Holding

Section 7 read with Section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act is constitutionally valid.

Summary

Inderjeet filed a writ petition under Article 32 challenging the constitutionality of Section 7 read with Section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, which imposes absolute liability and a mandatory minimum six‑month imprisonment for anyone found guilty of selling adulterated food, irrespective of mens rea. The petitioner argued that the provisions violate Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution because they impose a draconian, one‑size‑fits‑all punishment on both small retailers and large traders. The Supreme Court examined whether such mandatory sentencing constitutes cruel or unreasonable punishment and whether it breaches the principle of equal protection. The Court held that the provisions are a valid exercise of the State’s police power to protect public health and that mandatory minima are not per se unconstitutional. It observed that the legislature, not the judiciary, is the appropriate forum for policy changes, and that executive powers of remission remain available. Consequently, the petition was dismissed for lack of constitutional infirmity.

Issues considered

Whether Section 7 read with Section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, imposing absolute liability and a mandatory minimum sentence, violates Article 14 of the Constitution.
Whether the same provisions infringe Article 19 (freedom of trade) or Article 21 (right to life and personal liberty) by being cruel, unreasonable or disproportionate.

Legislation cited

Prevention of Food Adulteration Acts. 16, s. 7

Subjects

absolute liabilitymandatory minimum sentencefood adulterationconstitutional validityArticle 14Article 19Article 21public healthpenal policyjudicial review

Judgment

255

INDERJEET A
v.
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.
August 10, 1979
[V. R. KRISHNA }YER AND P. N. SHJNGHAL, JJ.J B
Statutory standardised sentence-Absolute liability 1vith mandatory mini-
muni sentence of six months' R.I. of offender's guilt of sale of adulterated
food, w/Jether constitutionally bad, offending Articles 14, 19 and 21-Preven-
tion of Food Adulteration Act, Section 7 read with Section 16, vires of.
Dismissing the Writ Petition, the Court
HELD : Section 7 read with Section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adul-
c
1eration Act is constitutionally valid. [257G]

Policy is for Parliament, constitutionality is for the Court. Protection of
public health and regulation of noxious trade belong to the police power of
the State an<l Legislation like the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act is of
that £enre. [256F-G] D
If a sentence, as in the instant Act, is prescribed as a mandatory minimum
and that is too cruel to comport with Art. 21 and too torturesome to be rea-
sonably justifiable or socially defensible under Article 19, then a case for
jud'icial review 1nay arise. [256 G-H]

Judge-proof sentencing· is not per se bad. Sometimes judicial fluctuations
in punishment, especially on the softer side where white collar criminals are E
involved, induce legislative standardisation of sentences, to avoid giving
societal protection in hostage to fortune. There is a wide play still left for
the Court, and mandatory minima are familiar from the days of the Penal
Code. [256H, 257AJ
The prescription of equal protection is not breached either, because within
the: range of judicial discretion the Court deals out to each what he deserves
according to established principles. [257B] F
Observation
(a) Public authorities entrusted with the enforcement of regulatory
provisions to protect society may, tn proper cases, examine those
prosecutions which are harassments to the humbler folk even if
they technically violate the law and cause only minimal harm to
society and decide whether they should at all sanction their prose- G
cution. [257D-E]

(b) The Legfslature, in its wisdom, may also consider the advisability
of resting power somewhere to reduce the sentence without the
bigger offender escaping through these \Vider meshes meant for the
smaller offenders. Even otherwise, there is a general po\ver in the
Executive to commute sentences and such power can be put into H
action on a principled basis when, small men_ get caught by the law.
[257E-F]
256 SUl>REME COURT REPORTS fl 980] ] S.C.R.

A 0RIGJNAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 449 of 1979
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)
R. K. Garg and D. K. Garg for the Petitioner.
The Order of the Court was delivered by
B
KRISHNA IYER, J.-The adventurous petitioner imaginatively chal-
lenges the vires of Section 7 read with Section 16 of the Prevention ot
Food Adulteration Act and the relevant rules framed thereunder. The
gravamen of his chmge is that the above provisions, read fogether,
impose an inflexible minimum sentence of six months R.I. of offender's
C guilty of sale of adulterated food, excluding in the process even the need
to prove mens rea in the accused. This absolute liability, with man-
datory sentence, dependent on sophisticated chemical tests and compli-
cated formulae, is' oppressively unreasomble in the illiterate, agrestic
realities of little Indian retail trade. Such, in one sentence, is the
submission of counsel.
D
The primary props to support this broad submission may be briefly
noticed. Counsel complains that there is no classification as between
injurious pollutants and innocuous adulterants while proscribing the
sentence. Nor is there any intelligent differentiation between petty
dealers and giant offenders, and vendors, big and small, are put on the
E
Procrustean bed of stem punishment alike. Articles 14, 19 and 21"
are the constitutional artillery employed by counsel to shoot down the
said provisions of the Act.

Frankly, we arc not impressed with the consternation about the
constitutionality even if the potential for victimisation affecting smaller
people may be real and elicit our commiseration. We may dwell for
a moment on the latter grievance against the law a little later. First,
we will repel the vice of unconstitutionality.

Let us be clear about the basics. Policy is for Parliament, consti-
G tutionality for the Court. Protection of public health and regulation of
noxious trade belong to the police power of the State and legislation
like the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act is of that genre.

If a sentence, as here, is prescribed as a mandatory minimum and
that is too cruel to comport with Art. 21 and too torturesome to be
H reasonably justifiable or socially defensible under Art. 19 then a case
for judicial review may arise. But we see none here. Nor can we
a!);ree that judge-proof sentencing is per se bad. Sometimes judicial
INDERJEET v. U.P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, !.) 25 7

fluctuations in punishment, especially on the softer side where white A
collar criminals are involved, induce legislative s•iandardisation of sen-
tences, to avoid giving societal protection in hostage to fortune.
There is a wide play still left for the court, and mandatory minima are

)
• familar from the days of the Penal Code (Vide Sec. 302). The ?res-
cription of equal protection is no't breached either, because within the
range of judicial discretion the court deals out to each what he deserves B
according to established principles.
Shri R. K. Garg feelingly urged that the poor and the weak, who
arc the larger, loll'cr sector of retail \raders, will have to suffer the
standardised imprisonment if Food Inspectors can cha!lan them in
Court and, on son1c 1ninor variation in the chen1ical con1position of c
food sold, get them convicted sans mens rea merely because, along the
chain, some bigger trader has fobbed off inferior commodities on
them. We are disturbed that it is possible that small men become
the victims of harsh law when there is no executive policy which guides
'
prosecution of offenders. Petty victuallers and big sharks operate on
society in different degrees and draconian equality will be tempered uy D
flexible policy.
This is a matter of penal policy in constitutionality and so it is, in
a sense, out of bounds for judicial advice. Even so, we feel constrain-
ed to state that public authorities entrusted wi_t;h the enforcement of
regulatory provisions to protect society may, in proper cases, examine E
those prosecutions which are harassments to the humbler folk even if
they technically violate the law and cause only minimal harm to society
and decide whether they should at all sanction their prosecution. The
Legislature, in its wisdom, may also consider the advisability of resting
power somewhere to reduce the sentence without the bigger offender
escaping through these wider meshes meant for the sm&ller offenders. F
Even otherwise, there is a gencrnl power in the Executive to commut'e
sentences and such power can be put into action on a principled basis
when small men get caught by the law.
We dismiss the Writ petition since there is no constitutional inva-
lidity made out and the grounds urged arc more appropriately an G
appeal to the Parliament and the Executive.

V.D.K. Petition dismissed.