.12.2007 and as the award was
made only on 27.10.2008, the appellant ought to have
G crystalised the extra cost and claimed it in the first
arbitration proceedings. The assumption that the
appellant ought to have made the claim for extra cost
which arose after the commencement of the arbitration
proceedings, in the pending proceedings by way of
H amendment, has no basis either in law or in contract. If
INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. v. SPS 517 ...
ENGINEERING LTD.
the cause of action arose after the completion of A
pleadings and commencement of hearing in the first
round of arbitration, nothing prevented the appellant from
making a separate claim by initiating a second arbitration,
(iii) Finding: Once a risk and cost tender is issued at the
risk and cost of a person, then, the amount which is to B
be claimed from the person who is guilty of breach ....
becomes crystallized when the risk purchase tender at a
higher cost is awarded. This might be true as a general
proposition. But it might not apply if there is a specific
provision in the contract (like clause 7 .0.9.0) which c
requires that the employer should claim as extra cost,
.
only the difference between the "amounts as would have
.
been payable to the contractor m respect of the work"
and "the amount actually expended by the owner for
completion of the entire work". [Para 18) [532-A-H; 533- D
A-CJ
2.2 The Designate should have avoided the risks and
dangers involved in deciding an issue relating to the
tenability of the claim without necessary pleadings and
a
documents, in proceeding relating to the limited issue E
of appointing an Arbitrator. It is clear that the Designate
committed a jurisdictional error in dismissing the
application filed by the appellant under Section 11 of the
Act, on the ground that the claim for extra cost was barred
by res judicata ar.d by limitation. Consideration of an F
application under Section 11 of the Act, does not extend
- to consideration of the merits of the claim or the chances
of success of the claim. [Para 19) [533-C-E]
2.3 The award amount due to the respondent under
the award dated 27.10.2008 is an ascertained sum due, G
recoverable by executing the award as a decree. On the
other hand the claim of the appellant for reimbursement
of the extra cost for getting the work completed, is a claim
for damages which is yet to be adjudicated by. an
adjudicating forum. The appellant cannot, therefore, H
518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 2 S.C.R.
A adjust the amount due by it under the award, against a
mere claim for damages made by it against the
respondent. The appellant would have to pay the award
amount due to the respondent and if necessary modify
its claim for extra cost against the respondent. [Para 20]
B [533-F-G]
3. The order of the Designate is set aside. The
application under Section 11 of the Act filed by appellant
before the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court is
C allowed. [Para 21] [534-A-B]
National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Boghara Polyfab Private
Limited 2009 (1) SCC 267; SBP and Co. v. Patel Engineering
Ltd. 2005 (8) sec 618 - referred to.
D Case Law Reference:
2009 (1) sec 267 Referred to Para 10
2005 (8) sec 618 Referred to Para 10
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
E 1282 of 2011.
From the Judgment & Order dated 08.12.2009 of the High
Court of Delhi at New Delhi in A.A. No. 288 of 2009.
F Goolam E. Vahanvati, AG, Rakesh Sawhney, Mona Aneja,
Aruna Mathur, Anoopam N. Prasad, Nishant Patil (for
Arputham, Aruna & Co.) for the Appellant.
Arvind Minocha for the Respondent.
G The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
R.V.RAVEENDRAN, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. The Indian Oil Corporation Limited, the appellant herein,
awarded an infrastructure work relating to drinking water
H system for its Paradip Refinery project to the respondent on .
INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. v. SPS 519
ENGINEERING LTD. [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
17 .10.2000 and followed by a formal agreement dated A
18.1.2001. The period stipulated under the contract for
completion of the work was 13 months from the date of issue
of the order dated 17.10.2000 and the contract value was
Rs.16,61, 17,473/-. The appellant terminated the contract on
29.10.2002 alleging that the respondent contractor though B
required to complete the work within 13 months, had achieved
a progress of hardly 15.94% till 30.4.2002 and notified the
respondent that the work will be got completed through an
alternative agency, at the risk and cost of the respondent under
Clause 7.0.9.0 of the General Conditions of Contract. · c
3. In view of the said termination, the respondent raised
certain claims against the appellant and invoked the arbitration
agreement contained in the General Conditions of Contract and
filed an application under section 11 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 ('Act' for short} before the Delhi High D
Court for appointment of an arbitrator. The Designate of the
Chief Justice of the High Court, by order dated 17.3.2003,
appointed a retired High Court Judge as the arbitrator.
