IN RE : SECTION 6A OF THE CITIZENSHIP ACT 1955 versus

                    [2024] 10 S.C.R. 961 : 2024 INSC 789

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955
                        (Writ Petition (C) No. 274 of 2009)
                                  17 October 2024
      [Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud,* CJI, Surya Kant,*
    J.B. Pardiwala,* M.M. Sundresh, and Manoj Misra, JJ.]


                               Issue for Consideration
          Issue arose as regards the constitutional validity of s.6A of the
          Citizenship Act; does s.6A offend preambular values like fraternity;
          s.6A, if ultra vires Part II of the Constitution; does s.6A create
          an unreasonable classification which violates Art. 14; does s.6A
          suffer from manifest arbitrariness; does s.6A violate the rights
          provided to ‘indigenous’ communities u/Art. 29; s.6A, if ultra vires
          Art. 21; does s.6A violate the political rights of Indian citizens in
          Assam u/Art. 326; does the operation of s.6A cause ‘external
          aggression’ and ‘internal disturbance’, culminating in the invocation
          of Art. 355; does the Citizenship Act conflict with provisions of the
          Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam Act), 1950, if so, how can the
          two legislations be harmoniously interpreted; and does s.6A violate
          international laws.

                                     Headnotes†

          Constitutional validity of s.6A of the Citizenship Act
          Citizenship Act, 1955 – s.6A – Special provisions as to
          citizenship of persons covered by the Assam Accord –
          s.6A confering citizenship on a specific class of migrants
          from Bangladesh to Assam – Provision conferred deemed
          citizenship to immigrants who entered prior to 01.01.1966; and
          process of registration for immigrants who entered between
          the period of 01.01.1966 and 25.03.1971 – However, immigrants
          who entered the State of Assam on or after 25.03.1971 not
          entitled to the protection conferred vide s.6A and consequently,
          declared to be illegal immigrants – Constitutional validity:
          Held: (per Surya Kant, J.) (for himself and for M.M. Sundresh
          and Manoj Misra, JJ.) s.6A is constitutionally valid – s.6A falls
          within the bounds of the Constitution and is a valid piece of


*Author
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       legislation – It does not contravene the foundational principles
       of fraternity, nor does it infringe upon Arts. 6, 7, 9, 14, 21, 29,
       326, or 355 – s.6A does not clash with the IEAA or established
       principles of international law – While the statutory scheme of s.6A is
       constitutionally valid, there is inadequate enforcement of the same,
       leading to the possibility of widespread injustice – Intention of s.6A,
       to restrict illegal immigration post-1971 has also not been given
       proper effect – s.6A has become redundant qua those immigrants
       who have entered the State of Assam on or after 25.03.1971 – In
       view thereof, directions issued in Sarbananda Sonowal’s case
       to be given effect to for deporting the illegal immigrants falling in
       the said category – Provisions of the Immigrants (Expulsion from
       Assam) Act, 1950 to be read into s.6A and be effectively employed
       for identification of illegal immigrants – Statutory machinery and
       tribunals tasked with the identification and detection of illegal
       immigrants or foreigners in Assam are inadequate to the legislative
       object of s.6A read with Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act,
       1950, Foreigners Act, 1946, Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964,
       Passport (Entry into India) Act, 1920 and Passport Act, 1967,
       thus, necessitates constant monitoring by this Court – Bench to
       be constituted to monitor the implementation of the directions
       issued. [Paras 387, 391, 392] – Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y
       Chandrachud, CJI.) (Concurring) s.6A not violative of Arts. 6
       and 7 of the Constitution – s.6A does not violate Art. 29(1) of
       the Constitution – s.6A(3) cannot be held unconstitutional on the
       ground of temporal unreasonableness and s.6A(2) cannot be held
       unconstitutional for not prescribing a procedure for registration.
       [Para 125] – Held: (per Pardiwala, J.) (Dissenting): By applying
       the doctrine of temporal reasonableness, s.6A declared to be invalid
       with prospective effect – Immigrants migrated before 01.01.1966
       and were granted deemed citizenship, and immigrants migrated
       between 01.01.1966 and 24.03.1971 and were granted citizenship
       to remain unaffected – Immigrants migrated between 01.01.1966
       and 24.03.1971, and were detected as foreigners, and registered
       with authorities to be treated as Indian citizens after the expiry of
       10 years after they were detected – Immigrants migrated between
       01.01.1966 and 24.03.1971, who were detected as foreigners but
       did not register on time to lose eligibility for citizenship benefits –
       Immigrants whose applications and appeals pending to be governed
       by s.6A(3) – After the said judgment, no illegal immigrants in Assam
       to benefit from s.6A – Constitution of India – Arts. 6, 7, 9, 14, 21,
       29, 326, or 355. [Paras 217, 218]
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                               963

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     Ethos of s.6A, aligned with fraternity
     Constitution of India – Fraternity – Preambular notion of
     fraternity – Meaning of ‘fraternity’ – Ethos of s.6A, if aligned
     with fraternity – Preambular value of fraternity, if applicable
     to the immigrants entering into the State of Assam under the
     aegis of s.6A:
     Held: (per Surya Kant, J.) (for himself and for M.M. Sundresh
     and Manoj Misra, JJ.) Ethos underlying s.6A, align with the concept
     of fraternity – In the Indian constitutional context, fraternity assumes
     a dynamic and inclusive role, aligning with the broader goals of
     social justice, equality, and upliftment – Very scope of fraternity
     beyond just being an ideal in the Preamble was thus expanded
     to be a principle that would create checks and balances on the
     system of governance and state actions – Essence of fraternity,
     is fundamentally geared towards fostering interconnectedness
     among Indians and was envisaged to be a principle for uplifting
     marginalised sections of society – Petitioners approach to interpret
     fraternity in a highly restrictive manner, which allows them to choose
     their neighbours, cannot be accepted since it runs contrary to the
     very idea and ethos of fraternity envisaged by the Constituent
     Assembly and interpreted by this Court – Fraternity requires people
     of different backgrounds and social circumstances to ‘live and let
     live’ – Nomenclature of fraternity itself is self-explanatory to the
     extent that it exhibits the notion of inclusiveness and togetherness,
     as opposed to restricted applicability – Thus, it becomes imperative
     to refrain from employing this concept in a negative manner
     that selectively applies it to a particular segment while labelling
     another faction as ‘illegal immigrants’, solely based on the alleged
     unconstitutionality of s.6A. [Paras 106, 114, 115, 117, 118]

     Part II and s.6A
     Citizenship Act, 1955 – s.6A – Special provisions as to
     citizenship of persons covered by the Assam Accord –
     Constitution of India – Part II – Arts. 6, 6A, 7 and 11 – s.6A, if
     ultra vires the Part II – s.6A, if violative of Arts 6, 7 and 11 –
     Parliament, if had the power to enact s.6A – s.6A, if contradicts
     s. 5 of the Citizenship Act, which requires every citizen to
     take an oath of allegiance – s.6A enabling dual citizenship, if
     unconstitutional for violating Art. 9 – Parliament, if had the
     competence to specify different conditions u/Art. 11.
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       Held: (per Surya Kant, J.) (for himself and for M.M. Sundresh
       and Manoj Misra, JJ.) s.6A aligns with the fundamental purpose
       of Arts. 6 and 7, which was to extend citizenship rights to those
       affected by the country’s partition and is not contrary to them – Art.
       6 does not prohibit the granting of citizenship after the cut-off date
       of 19.07.1948 – It only specifies the fulfilment of certain conditions,
       which, are also present in s.6A(3) – While s.6A(2) grants deemed
       citizenship without these conditions, the competence of Parliament
       to prescribe different conditions is well embedded in Art. 11 – Art.7
       prohibits citizenship to people who remigrated to India, this is
       only a sub-class of people who have been granted citizenship by
       s.6A – Since s.6A grants citizenship even to people who migrated
       for the first time, the class of re-migrants is severable from this
       provision – Art. 11 confers overriding powers upon the Parliament
       to make laws even when they are against other provisions of
       Part II and that it grants the Parliament the power to make ‘any’
       provision regarding citizenship and that this authority is not restricted
       by the provisions of Part II – Concept of dual citizenship means
       one has citizenship of two countries simultaneously – In India,
       such citizenship is restricted by Art. 9, and s. 9 of the Citizenship
       Act, and operate in different time spheres and in different fields –
       Even if it is assumed that s.6A grants dual citizenship, it does not
       run counter to Art. 9 which restricts a person possessing foreign
       citizenship from acquiring citizenship u/Arts. 5, 6, and 8 – However,
       s.6A does not grant citizenship under these provisions and is rather
       a separate method enacted by Parliament by virtue of its power
       u/Art.11 – Conflict between Art. 9 and s.6A, thus, does not arise at
       all – Further, s.6A also does not conflict with s. 9 because s.6A does
       not override the scheme of s. 9 and must be read complementarily
       thereto – However, s.6A, presumes the renunciation of previous
       citizenship – Furthermore, explicit lack of an oath of allegiance
       before the conferral of citizenship by s.6A does not absolve the
       immigrants covered under this provision from following the laws of
       the country, just as any other citizen of India – s.6A cannot be run
       down on the premise that it does not mandate an oath of allegiance.
       [Paras 132, 134, 135, 137, 141, 142, 144-146, 148, 149, 158, 159] –
       Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI.) (Concurring)
       s.6A not violative of Arts. 6 and 7, which prescribe cut-off date for
       conferring citizenship for migrants from East and West Pakistan at
       the commencement of the Constitution-26.01.1950 – s.6A confers
       citizenship from 01.01.1966 for those who migrated before that
       date – Those who migrated between 01.01.1966 and 24.03.1971,
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                              965

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     are conferred citizenship upon the completion of ten years from
     the date of detection as a foreigner – s.6A confers citizenship from
     a later date to those who are not covered by Arts. 6 and 7, thus,
     does not have the effect of amending Arts. 6 and 7 – Art. 11 is
     not a non-obstante clause – Legislative competence of Parliament
     to enact laws related to citizenship is traceable to Entry 17 List I
     and not Art. 11 – Provisions in Part II do not impact or limit the
     legislative competence of Parliament. [Paras 38, 42, 125] – Held:
     (per Pardiwala, J.) (Dissenting): s.6A is not similar in form and
     identical in spirit with Arts. 6 and 7 – Perusal of s.6A vis-à-vis Arts
     6 and 7 respectively would reveal that despite a few similarities
     between the two, the crucial difference lies in the fact that in Art.
     6, the onus of registration for a person seeking citizenship lies on
     that person and not on the State – All those persons who migrated
     to India from Pakistan after 19.07.1948, had to make an application
     before the commencement of the Constitution – Permit system
     which was introduced as per Art. 7 was also brought to an end in
     1952 – Both these conditions-onus of registration as well as the
     specification of a cut-off date till which such applications could
     have been made are absent from the very scheme of s.6A – This
     glaring absence renders the scheme of s.6A arbitrary and as a
     result unconstitutional. [Para 212]

     s.6A vis-à-vis Art. 14
     Citizenship Act, 1955 – s.6A – Special provisions as to
     citizenship of persons covered by the Assam Accord –
     Constitution of India – Art.14 – s.6A vis-à-vis Art. 14 – s.6A,
     if creates an unreasonable classification which violates
     Art.14 – Plea that s.6A falls foul of Art.14 as it treats equals
     unequally; and that the selective application of s.6A solely to
     the State of Assam exhibits hostility against it in comparison
     to other states:
     Held: (per Surya Kant, J.) (for himself and for M.M. Sundresh
     and Manoj Misra, JJ.) Since s.6A was predicated on the terms
     of the Assam Accord, it extended citizenship solely to immigrants
     in Assam because the Union of India had exclusively engaged in
     this accord with Assam – This serves as the basis of intelligible
     differentia vis-à-vis other States – s.6A duly considered the
     pertinent factors, notably that the Assam Accord pertained solely
     to the State of Assam – Since a piquant situation such as that in
     Assam did not exist in any of the other States, s.6A’s objective
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       did not extend to allowing such citizenship in these other States,
       thus, classification between the State of Assam and other States
       had a direct nexus with the object of the statute and classification
       was not ex-facie arbitrary – Striking down s.6A on the grounds
       of non-inclusion only of West Bengal would amount to allowing
       an under-inclusivity challenge in disguise, which, is not generally
       permitted – Thus, classification u/s.6A, not violative of Art.14
       simply because it is applicable to the State of Assam alone –
       Thus, s.6A not ultra vires Art. 14. [Paras 189, 198, 203-205] –
       Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI.) (Concurring)
       Undocumented migrants could be registered as citizens u/s.5(1)(a)
       of the Citizenship Act before it was amended by the Citizenship
       (Amendment) Act 2003 to exclude ‘illegal immigrants’ – Thus, the
       claim of the petitioner that s.6A is unconstitutional because instead
       of preventing migration to Assam, it incentivizes migrants in other
       states to come to Assam to secure citizenship through s.6A, is
       erroneous – s.6A confers citizenship to migrants from Bangladesh
       to Assam before 25 March 1971 – s.6A satisfies the two-pronged
       reasonable classification test - Legislative objective of s.6A was to
       balance the humanitarian needs of migrants of Indian Origin and
       the impact of the migration on the economic and cultural needs
       of Indian States – Two yardsticks employed in s.6A-migration
       to Assam and cut-off date of 24 March 1971 are reasonable –
       Though other states share a longer border with Bangladesh, the
       impact of migration in Assam in terms of numbers and resources
       is greater – Cut-off date of 25 March 1971 is reasonable because
       the Pakistani Army launched Operation Search light to curb the
       Bangladeshi nationalist movement in East Pakistan on 26 March
       1971 – Migrants before the operation were considered migrants
       of Indian partition – Both the yardsticks have a rational nexus
       with the object of s.6A – Also s.6A is neither under-inclusive nor
       over-inclusive. [Paras 75, 125]

       Constitution of India – Art. 14 – Right to equality –
       Reasonableness of classification – Yardsticks to check the
       reasonableness of classification – Qualifications regarding
       the yardsticks:
       Held: (per Surya Kant, J.) (for himself and for M.M. Sundresh
       and Manoj Misra, JJ.) Art. 14 requires the legislature to treat
       equals equally, but it also allows for differential treatment if the
       characteristics of the classes differ – Art. 14 permits the legislature
       to classify individuals into different groups and apply distinct
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                    967

              In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     norms accordingly, and such classification must be reasonable –
     Yardsticks to check the reasonableness of classification is that
     the classification should not be based on arbitrary criteria and
     must instead be based on a logic which distinguishes individuals
     with similar characteristics – Thus, a classification is reasonable
     if it differentiates between similar and dissimilar elements, if such
     distinction is intelligible, and if the similarities and dissimilarities have
     nexus with the purpose of the statute – Qualifications regarding
     the yardsticks is that while establishing a nexus with the object
     of the statute is necessary, it is not essential to demonstrate
     that the classification was the optimal method to achieve the
     object in question, and when gauging the reasonableness of
     classification, the Court must adopt a pragmatic view and refrain
     from deeming a classification unconstitutional solely because it is
     marginally under-inclusive. [Paras 168-170, 177, 179, 180] – Held:
     (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI.) (Concurring)
     Classification is constitutionally permissible, when two prong test
     that there must be an intelligible differentia between those forming a
     group and those left out; and the differentia must have a reasonable
     nexus with the object sought to be achieved, is satisfied – Court
     now, within the traditional two prong test has advocated for a more
     substantial inquiry that subsumes the following prongs which is
     the objective and the means – Determination of the yardstick for
     classification will help in the assessment of whether a provision is
     under-inclusive or over-inclusive – Yardstick must have a nexus
     with the object and must be in consonance with constitutional
     principles. [Paras 59, 68(c)]

     Citizenship Act, 1955 – s.6A – Over-inclusiveness and
     under-inclusiveness – Determination – s.6A, under-inclusive
     or over-inclusive :
     Held: (per Surya Kant, J.) (for himself and for M.M. Sundresh
     and Manoj Misra, JJ.) Classification u/s.6A, not violative of
     Art. 14 simply because it is applicable to the State of Assam
     alone – In adjudicating the validity of a statute, the concept of
     under-inclusiveness arises when classification within the law fails
     to encompass all individuals similarly situated with respect to the
     law’s intended purpose – Even if there are States that could share
     similar characteristics with Assam, comparison should be between
     two broad classes: Assam and the rest of India, rather than each
     individual constituent of these two classes – Since other States,
     in general, were not facing similar issues, unique political situation
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       created in Assam by the influx of immigrants, the differentiation
       in classes was reasonable – Hence, even if some States like
       West Bengal were placed similarly to Assam, that in and of itself
       would not lead to holding s.6A unconstitutional – Striking down
       s.6A on the grounds of non-inclusion only of West Bengal would
       amount to allowing an under-inclusivity challenge in disguise,
       which, is not generally permitted. [Paras 180, 203, 204] – Held:
       (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI.) (Concurring) s.6A
       is neither under-inclusive nor over-inclusive – Over-inclusiveness
       and under-inclusiveness must be determined based on whether
       there are similarly situated persons/situations who or which have
       not been included or have been included based on the yardstick
       identified – Determination cannot be made with reference to the
       objective without reference to the yardstick – Doing so would limit
       the ability of the Legislature to identify the degrees of harm –
       Yardstick can be challenged where another yardstick affects or
       is related to the objective in a comparable manner – 6A would
       be under-inclusive only when all those who are similarly situated
       with respect to the object and on the application of the rational
       yardstick are not included – Provision would be over-inclusive only
       when those who are not similarly situated with respect to these two
       parameters are included. [Paras 75, 76] – Held: (per Pardiwala,
       J.) (Concurring) s.6A cannot be said to be violative of Art. 14 for
       being under-inclusive – Distinction drawn between the State of
       Assam and other states for the grant of citizenship to immigrants
       was on the basis of special circumstances prevailing in Assam at
       the time of enactment of s.6A – s.6A was a statutory codification of a
       political settlement reached between the Government and the people
       of Assam and thus, not violative of the equality clause enshrined
       u/Art.14 at the time of its enactment in 1985. [Paras 15, 207]

       Constitution of India – Art. 14 – Writ petition challenging
       constitutionality of s.6A – Maintainability u/Art. 14:
       Held: (per Surya Kant, J.) (for himself and for M.M. Sundresh
       and Manoj Misra, JJ.) Art. 14 indicates that it confers individuals
       with equality before the law and is not restricted to mere equality
       for the benefits provided under law – Petitioner’s case that s.6A
       has singled out the State of Assam alone vis-à-vis other Indian
       States situated alongside the Bangladesh border and has curtailed
       the rights of only its original inhabitants – Petitioners’ assertion
       founded upon Art. 14 cannot be invalidated at a preliminary stage
       merely because they are seeking equality in regard to a restriction
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                            969

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     as opposed to a benefit – Thus, the objection regarding the
     maintainability of the petitioners’ claim u/Art. 14 rejected. [Paras
     163, 164, 166]

     s.6A, if manifestly arbitrary
     Citizenship Act, 1955 – s.6A – Special provisions as to
     citizenship of persons covered by the Assam Accord –
     Constitution of India – Art. 14 – Manifest Arbitrariness – s.6A,
     if manifestly arbitrary – Plea that there is no rationale for
     the cut-off dates-01.01.1966 and 25.03.1971, thus, manifestly
     arbitrary; that the process envisaged u/s.6A and the Citizenship
     Rules, 2009 for the migrants unreasonable and suffers from
     the vice of ‘manifest arbitrariness’; that s.6A offends Part II
     of the Constitution; and that the term ‘ordinarily resident’ in
     s.6A undefined and vague:
     Held: (per Surya Kant, J.) (for himself and for M.M. Sundresh
     and Manoj Misra, JJ.) s.6A does not suffer from manifest
     arbitrariness because there is application of mind behind the
     incorporation of the cut-off dates; the process u/s.6A is not
     arbitrary; s.6A does not violate Part II of the Constitution; and the
     term ‘ordinary residence’ is not vague enough to be void – Cut-
     off dates in s.6A not incorporated in a vacuous manner but were
     result of considerable deliberation and discussion, and also backed
     by well-considered rationale which does not militates against any
     constitutional values or the concept of constitutional morality –
     Instead, s.6A acknowledged the political and social realities of
     that period along with the impracticability of reversing the changes
     that had occurred – There are legibly delineated conditions and
     reasonable process envisaged u/s.6A and the Citizenship Rules,
     2009 for migrants who came before 01.01.1966, as well as those
     who came on or after 01.01.1966 and before 25.03.1971 – s.6A
     conferred citizenship only upon certain immigrants who met certain
     specified conditions up to a particular cut-off date – Its aim was
     not only to legitimize the stay of a particular class of immigrants
     but also to facilitate the detection and deportation of others.
     [Paras 232, 234, 238, 243, 245, 273] – Held: (per Pardiwala, J.)
     (Dissenting) s.6A suffers from the vice of manifest arbitrariness
     on account of the “systematic failure of the legislative vision –
     s.6A has acquired unconstitutionality subsequent to its enactment
     in 1985 by efflux of time and has thus become violative of Art. 14
     for being temporally unreasonable – Efflux of time has brought
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       to light the element of manifest arbitrariness in the scheme of
       s.6A(3) which fails to provide a temporal limit to its applicability.
       [Paras 15, 208, 210]
       Constitution of India – Art. 14 – Manifest Arbitrariness – Relation
       between Art. 14 and arbitrariness – Constituents of manifest
       arbitrariness – Facets of the test of manifest arbitrariness –
       Extent of review under manifest arbitrariness – Elucidated.
       (per Surya Kant, J.) (for himself and for M.M. Sundresh and
       Manoj Misra, JJ.) [Paras 206-226] – (per Dr Dhananjaya Y
       Chandrachud, CJI.) (Concurring) [Para 59] – (per Pardiwala,
       J.) (Dissenting) [Paras 171, 177, 179, 180]

       Vagueness in law
       Citizenship Act 1955 – s.6A – Term ‘ordinarily resident’ in
       s.6A, if vague – s.6A, if void for being vague :
       Held: (per Surya Kant, J.) (for himself and for M.M. Sundresh
       and Manoj Misra, JJ.) Term ‘ordinarily residence’ is not vague
       enough to be void. [Paras 267-273]
       Words and phrases – Vagueness in law – Meaning and
       explanation – Test for void-for-vagueness – Extent of review
       for the test of ‘void for vagueness’ –
       Held: (per Surya Kant, J.) (for himself and for M.M. Sundresh
       and Manoj Misra, JJ.) Vagueness is an inherent feature of
       language – Same intention can be expressed with a variety
       of words and expressions, and any given choice of words can
       relate to multiple different intentions – This problem is particularly
       exacerbated with vague terms – Most standards in law have some
       degree of open texture, and inevitably harbor some vagueness
       or multiple meanings – Vagueness in law, however, exists on a
       spectrum, and different scenarios necessitate different degrees
       of tolerance towards vagueness – Excessive vagueness in law
       can make the statute overbroad and might make the exercise
       of discretion a capricious exercise – At the same time, it might
       sometimes be desirable in the interest of justice to retain some
       open texture in statutes, to cover future eventualities that the
       legislature might not have anticipated but intended to address
       based on the overarching purpose of the law – In that sense, the
       sliding scale of vagueness in law determines whether the law is
       just and inclusive, or unjust and capricious – Vagueness needs
       to be viewed from the perspective of the authorities applying the
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                              971

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     impugned law; and the persons being regulated by the impugned
     law – Statute or its provision can be struck down for vagueness –
     Ordinarily, courts should endeavour to draw a demarcating line and
     infer some reasonable meaning from an impugned provision, rather
     than hastening to intervene and striking down the entire provision
     on the grounds of vagueness. [Paras 249, 251, 255, 263, 264]
     Citizenship Act, 1955 – s.6A – Phrase ‘ordinary resident in
     Assam’ under – Meaning – Discussed. (per Surya Kant, J.)
     (for himself and for M.M. Sundresh and Manoj Misra, JJ.)
     [Paras 268-273]

     s.6A vis-à-vis Art. 29
     Citizenship Act, 1955 – s.6A – Special provisions as to
     citizenship of persons covered by the Assam Accord –
     Constitution of India – Art. 29 – s.6A vis-à-vis Art. 29 – s.6A,
     if violative of the rights provided to 'indigenous' communities
     u/Art. 29:
     Held: (per Surya Kant, J.) (for himself and for M.M. Sundresh
     and Manoj Misra, JJ.) s.6A cannot be held to be violative of
     Art. 29 – Petitioners’ failed to show either an actionable impact
     on Assamese culture, or trace the cause of it to s.6A – On
     the contrary, s.6A mandates timely detection and deportation
     of illegal immigrants, a large portion of whom entered Assam
     post-1971 – It is the non-implementation of the statutory regime
     which is the cause of the petitioners’ concerns; their attack on
     the constitutionality of s.6A is misplaced – Also, s.6A does not
     compel pre-1971 immigrants to keep residing within the territory
     of Assam once they have obtained Indian citizenship, given that
     they would enjoy Art. 19(1)(e) rights like any other citizen of India.
     [Paras 298, 304] – Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud,
     CJI.) (Concurring) s.6A does not violate Art. 29(1) – Cultural
     and linguistic interests of the citizens of Assam are protected
     by constitutional and statutory provisions – Mere presence of
     different ethnic groups in a State not sufficient to infringe the right
     guaranteed by Art. 29(1) – Also the petitioners are unable to prove
     that the ability of the Assamese people to take steps to protect their
     culture, violated by the provisions of s.6A. [Paras 100-102, 125] –
     Held (per Pardiwala, J.) (Dissenting) By virtue of Art. 19(1)(e), s.6A
     does not compel pre-1971 immigrants to keep residing in the territory
     of Assam once they have obtained citizenship thereunder, said may
     be true for the immigrants belonging to the pre-1966 stream who
972                                                              [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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       were conferred citizenship automatically, and thus became citizens
       of India for all purposes from the date of commencement of s.6A
       itself, the same does not hold true for the immigrants belonging
       to the 1966-71 category – In the absence of any temporal limit,
       within which all immigrants belonging to the 1966-71 category are
       to be detected, deleted and registered as citizens, the immigrants
       of this category are tethered to the territory of Assam, so as to
       satisfy the criteria of “ordinarily resident in Assam” on the date
       when they eventually happen to get detected. [Para 214]

       Substance of Art. 29(1)
       Constitution of India – Art. 29(1) – Protection of interest of
       minorities – Substance of Art. 29(1):
       Held: (per Surya Kant, J.) (for himself and for M.M. Sundresh
       and Manoj Misra, JJ.) Rights conferred by Art. 29(1) require that
       the State not to take any steps to erode a community’s culture,
       language or script; and concomitantly accords to such section of
       citizens the freedom and independence to preserve and conserve
       their culture, language and script, by themselves – Right u/Art.29(1)
       does not necessitate the Government to enact specific provisions
       for its enforcement and also does not altogether restrict the State
       from enacting regulations. [Para 295]

       Art. 21 and s.6A
       Citizenship Act, 1955 – s.6A – Special provisions as to citizenship
       of persons covered by the Assam Accord – Constitution of India
       – Art. 21 – s.6A, if ultra vires Art. 21 – Plea that s.6A infringes
       upon the rights of the ‘indigenous’ Assamese community; that
       immigration led to the marginalization and disruption of their
       socio-economic aspirations; relying on Art.1 of ICCPR, their
       right of self-governance is being violated by s.6A; and inclusion
       of unidentified migrant population burdens country’s natural
       resources, hindering sustainable development:
       Held: (per Surya Kant, J.) (for himself and for M.M. Sundresh
       and Manoj Misra, JJ.) s.6A non-violative of Art. 21 – Petitioners
       not able to establish both a deleterious effect of s.6A on their
       indigenous communities as well as trace the cause of such effect to
       s.6A – As regards plea of self-governance, perceived right u/Art.1
       of the ICCPR not enforceable through writ jurisdiction – More so,
       India’s explicit reservation is against its application in India, and it
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                              973

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     generally is applicable only to people under foreign domination –
     Assertion that immigration has impacted the self-governance of the
     original inhabitants of Assam, cannot be accepted – Furthermore,
     petitioners have not demonstrated how s.6A affects their right to
     govern themselves democratically – Mere fact that sub-class of
     immigrants whose status has been legitimised by s.6A also has
     access to these resources does not automatically imply a disruption
     of ecological balance or violation of the original inhabitants’ rights
     to resource usage – This conflates the idea of “unfair usage” with
     “more usage”- premise that cannot be accepted – Nation can
     accommodate immigrants and refugees, while simultaneously
     prioritizing sustainable development and equitable allocation of
     resources. [Paras 308-321]

     Aim of Art. 326
     Constitution of India – Art. 326 – Aim and objective of Art. 326:
     Held: (per Surya Kant, J.) (for himself and for M.M. Sundresh and
     Manoj Misra, JJ.) Objective of Art. 326 is to enfranchise people as
     opposed to disenfranchising them – Evident purpose of its inclusion
     was to bestow upon every individual citizen the right to exercise
     their vote and choose their elected representatives. [Para 335]

     Right of exclusion and Art. 326
     Constitution of India – Art. 326 – Right of exclusion – Right
     u/Art. 326, if can be invoked to exclude certain individuals –
     s.6A, if violates the political rights of Indian citizens in Assam
     u/Art.326:
     Held: (per Surya Kant, J.) (for himself and for M.M. Sundresh
     and Manoj Misra, JJ.) Art. 326 bestows upon individuals the
     right to vote and the right to be included in electoral rolls unless
     disqualified by the legislature or other constitutional provisions – It
     cannot be said that the influx of immigrants in the State of Assam
     has affected the right of the Assamese people to vote – Once
     deemed citizens by operation of s.6A, the erstwhile immigrants
     would enjoy equal rights as any other Indian citizen, including
     the right to vote, irrespective of the mode or time of acquisition
     of citizenship – Such constitutional rights cannot be summarily
     revoked or infringed upon – There has been no violation of the
     right of the petitioners u/Art. 326 as it merely grants them the right
     to vote and be included in the electoral rolls, which continues to
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       subsist to this day devoid of any interruption – Citizenship Act,
       1955 – s.6A. [Paras 341-344]
       Elections – Adult suffrage – Background and evolution of –
       Stated. [Paras 325-330]

       s.6A vis-à-vis Art. 355
       Citizenship Act, 1955 – s.6A – Special provisions as to
       citizenship of persons covered by the Assam Accord –
       Constitution of India – Art. 355 – s.6A vis-a-vis Art. 355 –
       Operation of s.6A, if causes ‘external aggression’ and ‘internal
       disturbance’, culminating in the invocation of Art. 355:
       Held: (per Surya Kant, J.) (for himself and for M.M. Sundresh
       and Manoj Misra, JJ.) s.6A not contrary to Art. 355 – s.6A is
       limited in its ambit and does not by itself create unabated migration
       or legitimize its continuance – In fact, s.6A adopts a practical
       solution for the problem of incessant illegal immigration into
       Assam by devising an implementable solution keeping in mind
       India’s commitments, international relations and administrative
       realities – Migrants also need to satisfy certain conditions for
       invoking s.6A, apart from being persons of Indian origin and
       ordinary residents in India – s.6A addresses controlled and
       regulated form of immigration that would fall short of ‘external
       aggression’ – Migration legitimized by s.6A also does not constitute
       internal disturbance – s.6A was a crucial step in bringing quietus
       to the political upheaval in Assam and marked the culmination of
       various agitations surrounding illegal immigration and the rights
       of indigenous communities – Thus, s.6A does not cause ‘internal
       disturbance’. [Paras 364-367] – Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y
       Chandrachud, CJI.) (Concurring) Constitutional validity of a
       legislation cannot be tested for violation of Art. 355 – Art.355
       was included in the Constitution as a justification for the exercise
       of emergency powers by the Union over States – Art. 355 as
       an independent ground for judicial review of legislative action
       is beyond the scope of the provision – An interpretation that a
       legislative enactment can be challenged for contravention of Art.
       355 would lead to disastrous consequences – Reading the duty
       in Art. 355 into a right would effectively place the emergency
       powers with citizens and courts – Such a consequence would
       be catastrophic for the federal structure of the Constitution and
       would subjugate the constitutional status of States. [Paras 89,
       90, 125]
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                             975

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     Sarbananda Sonowal’s case
     Citizenship – Illegal immigrants – Sarbananda Sonowal v.
     Union of India’s case on detection and deportation of illegal
     immigrants – Explanation:
     Held: (per Surya Kant, J.) (for himself and for M.M. Sundresh
     and Manoj Misra, JJ.) Holding in Sarbananda Sonowal’s case
     that the term aggression in Art. 355 is of a wide import and can
     include unabated migration if it poses a threat to the security of the
     state, is concurred with – Thus, in such cases, the Union indeed
     bears a duty to protect the State from such unabated immigration
     that it amounts to external aggression or internal disturbance; and
     those statutes which violate this duty can be held unconstitutional.
     [Paras 356-361]
     Constitution of India – Art. 355 – Intention behind the inclusion
     of Art. 355 – Explained. [Paras 351-355] (per Surya Kant, J.)
     (for himself and for M.M. Sundresh and Manoj Misra, JJ.)

     Citizenship Act vis-à-vis the IEAA
     Citizenship Act, 1955 – s.6A – Special provisions as to
     citizenship of persons covered by the Assam Accord –
     Citizenship Act vis-à-vis the Immigrants (Expulsion from
     Assam Act), 1950-IEAA – IEAA, if applicable to the immigrants
     in Assam, to the exclusion of the Foreigners Act, 1946 – IEAA,
     if in conflict with the intent and aim of s.6A – Harmonious
     interpretation of two legislations:
     Held: (per Surya Kant, J.) (for himself and for M.M. Sundresh
     and Manoj Misra, JJ.) s.6A is not in conflict with a differently
     situated statute-IEAA – Instead, IEAA and s.6A can be read
     harmoniously along with other statutes – IEAA and Foreigners Act,
     1946, seek to regulate the residence and departure of foreigners
     in India – To that extent, no conflict between the Statutes and
     both of them supplement and complement each other within the
     framework of s.6A – s.6A need not be construed in a restrictive
     manner to mean that a person shall be detected and deported
     only under the Foreigners Act, 1946 – If there is any other piece
     of legislation such as the IEAA, under which the status of an
     immigrant can be determined, no reason as to why such statutory
     detection shall also not be given effect to, for the purposes of
     deportation – Provisions of IEAA shall also be read into s.6A and
     be applied along with the Foreigners Act, 1946 for the purpose of
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       detection and deportation of foreigners – Immigrants (Expulsion
       from Assam Act), 1950 – Foreigners Act, 1946. [Paras 376-382]

       Interface with International Law
       Citizenship Act, 1955 – s.6A – Special provisions as to
       citizenship of persons covered by the Assam Accord – s.6A,
       if violative of international laws – Plea that since s.6A impacts
       the culture of original inhabitants, thus, violates Art. 27 of
       the ICCPR:
       Held: (per Surya Kant, J.) (for himself and for M.M. Sundresh
       and Manoj Misra, JJ.) Art. 27 of the ICCPR restricts intervention
       in one’s culture – s.6A per se does not intervene in culture of
       Assamese people – Furthermore International law cannot trump
       domestic law – Thus, s.6A cannot be assailed on the ground of the
       perceived violation of Art. 27 of the ICCPR as well – Constitution
       of India – Art. 29 – International Covenant on Civil and Political
       Rights. [Para 386]

       Temporal Unreasonableness
       Citizenship Act, 1955 – s.6A(3) – Temporal Unreasonableness –
       Absence of temporal limit on the applicability of s.6A(3),
       if renders the said provision manifestly arbitrary and thus
       violative of Art. 14 – Efflux of time, if has rendered s.6A
       temporally unreasonable and thus liable to be struck down
       in consequence of violation of Art. 14 – Placing temporal
       limitations on the period of applicability, if an objective
       implicit in the scheme of s.6A – s.6A, if suffers from manifest
       arbitrariness:
       Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI.) (Concurring)
       Principle of temporal unreasonableness cannot be applied to a
       situation where the classification is still relevant to the objective of
       the provision – Process of detection and conferring citizenship in
       Assam is a long-drawn out process spanning many decades – To
       strike it down due to lapse of time is to ignore the context and object
       of the provision. [Para 120] – Held: (per Pardiwala, J.) (Dissenting)
       Absence of any temporal limits on the applicability of s.6A has
       the effect of rendering it manifestly arbitrary and constitutionally
       invalid – Although the mandate of timely detection and deportation
       of illegal immigrants was the fundamental premise on which the
       Assam Accord was signed, yet, this intention recorded in the
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                             977

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     Accord, was never translated statutorily, due to a faulty mechanism
     prescribed u/s.6A(3), either due to inadvertence or advertence of
     the legislature – s.6A has acquired unconstitutionality with the
     efflux of time – Efflux of time has brought to light the element of
     manifest arbitrariness in the scheme of s.6A(3) which fails to provide
     a temporal limit to its applicability – Neither s.6A nor the rules
     made thereunder prescribe any outer time-limit for the completion
     of detection of all such persons who belong to the 1966-71 stream
     and are eligible to avail the benefits of s.6A (3) – Absence of any
     prescribed time-limit for detection of foreigners of the 1966-71
     stream has two-fold adverse consequences-it relieves the state
     from the burden of effectively identifying, detecting, and deleting
     from the electoral rolls, in accordance with law, all immigrants of
     the 1966-71 stream, and it incentivises the immigrants belonging
     to the 1966-71 stream to continue to remain on the electoral
     rolls for an indefinite period and only get themselves registered
     u/s.6A once detected by a competent tribunal – Thus, the manner
     in which the provision is worded, counter-serves the very purpose
     of its enactment, which is the speedy and effective identification of
     foreigners of the 1966-71 stream, their deletion from the electoral
     rolls, registration with the registering authority and conferring of
     regular citizenship – Working mechanism of s.6A(3) goes against
     its avowed objective – Mechanism prescribed for giving effect to
     s.6A is imbued with the idea of temporal limitations and in the
     absence of temporal limits on the period during which s.6A is
     made applicable, the provision counter serves the object it was
     enacted with – To allow s.6A to continue indefinitely for all times
     to come would tantamount to taking a reductive and one-sided
     view of the historical context in which s.6A came to be enacted,
     more particularly, that s.6A sought to achieve a delicate balance
     between two competing interests. [Paras 139, 140, 142, 143, 178,
     208, 213, 215]

     Constitution of India – Art. 14 – Manifest arbitrariness
     vis-a-vis temporal unreasonableness – Explanation:
     Held: (per Pardiwala, J.) (Dissenting) Even if a statutory provision
     fulfils the two-pronged test of reasonable classification and rational
     nexus with the object of enactment, it can still suffer from the vice
     of manifest arbitrariness and be violative of Art. 14 if the provision
     may lead to differential application on similarly situated persons –
     Manifest arbitrariness also encompasses the aspect of temporal
     unreasonableness that a statute may acquire with the efflux of time –
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       While the test of manifest arbitrariness entails a two-prong test
       which requires that first, there is a reasonable classification based
       on an intelligible differentia; and second that such classification
       has a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by such
       classification – Test of temporal unreasonableness, on the other
       hand, would involve a further examination into whether the said
       two prongs have continued to remain relevant with the passage of
       time – Test of temporal unreasonableness would require examining
       the provision in two different time frames-first, when the provision
       was enacted, and second when such provision comes to be
       challenged on the ground of temporal unreasonableness – Even
       if a provision passes the two prong test in the first time-frame,
       it may still fail the test in the subsequent time-frame if the efflux
       of time renders either the classification, or the object sought to
       be achieved by such classification, or both as arbitrary and thus
       violative of Art. 14 – This could be said to be the third prong in
       the test of manifest arbitrariness u/Art. 14 as envisaged by the
       doctrine of temporal unreasonableness. [Paras 171, 177, 179, 180]
       Words and phrases – Term temporal Unreasonableness –
       Meaning of. (per Pardiwala, J.) [Paras 129-130]
       Doctrines/Principles – Doctrine of temporal Unreasonableness –
       Meaning. (per Pardiwala, J.) [Para 130]

       Scope of Judicial Review u/Art. 14
       Judicial Review – Scope of, u/Art. 14 – Grounds of unreasonable
       classification and arbitrariness – Two-prong test – Scope of
       judicial review of under-inclusive provisions – Elucidated. (per
       Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI.) [Paras 58-68]

       Limits to judicial review
       Judicial review – Concept of – Limits to judicial review –
       Judicial review of government policies – Validity of s.6A,
       hovering around foreign policy, if excluded from the purview
       of judicial review:
       Held: (per Surya Kant, J.) (for himself and for M.M. Sundresh
       and Manoj Misra, JJ.) Judicial review of government policies
       encapsulates determining whether they infringe upon the
       fundamental rights of citizens, contravene constitutional provisions,
       violate statutory regulations, or display manifest arbitrariness,
       capriciousness, or mala fides – Focus of judicial scrutiny is limited
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                979

              In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     to legality of the policy, excluding any evaluation of its wisdom or
     soundness – Court cannot compel the government to formulate a
     policy, evaluate alternatives or assess the effectiveness of existing
     policies – This constraint stems from the principle of separation
     of powers, where the Court lacks the democratic mandate and
     institutional expertise to delve into such matters – Thus, while the
     Court can invalidate a policy, it lacks the authority to create one –
     Court can check the constitutional validity of a policy, particularly
     so when it is elevated as an act of the Legislature – Challenge as
     regards the validity of s.6A, cannot be dismissed at the threshold,
     on the ground of judicial review – Citizenship Act, 1955 – s.6A.
     [Paras 53-55]– (per Pardiwala, J.) (Concurring) [Para 8]

     Applicability of doctrine of laches
     Doctrines/Principles – Doctrine of laches – Applicability, to
     writ petitions raising substantial questions – Writ petitions as
     regards constitutionality of s.6A raising significant public policy
     issues that involve ramifications for the original inhabitants
     of Assam, the rights of immigrants, and the security of the
     country – Writ petitions challenging the provisions introduced
     in 1985, filed after 27 years – Maintainability:
     Held: (per Surya Kant, J.) (for himself and for M.M. Sundresh
     and Manoj Misra, JJ.) While there has been a considerable
     delay in filing the instant writ petitions, the doctrine of laches
     cannot be applied strictly to disbar the petitioner’s claim at the
     threshold since the instant proceedings raise substantial questions
     that affect the public at large and the constitutional validity of a
     statutory provision – If decided otherwise, it would be creating an
     artificial deadline for important constitutional issues giving rise to an
     unfair principle of law in the realm of constitutional adjudication –
     Citizenship Act, 1955 – s.6A [Paras 75-76] – (per Pardiwala, J.)
     (Concurring) [Para 8]

     Limitation period for writs
     Constitution of India – Art. 32 – Writs under – Limitation
     period – Applicability of doctrine of laches:
     Held: (per Surya Kant, J.) (for himself and for M.M. Sundresh
     and Manoj Misra, JJ.) Limitation Act, 1963, as also Supreme
     Court Rules, 2013 do not specify the limitation period for
     filing a writ – Though period is not specified, writ petition filed
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       belatedly after a considerable delay is barred by the operation
       of the doctrine of laches – Doctrine of laches is not an inviolable
       legal rule but a rule of practice that must be supplemented
       with sound exercise of judicial discretion – Doctrine of delay
       and laches is not to be ipso facto excluded where a breach of
       fundamental rights is alleged – Doctrine is not applicable when the
       claim affects the public at large as also in matters where the vires
       of a statute are challenged vis-à-vis the Constitution, else, time
       would run in favour of a constitutionally invalid statute, which cannot
       be allowed in the larger interests of justice and the transformative
       nature of the Constitution – Limitation Act, 1963 – Supreme Court
       Rules, 2013. [Paras 59, 60, 63-67]

       Legislative objective of s.6A
       Citizenship Act, 1955 – s.6A – Legislative objective of s.6A:
       Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI.) (Concurring)
       Preamble to Citizenship (Amendment) Act 1985 by which s.6A was
       included states that the amendment was made for the “purpose
       of giving effect to certain provisions of the Memorandum of
       Settlement relating to the foreigners issue in Assam – Provisions
       of s.6A are traceable to the Assam Accord – s.6A was included
       with the objective of reducing the influx of migrants to India and
       dealing with those who had already migrated – Assam Accord
       was a political solution to the issue of growing migration from
       Bangladesh to Assam and s.6A was a legislative solution –
       s.6A must not be read detached from the previous legislation
       enacted by Parliament – s.6A is the legislation that balances the
       humanitarian needs of migrants of Indian Origin and the impact
       of such migration on economic and cultural needs of the Indian
       States. [Paras 69, 71]

       Scheme and mechanism of s.6A
       Citizenship Act, 1955 – s.6A – Scheme and mechanism of
       s.6A – Stated. (per Pardiwala, J.) [Paras 91-102]

       Legislative competence to enact s.6A
       Citizenship Act, 1955 – s.6A – Legislative competence to
       enact s.6A:
       Held: (per Surya Kant, J.) (for himself and for M.M. Sundresh
       and Manoj Misra, JJ.) Art. 11 gives the Parliament broad powers
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                             981

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     to enact laws on citizenship, notwithstanding any inconsistencies
     with any other provision in Part II of the Constitution – It grants
     the Parliament the power to make ‘any’ provision regarding
     citizenship – Thus, the Parliament indeed possesses the legislative
     power to enact laws concerning citizenship and that this authority
     is not restricted by the provisions of Part II of the Constitution.
     [Para 140-142] – (per Pardiwala, J.) (Concurring) [Para 11, 15]

     Object sought to be achieved by the prescription of two
     separate cut-off dates
     Citizenship Act, 1955 – s.6A – Special provisions as to
     citizenship of persons covered by the Assam Accord – Object
     sought to be achieved by the prescription of two separate
     cut-off dates-01.01.1966 and 24.03.1971:
     Held: (per Pardiwala, J.) (Dissenting) s.6A was enacted to give
     statutory effect to the political settlement arrived at in the form of
     Assam Accord – Object sought to be achieved by the prescription
     of two separate cut-off dates was adopting a humanitarian approach
     towards the immigrant population in Assam; and on the other,
     ensuring that large scale immigration does not result into the
     loss of culture, economy and the political rights of the people of
     Assam – Purpose behind the introduction of an additional cut-off
     date of 01.01.1966 and the corresponding concept of detection and
     deletion from the electoral rolls was to assuage the apprehensions
     of the protesting students – Intention of the legislature was
     to confer citizenship on the immigrants in a graded manner –
     To say that the sole object sought to be achieved by s.6A was to
     confer benefits on the immigrants alone would amount to taking a
     reductive view of the historical context in which the provision was
     enacted. [Paras 107-120]

     Onus of detection of foreigners of the 1966-71 stream lies
     on the State
     Citizenship Act, 1955 – s.6A – Special provisions as to
     citizenship of persons covered by the Assam Accord – Onus
     of detection of foreigners of the 1966-71 stream, if lies on
     the State:
     Held: (per Pardiwala, J.) (Dissenting) No provision which
     prescribes or provides for self- declaration/registration or voluntary
     detection as a foreigner within a given time period for availing
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       the benefit of citizenship by registration u/s.6A (3) – Mechanism
       of implementation of s.6A is set into motion with the first step of
       reference of a suspected foreigner to the foreigner’s tribunal – As
       soon as a reference is made to the tribunal, the onus is on the
       suspected person to either establish that he or she is an Indian
       citizen, or to establish that he or she is an immigrant eligible to avail
       the benefit available u/s.6A – It appears as illogically unique that
       a person wanting to avail the benefit of citizenship by registration
       u/s.6A(3) has to await identification as a suspicious immigrant and
       subsequent reference to the tribunal – No plausible reason why it
       should be impermissible for him or her to set the mechanism of s.6A
       into motion by voluntarily choosing to get detected as a foreigner of
       the class specified in s.6A, or to make an application for conferment
       of citizenship – Statutory scheme of s.6A(3), which does not envisage
       voluntary detection at the option of the immigrant, marks a clear
       departure, for no intelligible reason, from the prevalent scheme
       noticed under the rest of the Citizenship Act – Thus, there is no
       discernible reason why the mechanism prescribed u/s.6A does not
       require, or at the very least, permit an immigrant to come forward
       and make an application to avail the benefit. [121-128]

       Damage caused by the scheme of s.6A
       Citizenship Act, 1955 – s.6A – Special provisions as to
       citizenship of persons covered by the Assam Accord – Damage
       caused by the scheme of s.6A:
       Held: (per Pardiwala, J.) (Dissenting) Absurd and faulty
       mechanism has been prescribed u/s.6A – s.6A owing to its
       inherent problems of absence of temporal limit as to the period of
       application, and shifting of the onus of identification and detection
       of an immigrant as a foreigner on the State, has indeed resulted
       in the influx and continued presence of illegal immigrants into the
       State of Assam, to this date – Legislature instead of providing
       for a one-time process to avail the benefits of s.6A to all those
       who are eligible has instead provided a process where each
       immigrant of the 1966-71 category has to be first identified and
       then referred to the foreigner’s tribunal – Tribunal is then required
       to determine in each individual case whether the person referred
       is an illegal migrant, his date of entry in Assam, whether he is
       entitled to any benefits u/s.6A – More than 38 years having
       elapsed since s.6A came into effect, with the benefit of retrospect,
       s.6A, which was meant to dispel and discourage incoming illegal
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                              983

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     immigrants, turned out to be a beacon for the illegal immigrants
     from Bangladesh to come into Assam, by taking advantage of
     the poor mechanism which is prone to open abuse – Provision
     has far exceeded the time-limit within which it should have been
     made applicable, and has become vulnerable to misuse owing
     to the inherent arbitrariness – Assam Accord was a one-time
     political settlement, arrived at in the specific context of widespread
     violence and agitation in Assam – Extraordinary conditions
     existing in the years 1979-85 cannot provide a permanent
     and perennial ground for continuation of a manifestly arbitrary
     provision, which is uncertain and indeterminable owing to its
     sui-generis mechanism. [Paras 182, 189, 190, 195, 211]

     Doctrine of Prospective Overruling
     Doctrines/Principles – Doctrine of prospective overruling –
     Application of – s.6A, if unconstitutional with prospective effect:
     Held: (per Pardiwala, J.) (Dissenting) : This Court has been
     endowed with the power to mould the relief so as to do complete
     justice in a given situation, and to avoid the possibility of chaos and
     confusion that may be caused in the society at large – In the instant
     case, a number of immigrants who came into the State of Assam
     from Bangladesh, have already been conferred with citizenship
     u/s.6A – Unconstitutionality of s.6A is attributable to the efflux of
     time – s.6A being manifestly arbitrary, temporally unreasonable
     and, demonstrably unconstitutional cannot be allowed to continue
     for all times to come – Thus, s.6A declared as unconstitutional
     with prospective effect – This would ensure that the benefit which
     has already been derived by the immigrants in Assam is not taken
     away, more particularly when the challenge to s.6A has been made
     after a considerable delay. [Paras 205, 206]

     Assam accord
     Assam accord – Salient features of the Assam Accord – Stated.
     (per Surya Kant, J.) (for himself and for M.M. Sundresh and
     Manoj Misra, JJ.) [Paras 90, 187-189, 200] – (per Dr Dhananjaya
     Y Chandrachud, CJI.) [Paras 69-71] – (per Pardiwala, J.)
     [Paras 73-79]

     Citizenship
     Citizenship – Meaning of – Modes of acquiring citizenship –
     Indian vis-à-vis foreign jurisdiction – Elucidated. (per Surya
984                                                       [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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       Kant, J.) (for himself and for M.M. Sundresh and Manoj
       Misra, JJ.) [Paras 3-16]
       Citizenship – Legal regime under the Citizenship Act, 1955
       governing migrants – Legal regime governing migrants
       from East and West Pakistan to Assam – Discussed. (per Dr
       Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI.) (Concurring) [Paras 45-57]
       Constitution of India – Arts. 5 to 11 – Citizenship under –
       Legislative scheme on citizenship – Elucidated. (per Surya
       Kant, J.) (for himself and for M.M. Sundresh and Manoj Misra,
       JJ.) [Paras 3-16] (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI.)
       (Concurring) [Paras 14-19]

                              Case Law Cited

       In the Judgment of Surya Kant, J:
       Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha v. Union of India [2014] 14 SCR
       744 : (2015) 3 SCC 1; Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India
       [2005] Supp. 1 SCR 472 : (2005) 5 SCC 665; State (NCT of
       Delhi) v. Union of India (2018) 8 SCC 501; L. Chandra Kumar v.
       Union of India [1997] 2 SCR 1186 : (1997) 3 SCC 261: 1997
       SCC (L&S) 577; Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India [1973]
       2 SCR 757 : (1972) 2 SCC 788; A.L. Kalra v. Project & Equipment
       Corporation [1984] 3 SCR 646 : (1984) 3 SCC 316; Hindi
       Hitrakshak Samiti v. Union of India [1990] 1 SCR 588 : (1990) 2
       SCC 352; Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v. Union of India
       [1981] 2 SCR 52 : (1981) 1 SCC 568; A. K. Roy v. Union of India
       [1982] 2 SCR 272 : (1982) 1 SCC 271; Directorate of Film
       Festivals v. Gaurav Ashwin Jain [2007] 5 SCR 7 : (2007) 4 SCC
       737; Union of India v. S. L. Dutta [1990] Supp. 3 SCR 173 :
       (1991) 1 SCC 505; State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal [1987] 1
       SCR 1 : (1986) 4 SCC 566; Jacob Puliyel v. Union of India [2022]
       3 SCR 471 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 533; Gaurav Kumar Bansal v.
       Union of India [2014] 7 SCR 725 : (2015) 2 SCC 130; Shri Sitaram
       Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Union of India [1990] 1 SCR 909 : (1990) 3
       SCC 223; Santosh Singh v. Union of India [2016] 5 SCR 761 :
       (2016) 8 SCC 253; Ashwani Kumar v. Union of India [2019] 12
       SCR 30 : (2020) 13 SCC 585; Sanjeev Coke Mfg. Co. v. Bharat
       Coking Coal Ltd. [1983] 1 SCR 1000 : (1983) 1 SCC 147; Rustom
       Cavasjee Cooper (Banks Nationalisation) v. Union of India [1970]
       3 SCR 530 : (1970) 1 SCC 248; Maharashtra State Board of
       Secondary & Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                         985

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     Sheth [1985] 1 SCR 29 : (1984) 4 SCC 27; Tilokchand Motichand v.
     H. B. Munshi [1969] 2 SCR 824 : (1969) 1 SCC 110; Aflatoon v.
     Lt. Governor of Delhi [1975] 1 SCR 802 : (1975) 4 SCC 285;
     Narayani Debi Khaitan v. State of Bihar 1964 SCC OnLine SC 1;
     Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India
     [1979] 3 SCR 1014 : (1979) 3 SCC 489, Shri Vallabh Glass Works
     Ltd. v. Union of India [1984] 3 SCR 180 : (1984) 3 SCC 362;
     Daryao v. State of U.P. [1962] 1 SCR 574 : 1961 SCC OnLine
     SC 21; Amrit Lal Berry v. CCE [1975] 2 SCR 960 : (1975) 4 SCC
     714; Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC [2012] 13 SCR 29 : (2013) 1
     SCC 353; Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh [2020] 1 SCR
     749 : (2020) 2 SCC 569; Kashinath G. Jalmi (Dr) v. The Speaker
     [1993] 2 SCR 820 : (1993) 2 SCC 703; Navtej Singh Johar v.
     Union of India [2018] 7 SCR 379 : (2018) 10 SCC 1; Kesavananda
     Bharati v. State of Kerala [1973] Supp. 1 SCR 1 : (1973) 4 SCC
     225; Nandini Sundar v. State of Chhattisgarh [2011] 8 SCR 1028 :
     (2011) 7 SCC 547; Akbar Khan Alam Khan v. Union of India [1962]
     1 SCR 779 : AIR 1962 SC 70; State v. Syed Mohd. Khan [1962]
     Supp. 3 SCR 288 : 1962 SCC OnLine SC 2; Nagpur Improvement
     Trust v. Vithal Rao [1973] 3 SCR 39 : (1973) 1 SCC 500;
     Subramanian Swamy v. CBI [2014] 6 SCR 873 : (2014) 8 SCC
     682; State of M.P. v. Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd [1964] 6 SCR
     846 : (1964) 6 SCR 846; Clarence Pais v. Union of India [2001]
     2 SCR 43 : (2001) 4 SCC 325; State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali Sarkar
     [1952] 1 SCR 284 : (1952) 1 SCC 1; John Vallamattom v. Union
     of India [2003] Supp. 1 SCR 638 : (2003) 6 SCC 611; Transport
     & Dock Workers Union v. Mumbai Port Trust [2010] 14 SCR 873 :
     (2011) 2 SCC 575; State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas [1976] 1 SCR
     906 : (1976) 2 SCC 310; Ramesh Chandra Sharma v. State of
     Uttar Pradesh [2021] 6 SCR 219 : (2024) 5 SCC 217; Roop
     Chand Adlakha v. DDA [1988] Supp. 3 SCR 253 : (1989) Supp.
     1 SCC 116; D.S. Nakara v. Union of India [1983] 2 SCR 165 :
     (1983) 1 SCC 305; State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd [1974]
     3 SCR 760 : (1974) 4 SCC 656; State of T.N. v. National South
     Indian River Interlinking Agriculturist Association [2021] 7 SCR
     479 : (2021) 15 SCC 534; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Deoman
     Upadhyaya [1961] 1 SCR 14 : 1960 SCC OnLine SC 8; Charanjit
     Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India 1950 SCC Online SC 49; ;
     Superintendent & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Girish Kumar
     Navalakha [1975] 3 SCR 802 : (1975) 4 SCC 754; Javed v. State
     of Haryana [2003] Supp. 1 SCR 947 : (2003) 8 SCC 369;
     Basheer v. State of Kerala [2003] Supp. 1 SCR 580 : (2004) 3
986                                                           [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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       SCC 609; Subramanian Swamy v. Raju [2014] 9 SCR 283 : (2014)
       8 SCC 390; Council for Civil Service Union v. Minister for the Civil
       Service 1985 AC 374; Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri SR
       Tandolkar [1959] 1 SCR 279 : 1958 SCC OnLine SC 6; Gopi
       Chand v. Delhi Administration [1959] Supp. 2 SCR 87 : 1959
       SCC OnLine SC 29; Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar
       [1959] 1 SCR 629 : 1957 SCC OnLine SC 17; Bhagwati Saran v.
       State of Uttar Pradesh [1961] 3 SCR 563 : 1961 SCC OnLine
       SC 170; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhopal Sugar Industries
       Ltd. [1964] 6 SCR 846 : 1964 SCC OnLine SC 121; Ameerunnissa
       Begum v. Mahboob Begum [1953] 1 SCR 404 : (1952) 2 SCC
       697: Ram Prasad Narayan Sahi v. State of Bihar [1953] 1 SCR
       1129 : (1953) 1 SCC 274; Shayara Bano v. Union of India [2017]
       9 SCR 797 : (2017) 9 SCC 1; Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia v.
       Union of India [1970] 1 SCR 479 : (1969) 2 SCC 166; Arunachal
       Pradesh v. Khudiram Chakma [1993] 3 SCR 401 : 1994 Supp.
       1 SCC 615; Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain [1976] 2 SCR
       347 : 1975 Supp SCC 1; EP Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu
       [1974] 2 SCR 348 : (1974) 4 SCC 3; Maneka Gandhi v. Union
       of India [1978] 2 SCR 621 : (1978) 1 SCC 248; State of Andhra
       Pradesh v. McDowell [1996] 3 SCR 721 : (1996) 3 SCC 709;
       Joseph Shine v. Union of India [2018] 11 SCR 765 : (2019) 3
       SCC 39; Cellular Operators Assn. of India v. TRAI [2016] 9 SCR
       1 : (2016) 7 SCC 703; J.S. Luthra Academy v. State of Jammu
       and Kashmir [2018] 10 SCR 1098 : (2018) 18 SCC 65; Hindustan
       Construction Co. Ltd. v. Union of India [2019] 17 SCR 331 : (2020)
       17 SCC 324; Vivek Narayan Sharma (Demonetisation Case-5
       J.) v. Union of India [2023] 1 SCR 1 : (2023) 3 SCC 1; K.S.
       Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J) v. Union of India [2015] 9 SCR 99 :
       (2017) 10 SCC 1; State of Punjab v. Amar Nath Goyal [2005]
       Supp. 2 SCR 549 : (2005) 6 SCC 754; Union of India v.
       Parameswaran Match Works [1975] 2 SCR 573 : (1975) 1 SCC
       305; Indian Social Action Forum v. Union of India [2020] 4 SCR
       903 : (2021) 15 SCC 60; Nisha Priya Bhatia v. Union of India
       [2020] 10 SCR 596 : (2020) 13 SCC 56; Shreya Singhal v Union
       of India [2015] 5 SCR 963 : (2015) 5 SCC 1; State of Madhya
       Pradesh v. Baldeo Prasad [1961] 1 SCR 970 : (1961) 1 SCR
       970; Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [1994] 2 SCR 375 : (1994)
       3 SCC 569; Federation of Obstetrics & Gynaecological Societies
       of India (FOGSI) v. Union of India [2019] 7 SCR 12 : (2019) 6
       SCC 283; Seksaria Cotton Mills Ltd. v. State of Bombay [1953]
       1 SCR 825 : (1953) 1 SCC 561; K.A. Abbas v. Union of India
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                         987

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     [1971] 2 SCR 446 : (1970) 2 SCC 780; Smt. Shanno Devi v.
     Mangal Sain [1961] 1 SCR 576 : (1961) 1 SCR 576; Premium
     Granites v. State of T.N. [1994] 1 SCR 579 : (1994) 2 SCC 691;
     Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society v. State of Gujarat [1975]
     1 SCR 173 : (1974) 1 SCC 717; State of Karnataka v. Associated
     Management of Medium Primary and Secondary Schools [2014]
     5 SCR 1104 : (2014) 9 SCC 485; State of Bombay v. Bombay
     Education Society [1955] 1 SCR 568 : (1954) 2 SCC 152; D.A.V.
     College v. State of Punjab (1971) 2 SCC 269; S. P. Mittal v. Union
     of India [1983] 1 SCR 729 : (1983) 1 SCC 51; M. C. Mehta v.
     Kamal Nath [1996] Supp. 10 SCR 12 : (1997) 1 SCC 388; Natural
     Resources Allocation, In re, Special Reference No. 1 of 2012
     [2012] 9 SCR 311 : (2012) 10 SCC 1; N.P. Ponnuswami v.
     Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency [1952] 1 SCR 218 :
     AIR 1952 SC 64; Jyoti Basu v. Debi Gosal [1982] 3 SCR 318 :
     AIR 1982 SC 983; Shyamdeo Prasad Singh v. Nawal Kishore
     Yadav [2000] Supp. 2 SCR 668 : (2000) 8 SCC 46; Krishnamoorthy v.
     Sivakumar [2015] 4 SCR 987 : (2015) 3 SCC 467; People’s Union
     for Civil Liberties v. Union of India [2013] 12 SCR 283 : (2013)
     10 SCC 1; Rajbala v. State of Haryana [2015] 12 SCR 1106 :
     (2016) 2 SCC 445; Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India [2023] 9
     SCR 1 : (2023) 6 SCC 161; Inderjit Barua v. Election Commission
     of India AIR 1984 SC 1911; Extra-Judicial Execution Victim
     Families Assn. v. Union of India [2016] 4 SCR 909 : (2016) 14
     SCC 536; State Trading Corpn. of India Ltd. v. CTO 1963 SCC
     OnLine SC 3; State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal [1987] 1 SCR 1 :
     (1986) 4 SCC 566; Shri Raghunathrao Ganpatrao v. Union of
     India [1993] 1 SCR 480 : AIR 1993 SC 1267; Indra Sawhney v.
     Union of India [1992] Supp. 2 SCR 454 : AIR 1993 SC 477;
     AIIMS Students’ Union v. AIIMS [2001] Suppl. 2 SCR 79 : AIR
     2001 SC 3262; Indian Medical Association v. Union of India [2011]
     6 SCR 599 : AIR 2011 SC 2365; Izhar Ahmed Khan v. Union of
     India [1962] Supp. 3 SCR 235 : AIR 1962 SC 1052; Lakshmi
     Charan Sen v. A.K.M. Hassam Uzzaman [1985] Suppl. 1 SCR
     493 : (1985) 4 SCC 689 – referred to.
     Länsman v Finland (511/92); Diergaardt et al. v. Namibia,
     Communication No. 760/1997 (25 July 2000); Lubicon Lake
     Band v. Canada, Communication No. 167/1984 (26 March 1990),
     U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/45/40) at 1 (1990); Rakhim Mavlonov
     and Shansiy Sa’di case (Mavlonov v. Uzbekistan), Communication
     No. 1334/2004, UN Doc. CCPR/C/95/D/1334/2004 (2009); Perez v.
     Bromwell, [1958] 356 US 44, 46; Igartua De La Rosa v. United
988                                                       [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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       States [2000], 80 F.3d 29, (1st Cir. 2000); Thomas Bonham v.
       College of Physicians [1610], 8 Co. Rep. 107 77 Eng. Rep. 638;
       Marbury v. Madison [1803], 5 U.S. 137 (1803); Lorenzo v. McCoy,
       15 Phil 559 (Philippines Supreme Court); South Carolina v.
       Katzenbach 383 U.S. 301 (1966) – referred to.