4. Before the arbitrator, the respondent filed a statement E
of claims raish 1g eight claims. However in its written submission
before the Arbitrator, the contractor confined its claims to only
three, aggregating to Rs.1,31,81,288/-.
5. The appellant made several counter-claims aggregating
to Rs.92,72,529/-. Subsequently the statement of counter-claims F
was amended and the following para was added in regard to
the· extra cost in getting the work completed through an
alternative contractor:
"Since the aforementioned contract is still pending and G
/OCL is in the process of inducting agency (ies) to
complete the said work, the· Engineer-in-charge of the
said contract, Ell estimated a minimum expenditure of
Rs.18,36,20,000/- for completion of the works under the
said contract which Ell intimated to IOCl by its letter dated H
'520 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 2 S.C.R.
23.5.2002, ~- copy whereof is annexed hereto and marked
1
A
Annexure RY. The said estimated expenditure has been
revised by IOCL who has arrived at the reduced figure of
Rs.2, 10,41,6261-(Rupees Two Crores Ten Lacs Forty One
Thousand Six Hundred Twenty Six Only) in its proposal
dated 09.09,2006, a copy whereof is annexed hereto and
B
marked Annexure RY-1. Accordingly, IOCL is entitled to
recover from SPSEL any additional sums including the
abovementioned Rs.2, 10,41,6261- (Rupees Two Crores
Ten Lacs Forty One Thousand Six Hundred Twenty Six
Only) that it will according to its estimate incur upon
c execution of the balance work by other agencies pursuant
to the termination of the said contract in terms of Clause
7.0.6.0 of GCC along with any other additional
expenditure incurred by IOCL in completion of the said
works. IOCL, therefore, is entitled to an amount of
D Rs.2, 10,41,626/- (Rupees Two Crores Ten Lacs Forty One
Thousand Six Hundred Twenty Six Only) from SPSEL
which SPSEL has not paid till date."
(emphasis supplied)
E
The prayer in the counter-claim however remained unaltered
and did not include the claim of Rs.2, 10,41,626/- on account
of risk - execution of balance work. Even after the above
amendment, the prayer continued to be as under :
F "It is therefore prayed that the learned Arbitrator may be
pleased to:
(i) award a sum of Rs.92, 72,529/- (Rupees Ninety
Two Lacs Seventy Two Thousand Five Hundred
G Twenty Nine Only) against SPSEL and in favour of
IOCL along with the additional amounts which in
IOC's estimate, IOC will incur in further executing
and completing at the Claimant's risk and cost, the
balance works remaining incomplete under the said
contract.
H
INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. v. SPS 521
ENGINEERING LTD. [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
(ii) grant pendent lite interest@ 18% per annum on the ·,A
awarded amount;
(iii) grant interest on the awarded amount @ 18% ·per
annum from the date of award till the date of
payment in full; 8
(iv) grant cost of arbitration proceedings to lOCL;
I . .
(v) grant such oth~r or further order(s) and/or relief as ·'
are deemed appropriate in the circumstances of the
case;" c
6. The arbitrator made an award dated 27.10.2008. He
awarded Rs.91,33,844 towards the claims <;>f respondent. As
against the counter claims aggregating to Rs.92, 72,529 made
by the appellant, the arbitrator awarded a sum ofR~.11, 10,662. D
In regard to the averments made by the appellantfn regard to
the extra cost involved in getting the work completed through
an alternative contractor, the arbitrator observed thus : ·
"102. The contract was terminated in October 2002 and .
till date the balance work of the contract has not been E .
executed. Such damage could have been allowed to the
respondent if in a reasonable period after termination of
the contract, the respon~ent had executed the balance
work at the risk and costs of the claimant. In case the costs
actually incurred haveJ~eeo more than the costs which F
were required to be incurred under the contract, then the
difference between the two costs could have been
awarded as damages to the respondent. There is no
proper evidence on the record to show that what could
have been the costs. ofthe balance work if it had been G
executed within reasonable period after the termination of
the contract. Such damage cannot be awarded on mere
opinion of any particular person or on hypothetical basis.