       In the Judgment of Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI
       Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha v. Union of India [2014] 14 SCR
       744 : (2015) 3 SCC 1; Kulathil v. State of Kerala [1966] 3 SCR
       706 : AIR 1966 SC 1614; Izhar Ahmed v. Union of India [1962]
       Supp. 3 SCR 235 : 1962 SCC OnLine SC 1; State of UP v. Shah
       Mohammed [1969] 3 SCR 1006 : (1969) 1 SCC 771 [5]; National
       Human Rights Commission v. State of Arunachal Pradesh [1996] 1
       SCR 278 : (1996) 1 SCC 742; Committee for Citizenship Rights of
       the Chakmas of Arunachal Pradesh v. State of Arunachal Pradesh
       [2015] 9 SCR 1020 : (2016) 15 SCC 540; Shah Muhammad Anwar
       Ali v. State of Assam 2014 SCC OnLine Gau 103; Association for
       Democratic Reforms v. Union of India [2024] 2 SCR 420 : 2024
       INSC 113; Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri SR Tandolkar [1959]
       1 SCR 279 : 1958 SCC OnLine SC 6; Moorthy Match Works v.
       CCE [1974] 3 SCR 121 : (1974) 4 SCC 428; State of West
       Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar [1952] 1 SCR 284 : (1952) 1 SCC 1;
       EP Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu [1974] 2 SCR 348 : (1974) 4
       SCC 3; Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Seheravardi [1981] 2 SCR 79 :
       (1981) 1 SCC 722; State of Andhra Pradesh v. McDowell [1996]
       3 SCR 721 : (1996) 3 SCC 709; Shayara Bano v. Union of India
       [2017] 9 SCR 797 : (2017) 9 SCC 1; Navtej Singh Johar v. Union
       of India [2018] 7 SCR 379 : (2018) 10 SCC 1; State of Punjab v.
       Davinder Singh [2024] 8 SCR 1321 : 2024 INSC 562; Kerala Hotel
       and Restaurant Association v. State of Kerala [1990] 1 SCR 516 :
       (1990) 2 SCC 502; Joseph Shine v. Union of India [2018] 11 SCR
       765 : (2019) 3 SCC 39; Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao
       [1973] 3 SCR 39 : 1973 1 SCC 500; Arun Kumar v. Union of India
       [2006] Suppl. 6 SCR 290 : (2007) 1 SCC 732; G Sadasivan Nair v.
       Cochin University of Science and Technology [2021] 9 SCR 752 :
       (2022) 4 SCC 404; State of Tamil Nadu v. National South Indian
       River Inter-linking [2021] 7 SCR 479 : (2021) 15 SCC 534; State
       of Gujarat v. Ambica Mills [1974] 3 SCR 760 : (1974) 4 SCC 656;
       Basheer v. State of Kerala [2003] Supp. 1 SCR 580 : (2004) 3
       SCC 609; Gauri Shanker v. Union of India [1994] Suppl. 3 SCR
       244 : (1994) 6 SCC 349; Anant Mills v. State of Gujarat [1975] 3
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                        989

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     SCR 220 : (1975) 2 SCC 175; Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of
     India [2005] Supp. 1 SCR 472 : (2005) 5 SCC 665; Naga People’s
     Movement of Human Rights v. Union of India [1997] Suppl. 5 SCR
     469 : (1998) 2 SCC 109; Madhyamam Broadcasting Limited v.
     Union of India [2023] 10 SCR 595 : (2023) SCC OnLine SC 366;
     SR Bommai v. Union of India [1994] 2 SCR 644 : 1994 3 SCC 1;
     Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society v. State of Gujarat [1975]
     1 SCR 173 : (1974) 1 SCC 717; Father W Proost v. State of Bihar
     [5J] [1969] 2 SCR 73; DAV College, Bhatinda v. State of Punjab
     [1971] Supp. 1 SCR 677; Jagdev Singh Sidhanti v. Pratap Singh
     Daulta [1964] 6 SCR 750; Supriyo Chakraborty v. Union of India
     [2023] 16 SCR 1209 : 2023 INSC 920; Maneka Gandhi v. Union
     of India [1978] 2 SCR 621 : (1978) 1 SCC 248; Indian Young
     Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala [2018] 9 SCR 561 :
     (2019) 11 SCC 1; State of Kerala v. Very Rev. Mother Provincial
     [1971] 1 SCR 734 : (1970) 2 SCC 417; TMA Pai Foundation v.
     State of Karnataka (2002) 8 SCC 481; Motor General Traders v.
     State of Andhra Pradesh [1984] 1 SCR 594 : (1984) 1 SCC 222;
     Rattan Arya v. State of Tamil Nadu [1986] 2 SCR 596 : (1986)
     3 SCC 385; Malpe Vishwanath Acharya v. State of Maharashtra
     [1997] Supp. 6 SCR 717 : (1998) 2 SCC 1; JK Cotton Spinning
     & Weaving Mills Ltd. v. Union of India [1988] 1 SCR 700 : AIR
     1988 SC 191 – referred to.
     Missouri Kansas & Texas Railway v. May 194 US 297, 269;
     Williums-Yulee v. The Florida Bar, 575 US (2015) – referred to.


     In the Judgment of Pardiwala, J.
     Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India [2005] Supp. 1 SCR 472 :
     (2005) 5 SCC 665; Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights v.
     Union of India [1997] Supp. 5 SCR 469; Somaiya Organics
     (India) Ltd. & Another v. State of U.P. & Another [2001] 3 SCR
     33 : (2001) 5 SCC 519; Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of
     U.P [1989] Suppl. 1 SCR 623 : (1990) 1 SCC 109; Independent
     Thought v. Union of India [2017] 13 SCR 821 : (2017) 10 SCC
     800; Modern Dental College and Research Centre and Ors. v.
     State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. [2016] 3 SCR 579 : (2016)
     7 SCC 353; Satyawati Sharma v. Union of India [2008] 6 SCR
     566 : (2008) 5 SCC 287; Malpe Vishwanath Acharya v. State of
     Maharashtra [1997] Supp. 6 SCR 717 : (1998) 2 SCC 1; State
     of M.P. v. Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd [1964] 6 SCR 846 : 1964
990                                                           [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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       SCC OnLine SC 121; Rattan Arya and Ors. v. State of Tamil
       Nadu and Ors. [1986] 2 SCR 596 : (1986) 3 SCC 385; State of
       Assam v. Moslem Mandal 2013 SCC OnLine Gau 1; Shayara
       Bano v. Union of India [2017] 9 SCR 797 : (2017) 9 SCC 1;
       Cellular Operators Assn. of India v. Telecom Regulatory Authority
       of India [2016] 9 SCR 1 : (2016) 7 SCC 703; Joseph Shine v.
       Union of India [2018] 11 SCR 765 : (2019) 3 SCC 39; Narottam
       Kishore Deb Varman v. Union of India [1964] 7 SCR 55; H.H.
       Shri Swamiji of Shri Amar Mutt v. Commr., Hindu Religious and
       Charitable Endowments Deptt [1980] 1 SCR 368 : (1979) 4 SCC
       642, Motor General Traders v. State of A.P. [1984] 1 SCR 594 :
       (1984) 1 SCC 222; I.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab [1967] 2
       SCR 762 : AIR 1967 SC 1643, Kesavananda Bharati v. State
       of Kerala [1973] Supp. 1 SCR 1 : (1973) 4 SCC 225; State of
       UP v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. [1980] 2 SCR 531 : (1980)
       2 SCC 441 – referred to.

                        Books and Periodicals Cited

       In the Judgment of Surya Kant, J:
       T. S. MURTY, Assam, The Difficult Years: A Study of Political
       Developments in 1979- 83, Himalayan Books, 1983; Begum Aizaz
       Rasul, Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume 7, 08.12.1948; Z. H.
       Lari, Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume 7, 08.12.1948; Dr. B.R.
       Ambedkar, Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume 7, 08.12.1948;
       PASCUAL GISBERT, Fundamentals of Sociology, Orient Longman,
       1973 (3rd ed.), 342; BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, A Scientific Theory
       of Culture and Other Essays, The University of North Carolina Press,
       1944, 67; Govind Ballabh Pant, Constituent Assembly Debates,
       Volume 7, 08.12.1948; K. Santhanam, Constituent Assembly
       Debates, Volume 7, 08.12.1948; ORNIT SHANI, How India
       Became Democratic: Citizenship and the Making of the Universal
       Franchise, Cambridge University Press, 2017; M. Thirumala
       Rao, Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume 11, 22.11.1949;
       Brajeshwar Prasad, Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume 8,
       16.06.1949; Hriday Nath Kunzru, Constituent Assembly Debates,
       Volume 11, 22.11.1949; Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, Constituent Assembly
       Debates, Volume 11, 25.11.1949; B.R. Ambedkar, Constituent
       Assembly Debates, Volume 8, 02.06.1949; Alladi Krishnaswamy
       Ayyar, Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume 11, 23.11.1949;
       Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume 9,
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                         991

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     03.08.1949 and 04.08.1949; H.V. Kamath, Constituent Assembly
     Debates, Volume 9, 02.08.1949; Nehru-Liaquat Pact of 1950;
     ARISTOTLE, Politics, Book III, Benjamin Jowett (trans.), Batoche;
     Books, 1999, R. D. Masters (ed.), J. R. Masters (trans.), New
     York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978; ULRICH PREUSS, The Ambiguous
     Meaning of Citizenship, University of Chicago Law School (2003);
     STEPHANIE DEGOOYER ET AL, The Right to Have Rights,Verso
     Books, 2018; ROMILA THAPAR ET. AL., On Citizenship, Aleph
     Book Company, 2021; KANGNI KPODAR, Citizenship and Growth,
     IMF eLibrary; JAMES BROWN SCOTT, Nationality: Jus Soli or Jus
     Sanguinis, American Journal of International Law, 1930, 24(1),
     60; ACQUISITION OF CITIZENSHIP - AĠENZIJA KOMUNITÀ
     MALTA; DAVID FITZGERALD, Nationality and Migration in Modern
     Mexico, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 2005; STEYN,
     The Constitutionalisation of Public Law, 1999, 4, 6, 13-14; A. W.
     BRADLEY & K. D. EWING, Constitutional and Administrative
     Law, Pearson Longman, 2007; H. BARNETT, Constitution and
     Administrative Law, Cavendish, 2006; LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
     American Constitutional Law, Foundation Press, 2000; EDWARD
     GAIT, A History of Assam, Thacker, Spink & Company, 1906; MANOR
     DIN: ARUPJYOTI SAIKIA ON HOW THE BURMESE INVASION OF
     ASSAM TRANSPIRED DOWN TO EARTH; SANGEETA BAROOAH
     PISHAROTY, Assam: The Accord, the Discord, Penguin Random
     House, 2019, 221; ARUPJYOTI SAIKIA, The Quest for Modern
     Assam, Penguin Random House, 2023, 25; Ministry of External
     Affairs Annual Report (1943-44), para 15, ANTARA DATTA,
     Refugees and Borders in South Asia: The Great Exodus of 1971,
     Routledge, 2015; Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, Constituent Assembly
     Debates, Volume 11, 25.11.1949; DR. BABSAHEB AMBEDKAR
     WRITINGS AND SPEECHES, Dr. Ambedkar Foundation, Vol. 1,
     57; GEORGES LEFEBVRE, The Coming of the French Revolution,
     R. R. Palmer (trans.), Princeton University Press, 1973; THE NEW
     ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA: MACROPAEDIA (Encyclopaedia
     Britannica Inc.), 1974; JEREMIE GILBERT AND DAVID KEANE,
     Equality versus fraternity? Rethinking France and its minorities,
     International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2016, 14 (4), 901 and
     902; Decision 99-412 DC of June 15, 1999, Rec. 71 (European
     Charter for Regional or Minority Languages), para 10; R. K.
     Sidhwa, Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume 9, 11.08.1949;
     Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume
     9, 10.08.1949; Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar and H. N. Kunzru,
992                                                           [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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       Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume 9, 12.08.1949; K. M.
       Munshi, Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume 3, 29.04.1947;
       Nationality Law of People’s Republic of China, 1980, Article 9;
       Japan’s Nationality Law, 1950, Article 11; Kuwait, Ministerial
       Decree No. 15 of 1959 Promulgating the Nationality Law, Article
       11; The Oxford Handbook on Indian Constitution, Oxford University
       Press, 2016, 940; H.L.A. HART, Positivism and the Separation of
       Law and Morals, Harvard Law Review, 1958, 71(4), 607; B. K.
       MILLER, Constitutional Remedies for Underinclusive Statutes: A
       Critical Appraisal of Heckler v. Mathews, Harvard Civil Rights-Civil
       Liberties Law Review, 1985, 20, 86; Bholanath Sen, Lok Sabha
       Debate (CAB, 1985), 20.11.1985 – referred to.


       In the Judgment of Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI
       BR Ambedkar in Constituent Assembly Debates (10 August 1949);
       B Shiva Rao, The framing of India’s Constitution: Select Documents
       (Part II), 472; B Shiva Rao, The framing of India’s Constitution:
       Select Documents (Part II), 473; B Shiva Rao, The framing of India’s
       Constitution: Select Documents (Part II), 683; The emergence of
       Documentary Identities in Post-Colonial India, 1950-67 (2016),
       History Faculty Publications 129; BN Rao, Memorandum on the
       Union Constitution and Draft Clauses (May 30 1947); Ad-hoc
       Committee on Citizenship (12 July 1947); Draft Constitution of
       India, 1948; P Ramanatha Aiyar, Advanced Law Lexicon (6th Edition
       Volume 2 D-1) 1587, Citizenship Bill, Parliamentary Debates, New
       Delhi, 3 December 1955, p.1176; Shri RK Choudhuri (Assam),
       Parliamentary Debates: Official Report (Volume 1, 1950), 318; Shri
       Gopalaswami to the question from Dr Deshmukh, Parliamentary
       Debates: Official Report (Volume 1, 1950), 336; Arupjyoti Saikia,
       The Quest for Modern Assam, (Penguin and Allen Lane) 455;
       M Rafiqul Islam, A Tale of Millions: Bangladesh Liberation War, 1971
       (Bangladesh Books International); Report of Governor of Assam
       Lt. Col S.K Sinha dated 8.11.1998; W.N Hohfeld, Fundamental
       Legal Conceptions as applied in Judicial Reasoning and other
       legal essays, (W.W. Cook ed., Yale University Press, 1919); Anil
       Roychoudhury, National Register of Citizens 1951, (Vol 16, Issue
       no. 8, 21 Feb 1981); Justice GP Singh, Principles of Statutory
       Interpretation (15th edition, Lexis Nexis), Yasmin Khan, The Great
       Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan (Penguin India) –
       referred to.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                        993

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     In the Judgment of Pardiwala, J.
     Myron Weiner, The Political Demography of Assam’s Anti-
     Immigrant Movement, 9, POPUL. DEV. REV., 283 (1983); Arupjyoti
     Saikia, Quest For Modern Assam: A History; Uddipan Dutta, The
     Role of Language Management and Language Conflict in the
     Transition of Post-Colonia Assamese Identity, (2012); Assam
     Tribune, Nov. 12 1972; Times of India, Nov. 13 1972; Dainik
     Asam, Oct. 4, 1972; Times of India, Oct. 6, 1972; Times of India,
     Oct. 7, 1972; SANGEETA BAROOAH PISHAROTY, ASSAM:
     THE ACCORD, THE DISCORD; Report of the Non-Official
     Judicial Inquiry Commission on the Holocaust of Assam Before
     During and After Election 1983; Order of R.K. Trivedi, Chief
     Election Commissioner, India, Annexure F, 201 (Jan. 7, 1983);
     Report of the Non-Official Judicial Inquiry Commission on the
     Holocaust of Assam Before During and After Election 1983, Note
     Submitted by S.L. Khosla, Chief Electoral Officer, Assam to R.V.
     Subramaniam, Advisor to Governor, Assam, Annexure E, 193
     (Sept. 29, 1982); Lok Sabha Debates, Statement of A.K. Sen,
     Minister of Law and Justice on Statutory Resolution Regarding
     Disapproval of Representation of the People (Amendment)
     Ordinance and Representation of the People (Amendment) Bill.,
     at cols. 190–93, (Jan. 23, 1985); Assam Tribune, K.C. Khanna,
     Minefield of Uncertainties: The Assam Accord and After; Times
     of India, (20 August 1985); MANI SHANKAR AIYAR, RAJIV
     GANDHI’S INDIA: A GOLDEN JUBILEE RETROSPECTIVE,
     NATIONHOOD, ETHNICITY, PLURALISM AND CONFLICT
     RESOLUTION, (Atlantic Publishers 1998); Dr. Bhupendra Nath &
     Dilip C Nath, The Change of Religion and Language Composition
     in the State of Assam in Northeast India: A Statistical Analysis
     Since 1951 to 2001, 5 INT. J. SCI. RES. PUB. 2, (2012); Nandita
     Saikia, William Joe, Apala Saha & Utpal Chutia, Cross Border
     Migration in Assam during 1951-2011: Process, Magnitude, and
     Socio-Economic Consequences, Report submitted to ICSSR 38,
     (2016); Govt. of Assam, White Paper on Foreigner’s Issue; Session
     No. 136, Rajya Sabha Deb., Statement of Shri. Baharul Islam on
     The Citizenship (Amendment) Bill, 1985; SANGEETA BAROOAH
     PISHAROTY, Assam: The Accord, The Discord; Liaqat A. Khan,
     Temporality of Law, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. (2016); Cross Border
     Migration in Assam During 1951-2011: Process, Magnitude, and
     Socio-Economic Consequences by Dr. Nandita Saikia & Dr. William
     Joe; The Hindu Bureau – referred to.
994                                                            [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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                                List of Websites

       In the judgment of Surya Kant, J:
       https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/citizenship/; https://www.
       doi.gov/oia/islands/american-samoa; https://www.elibrary.imf.
       org/view/journals/022/0056/001/article-A014-en.xml; https://
       komunita.gov.mt/en/services/acquisition-of-citizenship/;
       https://globalresidenceindex.com/citizenship-by-investment/;
       https://www.downtoearth.org.in/interviews/governance/manor-
       din-arupjyoti-saikia-on-how-the-burmese-invasion-of-assam-
       transpired-93414; https://www.mea.gov.in/Images/attach/
       amb/Volume_01.pdf; https://static.mygov.in/saas/s3fs-saas/
       assam/mygov_149761430071181.pdf; https://pmindiaun.
       gov.in/pageinfo/ODY3#:~:text=Article%201%3A%20The%20
       Go – referred to.

                                  List of Acts

       In the Judgment of Surya Kant, J:
       Voting Rights Act of 1965; Citizenship Act, 1955; British Nationality
       Act, 1981; Representation of the People Act, 1983 (c. 2), Acts
       of Parliament, 1983 (United Kingdom); Immigration Act, Acts
       of Parliament, 1971 (UK); Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019;
       Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act, 1950; Limitation Act,
       1963; West Pakistan (Control) Ordinance; Chhattisgarh Police
       Act, 2007; Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 1985; Foreigners
       (Tribunals) Order, 1964; Foreigners Act, 1946; Passport (Entry
       into India) Act, 1920; Passport Act, 1967; Foreign Contribution
       (Regulation) Act, 2010; Information Technology Act, 2000; Life
       Insurance Corporation Act, 1956; Income Tax Act, 1961; Patents
       Act, 1970; Government of India Act, 1935; Representation of People
       Act, 1951; Representation of People Act, 1918; Illegal Migrants
       (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983; Citizenship Rules, 2009;
       Citizenship (Amendment) Rules, 2024; Citizenship (Amendment)
       Rules, 2013; Supreme Court Rules, 2013; Foreign Contribution
       (Regulation) Rules, 2011; Dadra and Nagar Haveli (Citizenship)
       Order, 1962; Goa, Daman and Diu (Citizenship) Order, 1962;
       Chandernagore (Merger) Act, 1954; Citizenship (Pondicherry)
       Order, 1962; Sikkim (Citizenship) Order, 1975; Special Courts Bill,
       1978; The Constitution (Thirteenth) Amendment Bill, 1962.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                         995

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     In the Judgment of Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI

     Citizenship Act 1955; Foreigners Act, 1946; Assam Official
     Language Act 1960; Citizenship (Amendment) Act 1985; Foreigners
     (Tribunals) Order, 1964; Passport Act 1967; Government of
     India Act 1935; Pakistan (Control) Act 1949; West Pakistan
     (Control) Ordinance 1948; Pakistan (Control) Repealing Act
     1952; Citizenship (Amendment) Act 2003; Foreigners Order 1948;
     Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act 1950; Illegal Migrants
     (Determination by Tribunals) Act 1983, Passport (Entry into India)
     Act 1920 ; Assam Disturbed Areas Act 1955; Representation of
     the People Act 1951; Constitution (Twenty-second Amendment)
     Act 1969; Assam Official Language Act 1960; Code of Civil
     Procedure 1908; Code of Criminal Procedure 1973; Registration
     of Foreigners Act 1939; Influx from Pakistan (Control) Repealing
     Act 1952; Citizenship Rules 1956; Illegal Migrants (Determination
     by Tribunals) Rules 1984; Citizenship (Registration of Citizens
     and Issue of National Identity Cards) Rules 2003; Citizenship
     (Registration of Citizens and Issue of National Identity Cards)
     Amendment Rules; Citizenship Rules 2009; Registration of
     Foreigners Rules 1939.


     In the Judgment of Pardiwala, J.

     Citizenship Act 1955; Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation, 1873;
     Charter Act, 1833; Assam Company Act, 1845; Government
     of India Act, 1935; Indian Independence Act, 1947; Pakistan
     (Control) Act, 1949; Pakistan (Control) Repealing Act, 1952;
     Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964; Foreigners Act, 1946;
     Bangladesh, Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals)
     Act, 1983; Citizenship (Temporary Provisions) Order, 1972;
     Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1939; Registration of Foreigners
     Act, 1939; Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 1985; Citizenship
     (Amendment) Bill, 1985; Citizenship Rules, 1956; Citizenship
     Rules, 2009; Citizenship (Amendment) Rules, 2013; Bombay Rents,
     Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947; Bhopal State
     Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1953; Passports Act, 1967; Pakistan
     (Control) Repealing Act, 1952; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908;
     Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act, 1950 .
996                                                              [2024] 10 S.C.R.

                        Digital Supreme Court Reports


                                List of Keywords
       Constitutional validity of s.6A of Citizenship Act; Preambular values
       like fraternity; Unreasonable classification; Manifest arbitrariness;
       Rights provided to ‘indigenous’ communities u/Art. 29; Political
       rights of Indian citizens in Assam u/Art. 326; ‘External aggression’
       and ‘internal disturbance’; Harmonious interpretation of two
       legislations; Special provisions as to citizenship of persons covered
       by the Assam Accord; Deemed citizenship to immigrants who
       entered prior to 01.01.1966; Process of registration for immigrants;
       Illegal immigrants; Principles of fraternity; Directions issued in
       Sarbananda Sonowal’s case; Deporting the illegal immigrants;
       Identification of illegal immigrants; Identification and detection of
       illegal immigrants or foreigners in Assam; Fraternity; Preambular
       notion of fraternity; Meaning of ‘fraternity’; Essence of fraternity;
       Principle for uplifting marginalized sections of society; Notion
       of inclusiveness and togetherness; Safeguarding community’s
       endogamous way of life; Disenfranchising; Dual citizenship;
       Competence to specify different conditions u/Art. 11; Concept
       of dual citizenship; Renunciation of previous citizenship; Oath
       of allegiance; Oath of allegiance before conferral of citizenship;
       Treats equals unequally; Selective application; Ex-facie arbitrary;
       Two-pronged reasonable classification test; Humanitarian
       needs of migrants of Indian origin; Impact of the migration on
       economic and cultural needs of Indian states; Rational nexus;
       Under-inclusive; Over-inclusive; Right to equality; Reasonableness
       of classification; Yardsticks to check reasonableness of classification;
       Marginally under-inclusive; Rationale for cut-off dates-01.01.1966 and
       25.03.1971; Constituents of manifest arbitrariness; Relation between
       Art. 14 and arbitrariness; Facets of test of manifest arbitrariness;
       Extent of review under manifest arbitrariness; Vagueness in law;
       Extent of review for test of ‘void for vagueness’; ‘Ordinary resident
       in Assam’; Actionable impact on Assamese culture; Protection
       of interest of minorities; Marginalization and disruption of their
       socio-economic aspirations; Right of self-governance; Inclusion of
       unidentified migrant population burdens country’s natural resources,
       Sustainable development; Right of exclusion; Right u/Art. 326, if can
       be invoked to exclude certain individuals; Adult suffrage; Federal
       structure of Constitution; Constitutional status of States; Detection
       and deportation of illegal immigrants; Intention behind inclusion of
       Art. 355; International law cannot trump domestic law; Limits to
       judicial review; Judicial review of government policies; Scope of
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                            997

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     judicial review; Grounds of unreasonable classification; Scope of
     judicial review of under-inclusive provisions; Limitation period for
     writs; Applicability of doctrine of laches; Transformative nature of
     Constitution; Equitable allocation of resources; Right of Assamese
     people to vote; Government policies hovering around foreign policy;
     Effectiveness of existing policies; Modes of acquiring citizenship.

                            Case Arising From
     CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (C) No. 274 of 2009
     (Under Article 32 of The Constitution of India)
     With
     Writ Petition (Civil) No. 916 of 2014, Writ Petition (Civil) Nos. 470
     and 1047 of 2018, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 68 of 2016, Writ Petition
     (Civil) No. 876 of 2014, Writ Petition (Civil) Nos. 449 and 450 of
     2015 and Writ Petition (Civil) No. 562 of 2012

                         Appearances for Parties
     R Venkataramani, Attorney General, Tushar Mehta, Solicitor
     General, K M Nataraj, A.S.G., Ardhendumauli Kumar Prasad,
     Tapesh Kumar Singh, Saurabh Mishra, Amit Anand Tiwari,
     A.A.Gs., Devajit Saikia, Amit Kumar, K N Balgopal, Gurminder
     Singh, Adv. Gen./Sr. Advs., Shyam Divan, Vijay Hansaria,
     Kamal Nayan Choudhury, Sanjay Hegde, Kapil Sibal, Ms. Indira
     Jaising, Salman Khurshid, Sanjay R Hegde, Anupam Lal Das,
     Chander Uday Singh, Ms. Malvika Trivedi, P V Surendranath,
     Dr. Manish Singhvi, Ajay Tewari, Colin Gonsalves, Sr. Advs.,
     Somiran Sharma, Udayaditya Banerjee, Ms. Kavya Jhawar,
     Sudipto Sircar, Ms. Anshula Laroiya, Adith Deshmukh, Arpit Jacob
     Varaprasad, Ms. Shristi Borthakur, Dhrubajit Saikia, Ms. Aadya
     Malik, Suryanusen Gupta, Manish Goswami, Navneet Gautam,
     Rongon Choudhury, Rishab Sharma, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal,
     Anjani Kumar Mishra, Fuzail Ahmad Ayyubi, Shivendra Singh,
     Bikram Dwivedi, Puneett Singhal, Sanjeev Chaudhary, Somesh
     Chandra Jha, Anas Tanwir, Mrigank Prabhakar, Ms. Sakshi Banga,
     Gautam Prabhakar, Sunil Murarka, Partha Sil, Tavish Bhushan
     Prasad, Ms. Sayani Bhattacharya, Joydeep Mukherjee, Abhiraj
     Choudhary, Syed Shahid Rizvi, Mansoor Ali, Bilal Mansoor, S.
     Islam, Imtiyaz Ali, Mukul Kumar, Anish Roy, Mrs. Rekha Pandey,
     Mrs. Shraddha Deshmukh, Shuvodeep Roy, Ms. Ruchi Kohli, Kanu
998                                                       [2024] 10 S.C.R.

                      Digital Supreme Court Reports


       Agrawal, Ms. Ruchi Gour Narula, Ms. Diksha Rai, Ms. Sneha
       Kalita, Chitvan Singhal, Ms. Sonali Jain, Abhishek Kumar Pandey,
       Raman Yadav, Kartikay Aggarwal, Gaurang Bhushan, Abhishek
       Kumar Pandy, Dr. Reeta Vasishta, Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Arvind
       Kumar Sharma, Mrs. Mrinal Elkar Mazumdar, Anil Hooda, Rajesh
       Singh Chauhan, P Nayak, Madhav Sinhal, Kritagya Kait, Tanmay
       Mehta, Rohit Khare, Akshay Nain, Deepayan Dutta, Saurabh
       Tripathi, Arijit Dey, Ms. Apurva Sachdev, Ms. Atiga Singh, Nizam
       Pasha, Gautam Bhatia, Mustafa Khaddam Hussain, Ms. Rupali
       Samuel, Ibad Mushtaq, Ms. Sumedha Ray Sarkar, Paras Nath
       Singh, Ms. Akanksha Rai, Ms. Lubna Naaz, Mohammad Wasim,
       Rohin Bhatt, Ms. Tehsheena Z Hussain, Sadeeq Sherwani,
       Ms. Gurneet Kaur, Arkam Pasha, Syed Ashhar, Adeel Ahmed,
       Abdur Rehman Sikdar, Raja Chatterjee, Ms. Taqdees Fatima,
       Piyush Sachdev, Md Sharuk Ali, Ms. Anupama Gupta, Ms. Riya
       Dutta, Ms. Sana Parveen, Ms. Lilly Biswas, Rahul Pratap, Anirudh
       Singh, Ms. Aparna Bhat, Ms. Bidya Mohanty, Ms. Karishma
       Maria, Mrinmoy Dutta, Amjid Maqbool, Ankit Yadav, Ms. Sujal
       Gupta, Shailendra Slaria, Ms. Prakriti Rastogi, Tarun Mehra,
       Gajjala Bhaskar, T. Mahipal, Biju P Raman, Subhash Chandran
       K R, Sawan Kumar Shukla, Mrs. Lekha Sudhakar, John Thomas
       Arakal, Ms. Krishna L R, Shadan Farasat, Mehmood Pracha,
       Syed Ali Ahmad, Syed Tanweer Ahmad, Syed Miran Ahmad, S S
       Bandyopadhyay, Ankit Verma, S Kundu, Abhaya Nath Das, Mrs.
       Barnali Basak, N D Kaushik, V K Shukla, Ms. Riya Soni, Satish
       Kumar, Dr. Vivek Sharma, Ms. Krishna Sarma, Navnit Kumar,
       Pardeep Kumar (for M/s. Corporate Law Group), Gaurav Dhingra,
       M.C. Dhingra, A.K. Singh, Mrs. Arna Dass, Mahender Ram,
       Joginder Kumar, Rishabh Kumar Singh, Lohit Kumar Bimal, Mrs.
       Palolavi Parmar, Pradeep Misra, Daleep Dhyani, Manoj Kumar
       Sharma, Suraj Singh, Bhuwan Chandra, Chanchal Kumar Ganguli,
       Debojit Borkakati, Mohit D. Ram, Sidhant Kumar, Sahil Tagotra,
       Manyaa Chandok, Ms. Ishita Deswal, Ms. Abhivyakti Banerjee,
       Ms. Sushma Suri, Ms. Astha Sharma, Srisatya Mohanty, Ms. Anju
       Thomas, Sanjeev Kaushik, Ms. Mantika Haryani, Shreyas Awasthi,
       Himanshu Chakravarty, Ms. Ripul Swati Kumari, Bhanu Mishra,
       Ms. Muskan Surana, Ms. Lihzu Shiney Konyak, Ms. Anvita Dwivedi,
       Ms. G. Indira, G. N. Reddy, Shantwanu Singh, Ms. Pragya Singh,
       Akshay Singh, Ashok Kumar Singh, Saket Singh, Mrs. Sangeeta
       Singh, Mrs. Niranjana Singh, Siddhesh Shirish Kotwal, Ms. Ana
       Upadhyay, Ms. Manya Hasija, Tejasvi Gupta, Pawan Upadhyay,
       T.illayarasu, Ms. Prachi Mishra, Sumeer Sodhi, Chaitanya
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                        999

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     Sharma, Ms. Shreya Singh, V. K. Sidharthan, D. S. Mahra,
     Gopal Singh, Merusagar Samantaray, Ms. Deepanwita Priyanka,
     Ms. Hemantika Wahi, Anuvrat Sharma, Anando Mukherjee, C. K.
     Sasi, Ms. Meena K Pouiose, Ms. Liz Mathew, Abhinav Mukerji,
     Mrs. Bihu Sharma, Ms. Pratishtha Vij, Mohit Prasad, Aditya Pratap
     Singh, Priyanshu Malik, Sunny Choudhary, K.N. Mishra, Siddharth
     Dharmadhikari, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Bharat Bagla, Sourav
     Singh, Aditya Krishna, Ms. Raavi Sharma, Ms. Yamini Singh,
     M/s. K J John And Co, Pukhrambam Ramesh Kumar, Karun
     Sharma, Ms. Rajkumari Divyasana, Avijit Mani Tripathi, Shaurya
     Sahay, Aditya S. Pandey, Himanshu Sehrawat, Ms. Rekha Bakshi,
     Sandeep Kumar Jha, V. N. Raghupathy, Manendra Pal Gupta,
     Ms. K. Enatoli Sema, Ms. Limayinla Jamir, Amit Kumar Singh,
     Ms. Chubalemla Chang, Prang Newmai, Ms. Swati Ghildiyal,
     Ms. Devyani Bhatt, Ms. Shubhangi Agarwal, Apurv Singhvi, Milind
     Kumar, Ms. Ranjeeta Rohatgi, Kuldip Singh, Ajay Pal, Mayank
     Dahiya, Ms. Sugandh Rathor, Shashi Shekhar Kumar Prasad,
     Raghvendra Kumar, Anand Kumar Dubey, Ms. Harsha Sharma,
     Simanta Kumar, Devvrat Singh, Jainendra Kumar, Maneesh
     Pathak, Nishant Verma, Kailas U More, Mrs. Nirmala D Borade,
     Narendra Kumar, Sabarish Subramanian, Ms. Devyani Gupta,
     Vishnu Unnikrishnan, C Kranthi Kumar, Naman Dwivedi, Danish
     Saifi, Ms. V Keerthana, Ms. Tanvi Anand, B. Balaji, Dr. Joseph
     Aristotle S., Sri Harsha Peechara, Duvvuri Subrahmanya Bhanu,
     Ms. Pallavi, Ms. Kriti Sinha, Akshat Kulshreshtha, Rajiv Kumar
     Choudhry, Mrs. Swarupama Chaturvedi, Siddharth Sangal,
     Ms. Nilanjani Tandon, Ms. Richa Mishra, Ms. Harshita Agrawal,
     Chirag Sharma, Parijat Sinha, Abhimanyu Tewari, Ms. Eliza
     Bar, Harsh Parashar, Mahfooz Ahsan Nazki, Dr. P.N. Mishra,
     Mrs. Hardeep Kaur Mishra, Praveen Mishra, Mohit Chaudhary,
     Ms. Puja Sharma, Kunal Sachdeva, Ms. Madhuri Jain, Prakhar
     Mithal, Ms. Srishti Bajpai, Aashish Arya, Anubhav Singhal,
     Ms. Sagrika Arya, Sanand Ramakrishnan, Rajeev Mishra, Madan
     Mohan Bora, Praveen Swarup, Ms. Rashmi Singhania, Ms. Bharti
     Tyagi, Vikash Kumar, M.R. Shamshad, Syed Shahid Husain
     Rizvi, Ms. Rubina Jawed, S Islam, Arijit Sarkar, Zeeshan Rizvi,
     Ms. Nabeela Jamil, Ms. Rashmi Nandakumar, Dhawal Uniyal,
     Abhishek, Ashwani Kumar Dubey, Avijit Roy, M/s. Corporate Law
     Group, Satya Mitra, Ms. Hetvi Patel, Mohan Pandey, Shibashish
     Misra, Krishna Dev Jagarlamudi, Pashupathi Nath Razdan,
     Ms. Maitreyee Jagat Joshi, Astik Gupta, Ms. Akanksha Tomar,
     Argha Roy, Gaurav Kumar, Advs. for the appearing parties.
1000                                                                                   [2024] 10 S.C.R.

                               Digital Supreme Court Reports


                          Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                               Judgment

       Surya Kant, J. (On Behalf of Himself, M.M. Sundresh J. and
       Manoj Misra, J.)

                                            Table of Contents*

        A. BACKGROUND.....................................................................                 4
        B. TERMS OF REFERENCE.....................................................                        33
        C. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES......................................                               36
        D. ISSUES.................................................................................        41
        E. ANALYSIS.............................................................................          42
              I.   Prefatory challenges..........................................................         43
                   i.       Judicial review...........................................................    43
                            (a) Concept of judicial review..................................              43
                            (b) Limits to judicial review....................................             46
                   ii.      Delay and maintainability of the writ petitions..........                     51
                            (a) Limitation period for writs..................................             52
                            (b) Applicability of doctrine of laches to the present                        56
                                case...................................................................
              II. Challenges regarding constitutionality..............................                    60
                   iii.     The preambular notion of fraternity...........................                65
                            (a) Meaning of ‘fraternity’.......................................            66
                            (b) Ethos of Section 6A is aligned with fraternity....                        72
                   iv.      Part II and Section 6A................................................        76
                            (a) Section 6A and Articles 6, 7 and 11 of the                                76
                                Constitution.......................................................
                            (b) Section 6A and dual citizenship.........................                  84
                            (c) Section 6A and the oath of allegiance..............                       88
                   v.       Article 14 and classification under Section 6A.........                       90
                            (a) Maintainability under Article 14.........................                 92
                            (b) Section 6A vis-à-vis Article 14............................               94


* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                       1001

              In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955



              vi.    Manifest arbitrariness............................................... 109
                     (a) Relation between Article 14 and arbitrariness                   111
                     (b) Constituents of manifest arbitrariness................          112
                     (c) Facets of the test of manifest arbitrariness........            113
                     (d) Extent of review under manifest arbitrariness...                115
                     (e) Cut-off dates in Section 6A.................................    118
                     (f)   Process prescribed under Section 6A............... 121
                     (g) Section 6A and Part II of the Constitution........ 126
                     (h) ‘Ordinarily resident’ in Section 6A..................... 126
              vii.   Article 29 and Section 6A......................................... 139
                     (a) Background of Article 29.................................. 140
                     (b) Standing under Article 29(1).............................. 142
                     (c) Substance of Article 29(1)............................... 146
                     (d) Section 6A vis-à-vis Article 29.......................... 149
              viii. Article 21 and Section 6A........................................ 153
                     (a) ‘Marginalization’ of a community...................... 153
                     (b) Right of self-governance.................................. 154
                     (c) Right of sustainable development.................... 156
              ix.    Article 326 and Section 6A...................................... 158
                     (a) Background and evolution of adult suffrage..... 159
                     (b) Aim of Article 326............................................. 162
                     (c) Right of exclusion and Article 326..................... 164
              x.     Article 355 and Section 6A...................................... 168
                     (a) Intention behind Article 355.............................. 170
                     (b) Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India........... 172
                     (c) Section 6A vis-à-vis Article 355......................... 175
              xi.    Citizenship Act vis-à-vis the IEAA............................ 177
              xii.   Interface with international law................................. 181
      F.   CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS.................................... 182
1002                                                                                 [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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1.     The present batch of matters involve the constitutional validity of
       Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955 (Section 6A). This provision
       was incorporated in 1985 to establish a framework and to delineate
       criteria for granting Indian citizenship to migrants who entered Assam
       before 25.03.1971. Briefly put, the provision created categories for
       the conferment of citizenship to immigrants who entered Assam –
       (i) deemed citizenship to immigrants who entered prior to 01.01.1966;
       and (ii) the process of registration for immigrants who entered
       between the period of 01.01.1966 and 25.03.1971. However, by
       omission, no protection was granted to those entering Assam after
       25.03.1971, thereby rendering their presence in India illegal and
       liable for deportation under other existing legislation. Expressing
       their anxiety over the problems that have been posed by the influx
       of immigration from Bangladesh into Assam, which the Petitioners
       contend have been compounded and legitimized by Section 6A, the
       present action has been brought before this Court.
2.     Citizenship and its penumbral dimension are at the core of the present
       challenge. Thus, before analyzing the challenges regarding the
       constitutionality and the scheme of citizenship under the Constitution
       of India and the Citizenship Act, 1955, (Citizenship Act) we shall
       endeavour to explore the jurisprudential scheme and framework of
       citizenship globally as well as in India.

       A.      BACKGROUND

       Meaning of citizenship
3.     Jurisprudentially, the term ‘citizenship’ is an abstract concept which
       has carried various interpretations that have evolved over time.1 In
       ancient Greek society, philosophers like Aristotle distinguished citizens
       from other members of society – such as residents, children, slaves,
       and the elderly. According to Aristotle, citizens were individuals who
       held judicial or legislative authority within a state.2 Hence, society
       was divided into citizens and mere subjects, where being a citizen
       was a matter of privilege. Called the ‘republican model’, this was also
       seconded by other philosophers such as Tacitus, Cicero, Machiavelli,



1    Citizenship, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/citizenship/.
2    Aristotle, Politics, Book III, Benjamin Jowett (trans.), Batoche Books, 1999, 53.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                                1003

                  In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


      Harrington and Rousseau.3 With the growth of the Roman empire,
      the notion of ‘citizen’ was broadened to encompass individuals in
      conquered territories. This eventually transformed the meaning of
      citizenship, where instead of granting access to political office, the
      term ‘citizen’ meant acquiring legal status of being part of a community
      and receiving protection under law.
4.    Over time, the term citizenship thus moved from the ‘republican
      model’ to a ‘liberal model’, which diluted the status of citizenship
      from a political privilege to a more egalitarian right based upon the
      similarity of legal status shared by a common populace.4

      The meaning of citizenship in India
5.    In the domestic context, citizenship was ascertained by a 9-Judge
      Bench of this Court in State Trading Corpn. of India Ltd. v. CTO,5
      as the ‘right to have rights’.6 It was held that citizenship is the
      pre-requisite that leads to gaining legal status and other socio-political
      rights in a country. However, although there is broad consensus
      on the fundamental concept of citizenship,7 the specific rights and
      privileges associated with citizenship vary from one jurisdiction to
      another. Additionally, countries differ in the mechanisms and criteria
      for acquiring citizenship. These variations reflect the unique historical,
      cultural, and legal contexts of each nation.
6.    In India, various rights are exclusively conferred upon citizens. These
      include the right to vote, the right to move freely, the right to form
      unions, the right to hold public office, the freedom of speech and
      expression, equality in public employment, etc. However, there are
      certain rights that are also made available to non-citizens, including
      the right to equality before the law, the prohibition of forced labour,
      etc. Additionally, the category of Overseas Citizen of India (OCI)
      represents a unique position within the spectrum of citizenship and



3    Citizenship, supra note 1; Rousseau, J.J., 1762, On the Social Contract with Geneva Manuscript and
     Political Economy, R. D. Masters (ed.), J. R. Masters (trans.), New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978,
     Chapter 15.
4    Ulrich Preuss, The Ambiguous Meaning of Citizenship, University of Chicago Law School (2003).
5    1963 SCC OnLine SC 3, para 13.
6    Stephanie DeGooyer et al, The Right to Have Rights,Verso Books, 2018, 7; Romila Thapar et. al., On
     Citizenship, Aleph Book Company, 2021, 35.
7    Perez v. Bromwell [1958] 356 US 44, 46
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       non-citizenship since they have more rights than non-citizens (such as
       a lifelong visa for visiting India) but have fewer rights in comparison
       to citizens (such as the absence of the right to vote).
7.     The bundle of rights accompanying ‘citizenship’ differs in other
       countries. For instance, in the United Kingdom, the British Nationality
       Act, 1981 creates six different classes of people: British Citizen,
       British Overseas Territories Citizen, British Overseas Citizen, British
       Subject, British National (Overseas), and British Protected Person.
       These classes are based on varying levels of association with the
       United Kingdom and its overseas territories, former colonies, and
       protectorates; and they carry different sets of rights. For instance,
       while British citizenship bestows the right to vote, it is also available
       to some Commonwealth citizens.8
8.     Similarly, Mexico establishes two distinct categories of “national” and
       “citizen”.9 A citizen is defined as a national who is 18 years of age
       and has an “honest way of life”.10 Once a national becomes a citizen,
       they get the right to vote, the right to assembly, the right to join the
       army, etc.11 Hence, while nationals and citizens can live in Mexico,
       only citizens get the extra right to vote. The situation is also similar
       in the United States of America (USA). Here, the residents of certain
       territories like American Samoa are only granted nationality and not
       citizenship of the USA. Like Mexico, such nationals can reside freely
       in the USA but cannot vote or hold certain elected offices.12 Further,
       while the residents of some other territories, like Puerto Rico, are
       granted citizenship, they still do not get the right to vote.13
9.     The trans-national comparison examined above aids us by
       providing three definite conclusions. First, globally, citizenship can
       be conceptualized as the right to be a member of a society. In that
       sense, citizenship is essential to one’s identity since it determines
       whether that person would be perceived as an alien or as ‘one of
       us’. This is particularly true given the historical context of the partition


8    Representation of the People Act, 1983 (c. 2), Acts of Parliament, 1983 (United Kingdom), Section 4;
     Immigration Act, Acts of Parliament, 1971 (UK), Section 2.
9    Constitution of Mexico of 1917, First Title, Chapter II & IV.
10   Id, Article 34.
11   Id, Article 35.
12   American Samoa, U.S. Department of the Interior, https://www.doi.gov/oia/islands/american-samoa.
13   Igartua De La Rosa v. United States [2000], 80 F.3d 29, (1st Cir. 2000).
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                        1005

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     and subsequent relations among the nations and people in our
     subcontinent. In addition to such identification by fellow members of
     society, citizenship is also a key determinant in enabling an individual
     to achieve their aims and objectives; since citizenship grants access
     to certain exclusive rights in society. Additionally, citizenship provides
     a sense of belongingness and esteem, apart from furthering the self-
     actualization needs of individuals. Collectively, citizenship provides an
     ‘identity’ to individuals, which has a significant impact on the quality
     of their lives and their individual psyche.
10. Second, beyond the conceptual understanding that citizenship grants
    an assemblage of certain rights in a community, the rights that
    may be conferred depend on the municipal policies of that country.
    While some countries like India reserve the right to vote exclusively
    for citizens, countries like the United Kingdom also extend it to
    Commonwealth citizens. Further, countries such as the USA do not
    bestow the right to vote even to some citizens.
11. Third, most nations have multiple classes of citizenship or nationality
    instead of a rigid dichotomy of citizens and non-citizens. In addition
    to this division, countries also have categories such as overseas
    citizens, nationals, subjects, etc. However, while the basket of rights
    differs inter-se such categories, citizenship is generally the highest
    basket a person can be classified under. Hence, though citizenship
    is one sub-set among many possible ways of being a member of
    a polity, it is the most significant one. Nonetheless, reality is often
    more nuanced, with numerous exceptions, caveats, entrenched
    inequalities and discriminatory legal regimes.
12. The conditions to acquire citizenship also vary across jurisdictions.
    Given that the Petitioners are challenging a specific mode of
    conferment of citizenship, it would be helpful to understand the
    manner in which citizenship is conferred both across the world and
    under our constitutional scheme. This will help us trace whether
    Section 6A is merely an aberration that does not fit into our domestic
    conceptualization of conferring citizenship or if it is another piece of
    a much more complicated puzzle.

     Modes of acquiring citizenship
13. Broadly, there are three approaches for granting citizenship:
    (i) jus soli, i.e., on the basis of birth within that particular country;
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        (ii) jus sanguinis, i.e., citizenship by blood/descent; and (iii) through
       special recognition by law, such as citizenship by registration,
       naturalization, incorporation of a foreign territory, etc. Globally, countries
       have adopted different models for constructing their citizenship regimes.
       While most countries in North America follow a jus soli regime, a
       majority of European nations follow a jus sanguinis regime. In contrast,
       Australia and the African nations follow a mixed regime.14
14. There are varied academic perspectives deliberating as to the
    reasons why a country chooses one mode of conferring citizenship
    over another. As per one perspective, countries that wish to grant
    citizenship to immigrants who do not have familial links in the country
    choose the jus soli model.15 However, from another perspective, the
    choice of mode is often based on the significance of ethnicity for
    the citizen’s identity resulting in adoption of a jus sanguinis model.
    Hence, if a nation emphasizes ethnic continuity through descent and
    lineage, it tends to choose the jus sanguinis model over the jus soli
    model. However, where the cultural identity is tied to the territory of the
    nation, the jus soli model is preferred.16 Beyond these considerations,
    citizenship models can also be justified on the basis of inter-state
    relations (by which citizenship is granted based on historical links or
    treaties between nations),17 or on economic considerations (which
    are instantiated by countries that allow citizenship by investment).18
15. While providing an exhaustive account of all academic perspectives
    is neither feasible nor necessary for the current discussion, it is
    evident that various policy reasons inform the selection of one
    citizenship pattern over another. There is no single policy that
    universally dictates the framing of citizenship laws; rather, diverse
    considerations, including historical, cultural, economic, and political
    factors, influence the formulation of citizenship regimes.19 Even


14   Kangni Kpodar, Citizenship and Growth,               IMF   eLibrary,   https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/
     journals/022/0056/001/article-A014-en.xml.
15   Id.
16   James Brown Scott, Nationality: Jus Soli or Jus Sanguinis, American Journal of International Law, 1930,
     24(1), 60.
17   This is particularly demonstrated by European states like the United Kingdom as discussed earlier,
     which, due to its historical ties extends citizenship to some individuals from Commonwealth countries.
18   Acquisition of citizenship - aġenzija komunità malta, https://komunita.gov.mt/en/services/acquisition-of-
     citizenship/.
19   David Fitzgerald, Nationality and Migration in Modern Mexico, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies,
     2005, 31(1), 172.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                                   1007

                   In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       though a uniform citizenship policy across the world could eliminate
       statelessness and multiple citizenships, the varying basis of granting
       citizenship is unavoidable because each country has its own unique
       policy considerations and political milieu. Since there is no single
       universally suitable model, no mode of granting citizenship can be
       called an aberration or an anomaly. Citizenship is purely a creation
       of law, which, in turn, is an instrument of policy based on different
       prevailing circumstances of each country. While some nations insist
       on connections in terms of descent and territory, some even grant
       citizenship for purely economic reasons.20
16. Further, since the policy reasons underlying a citizenship regime
    are bound to remain in flux, constitutions around the globe
    are wary of setting citizenship norms in stone. For instance, a
    country’s demographic pattern might change, it might want to effect
    inter-state arrangements, it might be engaged in a war, there could
    be international treaties granting rights to certain classes of people,
    etc. Therefore, rather than imposing rigid norms on citizenship, it is
    desirable for constitutions to grant the government the flexibility to
    determine laws regarding membership in the country’s community.
    For this, either the constitutions such as the Australian Constitution,
    remain silent on the conditions of acquiring citizenship, or they
    prescribe the overarching norms for the time being and give the
    power to make and change specific conditions to the Parliament.21

       Citizenship under the Constitution of India
17. In India, the approach of prescribing wide-ranging norms for
    citizenship was adopted at the commencement of the Constitution.
    Since the country was required to have norms for determining who
    could be a member of its community, the Constitution prescribed
    certain transitional conditions within Part II and made them subject to
    any laws that Parliament may make later.22 Prescribing such norms
    in the Constitution was all the more critical because the country had
    undergone two significant changes: first, there had been a complete



20   Citizenship by Investment Countries & Programs List in 2024, Global Residence Index, https://
     globalresidenceindex.com/citizenship-by-investment/.
21   Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil, Article 22; Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik, Article
     18; Constitution of Kenya, Article 18.
22   Constitution of India, Article 11.
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     metamorphosis from a ruled territory to an independent nation;
     and second, there was the partition of the country, and some of its
     territories that were hitherto a part of it were declared a separate
     nation. After the creation of an independent India and the demarcation
     of its territory being complete, the next logical question of who an
     Indian was, emerged. Since the Parliament itself was nascent, the
     Constituent Assembly chose to incorporate transitionary norms of
     citizenship in the Constitution itself, instead of keeping the question
     of who an Indian was unsettled till later.
18. In this context, the Constitution came to incorporate the provisions now
    enshrined in Part II of the Constitution. Articles 5 to 10 prescribed the
    overarching norms of citizenship at the time of the commencement
    of the Constitution, while Article 11 granted Parliament the power to
    make any law regarding citizenship.
19. Hence, the scheme of citizenship provided under the Constitution
    comprises broadly of the following provisions:
          “5. Citizenship at the commencement of the
          Constitution —
          At the commencement of this Constitution, every person
          who has his domicile in the territory of India and—
          (a)   who was born in the territory of India; or
          (b)   either of whose parents was born in the territory of
                India; or
          (c)   who has been ordinarily resident in the territory
                of India for not less than five years immediately
                preceding such commencement, shall be a citizen
                of India.”
          “6. Rights of citizenship of certain persons who have
          migrated to India from Pakistan —
          Notwithstanding anything in article 5, a person who has
          migrated to the territory of India from the territory now
          included in Pakistan shall be deemed to be a citizen of
          India at the commencement of this Constitution if—
          (a) he or either of his parents or any of his grand-parents
          was born in India as defined in the Government of India
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                         1009

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


          Act, 1935 (as originally enacted); and
          (b)(i) in the case where such person has so migrated
          before the nineteenth day of July, 1948, he has been
          ordinarily resident in the territory of India since the date
          of his migration, or
          (ii) in the case where such person has so migrated on
          or after the nineteenth day of July, 1948, he has been
          registered as a citizen of India by an officer appointed in
          that behalf by the Government of the Dominion of India on
          an application made by him therefor to such officer before
          the commencement of this Constitution in the form and
          manner prescribed by that Government: Provided that no
          person shall be so registered unless he has been resident
          in the territory of India for at least six months immediately
          preceding the date of his application.”
          “7. Rights of citizenship of certain migrants to
          Pakistan —
          Notwithstanding anything in articles 5 and 6, a person who
          has after the first day of March, 1947, migrated from the
          territory of India to the territory now included in Pakistan
          shall not be deemed to be a citizen of India:
          Provided that nothing in this article shall apply to a person
          who, after having so migrated to the territory now included
          in Pakistan, has returned to the territory of India under a
          permit for resettlement or permanent return issued by or
          under the authority of any law and every such person shall
          for the purposes of clause (b) of article 6 be deemed to
          have migrated to the territory of India after the nineteenth
          day of July, 1948.”
          “8. Rights of citizenship of certain persons of Indian
          origin residing outside India —
          Notwithstanding anything in article 5, any person who or
          either of whose parents or any of whose grand-parents
          was born in India as defined in the Government of India
          Act, 1935 (as originally enacted), and who is ordinarily
          residing in any country outside India as so defined
          shall be deemed to be a citizen of India if he has been
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         registered as a citizen of India by the diplomatic or consular
         representative of India in the country where he is for the
         time being residing on an application made by him therefor
         to such diplomatic or consular representative, whether
         before or after the commencement of this Constitution, in
         the form and manner prescribed by the Government of the
         Dominion of India or the Government of India.”
         “9. Persons voluntarily acquiring citizenship of a
         foreign State not to be citizens —
         No person shall be a citizen of India by virtue of article 5,
         or be deemed to be a citizen of India by virtue of article
         6 or article 8, if he has voluntarily acquired the citizenship
         of any foreign State.”
         “10. Continuance of the rights of citizenship —
         Every person who is or is deemed to be a citizen of India
         under any of the foregoing provisions of this Part shall,
         subject to the provisions of any law that may be made by
         Parliament, continue to be such citizen.”
         “11. Parliament to regulate the right of citizenship by
         law —
         Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this Part shall
         derogate from the power of Parliament to make any
         provision with respect to the acquisition and termination
         of citizenship and all other matters relating to citizenship.”
    Legislative scheme on citizenship
20. Exercising the power granted by Article 11 of the Constitution,
    the Parliament enacted the Citizenship Act, which expanded on
    the conditions prescribed by the aforementioned provisions of the
    Constitution. The key provisions that provided the conditions for
    citizenship under the Act are set out below:
         “3. Citizenship by birth ―
         (1) Except as provided in sub-section (2), every person
         born in India―
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                          1011

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


          (a) on or after the 26th day of January, 1950, but before
          the 1st day of July, 1987;
          (b) on or after the 1st day of July, 1987, but before the
          commencement of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2003
          (6 of 2004) and either of whose parents is a citizen of India
          at the time of his birth;
          (c) on or after the commencement of the Citizenship
          (Amendment) Act, 2003 (6 of 2004), where―
          (i) both of his parents are citizens of India; or
          (ii) one of whose parents is a citizen of India and the other
          is not an illegal migrant at the time of his birth, shall be a
          citizen of India by birth.
          (2) A person shall not be a citizen of India by virtue of this
          section if at the time of his birth―
          (a) either his father or mother possesses such immunity
          from suits and legal process as is accorded to an envoy
          of a foreign sovereign power accredited to the President of
          India and he or she, as the case may be, is not a citizen
          of India; or
          (b) his father or mother is an enemy alien and the birth
          occurs in a place then under occupation by the enemy.”
          “4. Citizenship by descent ―
          (1) A person born outside India shall be a citizen of India
          by descent, ―
          (a) on or after the 26th day of January, 1950, but before
          the 10th day of December, 1992, if his father is a citizen
          of India at the time of his birth; or
          (b) on or after the 10th day of December, 1992, if either
          of his parents is a citizen of India at the time of his birth:
          Provided that if the father of a person referred to in clause
          (a) was a citizen of India by descent only, that person shall
          not be a citizen of India by virtue of this section unless―
          (a) his birth is registered at an Indian consulate within one
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        year of its occurrence or the commencement of this Act,
        whichever is later, or, with the permission of the Central
        Government, after the expiry of the said period; or
        (b) his father is, at the time of his birth, in service under
        a Government in India:
        Provided further that if either of the parents of a person
        referred to in clause (b) was a citizen of India
        by descent only, that person shall not be a citizen of India
        by virtue of this section, unless―
        (a) his birth is registered at an Indian consulate within
        one year of its occurrence or on or after the 10th day of
        December, 1992, whichever is later, or, with the permission
        of the Central Government, after the expiry of the said
        period; or
        (b) either of his parents is, at the time of his birth, in service
        under a Government in India:
        Provided also that on or after the commencement of the
        Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2003 (6 of 2004), a person
        shall not be a citizen of India by virtue of this section,
        unless his birth is registered at an Indian consulate in
        such form and in such manner, as may be prescribed, ―
        (i) within one year of its occurrence or the commencement
        of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2003(6 of 2004),
        whichever is later; or
        (ii) with the permission of the Central Government, after
        the expiry of the said period:
        Provided also that no such birth shall be registered unless
        the parents of such person declare, in such form and in
        such manner as may be prescribed, that the minor does
        not hold the passport of another country.
        (1A) A minor who is a citizen of India by virtue of this
        section and is also a citizen of any other country shall
        cease to be a citizen of India if he does not renounce
        the citizenship or nationality of another country within six
        months of attaining full age.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                        1013

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


          (2) If the Central Government so directs, a birth shall be
          deemed for the purposes of this section to have been
          registered with its permission, notwithstanding that its
          permission was not obtained before the registration.
          (3) For the purposes of the proviso to sub-section (1),
          any person born outside undivided India who was, or was
          deemed to be, a citizen of India at the commencement of
          the Constitution shall be deemed to be a citizen of India
          by descent only.”
          “5. Citizenship by registration ―
          (1) Subject to the provisions of this section and such other
          conditions and restrictions as may be prescribed, the
          Central Government may, on an application made in this
          behalf, register as a citizen of India any person not being
          an illegal migrant who is not already such citizen by virtue
          of the Constitution or of any other provision of this Act if
          he belongs to any of the following categories, namely: ―
          (a) a person of Indian origin who is ordinarily resident in
          India for seven years before making an application for
          registration;
          (b) a person of Indian origin who is ordinarily resident in
          any country or place outside undivided India;
          (c) a person who is married to a citizen of India and is
          ordinarily resident in India for seven years before making
          an application for registration;
          (d) minor children of persons who are citizens of India;
          (e) a person of full age and capacity whose parents are
          registered as citizens of India under clause (a) of this
          sub-section or sub-section (1) of section 6;
          (f) a person of full age and capacity who, or either of his
          parents, was earlier citizen of independent India, and is
          ordinarily resident in India for twelve months immediately
          before making an application for registration;
          (g) a person of full age and capacity who has been
          registered as an Overseas Citizen of India Cardholder for
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        five years, and who is ordinarily resident in India for twelve
        months before making an application for registration.
        Explanation 1.―For the purposes of clauses (a) and (c),
        an applicant shall be deemed to be ordinarily resident in
        India if―
        (i) he has resided in India throughout the period of twelve
        months immediately before making an application for
        registration; and
        (ii) he has resided in India during the eight years
        immediately preceding the said period of twelve months
        for a period of not less than six years.
        Explanation 2.―For the purposes of this sub-section, a
        person shall be deemed to be of Indian origin if he, or
        either of his parents, was born in undivided India or in
        such other territory which became part of India after the
        15th day of August, 1947.
        (1A) The Central Government, if it is satisfied that special
        circumstances exist, may after recording the circumstances
        in writing, relax the period of twelve months, specified
        in clauses (f) and (g) and clause (i) of Explanation 1 of
        sub-section (1), up to a maximum of thirty days which may
        be in different breaks.
        (2) No person being of full age shall be registered as a citizen
        of India under sub-section (1) until he has taken the oath
        of allegiance in the form specified in the Second Schedule.
        (3) No person who has renounced, or has been deprived
        of, his Indian citizenship or whose Indian citizenship has
        terminated, under this Act shall be registered as a citizen
        of India under sub-section (1) except by order of the
        Central Government.
        (4) The Central Government may, if satisfied that there are
        special circumstances justifying such registration, cause
        any minor to be registered as a citizen of India.
        (5) A person registered under this section shall be a citizen
        of India by registration as from the date on which he is so
        registered; and a person registered under the provisions
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                             1015

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


          of clause (b)(ii) of article 6 or article 8 of the Constitution
          shall be deemed to be a citizen of India by registration as
          from the commencement of the Constitution or the date
          on which he was so registered, whichever may be later.
          (6) If the Central Government is satisfied that circumstances
          exist which render it necessary to grant exemption from
          the residential requirement under clause (c) of sub-section
          (1) to any person or a class of persons, it may, for reasons
          to be recorded in writing, grant such exemption.”
          “6. Citizenship by naturalization ―
          (1) Where an application is made in the prescribed
          manner by any person of full age and capacity 3[not
          being an illegal migrant] for the grant of a certificate of
          naturalisation to him, the Central Government may, if
          satisfied that the applicant is qualified for naturalisation
          under the provisions of the Third Schedule, grant to him
          a certificate of naturalisation:
          Provided that, if in the opinion of the Central Government,
          the applicant is a person who has rendered distinguished
          service to the cause of science, philosophy, art, literature,
          world peace or human progress generally, it may waive all
          or any of the conditions specified in the Third Schedule.
          (2) The person to whom a certificate of naturalisation is
          granted under sub-section (1) shall, on taking the oath of
          allegiance in the form specified in the Second Schedule,
          be a citizen of India by naturalisation as from the date on
          which that certificate is granted.”
          “7. Citizenship by incorporation of territory ―If any
          territory becomes a part of India, the Central Government
          may, by order notified in the Official Gazette, specify the
          persons who shall be citizens of India by reason of their
          connection with that territory; and those persons shall be
          citizens of India as from the date to be specified in the order.”
21. To understand the interplay of the norms prescribed by Part II of
    the Constitution and the provisions of the Citizenship Act, a brief
    overview of the different conditions is set out in the table below:
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         Condition         Condition on           Condition      Condition of          Other            Ref.
          on birth          residence            on descent      registration        conditions

                                         Citizenship by Birth (Jus Soli)

        ƒ Born before Had domicile                     -                 -         Is not barred       Article
          26.01.1950. in India at the                                              by Article 7.23      5(a)
                      commencement of
        ƒ Born in     the Constitution.
          India.
        ƒ Born on/                 -            Parents                  -                 -          Section
          after                                 must not                                              3(1)(a)
          26.01.1950                            be covered
          but before                            by Section
          01.07.1987.                           3(2).24

        ƒ Born in
          India.
        ƒ Born on/                 -            ƒ Either                 -                 -          Section
          after                                   parent is                                           3(1)(b)
          01.07.1987                              a citizen
          but before                              of India at
          03.12.2004.25                           the time of
                                                  birth.
        ƒ Born in
          India.                                ƒ Parents
                                                  must not
                                                  be covered
                                                  by Section
                                                  3(2).
        ƒ Born on/                              ƒ Both                                                Section
          after                                   parents are                                         3(1)(c)
          03.12.2004.                             citizens of
                                                  India, or
        ƒ Born in                                 one parent
          India.                                  was a
                                                  citizen of
                                                  India, and
                                                  the other
                                                  was not
                                                  an illegal
                                                  immigrant
                                                  at the time
                                                  of birth.