Under clause 1:0.9.0 of General Conditions of the
Contract, the respondent was entitled at the risk and
H,
522 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011} 2 S.C.R.
A expenses of the contractor to get completed the balance
work and recover the costs from the claimant. This clause
further contemplates that on the amount actually
expended by the owner for the completion of the work
15% to be added as supervision charges, the same would
8 have become recoverable from the claimant. In the
present case, no such cost has been incurred till date.
Thus, for these reasons, I reject this counter claim."
(emphasis supplied).
C The arbitrator adjusted Rs.11, 10,662 awarded to the appellant,
towards the sum of Rs.91,33,844 awarded in favour of the
respondent and consequently directed the appellant to pay to
the respondent, the balance of Rs.80,23, 182. He further
directed that if the amount was not paid within three months
D from the date of award, the appellant shall pay interest at the
rate of 12% per annum from the date of award till payment. The
appellant did not challenge the award and it thus attained
finality.
E 7. The appellant claims that it entrusted the incomplete
work to Deepak Construction Company for completion in the _
year 2005, that the said contractor completed the work on
29.12.2007, and that the final bill of the said alternative agency
was settled on 7.5.2008. On that basis, the appellant calculated
the actual extra cost incurred in completing the work and the
. F total amount recoverable from the petitioner in terms of the
contract, as under:
A. Amount determined as payable Rs.4,05,74,465.00
to the alternative agency (Deepak
G Construction Co.) for the balance
work
8. Material supplied to the alternative(+) Rs.2,78,68,861.64
agency for completing the work
C. Total Cost (A + 8) Rs.6,84,43,326.64
INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. v. SPS 523
ENGINEERING LTD. [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
A
D. The cost of such unfinished .work,(-) Rs.3,30,93,996.75
if it had been completed by the
respondent, as per its contract
rates.
B
E. Extra cost incurred on account Rs.3,53,49,329.89
of getting the work completed at
the risk and cost of respondent
(C - D)
c
F. Supervision charges at 15% on(+) Rs.1,02,66,499.00
Rs.6,84,43,326.64
Total amount recoverable from the
respondent (E+F) Rs.4,56, 15,828.89
D
Towards the said claim against the respondent, the appellant
adjusted the sum of Rs.80,23, 182/- awarded by the arbitrator
to the respondent and arrived at the net amount recoverable
from the respondent towards extra cost for completion as E
Rs.3, 75,92,646.89. The appellant by notice dated 22.1.2009
I •
called upon the respondent to pay the said sum of
Rs.3,75,92,646.89 (and interest thereon at 18% per annum if
the amount was not paid within seven days) and informed the
respondent that if it disputed its liability, to treat the said letter F
as appellant's notice invoking arbitration. The appellant also
suggested a panel of three names (including Justice P.K. Bahri
- the arbitrator who had made the award dated 27.10.2008)
with a request to select one of them as the arbitrator. The
respondent by reply dated 18.3.2009 refused to comply,
~ contending that the counter claim in regard to the risk-execution G
cost had already been rejected by the arbitrator, by his award
dated 27.10.2008 and that award having attained finality, there
could be no further arbitration. In view of the said stand of the
respondent, the appellant filed a petition under section 11 of
H
524 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 2 S.C.R.
A the Act praying for appointment of an arbitrator to decide its
claim for the extra cost in getting the work completed through
the alternative agency.
8. The learned Designate of the Chief Justice of the Delhi
High Court (for short 'the Designate') by the impugned order
8
dated 8.12.2009 dismissed the application with costs of
Rs.50,000/-. He held that the application under section 11 of
the Act by the appellant was misconceived, barred by res
judicata, and ma/a fide. The Designate held (i) that the claim
by the appellant in regard to extra cost had already been
C considered and rejected by the Arbitrator; (ii) that the claim
regarding extra cost was barred by limitation (by drawing an
inference from the observation of the Arbitrator that the risk
execution tender was not awarded to Deepak Construction Co.
within a reasonable period of termination of respondent's
D contract); and (iii) that as the work was completed by Deepak
Construction Co. on 29.12.2007 and the earlier arbitration
proceedings had came to an end much later on 27.10.2008,
the claim in regard to actual extra cost ought to have been
crystallized and claimed in the first round of arbitration.
E
9. The said order is challenged in this appeal by special
leave. On the contentions urged the questions that arise for
consideration are as follows :
(i) Whether the Chief Justice or his designate can
F examine the tenability of a claim, in particular
whether a claim is barred by res judicata, while
considering an application under section 11 of the
Act?
G (ii) Whether the Designate was justified in holding that
the claim was barred by res judicata and that
application under section 11 of the Act was
misconceived and ma/a fide?
H
INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD .. v. SPS 525
ENGINEERING LTD. [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
Re : Question (i) A
10. This Court, in National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Boghara
Polyfab Private Limited [2009 (1) SCC 267] following the
decision in SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. [2005 (8)
. SCC 618], identified and segregated the issues that may be B
raised in an application under section 11 of the Act into three
categories, as under :
·. "22.1. The issues (first category) which the Chief Justice/
his designate will have to decide are : ·
c
(a) Whether the party making the application has
approached the appropriate High Court?
(b) Whether there is an arbitration agreement and
whether the party who has applied .under Section D
11 of the Act, is a party to such an agreement?
22.2. The issues (second category) which the Chief
Justice/his designate may choose to decide (or leave
them to the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal) are:
, E
(a) Whether the claim is a dead (long-barred) claim or
a live claim?
(b) Whether the parties have concluded the contract/
transaction by recording satisfaction of their mutual
rights and obligation or by receiving the final F
payment without objection?
22.3. The issues (third category) which the Chief Justice/
his designate should leave exclusively to the Arbitral .
Tribunal are: G
(i) Whether a claim made falls within the arbitration
· clause (as for example, a matter which is reserved
for final decision of a departmental authority and
excepted or excluded from arbitration)?
H
526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 2 S.C.R.
A (ii) Merits or any claim involved in the arbitration."
11. To find out whether a claim is barred by res judicata,
or whether a claim is "ma/a fide", it will be necessary to
examine the facts and relevant documents. What is to be
decided in an application under section 11 of the Act is whether
8
there is an arbitration agreement between parties. The Chief
,fustice or his designate is not expected to go into the merits
of the claim or examine the tenability of the claim, in an
application under section 11 of the Act. The Chief Justice or
his Designate may however choose to decide whether the
C claim is a dead (long-barred) claim or whether the parties have,
by recording satisfaction, exhausted all rights, obligations and
remedies under the contract, so that neither the contract nor the
arbitration agreement survived. When it is said that the Chief
Justice or his Designate may choose to decide whether the
D claim is a dead claim, it is implied that he will do so only when
the claim is evidently and patently a long time barred claim and
there is no need for any detailed consideration of evidence. We
may elucidate by an illustration : If the contractor makes a claim
a decade or so after completion of the work without referring
E to any acknowledgement of a liability or other factors that kept
the claim alive in law, and the claim is patently long time barred,
the Chief Justice or his Designate will examine whether the
claim is a dead claim (that is, a long time barred claim). On
the other hand, if the contractor makes a claim for payment,
F beyond three years of completing of the work but say within five
years of completion of work, and alleges that the final bill was
drawn up and payments were made within three years before
the claim, the court will not enter into a disputed question
whether the claim was barred by limitation or not. The court will
G leave the matter to the decision of the Tribunal. If the distinction
between apparent and obvious dead claims, and claims
involving disputed issues of limitation is not kept in view, the
Chief Justice or his designate will end up deciding the question
of limitation in all applications under section 11 of the Act.
H
INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. v. SPS 527
ENGINEERING LTD. [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
12. An application under section 11 of the Act is expected A·
to contain pleadings about the existence of a dispute and the
existence of an arbitration agreement to decide such dispute.