23   Article 7 bars citizenship if a person has re-migrated to India from Pakistan without permit for resettlement
     or permanent return.
24   Section 3(2) applies if either parent possesses immunity like foreign envoy and is not a citizen of India/
     Either parent is an enemy alien and person was born at enemy territory.
25   The condition is before commencement of Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2003, which came into force on
     03.12.2004, https://egazette.gov.in/WriteReadData/2004/E_1031_2011_005.pdf.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                          1017

                 In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955



                           -         ƒ Parents               -                 -
                                       must not
                                       be covered
                                       by Section
                                       3(2).

                            Citizenship by descent (Jus Sanguinis)

     ƒ Born before Had domicile      Either parent           -           Is not barred   Article
       26.01.1950. in India at the   was born in                         by Article 7.    5(b)
                   commencement of India.
     ƒ Born        the Constitution.
       outside
       India.


     ƒ Born on/            -         Father was       Registration             -         Section
       after                         a citizen of     with the Indian                     4(a)
       26.01.1950                    India at the     consulate is
       but before                    time of birth.   required if
       10.12.1992.                                    the father is a
                                                      citizen of India
     ƒ Born                                           by descent
       outside                                        only and
       India.                                         was not in
                                                      service of the
                                                      government of
                                                      India.


     ƒ Born on/            -         Either parent Registration                -         Section
       after                         was a citizen with the Indian                        4(b)
       10.12.1992                    of India at   consulate is
       but before                    the time of   required if
       03.12.2004.                   birth.        either parent
                                                   is a citizen
     ƒ Born                                        of India by
       outside                                     descent only
       India.                                      and was not in
                                                   service of the
                                                   government of
                                                   India.

     ƒ Born on/            -         Either parent Compulsory            The parents     Section
       after                         was a citizen registration is       shall declare    4(b)
       03.12.2004.                   of India at   required with         that the
                                     the time of   the Indian            minor does
     ƒ Born                          birth.        consulate.            not possess
       outside                                                           a passport
       India.                                                            of another
                                                                         country.
1018                                                                               [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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                                          Citizenship by registration
              -         Is ordinarily         Person/         Compulsory               -          Article
                        residing outside      Either          registration                         8 and
                        India (India as       parent/Any      with                                Section
                        defined in Govt.      grandparent     diplomatic/                           5(5)
                        of India Act,         was born in     consular
                        1935, hereinafter     Undivided       representative
                        “Undivided India”)    India.          of India.
              -         Ordinary resident26 Person/          Must be           ƒ Person           Section
                        in India for seven Either parent compulsorily            who is not       5(1)(a)
                        years before        was born in      registered.         a minor           and
                        making the          Undivided                            must take        Section
                        application for     India or                             the oath of       5(2)
                        registration.       territories that                     allegiance.
                                            became part
                                                                               ƒ Person
                                            of India after
                                                                                 must not be
                                            independence.
                                                                                 an illegal
                                                                                 immigrant
        -                                     -               Must be          ƒ Spouse           Section
                                                              compulsorily       must be a        5(1)(c)
                                                              registered.        citizen of        and
                                                                                 India.           Section
                                                                                                   5(2)
                                                                               ƒ Person
                                                                                 who is not
                                                                                 a minor
                                                                                 must take
                                                                                 the oath of
                                                                                 allegiance.

                                                                               ƒ Person
                                                                                 must not be
                                                                                 an illegal
                                                                                 immigrant
                        Ordinary residents Person/            Must be          ƒ Person           Section
                        outside Undivided Either parent       compulsorily       who is not       5(1)(b)
                        India or           was born in        registered.        a minor           and
                                           Undivided                             must take        Section
                                           India or                              the oath of       5(2)
                                                                                 allegiance.




26   Here specifically, ordinary resident means a person who:
     (i) has resided in India throughout the period of twelve months immediately before making an application
     for registration; and
     (ii) has resided in India during the eight years immediately preceding the said period of twelve months
     for a period of not less than six years.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                                         1019

                   In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955



               -        territories that        territories that                   ƒ Person
                        became part             became part                          must not be
                        of India after          of India after                       an illegal
                        independence.           independence.                        immigrant.

               -                   -            Parents are        Must be         ƒ Person           Section
                                                citizens of        compulsorily      must be a        5(1)(d)
                                                India.             registered.       minor child.

                                                                                   ƒ Person
                                                                                     must not be
                                                                                     an illegal
                                                                                     immigrant


               -                   -            Parents are Must be                ƒ Person           Section
                                                registered     compulsorily          must be of       5(1)(e)
                                                under S.       registered.           full age and      and
                                                5(1)(a) or                           capacity27       Section
                                                naturalised                                            5(2)
                                                                                   ƒ Person
                                                under S. 6
                                                                                     must take
                                                as citizens of
                                                                                     the oath of
                                                India.
                                                                                     allegiance

                                                                                   ƒ Person
                                                                                     must not be
                                                                                     an illegal
                                                                                     immigrant


                        Ordinary resident       Person/      Must be               ƒ Person must      Section
                        in India for 12         either of    compulsorily            be of full       5(1)(f)
                        months before           the parents registered.              age and           and
                        making an               was earlier                          capacity.        Section
                        application for         a citizen of                                           5(2)
                                                                                   ƒ Person
                        registration.           independent
                                                                                     must take
                                                India.
                                                                                     the oath of
                                                                                     allegiance.

                                                                                   ƒ Person
                                                                                     must not be
                                                                                     an illegal
                                                                                     immigrant




27   As per Section 2(4): “a person shall be deemed to be of full age if he is not a minor and of full capacity if
     he is not of unsound mind.”
1020                                                               [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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        -                             -       Must be          ƒ Person           Section
                                              compulsorily       must be          5(1)(g)
        -                                                        registered as
                                              registered.                          and
                                                                 an Overseas      Section
                                                                 Citizen           5(2)
                                                                 of India
                                                                 Cardholder
                                                                 for five
                                                                 years.

                                                               ƒ Person must
                                                                 be of full age
                                                                 and capacity

                                                               ƒ Person
                                                                 must take
                                                                 the oath of
                                                                 allegiance

                                                               ƒ Person
                                                                 must not be
                                                                 an illegal
                                                                 immigrant

                            Citizenship by naturalization

        -   ƒ Had domicile            -              -         Is not barred       Article
              in the territory                                 by Article 7.        5(c)
              of India at the
              commencement
              of the
              Constitution.

            ƒ Was ordinarily
              residing in India
              for at least five
              years before the
              commencement
              of the
              Constitution.


            ƒ Was residing            -       Must apply to    ƒ Is of full age    Section
              in India/was in                 the govt. for      and capacity     6(1) and
              service of the                  getting the                           Third
                                                               ƒ Is not an
              government of                   certificate of                      Schedule
                                                                 illegal
              India/both for                  naturalisation
                                                                 immigrant
              twelve months
              before making                                    ƒ Takes oath
              the application.                                   of allegiance
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                   1021

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955



     -           ƒ During the 14     -                           ƒ Is of a good
                   years preceding                                 character
                   the 12 months                                   and
                   mentioned                                       adequately
                   above, the                                      knows
                   person has                                      languages
                   resided in India/                               specified in
                   has been in the                                 the Eighth
                   service of the                                  Schedule
                   government for                                ƒ Is not a
                   an aggregate of                                 subject/
                   11 years.                                       citizen of
                 ƒ After getting                                   a country
                   citizenship,                                    where Indian
                   intends to                                      citizens are
                   reside in India/                                barred from
                   work with the                                   becoming
                   government                                      subjects/
                   of India or an                                  citizens
                   international                                 ƒ Person
                   organization of                                 undertakes
                   which India is                                  to renounce
                   a member or a                                   previous
                   society/company/                                citizenship
                   body of persons                                 if Indian
                   established in                                  citizenship is
                   India.                                          granted.
                          Citizenship by incorporation of territory
     -                    -           -                 -        ƒ The person Section 7
                                                                   must be
                                                                   connected to
                                                                   the territory
                                                                   that is
                                                                   incorporated
                                                                   in India and
                                                                   is extended
                                                                   Indian
                                                                   citizenship
                                                                   by the
                                                                   Government
                                                                   of India.
                                                                 ƒ The person
                                                                   must
                                                                   fulfil the
                                                                   conditions
                                                                   prescribed
                                                                   by the
                                                                   governmental
                                                                   order
                                                                   granting
                                                                   citizenship.
1022                                                                                 [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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22. Apart from these general norms, the Constitution also prescribed
    citizenship norms for immigrants to and from Pakistan. For this,
    Article 6 provided citizenship to people who migrated from Pakistan
    if: (i) such person/either of their parents/ grand-parents were born
    in undivided India; (ii) if such person was an ordinary resident since
    the date of their migration; and (iii) such person was registered
    as a citizen of India if such migration was after 19.07.1948. As a
    corollary, Article 7 prohibited citizenship to people who migrated
    from India to Pakistan after 01.03.1947 and then sought citizenship
    after re-migrating to India, unless they came back under a permit
    for resettlement or permanent return. Similar to these provisions is
    Section 6A, which provides a framework addressing the conferment
    of citizenship to migrants entering the State of Assam based on
    their date of entry.28
23. Section 6A, which is presently under challenge, was inserted into the
    Citizenship Act, via Act 65 of 1985 and came into force with effect
    from 07.12.1985. This provision created special conditions for the
    citizenship of migrants who entered into Assam in accordance with
    certain cut-off dates. As per the provision, first, those who entered
    Assam from Bangladesh prior to 01.01.1966 were deemed to be
    Indian citizens, and second, those who entered into Assam between
    the period of 01.01.1966 and 25.03.1971 were conferred citizenship
    based on the fulfilment of specific procedures and conditions. Those
    who entered Assam after 25.03.1971 have been denied citizenship
    by implication.
24. To analyze this provision comprehensively, it is imperative to go
    through Section 6A and the language it employs. Section 6A, as it
    was added in 1985 to the Citizenship Act reads as follows:
              “6A. Special provisions as to citizenship of persons
              covered by the Assam Accord –
              (1) For the purposes of this section


28   We are also apprised of the fact that Parliament has promulgated the Citizenship (Amendment)
     Act, 2019, and more recently on 11.03.2024 the Government of India has notified the Citizenship
     (Amendment) Rules, 2024. However, we are not dealing with these provisions given that neither of the
     parties relied upon these provisions over the course of the proceedings before us. Additionally, some of
     these provisions had not yet been notified as of the date of reserving these judgments. In any case, these
     provisions are not germane to the controversy at hand, and a challenge to these amendments is already
     sub-judice before another bench of this Court.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                          1023

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


          (a) “Assam” means the territories included in the State
          of Assam immediately before the commencement of the
          Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 1985;
          (b) “detected to be a foreigner” means detected to be
          a foreigner in accordance with the provisions of the
          Foreigners Act, 1946 (31 of 1946) and the Foreigners
          (Tribunals) Order, 1964 by a Tribunal constituted under
          the said Order;
          (c) “specified territory” means the territories included in
          Bangladesh immediately before the commencement of
          the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 1985;
          (d) a person shall be deemed to be Indian origin, if he, or
          either of his parents or any of his grandparents was born
          in undivided India;
          (e) a person shall be deemed to have been detected to
          be a foreigner on the date on which a Tribunal constituted
          under the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 submits its
          opinion to the effect that he is a foreigner to the officer or
          authority concerned.
          (2) Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (6) and (7),
          all persons of Indian origin who came before the 1st day
          of January, 1966 to Assam from the specified territory
          (including such of those whose names were included in
          the electoral rolls used for the purposes of the General
          Election to the House of the People held in 1967) and who
          have been ordinarily resident in Assam since the dates of
          their entry into Assam shall be deemed to be citizens of
          India as from the 1st day of January, 1966.
          (3) Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (6) and (7),
          every person of Indian origin who―
          (a) came to Assam on or after the 1st day of January,
          1966 but before the 25th day of March, 1971 from the
          specified territory; and
          (b) has, since the date of his entry into Assam, been
          ordinarily resident in Assam; and
1024                                                      [2024] 10 S.C.R.

                   Digital Supreme Court Reports


        (c) has been detected to be a foreigner;
        shall register himself in accordance with the rules made
        by the Central Government in this behalf under section 18
        with such authority (hereafter in this sub-section referred
        to as the registering authority) as may be specified in
        such rules and if his name is included in any electoral roll
        for any Assembly or Parliamentary constituency in force
        on the date of such detection, his name shall be deleted
        therefrom.
        Explanation ― In the case of every person seeking
        registration under this sub-section, the opinion of the
        Tribunal constituted under the Foreigners (Tribunals)
        Order, 1964 holding such person to be a foreigner, shall
        be deemed to be sufficient proof of the requirement under
        clause (c) of this sub-section and if any question arises as to
        whether such person complies with any other requirement
        under this sub-section, the registering authority shall, ―
        (i) if such opinion contains a finding with respect to such
        other requirement, decide the question in conformity with
        such finding;
        (ii) if such opinion does not contain a finding with respect
        to such other requirement, refer the question to a Tribunal
        constituted under the said Order hang jurisdiction in
        accordance with such rules as the Central Government
        may make in this behalf under section 18 and decide the
        question in conformity with the opinion received on such
        reference.
        (4) A person registered under sub-section (3) shall have,
        as from the date on which he has been detected to be a
        foreigner and till the expiry of a period of ten years from
        that date, the same rights and obligations as a citizen
        of India (including the right to obtain a passport under
        the Passports Act, 1967 and the obligations connected
        therewith), but shall not entitled to have his name included
        in any electoral roll for any Assembly or Parliamentary
        constituency at any time before the expiry of the said
        period of ten years.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                          1025

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


          (5) A person registered under sub-section (3) shall be
          deemed to be a citizen of India for all purposes as from
          the date of expiry of a period of ten years from the date
          on which he has been detected to be a foreigner.
          (6) Without prejudice to the provisions of section 8―
          (a) if any person referred to in sub-section (2) submits in
          the prescribed manner and form and to the prescribed
          authority within sixty days from the date of commencement
          of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 1985, a declaration
          that he does not wish to be a citizen of India, such person
          shall not be deemed to have become a citizen of India
          under that sub-section;
          (b) if any person referred to in sub-section (3) submits in
          the prescribed manner and form and to the prescribed
          authority within sixty days from the date of commencement
          of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 1985, or from the
          date on which he has been detected to be a foreigner,
          whichever is later, a declaration that he does not wish to
          be governed by the provisions of that sub-section and
          sub-sections (4) and (5), it shall not be necessary for such
          person to register himself under sub-section (3).
          Explanation. ― Where a person required to file a declaration
          under this sub-section does not have the capacity to enter
          into a contract, such declaration may be filed on his behalf
          by any person competent under the law for the time being
          in force to act on his behalf.
          (7) Nothing in sub-sections (2) to (6) shall apply in relation
          to any person―
          (a) who, immediately before the commencement of the
          Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 1985, is a citizen of India;
          (b) who was expelled from India before the commencement
          of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 1985, under the
          Foreigners Act, 1946.
          (8) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this section, the
          provisions of this section shall have effect notwithstanding
          anything contained in any other law for the time being in
          force.”
1026                                                                         [2024] 10 S.C.R.

                           Digital Supreme Court Reports


25. A preliminary perusal of this provision and its associated rules
    contained in the Citizenship Rules, 2009, indicate various timelines
    and effects, resulting in the conferment of differing degrees of rights
    and obligations to immigrants entering into the State of Assam. These
    aspects are delineated below in a tabular format for greater ease of
    understanding. This tabular presentation aims to provide a structured
    overview of the different elements pertaining to immigrant entry into
    Assam, thereby aiding comprehension of the nuances involved.
             Right granted                   Conditions                Procedure established
                                  Immigrants before 01.01.1966
                                   Condition of birth or
                                   descent
                                   ƒ    As per sub-section (2),
                                        the deemed citizens
                                        are those persons who
                                        came to Assam before
                                        01.01.1966, along with
                                        those who were included
                                        in the electoral rolls in
                                        1967 and had to have
                                        been persons of ‘Indian
        Sub-section (2) grants          origin.’
                                                                        Since sub-section (2) grants
        deemed citizenship.
                                 ƒ      The term ‘persons of deemed citizenship, it does
        Such immigrants are
                                        Indian origin’ has been not provide for a procedure
        considered citizens from
                                        d e f i n e d u n d e r s u b - for registration.
        01.01.1966
                                        section (1) (d) to mean
                                        that (i) the individual
                                        himself; or (ii) either of
                                        his parents; or (iii) any
                                        of his grandparents were
                                        born in undivided India.
                                   Condition of residence
                                   ƒ    Sub-section (2) requires
                                        these individuals to have
                                        been ordinarily resident
                                        in the State of Assam.
                         Immigrants between 01.01.1966 to 25.03.1971
        Right granted              C o n d i t i o n o f b i r t h o r Procedure for citizenship
                                   descent                             by registration
        Sub-section (3) grants
        citizenship by registration ƒ   In similar parlance with Step 1: Declaration as a
        (the      process        is     sub-section (2), persons foreigner
        summarized in the last          must be of ‘Indian origin’.
        column)
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                                       1027

                  In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955



        ƒ   For the first ten years Condition of residence        ƒ              The very first step under
            after registration,                                                  sub-section (3) is that
                                    ƒ Sub-section (3) also
            persons will have                                                    the individual in question
                                      stipulates that the persons
            the same rights and                                                  should have been
                                      who entered into Assam
            obligations as citizens                                              detected to be a foreigner.
                                      between 01.01.1966 and
            of India except for
                                      25.03.1971 must have ƒ                     The opinion of a Tribunal
            inclusion in any
                                      been ordinarily resident                   constituted under the
            electoral rolls (This
                            29
                                      in Assam.                                  Foreigners (Tribunals)
            also includes the right
                                                                                 O r d e r, 1 9 6 4 , w o u l d
            to obtain a passport). Condition of detection
                                                                                 be sufficient proof to
        ƒ   Upon the expiry of ƒ             These individuals should            establish detection as a
            these 10 years from              be detected as foreigners           foreigner.
            the date of detection,           under sub-section (3).
                                                                          Step 2: Registration
            these individuals will
            be deemed to be ƒ              The term ‘detected to
                                                                          ƒ T h e r e a f t e r, p e r s o n s
            Indian citizens.               be a foreigner ’ has
                                                                             can register themselves
                                           been defined to be
                                                                             through Form XVIII
                                           read in accordance with
                                                                             in Schedule I to the
                                           the provisions of the
                                                                             Citizenship Rules, 2009,
                                           Foreigners Act, 1946
                                                                             with the registering
                                           and the Foreigners
                                                                             authority of the
                                           (Tribunals) Order, 1964
                                                                             concerned district within
                                           t h r o u g h a Tr i b u n a l
                                                                             30 days from the date of
                                           constituted under the
                                                                             detection or 30 days from
                                           said Order.
                                                                             the appointment of such
                                         Condition of registration           registering authority.

                                         ƒ   After being detected ƒ              The registering authority
                                             to be a foreigner, such             may also, for reasons
                                             persons should also                 recorded in writing,
                                             register themselves                 extend the period of 30
                                             (procedure summarized               days up to 60 days.30
                                             in the next column)
                                                                     ƒ           Additionally, a person
                                                                                 who has been declared
                                                                                 as a foreigner by the
                                                                                 Foreigners Tribunal prior
                                                                                 to 16.07.2013 and who
                                                                                 has not yet registered due
                                                                                 to non-receipt of the order
                                                                                 of the Foreigners Tribunal




29   Citizenship Act, 1955, Section 6A(4).
30   Rule 19, Citizenship Rules, 2009.
1028                                                                           [2024] 10 S.C.R.

                             Digital Supreme Court Reports



                                                                           or on account of refusal by
                                                                           the registering authority
                                                                           may within thirty days
                                                                           from the date of receipt
                                                                           of such order or, from
                                                                           the date of publication
                                                                           of the notification dated
                                                                           16.07.2013, make an
                                                                           application for registration
                                                                           vide Form XVIII to the
                                                                           registering authority of
                                                                           the concerned district.31
                                   Immigrants on or after 25.03.1971
        Section 6A does not              Section 6A does not            Concomitantly, Section 6A
        prescribe the start date         prescribe any conditions in    does not prescribe any
        for the conferment of            this regard. By implication,   procedure as it intends to
        citizenship to these             the provision declares the     deny citizenship to those
        individuals beyond the           entry of an immigrant after    immigrants who entered
        date of 25.03.1971.              25.03.1971 as illegal.         after 25.03.1971.


      (i)     Sub-section (6) allows immigrants to opt-out of being conferred
              Indian citizenship. Under sub-section (6)(a), deemed citizens
              are granted the option of declaring that they do not wish
              to be a citizen of India. If they choose to declare so, they
              will thereafter not be deemed to be Indian citizens under
              sub-section (6)(a). Further, under sub-section 6(b), individuals
              detected as foreigners can choose not to register themselves
              in accordance with the procedure laid down in sub-section (3).
              Consequently, these individuals will not be conferred citizenship.
              The persons who choose to renunciate their citizenship under
              sub-section (6) must declare the same vide Form XXI to the
              concerned District Magistrate of the area where such a person
              is ordinarily resident.32 This Form XXI is provided in Schedule
              I of the Citizenship Rules, 2009.
      (ii)    Sub-section (7) provides that Section 6A would not apply to
              persons who were Indian citizens prior to the commencement
              of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 1985 or, on the contrary,
              to persons who were expelled from India prior to the
              commencement of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 1985
              under the Foreigners Act, 1946.


31   Rule 2A, Citizenship (Amendment) Rules, 2013.
32   Rule 22, Citizenship Rules, 2009.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                  1029

                    In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


      (iii) Lastly, sub-section (8) is the non-obstante clause in this
            provision, which states that this section would have effect
            irrespective of anything contained in any other law for the time
            being in force.
27. Having understood the interplay between the modes of citizenship,
    as conferred by the Indian Constitution, the Citizenship Act and the
    provision of Section 6A itself, we will now examine the genesis of
    this controversy, the contentions put forth by the parties and the key
    issues that demand scrutiny.

      B.      TERMS OF REFERENCE
28. The first writ petition before this court in the present matter was
    filed in 2009 by Assam Public Works, an NGO, seeking the deletion
    of illegal migrants from electoral rolls in Assam and the updation
    of the National Register of Citizens (NRC), 1951. Thereafter, in
    2012, the Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha and other organisations
    challenged the constitutionality of Section 6A on the grounds that
    it was discriminatory, arbitrary, and illegal. Following this, a 2-judge
    bench of this court started monitoring the NRC updation process.
    This Court, vide judgement dated 17.12.2014 in Assam Sanmilita
    Mahasangha v. Union of India,33 framed 13 questions regarding the
    constitutionality of Section 6A as arising from the abovementioned
    writ petitions and referred them for adjudication by a Constitution
    Bench. For reference, the questions as they were framed are put
    forth hereinbelow:
              "i.     Whether Articles 10 and 11 of the Constitution of India
                      permit the enactment of Section 6A of the Citizenship
                      Act in as much as Section 6A, in prescribing a cut-off
                      date different from the cut-off date prescribed in Article
                      6, can do so without a “variation” of Article 6 itself;
                      regard, in particular, being had to the phraseology
                      of Article 4(2) read with Article 368(1)?
              ii.     Whether Section 6A violates Articles 325 and 326
                      of the Constitution of India in that it has diluted the
                      political rights of the citizens of the State of Assam;


33   Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha v. Union of India (2015) 3 SCC 1, para 33.
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        iii.   What is the scope of the fundamental right contained
               in Article 29(1)? Is the fundamental right absolute in
               its terms? In particular, what is the meaning of the
               expression "culture" and the expression "conserve"?
               Whether Section 6A violates Article 29(1)?
        iv.    Whether Section 6A violates Article 355? What is the
               true interpretation of Article 355 of the Constitution?
               Would an influx of illegal migrants into a State of
               India constitute “external aggression” and/or “internal
               disturbance”? Does the expression “State” occurring
               in this Article refer only to a territorial region or does
               it also include the people living in the State, which
               would include their culture and identity?
        v.     Whether Section 6A violates Article 14 in that, it
               singles out Assam from other border States (which
               comprise a distinct class) and discriminates against
               it. Also, whether there is no rational basis for having
               a separate cut-off date for regularizing illegal migrants
               who enter Assam as opposed to the rest of the
               country; and
        vi.    Whether Section 6A violates Article 21 in that the
               lives and personal liberty of the citizens of Assam
               have been affected adversely by the massive influx
               of illegal migrants from Bangladesh.
        vii.   Whether delay is a factor that can be taken into
               account in moulding relief under a petition filed under
               Article 32 of the Constitution?
        viii. Whether, after a large number of migrants from East
              Pakistan have enjoyed rights as Citizens of India for
              over 40 years, any relief can be given in the petitions
              filed in the present cases?
        ix.    Whether Section 6A violates the basic premise of the
               Constitution and the Citizenship Act in that it permits
               Citizens who have allegedly not lost their Citizenship
               of East Pakistan to become deemed Citizens of India,
               thereby conferring dual Citizenship to such persons?
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                1031

                    In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


              x.      Whether Section 6A violates the fundamental basis
                      of Section 5(1) proviso and Section 5(2) of the
                      Citizenship Act (as it stood in 1985) in that it permits
                      a class of migrants to become deemed Citizens of
                      India without any reciprocity from Bangladesh and
                      without taking the oath of allegiance to the Indian
                      Constitution?
              xi.     Whether the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam)
                      Act, 1950 being a special enactment qua immigrants
                      into Assam, alone can apply to migrants from East
                      Pakistan/Bangladesh to the exclusion of the general
                      Foreigners Act and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order,
                      1964 made thereunder?
              xii.    Whether Section 6A violates the Rule of Law in
                      that it gives way to political expediency and not to
                      Government according to law?
              xiii. Whether Section 6A violates fundamental rights in
                    that no mechanism is provided to determine which
                    persons are ordinarily resident in Assam since the
                    dates of their entry into Assam, thus granting deemed
                    citizenship to such persons arbitrarily?”
29. An application was then moved seeking this Court’s directions
    regarding the children who had been excluded from the final NRC
    list despite their parents having been included. Vide order dated
    06.01.2020, this Court noted the then Attorney General’s assurance
    that such children would not be separated from their parents and
    would not be sent to detention centers in Assam.34 In this context,
    it is also relevant to note that the final draft of the NRC list was
    published on 30.07.2018, whereby over 40 lakh persons out of 3.29
    crore applicants stood excluded. The final NRC list was published
    on 13.08.2019, whereby over 19 lakh persons out of 3.29 crore
    applicants stood excluded.
30. This Court, vide order dated 10.01.2023, viewed that the one main
    issue that arises for consideration is - “Whether Section 6A of


34   Re: Section 6A of the Citizenship Act 1955, W.P (C) No. 274/2009.
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     the Citizenship Act, 1955 suffers from any constitutional infirmity.”
     Subsequently, vide order dated 20.09.2023, the present matter was
     titled ‘In Re: Section 6A of the Citizenship Act 1955’.
31. We now turn to the submissions made by the parties in support of
    their respective stance on the matter.
     C.     CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
     Petitioners’ submissions
32. Mr. Shyam Divan, Mr. Vijay Hansaria and Mr. K.N. Choudhury, Learned
    Senior Advocates, appeared for the Petitioners. Their contentions
    are detailed hereinbelow:
     i.     The Petitioners argued that the operation of Section 6A violates
            the preambular values enshrined in the Constitution. They
            urged that the Constitution upholds national fraternity, not global
            fraternity and that the presence of Bangladeshi immigrants in
            Assam poses a threat to the unity and integrity of the country.
     ii.    They contended that Section 6A, which grants citizenship to
            immigrants, contradicts Articles 6 and 7 of the Constitution,
            which prescribe a different regime for granting citizenship to
            people who migrated to Pakistan or who migrated to India from
            Pakistan. Instead, they argued that the Parliament ought to
            have passed a constitutional amendment in this regard. The
            Petitioners also claimed that while Article 11 and Entry 17 of List
            I grant the Parliament the authority to alter these constitutional
            provisions, it does not include the power to override other
            provisions of Part II.
     iii.   The Petitioners further contended that Section 6A violates Article
            9 of the Constitution and Section 9 of the Citizenship Act, as it
            allows dual nationality by not requiring immigrants to renounce
            their previous citizenship.
     iv.    They contended that Section 6A contradicts Section 5(2) of
            the Citizenship Act, which mandates every citizen to take the
            oath of allegiance.
     v.     The Petitioners argued that Section 6A violates Article 14,
            treating equals unequally by applying the provision only to
            Assam without any intelligible differentia. They asserted that
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                          1033

              In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


            this geographical basis lacks justification. The Petitioners
            further urged that Section 6A goes against the principles of
            democracy, federalism, and the rule of law, being susceptible
            to being struck down on grounds of ‘manifest arbitrariness.’
            They also highlighted the lack of rationale in the cut-off dates
            and the absence of a mechanism to determine ‘ordinary
            residence.’
     vi.    The Petitioners claimed that Section 6A infringes on Article 21
            by impinging upon the rights of the indigenous Assamese
            community and violating their right to self-governance under
            Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
            (ICCPR). They contended that the inclusion of an unidentified
            migrant population burdens the country’s natural resources,
            which goes against sustainable development mandated under
            Article 21.
     vii.   The Petitioners further urged that the demographic shift due to
            the influx of migrants from East Pakistan threatens Assamese
            culture and breaches Article 29(1).
     viii. They asserted that Section 6A violates the voting rights of
           the Assamese people under Article 326 and has led to the
           marginalisation of their political rights.
     ix.    The Petitioners contended the violation of Article 355 on the
            ground that the continued presence of millions of Bangladeshi
            immigrants has precipitated violent ethnic clashes amounting to
            ‘external aggression’ and resulting in ‘internal disturbance’. They
            argued that, consequently, it becomes the duty of the Union to
            undertake necessary measures to protect the state of Assam.
     x.     The Petitioners also argued that the Immigrants (Expulsion
            from Assam) Act, 1950 applies exclusively to the immigrants
            in Assam.
     xi.    The Petitioners finally asserted that the writ petitions remain
            maintainable and should not be dismissed on the basis of
            delay. They contended that Section 6A can still be invoked
            and, therefore, constitutes a continuous wrong, providing a
            fresh cause of action. They argued against the application of
            the doctrine of laches, emphasizing that substantial questions
            of law are at the core of this case.
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     Respondents’ submissions
33. Mr. R. Venkataramani, learned Attorney General, Mr. Tushar Mehta,
    Learned Solicitor General, Mr. Kapil Sibal, Ms. Indira Jaising,
    Mr. Sanjay Hegde, Ms. Malvika Trivedi, Mr. P.V. Surendranath Learned
    Senior Counsel, Mr. Shadan Farasat, Dr. Vivek Sharma, Mr. Mehmood
    Pracha and Mr. Syed Shahi Rizvi appeared for the Respondents.
    Their contentions have also been summarized hereinbelow:
     i.     At the very outset, it is the Respondents’ assertion that this
            Court should refrain from delving any further into the matter
            on account of the issues raised in the context of foreign policy.
            They contend that foreign policy is traditionally excluded from
            the purview of judicial review.
     ii.    The Respondents countered the Petitioners’ claims, emphasizing
            that Section 6A, introduced in 1985, has faced challenge after a
            considerable delay of 27 years, invoking the doctrine of laches
            to argue against the removal of rights established during this
            period. They further urged that even if the damage may be
            construed to be continuing, it does not give a fresh cause of
            action to file the petition after an inordinate delay.
     iii.   Regarding the term fraternity, the Respondents argued that
            it encompasses equal regard among individuals, preventing
            societal division into distinct groups. The Respondents further
            asserted that Section 6A reinforces the idea of fraternity, in
            the absence of which society would be broken into a division
            between ‘others’ and ‘us’.
     iv.    Addressing concerns about Articles 6 and 7, the Respondents
            argued that the cut-off dates align with the permit system and are
            not violative of the Constitution. They asserted that Article 11, in
            conjunction with Entry 17 of List I of the Seventh Schedule, grants
            Parliament the power to legislate on citizenship, superseding
            other provisions in Part II of the Constitution.
     v.     The Respondents contended that Section 5(2)’s provision
            for the oath of allegiance is immaterial to Section 6A and is
            inconsequential.
     vi.    Article 14, according to the Respondents, can only be invoked
            by those seeking benefits for similarly situated individuals,
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                       1035

                 In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


             which the Petitioners do not claim. The Respondents argued
             that a statute cannot be struck down as violative of Article
             14 merely because it does not include all relevant classes,
             as the Parliament can decide the degrees of harm it wants
             to legislate. They further asserted that there is an underlying
             rationale for the cut-off dates and that the objective behind
             Section 6A and the Assam Accord reflects the constitutional
             tradition of accommodating differences through asymmetric
             federal arrangements.
      vii.   The Respondents maintained that Article 21 protects the
             Assamese community and the rights of foreigners affected by
             Section 6A. They argued that the provision is not violative of
             Article 21 as it is a lawfully established procedure.
      viii. Dismissing claims of cultural change, the Respondents
            argued that demographic shifts attributed to Section 6A are
            unrelated, emphasizing Article 29(1)’s endeavour to promote
            multiculturalism rather than cultural exclusivity. They also
            strived to underscore that accepting the Petitioner’s arguments
            would lead to cultural exclusivity, which is not constitutionally
            permissible.
      ix.    Regarding the right to vote, the Respondents countered the
             Petitioners, stating that Section 6A confers citizenship upon
             the immigrants. Therefore, citizenship rights, including voting,
             would naturally flow.
      x.     They further distinguished the decision of Sarbananda
             Sonowal v. Union of India,35 asserting that its ratio was based
             on classification under Article 14, and not Article 355. They
             contended that fulfilling the duty under Article 355 justified
             enacting Section 6A to address ‘internal disturbance’.
      xi.    The Respondents lastly argued for harmonizing domestic
             law with international norms, asserting that the prohibition of
             statelessness is a recognized international norm and rendering
             Section 6A unconstitutional would risk statelessness for the
             immigrants, justifying the provision’s validity.



35   Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India (2005) 5 SCC 665
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     D.    ISSUES
34. Although the reference to this Court is simple, being one of the
    factors in determining the constitutional validity of Section 6A of the
    Citizenship Act, this issue can be broken down into several constituent
    questions for this Court’s determination.
     I.    Prefatory issues
     a.    Does the power of judicial review extend to analysing the
           constitutionality of Section 6A?
     b.    Whether the present petitions are barred by delay and laches?
     II.   Challenges regarding constitutionality
     c.    Does Section 6A offend preambular values like fraternity?
     d.    Is Section 6A ultra vires Part II of the Constitution?
     e.    Does Section 6A create an unreasonable classification which
           violates Article 14?
     f.    Does Section 6A suffer from manifest arbitrariness?
     g.    Does Section 6A violate the rights provided to ‘indigenous’
           communities under Article 29?
     h.    Is Section 6A ultra vires Article 21 of the Constitution?
     i.    Does Section 6A violate the political rights of Indian citizens in
           Assam under Article 326?
     j.    Does the operation of Section 6A cause ‘external aggression’
           and ‘internal disturbance’, culminating in the invocation of
           Article 355?
     k.    Does the Citizenship Act conflict with provisions of the
           Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam Act), 1950? If so, how can
           the two legislations be harmoniously interpreted?
     l.    Does Section 6A violate international laws?

     E.    ANALYSIS
35. Before examining the contentions of the parties on the merits of
    the core issue challenging the constitutional validity of Section 6A,
    it is incumbent first to address the prefatory issues arising from the
    Respondents’ contentions on the maintainability of the present petition.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                       1037

                  In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


                                       Prefatory challenges

      i.      Judicial review
36. At the very outset, the Respondents asserted that this Court should
    refrain from delving further into the matter, as the petition raises
    issues hovering around foreign policy, a domain traditionally excluded
    from the purview of substantive judicial review. Consequently, they
    argued that the Petitioners are barred from challenging Section 6A.
37. The Petitioners, on the other hand, contended that Section 6A
    merely being a provision of the statute, it does not fall beyond the
    purview of judicial review. It is, thus, important for us to discuss
    and demarcate the principles and scope of judicial review in the
    instant case.

      (a)     Concept of judicial review
38. The principle of judicial review finds its roots in common law. It can
    effectively be traced back to Chief Justice Coke’s ruling in Thomas
    Bonham v. College of Physicians,36 wherein it was asserted that
    common law had the authority to oversee Acts of Parliament and
    empowered the courts to invalidate an enactment conflicting with
    common right and reason. This principle entails subjecting all laws
    to scrutiny against a higher law, typically embodied in a constitution.
39. This principle originated in the Supreme Court of the United States
    during the landmark case of Marbury v. Madison.37 In that decision,
    the Court asserted its authority by deeming the concerned legislation
    unconstitutional, thereby constraining the powers of Congress. The
    Court therein held that:
              "Thus, the particular phraseology of the Constitution of
              the United States confirms and strengthens the principle,
              supposed to be essential to all written Constitutions, that
              a law repugnant to the Constitution is void, and that
              courts, as well as other departments, are bound by
              that instrument.”
                                                                  [Emphasis supplied]


36   Thomas Bonham v. College of Physicians [1610], 8 Co. Rep. 107 77 Eng. Rep. 638.
37   Marbury v. Madison [1803], 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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40. The essence of our constitutional system is rooted in the concepts of
    constitutionalism and judicial review, which comprise three essential
    elements: first, the presence of a written Constitution establishing and
    constraining government organs; second, the Constitution serving
    as a superior law or standard by which the conduct of all organs is
    assessed; and third, the provision for sanctions to prevent, restrain,
    and if necessary, annul any violation of superior law. The third
    element, which seeks to safeguard superior law, is through judicial
    review. Despite the expansive powers granted to legislatures, they
    operate within the confines set by the Constitution. In a democratic
    nation governed by a written constitution, supremacy and sovereignty
    reside in the Constitution. However, the duty of protecting the rights
    given under the Constitution falls to courts through judicial review,
    making them, in the process, the ultimate arbiter of constitutional
    interpretation.38
41. Constitutional courts, equipped with the powers of judicial review,
    function as custodians of justice, ensuring effective safeguard
    of citizens’ rights. Embedded in Article 13 of our Constitution,
    judicial review is recognized as a basic feature of our constitutional
    framework.39 It gives the Court the authority to scrutinize any violation
    of constitutional mandates by state organs. As articulated by Lord
    Steyn, the justification for judicial review arises from a combination
    of principles, such as the separation of powers, the rule of law, and
    the principle of constitutionality.40
42. The power of judicial review does not undermine the doctrine of
    separation of powers. Instead, it fosters it by ensuring a system
    of checks and balances to prevent constitutional transgression by
    any organ of the state. Separation of powers should be seen as a
    connection or link, rather than as a limitation or impediment; allowing
    the Court to ensure that the constitutional order prevails.41
43. In the present case, the Respondents urged that the matter entails
    policy considerations, and hence, the Court should not step into it.


38   State (NCT of Delhi) v. Union of India (2018) 8 SCC 501
39   L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261: 1997 SCC (L&S) 577.
40   Steyn, The Constitutionalisation of Public Law, 1999, 4, 6, 13-14.
41   A. W. Bradley & K. D. Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law, Pearson Longman, 2007;
     H. Barnett, Constitution and Administrative Law, Cavendish, 2006; Laurence H. Tribe, American
     Constitutional Law, Foundation Press, 2000.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                            1039

                  In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


44. It is pertinent to iterate the language under Article 13(2) of the
    Constitution, which states that:
              "(2) The State shall not make any law which takes away
              or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law
              made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent
              of the contravention, be void.” The word “law” in Article 13
              includes within its ambit, “any Ordinance, order, bye-law,
              rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having in
              the territory of India the force of law”.
45. Upon a perusal of the above, it becomes clear that though the
    term ‘policy’ is not expressly mentioned in Article 13, it becomes
    justiciable if it takes the shape of a law.42 In the event such a law is
    deemed void due to a violation of any fundamental rights outlined in
    Part III of the Constitution, it cannot be protected merely for being
    legislative policy. This view has been elucidated in A.L. Kalra v.
    Project & Equipment Corporation,43 wherein objections were
    raised on the grounds that the Court could not review the statute, as
    it entailed policy considerations. However, this Court, having taken
    these contentions into consideration, held that a legislative policy
    taking the concrete shape of a statute could be tested on the anvil
    of violation of fundamental rights.
46. It is, therefore, abundantly clear that courts possess the authority
    to scrutinize whether legislative or executive actions contravene the
    Constitution, and the designation of a decision as a policy choice
    does not serve as a fetter to the exercise of this judicial power. This
    aligns with the principle of separation of powers, which bestows
    upon the judiciary the authority to serve as a guardian against the
    actions of the legislature and executive, intervening to safeguard the
    interests of citizens when necessary.

      (b)     Limits to judicial review
47. However, concurrently, it is imperative to acknowledge and respect
    the domain of the legislature and executive within the framework of
    the separation of powers. While the courts are entrusted with the


42   Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India (1972) 2 SCC 788
43   A. L. Kalra v. Project and Equipment Corporation (1984) 3 SCC 316
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      authority to maintain checks and balances on the other branches
      concerning the constitution and other legal provisions, they are not
      empowered to supplant the legislature by delving into additional
      facets of policy decisions and governing citizens in its stead. This
      sentiment resonated in Hindi Hitrakshak Samiti v. Union of India,
      wherein it was held that:
              "8. It is well settled that judicial review, in order to enforce
              a fundamental right, is permissible of administrative,
              legislative and governmental action or non-action, and
              that the rights of the citizens of this country are to be
              judged by the judiciary and judicial forums and not by
              the administrators or executives. But it is equally true
              that citizens of India are not to be governed by the
              judges or judiciary. If the governance is illegal or
              violative of rights and obligations, other questions
              may arise but whether, as mentioned hereinbefore, it
              has to be a policy decision by the government or the
              authority and thereafter enforcement of that policy,
              the court should not be, and we hope would not be
              an appropriate forum for decision.” 44
                                                                     [Emphasis supplied]
48. Similar views were echoed in Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union
    v. Union of India,45 where a 5-judge bench of this Court affirmed
    that, in accordance with the principle of separation of powers, the
    authority of the Court is confined to assessing whether legislative or
    executive actions comply with the law, without delving into judgments
    on their wisdom. Consequently, while the Court possesses the
    jurisdiction to interpret the law and scrutinize the legality of policy
    decisions, it is not empowered to substitute its discretion for that of
    the legislature or executive, nor to speculate on the appropriateness
    of such decisions.46 The courts do not operate as advisors to the
    executive in matters of policy formulation, a prerogative rightfully
    within the executive’s domain.


44   Hindi Hitrakshak Samiti v. Union of India (1990) 2 SCC 352, para 8.
45   Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 568, para 35.
46   A. K. Roy v. Union of India (1982) 1 SCC 271, para 51
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                          1041

                  In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


49. Similarly, it is imperative to emphasize that courts also lack the
    authority to intervene in policy matters when based on the premise of
    policy errors or the availability of ostensibly superior, fairer, or wiser
    alternatives. The Court cannot do a comparative analysis of policy
    to determine which would have been better. As summarized by this
    Court in Directorate of Film Festivals v. Gaurav Ashwin Jain:47
              “16. […] the scope of judicial review when examining a
              policy of the Government is to check whether it violates
              the fundamental rights of the citizens or is opposed to the
              provisions of the Constitution, or opposed to any statutory
              provision or manifestly arbitrary. Courts cannot interfere
              with policy either on the ground that it is erroneous or
              on the ground that a better, fairer or wiser alternative
              is available. Legality of the policy, and not the wisdom
              or soundness of the policy, is the subject of judicial
              review”.
                                                                     [Emphasis supplied]
50. This is particularly true for complex areas requiring empirical
    knowledge, data inputs, and technical expertise,48 such as matters
    involving economic policy, 49 scientific policy, 50 or international
    relations.51 Complex social, economic, or commercial issues require a
    trial and error approach, the weighing of different competing aspects,
    and often intricate factual studies.52 Such matters raise complicated
    multi-disciplinary questions that do not fall within the legal domain,
    are irreducible to one answer, and require adjustment of priorities
    amongst different stakeholders.53
51. Since courts are not equipped to evaluate such factual aspects, they
    cannot be allowed to formulate policy. In contrast, the legislature
    has the correct institutional mechanism to deliberate on various
    considerations, as it facilitates decision-making by democratically


47   Directorate of Film Festivals v. Gaurav Ashwin Jain (2007) 4 SCC 737, para 16.
48   Union of India v. S. L. Dutta (1991) 1 SCC 505, para 18.
49   State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal (1986) 4 SCC 566, para 34.
50   Jacob Puliyel v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 533, paras 91 and 93.
51   Gaurav Kumar Bansal v. Union of India (2015) 2 SCC 130, para 9.
52   Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Union of India (1990) 3 SCC 223, para 56.
53   Santosh Singh v. Union of India (2016) 8 SCC 253, paras 23 and 24.
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      elected representatives who possess diverse tools and skill sets to
      balance social, economic, and political factors.54 Such policy matters
      thus ought to be entrusted to the legislature. This principle is succinctly
      encapsulated by Sanjeev Coke Mfg. Co. v. Bharat Coking Coal
      Ltd.,55 in which a 5-judge bench of this Court held that:
              "Scales of justice are just not designed to weigh competing
              social and economic factors. In such matters legislative
              wisdom must prevail and judicial review must abstain.”
52. Furthermore, the Courts are not tasked with assessing the efficacy of
    policies. A policy may successfully achieve the objectives outlined in
    legislation, or it may possess limitations hindering the full realization
    of its aims. Regardless, the Court cannot sit in judgment over policy to
    determine whether revisions may be necessary for its enhancement.
    This has also been authoritatively elucidated by an 11-judge bench
    of this Court in the case of Rustom Cavasjee Cooper (Banks
    Nationalisation) v. Union of India:56
              "63. This Court is not the forum in which these
              conflicting claims may be debated. […] The Parliament
              has under Entry 45, List I the power to legislate in respect
              of banking and other commercial activities of the named
              banks necessarily incidental thereto: it has the power
              to legislate for acquiring the undertaking of the named
              banks under Entry 42, List III. Whether by the exercise
              of the power vested in the Reserve Bank under the
              pre-existing laws, results could be achieved which it
              is the object of the Act to achieve, is, in our judgment,
              not relevant in considering whether the Act amounts to
              abuse of legislative power. This Court has the power to
              strike down a law on the ground of want of authority,
              but the Court will not sit in appeal over the policy of
              the Parliament in enacting a law. […]”
                                                                   [Emphasis supplied]



54   Ashwani Kumar v. Union of India (2020) 13 SCC 585, paras 25 and 26.
55   Sanjeev Coke Mfg. Co. v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. (1983) 1 SCC 147, para 20.
56   Rustom Cavasjee Cooper (Banks Nationalisation) v. Union of India (1970) 1 SCC 248, para 63.
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                 In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


53. In summary, the judicial review of government policies encapsulates
    determining whether they infringe upon the fundamental rights
    of citizens, contravene constitutional provisions, violate statutory
    regulations, or display manifest arbitrariness, capriciousness, or mala
    fides.57 The focus of judicial scrutiny is limited to the legality of the
    policy, excluding any evaluation of its wisdom or soundness. The
    Court cannot compel the government to formulate a policy, evaluate
    alternatives or assess the effectiveness of existing policies. This
    constraint stems from the principle of separation of powers, where
    the Court lacks the democratic mandate and institutional expertise
    to delve into such matters. Thus, while the Court can invalidate a
    policy, it lacks the authority to create one.
54. However, to reiterate, while the Court cannot look into the
    aforementioned aspects, the Court can check the constitutional
    validity of a policy, particularly so when it is elevated as an act of
    the Legislature.
55. The present challenge concerns checking the validity of Section 6A,
    a statutory provision. We are, therefore, of the firm view that the
    Respondents’ plea regarding foreclosing the Petitioners’ challenge at
    the threshold, on the grounds of judicial review, cannot be accepted.

      ii.     Delay and maintainability of the writ petitions
56. In addition to the grounds of non-justiciability, the Respondents also
    protested against the maintainability of the writ petitions on account
    of inordinate delay and laches. They argued that while the subject
    provision was introduced in 1985, the writ petitions challenging the
    same have been filed after a long period of 27 years. Applying the
    doctrine of laches, the Respondents argued that the writ petitions must
    be held to be non-maintainable since the rights created during these
    27 years cannot now be taken away. In support of their contentions,
    the Respondents have cited, inter alia, a 5-judge bench decision of
    this Court in Tilokchand Motichand v. H. B. Munshi,58 and urged
    that even if it is assumed that Section 6A violates the fundamental



57   Maharashtra State Board of Secondary & Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth
     (1984) 4 SCC 27
58   Tilokchand Motichand v. H. B. Munshi (1969) 1 SCC 110.
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      rights of the Petitioners, it cannot be declared unconstitutional at
      this belated juncture.
57. Per contra, the Petitioners argued that inter partes, the question
    regarding maintainability has already been decided by this Court in
    Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha v. Union of India (supra). Hence,
    they contended that the writ petitions cannot be considered to have
    been filed after a delay. Alternatively, they urged that delay, per se,
    would not be fatal to their claim because the doctrine of laches is
    not applicable when substantial questions of law are involved. In the
    instant case, since the dispute involves questions like the security
    of the state, the rights of Assamese people under Article 29, the
    discrimination against the State of Assam, etc., the petitions should
    not be barred at the threshold on the grounds of delay.
58. The primary issue to be determined, therefore, is whether the current
    writ petitions should be dismissed outright due to delay without
    delving into the merits of the Petitioners’ claims.
      (a)     Limitation period for writs
59. In India, the Limitation Act, 1963 sets out the maximum period within
    which suits, appeals, and applications must be filed before the court.
    Cases brought after this prescribed period are typically barred due
    to delay unless the court decides to condone the delay. However, it
    is important to note that the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to
    writ proceedings and, therefore, does not specify a particular time
    limit within which a writ needs to be filed.59 Similarly, though the
    Supreme Court Rules, 2013 specify the time limit for certain petitions
    that the Limitation Act, 1963 does not cover (such as Special Leave
    Petitions),60 these Rules too do not specify the limitation period for
    filing a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution.
60. However, while such a period is not prescribed by the Limitation
    Act, 1963, or the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, a writ petition filed
    belatedly after a considerable delay is barred by the operation of
    the doctrine of laches.61 The said doctrine of laches is a common



59   Tilokchand & Motichand v. HB Munshi (1969) 1 SCC 110, para 9.
60   Supreme Court Rules, 2013, Order XXI Rule 1.
61   Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi (1975) 4 SCC 285, para 11; Narayani Debi Khaitan v. State of Bihar,
     1964 SCC OnLine SC 1, paras 8 and 13.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                                   1045

                  In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


      law principle disallowing a claim because it has been brought to the
      court after an unreasonable lapse of time. It is based on the maxim
      ‘vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt’, which means that the
      law assists those who are vigilant with their rights and not those that
      sleep thereupon. Hence, even in the absence of the prescription of
      a statutory time limit for its filing, a claim that has been filed after
      a significant delay can be rejected at the threshold by invoking this
      doctrine.
61. Indeed, the laches principle bears similarities to the Limitation Act,
    1963, as both are founded on similar policy considerations. A claim
    brought after considerable delay may not be entertained because
    third-party rights may have been established during this time-lapse,
    and it would be unjust to prejudice innocent parties due to the tardiness
    of the claimant.62 Additionally, considering a delayed claim could be
    unfair to the opposing party, as they may have lost access to crucial
    evidence needed to defend against the claim. Reopening the case
    after a significant delay could thus place the opposing party at a
    disadvantage, potentially resulting in an unjust or inaccurate outcome.
    Moreover, it is essential to put a time limit on proceedings to provide
    certainty and prevent confusion from cases being in perpetual flux.
    It is also important to deny a delayed claim to encourage parties to
    be more diligent when enforcing their rights.
62. While the doctrine of laches serves similar underlying purposes as
    the Limitation Act, 1963, it is less rigid in its application. Unlike the
    aforementioned Act, which prescribes specific time periods for filing
    claims, there is no fixed timeframe under the doctrine of laches.
    Instead, each case is evaluated based on its unique facts and
    circumstances. In the context of writ petitions, Hidayatullah, C.J., in
    Tilokchand Motichand (supra), held that while there is no upper or
    lower time limit for entertaining writ petitions, the Court shall consider
    whether the delay was avoidable and whether such delay affects the
    merits of the case. Similarly, in Shri Vallabh Glass Works Ltd. v.
    Union of India,63 it was held that the Court must consider the conduct
    of the parties, the change in circumstances, and the prejudice that
    would be caused to the other party or the general public.


62   Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India (1979) 3 SCC 489, para 35.
63   Shri Vallabh Glass Works Ltd. v. Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 362, para 9.
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63. Hence, it is settled law that the doctrine of laches is not an inviolable
    legal rule but a rule of practice that must be supplemented with
    sound exercise of judicial discretion. While Courts must ordinarily
    apply this doctrine in light of the policy reasons discussed before,
    the doctrine allows the Court to conduct an individualized analysis
    of each case and entertain claims in the competing interests of
    justice, even when the claim may be delayed and third-party rights
    may have been created.64
64. We may, however, hasten to clarify that the doctrine of delay and
    laches is not to be ipso facto excluded where a breach of fundamental
    rights is alleged. The 5-judge benches of this Court in Narayani
    Debi Khaitan v. State of Bihar,65 Daryao v. State of U.P.,66 and
    Tilokchand Motichand (supra), and a 3-judge bench in Amrit Lal
    Berry v. CCE,67 have reiterated that even in such like cases the court
    must see the effect of laches. However, that being said, there may
    be instances where considerations of justice demand that the court
    adjudicate on the merits of a case rather than summarily dismissing
    it based solely on procedural grounds such as delay.68
65. One such factual circumstance is when the claim affects the public
    at large. In Kashinath G. Jalmi (Dr) v. The Speaker,69 this Court
    analyzed several precedents (including Tilokchand & Motichand
    (supra)) and differentiated them by holding that the doctrine of
    laches cannot be used to expel a claim that is made on behalf of the
    public. Judicial discretion, while applying this doctrine, must always
    be governed by the objective of promoting the larger public interest;
    and if a claim affects the public at large, the Court should go into the
    merits of the case.70 Where it is found that denial of consideration on
    merits is likely to affect society in general and can have a cascading
    effect on millions of citizens, the Court will carve out an exception
    and proceed to decide the lis on merits.


64   State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal (1986) 4 SCC 566, para 24.
65   1964 SCC OnLine SC 1, para 8.
66   Daryao v. State of U.P., 1961 SCC OnLine SC 21, para 23.
67   Amrit Lal Berry v. CCE (1975) 4 SCC 714, paras 16 and 23.
68   Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC (2013) 1 SCC 353, paras 12 - 15; Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh
     (2020) 2 SCC 569, para 12.12.
69   Kashinath G. Jalmi (Dr) v. The Speaker (1993) 2 SCC 703, paras 28 and 30.
70   Id, paras 34 and 35.
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                  In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


66. Another vital circumstance where the doctrine of delay and laches
    would not be applicable strictly is in matters where the vires of a
    statute are challenged vis-à-vis the Constitution. This Court has,
    in the due course of time, accepted the idea of transformative
    constitutionalism, which conceptualizes the Constitution not as a still
    document cast in stone at the day of its formation but as a living and
    dynamic body of law, capable of constant updation and evolution as
    per changing societal mores. Should this Court deny a constitutional
    challenge solely based on delay, it would effectively establish an
    arbitrary cut-off beyond which laws could no longer be re-examined
    in light of changing circumstances. Such a rigid approach cannot
    be countenanced as changing societal circumstances sometimes
    necessitate a reconsideration of the status quo—even when the
    challenge is brought after a considerable lapse of time.
67. To instantiate, a Constitution Bench of this Court in Navtej Singh
    Johar v. Union of India,71 held Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code,
    1860 to be ultra vires of the Constitution, regardless of the fact that
    the provision was a part of the statute for over a century. The Court
    took note of the norms of contemporary society and declared them
    to be unconstitutional. If the doctrine of laches were to be applied
    strictly, time would run in favour of a constitutionally invalid statute,
    which cannot be allowed in the larger interests of justice and the
    transformative nature of the Constitution.
      (b)     Applicability of doctrine of laches to the present case
68. Adverting to the facts of the case, it seems that the two mitigating
    circumstances mentioned above are directly attracted.
69. First, the Petitioners have raised various substantial questions that
    affect the public at large, including the erosion of the culture of
    indigenous communities, discrimination against the State of Assam,
    and the larger perceived threat to the security of the country from
    immigration. Therefore, instead of being an in personam dispute
    between two individuals, the questions raised by the Petitioners
    directly or indirectly affect a large citizenry.
70. The question regarding the constitutionality of Section 6A raises
    significant public policy issues that involve ramifications for the original


71   Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) 10 SCC 1
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      inhabitants of Assam, the rights of immigrants, and the security of
      the country. Hence, foreclosing such questions at the threshold on
      the grounds of technicality of delay would lead to an unjust outcome.
      Instead, considering it has been a long-standing issue and because
      any resolution will affect millions of individuals, a compelling policy
      rationale exists to adjudicate the matter on its merits and settle the
      issue conclusively.
71. Second, since the controversy pertains to the constitutionality of a
    statutory provision, the doctrine of laches ought not to be applied
    strictly to bar the claim at the very threshold. As discussed in paragraph
    66, such constitutional adjudication cannot be made subject to any
    straitjacket rule of limitation. Challenges regarding the constitutionality
    of a statute require the Court to take a liberal approach and permit a
    certain amount of flexibility. A contrary approach would set a wrong
    precedent and act as a bar against challenging anachronistic laws
    that might no longer align with the ideals of constitutionalism. This
    would constitute an unsound legal principle since oppressive laws
    should not persist solely because they have been tolerated by society
    for a certain period.
72. Since the challenge in these cases relates to the constitutional validity
    of Section 6A, its consideration on merits ought not to be precluded
    on the grounds of delay. We reiterate that the doctrine of laches
    cannot be applied strictly. Whatever may be the ultimate view on the
    claims of the Petitioners, they are able to persuade us to examine the
    perceived harms, such as cultural erosion, the threat to the state’s
    security, damage to natural resources, etc., which cannot be strictly
    limited to a particular time-frame and could have occurred even after a
    lapse of time from the enactment of the impugned provision. In other
    words, even if Section 6A may not have been constitutionally invalid
    from the beginning, it might have incurred such invalidity subsequently.
    Hence, instead of closing the present challenge at the threshold, we
    shall proceed to analyse the merits of these claims to find out whether
    Section 6A has become ultra vires the Constitution with the passage
    of time and due to systematic failure of the legislative vision.
73. The Petitioners, however, may not be correct in contending that the
    issue of delay between the same parties was previously settled by
    the reference order dated 17.12.2014.72 At the outset, we must note


72   Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha, supra note 33.
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              In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     that the claim inter se the parties must not be construed strictly in
     constitutional adjudication such as the present one, since much larger
     questions of public importance are under consideration. Furthermore,
     it is imperative to note that a reference order does not represent a
     conclusive decision. Hence, the aforementioned contention of the
     Petitioners otherwise suffers from a factual error as the reference
     order cannot be construed as a final expression of views by this
     Court on any of the issues.
74. That apart, and as has been noted previously, instead of conclusively
    deciding the question of delay, this Court framed one of the specific
    questions as to whether delay should be considered for moulding
    appropriate relief. Thus, while the Court discussed the principle of
    delay in challenging the vires of Section 6A, it left the question open
    to be dealt with by a larger bench.
75. To conclude, while there has undoubtedly been a considerable delay in
    filing the instant writ petitions, the doctrine of laches cannot be applied
    strictly to disbar the claims at the threshold. This is so because the
    present proceedings raise substantial questions that affect the public at
    large and the constitutional validity of a statutory provision. If we were
    to decide otherwise, we would be, in essence, creating an artificial
    deadline for important constitutional issues. This would give rise to
    an unfair principle of law in the realm of constitutional adjudication.
76. We thus conclude that the Petitioners’ claim overcomes the preliminary
    hurdles, and cannot be dismissed at the threshold on the grounds
    of lack of judicial review or doctrine of laches.
                                      *******

                     Challenges regarding constitutionality
77. Prior to examining the contentions articulated by the parties on the
    constitutionality of the provision and engaging in a discussion on the
    various legal issues involved, it is imperative to trace the history of
    this matter and have a holistic understanding of how the provision,
    Section 6A, came into being. This historical context sheds light on
    Assam’s evolving dynamics and challenges, which were marked by
    partition decisions and the subsequent establishment of regulatory
    frameworks governing movement and citizenship.
78. Before we begin our discussion on the political history of Assam, it
    is crucial to emphasize that this serves as a broad overview based
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      on the material cited by both parties. It is not to be construed as an
      exercise of determining the factual veracity of competing versions of
      historical narratives and is not strictly germane to our legal analysis.
      It merely serves as a contextual background for those who might
      be unfamiliar with the origins of Section 6A and the present issue.
79. The region, known today as Assam, has historically been inhabited by
    diverse ethnic and linguistic communities. Throughout the sixteenth
    and seventeenth centuries, it was predominantly governed by the
    Ahom political authority, albeit with a brief period of Mughal rule.
    Subsequently, like numerous other regions across the nation, it came
    under British colonial administration in 1826.73
80. Prior to the beginning of the British colonial era, several parts of
    Assam fell under the dominion of the Burmese for a brief duration,
    during which the region underwent significant changes in its political
    and economic landscape. This period witnessed a substantial exodus
    of people from the valley, seeking refuge in the bordering towns of
    Bengal and other adjacent territories.74 However, there was soon a
    change of hands in terms of control over these regions after the First
    Anglo–Burmese War.75 By the middle of the nineteenth century, most
    of the Brahmaputra valley of Assam had fallen under British rule, and
    the East India Company assumed control over Assam. In 1874, a
    distinct province of Assam, administered by a Chief Commissioner,
    was established by amalgamating Goalpara, Cachar, Garo, Khasi
    and Jaintia Hills, and Naga Hills, with its capital at Shillong.76
81. Thereafter, in 1905, as part of the British partition of the Bengal
    Province, Assam became a constituent of the East Bengal region, with
    Dhaka serving as its capital, which is often regarded as the inception
    of friction between the Assamese and Bengali communities.77
82. Initially, during the partition deliberations, Assam was intended to
    be amalgamated with Bengal. However, this proposal encountered



73   Edward Gait, A History of Assam, Thacker, Spink & Company, 1906.
74   Manor Din: Arupjyoti Saikia on how the Burmese invasion of Assam transpired down to Earth, https://
     www.downtoearth.org.in/interviews/governance/manor-din-arupjyoti-saikia-on-how-the-burmese-
     invasion-of-assam-transpired-93414.
75   Sangeeta Barooah Pisharoty, Assam: The Accord, the Discord, Penguin Random House, 2019, 221.
76   Arupjyoti Saikia, The Quest for Modern Assam,Penguin Random House, 2023, 25.
77   Sangeeta Barooah Pisharoty, supra note 75.
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       significant opposition from political leaders in Assam, who opposed the
       integration. They perceived the proposed amalgamation as another
       attempt to subject Assam to Bengali dominance, resulting in their
       opposition to the British tendency to treat Assam as an extension
       of Bengal.78
83. This period also witnessed first-hand, the blending of communities
    and groups between the two regions. Unlike present-day India,
    which has linguistically organised states, the then-eastern front of
    British India witnessed numerous culturally divergent communities
    living together. The population of Sylhet in modern-day Bangladesh,
    for example, was then comprised of Bengali-speaking as well as
    Assamese-speaking people. This was representative of the fact that
    unlike the western border, in the eastern border, issues of culture
    and language were more at play.
84. After this period of unrest, the Nehru-Liaquat Pact of 1950 was signed
    between India and Pakistan, symbolising their mutual commitment
    to safeguard minorities and their interests in both nations. This
    period also denoted the Constitution of India coming into force,
    which contained a part prescribing different modes of citizenship,
    as already elucidated in paragraphs 19 and 21. In line with this, the
    Citizenship Act was enacted, empowering the Central Government
    to declare law on citizenship or nationality, the details of which have
    also been dealt with elaborately in the same.
85. Parallelly, in 1948, a permit system was instituted between West
    Pakistan and India vide the West Pakistan (Control) Ordinance,
    and subsequently, in 1952, a formal passport and visa system was
    introduced along the eastern border.79 Until then, border traffic was
    almost entirely unregulated on the eastern borders. The span from
    1960 to 1985 was marked by significant political turmoil, civil unrest,
    and violence in the country’s northeastern parts.
86. Amidst these developments, the NRC was initially prepared
    exclusively for the state of Assam in 1951. It intended to identify
    illegal immigrants entering the state from Bangladesh, utilizing data
    from the 1951 Census.