The applicant is not expected to justify the claim or plead
exhaustively in regard to limitation or produce documents to
demonstrate that the claim is within time in a proceedings under • B
- section 11 of the Act. That issue should normally be left to the
Arbitral Tribunal. If the Chief Justice or his designate is of the
view that in addition to examining whether there is an arbitration
agreement between the parties, he should consider the issue
whether the claim is a dead one (long time barred) or whether c
there has been satisfaction of mutual rights and obligation
under the contract, he should record his intention to do so and
give an opportunity to the parties to place their materials on
such issue. Unless parties are put on notice that such an issue
will be examined, they will be under the impression that only D
questions of jurisdiction and existence of arbitration agreement
. between the parties will be considered in such proceedings.
13. The question whether a claim is barred by res judicata,
does not arise for consideration in a proceedings under section
11 of the Act. Such an issue will have to be examined by the E
arbitral tribunal. A decision on res judicata requires
consideration of the pleadings as also the claims/issues/points
and the award in the first round of arbitration, in juxtaposition
with the pleadings and the issues/points/claims in the second
arbitration. The limited scope of section 11 of the Act does not F
permit such examination of the maintainability or tenability of a
claim either on facts or in law. It is for the arbitral tribunal to
examine and decide whether the claim was barred by res
judicata. There can be· no threshold consideration and rejection
of a claim on the ground of res judicata, while considering an G
application under section 11 of the Act.
Re : Question (ii)
14. We extract below the reasoning adopted by the
H
528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 2 S.C.R.
A Designate to dismiss the appellant's application under section
11 of the Act :
"5. In my opinion, not only the aforesaid para 102 in the
Award dated 27 .10.2008 operates as res judicata against
the present petitioner, I find that the present petition is _
B
misconceived and and ma/a fide because, if the present
petitioner is correct in saying and which I doubt it is, that
its limitation/right would only begin after the work is
completed by M/s Deepak Construction Company when
the amount of the higher cost is known, even then, the work
c was completed by the Mis Deepak Construction Company
admittedly on 29.12.2007, and thus the present petitioner,
could well have proved its counter claim in the earlier
proceedings and could have crystallized the amount in the
said earlier arbitration proceedings. If necessary it could
D have even amended its pleadings as regards the counter
claim. On a further query by the Court to the counsel for
the petitioner with respect to the statement in the notice
dated 22.01.2009 sent by the petitioner to the respondent
which states that Mis Deepak Construction Company has
E completed the work on 29.12.2007 and its final bill has now
been settled" that when was the bill of Mis Deepak
Construction Company settled, the counsel for petitioner
states that for the present no such information is at all
available whether in the form of any assertion in the
F present petition or in any document in support thereof.
6. A conspectus of the aforesaid facts show that firstly in
the earlier arbitration proceedings, the counter claim of the
present petitioner on this very subject matter was
specifically dismissed by holding and observing that the
G
risk purchase tender awarded to Mis Deepak Construction
Company was not given within a reasonable period of time
after termination of the work of the present respondent.
Secondly, it has further become clear that the work was
comp:cted by M/s Deepak Construction Company
H
INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. v. SPS 529
ENGINEERING LTD. [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
admittedly as per the case of the petitioner on 29.12.2007 A
and the earlier arbitration proceedings came to an end
later by passing of the Award on 27.10.2008 and, therefore,
the claim with respect to any cost of the total materials for
the substitute contract for the risk purchase could very well
have been crystallized and claimed. in the earlier arbitration B
proceedings. Thirdly, admittedly there is no challenge to
the award dated 27.10.2008 by the present petition
whereby its counter claim was rejected. Fourthly, I am of
the view that once a risk and cost tender is issued at the
risk ~nd cost of a person, then, the amount which is to be c
claimed from the person who is guilty of breach of contract
and against whom risk and cost is tendered, becomes
crystallized when the risk purchase tender at a higher cost
is awarded. Once a higher cost of work is known as
compared to the cost of the work for the earlier work for 0
which the earlier contract was there and with respect to
which the earlier contractor was in breach, then not only
the amount becomes crystallized but limitation also
commences for filing of the legal proceedings against the
person in breach of obligations under the earlier contract. E
It cannot be that limitation and a right continues indefinitely
to be extended till the performance is completed under a
. subsequent risk purchase contract. This would give·
complete uncertainty to the period of limitation striking at
the very root of one of the principles of the Limitation Act
and which is that evidence is lost by passage of time and F
Which will cause grave prejudice to the person against
whom a stale claim is filed."
15. The appellant submitted that having regard to clause
7.0.9.0 of the contract, damages can be claimed by it (as G
employer), in regard to the additional amount incurred for getting
the work completed through an alternative agency at the risk
and cost of the contractor along with the supervision charges,
only when the amount was actually expended for completion
of the entire work; and therefore, unless the work was H
•
I
530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 2 S.C.R.
A completed by the alternative agency and the final bill was settled
or finalized, the actual extra cost could not be determined. It was
pointed out that in the first round of arbitration, the hearing was
concluded by the Arbitrator on 13.3.2008 and matter was
reserved for orders and the award was declared on
B 27.10.2008; that the work was completed by the alternative
agency on 29.12.2007 and final bill of the alternative agency
was drawn and settled only on 7.5.2008, after the conclusion .
of the hearing, by the Arbitrator; that the actual extra cost could
be worked out only when the final bill was prepared, and not
c on the date of completion of work; that therefore the appellant
could not make the claim for actual extra cost, in the first round
art:iitration. It was also submitted that the appellant was not
expected to give details of completion of work and preparation
of the final bill, or produce documents in support of it in a
proceeding under section 11 of the Act; and that the Designate
0
was not therefore justified in finding fault with the appellant for
not stating the da\e of settlement of the final bill in the petition
under section 11 of the Act and for not producing the final bill.
16. The appellant also contended that when its statement
E of counter claim was amended before the Arbitrator, the
appellant had only indicated its estimation of the probable extra
cost to be Rs.2, 10,41,626/-, as advance indication of a claim
to be made in future on the basis of actuals, and that it had not
prayed for award of the said amount in the said proceeding. It
F was pointed out that even after mentioning the proposed claim
by amending the statement of counter claim, the actual counter
claim before the arbitrator remained as only Rs.92,72,529/-
exclusive of any claim on account of the risk completion cost.
It was submitted that having regard to clause 7.0.9.0, the counter
G claim for extra cost could not have been made when the first
arbitration was in progress and that the arbitrator had in fact
noticed in his award (at para 102) that only when the cost
actually incurred, the appellant could make the claim for the
extra cost. It is contended that the "rejection" by the arbitrator
H was not on the ground that the claim for extra cost was not
INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. v. SPS 531
ENGINEERING LTD. [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J:]
recoverable, nor on the ground that no extra cost was involved A -
in completing the work, but on the ground that as on the date
of the award, the appellant had not actually incurred any specific
extra cost; and that as the arbitrator clearly held that any claim ·
for extra cost was premature and could not be considered at
that stage, the observation that 'I reject this counter claim' only B
meant that the claim relating to extra cost was not being
considered in that award and that appellant should make the
claims separately after the amount was actually expended.
1i Clause 7.0.9.0 of the contract relied upon by the C
appellant reads thus :
"clause 7.0.9.0
Upon termination of the contract, the owner shall be entitled
at the risk and expenses of the contractor by itself or 0
through any independent contractor(s) or partly byJtself
and/or partly through independent contractor(s) to complete
to its entirety the work as contemplated in the scope of
work and to recover from the contractor in addition to any
other amounts, compensations or damages that the owner E
may in terms hereof or otherwise be entitled to (including
compensation within the provisions of clause 4.4.0 10 and
clause 7.0.7.0 hereof) the difference between the amounts
as would have been payable to the contractor in respect
of the work (calculated as provided for in clause 6.2 11.0
hereof read with the associated provisions thereunder and F
clause 6.3.1.0 hereof) and the amount actually expended
by the owner for completion of the entire work as
aforesaid together with 15% (fifteen per cent) thereof to
cover owner's supervision charges, and in the event of
the latter being in the excess former, the owner shall be G
entitled (without prejudice to any other mode of recovery
available to the owner) to recover the excess from security
deposit or any monies due to the contractor."