78   Id, 231.
79   Ministry of External Affairs Annual Report (1943-44), para 15.
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87. However, the scenario changed dramatically on 25.03.1971, when
    Pakistan initiated ‘Operation Searchlight’ to quell the Bengali nationalist
    movement in East Pakistan. The following day, on 26.03.1971,
    Bangladesh declared independence from Pakistan, triggering
    the Bangladesh Liberation War. Following these developments,
    in December 1971, India joined the war against Pakistan. While
    immigrants from East Pakistan (present-day Bangladesh) had been
    migrating to India since 1948, the wars of 1971 led to an influx of
    immigrants from Bangladesh into the State of Assam and other
    Indian states.80
88. Soon, there was anxiety surrounding the issue of electoral rolls
    in the Northeast region, fueled by concerns revolving around the
    influx of refugees from erstwhile East Bengal into Assam.81 During
    this period, the Assam Students Union (AASU) and the All Assam
    Gana Sangram Parishad (AAGSP) grew in popularity in the
    region. Thereafter, in 1979, the draft electoral rolls prepared for
    the bye-elections in the Lok Sabha Constituency of Mangaldoi in
    Assam revealed the names of numerous Bangladeshi immigrants.
    This led the AASU and AAGSP to launch a 6-year-long agitation,
    now known as the ‘Assam Movement’, fearing that Bangladeshi
    immigrants would overwhelm the indigenous population of Assam.82
    During this period, political tensions escalated, marked by fierce
    debates and demonstrations concerning the influx of immigrants
    into Assam. Simultaneously, there were counter-demonstrations in
    Bengal, expressing solidarity with the Bengali-speaking communities
    in Assam. These events had a detrimental impact on the economy
    and trade in Assam, and eventually, in 1981, the President’s rule
    was imposed in the State.
89. In 1983, after more than a year of President’s rule, the Union of
    India decided to hold elections, despite a breakdown in negotiations
    over electoral roll revisions and escalating student-led protests.83
    However, these aspirations came to an end with the occurrence
    of the Nellie Massacre on 18.02.1983, resulting in a devastating


80   Antara Datta, Refugees and Borders in South Asia: The Great Exodus of 1971, Routledge, 2015.
81   Sangeeta Barooah Pisharoty, supra note 75, 27.
82   Arupjyoti Saikia, supra note 76, 549.
83   Id, 566.
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                 In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


      massacre of people with severe casualties. It is believed that factors
      contributing to the tragedy included administrative failure, warnings
      of potential clashes being ignored, and underlying land-related
      tensions. The Nellie Massacre marked a turning point, transforming the
      once-peaceful student protests into a violent agitation that garnered
      national and international attention. Thereafter, in 1984, negotiations
      between the Centre and AASU stalled, but in January 1985, the then
      Prime Minister expressed a willingness to resolve Assam’s disputes,
      leading to the repeal of contentious laws and concessions to calm
      the agitations.84
90. The student-led Assam Movement finally came to an end on
    15.08.1985, with the signing of a Memorandum of Settlement known
    as the ‘Assam Accord’ between the Central Government and the
    leaders of AASU and AAGSP. The Assam Accord declared 01.01.1966
    as the base date for the detection of illegal immigrants and created
    three classes of immigrants: first, those who came before 01.01.1966,
    including those in the electoral list of 1967; second, those who
    came between 01.01.1966 and 24.03.1971; and third, those who
    came on or after 25.03.1971. The first class of persons were to be
    regularized under the Assam Accord, while those belonging to the
    second class were to be detected as foreigners, and their names
    were to be deleted from electoral rolls. It was further provided that
    their names would be restored after the expiry of ten years from
    their detection. The third class of persons, i.e., those who came
    on or after 25.03.1971, were to be detected and expelled as per
    the Assam Accord. Subsequently, Section 6A was inserted into the
    Citizenship Act through an amendment to give effect to the provisions
    of the Assam Accord.
91. However, despite the enactment of Section 6A, the influx of illegal
    immigrants into the State of Assam from Bangladesh was stronger
    than ever. In 1998, the then Governor of Assam submitted a report
    to the then President of India highlighting the threat posed by
    large-scale migration from Bangladesh into Assam. Currently, there
    exist thousands of migrants who have been accorded citizenship
    under Section 6A and have been residing in the State of Assam
    for several years. Conversely, there are also hordes of immigrants


84   Sangeeta Barooah Pisharoty, supra note 75, 184.
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     who have entered and continue to enter the State of Assam illegally.
     Thus, there presently exist two sets of immigrants who need to be
     bifurcated and treated differently—one set who will be conferred
     citizenship in accordance with the auspices of Section 6A and the
     other set who are illegal immigrants.
92. Having dealt with this historical and political context, and with
    this background, it is now pertinent to peruse the issues invoking
    constitutional challenge against the validity of Section 6A.

     iii.   The preambular notion of fraternity
93. The Petitioners seek to enforce the preambular notion of ‘fraternity’.
    They have urged that the idea of fraternity, as encapsulated in the
    Constitution of India, is to be interpreted in the context of the unity
    and integrity of the nation. They argued against a global/transnational
    construction of the term, wherein the notion of fraternity is extended
    beyond the citizens of India. They asserted that the constitutional
    mandate in the Preamble pertains to fraternity amongst citizens and
    that this notion of fraternity might be destroyed when a legislative
    enactment such as Section 6A threatens to destroy the cultural
    demography of that citizenry. The Petitioners further contended that
    the influx of immigrants from Bangladesh into the State of Assam
    has jeopardized the very ideal of fraternity in India.
94. Contrarily, the Respondents submitted that the term fraternity means
    individuals having equal regard for each other and preventing
    relationships from being confined to specific clans. The Respondents
    stated that Section 6A reinforces the idea of fraternity, in the absence
    of which, society would be broken into a division between ‘others’
    and ‘us’.
95. Having bestowed our consideration to the contentions set out by
    the parties, we must examine the meaning of the term fraternity
    and determine whether Section 6A violates or enforces the idea of
    fraternity.

     (a)    Meaning of ‘fraternity’
96. As articulated in the Preamble, the term ‘fraternity’ embodies a sense
    of collective brotherhood amongst all Indians. It serves as a critical
    element for national unity and social cohesion. Fraternity assumes
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                 In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       paramount significance in reinforcing the ideals of equality and liberty,
       both of which are integral facets of the Preamble.85
97. In order to have a holistic understanding of what fraternity as an ideal
    encompasses, it is integral to examine the meaning of ‘fraternity’ as
    envisaged by the drafters of the Constitution, as well as in terms
    of other jurisdictions which also employ the notion. Delving into
    the Constituent Assembly Debates would not only shed light on
    the ambit of fraternity but would also reveal a consensus that the
    principles of equality, liberty and fraternity are to be perceived as
    an indivisible whole.
98. The word ‘fraternity’ was initially not included as a part of the
    Objectives Resolution, which had been proposed by Jawaharlal
    Nehru on 13.12.1946 and thereafter adopted by the Constituent
    Assembly on 22.01.1947. In fact, this very resolution provided the
    basis for the inclusion of the Preamble to the Constitution of India.
    Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, however, emphasized the significance of adding
    the term fraternity into the Preamble, defining it to mean a sense of
    shared brotherhood among all Indians, and highlighted that it was
    imperative for national unity and social solidarity.86 In pursuance
    thereto, Dr. Ambedkar stated as follows:
              "What does fraternity mean? Fraternity means a sense of
              common brotherhood of all Indians— if Indians being
              one people. It is the principle which gives unity and
              solidarity to social life. It is a difficult thing to achieve.
              The sooner we realise that we are not as yet a nation
              in the social and psychological sense of the world, the
              better for us. For then only we shall realise the necessity
              of becoming a nation and seriously think of ways and
              means of realising the goal.”
                                                                  [Emphasis supplied]
99. Dr. Ambedkar introduced the term ‘fraternity’ into the preambular
    values of the Constitution with the objective of advancing his vision
    of democracy and eradicating the issues posed by caste distinctions.
    His vision encompassed fostering a societal framework characterised


85   Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume 11, 25.11.1949.
86   Id.
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      by shared interests and interconnectedness amongst all Indians.
      Notably, neither the deliberations within the Constituent Assembly nor
      Dr. Ambedkar’s conceptualisation of fraternity suggests any inherent
      restriction of this principle to a specific community or segment of
      citizens. Instead, it was conceived as a concept intended to cultivate
      a sense of brotherhood amongst all individuals within society. 87
      Dr. B.R. Ambedkar elucidated this core idea of fraternity in the
      following words:
              “…What is your ideal society if you do not want caste is a
              question that is bound to be asked of you. If you ask me,
              my ideal would be a society based on Liberty, Equality
              and Fraternity. And why not? What objection can
              there be to Fraternity? I cannot imagine any. An ideal
              society should be mobile, should be full of channels for
              conveying a change taking place in one part to other
              parts. In an ideal society there should be many interests
              consciously communicated and shared. There should
              be varied and free points of contact with other modes
              of association. In other words, there must be social
              endosmosis. This is fraternity, which is only another
              name for democracy. Democracy is not merely a form
              of Government. It is primarily a mode of associated living,
              of conjoint communicated experience. It is essentially an
              attitude of respect and reverence towards fellowmen.”
                                                                  [Emphasis supplied]
100. The idea of fraternity was therefore envisioned as a deep sense of
     well-being for others and understood as essential to counterbalance
     individualism, thereby preventing anarchy and sustaining moral order
     in society. It emphasized that a thriving democracy could be achieved
     through fraternity, which enabled the notions of liberty and equality
     to support each other rather than undermine one another. Further, it
     gave rise to the belief that the ideals of equality, liberty and fraternity
     could not be divorced from each other, as equality and liberty without
     fraternity would result in the supremacy of the few over the many.88


87   Dr. Babsaheb Ambedkar Writings and Speeches, Dr. Ambedkar Foundation, Vol. 1, 57, https://www.mea.
     gov.in/Images/attach/amb/Volume_01.pdf.
88   Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, supra note 85.
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                 In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


101. During the deliberations of the Constituent Assembly, the concepts
     of equality, fraternity, and liberty were perceived as constituting a
     trinity, forming the very bedrock of democracy. The notion of equality
     was afforded considerable impetus on account of the prevailing
     graded inequality within Indian society, characterized by affluence
     for some and abject poverty for many. Recognizing that various
     approaches might not eliminate disparities in social and economic
     aspects of the citizens’ lives, they formulated the principle of “one
     man, one value”, intending to create a level playing field for all.89
     However, the framers believed that equality devoid of liberty could
     lead to the forfeiture of individuality. Moreover, they recognized that
     in the absence of fraternity, the harmonious coexistence of liberty
     and equality would not be inherent or natural, necessitating external
     enforcement measures.90
102. The genesis of the very notion of fraternity can be traced back to
     the French ideal of fraternity or fraternité, originating from the French
     Revolution and intricately connected with the principles of liberty
     and equality. This period in French history reflected a marked shift
     from feudalistic societies governed by hereditary status to a society
     aspiring to be a democratic ideal. This evolution was recognised as
     not just a political concept but as a period that emphasised collective
     rights over the individual.91
103. The emergence of fraternity as a concept in the French context
     began to see recognition with the Declaration of the Rights of Man
     and Citizen, which prescribed communal participation in contrast to
     individual rights in the interests of society. This was, in essence, a
     clarion call for the notion of fraternity, though it had not been fully
     articulated at that point in time.92 It was only with the emergence of
     the Third Republic and the formation of the Paris Commune in 1871
     that fraternity was articulated more clearly and reflected the people’s
     need for a society based on collective welfare and shared interests.
     The Constitution of the Third Republic then included and recognised
     the principles of liberty, equality and fraternity as cornerstones of


89   Id..
90   Id.
91   Georges Lefebvre, The Coming of the French Revolution, R. R. Palmer (trans.), Princeton University
     Press, 1973.
92   Id.
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      French society. In this context, fraternity was not restricted to the
      idea of social cohesion but also extended to ensuring the dignity of
      each individual in a manner in which national unity and integrity were
      fostered. The evolution of fraternity, from a mere idea encompassing
      social values into a principle now embedded into the fabric of a
      nation’s identity, is indeed fascinating.93
104. Within the French context, fraternity transcended mere brotherhood,
     expanding to encompass a collective sense of solidarity among
     citizens. This journey of fraternity from a mere idea into a fundamental
     value shows the deeply entrenched political and social transformation
     that occurred in France. Fraternity, therefore, came to be understood
     as a sense of collective consciousness that unified individuals in
     their need for an equitable society.
105. Although fraternity is embedded in the constitutional fabric of
     both India and France, the manner in which they have come to
     be construed inherently differs. A nuanced differentiation can be
     discerned by examining them through the lenses of French and Indian
     perspectives. In the French context, the principle of fraternity was
     initially envisaged to symbolize a commitment towards the collective
     well-being of citizens and to showcase a bond that unified them in
     their aspirations for a just society. However, over time, the notion
     of fraternity in France came to be somewhat eclipsed by equality,
     which was perceived to be paramount, with a heightened emphasis
     on individual rights.94 Conversely, in India, fraternity was perceived
     by the Constituent Assembly, as seen in Dr. Ambedkar’s speeches,
     as a means to realize equality and uplift marginalised groups. The
     divergence in the interpretation of the term fraternity by these two
     nations in relation to equality is thus distinctly evident.95
106. In the Indian context, the meaning of fraternity has thus entirely
     diverged from the French sense of the term and is intricately woven
     into the fabric of fostering social solidarity, uplifting marginalised
     groups, and achieving a more equitable society. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s
     introduction of the term ‘fraternity’ into the constitutional Preamble


93   The New Encyclopaedia Britannica: Macropaedia (Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc.), 1974.
94   Decision 99-412 DC of June 15, 1999, Rec. 71 (European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages),
     para 10.
95   Jeremie Gilbert and David Keane, Equality versus fraternity? Rethinking France and its minorities,
     International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2016, 14(4), 901 and 902.
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                  In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       reflects a deliberate intention to use this principle as a means to
       promote unity and brotherhood.96 In light of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s
       persistent efforts towards eradicating caste discrimination, his
       subsequent advocacy for fraternity among individuals appears
       to mirror his commitment to inclusivity. Unlike some Western
       perspectives, where fraternity may be overshadowed by an emphasis
       on individual rights, in India, fraternity is distinctly perceived as a
       vital instrument for realising equality and harmonising the diverse
       segments of society. It serves as a conduit for transcending societal
       disparities and working towards collective well-being.97 Therefore,
       in the Indian constitutional context, fraternity assumes a dynamic
       and inclusive role, aligning with the broader goals of social justice,
       equality, and upliftment.
       (b)    Ethos of Section 6A is aligned with fraternity
107. Having examined the contentions presented by the Petitioners, it is
     imperative to scrutinize whether the preambular value of fraternity
     would be applicable to the immigrants entering into the State of
     Assam under the aegis of Section 6A.
108. In this regard, it would be apposite to consider whether such
     preambular values are justiciable in the first place. In the landmark
     case of Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala,98 this Court affirmed
     that while the Preamble may be employed to interpret ambiguous
     provisions of the Constitution, it, by itself, is not enforceable in a
     court of law. Indeed, our current comprehension of the preamble
     is evident. It serves as a tool for interpreting the Constitution and
     guiding our trajectory. However, akin to the Directive Principles of State
     Policy (DPSP), it was not envisaged as being directly enforceable.
     Nevertheless, the discourse on ‘fraternity’ holds relevance in the
     current context and will undeniably shape our interpretation of the
     pertinent laws at hand.
109. At this juncture, it would be essential to take into consideration the
     evolution of the principle of fraternity in terms of judicial construction to
     get a complete understanding of the meaning and scope of fraternity



96   Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, supra note 85.
97   Id.
98   Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225
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       as it stands today. The Preamble to the Constitution provides us
       insight into the values that embody the Constitution. The Preamble
       declares India to be a sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic, and
       republic and secures justice, equality, liberty, and fraternity for all
       its citizens. Though the Preamble does not grant any substantive
       rights and is not enforceable in courts, a plethora of cases have
       engaged with the Preamble and considered it to be a guiding light
       in interpreting the provisions of the Constitution.
110. Judicial precedents discussing fraternity will aid us in understanding
     whether fraternity remains to be seen as a beacon promoting
     togetherness amongst diverse groups or whether it has become
     more restrictive in its scope over time. This Court has dealt with the
     idea of fraternity or, at the very least, referred to it in a myriad of
     case laws. It has consistently held that the term ‘fraternity’ means a
     sense of common brotherhood of all citizens.99 This Court has also
     often reiterated that the ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity should
     not be treated as separate entities instead, should be viewed as a
     trinity that secures empowerment and political justice for all citizens.
     Additionally, fraternity was interpreted as a principle that afforded the
     means to achieve national unity and the dignity of the individual.100
111. This Court in Indian Medical Association v. Union of India,101
     addressed multiple petitions that had been filed challenging the
     exemptions provided under law, which allowed a private, non-aided
     educational institution to admit the children of army personnel
     exclusively. While examining the constitutionality of the challenged
     provision, the Court highlighted the significance of access to education
     as a means to foster fraternity and further promote social cohesion
     and unity. In the cited case, the Court determined that the restrictive
     admission policy was an impediment to achieving fraternity in
     society. Although not spelt out explicitly in the judgment, it is clear
     that the Court understood fraternity as encouraging the intermixing
     of people and one which discourages exclusivity or endogamous
     social structures.



99   Shri Raghunathrao Ganpatrao v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 1267, para 109.
100 Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 477, para 412; AIIMS Students’ Union v. AIIMS, AIR 2001
    SC 3262, para 58.
101 Indian Medical Association v. Union of India, AIR 2011 SC 2365.
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                   In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


112. It was, however, in the seminal case of Nandini Sundar v. State of
     Chhattisgarh102 that this Court, in the course of addressing issues
     pertaining to the appointment of Special Police Officers (SPOs)
     for the Salwa Judum in Chhattisgarh, extensively dealt with the
     aspect of fraternity. For context, the Salwa Judum was a militia
     formed and deployed to counter Maoist activities in the State of
     Chhattisgarh. This case brought to the fore several constitutional
     principles, including the ideals of fraternity, equality, the right to
     life, and personal liberty. This Court held that Section 9 of the
     Chhattisgarh Police Act, 2007 which allowed for the appointment
     of SPOs, violated the Constitution and delved into the relevance
     of the constitutional principle of fraternity.
113. In the aforesaid case, the Court interpreted fraternity as a safeguard
     against unchecked state power and an essential pillar for responsible
     governance. The Court held that state actions that de-humanized
     citizens violated the constitutional objective of the welfare of all citizens
     and would be wholly against the idea of dignity and fraternity, as
     enshrined in the Preamble to the Constitution. The Court further went
     on to underscore the significance of fraternity in shaping economic
     policies and stated thus:103
              “The primary task of the State is the provision of
              security to all its citizens, without violating human
              dignity. This would necessarily imply the undertaking
              of tasks that would prevent the emergence of great
              dissatisfaction, and disaffection, on account of the manner
              and mode of extraction, and distribution, of natural
              resources and organization of social action, its benefits
              and costs.”
                                                               [Emphasis supplied]
114. The very scope of fraternity beyond just being an ideal in the Preamble
     was thus expanded to be a principle that would create checks and
     balances on the system of governance and state actions.
115. Having examined the notion of fraternity from various perspectives,
     it can be deduced that the essence of fraternity, therefore, is


102 Nandini Sundar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2011) 7 SCC 547
103 Id, para 25.
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     fundamentally geared towards fostering interconnectedness among
     Indians and was envisaged to be a principle for uplifting marginalised
     sections of society.
116. Consequently, it might be antithetical to the essence of fraternity to
     deploy this inclusive constitutional value in a way which deliberately
     excludes large swathes of the population, who have been duly
     conferred citizenship through procedure established by law, from
     the protection of constitutional rights. In fact, our understanding
     of fraternity, as also applied by this Court in Indian Medical
     Association v. Union of India (supra), is that it encourages,
     if not compels, people to fraternise and intermingle with people
     dissimilar to them.
117. In many ways, the Petitioners want fraternity to be interpreted
     in a highly restrictive manner, which allows them to choose their
     neighbours. Since this approach runs contrary to the very idea and
     ethos of fraternity that was envisaged by the Constituent Assembly
     and as subsequently interpreted by this Court, it cannot be accepted.
     Our reading of the Constitution and precedents is that fraternity
     requires people of different backgrounds and social circumstances
     to ‘live and let live’. The nomenclature of fraternity itself is self-
     explanatory to the extent that it exhibits the notion of inclusiveness
     and togetherness, as opposed to restricted applicability. Thus, it
     becomes imperative to refrain from employing this concept in a
     negative manner that selectively applies it to a particular segment
     while labelling another faction as ‘illegal immigrants’, solely based
     on the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 6A.
118. In this light, when faced with the dilemma of disenfranchising millions
     or safeguarding a community’s endogamous way of life, this Court
     would certainly be compelled by the principles of fraternity to prioritize
     the former. Thus, in our considered view, the Petitioners contentions
     in this regard deserve to be rejected.

     iv.   Part II and Section 6A

     (a)   Section 6A and Articles 6, 7 and 11 of the Constitution
119. The Petitioners argued that our Constitution exhaustively addresses
     the conferment of citizenship to individuals who migrated from
     present-day Bangladesh and that the Parliament cannot legislate
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                       1063

                 In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       to the contrary without amending the Constitution. They asserted
       that Articles 6 and 7 prescribe a different regime for granting Indian
       citizenship to individuals who migrated from India to Pakistan or
       from Pakistan to India. They argued that ‘Pakistan’ encompasses
       Bangladesh, as it is a successor state to Pakistan, thus binding
       Parliament to the cut-off date of 19.07.1948 stipulated in Article
       6 of the Constitution. Since these are constituent provisions and
       the Parliament enacted Section 6A through its ordinary legislative
       power, it could not have prescribed a different cut-off date in this
       Section for granting citizenship to immigrants from Bangladesh.
       The Petitioners further claimed that Parliament should have
       sought a constitutional amendment instead. Consequently, they
       contended that Section 6A is unconstitutional for being in conflict
       with Articles 6 and 7.
120. Per contra, the Respondents put forth a different view. They urged
     that Section 6A does not violate Articles 6 and 7 because these
     Articles operate in different contexts, both in terms of time and
     geography. They provided additional context on the cut-off dates
     prescribed in Articles 6 and 7, asserting that these dates were a
     remnant of the permit system, which never applied to East Pakistan.
     Referring to the Constituent Assembly Debates, the Respondents
     also demonstrated that it was never intended for these provisions
     to apply to East Pakistan. Further, they argued that the spirit and
     intent behind Section 6A align with those of Articles 6 and 7 and that
     striking down Section 6A would not serve the objectives of these
     Constitutional provisions.
121. The Respondents further argued that even if it is assumed that Section
     6A conflicts with Articles 6 and 7, Article 11 of the Constitution is a
     non-obstante provision that grants Parliament the power to make
     laws regarding citizenship and that the other provisions of Part II of
     the Constitution cannot derogate from this power. In this regard, they
     relied upon Izhar Ahmed Khan v. Union of India,104 where it is held
     that the Parliament can make a valid law even when it is against
     such provisions. This power is supplemented by Entry 17 of List I
     of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, which also empowers
     Parliament to legislate on the subject of citizenship.


104 Izhar Ahmed Khan v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 1052.
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122. The Petitioners refuted this plea, asserting that while Article 11
     and Entry 17 of List 1 confer power upon Parliament, they do not
     include the authority to supersede other provisions within Part II of
     the Constitution. They interpreted Article 11 as a residual clause,
     empowering Parliament to enact laws that do not contravene other
     provisions within Part II. They argued that even if Article 11 admits
     multiple interpretations, the Court should adopt the construction that
     promotes harmony with the rest of the Constitution.
123. Considering these rival submissions, the issue that arises for
     consideration is whether Section 6A is violative of Articles 6 and 7
     of the Constitution, and whether the Parliament had the power to
     enact Section 6A.
124. As we have specified previously in paragraphs 19 and 22 of this
     judgement, Article 6 specifies the conditions for granting citizenship
     to people who have immigrated to India from Pakistan.
125. The language of Article 6 unambiguously suggests that there exist
     two sets of conditions under this provision: for persons who migrated
     before 19.07.1948, and for those who migrated after this date. In
     terms of the former, Article 6 prescribes two further conditions: first,
     is the condition of birth/descent, mandating that such an individual, or
     either his parents or his grandparents must have been born in India;
     and second, is the condition of residence, prescribing that such an
     individual must have been a resident of India since migration. A third
     set of conditions is also prescribed for the people who migrated after
     19.07.1948. This condition pertains to registration, which requires
     such individuals to have been registered as Indian citizens by an
     officer appointed for this purpose by the Government of India.
126. As a corollary to Article 6, and as previously discussed in paragraphs
     19 and 22 above, Article 7 prescribes the condition for granting
     citizenship to people who migrated to Pakistan.
127. Thus, Article 7 mandates that a person who migrated to Pakistan after
     01.03.1947 cannot claim Indian citizenship unless they fulfil three
     conditions: first, the person must have returned to India; second, such
     return must have been under permit for resettlement or permanent
     return; and third, that person must satisfy the conditions prescribed
     in Article 6 for a person migrating to India after 19.07.1948.
128. At this juncture, we may hasten to add that these conditions under
     Articles 6 and 7 covered both East and West Pakistan. This is
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              In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     visible from these provisions’ text, which explicitly states “territory
     now included in Pakistan”. Since Pakistan, at the time of the
     commencement of the Constitution (i.e., 1950), included both East
     and West Pakistan, creating any artificial distinction would militate
     against the text of these provisions. Accordingly, the Respondents’
     contention that these Articles would not cover East Pakistan cannot
     be accepted.
129. While the Respondents have cited the speeches of various members
     of the Constituent Assembly to argue that Articles 6 and 7 were not
     intended to apply to East Pakistan, we cannot use the opinion of
     individual members of the Constituent Assembly to negate the text
     of the Constitution, which, by itself, is the best manifestation of the
     Assembly’s intention. While the usage of such external aid might
     have been possible had the text been ambiguous, it cannot be used
     in the present context because Articles 6 and 7 leave no room to
     doubt that that they extend to both East and West Pakistan.
130. Having delineated the scope and ambit of these provisions, it
     is pertinent to comprehend the criteria outlined in Section 6A
     for bestowing citizenship upon immigrants from former East
     Pakistan, which was summarized previously in paragraph 25 of
     this judgement.
131. A perusal of these different conditions reflects various points of
     congruency between Section 6A and Articles 6 and 7. First, Section
     6A prescribes that the immigrant must have been of Indian origin,
     defined in Section 6A(1)(d) to mean the person/either of whose
     parents/grandparents were born in undivided India. Hence, similar
     to Articles 6 and 7, the condition of birth/descent is present. Second,
     similar to Article 6, which does not stipulate the condition of registration
     before 19.07.1948 but necessitates it thereafter, Section 6A also
     lacks a requirement for registration before the specified cut-off date
     (i.e., 01.01.1966) but imposes it afterwards. Finally, mirroring the
     provisions of Articles 6 and 7, Section 6A(2) and (3) introduce the
     condition of residence, mandating that the immigrant must have
     resided in India since their immigration.
132. Furthermore, Section 6A aligns with the fundamental purpose of
     Articles 6 and 7, which was to extend citizenship rights to those
     affected by the country’s partition. Articles 6 and 7 aimed to safeguard
     the rights of individuals who were previously Indian citizens but
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       found themselves residing in a foreign territory due to the political
       circumstances surrounding migration.105 Akin to this, Section 6A
       is also based on the same underlying policy reason of granting
       citizenship to the people of Indian origin migrating from Pakistan due
       to political disturbances in a foreign territory. Accordingly, Section
       6A is aligned with the Constitutional philosophy of Articles 6 and 7
       and is not contrary to them.
133. Regardless of these similarities, Section 6A diverges from Articles
     6 and 7 in terms of the cut-off dates. As discussed earlier, Articles
     6 and 7 prescribe the cut-off dates of 19.07.1948 and 01.01.1947,
     respectively. However, Section 6A prescribes two different cut-
     off dates: 01.01.1966 and 25.03.1971. Immigrants who entered
     Assam before 01.01.1966 are granted deemed citizenship, and
     immigrants who entered Assam between these two dates are
     granted citizenship once they fulfil certain conditions. Immigrants
     entering Assam on or after 25.03.1971 are not granted citizenship
     and are impliedly declared to be illegal immigrants who must be
     detected and deported.
134. The Petitioners’ contention that Section 6A is unconstitutional as it
     prescribes different dates in comparison to Articles 6 and 7 cannot
     be accepted because Article 6 does not prohibit the granting of
     citizenship after the cut-off date of 19.07.1948. It only specifies the
     fulfilment of certain conditions, which, as mentioned above, are
     also present in Section 6A(3). While Section 6A(2) grants deemed
     citizenship without these conditions, the competence of Parliament
     to prescribe different conditions—which will be analyzed in detail in
     the later part—is well embedded in Article 11.
135. Similarly, while Article 7 prohibits citizenship to people who re-migrated
     to India, this is only a sub-class of people who have been granted
     citizenship by Section 6A. Since Section 6A grants citizenship even
     to people who migrated for the first time, the class of re-migrants is
     severable from this provision. As will be discussed in the following
     paragraphs, the Parliament was competent to specify different
     conditions for this sub-class also.



105 R. K. Sidhwa, Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume 9, 11.08.1949.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                             1067

                 In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       Whether the Parliament had the competence to specify different
       conditions under Article 11
136. There is no quarrel among the parties that the Parliament has the power
     to enact laws on citizenship. This power is provided by Entry 17 of List
     1 of the Seventh Schedule, which reads “Citizenship, naturalisation
     and aliens”. Further, the present situation is also covered by Entry
     19, which reads, “Admission into, and emigration and expulsion from,
     India; passports and visas”. However, the parties are discordant to
     the extent of such power and whether law made by the Parliament
     can derogate from Article 6 and other provisions of Part II.
137. In this regard, it is pertinent to consider the objective and scope of
     Article 11 of the Constitution, which provides Parliament with the power
     to make laws on any matter relating to citizenship. Upon perusal of
     the text of Article 11, which was reproduced before in paragraph 19
     of this judgement, two important considerations come to light. First,
     the phrase “Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this Part shall
     derogate” clearly fortifies that Article 11 confers overriding powers
     upon the Parliament to make laws even when they are against other
     provisions of Part II.
138. This was also duly acknowledged by a 5-judge bench of this Court
     in Izhar Ahmed Khan (supra), where it was explicitly noted that
     Article 11 grants Parliament the sovereign right to make laws on
     citizenship and that such laws cannot be impeached on the ground
     that they go against Articles 5 to 10 of the Constitution.
139. Incidentally, the overriding effect of Article 11 is also clearly
     established by various speeches in the Constituent Assembly. They
     highlight that the provisions of Part II were only meant to enact the
     law on citizenship for the time being at the commencement of the
     Constitution and the Parliament was empowered to enact provisions
     in the future, including making altogether new provisions. 106 As
     discussed in paragraph 16 earlier, this is consistent with the global
     practice of laying down only overarching principles of citizenship



106 Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume 9, 10.08.1949; Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar
    and H. N. Kunzru, Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume 9, 12.08.1949; K. M. Munshi, Constituent
    Assembly Debates, Volume 3, 29.04.1947.
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     in the Constitution and empowering the Parliament to define the
     specifics through statutes.
140. From the phrase “Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this Part
     shall derogate”, the judicial pronouncement of this Court in Izhar
     Ahmed Khan (supra) and the accompanying speeches in the
     Constituent Assembly, we can appropriately conclude that Article
     11 gives the Parliament broad powers to enact laws on citizenship,
     notwithstanding any inconsistencies with any other provision in Part
     II of the Constitution.
141. The second important aspect of Article 11, which lends support to
     this conclusion, is that it grants the Parliament the power to make
     ‘any’ provision regarding citizenship. A critical amendment to the
     text of the draft Article 11 further fortifies this conclusion. Initially,
     the draft Article granted Parliament the power to make ‘further
     provisions’. However, during a session of the Constituent Assembly
     on 29.04.1947, the President of the Assembly argued that the word
     ‘further’ might imply that Parliament should only make provisions
     in continuation of other Articles in Part II. Consequently, the word
     ‘further’ was replaced with ‘any’. This amendment highlights the
     framers’ intention to afford Parliament nearly unrestricted flexibility
     in crafting laws pertaining to citizenship.
142. Based on the analysis presented in this section, it can be concluded,
     and we hold so, that the Parliament indeed possesses the legislative
     power to enact laws concerning citizenship and that this authority is
     not restricted by the provisions of Part II of the Constitution.

     (b)   Section 6A and dual citizenship
143. The Petitioners, having not limited their contentions to the violation
     of Articles 6 and 7, also urged that since the immigrants did not
     renounce their citizenship before they were granted Indian citizenship,
     Section 6A enables dual citizenship and is therefore unconstitutional
     for violating Article 9. While the Respondents have not directly
     addressed this issue, it is vital to provide a comprehensive analysis
     for the sake of completeness.
144. The concept of dual citizenship means one has citizenship of two
     countries simultaneously. Across the world, there are various countries
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                             1069

                   In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       like China,107 Japan,108 Kuwait,109 etc. that prohibit dual citizenship.
       Internationally, too, several countries have come together at various
       points to counter multiple citizenships. For instance, European
       nations that were members of the Council of Europe entered into the
       Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and on
       Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality, 1963, which, inter
       alia, provides that a person acquiring an additional nationality shall
       lose their previous nationality. Similarly, countries that were a part of
       the League of Nations (including India) entered the Convention on
       Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Law, 1930,
       to establish a commitment to abolishing dual citizenship.
145. In India, such citizenship is restricted by Article 9 of the Constitution
     and Section 9 of the Citizenship Act. Article 9 states that no person
     shall be granted Indian citizenship by Articles 5, 6, and 8 if such
     person has voluntarily acquired citizenship of a foreign state. As a
     corollary to this, Section 9 of the Citizenship Act provides:
               “Termination of citizenship —
               (1) Any citizen of India who by naturalisation, registration
               or otherwise voluntarily acquires, or has at any time
               between the 26th January, 1950 and the commencement of
               this Act voluntarily acquired, the citizenship of another
               country shall, upon such acquisition or, as the case may
               be, such commencement, cease to be a citizen of India:
               Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to a
               citizen of India who, during any war in which India may
               be engaged, voluntarily acquires the citizenship of another
               country, until the Central Government otherwise directs.
                                                                      [Emphasis supplied]
146. While both Article 9 and Section 9 seemingly restrict dual citizenship,
     they operate in different time spheres. As was held by this court
     in Izhar Ahmed Khan (supra), while Article 9 contemplates the
     denial of Indian citizenship to a person who had acquired foreign


107 Nationality Law of People’s Republic of China, 1980, Article 9.
108 Japan’s Nationality Law, 1950, Article 11.
109 Kuwait, Ministerial Decree No. 15 of 1959 Promulgating the Nationality Law, Article 11.
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       citizenship before the Constitution came into force, Section 9 deals
       with the acquisition of foreign citizenship after the commencement
       of the Constitution.
147. However, while they operate in different time spheres, a common
     theme that runs across both these provisions is the restriction on
     dual citizenship. Using these provisions, the Petitioners have urged
     that since Section 6A does not mandate the express renunciation
     of the immigrants’ previous citizenship before granting them Indian
     citizenship, Section 6A runs counter to these two constitutional and
     statutory provisions.
148. At the outset, even if it is assumed that Section 6A grants dual
     citizenship, it does not run counter to Article 9. We say so for the
     reason that these two provisions operate in different fields. As
     discussed above, Article 9 restricts a person possessing foreign
     citizenship from acquiring citizenship under Articles 5, 6, and 8.
     However, Section 6A does not grant citizenship under these provisions
     and is rather a separate method enacted by Parliament by virtue of
     its power under Article 11. The question of conflict between Article
     9 and Section 6A, therefore does not arise at all.
149. Further, Section 6A also does not conflict with Section 9 because
     Section 6A does not override the scheme of Section 9 and must be
     read complementarily thereto. In case an immigrant who has been
     granted citizenship by Section 6A is found to have dual citizenship,
     Section 9 can always be invoked to hold that such person has ceased
     to be an Indian citizen. By virtue of Section 9(2), read with Rule 40 of
     Citizenship Rules, 2009, the Central Government will determine the
     question of such acquisition of foreign citizenship as per the detailed
     procedure prescribed under Schedule III of the aforementioned
     Rules.110 Since Section 6A is not a safe harbor from Section 9 and
     is rather subject to the scheme of restricting dual citizenship, it is
     not in conflict with Section 9 of the Citizenship Act.
150. However, Section 6A, by operation of law, presumes the renunciation
     of previous citizenship. As was discussed before in paragraph 25,
     Section 6A(2) and 6A(3) grant citizenship to immigrants, with a



110 Akbar Khan Alam Khan v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 70, para 5; State v. Syed Mohd. Khan, 1962 SCC
    OnLine SC 2, para 6.
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                  In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       possibility of opting out of such citizenship by filing prescribed forms.
       If such forms are not filed, and the immigrants choose to retain
       Indian citizenship, the presumption is that the person is an Indian
       citizen only and has foregone their previous citizenship. For this, an
       analogy can be drawn with the foreign territories incorporated in India
       after independence, for which India passed various legislations that
       granted Indian citizenship without mandating the explicit renunciation
       of their previously acquired foreign citizenship.111 These legislations
       provide Indian citizenship by default and an opt-out mechanism
       similar to Section 6A. In the event the person does not opt-out, the
       law presumes renunciation of previous citizenship.
151. Globally as well, various jurisdictions have held that citizenship can
     be lost through implied renunciation. For instance, Article 13 of the
     Constitution of Panama explicitly provides implied renunciation of
     citizenship. In the USA, Section 349 of the Immigration and Nationality
     Act, 1952, provides for the automatic termination of citizenship
     when specific actions are taken. Similarly, in the case of Lorenzo
     v. McCoy,112 the Supreme Court of the Philippines held that express
     renunciation is not necessary for the forfeiture of one’s citizenship,
     and it could be terminated by the actions.
152. Similarly, by electing not to opt-out, immigrants involved in the present
     context are presumed to have implicitly renounced their previous
     citizenship as per the law. However, it is essential to acknowledge
     that this presumption regarding renunciation of citizenship is not
     definitive and is rebuttable. As elaborated earlier, if an individual
     is found to have voluntarily availed themselves of the benefits of
     foreign citizenship despite not opting out of Indian citizenship, such
     a person would fall under the purview of Section 9 of the Citizenship
     Act, allowing authorities to revoke their Indian citizenship and face
     consequential deportation.
153. Therefore, based on the aforementioned reasons, we are of the
     considered opinion that the framework outlined by Section 6A is
     that an individual falling under Sections 6A(2) and 6A(3) can only



111   Dadra and Nagar Haveli (Citizenship) Order, 1962; Goa, Daman and Diu, the Goa, Daman and Diu
      (Citizenship) Order, 1962; Chandernagore (Merger) Act, 1954, Section 12; Citizenship (Pondicherry)
      Order, 1962; Sikkim (Citizenship) Order, 1975.
112 Lorenzo v. McCoy, 15 Phil., 559 (Philippines Supreme Court).
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     assert Indian citizenship. Such individuals are presumed to have
     relinquished their previous citizenship. If authorities have reasons to
     believe that the previous citizenship is still being exercised, they are
     empowered under Section 9 of the Citizenship Act and associated
     rules to take steps to revoke the Indian citizenship of the delinquent
     individuals. Consequently, it can be deduced that Section 6A does
     not contradict Section 9 of the Citizenship Act, and we declare so.
     (c)   Section 6A and the oath of allegiance
154. The Petitioners also contended that Section 6A contradicts Section
     5 of the Citizenship Act (Section 5), which requires every citizen to
     take an oath of allegiance.
155. The Respondents refuted this argument by asserting that the failure
     to take the oath was inconsequential, and as such, an oath was not
     mandated for them.
156. A bare reading of Section 5(2) reflects that it requires the oath
     of allegiance specifically to be taken by persons who seek
     citizenship under Section 5(1), which, as summarized previously in
     paragraph 21, provides citizenship by registration upon making an
     application to the Central Government.
157. Hence, Section 5(2) requires an oath for a specific mode of acquisition
     of citizenship. Similarly, under the Citizenship Rules, 2009, the oath
     is limited to certain modes, such as citizenship by registration under
     Section 5, citizenship by naturalization under Section 6, etc. Since
     Section 5(2) does not mandate the oath for every form of citizenship,
     the immigrants cannot be said to have violated Section 5 by not
     taking the oath. Likewise, it is difficult to hold that the immigrants
     have contravened any constitutional provision, as the Constitution
     does not explicitly mandate an oath for citizenship.
158. Moreover, the absence of such an oath does not absolve the
     immigrants from their obligation to respect the law and order of India.
     Even when such oath is not taken before acquiring citizenship, every
     citizen has to compulsorily abide by the norms of the Constitution,
     statutory laws, and other rules and regulations. We need not further
     emphasise that once the immigrants have become Indian citizens
     by operation of Section 6A, they are regulated by the Constitution
     of India, the laws framed under it and the values enshrined within
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                       1073

                 In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       them. Hence, the explicit lack of an oath of allegiance before the
       conferral of citizenship by Section 6A does not absolve the immigrants
       covered under this provision from following the laws of our country,
       just as any other citizen of India.
159. Hence, on account of the above-stated reasons, Section 6A cannot
     be run down on the premise that it does not mandate an oath of
     allegiance.
       v.     Article 14 and classification under Section 6A
160. In addition to the numerous other grounds, the Petitioners have
     vehemently contended that Section 6A falls foul of Article 14 as it
     treats equals unequally. They argued that the selective application of
     Section 6A solely to the State of Assam exhibits hostility against it in
     comparison to other states. They contended that since the issue of
     illegal immigration from East Pakistan was also prevalent in States
     like West Bengal or, rather, was significantly greater in comparison,
     hence singling out Assam is unconstitutional. The Petitioners further
     argued that such recourse is unjustifiable and that geographical
     considerations could not be the determining factor for applying laws
     differently. In support of their contention that the classification under
     Article 14 has to be on a reasonable basis and based on lawful
     object, the Petitioners cited, inter alia, Nagpur Improvement Trust
     v. Vithal Rao113 and Subramanian Swamy v. CBI.114
161. In response, the Respondents have first contested the maintainability
     of the Petitioners’ plea by asserting that Article 14 can only be invoked
     by individuals who are alleged to have been unfairly excluded from
     benefits granted to others and not by those singled out and subjected
     to restrictions alone. It is the Respondents’ case that Article 14
     ensures equality in benefits provided but not in liabilities imposed.
     Given that the Petitioners’ claim falls into the latter category, the
     Respondents contended that the same would not be maintainable.
     Second, the Respondents argued that a statute cannot be struck
     down as violating Article 14 merely because it does not encompass
     all classes, as the Parliament wields discretion in legislating for



113 Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao (1973) 1 SCC 500
114 Subramanian Swamy v. CBI (2014) 8 SCC 682
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       varying degrees of harm. Citing precedents such as the State of
       M.P. v. Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd115 and Clarence Pais v. Union
       of India,116 the Respondents countered the Petitioners’ arguments
       by asserting that Parliament can make reasonable classifications
       and enact different laws based on territorial basis, thus justifying the
       differential treatment in granting citizenship. Third, the Respondents
       argued that Assam’s unique situation, marked by historical conflict,
       warrants differential treatment under Section 6A, ensuring that equals
       are not treated unequally. In this light, the central issue that arises
       for our consideration is whether Section 6A contravenes Article 14
       of the Constitution.
162. Article 14, as widely understood, guarantees that the State shall not
     deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection
     of laws within the territory of India. Typically, a claim under Article
     14 is brought forth by an individual contending that they have been
     unfairly excluded from the benefits or protection under law. However,
     the Petitioners’ argument diverges from this norm since they do not
     assert that they have been excluded from a benefit extended to
     similarly situated individuals. Instead, the Petitioners are contending
     that their rights under Article 14 are infringed because they alone
     have been statutorily compelled to bear the burden of Bangladeshi
     immigrants. Before examining whether Section 6A treats equals
     unequally, it is crucial to address whether the Petitioners have the
     locus to invoke a claim under Article 14 in the first place.
       (a)    Maintainability under Article 14
163. A bare reading of Article 14 indicates that it confers individuals with
     equality before the law and is not restricted to mere equality for the
     benefits provided under law. This provision came to be interpreted
     in the State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali Sarkar.117 In this case, a 7-judge
     Bench of this Court dealt with the challenge against the West Bengal
     Special Courts Act, 1950, which allowed the State government to
     refer certain offences to special courts. This Court noted that the
     procedure in such special courts was separate from the Code
     of Criminal Procedure and curtailed the rights of the accused.


115 State of M.P. v. Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd [1964] 6 SCR 846
116 Clarence Pais v. Union of India (2001) 4 SCC 325
117 State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952) 1 SCC 1, para 7.
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                  In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       Accordingly, it held that since the Act singled out certain cases and
       imposed restrictions on them, it violated Article 14. For this, the Court
       enunciated the principle that as per Article 14, “all persons similarly
       circumstanced shall be treated alike both in privileges conferred and
       liabilities imposed”.118
164. The argument of the Petitioners is similar. They contest that Section
     6A has singled out the State of Assam alone vis-à-vis other Indian
     States situated alongside the Bangladesh border and has curtailed
     the rights of only its original inhabitants. Accordingly, their plea of
     violation of Article 14 requires determination on merits.
165. This position is also clearly buttressed in John Vallamattom v.
     Union of India,119 in which the Court was concerned with a similar
     question regarding the imposition of restrictions upon Indian Christians
     alone and not on citizens belonging to other religions. Not only did
     the Court treat such a claim as maintainable under law, but it also
     held the provision to be violative of Article 14 because it applied
     restrictions on one class alone:
              “28. The provision relating to making of testamentary
              disposition by the citizens of India vis-à-vis those professing
              the religion of Christianity must be judged on the
              touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
              It is true that they form a class by themselves but ex
              facie I do not find any justifiable reason to hold that
              the classification made is either based on intelligible
              differentia or the same has any nexus with the object
              sought to be achieved.”
              “61. (…) The impugned provision is also attacked as
              discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 15 of the
              Constitution inasmuch as the restriction on bequest
              for religious and charitable purposes is confined
              to Christians alone and not to members of other
              communities. In my opinion, the classification between
              testators who belong to the Christian community
              and those belonging to other religions is extremely



118 Id.
119 John Vallamattom v. Union of India (2003) 6 SCC 611.
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               unreasonable. All the testators who bequeath property
               for religious and charitable purpose belong to the same
               category irrespective of their religious identity and so the
               impugned provision, which discriminates between the
               members of one community as against another, amounts
               to violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. (…)”
                                                                  [Emphasis applied]
166. Given the law cited above, the Petitioners’ assertion founded upon
     Article 14 cannot be invalidated at a preliminary stage merely
     because they are seeking equality in regard to a restriction as
     opposed to a benefit. Hence, the Respondents’ objection regarding
     the maintainability of the Petitioners’ claim under Article 14 is liable
     to be rejected.
       (b)     Section 6A vis-à-vis Article 14
167. The Petitioners argued that the exclusive application of Section 6A to
     Assam violates Article 14. They contended that by burdening Assam
     alone with the obligation to accommodate immigrants, Section 6A has
     detrimentally affected its natural resources and indigenous population.
     Furthermore, they asserted that since immigrants were also present
     in other States, there was no reasonable basis for discriminating
     against Assam and applying Section 6A solely to this State.
168. It is now a settled principle of law that the right to equality enshrined
     under Article 14 is not a mechanical idea of parity. Article 14 requires
     the legislature to treat equals equally, but it also allows for differential
     treatment if the characteristics of the classes differ.120 In fact, treating
     unequal entities alike and subjecting them to the same laws could
     potentially lead to greater injustice. Therefore, rather than enforcing a
     fixed procrustean notion of equality, Article 14 permits the legislature
     to classify individuals into different groups and apply distinct norms
     accordingly.
169. While the legislation can indeed classify persons into different
     groups and apply distinct standards, such classification must be
     reasonable. This Court has acknowledged that the precise parameters
     of what constitutes ‘reasonable’ has not been firmly established,



120 Special Courts Bill, 1978, In re (1979) 1 SCC 380, para 72.
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                  In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       and there is no single test to determine the reasonableness of a
       classification.121 However, while there is no straitjacket formula to
       determine reasonableness, certain yardsticks can be used to evaluate
       it, broadly categorized into the form and object of the classification.
       Yardsticks to check the reasonableness of classification
170. In terms of the form, the classification should not be based on arbitrary
     criteria and must instead be based on a logic which distinguishes
     individuals with similar characteristics i.e., the equals from the persons
     who do not share those characteristics—the unequals. Apart from
     requiring such differentia, this prong requires that the classification
     must be intelligible, such that it can be reasonably understood whether
     an element falls in one class or another.122 If the class is so poorly
     defined that one cannot reasonably understand its constituents, it
     will fail this test of ‘intelligible’ differentia. Therefore, instead of being
     based on arbitrary selection, the classification must be supported by
     valid and lawful reasons.123
171. Hence, using an intelligible criterion, the classes must be constituted
     in a manner that distinguishes the components of that class from
     the elements that have been left out of the class. This is instantiated
     by State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas,124 where a 7-judge bench was
     dealing with the challenge of exemption granted to Scheduled Castes
     from the departmental test required for promotion. The Court held
     that the same was based on intelligible differentia, as the persons
     belonging to the exempted class, i.e., the Scheduled Caste, differed
     from those excluded from this class.
172. At this juncture, it is essential to raise the question that if every
     person or object shares similarities and differences with others in
     numerous ways, how do we determine whether they are similar
     enough to be categorized together? To put this into context using an
     oft-quoted example–assume a law is enacted to create two classes
     of vehicles, one allowed inside the park and another prohibited.125 In
     this scenario, a motorcycle is similar to a child’s bicycle in that both


121 Transport & Dock Workers Union v. Mumbai Port Trust (2011) 2 SCC 575, para 24.
122 The Oxford Handbook on Indian Constitution, Oxford University Press, 2016, 940.
123 State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, supra note 117, para 18.
124 State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas (1976) 2 SCC 310
125 H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, Harvard Law Review, 1958, 71(4), 607.
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       these locomotives have two wheels but are dissimilar to the extent
       that the former operates with an engine and can achieve higher
       speeds. Further, while a bicycle differs from a motorcycle, it possesses
       characteristics similar to those of an electric motorcycle since both
       these vehicles do not emit pollution in the park. Simultaneously,
       an electric motorcycle is comparable to a fuel-based motorcycle
       due to their shared propulsion method by an engine, despite their
       disparity in pollution emissions. In light of these considerations,
       would such a classification be deemed reasonable if bicycles and
       electric motorcycles were grouped together as one class, excluding
       fuel-based motorcycles? Since different variables exist for checking
       the similarities and dissimilarities, how do we ascertain that ‘similar’
       elements are effectively grouped together?
173. This Court has held that the classification must withstand the test
     akin to the Wednesbury principles such that the classification shall
     consider all the ‘relevant’ similarities and disregard insubstantial or
     microscopic differences.126 However, this also does not answer the
     question conclusively, as one must still know the criterion for gauging
     ‘relevance’. For instance, in the example above, we still do not know
     whether being propelled by an engine should be a relevant criterion
     or not causing pollution should be the basis of classification!
174. This leads to the second prong of the test, which requires the
     classification to be as per the object of the statute.127 This Court has
     held that while determining who qualifies ‘similarly situated’ individuals
     in the given circumstances, the court must see the purpose of law:128
               "54. A reasonable classification is one which includes all
               who are similarly situated and none who are not. The
               question then is: what does the phrase “similarly
               situated” mean? The answer to the question is that
               we must look beyond the classification to the purpose
               of the law. A reasonable classification is one which
               includes all persons who are similarly situated with
               respect to the purpose of the law. The purpose of a law



126 Ramesh Chandra Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2024) 5 SCC 217, para 45; Roop Chand Adlakha v.
    DDA, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 116, para 19.
127 Special Courts Bill, supra note 120, para 72; D.S. Nakara v. Union of India (1983) 1 SCC 305, para 11.
128 State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd. (1974) 4 SCC 656, para 54.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                                       1079

                   In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


               may be either the elimination of a public mischief or the
               achievement of some positive public good.” 129
                                                                        [Emphasis supplied]
175. Hence, in the hypothetical above, the purpose of the law behind
     restricting the entry of vehicles inside the park will provide the standard
     of relevance for differentiating vehicles into separate classes. For
     instance, if the purpose is to stop pollution inside the park, electric
     motorcycles and bicycles can be grouped in the class of permissible
     vehicles. In contrast, vehicles based on petrol or diesel can be
     grouped into separate classes of restricted vehicles. However, if
     the purpose of the statute is to prevent people inside the park from
     getting hurt, children’s bicycles might be allowed, but other vehicles
     might be grouped and restricted.
176. This prong of the test is also echoed in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper
     v. Union of India,130 in which an 11-judge Bench of this Court held
     that the object of the statute was to foment economic development
     through the assistance of banks, and from a resource standpoint,
     this development could be more effectively facilitated by 14 banks
     in particular. Consequently, the Court ruled that classifying these 14
     banks in a separate class was based on reasoning that had a nexus
     with the object of the statute.
177. To sum up, a classification is reasonable if it differentiates between
     similar and dissimilar elements, if such distinction is intelligible, and
     if the similarities and dissimilarities have nexus with the purpose of
     the statute.131
178. Further, within this twin-test framework of checking the form and object
     of classification, this Court has held that the effect of the statute must
     also be considered.132 Instead of a mere formalistic study of checking


129 Id; Roop Chand Adlakha v. DDA, supra note 126, para 16.
130 Rustom Cavasjee Cooper (Banks Nationalisation), supra note 56, paras 178-180.
131 Provisions similar to Article 14 exist in Singapore (Article 12) and Malaysia (Art. 8(1)), which also use
    this twin test framework; Po Yen Jap, Constitutional Dialogue in Common Law Asia, Oxford University
    Press,2015; Similar provisions also exist in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 7), the
    International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 26), and Constitutions of other countries such
    as Bhutan (Article 7(15)), Brazil (Article 5), Canada (Article 15), China (Article 33), France (Article 1),
    Germany (Article 3), Italy (Article 3), Japan (Article 14), Nepal (Article 18), Switzerland (Article 8), and
    the USA (Article 1).
132 Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, supra note 71, para 409; State of T.N. v. National South Indian River
    Interlinking Agriculturist Association (2021) 15 SCC 534, para 21.
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       the intelligible differentia and nexus with the object, this Court would
       undertake a normative analysis and strike down a classification if
       the object itself is discriminatory or leads to a prejudicial outcome
       not conducive to constitutional morality.133 This effectively prevents
       the test of reasonable classification from becoming a mere formula
       and, instead, ensures that constitutional values are protected when
       the object itself is unjust.
       Qualifications regarding the yardsticks
179. Having established the yardsticks for the reasonableness of
     classification, it is important to note two crucial qualifications to
     complete the understanding of this test. First, while establishing a
     nexus with the object of the statute is necessary, it is not essential
     to demonstrate that the classification was the optimal method to
     achieve the object in question. To this end, this Court has held that:134
               "33. The nexus test, unlike the proportionality test,
               is not tailored to narrow down the means or to find
               the best means to achieve the object. It is sufficient
               if the means have a “rational nexus” to the object.
               Therefore, the courts show a greater degree of
               deference to cases where the rational nexus test is
               applied. A greater degree of deference is shown to
               classification because the legislature can classify
               based on the degrees of harm to further the principle
               of substantive equality, and such classification does
               not require mathematical precision. The Indian courts
               do not apply the proportionality standard to classificatory
               provisions (…).”
                                                                [Emphasis supplied]
180. Second, when gauging the reasonableness of classification, the
     Court must adopt a pragmatic view and refrain from deeming
     a classification unconstitutional solely because it is marginally
     under-inclusive.135 In adjudicating the validity of a statute, the concept
     of under-inclusiveness arises when a classification within the law


133 Ramesh Chandra Sharma, supra note 126, paras 34 and 40.
134 South Indian River Interlinking, supra note 132, para 33.
135 Shri Ambica Mills, supra note 128, para 55.
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                   In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       fails to encompass all individuals similarly situated with respect to
       the law’s intended purpose.136 The approach of Indian courts towards
       under-inclusive legislation generally exhibits tolerance137 on the
       premise that the legislature is “free to recognize degrees of harm”138
       and is allowed to “hit evil where it is most felt”.139 Moreover, this Court
       has also justified some under-inclusive classifications on the grounds
       of administrative convenience and legislative experimentation.140
181. Likewise, in Basheer v. State of Kerala,141 this Court upheld the
     validity of the law as long as it could be reasonably discerned based
     on intelligible differentia that advanced the object of the statute.
     The Court emphasized that merely because there is marginal
     under-inclusivity or the presence of cases falling on both sides of the
     dividing line, the law would not be declared as ultra vires of Article
     14. In this vein, it held that:
               "20. Merely because the classification has not been
               carried out with mathematical precision, or that there
               are some categories distributed across the dividing line,
               is hardly a ground for holding that the legislation falls
               foul of Article 14, as long as there is broad discernible
               classification based on intelligible differentia, which
               advances the object of the legislation, even if it be class
               legislation. As long as the extent of overinclusiveness or
               underinclusiveness of the classification is marginal, the
               constitutional vice of infringement of Article 14 would not
               infect the legislation.”
                                                                      [Emphasis supplied]
182. This principle was reiterated in Subramanian Swamy v. Raju,142
     where it was argued that individuals under the age of 18 could


136 Id.
137 Special Courts Bill, supra note 120, para 78; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Deoman Upadhyaya, 1960 SCC
    OnLine SC 8.
138 Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India, 1950 SCC Online SC 49.
139 B. K. Miller, Constitutional Remedies for Underinclusive Statutes: A Critical Appraisal of Heckler v.
    Mathews, Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, 1985, 20, 86.
140 South India River Interlinking, supra note 132; Superintendent & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Girish
    Kumar Navalakha (1975) 4 SCC 754, para 10; Javed v. State of Haryana (2003) 8 SCC 369, para 17.
141 Basheer v. State of Kerala (2004) 3 SCC 609, para 20.
142 Subramanian Swamy v. Raju (2014) 8 SCC 390, para 63.
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      demonstrate maturity, suggesting that age requirements should,
      therefore, be flexible under Article 14. While rejecting this argument,
      the Court held that categorization does not have to create classes
      with arithmetic precision, and instead, it would suffice if the classes
      are broadly comparable.
183. Having identified the criteria for evaluating the constitutionality of
     classifications, we can now proceed to analyse whether Section 6A
     is constitutionally valid.

      Reasonableness of classification as per Section 6A
184. To assess the reasonableness of the classification made by Section 6A,
     it is imperative to delve into the background of this provision.
185. As discussed earlier, Section 6A grants citizenship to those who
     migrated from East Pakistan into India before 25.03.1971. This grant
     of citizenship was prompted by several factors, with two primary
     considerations:
      (a)    First, as exemplified by the remarks in the Parliament during
             the discussion on the bill to introduce Section 6A, humanitarian
             concerns played a significant role in granting citizenship because
             it was deemed inhumane to repatriate thousands of people who
             had migrated during times of war.
      (b)    Second, considerations of inter-state relations were pivotal, as
             India sought to extend cooperation to the newly formed nation
             of Bangladesh and help it in restoring normalcy. As part of this
             understanding, it was agreed to grant citizenship in India to
             immigrants who arrived before 1971.143
186. The pertinent question that arises now is why such citizenship was
     granted exclusively to immigrants entering Assam. As acknowledged
     by the Union of India in its affidavit, the issue of immigration also
     existed in West Bengal. Therefore, if individuals from Bangladesh
     were immigrating to other States as well, we must ask what criteria
     justified conferring citizenship solely in Assam.
187. The answer to this question lies in history, specifically when Section
     6A was enacted. Between 1980 and 1985, the Government of India


143 Bholanath Sen, Lok Sabha Debate (CAB, 1985), 20.11.1985.
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             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     engaged in extensive negotiations with representatives of various
     bodies in Assam. Eventually, an agreement was reached among
     the Government of Assam, the Government of India, the AASU,
     and the AAGSP. According to this agreement, the movement’s
     representatives against foreigners in Assam agreed to call off the
     agitation in exchange for granting Indian Citizenship to only a limited
     category of immigrants in Assam. As a result, the government also
     extended benefits to those involved in the agitation and committed
     to focusing on the socio-economic development of Assam, with
     particular emphasis on building educational institutions. Known as the
     Assam Accord, this agreement represented a political compromise
     that specifically granted citizenship to immigrants in Assam based
     on the terms agreed upon in the Accord.
188. Section 6A was inserted to advance this political settlement
     established through the Assam Accord. The long title of the Citizenship
     Amendment Act, 1985 captures this by stating that, “Whereas for the
     purpose of giving effect to certain provisions of the Memorandum
     of Settlement relating to the foreigners’ issue in Assam (Assam
     Accord) which was laid down before the House of Parliament on the
     10th day of August, 1985 it is necessary to amend the Citizenship
     Act, 1955.”
189. Since section 6A was predicated on the terms of the Assam Accord,
     it extended citizenship solely to immigrants in Assam because the
     Union of India had exclusively engaged in this accord with Assam.
     This serves as the basis of intelligible differentia vis-à-vis other
     States. As discussed earlier, in assessing the reasonableness of
     classification, the Court must ascertain whether relevant factors were
     considered and whether similarly situated individuals were grouped in
     alignment with the law’s objective. Both these criteria are met in this
     instance. Section 6A duly considered the pertinent factors, notably
     that the Assam Accord pertained solely to the State of Assam. Since
     a piquant situation such as that in Assam did not exist in any of the
     other States, Section 6A’s objective did not extend to allowing such
     citizenship in these other States. Hence, the classification between
     the State of Assam and other States had a direct nexus with the
     object of the statute.
190. The next question that arises before us is whether the Court should
     go one layer further and hold that since such an agreement was
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       entered only with the State of Assam, the said exercise is liable to
       be construed as violative of Article 14 or whether the Union of India
       ought to have entered into similar agreements with other States?
       This has to be answered in the negative since such a determination
       falls outside the scope of judicial review, as this Court being not a
       representative body, should refrain from substituting its judgment for
       that of the elected representatives. The decision to enter into political
       compromises and agreements is a prerogative of the political entities
       involved, based on the specific circumstances and negotiations at
       hand. In the case of Assam, the unique situation and the negotiations
       conducted between 1980 and 1985 led to the Assam Accord, wherein
       certain benefits were extended to the State. However, it may not be
       appropriate for us to venture into the exercise of analysing whether
       similar agreements should have been pursued with other States
       like West Bengal.
191. Apart from the cases discussed while analyzing Issue i (Judicial
     Review) (supra), such judicial restraint has also been advocated
     by foreign courts. Lord Ruskill, in a 5-judge bench of the House of
     Lords in Council for Civil Service Union v. Minister for the Civil
     Service,144 elucidated that:
               "(…) Prerogative powers such as those relating to
               the making of treaties, the defence of the realm, the
               prerogative of mercy, the grant of honours, the dissolution
               of Parliament and the appointment of ministers as well as
               others are not, I think susceptible to judicial review
               because their nature and subject matter are such as
               not to be amenable to the judicial process. The courts
               are not the place wherein to determine whether a treaty
               should be concluded or the armed forces disposed in
               a particular manner or Parliament dissolved on one date
               rather than another.”
                                                                       [Emphasis supplied]
192. Indeed, India’s federal structure allows for diverse relationships
     between the Union and its constituent States, enabling the
     Parliament to engage in different agreements based on distinct


144 Council for Civil Service Union v. Minister for the Civil Service, 1985 AC 374, para 177.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                            1085

                  In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       regional aspirations, political needs, and state-specific requirements.
       The Assam Accord, along with the introduction of Section 6A, is
       not the only instance of such political compromises. Historical
       records document numerous occurrences, such as Article 371A
       of the Constitution, which was inserted pursuant to the agreement
       between the Government of India and leaders of the Naga Peoples
       Convention.145 Similarly, Article 371G was incorporated pursuant to
       a memorandum of settlement between the Government of India, the
       Government of Mizoram and the Mizo National Front.146 Identical
       is the basis of Article 332(6), which was based on the agreement
       between the governments of India and Assam and the Bodo
       Liberation Tigers.147 These agreements and provisions are based on
       asymmetric federalism, recognizing that different States may have
       unique circumstances and requiring differentiated treatment.
193. Moreover, this conclusion is also supported by various decisions
     of this Court, which have held that based on the unique historical
     circumstances of each State, the States may be grouped under
     different classes for the purpose of reasonable classification under
     Article 14.148
194. We thus do not find any fault with the government, nor do we dictate
     that similar agreements should have been made with other States
     when Parliament entered into a political agreement with Assam alone
     based on its unique historical situation.
196. As against these considerations, the Petitioners have not been able
     to conclusively establish that other States were similarly placed. It
     is an established principle of law that there exists a presumption of
     constitutionality that underpins legislative enactments unless proven
     otherwise.149 With respect to Article 14 specifically, this Court has
     dismissed claims pertaining to discrimination when insufficient material
     was presented to support the claim.150 It has been repeatedly held
     that to succeed with a claim under Article 14, a mere plea regarding


145 The Constitution (Thirteenth) Amendment Bill, 1962, Statement of Objects and Reasons.
146 The Constitution (Fifty-Third) Amendment Bill, 1986, Statement of Objects and Reasons.
147 The Constitution (Ninetieth) Amendment Bill, 2003, Statement of Objects and Reasons.
148 Ram Krishna Dalmia v. S.R. Tendolkar, 1958 SCC OnLine SC 6, para 11; Gopi Chand v. Delhi
    Administration, 1959 SCC OnLine SC 29, para 11.
149 Id.; Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, 1957 SCC OnLine SC 17, para 15.
150 Bhagwati Saran v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1961 SCC OnLine SC 170, para 15.
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       differential treatment is insufficient, and the Petitioner must show that
       similarly placed classes were discriminated against unjustifiably.151
197. While Mr. Divan, learned Senior Counsel representing the Petitioners,
     argued that the burden would shift unto the State once the Petitioners
     established prima facie evidence of unequal treatment, this shift
     primarily occurs when the classification is ex facie arbitrary, such that
     the unjust discrimination is so apparent that no proof is required.152
     In such circumstances, the onus must shift because the claimant
     cannot be burdened to disprove the absence of reasons when there
     are none.
198. However, unless the legislation is clearly arbitrary, this onus cannot
     be reversed liberally, as sought by the Petitioners. In the present
     case, the classification was not ex-facie arbitrary as it was grounded
     in the legitimate context of the unique circumstances prevailing in
     Assam. In addition, as discussed in paragraph 192, many States in
     India share a sui generis relationship with the Union, thereby raising
     the threshold for establishing ex-facie arbitrariness of Section 6A.
     Accordingly, the burden rested upon the Petitioners to rebut this
     presumption and demonstrate that other States were also comparably
     situated and faced similar levels of violence.
199. The illustrated burden has not been discharged by the Petitioners, and
     this Court is not engaging in a fact-finding endeavor at this stage. We
     are, therefore, bound to uphold the presumption of constitutionality
     and assume that the legislature has duly applied its mind and has
     taken into consideration relevant circumstances.
200. Further, the implementation of the Assam Accord and Section 6A
     brought quietus to the then-ongoing discord while concurrently
     enabling India to uphold its diplomatic commitments to Bangladesh
     and address humanitarian concerns. Although there is merit in the
     concern surrounding Assam alone having to shoulder the burden
     of these immigrants, it must be noted that this is not attributable
     to Section 6A alone. It is well documented, both by historians and
     by previous decisions of this Court, that incessant migration from
     Bangladesh has continued post-1971. It was neither the intention


151 State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd., 1964 SCC OnLine SC 121, para 11.
152 Ameerunnissa Begum v. Mahboob Begum (1952) 2 SCC 697, para 19; Ram Prasad Narayan Sahi v.
    State of Bihar (1953) 1 SCC 274, para 12.
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                 In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


      nor the effect of Section 6A to give shelter to this latter class of
      immigrants. Indeed, a large cause of the Petitioners’ grievance is
      the government’s failure to give effect to this latter part of the Assam
      Accord and our citizenship regime–which envisages timely detection
      and deportation of these post-1971 immigrants.
201. However, even if it is assumed that other States are similarly placed
     and should have been included thereunder, this alone would not
     render Section 6A unconstitutional.

      Under-inclusiveness and unconstitutionality of Section 6A
202. As was discussed previously in paragraphs 180 to 182 of this
     judgement, Courts are generally tolerant of marginally under-inclusive
     legislations and recognize that similar cases may fall on both
     sides of the dividing line, provided that there is a broad discernible
     classification based on intelligible differentia.153 While analyzing
     validity under Article 14, the Court has to be cognizant of the fact
     that any division done by a classification cannot be mathematically
     precise and accurate. As long as the broad purpose of the law is
     being fulfilled, a classification cannot be deemed unreasonable.
203. We are thus of the considered opinion that even if there are States
     that could share similar characteristics with Assam, the comparison
     should be between two broad classes: Assam and the rest of
     India, rather than each individual constituent of these two classes.
     Since other States, in general, were not facing similar issues, the
     differentiation in classes was reasonable. Hence, even if some States
     like West Bengal were placed similarly to Assam, that in and of itself
     would not lead to holding Section 6A unconstitutional. Accepting the
     Petitioners’ contention and striking down Section 6A on the grounds
     of non-inclusion only of West Bengal would amount to allowing an
     under-inclusivity challenge in disguise, which, as discussed before,
     is not generally permitted by this Court.
204. Instead of comparing borderline cases such as West Bengal with
     Assam, the comparison ought to be between Assam and an average
     constituent of the other class, i.e. the rest of India. As analysed in
     previous sections, Assam and the rest of India are distinguishable



153 Basheer, supra note 141.
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       on the basis of the unique political situation created in Assam by the
       influx of immigrants. The classification under Section 6A, therefore,
       is not violative of Article 14 simply because it is applicable to the
       State of Assam alone.
205. On the basis of the aforesaid reasoning, it is held that Section 6A is
     not ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

       vi.    Manifest arbitrariness
206. Citing Shayara Bano v. Union of India,154 the Petitioners argued
     that a provision can be struck down as unconstitutional if it is
     manifestly arbitrary. To prove that Section 6A is manifestly arbitrary,
     the Petitioners contended that:
       (a)    Section 6A is against the overarching principles of democracy,
              federalism and the rule of law and is liable to be struck down
              on the grounds of manifest arbitrariness.
       (b)    The cut-off dates in Section 6A, namely 01.01.1966 and
              25.03.1971, have no rationale and have been set arbitrarily.
       (c)    There is no machinery for evaluating, assessing and determining
              the grant of citizenship under Section 6A(2), thus allowing
              anyone above the age of 57 years in Assam to claim citizenship
              without claiming ancestry or provenance.
207. The Petitioners also contended that the expression ‘ordinarily resident’
     is vague as it does not prescribe any yardstick for the number of
     days required to qualify the same. In this light, the Petitioners have
     cited this Court’s decision in Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia v.
     Union of India155 to contend that when key concepts in a provision
     are vague, the same ought to be struck down.
208. Per contra, the Respondents contended that the challenge to Section
     6A under Article 14 on the grounds of being ‘manifestly arbitrary’ is
     untenable as there is an underlying rationale for the cut-off dates.
     It was submitted that the validity of 01.01.1966 as the cut-off date
     is severable from the validity of 25.03.1971. Hence, even if it is
     held to be arbitrary, Section 6A as a whole cannot be held to be


154 Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 1
155 Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia v. Union of India (1969) 2 SCC 166
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                         1089

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       unconstitutional. The Respondents also contended that the very
       objective behind Section 6A and the Assam Accord, as a whole,
       reflect a constitutional tradition of accommodating differences within
       Indian polity through asymmetric federal arrangements. Lastly, the
       Respondents have submitted that the term ‘ordinarily resident’ has
       been defined by this Court in Arunachal Pradesh v. Khudiram
       Chakma156 and hence is not vague.
209. The issues that fall for our consideration are four-fold:
       i.     Is there any rationale for the cut-off dates, i.e., 01.01.1966 and
              25.03.1971? Whether they are manifestly arbitrary?
       ii.    Whether the process envisaged under Section 6A and the
              Citizenship Rules, 2009 for the migrants is unreasonable and
              suffers from the vice of ‘manifest arbitrariness’?
       iii.   Is Section 6A is so ‘manifestly arbitrary’ that it offends Part II
              of the Constitution?
       iv.    Is the term ‘ordinarily resident’ in Section 6A undefined and
              vague? If yes, does Section 6A deserve to be struck down on
              the grounds of being manifestly arbitrary?

       (a)    Relation between Article 14 and arbitrariness
210. At the outset, it is pertinent to address that apart from the reasonable
     classification aspect of non-discrimination discussed in the preceding
     section, Article 14 also prohibits manifestly arbitrary actions. The
     principle underlying the same is that if an act is arbitrary and no
     rational basis exists for its application, it may lead to differential
     application on similarly situated persons. Hence, such arbitrariness
     is not only antithetical to the notion of equality, it is also prohibited
     under Article 14.
211. The absence of arbitrariness, or non-arbitrariness, as an essential
     component of the rule of law and a concomitant need in Article 14 is
     sufficiently evident. The relation between rule of law and arbitrariness
     was also traced in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain157 and




156 Arunachal Pradesh v. Khudiram Chakma, 1994 Supp. 1 SCC 615
157 Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain, 1975 Supp SCC 1
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       thereafter, in E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu,158 wherein
       equality was observed to be antithetical to arbitrariness. Furthermore,
       it was underscored that when an act is arbitrary, it inherently embodies
       inequality in political logic and constitutional jurisprudence, thus
       contravening the principles enshrined in Article 14. It is imperative
       to understand the significance of logic as one of the critical facets
       behind state action, the absence of which would render such action
       susceptible to arbitrariness.
212. This Court further elaborated upon the relationship between Article
     14 and the conception of non-arbitrariness in the seminal case of
     Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,159 wherein after emphasizing the
     dynamic nature of ‘equality’ and citing the ‘arbitrariness’ doctrine as
     formalized through EP Royappa (supra), it was observed by PN
     Bhagwati, J. (as His Lordship then was) that:
              "7. […] Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and
              ensures fairness and equality of treatment. The principle of
              reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically,
              is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness
              pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence and
              the procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer
              the test of reasonableness in order to be in conformity
              with Article 14. […]”

       (b)    Constituents of manifest arbitrariness
213. The test of ‘manifest arbitrariness’ itself was crystallized in the
     authoritative precedent set out in Shayara Bano v. Union of India
     (supra), where this Court dealt with the challenge to the practice
     of ‘triple talaq’ as recognized in the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat)
     Application Act, 1937. In that case, this Court over-ruled its previous
     decision in State of AP v. McDowell & Co.,160 wherein it held that
     an enactment cannot be struck down on the grounds of it being
     arbitrary or unreasonable and that some constitutional infirmity has
     to be found before invalidating an Act.
214. Thus, the test of ‘manifest arbitrariness’ was set out in Shayara
     Bano (supra) as follows:


158 E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974) 4 SCC 3
159 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248, para 7.
160 State of Andhra Pradesh v. McDowell & Co. (1996) 3 SCC 709
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              "101. […] Manifest arbitrariness, therefore, must be
              something done by the legislature capriciously, irrationally
              and/or without adequate determining principle. Also,
              when something is done which is excessive and
              disproportionate, such legislation would be manifestly
              arbitrary.”
                                                                 [Emphasis supplied]
215. The test of ‘manifest arbitrariness, as propounded in Shayara Bano
     (supra), was eventually relied on in a catena of decisions including
     Joseph Shine v. Union of India,161 and is the prevailing law on
     this issue.

       (c)    Facets of the test of manifest arbitrariness
216. The term ‘irrationality’ refers to the lack of reason or logic. While
     highlighting the need for the presence of clear reason or logic, this
     Court in Cellular Operators Assn. of India v. TRAI,162 determined
     that the legislation, statute or provision being challenged must be
     supported by a rationale. The rationale demonstrates the application
     of intelligent care and observation in the enactment of such laws or
     provisions. To this end, it was held that:
              "48. (…) We cannot forget that when viewed from the
              angle of manifest arbitrariness or reasonable restriction,
              sounding in Article 14 and Article 19(1)(g) respectively, the
              Regulation must, in order to pass constitutional muster,
              be as a result of intelligent care and deliberation, that
              is, the choice of a course which reason dictates. Any
              arbitrary invasion of a fundamental right cannot be said
              to contain this quality. (…)”
                                                                  [Emphasis applied]
217. Further, in Joseph Shine (supra), this Court emphasized the
     underlying logic while striking down the provision prohibiting adultery:
              "30. [...] The offence and the deeming definition of an
              aggrieved person, as we find, is absolutely and manifestly


161 Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2019) 3 SCC 39
162 Cellular Operators Assn. of India v. TRAI (2016) 7 SCC 703
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             arbitrary as it does not even appear to be rational and
             it can be stated with emphasis that it confers a licence
             on the husband to deal with the wife as he likes which
             is extremely excessive and disproportionate. We are
             constrained to think so, as it does not treat a woman as an
             abettor but protects a woman and simultaneously, it does
             not enable the wife to file any criminal prosecution against
             the husband. Indubitably, she can take civil action but the
             husband is also entitled to take civil action. However, that
             does not save the provision as being manifestly arbitrary.
             That is one aspect of the matter. If the entire provision
             is scanned being Argus-eyed, we notice that on the one
             hand, it protects a woman and on the other, it does not
             protect the other woman. The rationale of the provision
             suffers from the absence of logicality of approach
             and, therefore, we have no hesitation in saying that it
             suffers from the vice of Article 14 of the Constitution
             being manifestly arbitrary.”
                                                               [Emphasis supplied]
218. Still further, while the test of manifest arbitrariness requires the
     presence of logicality, such reasoning does not have to be stated
     explicitly and can be discernable from the facts and circumstances.163
     However, it should be noted that the converse may not hold. In
     other words, even if the reason or rationale behind the impugned
     provision is expressly stated, it does not automatically guarantee
     non-arbitrariness. Such reason also needs to align with constitutional
     morality and public interest, and must bear a nexus with the object
     of the statute. The aspect of irrationality, as found in the test for
     ‘manifest arbitrariness’, thus, does not solely imply the absence
     of reason but also requires alignment with constitutional morality.
     Hence, the legitimacy of the reason or logic behind the impugned
     legislation should be viewed from the lens of constitutional ideals. This
     was so observed by this Court in Joseph Shine (supra), wherein it
     was clarified that irrationality does not merely denote the absence
     of reason but also requires that such reasoning be in harmony with
     constitutionalism.


163 J.S. Luthra Academy v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (2018) 18 SCC 65
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219. We may hasten to add that, the legitimacy of the reason behind the
     legislation that has been impugned must be viewed from the lens
     of public interest also. This Court, in Hindustan Construction Co.
     Ltd. v. Union of India,164 struck down Section 87 of the Arbitration
     and Conciliation Act, 1996, on the ground of manifest arbitrariness by
     observing that it was against public interest. This was also observed
     in Manish Kumar v. Union of India (supra), that the golden thread
     running through this ground, making up the doctrine of manifest
     arbitrariness, is the absence of public interest.

       (d)    Extent of review under manifest arbitrariness
220. The standard for applying the test of ‘manifest arbitrariness’ is reflected
     in the word ‘manifest’, which signifies that the arbitrariness should
     be palpable and visible on the face of it.165 Hence, while examining
     whether a provision is manifestly arbitrary, Courts should practice
     judicial restraint and must not substitute their will against that of
     lawmakers.166 Using this test, Courts cannot question the wisdom of
     the policy but can only test its legality in terms of the aforementioned
     grounds.
221. Such judicial restraint becomes all the more necessary while testing
     the arbitrariness behind a bright-line test. In law, the bright-line test is
     a clearly defined norm that does not leave a scope of interpretation.
     For instance, consider a legal requirement stipulating that individuals
     must be 18 years old to marry. Such a rule leaves no room for
     interpretation. In this context, it could be argued that if maturity is
     the rationale behind marriageable age, the use of the bright-line test
     introduces arbitrariness into legal standards, as a person aged 17.5
     years old may in theory be more mature and suitable for marriage
     than someone aged 18.5 years old.
222. The fallacy in this argument can be elucidated by the Sorites
     paradox, a logical quandary generated by vague terms, with
     blurred boundaries of application. To give an oft-quoted example,
     consider defining the term ‘heap of wheat’ based on the number of



164 Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. Union of India (2020) 17 SCC 324
165 Vivek Narayan Sharma (Demonetisation Case-5 J.) v. Union of India (2023) 3 SCC 1, para 255.
166 K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J) v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1, para 310.
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     wheat grains. If a collection of N number of grains is called a heap,
     removing one grain would not alter the assessment because the
     difference between a heap and non-heap cannot be of one single
     grain. By the same reasoning, removing two wheat grains would
     not change the classification. Extending this logic incrementally, by
     deducting one wheat grain at a time, one could argue that even
     a heap with N minus N grains would not be a heap, leading to a
     fallacious conclusion.
223. Applying this paradox to the above illustration, if an individual of 18
     years is deemed mature enough for marriage, then logically, someone
     who is 18 years minus one day should also be considered mature.
     Following the same reasoning, one could argue that a person who is
     18 years minus 365 days, effectively 17 years old, would also meet
     the maturity criterion and therefore, the stipulation of 18 years as the
     minimum age appears arbitrary, as it fails to account for the potential
     maturity of individuals who are younger. As already explained, there
     exists an inherent fallacy in this argument, and hence, it ought to
     be rejected.
224. In that sense, every bright-line test, to some extent, is arbitrary.
     However, not every arbitrariness crosses permissible limits inherent
     in law. Indeed, the law sometimes prescribes these heuristic devices
     because the cost of arbitrariness is less than the gains received
     by prescribing a clear standard instead of keeping it vague. To put
     it differently, where arbitrariness is necessitated for a legislative
     distinction, the object of such a legislative act is also to prevent
     manifest arbitrariness.
225. To explain using another analogy, let us consider the context of setting
     speed limits. Juxtapose two scenarios: one, where a sign is posted
     saying “do not drive faster than 60 kmph”; and second, where the
     sign says, “do not drive fast”. Following the logic discussed earlier, the
     60 kmph standard appears arbitrary because if 60 kmph is deemed
     fast, then 59 kmph should also be considered fast, yet it would not
     be restricted. However, if the standard is left vague as “fast”, the
     consequences could be unjust and manifestly arbitrary. Some cars
     might exceed 80 kmph, leading to potential legal disputes when
     stopped. The lack of precise regulation could result in ineffective
     traffic control and costly litigation for public institutions. Conversely,
     if law enforcement clamps down to limit fast driving, it could create
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       a chilling effect, slowing traffic even below the optimal speeds. Thus,
       while a 60 kmph limit may appear arbitrary, yet implementing that
       as a bright-line test would be more reasonable overall.
226. Therefore, while testing the arbitrariness of bright-line tests, the
     Courts must be mindful of the inherent limitations in such norms
     and therefore a microscopic review should be avoided. Instead, as
     discussed above, the effort should be to determine if the bright-line
     norm crosses the prescribed limit of ‘manifest arbitrariness’ and is
     irrational and capricious enough to be struck down. If the norm is
     backed by a policy reason, the Court must refrain from excessively
     questioning the specific standard and should exercise judicial review
     cautiously.

       (e)    Cut-off dates in Section 6A
227. The Petitioners vehemently challenged the cut-off dates and argue
     that those dates are arbitrary. As explained above, a bright-line test
     given by cut-off dates cannot be arbitrary unless it is shown to be
     unreasonable. This Court has, in a catena of decisions, maintained
     that the determination of cut-off dates falls within the domain of
     the Executive and the Court should not interfere with the fixation
     of the same, unless it appears to be, on the face of it, blatantly
     discriminatory and arbitrary.167 To this effect, this Court has even
     held that the choice of a cut-off date cannot always be dubbed as
     arbitrary, even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice,
     unless it is demonstrated to be capricious or whimsical. 168 This
     stance aligns with the understanding of the inherent arbitrariness
     of bright-line tests, as discussed above in paragraphs 221 to 224.
228. Adverting to the rationale behind the cut-off date of 01.01.1966, it
     seems there are historical circumstances, and the said date appears
     to be based on two significant policy reasons:
       (a)    Humanitarian grounds: As discussed in paragraph 185 of this
              judgement, Section 6A was predicated on humanitarian grounds,
              where citizenship was granted to the people displaced by wars
              and political turmoil. Between 1964 and 1965, a significant



167 State of Punjab v. Amar Nath Goyal (2005) 6 SCC 754
168 Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works (1975) 1 SCC 305
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               influx of refugees prompted the Union to issue instructions to
               register such persons as citizens.169 The humanitarian grounds
               for the grant of citizenship apparently influenced the rationale
               for choosing this cut-off date.
       (b)     Administrative convenience: Further, the immigrants who
               migrated before 1966 were added to the electoral rolls prepared
               as on 01.01.1966. These rolls served as the nearest definite
               document that could be drawn upon to determine citizenship,
               especially with a view to desist from disturbing the status quo
               amidst the large-scale migration and consequent settlement
               of people before 01.01.1966.170 It was also administratively
               convenient to select this cut-off date because of the
               impracticality of requesting documents from individuals who
               migrated much earlier, such as in 1951. Although 1961 was
               initially proposed as the cut-off date, but after due deliberations,
               eventually, the cut-off date of 01.01.1966 was agreed to, and
               thus, the period before and after 1966 was dealt with in a
               differential manner.
229. It can thus be concluded that the date of 01.01.1966 was not set
     arbitrarily but based on proper application of mind.
230. As regards to the reasoning behind the cut-off date of 25.03.1971,
     the same can be traced to the launch of Operation Searchlight by
     Pakistan, an event which also marked the onset of the Bangladesh
     Liberation War. Subsequently, on the very next day, on 26.03.1971,
     Bangladesh officially declared independence. In response to these
     developments, the Prime Minister of Bangladesh committed to “by
     every means, the return of all the refugees who had taken shelter
     in India since March 25, 1971, and to strive, by every means to
     safeguard their safety, human dignity and livelihood”.171
231. Soon thereafter, the President of Bangladesh promulgated the
     Bangladesh Citizenship (Temporary Provisions) Order, 1972, on
     15.12.1972, with retrospective validity from 26.03.1971. The 1972


169 T. S. Murty, Assam, The Difficult Years: A Study of Political Developments in 1979-83, Himalayan Books,
    1983.
170 Id.
171 Joint Communique issued at the end of the visit of the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibur
    Rahman, to India, 08.02.1972.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                     1097

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     Order essentially introduced a framework of constituent citizenship,
     signifying the initial acquisition of citizenship through the operation
     of the law. The 1972 Order put forth a discernible distinction and
     provided citizenship from 25.03.1971, ameliorating the issue of
     statelessness. Since the war had ended and a new nation was
     formed on 25.03.1971, the concern regarding providing citizenship
     based on humanitarian grounds was also assuaged. This appears
     to be the rationale behind prescribing the date of 25.03.1971 as a
     cut-off for obtaining citizenship in India.
232. This background indicates that the cut-off dates in Section 6A
     were not incorporated in a vacuous manner but were a result of
     considerable deliberation and discussion, and were also backed
     by a well-considered rationale. Furthermore, keeping in mind the
     humanitarian considerations that would have gone into the grant
     of citizenship under Section 6A, we cannot hold that the rationale
     behind the cut-off dates militates against any constitutional values
     or the concept of constitutional morality. Instead, Section 6A
     acknowledged the political and social realities of that period along
     with the impracticability of reversing the changes that had occurred.
233. Nevertheless, and as noted earlier, the determination of a cut-
     off date falls within the ambit of the policy makers and the Court
     would be reluctant to impinge into such fixation, save and except
     when the assigned date is vitiated with discriminatory and arbitrary
     considerations. Since the cut-off dates in Section 6A have been found
     not to offend the aforementioned principles, we are not inclined to
     interfere in the prescription of such cut-off dates.
234. We may hasten to add here that Section 6A does not operate
     perpetually and since it does not rescue those immigrants who
     entered the State of Assam on or after 25.03.1971 and has become
     redundant qua them, the cut-off dates prescribed therein cannot be
     said to be tainted with the element of manifest arbitrariness.

     (f)   Process prescribed under Section 6A
235. The Petitioners also claimed that the process as prescribed under
     Section 6A is also manifestly arbitrary. Let us now proceed to
     consider whether the process in built in Section 6A suffers with the
     vice of manifest arbitrariness, regardless of the number of conditions
     prescribed therein for claiming citizenship.
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236. The conditions for an individual who migrated prior to 01.01.1966
     are such that first, the person must be of Indian origin; second, they
     should have migrated to Assam from the specified territory before
     01.01.1966; and third, the person must have been ordinarily resident
     in Assam since the date of their entry into Assam. Additionally, the
     persons whose names were included in the electoral rolls for the
     1967 elections were also to be conferred deemed citizenship. Section
     6A(1) further defines the meaning of the terms contained in Section
     6A(2). Section 6A(1) (a) explains ‘Assam’ to mean “territories included
     in the State of Assam immediately before the commencement of
     the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 1985”. Section 6A(1) (c) defines
     ‘specified territory’ to mean “territories included in Bangladesh
     immediately before the commencement of the Citizenship Act, 1985”.
     Further, the person is deemed to be of ‘Indian origin’, as per Section
     6A(1) (d), if “he, or either of his parents or any of his grandparents
     was born in undivided India”. The meaning of ‘ordinarily resident
     in Assam’ is also clear and has been discussed in the succeeding
     paragraphs. Hence, conferring deemed citizenship under Section
     6A(2) is not arbitrary but subject to the abovementioned conditions.
237. Further, the migrants who came to Assam on or after 01.01.1966
     and before 25.03.1971, will have to be subjected to the following
     conditions and processes, in addition to the conditions stipulated
     above:
     i.     Such persons should have been detected to be foreigners.
            Section 6A(1) (e) makes it clear that a person is deemed to have
            been a foreigner on the date on which a Tribunal constituted
            under the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 submits its opinion
            to the effect that he is a foreigner to the officer or authority
            concerned.
     ii.    Such persons, thereafter, should register themselves in
            accordance with the provisions of the Citizenship Rules, 2009,
            with a registering authority as specified therein. Rule 19 of the
            Citizenship Rules, 2009 deals with the Registering Authority,
            who would be an officer not below the rank of the Additional
            District Magistrate.
     iii.   Thereafter, per Rule 19(2), an application for registration under
            Form XVIII would have to be made by the persons so detected
            by the Tribunals, before the Registering Authority within 30 days
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                        1099

              In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


            of such detection. Such application must be made within 30
            days of the appointment of the Registering Authority.
     iv.    The Registering Authority would thereafter enter the particulars of
            the application in Form XIX and return a copy of the application
            under his seal to the applicant.
     v.     The Authority would send such a copy of the application to
            the Central and State governments with a quarterly return in
            Form XX.
     vi.    Further, as per Section 6A(4), a person registered under the
            process mentioned above would be entitled from the date of
            his detection as a foreigner and till the expiry of ten years from
            that date, the same rights and obligations as an Indian citizen
            except for the right to vote.
     vii.   Rule 20 of the Citizenship Rules, 2009 also allows the Registering
            Authority to make a fresh reference to the Tribunals upon receipt
            of an application from an applicant when any question arises
            whether such person fulfils the necessary criteria or the Tribunal
            has not recorded a finding to that effect.
238. From the above, it is clear that there are legibly delineated conditions
     and a reasonable process envisaged under Section 6A and the
     Citizenship Rules, 2009 for migrants who came before 01.01.1966,
     as well as for those who came on or after 01.01.1966 and before
     25.03.1971.
239. Still further, apart from these conditions prescribed within Section
     6A itself, various other statutes supplement the issue of migrants
     in Assam. As will be detailed in the later part of this judgement
     under Issue xi (Citizenship Act vis- à-vis the IEAA) (infra), these
     statutes include the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act, 1950,
     Foreigners Act, 1946, the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964, the
     Passport (Entry into India) Act, 1920 and the Passport Act, 1967.
     In these statutes, the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act, 1950
     prescribes the mechanism for the expulsion of immigrants acting
     against the public interest, and the Foreigners Act, 1946 as well
     as the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 prescribe, inter alia, the
     mechanism for detection of foreigners, the norms regarding their
     stay in India before they are granted citizenship, and deportation of
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     illegal immigrants post-1971. Additionally, the Passport (Entry into
     India) Act, 1920 can also be used to penalize illegal immigrants
     who entered India without a valid passport. The Passport Act, 1967
     can be used for penalizing immigrants travelling out of India without
     such a passport.
240. The above statutes, for the reasons assigned in the later part,
     supplement Section 6A and are to be read together to create a
     harmonious code. The process which runs through all of these
     legislations does not appear to be capricious or irrational. We cannot
     therefore approve the Petitioners’ approach of singularly reading
     Section 6A in isolation, calling it incomplete and terming it manifestly
     arbitrary for not prescribing all conditions exhaustively.
241. There also appears to be an explicit and legitimate reason behind the
     process of segregating migrants into different classes, as provided in
     Section 6A. This is so, since the over-arching objective of Section 6A
     and the Assam Accord was to achieve a comprehensive and lasting
     solution to the complex issue of migration in Assam; balancing legal,
     political, and humanitarian considerations.
242. At this juncture, it is crucial to distinguish between the prescribed
     process under the provision and its actual implementation. While the
     legislature had anticipated that the procedure outlined in Section 6A,
     along with other complementary statutes mentioned in paragraph
     239 above, would suffice to address the issue of immigration into
     Assam, this intention has not been realized. Instead of adequately
     addressing the immigrants who entered the state before 1971 and
     timely identifying and deporting those who entered illegally post-
     1971, the Respondents have not properly implemented this legal
     regime, leading to a scenario where the latter category of immigrants
     have been residing in Assam like ordinary citizens. However, this
     failure is not attributable to Section 6A but rather to its inadequate
     implementation.
243. Certainly, had the law granted Indian citizenship to undocumented
     immigrants from another country on an ongoing basis without
     any intelligible criteria or discernible principle, it could have been
     susceptible to challenge. However, this is not the case here. As
     previously analyzed, Section 6A conferred citizenship only upon
     certain immigrants who met certain specified conditions up to a
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                        1101

                  In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       particular cut-off date. Functioning alongside other statutes, its aim
       was not only to legitimize the stay of a particular class of immigrants
       but also to facilitate the detection and deportation of others. Section
       6A is clearly not manifestly arbitrary.

       (g)    Section 6A and Part II of the Constitution
244. The Petitioners further argued that individuals declared as citizens
     in Part II of the Constitution, along with successive generations,
     constitute the basic structure of the Constitution, and any statute or
     statutory provision which interferes with this basic structure, without
     reasonable care and fairness, should be deemed ‘manifestly arbitrary’
     thus rendering Section 6A as liable to be struck down.
245. Since we have already dealt with Part II of the Constitution in the
     preceding parts, this issue need not be iterated again. It would be
     sufficient to observe that Section 6A does not go against the notion
     of citizens under Part II of the Constitution, and the same does not
     sustain a challenge based on either the ‘basic structure’ theory or
     ‘manifest arbitrariness’.

       (h)    ‘Ordinarily resident’ in Section 6A
246. The Petitioners submitted that the expression ‘ordinarily resident’,
     as contained in Section 6A, is vague as it does not prescribe any
     yardstick for the number of days required to qualify the same. In
     this light, the Petitioners cited this Court’s holding in Harakchand
     Ratanchand Banthia v. Union of India (supra), to contend that
     when key concepts in a provision are vague, the same ought to be
     struck down.
247. Vagueness as one of the grounds for striking down a provision
     under Article 14 can be understood through judicial pronouncements
     made by this Court. In the Indian Social Action Forum v. Union
     of India,172 a 2-judge Bench of this Court dealt with a challenge
     to certain provisions of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act,
     2010 and the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Rules, 2011. While
     particularly analyzing the words ‘activity, ideology and programme’
     in Section 5(1) of the above enactment, this Court affirmed the High


172 Indian Social Action Forum v. Union of India (2021) 15 SCC 60.
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       Court’s view that the abovementioned words do not suffer from the
       vice of vagueness, and would not invite the wrath of Article 14. This
       Court observed as follows:
              “16. […] The High Court held that the words "activities of the
              organisation, the ideology propagated by the organisation
              and the programme of the organisation” having nexus with
              the activities of a political nature are expansive but cannot
              be termed as vague or uncertain. Sufficient guidance is
              provided by Parliament in Section 5 and it is for the rule-
              making authority to lay down the specific grounds. We
              are in agreement with the High Court that Section 5(1)
              does not suffer from the vice of vagueness inviting
              the wrath of Article 14. […]”
                                                             [Emphasis supplied]
248. The vagueness doctrine was further developed in Nisha Priya Bhatia
     v. Union of India173 which observed that a duly enacted law cannot
     be struck down merely on the grounds of vagueness, unless such
     vagueness transcends into arbitrariness. With this background, we
     shall now examine the test for assessing vagueness and whether
     Section 6A falls foul of the same.
       Vagueness in law
249. Vagueness is an inherent feature of language. The same intention
     can be expressed with a variety of words and expressions, and any
     given choice of words can relate to multiple different intentions. This
     problem is particularly exacerbated with vague terms, which often
     have a wide variety of referents, leading to comparatively greater
     open-endedness and variability. It is well known that unless the law
     prescribes a bright-line test, which too has its own set of interpretative
     problems as discussed before, most standards in law have some
     degree of open texture, and inevitably harbor some vagueness or
     multiple meanings.
250. The following example may be considered to understand the import
     of a word with an open texture. Suppose a statute uses the term
     ‘tall’ instead of prescribing a particular numerical test for height. Now,


173 Nisha Priya Bhatia v. Union of India (2020) 13 SCC 56.
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             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     the meaning of this term can vary depending on the context and the
     purpose of the statute. The standard of tallness might differ for a
     ride at an amusement park and perhaps in discerning the maximum
     height of vehicles on motorways. Hence, in that sense, the term is
     vague and open to wide interpretation.
251. Vagueness in law, however, exists on a spectrum, and different
     scenarios necessitate different degrees of tolerance towards
     vagueness. Excessive vagueness in law can make the statute
     overbroad and might make the exercise of discretion a capricious
     exercise. At the same time, it might sometimes be desirable in the
     interest of justice to retain some open texture in statutes, to cover
     future eventualities that the legislature might not have anticipated
     but intended to address based on the overarching purpose of the
     law. In that sense, the sliding scale of vagueness in law determines
     whether the law is just and inclusive, or unjust and capricious.
252. To instantiate, consider Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963,
     which allows the condonation of delay if ‘sufficient cause’ has been
     delineated by such applicant. In this context, instead of prescribing
     a mathematically precise formula in regards to what is a sufficient
     cause, it was considered necessary to use words that provide a
     broad spectrum and enable a fact-based analysis for each case.
     Since lawmakers could not possibly envisage all potential situations
     that may arise in the future at the time of legislating, it was therefore
     considered prudent to leave it to the facts and circumstances of
     each individual case.
253. Apart from enabling individualized application of the broad legal
     directive, a certain degree of vagueness is also necessary to address
     evolving societal needs. An excellent example of this is reflected
     in the jurisprudence of Article 21. In this scenario, if the framers of
     the Constitution had sought to include a laundry list encompassing
     a myriad of conditions to which Article 21 would be applicable, the
     ramifications would have been substantial. Any interpretation of the
     right to privacy would have required a constitutional amendment.
     Therefore, it may often be beneficial to prescribe a broad standard
     and allow enough flexibility to address changing needs of the society.
     Judicial discretion in that sense is often wedded unto the law and
     cannot be eliminated by invoking excessive formalism.
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254. This takes us to the question that if vagueness is inherent in law
     and may even be desirable on some level, then what ought to be
     the test and standard for striking down a law on grounds of being
     vague. In this regard, we will now analyze the test and standard for
     vagueness, which would make a statute or legislation liable to be
     struck down on that basis.

       Test for void-for-vagueness
255. Vagueness needs to be viewed from the perspective of: (a) the
     authorities applying the impugned law; and (b) the persons being
     regulated by the impugned law, as was held in Shreya Singhal v
     Union of India,174 where this Court dealt with the constitutionality
     of Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000. This Court,
     after referring to terms in Section 66A, such as ‘grossly offensive’ or
     ‘menacing’, observed the same to be very vague and held that neither
     the prospective offender under Section 66A nor the authorities who
     are to apply Section 66A would have any manageable standard to
     charge a person for an offence under Section 66A. It was observed
     as follows:
              "85. […] Quite obviously, a prospective offender of
              Section 66-A and the authorities who are to enforce
              Section 66-A have absolutely no manageable standard
              by which to book a person for an offence under Section
              66-A […].”
                                                                [Emphasis supplied]
256. With respect to the first limb, i.e., the perspective of the person
     applying the law, the standards are made clear in State of
     Madhya Pradesh v. Baldeo Prasad,175 where while dealing with a
     constitutional challenge to the validity of the Central Provinces and
     Berar Goondas Act, 1946, it was observed that the definition of the
     word ‘goonda’ does not give necessary assistance to the District
     Magistrate, in deciding whether a particular citizen falls under the
     category of ‘goonda’ or not. Further, in Maneka Gandhi (supra), a
     Constitution Bench of this Court, while trying to construe the import


174 Shreya Singhal v Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1
175 State of Madhya Pradesh v. Baldeo Prasad [1961] 1 SCR 970
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                  In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       of the words ‘in the interests of general public’ in Section 10(3)(c) of
       the Passport Act, 1967, observed that the law is well settled to the
       effect that “when a statute vests unguided and unrestricted power
       in any authority to affect the rights of a person without laying down
       any policy or principle which is to guide the authority in exercise of
       this power, it would be affected by the vice of discrimination…”. After
       noting that the impugned words in the provision are taken ipsissima
       verba from Article 19(5) of the Constitution, it was held as follows:
              "16. (…)We are clearly of the view that sufficient
              guidelines are provided by the words “in the interests
              of the general public” and the power conferred on the
              Passport Authority to impound a passport cannot be
              said to be unguided or unfettered(…).”
                                                        [Emphasis supplied]
257. This view has also been endorsed in Harakchand Ratanchand
     Banthia (supra), where a Constitution Bench of this Court dealt
     with the constitutional validity of the Gold Control Act, 1968. The
     challenge made by the Petitioners therein, against Section 27 of
     the Act, mainly contended that the conditions imposed through the
     section for the grant or renewal of licenses were uncertain, vague
     and unintelligible, thus conferring broad and unfettered power upon
     the statutory authorities in the matter of grant or renewal of license.
258. Hence, to satisfy the first facet regarding the person applying the
     law, the impugned law must be clear enough to provide necessary
     guidelines regarding application, and must not confer unfettered
     discretion.
259. When evaluating the issue from the second perspective, which
     focuses on the individuals affected by the law, it is essential to
     adopt an objective standard reflecting the viewpoint of a person of
     average intelligence within the affected group. Thus, it follows that
     a person of ordinary intelligence amongst such a class of persons
     on which the impugned law operates should be able to understand
     the scope or sphere of application of the law. This standard was
     observed by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Kartar Singh v.
     State of Punjab,176 where it dealt with the constitutionality of specific


176 Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab (1994) 3 SCC 569.
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       provisions in the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act,
       1987, analyzed the term ‘abet’ and gave it a reasonable construction
       to avoid the vice of vagueness. It was observed that vague laws
       offend important values and reinforce the need for laws to give a
       person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know
       what is prohibited.
260. Nisha Priya Bhatia (supra), was a case where a challenge to Rule
     135 of the Research and Analysis Wing (Recruitment, Cadre and
     Services) Rules, 1975 was laid. This Court observed that such a
     challenge on the ground of vagueness could only be sustained if
     the Rule does not provide a person of ordinary intelligence with a
     reasonable opportunity to know the scope of the sphere in which the
     Rule would operate. This position was further developed, in line with
     the perspective of the persons upon which the provision operates, by
     observing that this standard is to be applied from the point of view
     of a member working in the organization as an intelligence officer,
     more particularly, a Class I intelligence officer.
261. Furthermore, this standard was also seen to have been applied in
     the Federation of Obstetrics & Gynaecological Societies of India
     (FOGSI) v. Union of India,177 wherein the constitutional validity
     of Sections 23(1) and 23(2) of the Pre-conception and Pre-natal
     Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 was
     being challenged. While holding against such a challenge, it was
     observed by this Court that the provisions are not vague and that a
     responsible doctor is expected to know what they are undertaking
     and what their responsibilities are. In this light, the standard of a
     ‘person of ordinary intelligence’ was also seen to be employed and
     the Court went on to observe that a person of ordinary intelligence
     can comprehend the provisions of the Act and they can have fair
     notice of what is prohibited and what omission they should make.
     A nuanced understanding of the term ‘ordinary intelligence’ can
     be gained from this Court’s ruling in Seksaria Cotton Mills Ltd.
     v. State of Bombay,178 where, albeit in a different context, while
     interpreting the meaning of the word ‘possession’, it was observed
     as follows:


177 Federation of Obstetrics & Gynaecological Societies of India (FOGSI) v. Union of India (2019) 6
    SCC 283.
178 Seksaria Cotton Mills Ltd. v. State of Bombay (1953) 1 SCC 561, para 21.
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             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


           "21. But we need not go into all this. Here is an order
           which is to affect the business of hundreds of persons,
           many of whom are small petty merchants and traders,
           the sort of men who would not have lawyers constantly at
           their elbow; and even if they did, the more learned their
           advisers were in the law the more puzzled they would be
           as to what advice to give, for it is not till one is learned
           in the law that subtleties of thought and bewilderment
           arise at the meaning of plain English words which any
           ordinary man of average intelligence, not versed in
           the law, would have no difficulty in understanding [...]”
                                                 [Emphasis supplied]
262. To sum up this facet, the impugned law is to be tested from the
     perspective of a person of ‘ordinary intelligence’ from the class to
     which the law applies. We have also delineated cases where the
     impugned law operates on a specialized class of persons, such as
     a Class-I intelligence officer of the Research and Analysis Wing,
     as seen in Nisha Priya Bhatia (supra), and medical practitioners
     or doctors as seen in FOGSI (supra). In any case, even if the
     persons being regulated are not a specialized class of persons,
     the Court would adopt the standard of an ordinary man of average
     intelligence, who, though not well versed in law, would have no
     difficulty in understanding the plain meaning of the words contained
     in the impugned law, when confronted with it.
263. Given the above, it is observed that the test for striking down a law on
     the grounds of vagueness can be viewed through two perspectives,
     both of which are to be taken into account, and the standards for the
     same have to be satisfied to sustain a challenge on the grounds of
     a law or provision being void for vagueness. Thus, a statute or its
     provision can be struck down for vagueness if:
     i.    The authority interpreting and applying the impugned law or
           provision is not sufficiently guided by such law or provision and
           is conferred unfettered discretion by virtue of the same; and
     ii.   When confronted with the plain meaning, a person of ordinary
           intelligence, amongst the persons regulated by the impugned
           law or provision, faces difficulty in understanding the sphere
           of their application.
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       The extent of review for the test of ‘void for vagueness’
264. It is also well settled that ordinarily, courts should endeavour to draw
     a demarcating line and infer some reasonable meaning from an
     impugned provision, rather than hastening to intervene and striking
     down the entire provision on the grounds of vagueness. This view was
     also echoed in K.A. Abbas v. Union of India,179 where a Constitution
     Bench of this Court dealt with the constitutionality of Section 5B
     of the Cinematograph Act, 1952 and laid down the thresholds for
     applicability of the vagueness doctrine. It was held that if a law is
     vague, it should be accorded the interpretation which best suits the
     legislature’s intention and advances the purpose of the legislation. If
     that was not possible, and the legislation was marred with uncertainty
     which prima facie appeared to take away a guaranteed freedom, it
     could be struck down. However, this Court also cautioned that such
     recourse be resorted to sparingly, and the Court should instead
     endeavor to draw the line of demarcation where possible.
265. Similarly, another important principle governing this doctrine is that
     vagueness ought to be inversely proportional to the gravity of the
     consequences involved—i.e., the more penal the consequences, the
     less vague the legislation should be. Vagueness, especially in criminal
     laws, ought to be used to protect the individual facing penalty.180

       Whether Section 6A is void for being vague
266. Now turning to the issue at hand, the Petitioners’ apprehension
     concerns the meaning of the phrase ‘ordinarily resident in Assam’,
     as provided in Section 6A, and more particularly in clauses (2) and
     (3) thereof.
267. At the very threshold, we must note that the consequences of Section
     6A are relevant for our determination of vagueness, as discussed
     in paragraph 263 of this judgement. Section 6A confers citizenship
     upon a sub-class of immigrants into Assam, and can therefore not
     be classified as criminal or penal. Instead, by legitimizing the stay of
     certain immigrants in India, Section 6A is more akin to a beneficial
     legislation. Given this, we are inclined to extend greater laxity when
     testing the term ‘ordinarily resident’ for vagueness.


179 K.A. Abbas v. Union of India (1970) 2 SCC 780
180 Shreya Singhal, supra note 174.
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                  In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


268. First, while examining the expression ‘ordinarily resident’ from
     the viewpoint of the authority interpreting and applying the law, it
     could be observed that there is little vagueness in this term, given
     that this Court has already dealt with the same and extracted its
     import, particularly within the context of its usage in Section 6A.
     Khudiram Chakma (supra), dealt with the case of the Chakmas,
     who were a group of people who had migrated to Assam in 1964
     and had shifted to Arunachal Pradesh thereafter, and were claiming
     citizenship under Section 6A. It was held that ‘ordinarily resident’
     within Section 6A meant “ordinarily resident in Assam from the date
     of entry till the incorporation of Section 6-A, namely, 07.12.1985”.
     To further understand the nuanced import of ‘ordinarily resident’,
     this Court, after placing reliance on Smt. Shanno Devi v. Mangal
     Sain181 observed the same to mean that “it is not necessary that
     for every day of this period he should have resided in India. In the
     absence of the definition of the words ‘ordinarily resident’ in the
     Constitution it is reasonable to take the words to mean ‘resident
     during this period without any serious break.’” In Smt. Shanno Devi
     (supra), this Court was interpreting the term ‘ordinarily resident’ as
     appearing in Article 6 of the Constitution, which applies in the case
     of citizenship for persons who migrated to India from Pakistan. The
     term ‘ordinarily resident’ under Section 6A can thus hardly be said
     to be undefined or vague.
269. In addition, it must also be noted that the phrase ‘ordinarily resident’
     is used in various Indian legislations, in contexts not too dissimilar
     from Section 6A. Besides the Indian Constitution, it finds mention in
     Sections 5 and 10 of the Citizenship Act, 1955, in the Representation
     of the People Act, 1950, in the Life Insurance Corporation Act,
     1956, the Income Tax Act, 1961 and the Patents Act, 1970, among
     other statutes. Given such frequent usage, it would be difficult to
     term ‘ordinarily resident’ as vague. This Court has held the same in
     Premium Granites v. State of T.N.,182 where it was noted that the
     term ‘public interest’ had acquired the character of being a ‘definitive
     concept’ in Indian jurisprudence, owing to its widespread usage in
     the Constitution and other enactments, apart from its interpretation
     in several judicial pronouncements.


181 Smt. Shanno Devi v. Mangal Sain [1961] 1 SCR 576
182 Premium Granites v. State of T.N. (1994) 2 SCC 691.
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270. Hence, the words ‘ordinarily resident in Assam’, as contained in
     Section 6A (2) and (3), cannot be seen to suffer from the vice of
     vagueness, keeping in view the fact that the judicial officers constitute
     the Foreigners Tribunals; their orders are subject to review by superior
     courts; and there are civil administration officers aiding the Tribunals,
     all of whom are well conversant with the nuances of the procedure
     contemplated under Section 6A.
271. When proceeding to apply the second limb of the test of vagueness,
     i.e., from the perspective of persons regulated by the impugned
     law, the relevant class of persons for consideration would be the
     immigrants who came to Assam from erstwhile East Pakistan before
     the cut-off date of 25.03.1971.
272. Such an analysis would indicate that an immigrant from East
     Pakistan of ordinary intelligence, who has come before 25.03.1971 to
     Assam and who is not versed in law, when confronted with the plain
     meaning of the words ‘ordinarily resident since the date of his entry
     in Assam’, would readily be able to understand the scope or sphere
     or application of the words. The emphasis here is whether a person
     of ordinary intelligence can understand the meaning simpliciter
     and gain a basic idea of the scope or sphere of application of the
     same within the context of the impugned law, and not a nuanced or
     exact legal understanding. On application of such a threshold with
     respect to the persons being regulated, it would be difficult to hold
     that such persons would be unable to understand the simpliciter
     contour and indicative meaning of the phrase ‘ordinarily resident’,
     and would find it so vague as to be unable to the meaning of the
     words. This observation is further bolstered by the fact that none
     from the affected class of immigrants has contended before us that
     they found the term ‘ordinarily resident’ to be vague or evasive.
273. We thus hold that Section 6A does not suffer from manifest
     arbitrariness because: (a) there is application of mind behind the
     incorporation of the cut-off dates; (b) the process under Section 6A
     is not arbitrary; (c) Section 6A does not violate Part II; and (d) the
     term ‘ordinary residence’ is not vague enough to be void.

        vii. Article 29 and Section 6A
274. The Petitioners have attempted to claim endogamous community
     rights through the route of Article 29 of the Constitution. They
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     contended that there has been a drastic demographic change in the
     State of Assam due to the influx of illegal migrants from erstwhile
     East Pakistan, which has resulted in Assamese culture being lost.
     They further argued that the right under Article 29(1) is absolute and
     provides a group the freedom to shape their cultural identity. This,
     they argue, gets jeopardized when there is a forcible imposition of
     a foreign culture, as is happening through the unchecked migration
     of Bangladeshi immigrants into Assam.
275. Countering the Petitioners’ contentions, the Respondents submitted
     that demographic changes could not be a constitutionally valid metric
     for measuring cultural change. Changes to religious demographics
     could be traced to several different factors, including state
     reorganisation and internal migration. Further, they contended that
     the objective of Article 29(1) is to establish a multicultural society,
     and not an endogamous one. They argued that accepting the
     Petitioners’ argument would lead to cultural exclusivity, which they
     felt was not constitutionally permissible. Further, they also urged
     that a constitutional culture exists in India, which ought not to be
     endangered on the basis of demographic change.

     (a)   Background of Article 29
276. Article 29(1) of the Constitution, which is included in Part III, confers
     upon any section of citizens residing in the territory of India, the right
     to conserve its language, script or culture. The text of the provision
     reads as follows:
           "29. Protection of interests of minorities. — (1) Any section
           of the citizens residing in the territory of India or any part
           thereof having a distinct language, script or culture of its
           own shall have the right to conserve the same.”
277. Incorporated into the constitutional framework with a distinctive
     approach to bestowing rights upon a segment of the populace,
     this provision underwent extensive debate and scrutiny within the
     halls of the Constituent Assembly. The deliberations surrounding
     this provision serve as an invaluable resource for comprehensively
     understanding the significance of Article 29, affording us insight into
     the overarching intent of its framers during the formulation of this
     particular provision.
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278. Article 29, which was then draft Article 23 prior to its inclusion
     into the Constitution, was the subject matter of intense debate,
     with respect to both the terms used in the provision itself and the
     import of the rights it conferred. Although draft Article 23 initially
     used the term ‘minority’, it was substituted for the words ‘section
     of citizens’. This change was made keeping in mind the diversity of
     India and with the aim of ensuring that children received education
     in the language of their choice, while simultaneously making sure
     that they continued to learn the language of whichever State they
     may be a part of.183 Thereafter, the term ‘section of citizens’ got
     crystallised to the extent that attempts to replace it with the term
     ‘minority’ were negatived by the Assembly.184 With that, Article
     29, as we are familiar with today, found its place as a part of the
     Constitution.
279. Provisions akin to Article 29(1), which establish a right to preserve
     culture, can be identified in numerous Constitutions across various
     jurisdictions. For instance, Article 20(2) of the Constitution of Albania
     grants the right to ‘preserve and develop’ ethnic, cultural, and linguistic
     identity. A similar right is articulated in Article 56 of the Armenian
     Constitution, Article 11 of the Georgian Constitution, Article 59 of the
     Kosovan Constitution, Article 114 of the Latvian Constitution, and
     Article 35(1) of the Polish Constitution. While these provisions share
     the common objective of cultural preservation, they vary slightly from
     Article 29(1) by incorporating the term ‘develop’.
280. The Petitioners in the present case allege a violation of their right
     specifically under Article 29(1). This article aims to protect and
     guarantee the right conferred upon every citizen of India to conserve
     their language, script or culture. When read in conjunction with
     Article 30, the overarching objective of Article 29 is to allow minority
     communities to establish educational institutions to preserve and
     fortify their cultural, linguistic, or scriptural heritage. However, given
     the specific allegations presented by the Petitioners, our scrutiny
     will be confined exclusively to assessing a potential violation of
     Article 29(1).


183 Begum Aizaz Rasul, Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume 7, 08.12.1948.
184 Z. H. Lari, Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume 7, 08.12.1948.
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       (b)    Standing under Article 29(1)
281. Article 29(1) effectively has two key aspects that need to be
     determined: first, whether there is a ‘section of citizens’ seeking to
     conserve their language, script or culture and second, that such
     language, script or culture in question is ‘distinct’.
282. Article 29(1) begins with the term ‘any section of citizens’. Though the
     term ‘minority’ is used in the marginal heading, the scope of Article
     29(1) is not restricted to minorities as understood in the technical
     sense.185 It instead extends to any section of citizens residing in
     the territory of India. This was a conscious choice on the part of
     the framers of our Constitution,186 as is apparent from the following
     words of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar:
              "For instance, for the purposes of this article 23, if a
              certain number of people from Madras came and settled
              in Bombay for certain purposes, they would be, although
              not a minority in the technical sense, cultural minorities.
              Similarly, if certain number of Maharashtrians went
              from Maharashtra and settled in Bengal, although they
              may not be minorities in the technical sense, they
              would be cultural and linguistic minorities in Bengal.
              The article intends to give protection in the matter of
              culture, language and script not only to a minority
              technically, but also to a minority in the wider sense
              of the terms as I have explained just now. That is the
              reason why we dropped the word “minority” because we
              felt that the word might be interpreted in the narrow sense
              of the term, when the intention of this House, when it
              passed article 18, was to use the word “minority” in a
              much wider sense, so as to give cultural protection
              to those who were technically not minorities but
              minorities nonetheless. It was felt that this protection
              was necessary for the simple reason that people who
              go from one province to another and settle there,
              do not settle there permanently. They do not uproot


185 Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume 7, 08.12.1948.
186 Id.
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              themselves from the province from which they have
              migrated, but they keep their connections. They go
              back to their province for the purpose of marriage. They
              go back to their province for various other purposes, and
              if this protection was not given to them when they
              were subject to the local Legislature and the local
              Legislature were to deny them the opportunity of
              conserving their culture, it would be very difficult for
              these cultural minorities to go back to their province
              and to get themselves assimilated to the original
              population to which they belonged. In order to meet
              the situation of migration from one province to another,
              we felt it was desirable that such a provision should be
              incorporated in the Constitution.”
                                                                   [Emphasis supplied]
283. Thus, Article 29(1), while conferring the right to conserve, does not
     restrict itself only to the notion of a minority as understood in the
     technical sense but includes any group that may seek to conserve
     a distinct language, script or culture.
284. This interpretation of Article 29(1) has also been established by a
     9-judge bench of this Court in Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College
     Society v. State of Gujarat,187 wherein it held that:
              "6. It will be wrong to read Article 30(1) as restricting the
              right of minorities to establish and administer educational
              institutions of their choice only to cases where such
              institutions are concerned with language, script or
              culture of the minorities. The reasons are these. First,
              Article 29 confers the fundamental right on any
              section of the citizens which will include the majority
              section whereas Article 30(1) confers the right on all
              minorities. Second, Article 29(1) is concerned with
              language, script or culture, whereas Article 30(1)
              deals with minorities of the nation based on religion
              or language. Third, Article 29(1) is concerned with the


187 Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society v. State of Gujarat (1974) 1 SCC 717, para 6.
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                   In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


               right to conserve language, script or culture, whereas
               Article 30(1) deals with the right to establish and
               administer educational institutions of the minorities
               of their choice. Fourth, the conservation of language,
               script or culture under Article 29(1) may be by means
               wholly unconnected with educational institutions
               and similarly establishment and administration of
               educational institutions by a minority under Article
               30(1) may be unconnected with any motive to conserve
               language, script or culture. A minority may administer
               an institution for religious education which is wholly
               unconnected with any question of conserving a
               language, script or culture.”
               “238. […] Article 29(1) gives security to an interest:
               Article 30(1) gives security to an activity.”
                                                                     [Emphasis supplied]
285. The Petitioners herein have sought to protect their ‘culture’. While
     there is no single definition of the term, academicians and scholars
     have defined culture as “that complex whole which includes
     knowledge, belief, arts, morals, law, custom and any other capabilities
     and habits acquired by a man as a member of society”188 or as “the
     handiwork of man and as the medium through which he achieves
     his ends.”189 Hence, although a precise definition of the term ‘culture’
     cannot explicitly be delineated, its comprehensive connotation is
     expansive, encompassing diverse elements inherent to a specific
     group or community.
286. Considering these aspects, the next point which arises for
     consideration is whether the right under Article 29(1) can be invoked
     by the entire section of citizens aiming to preserve their culture or
     language or if it can be invoked by a few individuals on behalf of
     the larger section of citizens. In this context, it becomes essential to
     examine previous decisions of this Court where a violation of Article
     29(1) has been put forth to ascertain who the invoking party was.


188 Pascual Gisbert, Fundamentals of Sociology, Orient Longman, 1973 (3rd ed.), 342.
189 Bronislaw Malinowski, A Scientific Theory of Culture and Other Essays, The University of North Carolina
    Press, 1944, 67.)
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287. In State of Karnataka v. Associated Management of English
     Medium Primary and Secondary Schools,190 the imposition of
     a particular language by the State in primary schools was under
     challenge. Rights under Article 29(1) were asserted by an association
     representing private schools. Similarly, in State of Bombay v.
     Bombay Education Society and others,191 the right of the Anglo-
     Indian community to conserve their culture and language under
     Article 29(1) was upheld. The parties invoking the right were the
     Bombay Society and its two directors, which sought to ensure value-
     based education for the underprivileged. Thus, notwithstanding the
     language of Article 29(1), it is not necessary that the right must
     be invoked by the entirety of the section of citizens belonging to
     a particular community, or that such community must collectively
     seek redressal.
288. In the instant case, the Petitioners include various Assamese
     student organisations like the Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha and All
     Assam Ahom Sabha; their invocation of Article 29(1) is, therefore,
     maintainable. Furthermore, it is not in dispute before us that there
     exists a distinct Assamese culture. Indeed, Assam proudly serves
     as a testament to our nation’s rich culture and diversity, with various
     groups and sub-groups co-existing harmoniously, including the
     Koch-Rajbangsi, Bodo, Sonowal Kacharis, Dimasas, and more.192
     This cohabitation reflects a cooperative and peaceful integration
     of diverse cultures within the region. Furthermore, adding to the
     cultural mosaic, Assam also boasts of linguistic diversity, with over
     13 million residents conversing in Assamese and Bengali while
     also embracing local languages like Karbi, Mishing, Rabha, Tiwa,
     Dimaca, and more.193 Indeed, the crux of the matter at hand does
     not revolve around whether Article 29(1) applies to the Petitioners.
     Instead, the focal point is whether Section 6A by its operation has
     curtailed the Petitioners’ rights under Article 29 to conserve their
     distinct culture.