(emphasis supplied) H
''.i(/,;:
532 Sl.}PREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 2 S.C.R.
A 18. On a perusal of the order of the Designate, we find that
the Designate has clearly exceeded his limited jurisdiction
under section 11 of the Act, by deciding that the claim for extra
cost, though covered by the arbitration agreement was barred
by limitation and by the principle of res judiata. He was also
B not justified in terming the application under section 11 of the
Act as 'misconceived and malafide'. Nor could he attribute
'ma/a fides' to the appellant, a public sector company, in filing
an- application under section 11 of the Act, without any material
to substantiate it. We may refer to some of the findings of fact
c recorded by the Designate, which were wholly unwarranted in
a proceeding under section 11 of the Act and the fallacy in such
findings:
(i) Finding : The appellant did not state anywhere in the
petition the date which the final bill was settled and did not
D produce any document containing such information. The
appellant was not expected or required to give such information
in a petition under section 11 of the Act or produce the
documents showing the settlement of final bill along with the
said petition. Therefore, the appellant could not be found fault
E for such omission. In fact, the Designate noticed that the work
was completed on 29.12.2007. The claim was in time with
reference to the date on which the work completed
(29.12.2007) by the alternative agency.
F (ii) Finding: As the work was completed on 29.12.2007
and as the award was made only on 27.10.2008, the appellant
ought to have crystalised the extra cost and claimed it in the
first arbitration proceedings. The assumption that the appellant
ought to have made the claim for extra cost which arose after
G the commencement of the arbitration proceedings, in the
pending proceedings by way of amendment, has no basis
either in law or in contract. If the cause of action arose after
the completion of pleadings and commencement of hearing in
the first round of arbitration, nothing prevented the appellant from
making a separate claim by initiating a second arbitration. ·
H
INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. v. SPS 533
ENGINEERING LTD. [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
(iii) Finding : Once a risk and cost tenderis issued at the A
risk and cost of a person, then, the amount which is to be
claimed from the person who is guilty of breach ......... :
becomes crystallized when the risk purchase. tender at a
higher cost is awarded.. This may be true as a general
proposition. But it may not apply if there is a specific provision B
in the contract (like clause 7.0.9.0) which requires that the
employer should claim as extra cost, only the difference
between the "amounts as would have been payable to the
contractor in respect of the work" and "the amount actually
expended by the owner for completion of the entire work". c
19. The Designate should have avoided the risks and
dangers involved in deciding an issue relating to the tenability
of the claim without necessary pleadings and documents, in a
proceeding relating to the limited issue of appointing an
Arbitrator. It is clear that the Designate committed a 0
jurisdictional error in dismissing the application filed by the
appellant under section 11 of the Act, on the ground that the
claim for extra cost was barred by res judicata and by limitation.
Consideration of an application under section 11 of the Act,
does not extend to consideration of the merits of the claim or E
the chances of success of the claim.
20. We may at this stage refer to one aspect of the claim
for extra cost. The award amount due to the respondent under
the award dated 27 .10.2008 is an ascertained sum due, p
recoverable by executing the award as a decree. On the other
hand the claim of the aµpellant for reimbursement of the extra
cost for getting the work completed, is a claim for damages
which is yet to be adjudicated by an adjudicating forum. The
appellant cannot therefore adjust the amount due by it under G
the award, against a mere claim for damages made by it
against the respondent. The appellant will have to pay the
award amountdu~ to the respondent and if necessary modify'
its claim for extra· cost against the respondent.
21. In view of the foregoing, this appeal is allowed and the H
r
534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011) 2 S.C.R.
A order of the Designate is set aside. The application under
section 11 of the Act filed by appellant before the Chief Justice
of the Delhi High Court is allowed and Justice P.K.Bahri (Retd.)
who was the earlier Arbitrator is appointed as the sole. arbitrator
to decide the appellant's claim in regard to the additional cost
B for completing the work. It is open to the respondent to raise
all contentions against the claim of the appellant including the
contention of limitation, maintainability and res judicata, before
the arbitrator. Nothing in this order shall be construed as
expression of any opinion on the merits or tenability of the claim
c of the appellant regarding extra cost.
N.J. Appeal allowed.
•
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