190 State of Karnataka v. Associated Management of Medium Primary and Secondary Schools (2014) 9
    SCC 485
191 State of Bombay v. Bombay Education Society (1954) 2 SCC 152
192 Culture of Assam – Assam            State   Portal,   https://static.mygov.in/saas/s3fs-saas/assam/
    mygov_149761430071181.pdf.
193 Census of India, 2011.
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       (c)    Substance of Article 29(1)
289. As discussed previously, Article 29(1) aims to ‘conserve’ the language,
     culture or script of a section of citizens. Instead of obligating the
     State to make any special provisions for the development of such
     language, script, or culture, the ambit of the term ‘conserve’ is to
     prohibit state intervention in these aspects.194 This intent to proscribe
     interference, though not apparent, has been explicitly emphasized
     in the discussions of the Constituent Assembly and has consistently
     been underscored by this Court in various decisions.
290. A dialogue between K. Santhanam and Hasrat Mohani during the
     Assembly debates notably encapsulates this dimension of non-
     intervention. It suggests that the objective of Article 29(1) was
     envisioned to forestall any potential harm to cultures by fascist
     regimes, should such a scenario arise.195 K. Santhanam, in particular,
     had stated in this regard as follows:
              "Sir, you will remember that throughout Europe, after the
              first World War, all that the minorities wanted was the right
              to have their own schools, and to conserve their own
              cultures which the Fascist and the Nazis refused them.
              In fact, they did not want even the State schools. They
              did not want State aid, or State assistance. They simply
              wanted that they should be allowed to pursue their
              own customs and to follow their own cultures and to
              establish and conduct their own schools. Therefore,
              I do not think it is right on the part of any minority to
              depreciate the rights given in article 23(1).”
                                                                [Emphasis supplied]
291. Likewise, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar gave his perspective on the matter,
     echoing the sentiment that the State should refrain from intervening
     and imposing any culture, whether local or otherwise, upon a
     community. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar further underscored that the provision
     does not levy any burden or obligation upon the State.196 In this
     regard, he articulated the following:


194 Govind Ballabh Pant, Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume 7, 08.12.1948
195 K. Santhanam, Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume 7, 08.12.1948.
196 Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, supra note 185.
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              "I think another thing which has to be borne in mind in
              reading article 23 is that it does not impose any obligation
              or burden upon the State. It does not say that, when
              for instance the Madras people come to Bombay, the
              Bombay Government shall be required by law to finance
              any project of giving education either in Tamil language
              or in Andhra language or any other language. There is
              no burden cast upon the State. The only limitation that
              is imposed by article 23 is that if there is a cultural
              minority which wants to preserve its language, its
              script and its culture, the State shall not by law impose
              upon it any other culture which may be either local
              or otherwise […]"
              "[…] The original article as it stood in the Fundamental
              Rights only cast a sort of duty upon the State that the
              State shall protect their culture, their script and their
              language. The original article had not given any
              Fundamental Right to these various communities. It
              only imposed the duty and added a clause that while
              the State may have the right to impose limitations
              upon these rights of language, culture and script, the
              State shall not make any law which may be called
              oppressive, not that the State had no right to make
              a law affecting these matters, but that the law shall
              not be oppressive. Now, I am sure about it that the
              protection granted in the original article was very insecure.
              It depended upon the goodwill of the State. The present
              situation as you find it stated in article 23 is that we
              have converted that into a Fundamental Right, so
              that if a State made any law which was inconsistent
              with the provisions of this article, then that much of
              the law would be invalid by virtue of article 8 which
              we have already passed.”
                                                         [Emphasis supplied]
292. The nature of the protection afforded by Article 29 also came up
     before this Court in D.A.V. College v. State of Punjab,197 which


197 D.A.V. College v. State of Punjab (1971) 2 SCC 269
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                   In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       analysed a counterfactual and held that had the State intervened
       in compelling affiliated colleges, including minority institutions, to
       provide instruction in the Punjabi language, it would have impeded
       the right to conserve their language, script, and culture. It held that
       such an intervention would have amounted to stifling the language
       and script of other sections of citizens and encroaching on their right
       to conserve their own culture and language.
293. At this juncture, it is imperative to recognize that Article 29 does not
     advocate for absolute governmental abstention in matters involving
     culture, language or script. In fact, to some extent, government
     intervention is unavoidable as regulation is essential for the
     maintenance of public order and for upholding constitutionalism.
     State actions and regulations with an insignificant or merely incidental
     effect on a community’s cultural rights might also not be caught in
     the crosshairs of Article 29(1). This is also seconded by various
     decisions of this Court, where some such regulatory interventions
     by the State were held to not constitute a curtailment of Article 29(1)
     rights.198 In addition, although not germane to the controversy at
     hand, we must add a word of caution that not all cultural practices
     of a section of citizens—for example, those blatantly running against
     the spirit and grain of our Constitution, like casteism and gender
     discrimination—would be protected by Article 29(1).
294. A violation of Article 29, therefore hinges on the ‘nature’ and ‘degree’ of
     State intervention and not merely on the simpliciter fact of intervention.
     In other words, the violation of Article 29 is necessarily a question of
     law which requires adjudication of the circumstances, intention and
     effect of the state intervention on the aggrieved section of citizens,
     as well as the society at large.
295. To sum up our discussion, the rights conferred by Article 29(1) require
     that the State not take any steps to erode a community’s culture,
     language or script; and concomitantly accords to such section of
     citizens the freedom and independence to preserve and conserve
     their culture, language and script, by themselves. At the same time,
     the right under Article 29(1) does not necessitate the Government
     to enact specific provisions for its enforcement and also does not
     altogether restrict the State from enacting regulations.


198 S. P. Mittal v. Union of India (1983) 1 SCC 51
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     (d)   Section 6A vis-à-vis Article 29
296. Having scrutinized the fundamental basis on which the applicability
     of Section 6A needs to be examined, it is imperative at this juncture
     to systematically address each of the Petitioners’ contentions.
297. The Petitioners contended that the presence of immigrants from
     Bangladesh has led to an erosion of their culture. However, it is not
     their contention, nor is it our opinion, that the scheme of Section
     6A was intended to take away these cultural rights. Section 6A
     does not address culture at all; it focuses solely on establishing
     the criteria that migrants from the East Pakistan region must fulfil
     within specified dates to obtain citizenship upon entering Assam.
     The impact on Assamese culture, if any, would be only incidental
     and not direct or intentional.
298. In addition, the onus is on the Petitioners to not only show effect,
     but also demonstrate causation. The Petitioners need to establish
     both, that there has been an adverse impact on Assamese culture
     over time and that such impact is attributable to the legitimisation
     of the citizenship status of pre-1971 immigrants. The Petitioners
     have been unable to establish the latter. Indeed, the respondents
     have proffered various other plausible explanations, like internal
     migration, state reorganization and unchecked immigration post-
     1971 which fall outside the umbrella of Section 6A. Additionally,
     Section 6A does not compel pre-1971 immigrants to keep residing
     within the territory of Assam once they have obtained Indian
     citizenship, given that they would enjoy Article 19(1)(e) rights like
     any other citizen of India.
299. To substantiate the former limb on effect, the Petitioners have
     cited data showing changes in Assam’s religious and linguistic
     demographics. These metrics by themselves are not ‘culture’ within
     the meaning of Article 29(1). Although significant changes to the
     demographics of a region can affect the interests of its original
     inhabitants, the ‘culture’ of a region by itself is a far more complex and
     dynamic phenomenon—involving an interplay of various competing
     forces and interconnected elements.
300. Though we are not oblivious to the Petitioners’ demographic anxiety,
     we must be cautious of the impact our findings would have on the
     greater national landscape. Accepting the Petitioners’ assertion that
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              In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     a mere change in demographics is sufficiently actionable evidence
     of erosion of rights under Article 29(1) would have far reaching
     consequences. We say so, for the reason that it would undermine the
     idea of fraternity envisaged by our Constitutional drafters, and bring
     to life their fears by threatening the cohesion of our diverse nation.
     It would open the floodgates for similar challenges by residents of
     other states who might seek to undermine Article 19(1)(e) rights and
     inter-state migration under the guise of protecting their indigenous
     culture under Article 29(1). The Constitution of India, and indeed this
     Court as well, does not envision India as a union of endogamous-
     homogenous territories. The cascading ramifications of accepting
     the Petitioners’ stand on federalism and national harmony would be
     significant, deleterious and not improbable.
301. The Petitioners further asserted that the influx of migrants from
     East Pakistan has led to a substantial acquisition of land and
     scarce resources by these immigrants, consequently resulting in
     the marginalization of the original Assamese inhabitants within their
     own territory. It was their specific contention that such acquisition
     not only poses a threat to Assamese people but specifically to the
     culture and heritage of endangered tribes in Assam.
302. Though the material on record does not substantiate such claim,
     regardless thereto, such a plea has no legally sustainable foundation.
     All citizens have the right to own property and, unless restricted
     by statute or other law, they are free to enter into private land
     transactions. Once such a transaction has taken place between
     two private individuals, this Court cannot set the clock back in the
     teeth of Article 300A of the Constitution merely because when seen
     collectively it results in a pattern of land ownership which is considered
     undesirable by some other groups. Simultaneously, individual
     allegations of involuntary land transactions are best not dealt with
     us, considering that we are examining a question of constitutional
     interpretation, while sitting in writ jurisdiction.
303. At this stage, and given the restricted ambit of the present proceedings,
     this Court cannot embark on a complex or microscopic fact-finding
     exercise to determine whether factually there has been any cultural
     erosion as alleged by the Petitioners.
304. We thus sum up our analysis of the Petitioners’ claim under Article
     29, holding that though they have the standing to make such a claim
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     but on the facts of the present case, they have failed to show either
     an actionable impact on Assamese culture, or trace the cause of it
     to Section 6A. On the contrary, Section 6A when read along with
     the larger statutory regime surrounding citizenship and immigration,
     mandates timely detection and deportation of illegal immigrants, a
     large portion of whom entered Assam post-1971. Seen from this
     perspective, it is the non-implementation of the statutory regime
     which is the cause of the Petitioners’ concerns; their attack on the
     constitutionality of Section 6A is misplaced.

     viii. Article 21 and Section 6A
305. The Petitioners contended that Section 6A is violative of Article 21
     because it infringes upon the rights of the ‘indigenous’ Assamese
     community. They argued that immigration has led to the marginalization
     and disruption of their socio-economic aspirations. Further, relying
     on Article 1 of ICCPR, they urged that their right of self-governance
     is being violated by Section 6A. Lastly, the Petitioners claimed
     that the inclusion of an unidentified migrant population burdens
     the country’s natural resources, particularly impacting the citizens
     residing in a State and hindering sustainable development, along with
     depriving the Assamese community from enjoying the full spectrum of
     socio-economic rights.
306. Per contra, the Respondents argued that instead of contravening
     Article 21, Section 6A enforces the same because foreigners’ rights
     are also protected thereunder. Additionally, they contend that Section
     6A, in fact, gives quietus to a long-standing dispute. According to the
     Respondents, the provision does not violate Article 21 as Section 6A
     is to be construed as a “procedure established by law”.
307. The issue that arises for consideration therefore is whether Section
     6A is violative of Article 21. Though Article 21 needs no introduction,
     it provides that no person can be deprived of life and personal liberty
     except according to procedure established by law.

     (a)   ‘Marginalization’ of a community
308. In this regard, the Petitioners have put forth an argument akin to
     their claim under Article 29 and have argued that Section 6A violates
     Article 21 as it affects the way of life of original inhabitants.
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               In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


309. Although the rights conferred by Article 21 differ from those under
     Article 29 of the Constitution; the burden to be discharged by the
     Petitioners to support their claims would remain broadly similar. It
     would be otiose for us to delineate the legal tests and the substance
     of the rights provided by Article 21 in the context of the Petitioners’
     cultural claims, given that the Petitioners have failed to provide
     material beyond mere averments.
310. As elaborated in paragraph 298 of this judgement, the Petitioners
     need to establish both a deleterious effect of Section 6A on their
     indigenous communities as well as trace the cause of such effect
     to Section 6A. In light of our conclusions in the preceding segment
     re: Article 29, namely, that the Petitioners have been not been able
     to show a constitutionally actionable impact on their communities,
     and if at all there is any such impact it can be attributed to several
     factors beyond Section 6A. The Petitioners’ challenge on the
     ground of violation of Article 21, thus deserves to be closed at the
     threshold itself.

      (b)   Right of self-governance
311. In addition to asserting that their community is being marginalized,
     the Petitioners have also laid claim to the right of self-governance.
     In support of this assertion, they have referenced Article 1 of
     the ICCPR, which affirms that all “peoples” possess the right to
     self-governance. The expression ‘peoples’ has a wide connotation and
     it is nearly impossible to outline its exact constituents. It is however,
     a settled proposition that Article 1 referred to above, is a collective
     right, which cannot be claimed by an individual.
312. In any case, India has declared its reservation regarding this Article
     and has stated that:199
            "The Government of the Republic of India declares that
            the words ‘the right of self-determination’ appearing in
            [this article] apply only to the peoples under foreign
            domination and that these words do not apply to sovereign


199 Permanent Mission of India, Human Rights Committee https://pmindiaun.gov.in/pageinfo/
    ODY3#:~:text=Article%201%3A%20The%20Government%20of,which%20is%20the%20essence%20
    of.
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               independent States or to a section of a people or
               nation-which is the essence of national integrity.”
                                                                 [Emphasis supplied]
313. Further, we are of the considered opinion that the perceived right under
     Article 1 of the ICCPR is not enforceable through writ jurisdiction.
     Even otherwise, it cannot be invoked by the Petitioners, more so
     in light of India’s explicit reservation against its application in India,
     and given that it generally is applicable only to people under foreign
     domination.
314. That apart, it is difficult to countenance the assertion that immigration
     has impacted the self-governance of the original inhabitants of
     Assam. The Petitioners have not demonstrated how Section 6A
     affects their right to govern themselves democratically. In India, the
     right of self-governance has to be understood within the contours
     of the Constitution and the laws framed under it, which provides
     self-governance at the level of political units such as Panchayats
     and District Councils, in addition to the national-level Parliament
     and various state-level Legislatures.200 In addition, as discussed
     in Issue ix (Article 326 and Section 6a) (infra), India allows the
     opportunity for self-governance by providing the right to vote on the
     basis of adult franchise.
315. We must also note that the Petitioners’ have not claimed that any of
     these Constitutional or other electoral legislations have been violated.
     We are therefore not inclined to entertain the Petitioners’ claim on
     self-governance, which in a way amounts to a prayer for creation and
     recognition of an extra-Constitutional right. In any case, our analysis
     in this context would border on adjudicating the appropriateness and
     sufficiency of the electoral framework created by the Constitution.
316. It is clarified that, the arguments surrounding dilution of the voting
     ability of the indigenous Assamese have been addressed in the
     next section. Without repeating our observations on demographic
     anxiety in paragraph 300 of this judgement, it would suffice to state
     that we are unable to agree with the Petitioners’ argument that
     conferring citizenship to a subset of immigrants from East Pakistan


200 Constitution, supra note 22, Part IX, IXA, Sixth Schedule.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                                 1125

                  In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       with a different language or culture would amount to undermining the
       self-governance rights of the Assamese.

       (c)    Right of sustainable development
317. The Petitioners have contended that Article 21 has been infringed
     by Section 6A, as it permits immigrants to utilize natural resources,
     thereby contravening the public trust doctrine. They argued that had
     the immigrants been resettled in other States, the strain on natural
     resources in Assam would have been mitigated, and the government
     could have managed resources more effectively. The Petitioners have
     also contended that allowing increased access to Assam’s natural
     resources contradicts the principles of sustainable development.
318. In this vein, the doctrine of public trust provides that the State holds
     the natural resources as the trustee of the general public, and as a
     consequence, bears a duty to protect them.201 This doctrine mandates
     that resources should be used in a manner that does not efface other
     people’s and subsequent generations’ right to use such resources in
     the long term. A 5-judge bench of this Court has held that the task of
     adjudicating whether public trust has been violated or not, would not
     entail a comparative analysis of alternative deployments of such natural
     resources. The Court ought to only assess whether the deployment
     under challenge as implemented by the government, is fair or not.202
319. We therefore need to examine whether the Parliamentary enactment
     contravenes the constitutional principles for having expropriated
     natural resources in an unfair, wasteful or exploitative manner, such
     that larger collective or community rights have been undermined.
320. In our considered opinion, the mere fact that a sub-class of immigrants
     whose status has been legitimised by Section 6A also has access
     to these resources does not automatically imply a disruption of
     ecological balance or a violation of the original inhabitants’ rights to
     resource usage. This argument conflates the idea of “unfair usage”
     with “more usage”—a premise that cannot be accepted.
321. Sustainable development and population growth can coexist
     harmoniously and need not be mutually exclusive. A nation can
     accommodate immigrants and refugees, while simultaneously


201 M. C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath (1997) 1 SCC 388, para 34.
202 Natural Resources Allocation, In re, Special Reference No. 1 of 2012 (2012) 10 SCC 1, para 146.
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     prioritizing sustainable development and equitable allocation of
     resources. By implementing policies that encourage environmental
     conservation, efficient resource management, and social integration, a
     country can effectively address the challenges posed by demographic
     changes while safeguarding its long-term prosperity. The logic
     underlying the Petitioners’ argument, if allowed, can tomorrow be
     extended to seek controls on even domestic inter-state movement.
     The Petitioners’ challenge on the basis of sustainable development
     under Article 21 therefore, must be rejected.

     ix.   Article 326 and Section 6A
322. The Petitioners contended that the application of Section 6A on the
     State of Assam violates the Assamese people’s right to vote under
     Article 326 of the Constitution. It was asserted that the right to vote and
     the right to be registered on the electoral rolls is specific only to the
     citizens of India and not to illegal immigrants. They further contended
     that the process of Section 6A conferring political rights upon millions
     of Bangladeshi immigrants has resulted in the marginalisation of
     the political rights of the people of Assam, which, in turn, is not in
     the interest of the security and integrity of the State. They asserted
     that continuance of these immigrants on Indian soil poses severe
     threat to the identity of the indigenous people of Assam, as well as
     the security of the nation.
323. The Respondents argued that the contentions advanced by the
     Petitioners in the present case amount to a reverse reading of
     Article 326 of the Constitution. They submitted that considering the
     persons falling under Section 6A would be valid citizens, the right
     under Article 326 would therefore naturally follow to such ‘citizens’.
     Additionally, they also urged that Section 6A is not concerned with
     the preparation of the electoral roll and only deals with the grant of
     citizenship to the categories of persons covered thereunder.
324. Thus, in examining the purported violation of the Petitioners’ rights,
     it is imperative to first delve into the historical progression of adult
     suffrage in India, given that Article 326 explicitly addresses the
     conferment of voting rights upon Indian citizens.

     (a)   Background and evolution of adult suffrage
325. In response to the clamour for adult suffrage, the issue of
     franchise in India was heavily deliberated upon in the Round Table
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                            1127

                 In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       Conference in 1931, and the Indian Franchise Committee was
       set up. However, the Committee’s report, presented with an air of
       caution, vehemently discouraged the adoption of universal adult
       franchise in India, citing the widespread illiteracy rates. Instead,
       the Committee’s proposal for franchise resulted in the enactment
       of the Government of India Act, 1935. The Act put forth several
       parameters regarding voter eligibility, including the extent of
       property owned, amount of taxes paid, residence, etc. Yet, despite
       these efforts, only a mere one-fifth of the adult population found
       themselves deemed worthy of the electoral badge of honour at
       that pivotal juncture in history.203
326. In any case, the 1935 Act was short-lived, with the onset of Indian
     independence and the subsequent establishment of the Constituent
     Assembly. The Constituent Assembly itself was constituted as a formal
     constitution-making body under the Cabinet Mission Plan, 1946. The
     provincial assemblies elected the 389 members that comprised the
     Constituent Assembly based on a single transferable vote system
     having proportional representation. These members were, thus,
     indirectly elected representatives tasked with the mammoth project
     of drafting a Constitution for India. The Constituent Assembly sat for
     a period of two years, eleven months and seventeen days, between
     06.12.1946 and 24.01.1950, to write the Constitution of India.
327. On the issue of adult franchise, the notion was initially met with
     opposition by the likes of M. Thirumala Rao and Brajeshwara Prasad,
     who considered universal adult franchise to be a violation of the
     tenets of democracy on account of the largely illiterate populace of
     the country.204 Other members, such as Hriday Nath Kunzru, believed
     that while franchise being bestowed based on parameters such as
     property was antithetical to the idea of a democracy, universal adult
     suffrage at such a nascent stage would prove troublesome. Instead,
     he recommended enfranchising approximately half the population and
     then extending it to the remaining population in a phased manner
     over a period of fifteen years.205



203 Ornit Shani, How India Became Democratic: Citizenship and the Making of the Universal Franchise,
    Cambridge University Press, 2017.
204 M. Thirumala Rao, Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume 11, 22.11.1949; Brajeshwar Prasad,
    Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume 8, 16.06.1949.
205 Hriday Nath Kunzru, Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume 11, 22.11.1949.
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328. However, during the final days of the Assembly, several Assembly
     members began to express their views in favour of universal adult
     franchise, arguing that the inclusion of adult franchise into the
     Constitution would contribute towards the cause of nation-building and
     secure the betterment of the common man. Hence, universal adult
     franchise was incorporated into the Indian Constitution, as enshrined in
     Article 326. The inaugural general elections of Independent India were
     conducted between 25.10.1951 and 21.02.1952. This monumental
     exercise witnessed the participation of a sixth of the world’s population,
     rendering it the largest election globally at that juncture.
329. The historic inclusion of universal adult suffrage as a constitutional
     value in India was noteworthy for accommodating an unprecedented
     number of voters, and its revolutionary nature. What is now considered
     a matter of fact was, at that time, perceived as a daring and potentially
     risky endeavour. The embrace of universal adult suffrage in India,
     devoid of property, taxation, or literacy qualifications, was deemed a
     ‘bold experiment’, particularly given the country’s vast geographical
     expanse and population. This stride was even monumental, especially
     when juxtaposed with the trajectory of more economically advanced
     nations, such as the United States of America, which achieved
     universal adult franchise only in 1965.206 India’s adoption of adult
     franchise also positioned it in close proximity to the timelines of
     countries like France and Britain, where universal adult suffrage
     commenced in 1945 and 1928, respectively.
330. This historical background, coupled with the Constituent Assembly
     deliberations, unmistakably signify that the incorporation of universal
     adult suffrage through Article 326 was undertaken with the avowed
     purpose of granting voting rights and empowerment to every adult
     citizen of India, devoid of any unjustifiable limitations or constraints.
     Thus, the drafters of the Constitution crystallized their vision of ‘one
     man, one value, one vote’ by enshrining it in Article 326.207

       (b)    Aim of Article 326
331. The text of Article 326 provides that “the elections to the House
     of the People and to the Legislative Assembly of every State shall



206 Voting Rights Act of 1965.
207 Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume 11, 25.11.1949.
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                   In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       be on the basis of adult suffrage.” Article 326 further lays down
       the qualifications for being a voter, subject to statutory limitations
       concerning disqualification, corrupt practices, detention, etc. As
       established previously, these Articles were encapsulated within the
       Constitution to provide the right to vote to large swathes of people,
       irrespective of their literacy or ownership of property. Nevertheless, it
       is imperative to delineate the nature of the right to vote. This analysis
       will serve as a crucial foundation in conclusively determining the
       validity of the contentions presented by the Petitioners regarding the
       alleged violation and adverse impact on their right to vote stemming
       from the influx of migrants from Bangladesh.
332. The right to vote has been the subject of considerable deliberation
     and judicial interpretation. This Court has evolved the notion of the
     right to vote, per constitutional and statutory principles, to empower
     voters further. One of the very first cases to discuss the issue
     pertaining to the nature of the right to vote was N.P. Ponnuswami
     v. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency, where this Court
     categorically held that “the right to vote or stand as a candidate for
     election is not a civil right but is a creature of statute or special law
     and must be subject to limitation imposed by it.”208 This view was
     upheld in the case of Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal,209 holding that
     the right to elect is neither a fundamental nor a common law right
     but a statutory right. This was, thereafter, the consistent view that
     was laid down in a plethora of decisions.210
333. There were diverging views expressed in the case of the People’s
     Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, wherein this Court held
     that though the right to vote may not be construed as a fundamental
     right, it is nonetheless a constitutional right.211 The debate on this
     issue was finally laid to rest by this Court in Rajbala v. State of
     Haryana212 in the course of adjudicating the constitutionality of the
     Haryana Panchayati Raj (Amendment) Act, 1935. The Court therein
     held that the right to vote under Article 326 was not merely a statutory



208 N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency, AIR 1952 SC 64
209 Jyoti Basu v. Debi Gosal, AIR 1982 SC 983
210 Shyamdeo Prasad Singh v. Nawal Kishore Yadav (2000) 8 SCC 46, para 25; Krishnamoorthy v.
    Sivakumar (2015) 3 SCC 467
211 People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India (2013) 10 SCC 1
212 Rajbala v. State of Haryana (2016) 2 SCC 445
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       right but was a constitutional right that conferred upon citizens the
       right to vote, subject to certain limitations. It may thus be seen that
       with the aid of judicial construction in the context of the nature of
       the right to vote, it has been upgraded from being a mere statutory
       right to a constitutional right. More recently, this view was once again
       affirmed by this Court in Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India.213
334. It is also crucial to take into consideration that Articles 325 and 326
     contained in Part XV of the Constitution, deal with rights and duties
     in the context of elections. These provisions broadly encompass
     the powers and duties conferred upon various bodies, with the
     objective of ensuring that elections are conducted in a free and fair
     manner. For instance, Article 324 vests the Election Commission
     with powers to supervise elections, thereby ensuring free and fair
     elections. Similarly, Article 329 limits the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction
     in election matters. Any challenge to an election can be made after
     the election has been completed through an election petition under
     the Representation of People Act, 1951.214 These provisions have
     been included with the intent of strengthening the political rights
     of the citizens of the country. It is trite law that provisions which
     pertain to the same subject matter must be read as a whole and
     in their entirety, each throwing light and illuminating the meaning
     of the other.
335. The objective of these provisions, and more specifically Article 326,
     is, therefore, to enfranchise people as opposed to disenfranchising
     them. As illuminated by the historical trajectory of adult suffrage in
     India and the meticulous deliberations of the framers in instating
     Article 326, the evident purpose of its inclusion was to bestow upon
     every individual citizen the right to exercise their vote and choose
     their elected representatives. Hence, in contemplating the contentions
     put forth by the Petitioners, the question which arises is whether the
     right under Article 326 can be invoked to exclude certain individuals.

       (c)    Right of exclusion and Article 326
336. Article 326, while conferring the right to vote, also broadly provides
     that this right would be subject to certain statutory limitations. A



213 Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023) 6 SCC 161
214 Inderjit Barua v. Election Commission of India, AIR 1984 SC 1911
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                     1131

                  In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       brief perusal of the Constituent Assembly Debates, along with
       contemporary jurisprudence, clearly indicates that Article 326 confers
       the right to vote upon individuals and does not elaborate on the
       procedure of exclusion of persons from this entitlement. In order
       to ascertain where the power of exclusion has been enumerated,
       we will analyse the following: (i) Constituent Assembly Debates;
       (ii) the practice in comparative jurisdictions; (iii) relevant statute; and
       (iv) contemporary jurisprudence.
337. Primarily, the considerations of the Constituent Assembly during
     the discourse on the right to vote emphasized that determinations
     regarding disqualifications and exclusions from the right to vote
     should be outlined by the legislature through suitable statutes. In this
     context, focused deliberations were conducted, particularly addressing
     the prescription of qualifications for the right to vote, with Dr. B.R.
     Ambedkar asserting that the establishment of such qualifications
     ought to be entrusted to the legislature.215 Similar observations were
     articulated by other members of the Assembly during discussions
     on the qualifications and disqualifications to the right to vote and
     inclusion of individuals in the electoral rolls.216
338. Furthermore, an examination of practices in comparable jurisdictions
     underscores that the authority to exclude individuals from voting
     is usually entrusted to the legislature. For instance, in the United
     Kingdom, the rationale and procedure for the exclusion of any
     individual from voting are delineated in the Representation of the
     People Act, 1918. Similarly, in the USA, the power and discretion to
     enforce the right to vote of citizens are bestowed upon Congress.217
339. In India, too, the Representation of People Acts, 1950 and 1951
     delineate provisions relating to the disqualification from voting,
     removal of disqualification, the right to vote, and prohibitions against
     seeking votes by appealing to divisive factors. In fact, the 1951 Act
     also elucidates the right to vote under Section 62 and establishes
     limitations and disqualifications surrounding it. The Representation of
     People Act, 1950 has in place a scheme and procedure for effectuating
     changes onto the electoral roll if it is considered erroneous under



215 B.R. Ambedkar, Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume 8, 02.06.1949.
216 Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar, Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume 11, 23.11.1949.
217 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
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      Section 22. This provision states that if the electoral registration
      officer for a constituency, upon an application made to him or on
      his own motion, is satisfied that an entry in the electoral roll of a
      constituency is defective or erroneous, should be transposed to
      another place on account of the concerned person having changed
      his place of ordinary residence, or if the person is dead or is not
      entitled to be registered on that roll, then the officer may amend,
      transpose or delete such an entry. By virtue of the aforementioned
      sections, the Act thus clearly envisages mechanisms and procedures
      for disqualifying individuals from voting and removing the names of
      people from the electoral roll.
340. These deliberations and instances further strengthen the assertion
     that the aspect of exclusion from the right to vote cannot be invoked
     merely by alleging the violation of Article 326. In absence of any such
     right guaranteed under Article 326, and in light of there being such
     provision under the Representation of People Acts of 1950 and 1951,
     the question of exclusion of individuals from the right to vote needs
     to be viewed from the lens of the aforementioned two statutes.218
341. This leads us to the contention raised by the Petitioners that the
     inclusion of individuals in the electoral rolls by virtue of Section 6A
     has resulted in a violation of Article 326. To summarise our foregoing
     analysis, Article 326 bestows upon individuals the right to vote and
     the right to be included in electoral rolls unless disqualified by the
     legislature or other constitutional provisions. However, the crucial
     question that arises is the nature of the right conferred by Article
     326—particularly, whether it allows the Petitioners to seek an en
     masse removal of an entire block of people based upon generalised
     assertions surrounding their impact on another group of citizens and
     their voting rights.
342. We cannot answer this in the affirmative, not only because allowing
     such a plea would militate against the spirit of Article 326 and the
     centuries-old struggle for enfranchisement that it embodies, but also
     because the language of Article 326 unambiguously devolves the
     power to set out the mechanism for excluding people from the voter
     list to the legislature. If there is an inclusion of ineligible migrants
     in the voter list, persons aggrieved are free to invoke the existing


218 Lakshmi Charan Sen v. A.K.M. Hassam Uzzaman (1985) 4 SCC 689, para 22.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                        1133

              In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     provisions under the Representation of the People Acts of 1950 and
     1951, to seek the removal of such individual voters from the voter
     list. Upon receipt of such an application, if the electoral Registration
     Officer, after due consideration, determined that an error existed in
     the inclusion of these individuals, the officer would have rectified the
     situation by amending, transposing, or deleting the relevant entries
     as per the prevailing legal provisions. We are unable to persuade
     ourselves to read an additional ground for disqualification and removal
     of voters directly into Article 326.
343. Additionally, the Petitioners’ arguments on this count demonstrate
     a fundamental misreading of Article 326. They fail to note that once
     deemed citizens by operation of Section 6A, the erstwhile-immigrants
     would enjoy equal rights as any other Indian citizen, including the
     right to vote, irrespective of the mode or time of acquisition of
     citizenship. Such constitutional rights cannot be summarily revoked
     or infringed upon.
344. We are, therefore, not inclined to accept the Petitioners’ contention
     that the influx of immigrants in the State of Assam has affected the
     right of the Assamese people to vote. Moreover, there has been no
     violation of the right of the Petitioners under Article 326 as it merely
     grants them the right to vote and be included in the electoral rolls,
     which continues to subsist to this day devoid of any interruption. As
     stated earlier, the Petitioners have not claimed any violation of their
     statutory rights and have failed to demonstrate the violation of any
     rights under Article 326 of the Constitution.

     x.    Article 355 and Section 6A
345. The Petitioners contended that Section 6A is violative of Article 355
     of the Constitution on account of the continued presence of millions
     of illegal Bangladeshi immigrants in Assam, purportedly, leading to
     a transformation in the demographic composition of the State. They
     contended that the continuing influx has resulted in a scenario where
     the indigenous population of Assam finds themselves effectively
     reduced to a minority in their own State.
346. Drawing upon the precedent in Sarbananda Sonowal (supra), the
     Petitioners posit that Assam is currently grappling with a state of
     ‘external aggression’ and ‘internal disturbance’ due to the said influx of
     immigrants. Consequently, they argue that it becomes the duty of the
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     Union, as provided in Article 355, to undertake necessary measures
     for the protection of Assam. In such circumstances, the Petitioners
     contend that Section 6A, in its current form, contravenes Article 355
     and should, therefore, be deemed unconstitutional and struck down.
347. The Petitioners further argued that the Union’s obligation, as outlined
     in Article 355, to safeguard a ‘State’ from ‘external aggression’
     encompasses not only a responsibility towards the territorial integrity
     but also extends to the inhabitants of the State, encompassing
     their culture and identity. According to the Petitioners, this duty
     mandates the State to shield itself from cultural aggression arising
     from extensive migration.
348. Au contraire, the Respondents maintained that the conclusions
     drawn in Sarbananda Sonowal (supra) are distinguishable, as that
     case primarily focused on the inadequate detection and deportation
     of illegal migrants entering after the year 1971, without delving into
     the provisions related to the grant of citizenship under Section 6A.
     Moreover, it is asserted that the prerequisite for ‘external aggression’
     is the principle of ‘animus belligerendi’, and since the migration in
     question was distress-driven, intending to seek refuge in India, it
     should not fall within the purview of Article 355.
349. The Respondents also contend that Article 355 should not be
     considered an independent and standalone basis for challenging
     Section 6A. They argue that any challenge to Section 6A based on
     the alleged violation of Article 355 would be unsuccessful unless
     the claimed deprivation of rights can be directly linked to Part III
     of the Constitution. Additionally, the Respondents assert that the
     primary objective of Section 6A was to provide a lasting solution to
     the disturbances in Assam and to facilitate the governance of the
     state in conformity with the constitutional provisions. According to
     the Respondents, Section 6A therefore does not contravene the
     provisions of Article 355; instead, it strengthens and reinforces the
     principles enshrined therein.
350. Against this backdrop, the Court is confronted with deciding whether
     Section 6A is unconstitutional for being violative of Article 355.

     (a)   Intention behind Article 355
351. In order to comprehend the reason behind the inclusion of Article
     355, it is vital to understand its intended objective. Article 355
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                           1135

                 In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       states that it is the duty of the Union to protect every State against
       ‘external aggression’ and ‘internal disturbance’ and to ensure that
       the Government of every State is carried on in accordance with the
       provisions of this Constitution. Article 355, expounded in Part XVIII
       of the Indian Constitution, which pertains to ‘Emergency Provisions,’
       was initially not present in the Draft Constitution of 1948. However, it
       was subsequently introduced in 1949 by the Chairman of the Drafting
       Committee in the Constituent Assembly.219 At that time, Article 355
       was denoted as Article 277A and was presented for discussion in
       the Constituent Assembly along with draft Articles 278 and 278A,
       now recognized as Articles 356 and 357 of the Indian Constitution.
352. In the context of the introduction of draft Article 277A, later designated
     as Article 355, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar elucidated its underlying purpose.
     He emphasized that despite the numerous provisions conferring
     overriding powers on the Center, the Indian Constitution was
     fundamentally federal, with States having primacy in legislating over
     their designated domains. Accordingly, if the Centre was to interfere
     in the administration of provincial affairs through Article 356 and
     357 (draft Articles 278 and 278A of the Indian Constitution), there
     ought to be some obligation which the Constitution imposes upon
     the Center. It was emphasized that such an ‘invasion’ by the Centre
     of the Provincial field “must not be an invasion which is wanton,
     arbitrary and unauthorized by law.” Thus, it was succinctly stated
     that “in order to make it quite clear that Draft Arts. 278 and 278A are
     not deemed as a wanton invasion by the Centre upon the authority
     of the provision, we propose to introduce Article 277A.”
353. Similar clauses appear in the Australian and American Constitutions.
     Dr. Ambedkar stated that Article 355 incorporated an additional clause
     to the principle enunciated in these other constitutions, namely, that
     it shall also be the duty of the Union to protect the Constitutional
     mandate in the Provinces. For context, Article 355 is seen to be
     borrowed from Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution of the United
     States and Section 119 of the Australian Constitution. Article IV,
     Section 4 of the Constitution of the United States provides as follows:
              "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
              Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect


219 Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume 9, 03.08.1949 and 04.08.1949.
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           each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the
           Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature
           cannot be convened) against domestic violence.”
354. Similarly, Section 119 of the Australian Constitution provides as
     follows:
           "The Commonwealth shall protect every State against
           invasion and, on the application of the Executive
           Government of the State, against domestic violence.”
355. The key differentiation, evident from the aforementioned provisions
     of the American and Australian Constitutions, as opposed to Article
     355, lies in the terminology employed—specifically, the use of
     ‘invasion’ and ‘domestic violence’ in contrast to ‘external aggression’
     and ‘internal disturbance’ as outlined in Article 355. Another notable
     distinction is that, in the corresponding provisions of the American
     and Australian Constitutions, it is mandated that the State must apply
     to the Centre for protection against domestic violence. In contrast,
     no such condition is stipulated in India under Article 355.

     (b)   Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India
356. In Sarbananda Sonawal (supra), the petitioner, a citizen of Assam,
     filed a writ petition challenging the constitutional validity of the
     Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983 (IMDT Act),
     which was made applicable to the state of Assam for the detection
     and deportation of illegal immigrants entering into India, on or after
     25.03.1971. The petitioner therein alleged, inter alia, that the IMDT
     Act had failed to effectuate the detection and deportation of such
     illegal immigrants. In comparison, the Foreigners Act, 1946, which
     was applicable to the rest of the country, was asserted to be more
     effective in deporting illegal immigrants. The petitioner therein argued
     that since the unabated illegal immigration posed a threat to the
     security of the State, the IMDT Act would be violative of Article 355
     of the Constitution.
357. The Court analyzed the provisions of the IMDT Act and noted that
     it laid down a high threshold for establishing an individual as an
     illegal immigrant. Moreover, if a citizen of India wanted to inform the
     authorities regarding the whereabouts of an illegal immigrant, such
     a citizen needed to be a resident of the same police station where
     the immigrant was purportedly residing. Since the immigrants were
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                        1137

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     constantly on the move, this condition was held to be arbitrary. In
     essence, the Court held that the IMDT Act had been purposefully
     enacted to provide shelter to the immigrants who entered Assam
     from Bangladesh after 25.03.1971.
358. The Court thereafter held that the Union has the duty to protect its
     citizens. While interpreting Article 355, the Court held that the term
     ‘aggression’ is of wide import and is different from the term ‘war’,
     which involves a contest between two nations for the purpose of
     vanquishing each other. On the contrary, the term ‘aggression’ is
     a broader term that may include complex situations depending on
     the fact situation and its impact. Accordingly, illegal immigration was
     held to be included in ‘external aggression’. Consequently, the Court
     held as follows:
          "62. […] The Governor of Assam in his report dated 8-11-1998
          sent to the President of India has clearly said that
          unabated influx of illegal migrants of Bangladesh
          into Assam has led to a perceptible change in the
          demographic pattern of the State and has reduced
          the Assamese people to a minority in their own
          State. It is a contributory factor behind the outbreak
          of insurgency in the State and illegal migration
          not only affects the people of Assam but has more
          dangerous dimensions of greatly undermining
          our national security. Pakistan’s ISI is very active
          in Bangladesh supporting militants in Assam. Muslim
          militant organisations have mushroomed in Assam. The
          report also says that this can lead to the severing of the
          entire landmass of the North-East with all its resources
          from the rest of the country which will have disastrous
          strategic and economic consequences. The report is by
          a person who has held the high and responsible position
          of the Deputy Chief of the Army Staff and is very well
          equipped to recognise the potential danger or threat to
          the security of the nation by the unabated influx and
          continued presence of Bangladeshi nationals in India.
          Bangladesh is one of the world’s most populous countries
          having very few industries. The economic prospects of
          the people in that country being extremely grim, they
          are too keen to cross over the border and occupy the
1138                                                      [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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          land wherever it is possible to do so. The report of the
          Governor, the affidavits and other material on record show
          that millions of Bangladeshi nationals have illegally
          crossed the international border and have occupied
          vast tracts of land like “Char land” barren or cultivable
          land, forest area and have taken possession of the
          same in the State of Assam. Their willingness to work
          at low wages has deprived Indian citizens and specially
          people of Assam of employment opportunities. This, as
          stated in the Governor’s report, has led to insurgency
          in Assam. Insurgency is undoubtedly a serious form
          of internal disturbance which causes grave threat to
          the life of people, creates panic situation and also
          hampers the growth and economic prosperity of the
          State of Assam though it possesses vast natural
          resources.”
          "63. This being the situation there can be no manner
          of doubt that the State of Assam is facing “external
          aggression and internal disturbance” on account of
          large-scale illegal migration of Bangladeshi nationals.
          It, therefore, becomes the duty of the Union of India to
          take all measures for protection of the State of Assam
          from such external aggression and internal disturbance
          as enjoined in Article 355 of the Constitution. Having
          regard to this constitutional mandate, the question arises
          whether the Union of India has taken any measures for
          that purpose.”
                                                 [Emphasis supplied]
359. Thereafter, the Court held that as compared to the Foreigners
     Act, 1946, the IMDT Act was not as effective in the detection and
     deportation of illegal immigrants and created insurmountable hurdles
     regarding the same. Hence, this Act was held to be beneficial for
     illegal immigrants, whose numbers ran into the millions and who were
     creating a scenario of insurgency in the State of Assam. Accordingly,
     the Act was held to be violative of Article 355.
360. We respectfully agree with Sarbananda Sonowal (supra) in its
     holding that the term aggression in Article 355 is of a wide import and
     can include unabated migration if it poses a threat to the security of
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                                   1139

                  In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       the state. Therefore, in such cases, the Union indeed bears a duty
       to protect the State from such unabated immigration that it amounts
       to external aggression or internal disturbance; and those statutes
       which violate this duty can be held unconstitutional.
361. Having established that, we shall now consider whether Section 6A
     falls flat because of being violative of Article 355.

       (c)     Section 6A vis-à-vis Article 355
362. In this regard, the Respondents have argued that the claim under
     Article 355 is not maintainable since migration cannot be termed
     as external aggression, and because a statute cannot be held
     unconstitutional for being violative of Article 355 simpliciter. However,
     as seen above, this contention has already been negatived in
     Sarbananda Sonowal (supra), to which we profoundly agree.
     Therefore, their objection against the maintainability of Petitioners’
     claim is rejected.
363. That being said, the Respondents are seemingly right to contend that
     the cited decision is not applicable to the facts at hand presently. As
     may be seen from the reproduction of the analysis in Sarbananda
     Sonowal (supra) at paragraph 358 above, this Court held that
     migration could constitute ‘external aggression’. Although the present
     situation is similar in nature to Sarabananda Sonowal (supra), but
     it differs in degree. There, this Court was dealing with a situation
     where millions of illegal immigrants had been coming into the State
     of Assam incessantly post-1971 and were posing a security threat for
     the country. This understanding of ‘external aggression’ is also in tune
     with the case of Extra-Judicial Execution Victim Families Assn. v.
     Union of India,220 wherein this Court interpreted the term and held
     that it threatens the security of the country. In Constituent Assembly
     Debates as well, the term ‘external aggression’ was interpreted to
     include situations similar to war, without its actual declaration.221
364. However, in the present case, Section 6A is limited in its ambit
     and does not by itself create unabated migration or legitimize its
     continuance. As was seen in paragraph 25 of this judgement,
     Section 6A segregates immigrants from East Pakistan to Assam into


220 Extra-Judicial Execution Victim Families Assn. v. Union of India (2016) 14 SCC 536, para 169.
221 H.V. Kamath, Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume 9, 02.08.1949
1140                                                        [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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     three classes. It grants deemed citizenship only to the immigrants
     who migrated before 01.01.1966, and citizenship by registration to
     immigrants between 01.01.1966 and 25.03.1971. Further, when read
     along with other legislations on immigration and citizenship, it declares
     by implication, immigration into the State post-1971, as illegal. In fact,
     Section 6A adopts a practical solution for the problem of incessant
     illegal immigration into Assam by devising an implementable solution
     keeping in mind India’s commitments, international relations and
     administrative realities.
365. Not only this, as was deliberated in the section on ‘manifest
     arbitrariness’, the migrants also need to satisfy certain conditions for
     invoking Section 6A, apart from being persons of Indian origin and
     ordinary residents in India. Hence, unlike the immigration scrutinized
     in Sarbananda Sonowal (supra), Section 6A addresses a controlled
     and regulated form of immigration that in our opinion would fall short
     of ‘external aggression’.
366. Along similar lines, the migration legitimized by Section 6A also does
     not constitute internal disturbance. As was discussed before, Section
     6A was a crucial step in bringing quietus to the political upheaval in
     Assam and marked the culmination of various agitations surrounding
     illegal immigration and the rights of indigenous communities. Given
     this background, it is difficult to accede to the proposition that Section
     6A caused ‘internal disturbance’.
367. Hence, the claim of the Petitioners regarding Section 6A being
     contrary to Article 355 cannot be accepted. However, that being
     said, upholding the constitutionality of Section 6A should not be
     construed as an impediment in implementing existing citizenship and
     immigration legislations, or giving effect to other judicial decisions
     controlling the field.

     xi.   Citizenship Act vis-à-vis the IEAA
368. The Petitioners have finally contended that the Immigrants (Expulsion
     from Assam) Act, 1950 (IEAA), being a special statute qua the
     immigrants in Assam, alone can apply to the exclusion of the
     Foreigners Act, 1946. Accordingly, the Petitioners assailed the phrase
     ‘detected to be a foreigner’ in Section 6A, in so far as it applies to
     the Foreigners Act, 1946 and not the IEAA. In addition to this, the
     Petitioners contended that the IEAA, is a Parliamentary Statute, and
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                        1141

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     its main purpose being that of expulsion, should apply exclusively
     to the immigrants in Assam.
369. The Respondents have not made any particular submissions in this
     regard. However, for the sake of the comprehensiveness of analysis,
     we shall address this issue as well.
370. Having taken into account these contentions, the issues that arise
     for our consideration are twofold–(i) whether the IEAA should apply
     to the immigrants in Assam, to the exclusion of the Foreigners Act,
     1946; and (ii) whether the IEAA is in conflict with the intent and aim
     of Section 6A.
371. We must note here that the Petitioners have argued that the IEAA
     should override the provisions of other enactments like the Foreigners
     Act, 1946 or Section 6A, as they presume some conflict between
     these legislations. However, we find that this fundamental assumption
     made by the Petitioners, as to the existence of a conflict, is misplaced.
     Indeed, it is not only possible but also our endeavor to read all the
     enactments controlling the field harmoniously, supplementing and
     complementing each other.
372. The intent behind the IEAA can be understood from its Statement
     of Objects and Reasons stipulating that:
           "During the last few months a serious situation had arisen
           from the immigration of a very large number of East Bengal
           residents into Assam. Such large migration is disturbing
           the economy of the province, besides giving rise to a
           serious law and order problem. The Bill seeks to confer
           necessary powers on the Central Government to deal
           with the situation.”
373. This intention is manifested in Section 2 of IEAA, which grants Central
     Government the power to direct the removal of immigrants who are
     detrimental to the interests of India.
374. Similar to this, the preamble of Foreigners Act, 1946 reads:
           "Whereas it is expedient to provide for the exercise by the
           Central Government of certain powers in respect of the
           entry of foreigners into India, their presence therein and
           their departure therefrom.”
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375. In light of this objective, Section 3(1) of the Foreigners Act, 1946
     empowers the Central Government to make provisions concerning
     foreigners’ entry, departure, presence, or continued presence in
     India. Without diminishing the expansive authority granted by Section
     3(1), Section 3(2) confers upon the Central Government the power
     to issue comprehensive orders regarding foreigners, which include
     directives such as prohibiting a foreigner from remaining in India
     or any specified area, requiring the individual to meet the cost of
     removal from India, or compliance with specified conditions, etc.
376. We find from a perusal of both, the IEAA and the Foreigners Act, 1946,
     that these legislations seek to regulate the residence and departure
     of foreigners in India. To that extent, there is thus no conflict between
     the Statutes and both of them supplement and complement each
     other within the framework of Section 6A. This is also seconded by
     Sarbananda Sonawal (supra), which held:
           "83. To sum up our conclusions, the provisions of the Illegal
           Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983 are ultra
           vires the Constitution and are accordingly struck down. The
           Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Rules, 1984
           are also ultra vires and are struck down. As a result, the
           Tribunals and the Appellate Tribunals constituted under
           the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983
           shall cease to function. The Passport (Entry into India)
           Act, 1920, the Foreigners Act, 1946, the Immigrants
           (Expulsion from Assam) Act, 1950 and the Passport
           Act, 1967 shall apply to the State of Assam […]”
                                                  [Emphasis supplied]
377. That apart, and as held by the Court in Sarbanda Sonawal (supra),
     apart from the IEAA, there are various other statutes—including the
     Passport (Entry into India) Act, 1920, the Foreigners Act, 1946, the
     Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act, 1950 and the Passport Act,
     1967—which are applicable to the State of Assam.
378. In light of the brief foregoing analysis of various statutes, we are
     of the considered opinion that Section 6A need not be construed in
     a restrictive manner to mean that a person shall be detected and
     deported only under the Foreigners Act, 1946. If there is any other
     piece of legislation such as the IEAA, under which the status of an
     immigrant can be determined, we see no reason as to why such
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                       1143

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     statutory detection shall also not be given effect to, for the purposes
     of deportation. We thus hold that the provisions of IEAA shall also
     be read into Section 6A and be applied along with the Foreigners
     Act, 1946 for the purpose of detection and deportation of foreigners.
379. Similarly, in light of this, we find it difficult to accept the second
     contention of the Petitioners that the IEAA is a complete code
     in dealing with the situation of immigrants in Assam, and that
     Section 6A cannot prescribe contrary norms by granting immigrants
     citizenship. As discussed above, IEAA is only one of the statutes
     that addressed a specific problem that existed in 1950. The issue
     of undesirable immigration in 1950 necessitated the promulgation
     of the IEAA and the granting of power to the Central government to
     expel such immigrants. On the contrary, the provisions of Section 6A
     have to be viewed from the focal point of 1971, when Bangladesh
     was formed as a new nation and an understanding was reached to
     grant citizenship to certain classes of immigrants who had migrated
     from erstwhile East Pakistan, as has been detailed in paragraphs
     230 and 231 of this judgement. Hence, Section 6A, when examined
     from this perspective, is seen to have a different objective—one of
     granting citizenship to certain classes of immigrants, particularly
     deemed citizenship to those immigrants who came to India before
     01.01.1966 and qualified citizenship, to those who came on or after
     01.01.1966 and before 25.03.1971.
380. Since the two statutes operate in different spheres, we find no conflict
     existing between them. The Parliament was fully conversant with
     the dynamics and realities, while enacting both the Statutes. The
     field of operation of the two enactments being distinct and different
     and there being a presumption of the Legislature having informed
     knowledge about their consequences, we decline to hold that Section
     6A is in conflict with a differently situated statute, namely the IEAA.
381. Instead, we are satisfied that IEAA and Section 6A can be read
     harmoniously along with other statutes. As held in Sarbananda
     Sonawal (supra), none of these Statutes exist as a standalone code
     but rather supplement each other.
382. We may also hasten to add that the present reference is restricted
     and limited to the constitutional validity of Section 6A, and the extent
     of applicability of IEAA is not the subject matter of reference. As
     discussed earlier, there are multiple statutory enactments to address
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       the influx of immigrants in Assam, namely Section 6A of the Citizenship
       Act, the Foreigners Act, 1946, the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964,
       the Passport (Entry into India) Act, 1920 and the Passport Act, 1967.
       Hence, in our view, the IEAA must be effectively applied along with
       all other Statutes which occupy similar or related fields and are, in
       a way, complementary to each other.

       xii. Interface with international law
383. In support of the constitutionality of Section 6A, the Respondents
     have argued that an international norm against statelessness exists,
     and thus, the Court should harmonize the interpretation of domestic
     law with international law. They contend that holding Section 6A
     unconstitutional would potentially render these immigrants stateless,
     and therefore, the Court should refrain from invalidating this provision.
384. In light of the discussion in the foregoing sections, since we have
     not been able to persuade ourselves to strike down Section 6A on
     the strength of the contentions of Petitioners, the need to examine
     the issue of statelessness does not arise and is rendered academic.
385. The Petitioners too have invoked Article 27 of the ICCPR, to argue
     that since Section 6A impacts the culture of original inhabitants, it
     therefore violates Article 27.
386. Similar to Article 29 of the Constitution of India, Article 27 of the
     ICCPR also restricts intervention in one’s culture.222 In this regard,
     since we have already analysed in detail that Section 6A per se does
     not intervene in culture of Assamese people, we see no need to re-
     agitate the issue here. In any case, it is an established principle that
     international law cannot trump domestic law.223 Therefore, Section
     6A cannot be assailed on the ground of the perceived violation of
     Article 27 of the ICCPR as well.

       F.     CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS
387. Drawing upon the comprehensive analysis presented in the preceding
     sections, we thus hold that Section 6A falls within the bounds of the


222 Länsman v Finland (511/92); Diergaardt et al. v. Namibia, Communication No. 760/1997 (25 July
    2000); Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Communication No. 167/1984 (26 March 1990), U.N. Doc. Supp.
    No. 40 (A/45/40) at 1 (1990); Rakhim Mavlonov and Shansiy Sa’di case (Mavlonov v. Uzbekistan),
    Communication No. 1334/2004, UN Doc. CCPR/C/95/D/1334/2004 (2009)
223 Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, supra note 98.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                        1145

              In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     Constitution and does not contravene the foundational principles
     of fraternity, nor does it infringe upon Articles 6 and 7, Article 9,
     Article 14, Article 21, Article 29, Article 326, or Article 355 of the
     Constitution of India. Furthermore, Section 6A does not clash with
     the IEAA or established principles of international law. Hence, the
     constitutional validity of Section 6A, as contested before us, is
     resolved accordingly.
388. Nevertheless, it is imperative to acknowledge and address the
     valid concerns raised by the Petitioners regarding the persistent
     immigration in the State of Assam post 25.03.1971. Although Section
     6A conferred citizenship rights exclusively to immigrants arriving
     before this cut-off date, there seems to still be an ongoing influx
     of migrants through various border States of India. Due to porous
     borders and incomplete fencing, this unceasing migration imposes
     a significant challenge.
389. On account of these concerns, we passed an order on 07.12.2023
     and directed the Respondent Union of India to provide data, inter alia,
     the estimated inflow of illegal migrants into India after 25.03.1971, the
     number of cases presently pending before the Foreigner Tribunals
     for such immigrants and the extent to which border fencing has
     been carried out.
390. Regarding the inquiry into the estimated influx of illegal migrants post
     25.03.1971, the Union of India was unable to provide precise figures
     due to the clandestine nature of such inflows. This underscores the
     necessity for more robust policy measures to curb illicit movements
     and enhance border regulation. Additionally, it was disclosed that
     approximately 97,714 cases are pending before the Foreigner
     Tribunals, and nearly 850 kilometres of border remain unfenced or
     inadequately monitored.
391. We hold that while the statutory scheme of Section 6A is constitutionally
     valid, there is inadequate enforcement of the same—leading to the
     possibility of widespread injustice. Further, the intention of Section 6A,
     i.e., to restrict illegal immigration post-1971 has also not been given
     proper effect. Accordingly, we deem it fit to issue following directions:
     (a)   In view of the conclusion drawn in paragraph 387, it is held that
           Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955 falls within the bounds
           of the Constitution and is a valid piece of legislation;
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     (b)   As a necessary corollary thereto, (i) immigrants who entered
           the State of Assam prior to 1966 are deemed citizens; (ii)
           immigrants who entered between the cut off dates of 01.01.1966
           and 25.03.1971 can seek citizenship subject to the eligibility
           conditions prescribed in Section 6A(3); and (iii) immigrants
           who entered the State of Assam on or after 25.03.1971 are
           not entitled to the protection conferred vide Section 6A and
           consequently, they are declared to be illegal immigrants.
           Accordingly, Section 6A has become redundant qua those
           immigrants who have entered the State of Assam on or after
           25.03.1971;
     (c)   The directions issued in Sarbananda Sonowal (supra) are
           required to be given effect to for the purpose of deporting the
           illegal immigrants falling in the category of direction (b) (iii)
           above;
     (d)   The provisions of the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam)
           Act, 1950 shall also be read into Section 6A and shall be
           effectively employed for the purpose of identification of illegal
           immigrants;
     (e)   The statutory machinery and Tribunals tasked with the
           identification and detection of illegal immigrants or foreigners in
           Assam are inadequate and not proportionate to the requirement
           of giving time-bound effect to the legislative object of Section 6A
           read with the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act, 1950, the
           Foreigners Act, 1946, the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964,
           the Passport (Entry into India) Act, 1920 and the Passport Act,
           1967; and
     (f)   The implementation of immigration and citizenship legislations
           cannot be left to the mere wish and discretion of the authorities,
           necessitating constant monitoring by this Court.
392. For this purpose, let this matter be placed before Hon’ble the Chief
     Justice of India for constituting a bench to monitor the implementation
     of the directions issued hereinabove.
393. These writ petitions are accordingly disposed of in terms of this
     judgment.
394. Pending applications (if any) are also disposed of.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                                            1147

                   In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       J.B. Pardiwala, J.
       For the convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided into the
       following parts: -

        I.     SALIENT FEATURES OF THE JUDGMENT PENNED BY
               JUSTICE SURYA KANT .......................................................                      3*
        II.    FACTUAL MATRIX ..............................................................                  13*
               A. Historical Background .................................................                     13*
                     i.    Colonial ......................................................................    13*
                     ii.   Post-Independence .................................................                17*
                     iii. Assam Accord ..........................................................             23*
               B. Salient Features of the Assam Accord ......................                                 31*
        III. SUBMISSIONS ON THE DAMAGE CAUSED DUE TO THE
             INFLUX OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS INTO ASSAM ...........                                              37*
        IV. ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION .............................................                             42*
        V.     ANALYSIS ............................................................................          45*
               A. Scheme and Mechanism of Section 6A .........................                                45*
               B. How many Immigrants eligible under Section 6A(3) of
                  the Act have registered till date? ..............................                           57*
               C. Object sought to be achieved by the prescription of
                  Two Separate Cut-Off Dates ........................................                         60*
               D. Whether the Onus of Detection of Foreigners of the
                  1966-1971 Stream lies on the State? ..........................                              67*
               E. Temporal Reasonableness ............................................                        71*
                     i.    Whether there is a temporal limit on the applicability
                           of Section 6A(3)? .......................................................          76*
                     ii.   Whether placing temporal limitations on the period
                           of applicability is an objective implicit in the scheme
                           of Section 6A? ..........................................................          78*
                     iii. Absurd consequences arising out of Section 6A(3)
                          in the absence of any temporal limits to its
                          application .................................................................       85*


* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
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              F.   M a n i f e s t A r b i t r a r i n e ss v i s - à - v i s T e m p o r a l
                   Unreasonableness .........................................................   94*
              G. Damage Caused by the Scheme of Section 6A ...............                      98*
              H. Doctrine of Prospective Overruling ............................ 110*
        VI.   CONCLUSION ...................................................................... 120*



1.   I have had the benefit of reading a very erudite judgment penned by
     my learned brother, Justice Surya Kant – holding Section 6A of the
     Citizenship Act, 1955 (“the Citizenship Act”) to be constitutionally
     valid. However, with all humility at my command, I beg to differ with
     the views expressed by Justice Surya Kant on certain issues.
2.   I have examined the matter from a different dimension, more
     particularly by applying the doctrine of temporal reasonableness.
     I propose to hold Section 6A of the Citizenship Act invalid with
     prospective effect, for the reasons I shall assign hereinafter in my
     judgment.
3.   However, before I proceed to express my views, I would like to
     highlight a few salient features of the judgment penned by Justice
     Surya Kant.

     I.       SALIENT FEATURES OF THE JUDGMENT PENNED BY
              JUSTICE SURYA KANT.
4.   Justice Surya Kant, in his judgment, after giving an overview of
     the jurisprudence regarding the concept of citizenship and the
     associated statutory framework in India and various other international
     jurisdictions, has framed and discussed twelve issues. The first two
     issues are preliminary in nature and deal with the scope and extent
     of judicial review and the applicability of doctrine of delay and laches
     to the present case. The remaining ten issues pertain to the various
     challenges to the constitutionality of Section 6A of the Citizenship
     Act as raised by the Petitioners.
5.   In the present judgment, I have dealt with the issues pertaining to the
     manifest arbitrariness and temporal unreasonableness of Section 6A
     of the Citizenship Act. Hence, I do not deem it appropriate to express
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                        1149

                  In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


      my views on all the issues as framed by Justice Surya Kant in his
      judgment. I have expressed my concurrence or disagreement, as
      the case may be, with the views taken by him, only where I deemed
      it to be completely necessary for the purposes of answering the
      questions framed by me in this judgment.
6.    On the first prefatory issue pertaining to the scope and extent of
      judicial review, Justice Surya Kant has held that it is well within
      the domain of this Court to examine the challenges raised by the
      petitioners against the vires of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act.
      He has considered and rejected the objections of the respondents
      that Section 6A, being in the nature of foreign policy, should not be
      examined on the touchstone of constitutionality.1
7.    Further, Justice Surya Kant has delineated the extent of judicial
      review and has observed that while examining the constitutionality of
      a policy, the courts have to examine whether the policy infringes upon
      the fundamental rights of the citizens, contravenes constitutional or
      statutory provisions or displays manifest arbitrariness, capriciousness
      or mala fides. At the same time, he has clarified that this Court should
      not sit in judgment over a policy to determine whether revisions are
      necessary for its enhancement.
8.    On the second preliminary issue pertaining to delay and laches,
      Justice Surya Kant has held that although there has been a
      considerable delay in filing of the present batch of petitions, yet
      they do not deserve to be dismissed at the outset as they raise
      substantial questions that pertain to the constitutional validity of a
      statutory provision and affect the public at large.2 I concur with the
      views expressed by him on both the prefatory issues.
9.    On the substantive issues, Justice Surya Kant has first dealt with the
      submission of the petitioners that Section 6A of the Citizenship Act
      is violative of the preambular notion of fraternity. After elaborating on
      the idea of fraternity as understood by the framers of our Constitution
      in detail, he has held that the ethos underlying Section 6A align
      with the concept of fraternity, as envisaged by our Constitution and



1    Paragraphs 45-46 of the judgment of Justice Surya Kant.
2    Id., paragraphs 72, 75.
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      interpreted by our courts. He has held that the concept of fraternity
      cannot be applied in a restrictive manner to protect and promote the
      endogamous way of life of any specific community.3
10. Justice Surya Kant has thereafter examined if Section 6A of the Act
    is violative of Articles 64 and 75 respectively of the Constitution and
    whether the Parliament in exercise of its powers under Article 116 of
    the Constitution could have enacted such a provision. He has held
    that it was within the competence of the legislature to enact the
    provision and that the conditions mentioned under Section 6A are
    similar to those under Articles 6 and 7 of the Constitution, thereby
    indicating that Section 6A aligns with the underlying object of both
    these Articles, which was to grant citizenship to people affected by
    the partition of India.7
11. While I agree with my learned brother’s view that the Parliament,
    undoubtedly, has the jurisdiction to specify conditions for the
    conferment of citizenship and thus Section 6A of the Citizenship Act
    is not rendered void for the lack of competence of the legislature, I
    wish to express my disagreement with the fundamental premise of
    his reasoning that Section 6A is similar in form and identical in spirit
    with Articles 6 and 7 respectively of the Constitution.


3   Id., paragraphs 117-118.
4   6. Rights of citizenship of certain persons who have migrated to India from Pakistan.—
    Notwithstanding anything in article 5, a person who has migrated to the territory of India from the
    territory now included in Pakistan shall be deemed to be a citizen of India at the commencement of this
    Constitution if—
    (a) he or either of his parents or any of his grand-parents was born in India as defined in the Government
    of India Act, 1935 (as originally enacted); and
    (b)(i) in the case where such person has so migrated before the nineteenth day of July, 1948, he has
    been ordinarily resident in the territory of India since the date of his migration, or
    (ii) in the case where such person has so migrated on or after the nineteenth day of July, 1948, he has
    been registered as a citizen of India by an officer appointed in that behalf by the Government of the
    Dominion of India on an application made by him therefor to such officer before the commencement of
    this Constitution in the form and manner prescribed by that Government:
    Provided that no person shall be so registered unless he has been resident in the territory of India for at
    least six months immediately preceding the date of his application.
5   7. Rights of citizenship of certain migrants to Pakistan.— Notwithstanding anything in articles 5 and
    6, a person who has after the first day of March, 1947, migrated from the territory of India to the territory
    now included in Pakistan shall not be deemed to be a citizen of India:
    Provided that nothing in this article shall apply to a person who, after having so migrated to the territory now
    included in Pakistan, has returned to the territory of India under a permit for resettlement or permanent
    return issued by or under the authority of any law and every such person shall for the purposes of clause
    (b) of article 6 be deemed to have migrated to the territory of India after the nineteenth day of July, 1948.
6   11. Parliament to regulate the right of citizenship by law.— Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this
    Part shall derogate from the power of Parliament to make any provision with respect to the acquisition
    and termination of citizenship and all other matters relating to citizenship.
7   Paragraph 132 of the judgment of Justice Surya Kant.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                                  1151

                  In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


12. A close reading of both the aforesaid Articles would indicate that
    unlike Section 6A(3) of the Citizenship Act which entrusts the State
    with the duty of detecting immigrants and conferring citizenship on
    them, Article 6 prescribes for a registration system that places the
    onus of individually undertaking such registration on the person
    who wishes to avail citizenship. Secondly, unlike Section 6A(3)
    of the Citizenship Act which has no prescribed end-date for the
    completion of registration, Article 6 prescribes that an application
    for registration has to be made before the date of commencement
    of the Constitution. As discussed by me in detail in the later parts
    of this judgment, these two crucial differences are the underlying
    reasons for shrouding Section 6A of the Citizenship Act with a cloak
    of unconstitutionality.
13. Justice Surya Kant has further dealt with the challenge raised by
    the petitioners that Section 6A of the Citizenship Act is violative
    of Article 148 of the Constitution. While rejecting the preliminary
    objection raised by the respondents that the petitioners cannot
    seek equality in regard to a restriction as opposed to a benefit,9
    Justice Surya Kant, after a detailed consideration of the arguments
    and precedents, has rejected the contention of the petitioners and
    has held that Section 6A does not violate Article 14. He has held
    that Section 6A is a result of a political settlement between the
    Government and the people of Assam, namely the Assam Accord,
    and thus is not violative of Article 14 for treating Assam differently
    from the rest of the States.10
14. Further, on the question of Section 6A of the Act being ‘manifestly
    arbitrary’ and thus violative of Article 14, Justice Surya Kant has held
    that neither the cut-off dates11 prescribed in the scheme of Section 6A
    of the Citizenship Act nor the criteria and the procedure12 provided
    for conferment of citizenship under the said provision are devoid of
    reason or are palpably arbitrary. For these reasons, he has held that
    Section 6A does not suffer from manifest arbitrariness.



8    14. Equality before law.— The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal
     protection of the laws within the territory of India.
9    Paragraphs 164 and 166 of the judgment of Justice Surya Kant.
10   Id., paragraphs 187-190.
11   Id., paragraphs 230-232.
12   Id., paragraphs 238-241.
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15. I am in agreement with the view taken by Justice Surya Kant
    that it was permissible for the legislature to enact Section 6A of
    the Citizenship Act solely for the State of Assam in view of the
    extraordinary conditions prevailing therein and the Assam Accord
    which was entered into as a culmination of such circumstances.
    Further, I concur with his view that Section 6A cannot be said to be
    violative of Article 14 for being under-inclusive. However, I differ from
    his views on the aspect of manifest arbitrariness for the reasons
    that I have assigned in the later parts of this judgment. I am also of
    the considered view that Section 6A has acquired unconstitutionality
    subsequent to its enactment in 1985 by efflux of time and has thus
    become violative of Article 14 for being temporally unreasonable.
    I have dealt with this aspect too in detail in the later parts of this
    judgment.
16. The next issue which my learned brother has dealt with pertains to the
    violation of the Article 2913 of the Constitution on account of Section
    6A of the Citizenship Act. The view taken by him is that Section 6A
    does not deal with culture, but merely prescribes the conditions for
    conferment of citizenship on certain categories of immigrants. Thus,
    any impact on culture is only incidental and not direct or intentional.
    He has also held that Section 6A does not compel the pre-1971
    immigrants to continue to reside within the territory of Assam after
    having obtained Indian citizenship which entitles them to reside
    and settle in any part of the country.14 In the ultimate analysis, he
    has held that due to the failure of the petitioners to establish an
    actionable impact on Assamese culture, Section 6A cannot be held
    to be violative of Article 29 of the Constitution.15
17. Justice Surya Kant has also considered the issue as to whether
    Section 6A of the Citizenship Act is violative of Article 2116 of the
    Constitution, and has held that the petitioners have failed to show


13   29. Protection of interests of minorities.— (1) Any section of the citizens residing in the territory of
     India or any part thereof having a distinct language, script or culture of its own shall have the right to
     conserve the same. (2) No citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained
     by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any
     of them.
14   Paragraphs 297-298 of the judgment of Justice Surya Kant.
15   Id., paragraphs 300, 304.
16   21. Protection of life and personal liberty.— No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty
     except according to procedure established by law.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                                       1153

                   In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       a constitutionally actionable impact. He has taken the view that
       the impact caused in the State of Assam due to immigration can
       be attributed to several factors other than just Section 6A of the
       Citizenship Act. For such reasons, he has held Section 6A to be
       non-violative of Article 21 of the Constitution.17
18. The next issue considered by Justice Surya Kant is whether
    Article 32618 of the Constitution stood violated by Section 6A of the
    Citizenship Act. After traversing the history and evolution of adult
    franchise in India and the case laws on this aspect, he has held that
    the petitioners have failed to show how their rights under Article 326
    have been violated by Section 6A. He has also observed that the
    language of Article 326 unambiguously confers the power to set out
    the mechanism for excluding people from the electoral rolls on the
    legislature. It is, thus, open to the petitioners to follow the mechanism
    prescribed under the Representation of People Act, 1951 to seek
    the removal of individual immigrants, wherever such immigrants are
    wrongly enrolled on the electoral rolls.19
19. Justice Surya Kant has also examined the contention raised by
    the petitioners that whether on account of continued presence of
    illegal immigrants, Section 6A of the Citizenship Act is violative of
    Article 35520 of the Constitution. Relying on the decision of this
    Court in Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India reported in
    (2005) 5 SCC 665, he has rejected the preliminary contention of
    the respondents that Section 6A of the Citizenship Act cannot be
    held unconstitutional for violating Article 355 simplicter. However,
    he has held that the magnitude and degree of immigration in the
    case governed by Section 6A is much lesser than that referred to in



17   Paragraphs 310 and 315 of the judgment of Justice Surya Kant.
18   326. Elections to the House of the People and to the Legislative Assemblies of States to be on the
     basis of adult suffrage.— The elections to the House of the People and to the Legislative Assembly of
     every State shall be on the basis of adult suffrage; that is to say, every person who is a citizen of India
     and who is not less than 2 [eighteen years] of age on such date as may be fixed in that behalf by or under
     any law made by the appropriate Legislature and is not otherwise disqualified under this Constitution
     or any law made by the appropriate Legislature on the ground of non-residence, unsoundness of mind,
     crime or corrupt or illegal practice, shall be entitled to be registered as a voter at any such election.
19   Paragraph 342 of the judgment of Justice Surya Kant.
20   355. Duty of the Union to protect States against external aggression and internal disturbance.— It
     shall be the duty of the Union to protect every State against external aggression and internal disturbance
     and to ensure that the Government of every State is carried on in accordance with the provisions of this
     Constitution.
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      the Sarbananda Sonowal (supra) case, and thus doesn’t amount
      to external aggression.21
20. Justice Surya Kant has also considered the interplay of Section 6A
    of the Citizenship Act with Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act,
    1950 (“IEAA, 1950”) and has held that Section 6A should be read
    harmoniously with the other existing provisions and thus it cannot
    be said to be contrary to the object of the IEAA, 1950.22
21. Finally, Justice Surya Kant has held that Section 6A of the Citizenship
    Act is not violative of any international covenant, treaty or any other
    obligation imposed on India by any international law.23

      II.     FACTUAL MATRIX
22. For a more comprehensive understanding of the issues raised in the
    present case, it is necessary to refer to the historical and sociological
    context in which these issues have arisen.

      A.      Historical Background

      i.      Colonial
23. Between 1817 and 1826, there were multiple invasions by the
    Burmese into Assam. This brought the Kingdom of Ava, i.e., the
    sovereign kingdom that ruled Upper Burma into conflict with the
    British East India Company.
24. There was a great deal of mistrust and friction between the British
    and the Burmese. This culminated into the first Anglo-Burmese
    war in 1824 which ended with the signing of the Yandabo Peace
    Treaty on 24.02.1826 between the East India Company and the
    Burmese Kingdom of Ava. The treaty, inter-alia, stipulated for the
    ceding of the territories of Assam, Manipur, Arakan, and the Taninthayi
    to the British. However, two more wars were fought between the
    British and Burmese before annexation of Burma was completed
    by the British.


21   Paragraph 364-366 of the judgment of Justice Surya Kant.
22   Id., paragraphs 380-382.
23   Id., paragraph 386.
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                  In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


25. Through subsequent treaties, the regions included in the erstwhile
    Ahom Kingdom were integrated within the Bengal Presidency.
    Adjacent territories, including those forming the present-day states
    of Meghalaya, Mizoram, Arunachal Pradesh and Nagaland, were
    designated as the ‘frontier tracts’ and were annexed in due course.
    The British province that came to be known as ‘Assam’ roughly
    took shape by 1873. Subsequently, in the same year, the British
    introduced inner line under the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation
    of 1873 to restrict the migrants.24
26. In 1836, Bengali was declared as the official language of the
    Bengal province of which Assam was a constituent. In 1839, with
    the annexation of Maran/Matak territory in upper Assam, the British
    control over Assam was complete and the British saw it fit to extract
    the most out of Assam’s fertile lands.
27. The charter granted to the East India Company in 183325 marked the
    triumph of the British industrial interests over its mercantile interest
    and had a significant impact on the settlement of the newly conquered
    Assam. The Charter permitted the Europeans to hold land outside
    the Presidency towns on a long-term lease or with free-hold rights.
    This paved the path for a colonial plantation economy. The Assam
    Company which was started in 1839 became the first joint-stock
    company of India to be incorporated with limited liabilities under an
    Act of Parliament in August, 1845.26
28. In 1858, with India coming under the rule of the British Crown as a
    unified territory, the growing demand of labour in tea-plantations and
    the expanding agriculture provided an opportunity to the planters
    to import cheap indentured labour from across India to the fertile
    valleys of Brahmaputra River in Assam.
29. This migration was accompanied by an influx of Bengali speaking
    population into positions of administrative services. The British
    dismantled the existing structure of governance, made Bengali the
    official language and recruited Bengali speaking populace to run



24   Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation, 1873, Regulation 2, Regulation 5 of 1873.
25   The Charter Act, 1833, Chapter No. 85, Acts of Parliament (U.K.).
26   The Assam Company Act, 1845, No. 19 of 1845, Acts of Parliament (U.K.).
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       the administration.27 Assam was more sparsely populated than East
       Bengal. As a result, the Bengali speaking population coming from
       East Bengal reclaimed thousands of acres of land, cleared vast
       tracts of dense jungle along the south bank of the Brahmaputra,
       and occupied flooded lowlands all along the river.28
30. However, owing to the inconvenience of governing the Assam districts
    as a division of the Bengal Presidency and on the demand of the tea
    planters, Assam Proper, Cachar, Goalpara, Sylhet and Hill District
    were constituted as a separate Chief Commissioner’s province of
    Assam, also known as the North East Frontier, with capital at Shillong.
    With this development, Assamese, which had been replaced with
    Bengali as the official language during the annexation of Assam in
    1830s, was reinstated alongside Bengali as the official language.
    However, Assam’s status as a separate province came to an end
    on 16.10.1905 and it was reconstituted as a part of the newly born
    composite province of Eastern Bengal and Assam.
31. The partition of Bengal was short-lived because of the rise of anti-
    British sentiment on account of their policies which led the British
    to attempt to bring about political stability in the territory of India. At
    the Delhi Durbar held on 12.12.1911, the partition of Bengal was
    annulled by a royal declaration. Assam-Sylhet was formally reverted
    to its old status as a Chief Commissioner’s province with effect
    from 01.04.1912. The province of East Bengal was reorganized by
    removing Assam from East Bengal, and Assam was constituted as
    a separate administrative province.
32. In 1937, the Government of India Act, 1935 (“GOI Act, 1935”) came
    into force. With the introduction of the GOI Act, 1935, the territory of
    Burma ceded from India and Assam was incorporated as a territory
    of India.

       ii.   Post-Independence
33. The Indian Independence Bill, 1947 proposed that all of Sylhet would
    become a part of East Bengal. After partition, Sylhet district was
    transferred to East Pakistan by a referendum.


27   Myron Weiner, The Political Demography of Assam’s Anti-Immigrant Movement, 9, Popul. Dev. Rev.,
     283 (1983).
28   Id.
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                 In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


34. The Indian Independence Act, 1947 was passed on 18.07.1947,
    dividing erstwhile India into two new nations, i.e., India and Pakistan.
    Considering the incessant migration at the time of partition, the Influx
    from West Pakistan (Control) Ordinance, 1948 was promulgated,
    putting into place a permit system. The ordinance was subsequently
    replaced by the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Ordinance, 1948.
    Thereafter, on 22.04.1949, the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act,
    1949 was enacted.
35. It was the understanding during the drafting of the Constitution that
    as Assam and East Bengal shared a long history of migration, thus it
    would not be prudent to apply the permit system for migration in East
    India vis-à-vis the permit system that was in place for the territory
    of North-West India and erstwhile West Pakistan. Consequently,
    the permit system was never implemented in relation to the border
    with East Pakistan.
36. At the time of independence, Assam occupied one-fifteenth of India’s
    total land surface and had a very fluid border. The muddy and riverine
    border with East Pakistan led to regular trouble as disputes over
    territory surfaced. There were claims and counter-claims about the
    territorial jurisdiction of India and East Pakistan.29
37. In 1950, keeping in mind the excessive migration taking place into
    Assam post-independence, the Government of India sought to
    stabilize the situation and protect the resources of the country from
    excess migration and enacted IEAA, 1950. During this period, there
    were instances of communal disturbance and some immigrants living
    in the districts of Goalpara, Kamrup and Darrang in Assam fled to
    East Pakistan, leaving their properties behind.30
38. Inter-alia in light of the aforesaid developments, an agreement
    between the Governments of India and Pakistan respectively was
    signed on 08.04.1950, popularly known as the Nehru-Liaquat
    Agreement,31 whereby refugees were allowed to return to dispose
    of their properties.



29   Arupjyoti Saikia, Quest for Modern Assam: A History (Penguin Books 2023).
30   Id.
31   Agreement Between the Government of India and Pakistan Regarding Security and Rights of Minorities
     (Nehru-Liaquat Agreement), India-Pak., Apr. 8, 1950, New Delhi.
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39. On 26.12.1952, the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Repealing Act,
    1952 was enacted to repeal the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act,
    1949 and this ended the permit system w.e.f. 15.10.1952.
40. The Citizenship Act, 1955 came into force on 30.12.1955, inter-alia,
    prescribing and laying down the various manners and conditions
    under which the citizenship of India was to be obtained or granted.
41. Post the partition of the country, there were constant skirmishes
    between the two newly born nations, and the India-Pakistan war of
    1965 occasioned a large-scale migration of people from East Pakistan
    (now Bangladesh) into India, particularly into the states of Assam
    and West Bengal, creating fresh security concerns.
42. Until 1963, the task of detection, prosecution and deportation of
    illegal immigrants was solely done by the police forces. Concerned
    by the excessive migration to Assam as well as the lack of judicial
    scrutiny in the procedure of detection and deportation of immigrants,
    the Government decided to establish tribunals in Assam to bring in
    an element of judicial scrutiny and as such the Foreigners (Tribunals)
    Order, 1964 was issued. The tribunals constituted under the said
    order were entrusted with the task of deciding whether a person was
    a foreigner or not as defined by the Foreigners Act, 1946.
43. Meanwhile, in the absence of any resolution of ongoing disputes
    between the East and the West Pakistan, the War of Independence
    broke out in March, 1971 in Bangladesh. By early April, several
    thousands of Bangladeshi citizens were killed resulting in a
    massive flow of refugees into India which took the form of a huge
    humanitarian crisis.
44. During this period, Assam was undergoing significant territorial
    changes with States such as Meghalaya, Manipur and Tripura coming
    into existence as well as the formation of the Union Territories of
    Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh.
45. On 19.03.1972, a treaty of friendship, co-operation and peace,
    popularly known as the Indira-Mujib Agreement32 was signed between
    India and Bangladesh.


32   Treaty of Peace and Friendship Between the Government of India and the Government of the People’s
     Republic of Bangladesh, India-Bangl., Mar. 19, 1972, Dacca.
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                   In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


46. A Joint Communiqué between the Prime Ministers of India and
    Bangladesh respectively was signed in Calcutta. Inter alia, it stated
    thus:
               "The Prime Minister of Bangladesh solemnly re-affirmed
               his resolve to ensure by every means the return of all the
               refugees who had taken shelter in India since March 25,
               1971, and to strive by every means to safeguard their
               safety, human dignity and means of livelihood”33
47. On 15.12.1972, the Bangladesh Citizenship (Temporary Provisions)
    Order, 1972,34 came to be promulgated by the Government of
    Bangladesh, which provided that any person whose father or grand-
    father was born in Bangladesh and who was a permanent resident of
    Bangladesh on 25.03.1971 and continued to reside in the present-day
    Bangladesh as on 25.03.1971, shall be a citizen of Bangladesh. In
    other words, all persons who migrated to India before 25.03.1971,
    were not entitled to Bangladeshi citizenship.
48. With the influx of Bengali speaking migrants from East Pakistan,
    the situation at the ground level in Assam underwent a significant
    change. The confrontation between Bengali and Assamese speakers
    took multiple forms. On the one hand, Assamese-speaking students
    boycotted classes, whereas on the other there was an increasing
    demand for state-support for the Bengali language.35
49. In March, 1972, when Guwahati University provided the students
    with an option of writing their exams in Bengali language, it evoked
    strong protest from Assamese students, who cited this as an attack
    on their identity and culture. This created a grave security situation
    in the area.36
50. Thereafter, it was proposed that a separate university, fully funded by


33   Joint Communiqué between the Prime Minister of Bangladesh Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the Prime
     Minister of India, India-Bangl., Feb. 8, 1972 (Calcutta).
34   Bangladesh Citizenship (Temporary Provisions) Order, 1972, No. 149, President’s Order, 1972, (Bangl.).
35   Arupjyoti, supra note 29.
36   Sarat Chandra Sinha, Chief Minister, Assam, Letter to K.C. Pant, Union Minister, Home Affairs, State
     (Jun. 23, 1972) (on file with Gauhati University, File No. CMS 39/72, Assam State Archives) ‘When the
     people of Cachar presented their apprehension to the Government, we informally suggested to the
     University authorities the need to reconsider their earlier decision in keeping with the spirit of the relevant
     provisions in the Assam Official Language Act’.
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      the Central Government, would be established in Cachar. However,
      this did not go down well with the Assamese speakers. The Asam
      Sahitya Sabha and the All-Assam Students Union (“AASU”), followed
      by many others, opposed the idea of a separate central university in
      Assam and that of bilingual instruction in the universities of Assam.37
      An Assam Bandh, called by the AASU, was observed.38 Clashes took
      place with instances of riot, loot, burning of homes, etc., taking place.
      Several people, including students died in the ensuing unrest. 39
51. Due to the protest and agitations in Assam, the Government
    withdrew its decision to open a university in Cachar and also
    introduced compulsory learning of Assamese till high school.40 A
    formal announcement of the end of the agitation was also made by
    AASU.41 However, the groundwork for future conflicts between the
    Bengali and Assamese speakers was gradually being prepared with
    hostilities continuing in some manner or the other.

      iii.    Assam Accord
52. By June 1978, the students belonging to the All-Guwahati
    Students Union (“AGSU”) and AASU staged several protests and
    demonstrations. They demanded, inter alia, that the flow of outsiders
    into Assam be checked, only the youth from Assam be employed
    in government undertakings and that they be allowed to write the
    Assam Public Service Commission examination in Assamese.42 The
    AASU took to the streets, boycotted classes and eventually enforced
    a strike on 22.09.1978 which brought the state to a halt.43



37   Jatindra Nath Goswami, General Secretary, Asam Sahitya Sabha, Letter to Chief Minister, Assam
     (Sept. 30, 1972) (on file with Gauhati University, File No. CMS 39/72, Assam State Archives); Prasanna
     Narayan Choudhury, General Secretary, Post-Graduate Students’ Union, Gauhati University, Letter
     to Members of Academic Council, Gauhati University (June 3, 1972) (on file with Gauhati University,
     File No. CMS 39/72, Assam State Archives); Telegram from DC, Nagaon to Principal Private Secretary
     to Chief Minister (Sept. 29, 1972) (on file with Gauhati University, File No. CMS 39/72, Assam State
     Archives); Dainik Asam, Oct. 1, 1972.
38   Dainik Asam, Oct. 4, 1972; Times of India, Oct. 6, 1972; Times of India, Oct. 7, 1972.
39   Uddipan Dutta, The Role of Language Management and Language Conflict in the Transition of Post-
     Colonia Assamese Identity, (2012).
40   Assam Tribune, Nov. 12 1972.
41   Times of India, Nov. 13 1972.
42   Assam Tribune, Jun. 2 and 3, 1978.
43   Dainik Asam, Sept. 23, 1979; Assam Tribune, Sept. 23, 1979.
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                  In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


53. The Chief Election Commissioner in 1978 made a statement that
    a large number of foreigners had entered the electoral rolls in the
    North-Eastern states of India. The news about discrepancies in the
    electoral rolls soon found its way into the Assamese popular press.44
54. In 1979, during the routine update of the electoral rolls, various illegal
    immigrants were detected therein causing the AASU to observe
    its first state-wide strike to protest against the infiltration of illegal
    immigrants. The publication of the electoral rolls of the Mangaldoi
    parliamentary constituency ahead of a bye-election in 1979 is widely
    considered as the proximate episode which kickstarted the six-year
    long student-led movement in Assam.
55. The reports that the number of eligible voters in Mangaldoi had
    increased by a vast margin since the last election held two years
    ago, led many in the state to make formal complaints that challenged
    the citizenship of many voters included in the electoral rolls. This
    came in the wake of multiple, well-publicised accounts detailing the
    continuous high levels of migration from Bangladesh into Assam.
    Shortly after this, in June, 1979, the AASU demanded the detection,
    disenfranchisement and deportation of foreigners.
56. In 1980, the then Prime Minister once again invited leaders of
    the Assam movement for deliberations over the prevailing issues.
    The student leaders met the Prime Minister and submitted a
    memorandum detailing their demands, the economic situation and
    a future roadmap for Assam. Their demands included a register
    of citizens, detection of all foreigners who came to live in Assam
    since 1951 and their deportation. However, consensus could not
    be arrived at between the Central Government and the leaders of
    the Assam movement leading to the continuation of the agitation.
    The student leaders were given the option of accepting 1967 as
    the cut-off date for the detection and deportation of illegal citizens
    but the offer was turned down.45
57. Between 1980 and 1983, talks with the student leaders continued at
    the highest level of the Central Government. However, the Assamese
    leaders stuck to the 1951 benchmark for grant of citizenship as per
    the Citizenship Act.


44   Arupjyoti, supra note 29.
45   Sangeeta Barooah Pisharoty, Assam: The Accord, The Discord (Penguin 2019).
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58. Arupjyoti Saikia has observed that the student-led movement
    presented “no specific charter or program for bringing political and
    economic change to Assam. Instead, it focused on two demands
    that the agitators believed would bring the desired change – first,
    push back the foreigners and secondly, increase Assam’s share
    in the Union budget.”46 He has also observed that “the movement
    at its essence was largely in the hands of student leaders – both
    rural and urban. Students across the rural and urban divide had
    withdrawn from classrooms, the large majority missing class for an
    entire year in 1980.”
59. In 1981, both the Central government and the Assam leaders tried
    to seek an answer to the definition of ‘illegal’ foreigners,47 and the
    former was willing to deport those who came after 1966.48 However,
    by the end of 1982, the dispute was mainly about the fate of those
    who had entered Assam between 1961 and 1971.49 The Central
    Government agreed that those who had entered Assam post-1971
    would be deported from India—a decision believed to have been
    supported by various political groups in Assam.
60. After a little less than a year of the President’s Rule in Assam, the
    Union government tried to get the support of the opposition parties to
    hold elections for the constitution of the Seventh Assam Legislative
    Assembly. The Union government, without specifying the legal and
    political modalities for the identification of a foreigner, offered to
    drop from the electoral rolls the names of foreigners and identify
    those who had come to Assam between 1966 and 24.03.1971 (the
    date is linked with the Bangladesh Liberation War which began on
    25.03.1971), but the offer was rejected by the Assamese student
    leaders.50
61. As the Central Government decided to proceed with the state
    legislative assembly elections in Assam in February 1983, protests
    turned violent and many were reportedly killed in the ensuing violence.


46   Arupjyoti, supra note 29.
47   Indian Express, Jul. 1, 1981.
48   Indian Express, Aug. 1 1981.
49   Indian Express, Oct. 2, 1982.
50   Dainik Asam, Jan. 6, 1983.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                                     1163

                  In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


      What was till then largely seen as a powerful, popular and relatively
      peaceful movement came at the center of national and international
      attention after this unfortunate turn of events.
62. The holding of elections in Assam in February 1983 was a
    constitutional requirement after a one-year period of President’s
    Rule. However, the fundamental demand of the protestors for holding
    elections, i.e., the revision of electoral rolls was not fulfilled.51 The
    Assamese leaders were steadfast in their demand that “no election
    should be held to the Assembly or Parliament before the deletion of
    the names of foreigners from the electoral rolls.”52
63. Despite the unstable political environment existing in Assam at that
    time, the Central Government decided to proceed with the elections.
    However, the elections took place in the backdrop of distrust between
    the student-led movement and the Central government. As per news
    reports, on the day of voting, many polling stations returned empty
    ballot boxes.
64. On the morning of 18.02.1983, the unfortunate tragedy of Nellie
    unfolded. Attackers, reportedly armed with guns, knives, spears,
    bows and arrows attacked the people of Nellie.
65. Post the Nellie incident, the situation became more tense and volatile
    than ever before. As per various reports, the religious narrative
    overtook the regional, economic and political character of the
    anti-foreigner movement, and there was heavy communal, linguistic
    and ethnic polarization. The social relations between communities –
    based on economic exchanges and agrarian relations – had been
    less polarized prior to 1980. The Nellie incident was not an isolated
    event and many places reported widespread clashes.
66. In light of the ongoing instability and violence in the State, the main
    issue was the fate of the people in Assam who had migrated from
    East Pakistan or, later, from Bangladesh. The discord was about
    the cut-off date, as it was called, that is the year until which the



51   Report of the Non-Official Judicial Inquiry Commission on the Holocaust of Assam Before During and After
     Election 1983, Order of R.K. Trivedi, Chief Election Commissioner, India, Annexure F, 201 (Jan. 7, 1983).
52   Report of the Non-Official Judicial Inquiry Commission on the Holocaust of Assam Before During and
     After Election 1983, Note Submitted by S.L. Khosla, Chief Electoral Officer, Assam to R.V. Subramaniam,
     Advisor to Governor, Assam, Annexure E, 193 (Sept. 29, 1982).
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      migrants would be accepted as Indian citizens by the leaders of
      the movement. The Central Government, in their early negotiations
      with the Assamese leaders, suggested 1971 as this date, which
      was generally agreed upon by the opposition political parties. Given
      the humanitarian crisis, this consensus was crucial. However, the
      Assamese leaders insisted on 1951 as the cut-off date.
67. However, after February 1983, the mass support for the agitational
    programs reportedly began to wither. The intensity of popular
    mobilization had fizzled out by the second half of 1983. The events
    of early 1983 had created a sense of cluelessness; many were
    tormented by the violent turn the movement had taken, and the
    movement began to lose its unifying appeal.
68. In 1983, the Government of India enacted the Illegal Migrants
    (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983 (“IMDT Act”) by which tribunals
    were established for determining whether a person is an illegal migrant
    and to enable the Central Government to expel or deport those
    determined as such. The IMDT Act was made applicable to anyone
    who came into India after 25.03.1971 and was made applicable only
    to the State of Assam. However, in 2005, a three-Judge Bench of
    this Court in Sarbananda Sonowal (supra) struck down the IMDT
    Act and the rules made thereunder.
69. However, after a period of ebb, the agitation briefly resurfaced in
    mid-1984. This was largely an outcome of the State Government’s
    determination to correct the electoral rolls in June, 1984 without
    securing any political consensus. Once again, students took to the
    streets and called for bandhs and picketing.53
70. However, as the movement became long drawn, the leaders too
    recognized the ground reality – that it was time for a settlement with
    the Central Government. After years of popular protest, the number
    of street agitators had declined and the outlook of the leaders of the
    movement also changed accordingly.54



53   Assam Tribune, Jun. 15 and 16, 1984.
54   Lok Sabha Debates, Statement of A.K. Sen, Minister of Law and Justice on Statutory Resolution
     Regarding Disapproval of Representation of the People (Amendment) Ordinance and Representation of
     the People (Amendment) Bill., at cols. 190–93, (Jan. 23, 1985).
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                                   1165

                  In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


71. After a series of negotiations held in Shillong, agreement was arrived
    at on some of the most contentious issues on 30.07.1985.55 Early
    in the morning of 15.08.1985, the Central Government and the
    leaders of the movement signed the Assam Accord, which promised
    that all immigrants who had arrived in Assam after 1965 would be
    disenfranchised and immigrants who arrived after 24.03.1971 would
    be deported. The Prime Minister also assured the student leaders
    that the state legislature, elected in the disputed poll of 1983, would
    be dissolved, with a caretaker government in control until fresh
    elections could be held. This was seen as the biggest victory for
    the leaders of the movement. Apart from the promises to accelerate
    the economic development of Assam, legislative and administrative
    safeguards were also promised by the Central Government to protect
    the cultural, social and linguistic identity and heritage of the Assamese
    people. Concerning those who had come to Assam post-1965, the
    then Home Minister clarified that though their right to vote would
    be suspended, they would not be harassed in any way and would
    continue to enjoy all other legal and constitutional rights.56 The date
    of the beginning of the Bangladesh War, that is, 25.03.1971, was
    accepted as the cut-off date for the deportation of foreigners.57 The
    Central Government also promised in the accord to erect a fence
    along the riverine and open part of the Indo-Bangladeshi border.
    This officially marked the end of the six-year-long anti-foreigner
    movement in Assam.
72. On the basis of the Assam Accord, the Government of India introduced
    Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, whereby it sought to codify the
    political settlement arrived at through a series of negotiations and
    provide clarity, inter-alia, on the status of citizenship of immigrants
    between 1950 to 1971.

      B.      Salient Features of the Assam Accord
73. As a result of the student movement and the ensuing negotiations
    between the Central Government, State Government, AASU, and the


55   Assam Tribune, Jul. 28, 1985.
56   K.C. Khanna, Minefield of Uncertainties: The Assam Accord and After, Times of India, (20 August 1985).
57   Mani Shankar Aiyar, Rajiv Gandhi’s India: A Golden Jubilee Retrospective, Nationhood, Ethnicity,
     Pluralism and Conflict Resolution, (Atlantic Publishers 1998); Hiteswar Saikia acknowledged that, to
     him, ‘the Accord was good because, for the first time, those who came to Assam right from 1947 to 1971
     after the Partition were recognised’ as citizens of India.
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    All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (“AAGSP”), a Memorandum of
    Settlement was arrived at on 15.08.1985, which is commonly known
    as the “Assam Accord”. Terms of the Assam Accord are reproduced
    below for ease of reference: -
                  “MEMORANDUM OF SETTLEMENT
        1.   Government have all along been most anxious to find
             a satisfactory solution to the problem of Foreigners in
             Assam. The All Assam Students’ Union (AASU) and
             the All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (AAGSP) have
             also expressed their Keenness to find such a solution.
        2.   The AASU through their Memorandum dated 2nd
             February, 1980 presented to the Late Prime Minister
             Smt. Indira Gandhi, conveyed their profound sense
             of apprehensions regarding the continuing influx
             of foreign nationals into Assam and the fear about
             adverse effects upon the political, social, cultural and
             economic life of the State.
        3.   Being fully alive to the genuine apprehensions of the
             people of Assam, the then Prime Minister initiated
             the dialogue with the AASU/AAGSP. Subsequently,
             talks were held at the Prime Minister’s and Home
             Ministers levels during the period 1980-83. Several
             rounds of informal talks were held during 1984. Formal
             discussions were resumed in March, 1985.
        4.   Keeping all aspects of the problem including
             constitutional and legal provision, international
             agreements, national commitments and humanitarian
             considerations, it has been decided to proceed as
             follows :-

        Foreigners Issue:
        5.1 For purpose of detection and deletion of foreigners,
            1-1-1966 shall be the base date and year.
        5.2 All persons who came to Assam prior to 1-1-1966,
            including those amongst them whose names
            appeared on the electoral rolls used in 1967 elections,
            shall be regularized.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                         1167

               In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


          5.3 Foreigners who came to Assam after 1-1-1966
              (inclusive) and upto 24th March, 1971 shall be
              detected in accordance with the provisions of the
              Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Foreigners (Tribunals)
              Order, 1939.
          5.4 Names of foreigners so detected will be deleted
              from the electoral rolls in force. Such persons
              will be required to register themselves before the
              Registration Officers of the respective districts in
              accordance with the provisions of the Registration
              of Foreigners Act, 1939 and the Registration of
              Foreigners Rules, 1939.
          5.5 For this purpose, Government of India will undertake
              suitable strengthening of the governmental
              machinery.
          5.6 On the expiry of the period of ten year following the
              date of detection, the names of all such persons
              which have been deleted from the electoral rolls
              shall be restored.
          5.7 All persons who were expelled earlier, but have since
              re-entered illegally into Assam, shall be expelled.
          5.8 Foreigners who came to Assam on or after March
              25, 1971 shall continue to be detected, deleted and
              expelled in accordance with the law. Immediate
              and practical steps shall be taken to expel such
              foreigners.
          5.9 The Government will give due consideration to certain
              difficulties express by the AASU/AAGSP regarding the
              implementation of the Illegal Migrants (Determination
              by Tribunals) Act, 1983.

          Safeguards and Economic Development:
          6.     Constitutional, legislative and administrative
                 safeguards, as may be appropriate, shall be provided
                 to protect, preserve and promote the cultural, social,
                 linguistic identity and heritage of the Assamese
                 people.
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        7.   The Government takes this opportunity to renew
             their commitment for the speedy all round economic
             development of Assam, so as to improve the standard
             of living of the people. Special emphasis will be placed
             on the education and Science & Technology through
             establishment of national institutions.

        Other Issues:
        8.1 The Government will arrange for the issue of
            citizenship certificate in future only by the authorities
            of the Central Government.
        8.2 Specific complaints that may be made by the AASU/
            AAGSP about irregular issuance of Indian Citizenship
            Certificates (ICC) will be looked into.
        9.   The international border shall be made secure against
             future infiltration by erection of physical barriers like
             walls barbed wire fencing and other obstacles at
             appropriate places. Patrolling by security forces on
             land and riverine routes all along the international
             border shall be adequately intensified. In order to
             further strengthen the security arrangements, to
             prevent effectively future infiltration, an adequate
             number of check posts shall be set up.
        9.2 Besides the arrangements mentioned above and
            keeping in view security considerations, a road all
            along the international border shall be constructed
            so as to facilitate patrolling by security forces. Land
            between border and the road would be kept free
            of human habitation, wherever possible. Riverine
            patrolling along the international border would be
            intensified. All effective measures would be adopted
            to prevent infiltrators crossing or attempting to cross
            the international border.
        10. It will be ensured that relevant laws for prevention
            of encroachment of government lands and lands
            in tribal belts and blocks are strictly enforced and
            unauthorized encroachers evicted as laid down
            under such laws.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                       1169

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


          11. It will be ensured that the law restricting acquisition
              of immovable property by foreigners in Assam is
              strictly enforced.
          12. It will be ensured that Birth and Death Registers are
              duly maintained.

          Restoration of Normalcy:
          13. The All-Assam Students Unions (AASU) and the All
              Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (AAGSP) call off
              the agitation, assure full co-operation and dedicate
              themselves towards the development of the Country.
          14. The Central and the State Government have agreed
              to:
                a.   Review with sympathy and withdraw cases of
                     disciplinary action taken against employees in
                     the context of the agitation and to ensure that
                     there is no victimization;
                b.   Frame a scheme for ex-gratia payment to next
                     of kin of those who were killed in the course in
                     the agitation.
                c.   Give sympathetic consideration to proposal for
                     relaxation of upper age limit for employment
                     in public service in Assam, having regard to
                     exceptional situation that prevailed in holding
                     academic and competitive examinations etc. in
                     the context of agitation in Assam:
                d.   Undertake review of detention cases, if any,
                     as well as cases against persons charged
                     with criminal offences in connection with the
                     agitation, except those charged with commission
                     of heinous offences.
                e.   Consider withdrawal of the prohibitory orders/
                     notifications in force, if any:
          15. The Ministry of Home Affairs will be the nodal Ministry
              for the implementation of the above.
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           Signed/-                                  Signed/-
           R.D. Pradhan                              P.K. Mahanta
           Home Secretary                            President
           Govt. of India                            All Assam
                                                     Students Union

           Signed/-             Signed/-             Signed/-
           (B.K. Phukan)        (Biraj Sharma)       (Smt. PP
           General              Convenor             Trivedi)
           Secretary            All Assam            Chief Secretary
           All Assam            Gana Sangram         Govt. of Assam
           Students Union       Parishad
           In the presence of
           Signed/-
           (RAJIV GANDHI)
           PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA
           Date: 15th August, 1985
           Place: New Delhi"

74. The clauses of the Accord dealt with, inter-alia, the following issues: -
     •    The foreigners’ issue in Assam;
     •    Constitutional, legislative and administrative safeguards for
          cultural, social and linguistic identity and heritage of the
          Assamese people;
     •    Economic development of Assam;
     •    Security of the international border;
     •    Restricting acquisition of immovable property by foreigners;
     •    Prevention of encroachment of government lands;
     •    Registration of births and deaths;
     •    Call-off of the agitation by the protesting groups;
     •    Withdrawal of cases against persons involved in the agitation;
          and
     •    Framing of scheme for payment of ex-gratia compensation to
          next of kin of those who were killed during the agitation, etc.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                    1171

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


75. For the purpose of the present discussion, it is important to
    highlight the features of clause 5 of the Accord which deals with the
    foreigners’ issue and also forms the basis of Section 6A of the
    Citizenship Act.
76. Clause 5.1 provided that foreigners who have entered into
    Assam after 25.03.1971 will continue to be detected and their
    names will be deleted from the electoral rolls and they will be
    deported from India.
77. Clause 5.2 provided for the regularization of citizenship of all the
    immigrants who had entered into Assam on or before 31.12.1965
    including those whose names appeared in electoral rolls published
    in 1967.
78. Further, Clause 5.9 provided that “the Government will give due
    consideration to certain difficulties expressed by AASU/AAGSP
    regarding the implementation of IMDT Act, 1983”.
79. Clause 5 also provided for detection of people entering into Assam
    between 01.01.1966 and 24.03.1971. For this category of immigrants,
    citizenship was to be granted in terms of Clause 5.3 of the Accord. As
    per the said Clause, immigrants belonging to the aforesaid category
    were to be detected in accordance with the Foreigners Act, 1946
    and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964. As per Clause 5.4,
    upon detection the names of such immigrants were to be deleted
    from the electoral rolls and subsequently they would be required
    to get themselves registered for grant of citizenship in accordance
    with the Registration of Foreigners Act, 1939 and the Registration
    of Foreigners Rules, 1939, failing which they would be liable to get
    deported. Ten years post such detection, their names would be
    reinstated on the electoral rolls. Clause 5.3 subsequently became
    the basis of Section 6A(3) of the Citizenship Act.

     III.   SUBMISSIONS ON THE DAMAGE CAUSED DUE TO THE
            INFLUX OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS INTO ASSAM
80. It is the case of the petitioners that the acute problem of illegal
    immigration has led to a major change of demography in the State
    of Assam, and is posing a serious threat to the unity, integrity and
    security of India. It was submitted before us that Section 6A of the
    Citizenship Act has directly impacted the political landscape of the
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       State by granting citizenship to a large number of immigrants from
       Bangladesh thereby rendering the local population a minority.
81. It was submitted by the petitioners that the grant of citizenship in
    the manner provided under Section 6A of the Citizenship Act has
    altered the demographics of the State of Assam, which has led to
    the marginalization of the citizens belonging to various indigenous
    and ethnic groups living in the State prior to the coming into force
    of Section 6A.
82. The petitioners relied on a report relating to the unabated influx of
    people from Bangladesh into Assam dated 08.11.1998 submitted to
    the President by the then Governor of Assam, Lt. General (retd.) Shri
    S.K. Sinha.58 The following key findings of the report were highlighted
    during the course of the hearing:
       a.      The report was prepared keeping in mind the demographic
               change in Tripura and Sikkim to highlight the issues that have
               arisen and that may arise with the unabated influx of immigrants
               which has been legitimized/attempted to be legitimized with
               Section 6A of the Citizenship Act.
       b.      The report stated that the issue of unchecked immigration
               threatens to reduce the native Assamese population to a minority
               in the State of Assam.
       c.      The Governor in his report was conscious of the fact that in
               the absence of any census being carried out to determine the
               number of illegal immigrants, precise and authentic figures
               regarding the same were not available.59 However, the Governor
               on the basis of estimates, extrapolations and various indicators
               indicated that the number of immigrants ran into millions. The
               Governor drew attention towards the speech of Mr. Indrajit
               Gupta, the then Home Minister of India, who, while making a
               speech in the Parliament on 06.05.1997, stated that there were
               ten million illegal immigrants residing in India.60



58   Governor of Assam Report to the President of India on Illegal Migration into Assam, D.O. No. GSAG.3/98,
     (Nov. 8, 1998).
59   Id. at para 13.
60   Id. at para 16.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                                    1173

                    In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       d.         The report estimated the number of immigrants by considering
                  the shortfall of population growth in Bangladesh. In 1970, the
                  total population of East Pakistan was 75 million but in 1974 it
                  had come down to 71.4 million. On the basis of 3.1 percent
                  annual population growth rate during that period, the population
                  of Bangladesh in 1974 should have been 77 million. The
                  shortfall of about six million people could only be explained by
                  large-scale immigration.61
83. The petitioners, placing reliance on a study titled “The Change
    of Religion and Language Composition in the State of Assam in
    Northeast India: A Statistical Analysis Since 1951 to 2001” 62 conducted
    by Dr. Bhupender Kumar Nath and Prof. Dilip Nath, submitted that
    the districts bordering Bangladesh witnessed a significantly high
    growth of Bengali speakers post partition. The study indicated that
    from 1951 to 2011, the percentage of Bengali speaking population
    in Assam increased by 36.36% (from 21.2% to 28.91% of the
    total population of Assam), but during this period the proportion of
    Assamese speaking people in the State had declined by 30.18% i.e.
    (from 69.3% to 48.38% of the total population of Assam). However,
    rest of the districts did not experience a substantial change in
    linguistic composition. As far as the other languages are concerned,
    no major change was seen for Hindi, Nepali and other language
    groups.63 Dr. Bhupender Nath, while relying on the empirical analysis
    based on district-level census data, concluded that the proportion
    of Bengali-speaking and Muslim population rapidly rose between
    1951-2001, more than any other religion and language.64 The same
    stands true as per the data available from the 2011 census as well.
    As per Dr. Nath, this unusually high growth could not be attributed
    to natural increase, and thus, could only be attributed to the influx
    of Bangladeshi immigrants into Assam. This could adversely affect
    the future of the Assamese language given the rate at which the
    immigration has been regularized.65


61   Id. at para 18(c).
62   Dr. Bhupendra Nath & Dilip C Nath, The Change of Religion and Language Composition in the State of
     Assam in Northeast India: A Statistical Analysis Since 1951 to 2001, 5 Int. J. Sci. Res. Pub. 2, (2012).
63   Id., at 5.
64   Id.
65   Id.
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84. In other words, the submission of the petitioners is that while the
    proportion of Bengali speaking population has risen over the past few
    decades, the proportion of Assamese speakers has declined in all
    the districts of Assam. Such a change in the demography of Assam
    has led to many adverse consequences and may continue to cause
    damage to the interests of the State. The influx of immigrants into
    the State has accelerated population growth, altered demographic
    attributes, increased border fluidities and has created economic and
    political pressure on the country.66
85. In response to the aforesaid concerns raised by the petitioners,
    the learned Solicitor General fairly accepted that the negative
    consequences of the unabated influx on the people of Assam, as
    pointed out by the petitioners, cannot be denied. He further submitted
    that the problem is a serious and a continuing one. However, the
    aforesaid ongoing issues cannot form the basis for declaring Section
    6A of the Citizenship Act as unconstitutional as the said provision is
    confined to a particular period of time.

      IV.     ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION
86. During the course of hearing, it was submitted by Mr. Shyam Divan,
    the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners, that there is
    no temporal limit to the operation of Section 6A(3) of the Citizenship
    Act which means that the provision continues to remain applicable till
    this date. He submitted that an immigrant of the 1966-71 stream can
    make an application even today for the purpose of seeking benefit
    under the said provision. He further argued that in the absence of any
    time-limit for working out the provision, it will remain on the statute
    book indefinitely and will continue to act as an incentive attracting
    immigrants to Assam. It was argued by him that in the absence of
    any prescribed time period for seeking the benefit of the provision,
    the same has also proved to be a fertile ground for local industries
    with regard to counterfeiting of documents, etc.
87. Mr. Divan further submitted that the power of the Central Government




66   Nandita Saikia, William Joe, Apala Saha & Utpal Chutia, Cross Border Migration in Assam during 1951-
     2011: Process, Magnitude, and Socio-Economic Consequences, Report submitted to ICSSR 38, (2016).
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                                         1175

                   In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       under Section 2 of the IEAA, 195067 to direct a person to remove
       himself is coupled with a duty to conduct expeditious detection
       and deportation of the immigrants. However, in the absence of any
       time-limit for working out Section 6A(3) of the Citizenship Act, it is
       difficult to balance the duty cast by Section 2 of the IEAA, 1950.
       He also submitted that for taking the benefit of registration under
       Section 6A(3), detection as a foreigner is a condition precedent.
       However, there is no method by which an immigrant can make a
       self-declaration, thereby shifting the onus of detection solely on the
       state and making it an endless exercise.
88. Mr. Vijay Hansaria, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for another
    set of petitioners, relied upon the constitutional scheme under Article
    6(b)(ii) to argue that to be able to seek the benefit of citizenship
    under Article 6,68 a person migrating to India from Pakistan after
    19.07.1948 had to make an application before the commencement
    of the Constitution. Thus, the scheme of Section 6A, in the absence
    of a temporal-limit on its functioning and the sole onus of detection
    on the state, marks a departure from the prevalent statutory scheme
    and leads to absurd consequences. Mr. Hansaria further submitted
    that the benefit of Section 6A should only be limited to the 32,381


67   2. Power to order expulsion of certain immigrants.— If the Central Government is of opinion that
     any person or class of persons, having been ordinarily resident in any place outside India, has or have,
     whether before or after the commencement of this Act, come into Assam and that the stay of such person
     or class of persons in Assam is detrimental to the interests of the general public of India or of any section
     thereof or of any Scheduled Tribe in Assam, the Central Government may by order —
     (a) direct such person or class of persons to remove himself or themselves from India or Assam within
     such time and by such route as may be specified in the order; and
     (b) give such further directions in regard to his or their removal from India or Assam as it may consider
     necessary or expedient:
     Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to any person who on account of civil disturbances or the
     fear of such disturbances in any area now forming part of Pakistan has been displaced from or has left
     his place of residence in such area and who has been subsequently residing in Assam.
68   6. Rights of citizenship of certain persons who have migrated to India from Pakistan.—
     Notwithstanding anything in article 5, a person who has migrated to the territory of India from the
     territory now included in Pakistan shall be deemed to be a citizen of India at the commencement of this
     Constitution if—
           (a) he or either of his parents or any of his grand-parents was born in India as defined in the
                 Government of India Act, 1935 (as originally enacted); and
           (b) (i) in the case where such person has so migrated before the nineteenth day of July, 1948, he
                 has been ordinarily resident in the territory of India since the date of his migration, or
     (ii) in the case where such person has so migrated on or after the nineteenth day of July, 1948, he has
     been registered as a citizen of India by an officer appointed in that behalf by the Government of the
     Dominion of India on an application made by him therefor to such officer before the commencement of
     this Constitution in the form and manner prescribed by that Government:
     Provided that no person shall be so registered unless he has been resident in the territory of India for at
     least six months immediately preceding the date of his application.
1176                                                        [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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     people already detected as foreigners of the 1966-71 stream till
     date, as stated by Union of India in its affidavit, and should not
     continue any further.
89. The petitioners, in the alternative, submitted that the impugned
    provision may be struck down with prospective effect as the
    provision was inserted for a historic and limited purpose i.e., for
    granting citizenship to those immigrants who came in between the
    years 1966 and 1971. The petitioners relied upon the decision of
    this Court in Somaiya Organics (India) Ltd. & Another v. State
    of U.P. & Another reported in (2001) 5 SCC 519 and Synthetics
    and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of U.P. reported in (1990) 1 SCC 109
    to buttress their submission.
90. Thus, having read into the line of reasoning as assigned by my learned
    brother Justice Surya Kant and also having regard to the specific
    submissions canvassed on behalf of the petitioners, more particularly,
    the submissions on temporal limits and manifest arbitrariness, the only
    question that needs to be addressed in my considered view is as under:
          "Whether the absence of any temporal limits in the scheme
          of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act has rendered the said
          provision manifestly arbitrary and thus violative of Article 14
          of the Constitution? To put it in other words, whether the
          efflux of time has rendered Section 6A of the Citizenship
          Act temporally unreasonable and thus liable to be struck
          down in consequence of violation of Article 14?”
     V.   ANALYSIS
     A.   Scheme and Mechanism of Section 6A
91. Pursuant to the signing of the Assam Accord, the Citizenship Act was
    amended by the Parliament in order to give effect to the mandate
    of the Accord and accordingly Section 6A came to be inserted by
    the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 1985. The Statement of Object
    and Reasons which accompanied the Citizenship (Amendment) Bill,
    1985 reads as under: -
          "The core of the Memorandum of Settlement (Assam
          Accord) relates to the foreigners’ issue, since the agitation
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                        1177

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


          launched by the A.A.S.U. arose out of their apprehensions
          regarding the continuing influx of foreign nationals into
          Assam and the fear about adverse effects upon the
          political, social, cultural and economic life of the State.
          Assam Accord being a political settlement, legislation is
          required to give effect to the relevant clauses of the Assam
          Accord relating to the foreigners’ issue.
          It is intended that all persons of Indian origin who came
          to Assam (including such of those whose names were
          included in the electoral rolls used for the purpose of
          General Election to the House of the People held in
          1967) and who have been ordinarily resident in Assam
          ever since shall be deemed to be citizens of India as
          from the 1st day of January, 1966. Further, every person
          of Indian origin who came on or after the 1st January,
          1966 but before the 25th March, 1971 from territories
          presently included in Bangladesh and who has been
          ordinarily resident in Assam ever since and who has
          been detected in accordance with the provisions of the
          Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order,
          1964 shall, upon registration, be deemed to be a citizen
          for all purposes as from the date of expiry of a period of
          ten years from the date of detection as a foreigner. It is
          also intended that in the intervening period of 10 years,
          these persons should not suffer from any other disability
          vis-a-vis citizens, excepting the right to vote and that
          proper record should be maintained of such persons. To
          inspire confidence, judicial element should be associated
          to determine eligibility in each and every case under this
          category.
          The Bill seeks to amend the Citizenship Act, 1955 to
          achieve the above objectives.”
                                                (Emphasis supplied)
92. The Preamble to the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 1985 reads as
    follows: -
1178                                                                               [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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              “THE CITIZENSHIP (AMENDMENT) ACT, 1985
              No. 65 of 1985
                                                                    [7th December, 1985]
              An Act further to amend the Citizenship Act, 1955.
              Whereas for the purpose of giving effect to certain
              provisions of the Memorandum of Settlement relating to
              the foreigners’ issue in Assam (Assam Accord) which was
              laid before the Houses of Parliament on the 16th day of
              August, 1985 it is necessary to amend the Citizenship
              Act, 1955;
              BE it enacted by Parliament in the Thirty-sixth Year of the
              Republic of India as follows”
93. A perusal of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act,69 more particularly
    the use of the words “Special provisions” and “Assam Accord ” in
    the marginal note makes it abundantly clear that the said provision
    was in the nature of a special provision pertaining to citizenship
    and was intended only for a limited class of persons in Assam who
    were covered by the Assam Accord which, as stated earlier, was a
    political settlement meant to tackle the exigencies prevailing in the
    State of Assam at the time of signing of the Accord.
94. A close reading of Section 6A reveals that the benefit of citizenship
    to the immigrants from Bangladesh, as envisaged under the Assam
    Accord, has been conferred under the said provision in two distinct
    ways.
95. First, Section 6A sub-section (2) provides that persons of Indian origin
    who came into Assam from the territories now part of Bangladesh
    before 01.01.1966 and subsequent to their entry have been ordinarily
    resident in Assam are deemed to be citizens of India.


69   6A. Special provisions as to citizenship of persons covered by the Assam Accord. —
     (1) For the purposes of this section —
         (a) “Assam” means the territories included in the State of Assam immediately before the
         commencement of the Citizenship (Amend-ment) Act, 1985;
         (b) “detected to be a foreigner” means detected to be a foreigner in accordance with the provisions
         of the Foreigners Act, 1946 (31 of 1946) and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 by a Trib-unal
         constituted under the said Order;
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                                         1179

                  In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


96. In other words, immigrants falling under the aforesaid category are
    automatically conferred citizenship by virtue of a legal fiction. For
    an immigrant to be entitled to the benefits under sub-section (2), the
    following requirements have been prescribed: -




        (c) “specified territory” means the territories included in Bangladesh immediately before the
        commencement of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 1985;
        (d) a person shall be deemed to be of Indian origin, if he, or either of his parents for any of his
        grandparents was born in undivided India;
        (e) a person shall be deemed to have been detected to be a for-eigner on the date on which a
        Tribunal constituted under the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 submits its opinion to the effect
        that he is a foreigner to the officer or authority concerned.
    (2) Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (6) and (7), all persons of Indian origin who came before
    the 1st day of January, 1966 to Assam from the specified territory (including such of those whose names
    were included in the electoral rolls used for the purposes of the General Election to the House of the
    People held in 1967) and who have been ordinarily resident in Assam since the dates of their entry into
    Assam shall be deemed to be citizens of India as from the 1st day of January, 1966.
    (3) Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (6) and (7), every person of Indian origin who: —
        (a) came to Assam on or after the 1st day of January, 1966 but before the 25th day of March, 1971
        from the specified territory; and
        (b) has, since the date of his entry into Assam, been ordinarily resident in Assam; and
        (c) has been detected to be a foreigner, shall register himself in accordance with the rules made by
        the Central Government in this behalf under section 18 with such authority (thereafter in this sub-
        section referred to as the registering authority) as may be specified in such rules and if his name is
        included in any electoral roll for any Assembly or Parliamentary constituency in force on the date of
        such detec-tion, his name shall be deleted therefrom.
    Explanation. — In the case of every person seeking registration under this sub-section, the opinion of the
    Tribunal constituted under the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 holding such person to be a foreigner,
    shall be deemed to be sufficient proof of the requirement under clause (c) of this sub-section and if any
    question arises as to whether such person complies with any other requirement under this sub-section,
    the registering authority shall,—
        (i) if such opinion contains a finding with respect to such other requirement, decide the question in
        conformity with such finding;
        (ii) if such opinion does not contain a finding with respect to such other requirement, refer the
        question to a Tribunal constituted under the said Order hang jurisdiction in accordance with such
        rules as the Central Government may make in this behalf under section 18 and decide the question
        in conformity with the opinion received on such reference.
    (4) A person registered under sub-section (3) shall have, as from the date on which he has been detected
    to be a foreigner and till the expiry of a period of ten years from that date, the same rights and obligations
    as a citizen of India (including the right to obtain a passport under the Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967)
    and the obligations connected therewith), but shall not be entitled to have his name included in any
    electoral roll for any Assembly or Parliamentary constituency at any time before the expiry of the said
    period of ten years.
    (5) A person registered under sub-section (3) shall be deemed to be a citizen of India for all purposes
    as from the date of expiry of a period of ten years from the date on which he has been detected to be
    a foreigner.
1180                                                                                  [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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       i.      Immigrant is a Person of Indian Origin;70 and
       ii.     Has entered into Assam71 from Bangladesh;72 and
       iii.    Has entered into Assam prior to the cut-off date of 01.01.1966;
               and
       iv.     Has been ordinarily resident in Assam since the date of entry.
97. Secondly, Section 6A sub-section (3) provides that persons of
    Indian origin who came into Assam from the territories now part
    of Bangladesh on or after 01.01.1966 but before 25.03.1971 and
    since then have been ordinarily resident in Assam and subsequently
    have been detected to be a foreigner, shall be liable to have their
    names deleted from the electoral rolls for a period of ten years
    from the date of their detection. The provision further stipulates
    that persons belonging to this category will be entitled to get
    themselves registered as citizens with the appropriate authority
    as per the prescribed procedure and the rules only upon detection
    as a foreigner and upon consequent deletion of their name from
    the electoral rolls.


     (6) Without prejudice to the provisions of section 8, —
         (a) If any person referred to in sub-section (2) submits in the prescribed manner and form and
         to the prescribed authority within sixty days from the date of commencement of the Citizenship
         (Amendment) Act, 1985, for year a declaration that he does not wish to be a citizen of India, such
         person shall not be deemed to have become a citizen of India under that sub-section;
         (b) If any person referred to in sub-section (3) submits in the prescribed manner and form and to the
         prescribed authority within sixty days from the date of commencement the Citizenship (Amendment)
         Act, 1985, for year or from the date on which he has been detect-ed to be a foreigner, whichever is
         later, a declaration that he does not wish to be governed by the provisions of that sub-sec-tion and
         sub-sections (4) and (5), it shall not be necessary for such person to register himself under sub-
         section (3).
     Explanation. — Where a person required to file a declaration under this sub-section does not have the
     capacity to enter into a contract, such declaration may be filed on his behalf by any person competent
     under the law for the time being in force to act on his behalf.
     (7) Nothing in sub-sections (2) to (6) shall apply in relation to any person—
         (a) who, immediately before the commencement of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 1985, for year
         is a citizen of India;
         (b) who was expelled from India before the commencement of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act,
         1985, for year under the Foreigners Act, 1946 (31 of 1946).
     (8) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this section, the provisions of this section shall have effect
     notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force.
70   Id., § 6A sub-section (1) cl. (d), “a person shall be deemed to be of Indian origin, if he, or either of his
     parents for any of his grandparents was born in undivided India”.
71   Id., § 6A sub-section (1) cl. (a), “Assam” means the territories included in the State of Assam immediately
     before the commencement of the Citizenship (Amend-ment) Act, 1985.
72   Id., § 6A sub-section (1) cl. (c), “specified territory” means the territories included in Bangladesh
     immediately before the commencement of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 1985.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                                       1181

                   In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


98. Thus, unlike section 6A sub-section (2), the benefit under sub-
    section (3) is not automatically conferred but rather has to be availed
    by an immigrant after he or she has been detected as a foreigner
    by a tribunal constituted under the Foreigners (Tribunal) Order,
    1964. In other words, to be able to avail the benefit under Section
    6A sub-section (3), the following requirements have to be fulfilled: -
       i.      Immigrant must be a Person of Indian Origin; and
       ii.     Has entered into Assam from Bangladesh; and
       iii.    Has entered into Assam on or after 01.01.1966 but before
               25.03.1971; and
       iv.     Has been ordinarily resident in Assam since the date of entry;73
               and
       v.      Has been detected to be a foreigner subsequent to the date
               of entry; and
       vi.     Having been detected, has registered himself with the
               appropriate authority designated by the Central Government
               in accordance with the Rules made under Section 18 of the
               Citizenship Act.
99. The White Paper on Foreigners Issue74 published by the Government
    of Assam in 2012 (“White Paper”) explained the working mechanism
    of Section 6A as follows:
               "Border Police Personnel (“BPP”) are deployed in all the
               districts of Assam for detection of suspected foreigners
               and deportation/push back of declared foreigners. BPP
               would conduct survey work for the identification of
               suspected foreigners by seeking assistance from local
               people. The survey work is generally conducted in areas
               of new settlements, construction sites, encroached land,
               government land, forest land, etc. If any doubtful person
               is found then they are asked to produce documents in


73   Id., § 6A sub-section (1) cl. (e), “a person shall be deemed to have been detected to be a foreigner on the
     date on which a Tribunal constituted under the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 submits its opinion to
     the effect that he is a foreigner to the officer or authority concerned.”
74   Govt. of Assam, White Paper on Foreigner’s Issue, (October 2012).
1182                                                                                   [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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               support of their citizenship. If the documents produced are
               found to be unauthenticated or unreliable, then an enquiry
               is initiated with the approval of the Superintendent of Police
               (“SP”). If the SP is satisfied with the enquiry report, then he
               could make a reference to the Foreigners Tribunal (“FT”)
               constituted under the Foreigners (Tribunal) Order, 1964.
               If the suspected person is able to produce any document
               establishing arrival in India before 01.01.1966, then he is
               treated as a citizen in accordance with s. 6A(2) of the Act.
               If the suspected person fails to establish arrival before
               01.01.1966, but produces any document establishing his
               entry into India between 01.01.1966 to 24.03.1971, then
               an enquiry is initiated whether he is a suspected foreigner
               of the 1966-1971 stream. Their names are then removed
               from the electoral roll for a period of 10 years and they
               are required to register with the registering authority
               within a period of 60 days, failing which they are liable
               to be deported.”
100. The rules for giving effect to Section 6A of the Citizenship Act
     were inserted in the Citizenship Rules, 1956 (“Rules, 1956”) vide
     the Citizenship (Amendment) Rules, 1986 which were brought
     into force by the notification dated 15.01.198775. After the said
     amendment, Rule 16D76 of the Rules, 1956 provided for reference
     to tribunals constituted under the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order,
     1964 as prescribed under the Explanation (ii) to Section 6A(3) of
     the Citizenship Act. Rule 16E77 provided for the jurisdiction of the


75   Notification No. G.S.R. 25(E) dated 15.01.1987 w.e.f. 15.01.1987.
76   16D. Reference to Tribunal.— Where in the case of a person seeking registration under sub-section (3)
     of section 6A of the Act -
     (a) Any question arises as to whether such person complies with any requirement contained in the said
     sub-section, or
     (b) The opinion of the Tribunal constituted under the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 in relation
     to such person does not contain a finding with respect to any requirement contained in the said
     sub-section other than the question that he is a foreigner, the registering authority shall, within fifteen
     days of receipt of an application in Form XXIII from such person, make a fresh reference to the Tribunal
     in this regard.
77   16E. Jurisdiction of the Tribunal.— A Tribunal constituted under the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order,
     1964 having jurisdiction over a district or part thereof in State of Assam shall exercise jurisdiction to
     decide references received from the registering authority of that district in relation to all references made
     under sub-section (3) of section 6A of the Act in respect of the corresponding area covered by the
     Tribunal.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                                           1183

                   In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       Foreigners Tribunal to decide upon the references received under
       Rule 16D. Rule 16F78 prescribed the registering authority for the
       purpose of Section 6A(3) and the appropriate form79 to be filled
       for the purpose of registration. Finally, Rule 16G80 laid down the
       procedure for making a declaration under Section 6A(6) of the
       Citizenship Act.
101. The relevant rules pertaining to Section 6A of the Citizenship Act
     were incorporated virtually pari materia in the Citizenship Rules, 2009
     (“the Rules, 2009”) thereby replacing the Rules, 1956. For the sake
     of clarity, the provisions pertaining to Section 6A of the Citizenship
     Act contained in the Rules, 1956 and their corresponding provisions
     in the Rules, 2009 are listed in the following table:

          The Citizenship Rules, 1956                           The Citizenship Rules, 2009
                           Rule 16D                                               Rule 20
                           Rule 16E                                               Rule 21
                           Rule 16F                                               Rule 19
                           Rule 16G                                               Rule 22

102. Rule 19 of the Rules, 2009 was further amended by the Citizenship
     (Amendment) Rules, 2013. The amended Rule 19 came into effect



78   16F. The registering authority for the purpose of section 6A(3) and form of application for
     registration.—
     (1) The registering authority, for the purpose of sub-section (3) of section 6A of the Act shall be such
     officer as maybe appointed for each district of Assam by the Central Government.
     (2) An application for registration under sub-section (3) of section 6A of the Act shall be filed in Form XXIII
     by the person with the registering authority for the district in which he is ordinarily resident-
          (a) Within thirty days from the date of his detection as a foreigner, where such detection takes place
          after the commencement of the Citizenship (Amendment) Rules, 1986; or
          (b) Within thirty days of the appointment of the registering authority for the district concerned where
          such detection has taken place before the commencement of the Citizenship (Amendment) Rules,
          1986.
     (3) The registering authority shall, after entering the particulars of the application in a register in Form
     XXIV, return a copy of the application under his seal to the applicant.
     (4) One copy of every application received during a quarter shall be sent by the registering authority to
     the Central Government and the State Government of Assam along with a quarterly return in Form XXV.
     (5) The period referred to in sub-rule (2) may be extended for a period not exceeding sixty day by the
     registering authority for reasons to be recorded in writing.
79   Form XXIII, Schedule I, Citizenship Rules, 1956.
80   16G. Declaration under section 6A(6) .— The declaration referred to in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-
     section (6) of section 6A of the Act shall be made to the District Magistrate of the area within whose
     jurisdiction the person concerned is ordinarily resident in Form XXVI.
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    vide notification dated 16.07.2013. The amendment stipulated that
    all immigrants belonging to the 1966-71 stream, who had been
    detected as a “foreigner” by a foreigners tribunal before 16.07.2013
    and who couldn’t register as per the prescribed procedure either due
    to the non-receipt of the order of the tribunal or due to the refusal of
    the registering authority owing to the delay in registration, would be
    provided one last opportunity to register themselves within the period
    prescribed in the amended Rule 19. A comparative chart showing
    Rule 16F of the Rules, 1956; Rule 19 of the Rules, 2009; and Rule
    19 of the Rules, 2009 as amended by the Citizenship (Amendment)
    Rules, 2013 is produced below:

        16F. The registering          19. Registering               19. Registering
        authority for the purpose     authority for                 authority for
        of section 6A (3) and         the purpose of                the purpose of
        form of application for       sub- section (3) of           sub- section (3) of
        registration                  section 6A and form           section 6A and form
                                      for registration-             for registration-
        (1) The registering           (1) The Central               (1)     The      Central
        authority, for the purpose    Government may, for the       Government may, for the
        of sub-section (3)            purposes of sub-section       purposes of sub-section
        of section 6A of the Act      (3) of section 6A, appoint    (3) of section 6A, appoint
        shall be such officer as      an officer not below          an officer not below
        maybe appointed for each      the rank of Additional        the rank of Additional
        district of Assam by the      District Magistrate as        District Magistrate as the
        Central Government.           the registering authority     registering authority for
                                      for every district of the     every district of the State
                                      State of Assam.               of Assam.
        (2) An application for        (2) An application for        2) An application for
        registration under sub-       registration under sub-       registration under sub-
        section (3) of section        section (3) of section 6A     section (3) of section 6A
        6A of the Act shall be        shall be made in Form         shall be made in Form
        filed in Form XXIII by the    XVIII, by the person to       XVIII, by the person
        person with the registering   the registering authority     to the registering
        authority for the district    for the district in which     authority for the district
        in which he is ordinarily     he is ordinarily resident,    in which such person
        resident-(a) Within thirty    within a period of thirty     is ordinarily a resident
        days from the date of his     days from the date of his     within a period of thirty
        detection as a foreigner,     detection or identification   days from the date of
        where such detection                                        receipt of order of the
        takes place after the
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                          1185

               In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955



      commencement of the as a foreigner or, as the                Foreigners Tribunal
      Citizenship (Amendment) case may be, within a                declaring such person
      Rules, 1986; or            period of thirty days of          as a foreigner; Provided
                                 the appointment of the            that the registering
      (b) Within thirty days of
                                 registering authority in          a u t h o r i t y m a y, f o r
      the appointment of the
                                 the district.                     reasons to be recorded
      registering authority for
                                                                   in writing, extend the
      the district concerned ( 3 ) T h e r e g i s t e r i n g
                                                                   said period to such
      where such detection has authority shall, after
                                                                   further period as may
      taken place before the entering the particulars
                                                                   be justified in each case
      commencement of the of the application in a
                                                                   but not exceeding sixty
      Citizenship (Amendment) register in Form XIX,
                                                                   days.
      Rules, 1986.               return a copy of the
                                 application under his             (2A) A person who
      (3) The registering
                                 seal to the applicant.            has been declared
      authority shall, after
                                                                   as a foreigner by the
      entering the particulars (4) One copy of every
                                                                   Foreigners Tribunal
      of the application in a application received
                                                                   p r i o r t o 1 6 t h J u l y,
      register in Form XXIV, during a quarter shall be
                                                                   2013 and has not been
      return a copy of the sent by the registering
                                                                   registered under sub-
      application under his seal authority to the Central
                                                                   section (3) of Section
      to the applicant.          Government and the
                                                                   6A for the reason of
                                 State Government of
      (4) One copy of every                                        non-receipt of order of
                                 Assam along with a
      application received                                         the Foreigners Tribunal
                                 quarterly return in Form
      during a quarter shall be                                    or refusal by the
                                 XX.
      sent by the registering                                      registering authority to
      authority to the Central ( 5 ) T h e r e g i s t e r i n g   register such person as
      Government and the State authority may, and for the          a foreigner on account
      Government of Assam reasons to be recorded                   of delay may, within a
      along with a quarterly in writing, extend the                period of thirty days
      return in Form XXV.        period specified in sub-          from the date of receipt
                                 rule (2) for a period not         of the order passed
      (5) The period referred
                                 exceeding sixty days.             by the Foreigners
      to in sub-rule (2) may be
                                                                   Tribunal, or, from the
      extended for a period not
                                                                   date of publication of
      exceeding sixty day by the
                                                                   this notification, make
      registering authority for                                    an application for
      reasons to be recorded                                       registration in Form
      in writing.                                                  XVIII to the registering
                                                                   authority of the district
                                                                   in which such person
                                                                   is ordinarily a resident:
                                                                   Provided that the
                                                                   registering authority
1186                                                                           [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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                                                                        may, for reasons to be
                                                                        recorded in writing,
                                                                        extend the said period
                                                                        to such further period
                                                                        as may be justified
                                                                        in each case but not
                                                                        exceeding one hundred
                                                                        eighty days
                                                                        (As amended by
                                                                        Notification dated
                                                                        16.07.2013)
                                                                        (3) The registering
                                                                        authority shall, after
                                                                        entering the particulars
                                                                        of the application in a
                                                                        register in Form XIX,
                                                                        return a copy of the
                                                                        application under his
                                                                        seal to the applicant.
                                                                        (4) One copy of every
                                                                        application received
                                                                        during a quarter shall
                                                                        be sent by the registering
                                                                        authority to the Central
                                                                        Government and the
                                                                        State Government of
                                                                        Assam along with a
                                                                        quarterly return in Form
                                                                        XX.


      B.      How many Immigrants eligible under Section 6A(3) of the Act
              have registered till date?

103. Although exact figures on the extent of immigration from Bangladesh
     into Assam are not available, yet the debates that took place in the
     Rajya Sabha during the introduction of the Citizenship (Amendment)
     Act, 1985 give an approximate number of immigrants who came
     into Assam from Bangladesh during the time-period covered under
     section 6A81: -



81   Session No. 136, Rajya Sabha Deb., Statement of Shri. Baharul Islam on The Citizenship (Amendment)
     Bill, 1985 at cols. 323-324, (Dec. 2, 1985).
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                       1187

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     1.   1951 to 31.12.1965: 15,33,000 of which nearly 6,59,000 figured
          in the electoral rolls.
     2.   01.01.1966 to 24.03.1971: 5,45,000 of which nearly 2,34,000
          figured in the electoral rolls.
104. The White Paper mentions the following about the working of
     foreigners tribunals prior to the student-led agitation: -
          "The number of Foreigner’s Tribunals established has
          varied from time to time, according to the requirements of
          the situation. The Foreigner’s Tribunals established after
          1964 were gradually wound up between December 31,
          1969 and March 1, 1973 in phases when they were no
          longer found necessary as most of the infiltrators had been
          deported. Besides, with the issue of revised procedure for
          deportation of Pakistani infiltrators in June 1969, it was
          decided that fresh references for the Foreigners Tribunals
          were to be dispensed with and the existing Tribunals were
          to continue only till the old pending cases were disposed
          of. For the residue work, the task was to be by the
          normal course of law. However, the Foreigner’s Tribunals
          were revived in 1979, and 10 Foreigners Tribunals were
          constituted on July 4, 1979. The Foreigner’s Tribunals
          co-existed with IM(D)Ts with the signing of the Assam
          Accord. While IM(D)Ts took up cases of suspected
          foreigners of the post March 25th 1971 stream, the existing
          Foreigners Tribunals were entrusted with the responsibility
          of disposing of cases pertaining to pre-March 25th 1971
          stream of suspected foreigners.”
                                               (Emphasis supplied)
105. It can be seen from the above that the detection of foreigners gained
     pace on the commencement of the student-led agitation in Assam.
     It could be presumed that certain number of immigrants of the
     1966-71 stream would have either been detected and deported prior
     to the enactment of Section 6A in 1985, or might have left Assam
     apprehending such detection and deportation. However, even after
     taking into consideration such variations, the data on the number of
     immigrants detected by virtue of Section 6A, as presented to us by
     the Union of India, is not commensurate to the extent of influx that
     took place during the relevant period.
1188                                                   [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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     Number of immigrants belonging to the 1966-71 stream detected/
     registered:

        S.         Particulars          White Paper     Affidavit dated
        No.                            on Foreigner’s     11.12.2023
                                      Issue (October,    filed by the
                                           2012)        Union of India

        1.    Number of immigrants 32,537               Not Applicable
              of the 1966-71 stream
              declared as foreigners
              between 1985 - July,
              2012

        2.    Number of immigrants Not Applicable       32,381
              of the 1966-71 stream
              declared as foreigners
              by an order of the
              Foreigners Tribunal (till
              31.10.2023)

        3.    Number of immigrants Not Available        17,861
              belonging to the 1966-
                                                        (persons who
              71 stream to whom
                                                        had registered
              citizenship has been
                                                        with the FRRO
              granted under Section
                                                        till 31.10.2023)
              6A(3)

     Note: Although the white paper was published in 2012, yet the
     number of immigrants of the 1966-71 stream who have been
     detected as foreigners indicated therein is higher than that
     indicated in the Affidavit dated 11.12.2023.


106. As is evident from the table above, the number of immigrants
     belonging to the 1966-71 stream and detected as “foreigner” is
     significantly smaller in comparison to the approximate number of
     immigrants who had entered into Assam from Bangladesh between
     01.01.1966 and 24.03.1971. This, in my considered opinion, doesn’t
     appear to be solely due to the inadequate implementation of Section
     6A, but rather due to the inherent and manifest arbitrariness in the
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                         1189

              In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     mechanism prescribed under the provision, which I shall elaborate
     upon in later parts of this judgment.

     C.    Object sought to be achieved by the prescription of Two
           Separate Cut-Off Dates
107. From the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that Section 6A creates three
     categories of immigrants by prescribing two distinct cut-off dates.
     The first two categories of immigrants are those who had immigrated
     on or before 24.03.1971 (i.e., those entitled to citizenship), and the
     third category consists of those who immigrated into Assam after
     24.03.1971 and are considered as illegal immigrants who are liable
     to be deported. However, a different mechanism has been prescribed
     for acquisition of citizenship even within the first two classes, as
     indicated by the following table:

         CATEGORY I –       CATEGORY II –       CATEGORY III –
      Immigrants who came Immigrants who came Immigrants who came
        before 01.01.1966       between         after 24.03.1971
                             01.01.1966 –
                              24.03.1971
      Governed by Section Governed by Section Not entitled to citizenship
      6A(2) of the Citizenship 6A(3) of the Citizenship under Section 6A of the
      Act.                     Act.                     Citizenship Act.

108. At this juncture, it is important to examine whether it was open to the
     legislature to prescribe two cut-off dates, thereby creating two different
     classes of immigrants who are entitled to citizenship by two distinct
     mechanisms. The determination of this question requires ascertaining
     whether there is any intelligible differentia between the two classes
     of immigrants, that is, those who immigrated prior to 01.01.1966
     and those who immigrated between 01.01.1966 and 24.03.1971.
     The observations made by Justice Surya Kant in paragraphs 170
     and 171 respectively speak for themselves. The said paragraphs
     are reproduced hereinbelow: -
           "170. In terms of the form, the classification should not
           be based on arbitrary criteria and must instead be based
           on a logic which distinguishes individuals with similar
           characteristics i.e., the equals from the persons who
           do not share those characteristics—the unequals. Apart
1190                                                       [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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          from requiring such differentia, this prong requires that
          the classification must be intelligible, such that it can be
          reasonably understood whether an element falls in one
          class or another. If the class is so poorly defined that one
          cannot reasonably understand its constituents, it will fail
          this test of ‘intelligible’ differentia. Therefore, instead of
          being based on arbitrary selection, the classification must
          be supported by valid and lawful reasons.
          171. Hence, using an intelligible criterion, the classes
          must be constituted in a manner that distinguishes the
          components of that class from the elements that have
          been left out of the class. This is instantiated by State
          of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas, where a 7-judge bench
          was dealing with the challenge of exemption granted to
          Scheduled Castes from the departmental test required
          for promotion. The Court held that the same was based
          on intelligible differentia, as the persons belonging to the
          exempted class, i.e., the Scheduled Caste, differed from
          those excluded from this class.”
109. The cut-off date of 01.01.1966 clearly categorizes the immigrants
     into two discernible and determinable categories. The first category is
     conferred citizenship by the mechanism prescribed under Section 6A
     sub-section (2) and the second category is conferred citizenship by
     the procedure prescribed under Section 6A sub-section (3).
110. Further, it is necessary to decipher the object sought to be achieved
     by creating two distinct categories of immigrants with fundamentally
     different procedure under Section 6A for the purpose of conferring
     the same benefit, that is, the benefit of conferment of citizenship on
     the immigrants from Bangladesh.
111. Indisputably, Section 6A was enacted to give statutory effect to the
     political settlement arrived at in the form of Assam Accord. The
     Accord was a result of years of negotiation that took place between
     the Central Government, State Government, AASU and AAGSP.
     The sui-generis scheme of Section 6A also reflects this process of
     negotiation, or “give and take”, so to say.
112. I have already discussed in paragraph 54 of this judgment that the
     proximate event which led to protests and demonstrations over the
     immigrant issue in Assam was the publication of the electoral rolls
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                       1191

                 In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


      for the bye-elections to be held for the Mangaldoi constituency in
      1979. The apprehension of the local population was that a large
      number of illegal immigrants had managed to get themselves on
      the electoral rolls thereby rendering the local population a minority
      in the coming bye-elections. The resentment soon translated into
      state-wide movement against illegal immigration, which was led at
      the forefront by several student-run organisations.
113. As Sangeeta Barooah Pisharoty has discussed in her book, Assam:
     The Accord, The Discord82, and as also discussed in paragraph 56
     of this judgment, initially, the demand of the protesting students was
     that the National Register of Citizens (“NRC”) prepared in the year
     1951 should act as the baseline for detection and deportation of
     illegal immigrants. However, during the course of negotiations, an
     understanding was reached that 24.03.1971 would act as the cut-off
     date for detection and deportation of illegal immigrants. However, to
     avoid deadlocks and expedite the settlement, a further cut-off date of
     01.01.1966 was decided as the cut-off date for disenfranchisement
     as opposed to deportation of the immigrants belonging to the
     1966-71 stream. In other words, the said cut-off date was decided
     as the baseline for detection of immigrants and their consequent
     deletion from the electoral rolls.
114. Thus, it appears from an overview of the historical context that the
     only purpose behind the introduction of an additional cut-off date of
     01.01.1966 and the corresponding concept of detection and deletion
     from the electoral rolls was to assuage the apprehensions of the
     protesting students. By mandating the deletion of all the immigrants
     belonging to the 1966-71 stream from the electoral rolls, it was hoped
     that the effect of wrongful inclusion of immigrants in the electoral
     rolls on the upcoming elections would be mitigated.
115. However, as discussed in the later paragraphs of this judgment, the
     object of removal of the immigrants belonging to the 1966-71 stream
     from the electoral rolls could only be meaningful if it was given effect
     through an exercise of en-masse detection and deletion conducted
     within a fixed time-period. It can be seen from paragraph 62 of this
     judgment that the protesting leaders in Assam at the relevant point


82   Sangeeta Barooah Pisharoty, supra, note 45.
1192                                                      [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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     of time were opposed to the conduct of elections to the Parliament
     and State Legislature unless and until the names of immigrants were
     dropped from the electoral rolls.
116. Another purpose which is clearly discernible from the scheme of
     Section 6A is the intention of the legislature to confer citizenship
     on the immigrants in a graded manner. To illustrate, an immigrant
     who crossed the border and came into Assam sometime before
     01.01.1966, was conferred with automatic deemed citizenship on
     the date of coming into force of Section 6A, that is, 07.12.1985.
     On the other hand, an immigrant who crossed the border to come
     into Assam between 01.01.1966 and 24.03.1971 had to undergo
     detection, deletion and registration as specified in Section 6A(3).
     Further, any immigrant who came into Assam after 24.03.1971
     was not considered entitled to citizenship at all. Thus, it is evident
     that within the first two categories, the conditions for acquisition of
     citizenship were more stringent for the immigrants belonging to the
     1966-71 stream, while there was a complete denial of citizenship to
     immigrants belonging to the post-1971 stream.
117. The mechanism of graded conferment of citizenship was introduced to
     arrive at a common ground during the negotiations, which otherwise
     might have ended in a failure, due to the reluctance of the student
     protestors to agree to a blanket conferment of citizenship up to the
     cut-off date in 1971.
118. It could be said that Section 6A was a humanitarian and beneficial
     provision for the immigrants. However, to say that the sole object
     sought to be achieved by Section 6A was to confer benefits on the
     immigrants alone would amount to taking a reductive view of the
     historical context in which the provision was enacted.
119. In the aforesaid context, I may only say that if such was the sole
     object of the provision, then there was no need for the legislature
     to create two distinct categories of immigrants who were eligible
     for citizenship. The legislature could have simply conferred
     deemed citizenship on every immigrant who came into Assam
     before 24.03.1971 from the date of coming into force of Section
     6A. The very fact that a second category of immigrants (1966-71)
     was statutorily created and subjected to undergo a more stringent
     test of procedure for the purpose of obtaining citizenship would
     indicate that conferment of citizenship was not the sole object of
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                       1193

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     Section 6A(3). The object behind insertion of Section 6A(3) seems
     to have been to pacify the apprehension of the people of Assam
     that conferment of citizenship would not have an immediate impact
     on the then upcoming elections in the State of Assam due to the
     inclusion of a large number of immigrants. The apprehension was
     taken care of by the scheme of Section 6A(3) which provides for
     the removal of the immigrants belonging to the 1966-71 stream
     from the electoral rolls for a period of ten years from the date
     of their detection. Section 6A(3) embodies the approach of the
     government of the day in finding a middle ground between two
     competing interests prevailing at that time – on one hand, adopting
     a humanitarian approach towards the immigrant population in
     Assam; and on the other, ensuring that large scale immigration
     doesn’t result into the loss of culture, economy and the political
     rights of the people of Assam.
120. While construing the object of enactment of Section 6A, one should
     not lose sight of an important fact that Section 6A was enacted to
     give a statutory avatar to certain clauses of the Assam Accord. The
     provision, thus, could be said to have been multifaceted in design
     and purpose and representative of the interests of all the parties
     to the negotiation. I am of the view that the intention of the parties
     while signing the Accord should be kept in mind while construing
     the object of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act.

     D.   Whether the Onus of Detection of Foreigners of the 1966-
          71 Stream lies on the State?
121. From a perusal of Section 6A and the associated rules, it is clear that
     there is no provision which prescribes or provides for self-declaration/
     registration or voluntary detection as a foreigner within a given time
     period for availing the benefit of citizenship by registration under
     Section 6A(3).
122. The mechanism of implementation of Section 6A is set into motion with
     the first step of reference of a suspected foreigner to the foreigners
     tribunal. As soon as a reference is made to the tribunal, the onus
     is on the suspected person to either establish that he or she is an
     Indian citizen, or to establish that he or she is an immigrant eligible
     to avail the benefit available under Section 6A. Once the tribunal
     holds that the suspected person is a foreigner of the 1966-71 stream
     of immigrants, then again, the onus is on the said person to get
1194                                                      [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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     registered in accordance with the Citizenship Rules, 2009 failing
     which his or her claim to citizenship would abate.
123. While the statute is clear that the onus completely shifts on the
     suspected foreigner once a reference is made to the tribunal, it
     appears to me as illogically unique that a person wanting to avail
     the benefit of citizenship by registration under Section 6A(3) has
     to await identification as a suspicious immigrant and subsequent
     reference to the tribunal. There is no plausible reason why it should
     be impermissible for him or her to set the mechanism of Section 6A
     into motion by voluntarily choosing to get detected as a foreigner
     of the class specified in Section 6A, or to make an application for
     conferment of citizenship.
124. Further, what stands out as palpably irrational in the scheme
     of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act is that there is no end date
     after which the benefit of citizenship under Section 6A(3) cannot
     be availed. I have dealt in later parts of this judgment as to
     how this militates against the very purpose of the enactment of
     Section 6A(3).
125. Section 6A(3) was enacted as a beneficial provision, both for the
     immigrants who entered into Assam before 25.03.1971 as well as
     for the people of Assam. It confers citizenship in a graded manner
     upon all such persons who meet the conditions specified therein.
     On the other hand, by implication, it denies the benefit of citizenship
     to illegal immigrants of the post-1971 stream. Additionally, it also
     prescribes a stricter citizenship regime for the class of immigrants
     who came between 01.01.1966 and 24.03.1971 including the deletion
     of names of such immigrants from the electoral rolls. The key intent
     behind inserting Section 6A and conferring citizenship only upon a
     limited segment of persons, that too by a retrospective cut-off date,
     was to ensure that apart from a very limited number of immigrants
     who had already come into Assam much before the enactment of
     Section 6A, all other illegal immigrants shall be expelled and no
     other benefit would be provided.
126. Citizenship provides a bouquet of rights to the person who is conferred
     with it. It was pointed by Shri Bholanath Sen, Member of the Lok
     Sabha, during the discussions on the Citizenship Amendment Bill,
     1985, that: -
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                          1195

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


           "All those who had come between 1966 and 1971 had
           no such right before. No such law was there in this
           country which could have given them this protection. This
           protection is now being given. Many people go to Haj for
           religious reasons and they need a Passport. They will be
           given Passport. They might like to go even to Bangladesh
           to see their own relations. They will be given Passport.
           Passport will be given to them and that is recognised by
           this legislation clearly. The only thing that is being taken
           away from them is that they will not be able to cast vote
           for ten years from the date of detection as foreigners.”
                                                  (Emphasis supplied)
127. One of the ideas behind providing for a stricter citizenship regime for
     the immigrants belonging to the 1966-71 category was expressed by
     Shri Bir Bhadra Pratap Singh, Member of the Rajya Sabha, during the
     discussions on the Citizenship (Amendment) Bill was expressed thus: -
           "[...] People from East Pakistan have come here. We
           have welcomed them. We love them. But we will ensure
           whether they have come with genuine intentions to stay
           in this country and they will be good citizens. Let them
           register themselves. Let them get their claim decided. For
           ten years their voting right will be suspended, but after ten
           years we will confer full citizenship on them. De you think
           we do not have a right to scrutinise the bona fides of these
           people? We have a right to scrutinise to see whether they
           have come here with genuine intentions to settle in this
           country. But we have never intended to throw them out.
           We have welcomed them [...]”
128. The statutory scheme of Section 6A(3), which doesn’t envisage
     voluntary detection at the option of the immigrant, marks a clear
     departure, for no intelligible reason, from the prevalent scheme noticed
     under the rest of the Citizenship Act. Even across other international
     jurisdictions, citizenship by registration or naturalisation is a process
     that is initiated at the behest of the person seeking to avail the
     benefit of citizenship by registration or naturalization. Articles 6(b)
     and 7 respectively of the Constitution, which deal with citizenship by
     registration and the permit system introduced to meet the exigencies
     of partition, too, place the onus of registration and obtaining permit
1196                                                                      [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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      on the person who wishes to claim such benefit. Thus, there is no
      discernible reason why the mechanism prescribed under Section 6A
      does not require, or at the very least, permit an immigrant to come
      forward and make an application to avail the benefit.

      E.      Temporal Reasonableness
129. Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary defines ‘temporal’ as ‘connected
     with or limited by time’. The term ‘Temporal Reasonableness’, thus,
     describes what in our jurisprudence we say as something which
     was earlier reasonable is no longer so or ceases to be so with the
     passage of time.
130. The doctrine of temporal reasonableness is encapsulated in the Latin
     maxim “Cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex” which means that
     reason is the soul of the law and when the reason of any particular
     law ceases, so does the law itself. Thus, when the reason for which
     a particular law was enacted ceases to exist due to efflux of time,
     then the law too must cease to exist.
131. For better analysis, it is also necessary to understand the concept
     of temporal triggers. A time trigger may be defined as “a point in
     time that initiates or terminates a legal event. A time trigger activates
     or terminates laws, powers, rights, and obligations.”83 Allocative
     time triggers are points in time that mark the beginning or coming
     into force of treaties, constitutions, statutes, obligations, rights, etc.
     Terminative time triggers on the other hand end powers, rights,
     obligations and claims.
132. In the aforesaid context, it would be apposite to refer to a few
     decisions of this Court wherein the dynamic nature of law vis-à-vis
     the passage of time has been discussed. In Independent Thought
     v. Union of India reported in (2017) 10 SCC 800, it was observed
     thus by a two-Judge Bench of this Court: -
              "88. … Traditions that might have been acceptable at
              some historical point of time are not cast in stone. If
              times and situations change, so must views, traditions
              and conventions.”
                                                                  (Emphasis supplied)


83   Liaqat A. Khan, Temporality of Law, 40 McGeorge L. Rev. (2016).
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                           1197

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


133. In Modern Dental College and Research Centre and Ors. v. State
     of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. reported in (2016) 7 SCC 353, a
     five-Judge Bench of this Court observed as follows: -
          “69. … law is not an Eden of concepts but rather an
          everyday life of needs, interests and the values that a given
          society seeks to realise in a given time. The law is a tool
          which is intended to provide solutions for the problems of
          human being in a society.
                            xxx        xxx        xxx
          92. … law is not static, it has to change with changing
          times and changing social/societal conditions.”
                                                  (Emphasis supplied)
134. In Satyawati Sharma v. Union of India, reported in (2008) 5 SCC
     287, a two-Judge Bench of this Court observed as under: -
          "32. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite
          reasonable and rational at the time of its enactment may
          with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances
          become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine
          of equality and even if the validity of such legislation may
          have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in
          subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that
          the rationale of classification has become non-existent [...]”
                                                  (Emphasis supplied)
135. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya v. State of Maharashtra reported
     in (1998) 2 SCC 1, a three-Judge Bench of this Court considered
     the validity of determination of standard rent by freezing or pegging
     down the rent as on 01.09.1940 or as on the date of first letting,
     under Sections 5(10)(b), 7, 9(2)(b) and 12(3) respectively of the
     Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947.
     It was held that the said process of determination under the said Act,
     which was reasonable when the law was made, became arbitrary and
     unreasonable with the passage of time in view of constant escalation
     of prices due to inflation and corresponding rise in money value. The
     relevant extracts are as follows: -
          “29. Insofar as social legislation, like the Rent Control
          Act is concerned, the law must strike a balance between
1198                                                      [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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          rival interests and it should try to be just to all. The law
          ought not to be unjust to one and give a disproportionate
          benefit or protection to another section of the society. When
          there is shortage of accommodation it is desirable, nay,
          necessary that some protection should be given to the
          tenants in order to ensure that they are not exploited. At
          the same time such a law has to be revised periodically so
          as to ensure that a disproportionately larger benefit than
          the one which was intended is not given to the tenants”
                                                 (Emphasis supplied)
136. In State of M.P. v. Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd., reported in
     1964 SCC OnLine SC 121, a five-Judge Bench of this Court was
     hearing a challenge to the Bhopal State Agricultural Income Tax Act,
     1953 on the ground that it was applicable only within the territory
     of the former State of Bhopal and not in the rest of the territories of
     Madhya Pradesh. This Court while remanding the case to the High
     Court, observed that a provision introduced to achieve a temporary
     objective, could not be allowed to assume permanency. The relevant
     observations read as under: -
          “6. The reorganized State of Madhya Pradesh was formed
          by combining territories of four different regions. Shortly
          after reorganisation, the Governor of the State issued
          the Madhya Pradesh Adaptation of Laws (State and
          Concurrent Subjects) Order, 1956, so as to make certain
          laws applicable uniformly to the entire State and later the
          legislature by the Madhya Pradesh Extension of Laws Act,
          1958, made other alterations in the laws applicable to the
          State. But Bhopal remained unamended and unaltered :
          nor was its operation extended to other areas or regions
          in the State. Continuance of the laws of the old region
          after the reorganisation by Section 119 of the States
          Reorganisation Act was by itself not discriminatory even
          though it resulted in differential treatment of persons,
          objects and transactions in the new State, because it was
          intended to serve a dual purpose — facilitating the early
          formation of homogeneous units in the larger interest
          of the Union, and maintaining even while merging its
          political identity in the new unit, the distinctive character
          of each region, till uniformity of laws was secured in those
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                         1199

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


          branches in which it was expedient after full enquiry to
          do so. The laws of the regions merged in the new units
          had therefore to be continued on grounds of necessity
          and expediency. Section 119 of the States Reorganisation
          Act was intended to serve this temporary purpose viz. to
          enable the new units to consider the special circumstances
          of the diverse units, before launching upon a process of
          adaptation of laws so as to make them reasonably uniform,
          keeping in view the special needs of the component
          regions and administrative efficiency. Differential treatment
          arising out of the application of the laws so continued in
          different regions of the same reorganised State, did not,
          therefore immediately attract the clause of the Constitution
          prohibiting discrimination. But by the passage of time,
          considerations of necessity and expediency would be
          obliterated, and the grounds which justified classification
          of geographical regions for historical reasons may cease
          to be valid. A purely temporary provision which because
          of compelling forces justified differential treatment when
          the Reorganisation Act was enacted cannot obviously be
          permitted to assume permanency, so as to perpetuate
          that treatment without a rational basis to support it after
          the initial expediency and necessity have disappeared."
                                                 (Emphasis supplied)
137. In Rattan Arya and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. reported
     in (1986) 3 SCC 385, this Court observed thus:
          "…As held by this court in Motor General Traders v.
          State of A.P. [(1984) 1 SCC 222 : AIR 1984 SC 121] a
          provision which was perfectly valid at the commencement
          of the Act could be challenged later on the ground of
          unconstitutionality and struck down on that basis. What
          was once a perfectly valid legislation, may in course of
          time, become discriminatory and liable to challenge on the
          ground of its being violative of Article 14. …”
138. Having discussed the concept and the position of law on temporal
     reasonableness, I shall now look into the submissions of the petitioners
     on the lack of a temporal limit to the application of Section 6A and
     the consequences that follow.
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     i.    Whether there is a temporal limit on the applicability of
           Section 6A(3)?
139. Neither Section 6A nor the rules made thereunder prescribe any outer
     time-limit for the completion of detection of all such persons who
     belong to the 1966-71 stream and are eligible to avail the benefits
     of Section 6A(3). The clock only starts to tick once the detection is
     made by the foreigners tribunal and there is no prescription as to
     the period of time within which the exercise of detection is to be
     completed from the commencement of Section 6A.
140. The absence of any prescribed time-limit for detection of foreigners
     of the 1966-71 stream has two-fold adverse consequences – first, it
     relieves the state from the burden of effectively identifying, detecting,
     and deleting from the electoral rolls, in accordance with law, all
     immigrants of the 1966-71 stream. Secondly, it incentivises the
     immigrants belonging to the 1966-71 stream to continue to remain
     on the electoral rolls for an indefinite period and only get themselves
     registered under Section 6A once detected by a competent tribunal.
     Hence, the manner in which the provision is worded, counter-serves
     the very purpose of its enactment, which is the speedy and effective
     identification of foreigners of the 1966-71 stream, their deletion
     from the electoral rolls, registration with the registering authority
     and conferring of regular citizenship. As submitted on behalf of the
     petitioners, the open-ended nature of Section 6A(3) also subserves
     the legislative intent behind the enactment of the IEAA, 1950 and
     the spirit of the Assam Accord.
141. Section 6A(3) of the Citizenship Act was never meant to maintain
     the status quo regarding the immigrants of the 1966-71 stream. It
     was enacted with the object of achieving en-masse deletion of this
     category of immigrants from the electoral rolls subsequent to which
     de-jure citizenship was to be conferred on them after a cooling-off
     period of ten years.
142. In the absence of any statutory mandate to do so within a time limit,
     and there being no temporal limit to the applicability of Section 6A(3),
     it follows that any immigrant of the 1966-71 stream, whose name
     figures in the electoral rolls, would not voluntarily want to get detected
     as a foreigner, as upon detection, such immigrant becomes liable to
     having his or her name struck off from the electoral rolls, and is also
     required to register with the registering authority within a specified time
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                                     1201

                  In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


      period, failing which he or she would become liable to deportation.
      Even otherwise, no person belonging to the aforesaid category
      would, out of their own volition, get detected as a foreigner due to
      the inherent subjectivity that is involved in the process of scrutiny and
      determination of the various conditions as stipulated under Section
      6A(3), i.e., date of entry into Assam, ordinarily resident, etc. However,
      the same degree of reluctance would not have been present on part
      of the immigrants of the said category if the procedure of conferment
      of citizenship under Section 6A(3) was instead a one-time exercise
      which was to be mandatorily undertaken in a time-bound manner by
      anyone who wished to avail the benefit of citizenship under the said
      provision, and any failure to abide by such time-bound procedure
      would have resulted into the abatement of their claim to citizenship.
      Seen thus, the working mechanism of Section 6A(3) goes against
      its avowed objective.

      ii.     Whether placing temporal limitations on the period of
              applicability is an objective implicit in the scheme of
              Section 6A?
143. Upon perusal of the statutory scheme under the Citizenship Act, the
     Foreigners Act, 1946 and other related provisions, it could be seen that
     the mechanism prescribed for giving effect to Section 6A is imbued
     with the idea of temporal limitations and in the absence of temporal
     limits on the period during which Section 6A is made applicable, the
     provision counter-serves the object it was enacted with.
144. A foreigner’s tribunal enters upon adjudication on the citizenship
     status of a person only upon a reference received from a competent
     authority. Paragraph 2(1)84 of the Foreigners (Tribunal) Order, 1964
     prescribes that the Central Government may refer the question
     whether a person is a foreigner or not within the meaning of the
     Foreigners Act, 1946 to the Foreigners Tribunal. Paragraph 2(1A)85
     also empowers the registering authority constituted under Rule 19


84   2. Constitution of Tribunals.—
     (1) The Central Government or the State Government or the Union territory administration or the District
     Collector or the District Magistrate may, by order, refer the question as to whether a person is not a
     foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigners Act, 1946 (31 of 1946) to a Tribunal to be constituted for
     the purpose, for its opinion.
85   (1-A) The registering authority appointed under sub-rule (1) of Rule 19 of the Citizenship Rules, 2009]
     may also refer to the Tribunal the question whether a person of Indian Origin, complies with any of the
     requirements under sub-section (3) of Section 6-A of the Citizenship Act, 1955 (57 of 1955).
1202                                                                                      [2024] 10 S.C.R.

                                Digital Supreme Court Reports


       of the Rules, 2009 to make a reference to the foreigners tribunal
       to ascertain whether a person of Indian origin complies with the
       requirements under section 6A(3) of the Citizenship Act.
145. Paragraph 3(14)86 of the Foreigners (Tribunal) Order, 1964 which
     was inserted vide amendment dated 10.12.2013 prescribes that
     the foreigners tribunal must dispose of the case within 60 days of
     receipt of reference from the competent authority.
146. Rule 19(2)87 of the Citizenship Rules, 2009 prescribes that an
     application for registration under Section 6A(3) has to be made
     within 30 days from the date of the receipt of the order of the
     foreigners tribunal.
147. Rule 2088 of the Citizenship Rules, 2009 provides that the registering
     authority, in case any question arises as to whether any person fulfils
     any requirement contained in Section 6A(3), has to make a fresh
     reference to the foreigners tribunal within 15 days.
148. Section 6A(4)89 of the Citizenship Act prescribes that upon detection
     as a foreigner, the name of the immigrant is struck off the electoral
     rolls for a period of 10 years, after which the person becomes
     entitled to have his or her name on the rolls again.


86   3. Procedure for disposal of questions.—
                                                     ………
     (14) The Foreigners Tribunal shall dispose of the case within a period of sixty days of the receipt of the
     reference from the competent authority.
87   19. Registering authority for the purpose of sub-section (3) of section 6A and form for registration.—
                                                       ………
     (2) An application for registration under sub-section (3) of section 6A shall be made in Form XVIII, by
     the person to the registering authority for the district in which such person is ordinarily a resident within
     a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of order of the Foreigners Tribunal declaring such person
     as a foreigner; Provided that the registering authority may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend
     the said period to such further period as may be justified in each case but not exceeding sixty days.
88   20. Reference to Tribunals.— Where in case of a person seeking registration under sub-section (3) of
     section 6A -
     (a) any question arises as to whether such person fulfils any requirement contained in the said sub-
     section; or
     (b) the opinion of the Tribunal constituted under the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 in relation to such
     person does not contain a finding with respect to any requirement contained in the said sub-section other
     than the question that he is a foreigner, then, the registering authority shall, within a period of fifteen days
     of the receipt of the application under sub-rule (2) of rule 19, make a fresh reference to the Tribunal in
     this regard.
89   (4) A person registered under sub-section (3) shall have, as from the date on which he has been detected
     to be a foreigner and till the expiry of a period of ten years from that date, the same rights and obligations
     as a citizen of India (including the right to obtain a passport under the Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967)
     and the obligations connected therewith), but shall not be entitled to have his name included in any
     electoral roll for any Assembly or Parliamentary constituency at any time before the expiry of the said
     period of ten years.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                                      1203

                  In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


149. Section 6A(6)(a)90 of the Citizenship Act prescribes that any person
     referred to under section 6A(2) who doesn’t wish to become a
     citizen of India has to give a declaration within sixty days of the
     commencement of the Citizenship Amendment Act, 1985.
150. Section 6A(6)(b)91 provides that any person referred to under section
     6A(3) who doesn’t wish to become a citizen of India has to give a
     declaration within sixty days of coming into force of the Citizenship
     Amendment Act, 1985 or from the date of detection as a foreigner,
     whichever is later.
151. A perusal of all the above provisions indicates that at every stage,
     except the first stage of detection, the mechanism for implementation
     of Section 6A is circumscribed by specific temporal limits. The same
     was taken note of by a Full Bench of the Gauhati High Court in State
     of Assam v. Moslem Mandal reported in 2013 SCC OnLine Gau 1:
              "108. Rule 16F of the Citizenship Rules, 1956, as amended
              in 2005, provides the time limit for registration of a foreigner
              within the meaning of section 6A(3), which is 30 days
              from the date of detection as a foreigner, which period is
              extendable by another 60 days by the registering authority
              for the reasons to be recorded in writing. Rule 16D of the
              said Rules also empowers the registering authority to
              make a reference to the Tribunal if any question arises
              as to whether such person complies with any requirement
              contained in section 6A(3) of the 1955 Act, which is required
              to be decided by the Tribunal under rule 16E of the said
              Rules. The 2009 Rules, which has repealed the 1956 Rules,
              also contains pari materia provisions. From the aforesaid
              provisions, it, therefore, appears that the 1955 Act confers
              the deeming citizenship on the persons of Indian origin



90   (6) Without prejudice to the provisions of section 8, —
     (a) If any person referred to in sub-section (2) submits in the prescribed manner and form and to the
     prescribed authority within sixty days from the date of commencement of the Citizenship (Amendment)
     Act, 1985, for year a declaration that he does not wish to be a citizen of India, such person shall not be
     deemed to have become a citizen of India under that sub-section;
91   (b) If any person referred to in sub-section (3) submits in the prescribed manner and form and to the
     prescribed authority within sixty days from the date of commencement the Citizenship (Amendment) Act,
     1985, for year or from the date on which he has been detect-ed to be a foreigner, whichever is later, a
     declaration that he does not wish to be governed by the provisions of that sub-sec-tion and sub-sections
     (4) and (5), it shall not be necessary for such person to register himself under sub-section (3).
1204                                                     [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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        who came to Assam from the specified territory before
        1.1.1966 and who have been ordinarily resident in Assam
        since the date of their entry into Assam. The other class
        of persons, namely, the persons who came to Assam from
        the specified territory on or after 1st day of January, 1966
        but before 25th day of March, 1971, would not become
        citizens of India automatically and they would continue
        to be foreigners, unless of course they are registered in
        accordance with the provisions contained in sub-section
        (3) of section 6A of the 1955 Act read with Rule 1.9 of
        the 2009 Rules.
        109. Prescription of time for filing such application seeking
        registration has a purpose, persons, who are detected to be
        a foreigner of the stream between 1.1.1966 and 25.3.1971,
        cannot enjoy the right under sub-section (4) of section 6A
        for an indefinite period of time, without registering their
        names as required by law. They being recognized as the
        foreigners by sub-section (3) of section 6A, they will be
        treated as foreigners for all purposes, unless they register
        their names within the time limit prescribed. The limited
        rights and obligations as a citizen of India, however, has
        been conferred on those persons, by virtue of sub-section
        (4) of section 6A, so that they are not deprived of the
        basic rights as a citizen during the time limit prescribed
        for filing the application and till the order is passed by the
        registering authority registering their names. By virtue of
        the provisions contained in sub-section (4) of section 6A,
        it cannot be said that the persons who are detected to be
        foreigners of the stream between 1.1.1966 and 25.3.1971
        would continue to be the citizens of India and as such
        cannot be deported from India, even if they do not file their
        applications for registration at all, as required by law. The
        time limit prescribed by the aforesaid provisions of law
        would, however, commence from the date of rendering
        the opinion by the Tribunal.
                          xxx        xxx       xxx
        111. 1956 Rules as well as 2009 Rules, as noticed
        above, provide the initial time limit for filing application
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                           1205

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


          for registration, i.e., one month, which is extendable by
          another 60 days by the registering authority. Though there
          is no time limit prescribed in section 6A of the 1955 Act
          for filing such application, having regard to the purpose for
          which section 6A of the 1955 Act has been enacted, it also
          cannot be said that the fixation of time limit for filing the
          application has no bearing on the purpose sought to be
          achieved by such enactment. However, such time limit
          can be extended by the registering authority, only under very
          exceptional circumstances preventing the applicant from
          filing the application due to reasons beyond his control, for
          which the reasons have to be recorded by the registering
          authority. But such extension of time cannot also be for
          an indefinite period of time, having regard to the object
          of the enactment of section 6A of the 1955 Act. A person
          who does not register within the time limit fixed or within the
          time limit that may be extended by the registering authority,
          is liable to be deported from India as he is admittedly a
          foreigner and he has not acquired the right of a citizen of
          India as has been acquired by a person of Indian origin
          who came to Assam from the specified territory prior to
          1.1.1966, by virtue of the deeming provision in sub-section
          (2) of section 6A of the 1955 Act. The decision of the Apex
          Court in National Human Rights Commission (supra) on
          which Mr. Das, learned senior counsel has placed reliance,
          does not support the contention that a person of Indian
          origin who came to Assam from specified territory between
          1.1.1966 to 25.6.1971 would continue to be the citizen of
          India despite non-filing of application for registration. In
          the said case, the Apex Court had interfered with the quit
          notices and ultimatum issued by a Student organization, on
          the ground that they do not have the authority to issue the
          same and it tantamounts to threat to the life and liberty of
          each and every person of Chakma tribe. The Apex Court
          had also directed not to evict or remove the Chakmas from
          their occupation on the ground that he is not a citizen of
          India until the competent authority takes a decision on the
          application filed by them for registration under the provisions
          of the 1955 Act.”
                                                  (Emphasis supplied)
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152. Another absurdity which is manifest in the scheme of Section 6A is
     that once an immigrant belonging to the 1966-71 stream is detected
     as a foreigner, that person has to mandatorily register within a
     fixed time period, otherwise the person concerned would be liable
     to deportation. However, a similarly situated immigrant, who is yet
     to be detected by the state, can continue to stay in Assam without
     incurring any liability of deportation.
153. Thus, from an analysis of the scheme of Section 6A and the
     corresponding rules along with the decision in the case of Moslem
     Mandal (supra), it is as clear as the noon-day sun that placing temporal
     limitations on the benefits available under Section 6A appears to have
     been one of the objects of the legislation - as otherwise the provision
     would go against the spirit of the Assam Accord.
154. It is pertinent to mention that even the permit system, which was
     brought in after the partition of the country to allow the immigrants from
     Pakistan to migrate to India had a temporal limit to its applicability.
     The said system was brought to an end on 26.12.1952 by the Influx
     from Pakistan (Control) Repealing Act, 1952. Seen in this context, it
     appears to me to be unreasonable why Section 6A of the Citizenship
     Act, which too was brought in to deal with a one-time extraordinary
     situation, should be allowed to continue for all times to come.
155. Continuance of the exercise of detection indefinitely without any
     temporal limitations promotes the immigrants to stay in Assam, and
     the immigrants residing in the neighbouring states to come into
     Assam92 in the hope of never being detected as a foreigner, or of
     setting up a defence under Section 6A of the Citizenship Act upon
     identification to claim its benefit.

       iii.    Absurd consequences arising out of Section 6A(3) in the
               absence of any temporal limits to its application.
156. Shri S.W. Dhabe, Member of the Rajya Sabha, during discussion on
     the Citizenship (Amendment) Bill, 1985 mentioned93: -


92   Sangeeta Barooah Pisharoty, supra note 45, “That the government gave a general amnesty to such migrants
     in Assam, have also led some to presume that it might have encouraged that category of people from other
     border states to move into Assam. Since the government didn’t register the category of people who came to
     the state post the 1950 citizenship cut-off date before granting the general amnesty of 1971, there is no data,
     though, to pin down exactly how many people benefitted from the exclusive cut-off date in Assam.”.
93   Session No. 136, Rajya Sabha Deb., Statement of Shri. S.W. Dhabe on The Citizenship (Amendment)
     Bill, 1985 at cols. 371-372 (Dec. 2, 1985).
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                                1207

                  In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


              “What do you mean by “ten years from the date on which
              he has been detected to be a foreigner”? In Sub-Clause
              (5) on page 3 it is stated:
                     “A person registered under sub- section (3)
                     shall be deemed to be a citizen of India for all
                     purposes as from the date of expiry of a period
                     of ten years from the date on which he has been
                     detected to be a foreigner.”
              Suppose you take 15 years or 20 years or 30 years for
              detection purposes, the person shall not be eligible to
              vote for ten years after the detection. Is that so? It means
              not from just 1971 it can go to 1990. Therefore, there is
              a big lacuna. I hope the Minister seriously considers this
              aspect. Unfortunately, the wording of this clause is not
              happily or properly set.”
                                                                  (Emphasis supplied)
157. Shri P. Babul Reddy, Member of the Rajya Sabha from Andhra
     Pradesh, during the aforesaid discussion on the Bill remarked thus94: -
              “Then, I will point out one more defect. The Bill says, after
              ten years of detection they would be entitled to citizenship,
              not for ten years from detection. This starting point from
              “detection” is wrong. It must start from a particular date.
              Otherwise, it would lead to a lot of anomalies. The Hon.
              Minister may see the point I am making. Justice Baharul
              Islam, the Hon. Member, here has given the figure of
              5,66,000 people fall in category two, that is, those who
              came after 1966 but before 1971. So, the Tribunal has
              to enquire about these 5,66,000 people. They have to be
              detected, and then they have to be registered. From the
              date of registration their rights would start. They would
              have all the rights of citizenship for what time? For ten
              years. From what date? From the date of detection.
              Suppose, in one man’s case detection takes place in 1985
              and in another man’s case the detection takes place in


94   Session No. 136, Rajya Sabha Deb., Statement of Shri. P. Babul Reddy on The Citizenship (Amendment)
     Bill, 1985 at cols. 327-329 (Dec. 2, 1985).
1208                                                       [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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           1988. So, the 1988 man will have to wait for another ten
           years. So, it should not be from the date of detection.
           This is a great anomaly. I have not seen this having been
           pointed out. And I am sure, I am not running on a slippery
           ground. It means that about 6,66,000 people you have to
           make enquiries. The Tribunal will detect one man today,
           another man five years afterwards. Because there is delay
           in detection, why should that man suffer after ten years for
           another five years? So, this date should also be amended.
           It should be from a particular date. You can give one date.
           Irrespective of when detection takes place, he should
           have citizenship right from that date. In all seriousness I
           submit that this requires particular attention.”
                                                  (Emphasis supplied)
158. If the statutory construction that there is no time-limit within which
     the exercise of detection under Section 6A(3) is to be completed is
     accepted as correct, then it follows that an immigrant of the 1966-
     71 stream, upon detection, can avail the benefit of Section 6A(3)
     even today by following the procedure prescribed under the rules.
     Thus, it follows that an immigrant who would have entered in the
     1966-71 stream and who gets detected as a foreigner of the 1966-71
     stream today, can register with the registering authority and his or
     her name will then be struck off from the electoral rolls for a period
     of 10 years starting today.
159. Thus, an immigrant whose name figures in the electoral roll, despite
     being a foreigner, continues to be eligible to vote in the elections till
     that person is detected as a foreigner and the name of that person
     is struck off the electoral roll. There being no temporal limit to the
     applicability of Section 6A, this situation would continue in the years
     to come till the detection exercise is completed. Further, there
     would never be any way to assess if all the immigrants eligible for
     availing the benefit of citizenship under Section 6A(3) have done
     so, despite the set of people eligible for such a benefit being distinct
     and determinable. The object of Section 6A(3) of the Citizenship Act
     was never to permit the immigrants of the 1966-71 stream to vote
     for an indefinite period of time without first having been deleted from
     the electoral rolls for a period of ten years or without having been
     conferred de-jure citizenship in the first place.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                         1209

              In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


160. One another way of looking at the aforesaid is by the use of ‘time
     triggers.’ In the case of an immigrant of the pre-1966 stream, the
     date of coming into effect of Section 6A acts as the terminative time
     trigger with respect to the status of that person as an ‘illegal immigrant’
     and at the same time, it also acts as the allocative time trigger with
     respect to that person’s status as a citizen of India. That is, on the
     date of commencement of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 1985,
     such a person ceases to be an illegal immigrant and becomes a
     citizen in the eyes of the law as per the deeming fiction provided in
     Section 6A sub-section (2).
161. However, in the case of an immigrant belonging to the 1966-
     71 stream, the situation is much more complicated. Even after
     the commencement of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 1985,
     an immigrant belonging to this class continues to be an illegal
     immigrant till the date of his or her detection as a foreigner. This
     date of detection then becomes the allocative trigger, conferring
     upon such person a right to register. Subsequent and subject to
     registration, the immigrant then enjoys all the rights similar to that
     of a citizen except voting rights for a period of ten years from the
     date of detection as a foreigner. On expiry of the period of ten years
     from the date of detection, an allocative time trigger confers the
     status of de-jure citizenship on that person on the day the ten-year
     period comes to an end.
162. The consequence of devising a complex and deceptive mechanism
     under Section 6A(3) by the legislature is brought to daylight by virtue of
     the aforesaid analysis. While the object of Section 6A(3), as discussed
     elaborately in the preceding paragraphs, was to make conferment
     of citizenship a stricter affair as compared to Section 6A(2) and to
     facilitate the deletion of immigrants of the 1966-71 stream from the
     electoral rolls through the exercise of detection, however, the shifting
     of onus of detection on the state coupled with the absence of any
     temporal limit ensures that such an immigrant continues to stay on
     the electoral rolls and enjoy the rights of being a de-facto citizen till
     the time detection takes place, if it ever takes place.
163. Another corollary of the aforesaid is that in the absence of a temporal
     limit to the exercise of detection, the condition - ‘has been ordinarily
     resident in Assam since the date of entry’ stipulated under Section 6A
1210                                                         [2024] 10 S.C.R.

                              Digital Supreme Court Reports


      of the Citizenship Act, tethers the immigrants of the 1966-71 stream
      and incentivises them to continue to stay in Assam and not move
      out of Assam to any other place in or outside India, since that would
      potentially jeopardize their claim to citizenship under Section 6A. To
      illustrate, if an immigrant had entered into Assam from Bangladesh
      in the year 1970, but hasn’t been detected to be a foreigner till date,
      such a person would be incentivised to continue to stay in Assam
      indefinitely, pending his detection as a foreigner. I say so because
      an immigrant belonging to the 1966-71 stream becomes eligible for
      the conferment of citizenship only if, on the date of his detection as a
      foreigner, he is able to establish that he ‘has been ordinarily resident
      in Assam since the date of entry’. To further add to the absurdity of
      the provision, the requirement of ‘ordinarily resident’ also doesn’t
      have a prescribed temporal limit, meaning thereby an immigrant of
      the 1966-71 stream is left with no choice but to continue to reside
      in Assam till he or she happens to get detected as a foreigner.
164. Thus, the submission of the learned Attorney General that an immigrant
     once granted citizenship is free to move and settle in any part of the
     country doesn’t hold true for the immigrants falling under Section 6A(3).
     I say so because the date of conferment of citizenship is dependent
     on the date of ‘detection as a foreigner’ and the condition of ‘ordinarily
     resident in Assam’ both of which are mandatory in nature. Thus, an
     immigrant of the 1966-71 stream is left with no choice but to continue
     to reside in Assam till the detection exercise takes place.
165. In my considered opinion, the open-ended nature of Section 6A has,
     with the passage time, become more prone to abuse due to the
     advent of forged documents to establish, inter-alia, wrong date of
     entry into Assam, inaccurate lineage, falsified government records
     created by corrupt officials, dishonest corroboration of the date
     of entry by other relatives so as to aid illegal immigrants who are
     otherwise not eligible under Section 6A by virtue of having entered
     into Assam after 24.03.1971.
166. In a report submitted to the Indian Council for Social Science
     Research, 2016 titled “Cross Border Migration in Assam
     During 1951-2011: Process, Magnitude, and Socio-Economic
     Consequences” by Dr. Nandita Saikia & Dr. William Joe95, the


95   Saikia, supra note 65.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                           1211

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     problem of fake documents and corrupt officials was highlighted,
     and it was observed that many illegal immigrants were using forged
     documents to secure citizenship. The relevant observations are
     reproduced below: -
          “Corrupt police officers
          The entire problem of bribing and simultaneous political
          pressure cripples the police as well.
          Government is negligent in this case. Officials deny the
          presence of Bangladeshis for bribe. Even on complaining,
          the police come and report that the targets have run away
          and thus do not report their presence. This problem will
          not be solved. (Male, aged 50 years, Science teacher)
          Assam police Border personnel force is like milking cow...
          they can go, take money and…Our people are equally
          responsible; as a policeman, as mondal, hakim, general
          people as employer, we think about our own benefits.
          (Male, aged 67 years, retired Principal).
          The police therefore are seen to not co-operate with the
          locals and provide both direct and indirect support to the
          immigrants.
          Fake Documentation
          The whole problem of enumerating and estimating illegal
          immigrants in Assam exists because most illegal settlers
          possess legal documents. Therefore, it becomes very
          difficult to tell them apart from the legal citizens. And these
          legal documents are acquired by illegal means.
          Indigenous people in Assam are living in great fear. The
          immigrants are collecting the legal documents huge way.
          For example, consider my today’s experience: a birth
          certificate is shown to me which was signed on a date
          of 2009 but was printed in 2012. On the same page, the
          year of print was printed in very small fonts. As an officer,
          I send these kinds of certificates for review but it will be
          sent back to me as “no record is available”. Now I have
          two options: to file a criminal case which will take 7 to
          months... or to file an FIR. But at the end, everything will
1212                                                                          [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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              be managed by money … Also thousands of people are
              buying (Male, aged 34 years, ADC).
                                      xxx           xxx          xxx
              This is a racket known most commonly to locals, yet
              the government seems most unaware of. Therefore, it
              is this complex network of corruption that makes legal
              documents available to illegal settlers through illegal means
              to designate them as legal citizens with the right to vote
              and return benefits to the corrupt politicians.”
                                                                 (Emphasis supplied)
167. Thus, Section 6A without any end date of application, promotes
     further immigration into Assam – immigrants come hoping with forged
     documents96 to set up the defence of belonging to pre-1966 or the
     1966-71 stream upon identification as a foreigner and reference to
     the tribunal.
168. While the object that was sought to be achieved long back with the
     aid of the enactment of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act remained a
     distant dream, its misuse has only continued to increase with the efflux
     of time. I say so because with the passage of time, the government
     records would get damaged and perish making it increasingly difficult
     to cross-check the false claims that may be made by the immigrants
     of the post-1971 stream trying to misuse the benefits conferred
     exclusively to the immigrants of the pre-1971 stream.
169. It could be argued that the principle of temporal unreasonableness
     cannot be made applicable to a situation where the classification still
     remains relevant to the object sought to be achieved by the provision.
     However, as discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, the underlying
     object behind the creation of two distinct categories of immigrants
     under Section 6A of the Citizenship Act could have been achieved
     only if the exercise of detection of the immigrants of the 1966-71
     stream and their deletion from the electoral rolls was conducted in
     an en-masse and time-bound manner. However, the same having
     not been achieved as intended, I find no justification to hold that
     the classification made between the immigrants of the pre-1966 and


96   The Hindu Bureau, Assam plans action against people who forged documents to be in NRC, The Hindu,
     Dec. 10, 2023.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                          1213

              In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     1966-71 stream still remains relevant to the object of Section 6A. To
     allow Section 6A to continue indefinitely for all times to come would
     tantamount to taking a reductive and one-sided view of the historical
     context in which Section 6A came to be enacted, more particularly,
     that Section 6A sought to achieve a delicate balance between two
     competing interests.

     F.    Manifest Arbitrariness vis-à-vis Temporal Unreasonableness
170. Having discussed in detail the working mechanism and the object
     sought to be achieved by the enactment of Section 6A of the
     Citizenship Act, I shall now examine if the said section suffers from
     manifest arbitrariness.
171. It is settled law that even if a statutory provision fulfils the two-pronged
     test of reasonable classification and rational nexus with the object of
     enactment, it can still suffer from the vice of manifest arbitrariness
     and be violative of Article 14 if the provision may lead to differential
     application on similarly situated persons.
172. The test for manifest arbitrariness was laid down in Shayara Bano
     v. Union of India reported in (2017) 9 SCC 1, wherein it was held
     as follows:
           “101. It will be noticed that a Constitution Bench of this
           Court in Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v.
           Union of India [Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay)
           (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (1985) 1 SCC 641 : 1985 SCC
           (Tax) 121] stated that it was settled law that subordinate
           legislation can be challenged on any of the grounds
           available for challenge against plenary legislation. This
           being the case, there is no rational distinction between
           the two types of legislation when it comes to this ground
           of challenge under Article 14. The test of manifest
           arbitrariness, therefore, as laid down in the aforesaid
           judgments would apply to invalidate legislation as well
           as subordinate legislation under Article 14. Manifest
           arbitrariness, therefore, must be something done by
           the legislature capriciously, irrationally and/or without
           adequate determining principle. Also, when something
           is done which is excessive and disproportionate, such
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          legislation would be manifestly arbitrary. We are, therefore,
          of the view that arbitrariness in the sense of manifest
          arbitrariness as pointed out by us above would apply to
          negate legislation as well under Article 14.”
                                                 (Emphasis supplied)
173. In Cellular Operators Assn. of India v. Telecom Regulatory
     Authority of India reported in (2016) 7 SCC 703, it was held by this
     Court that in order to pass the scrutiny of Article 14, the provision
     under challenge must be shown to have been drafted as a result of
     intelligent care and deliberation.
174. From a perusal of the scheme of Section 6A sub-section (3), it is
     evident that the procedure prescribed therein leaves the possibility
     of differential application on similarly situated persons wide open.
     From any view of the matter, the way in which the provision is
     worded doesn’t effectively serve either the purpose of granting
     citizenship to the immigrants belonging to the 1966-71 category,
     nor does it effectively serve the object of the expeditious deletion
     of the same category of immigrants from the electoral rolls. On
     the contrary, as discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, Section
     6A, in the absence of any temporal limit to its application, with
     the efflux of time is rather counter-serving the object with which
     it was enacted.
175. The mechanism doesn’t permit an immigrant of the 1966-71 stream
     to voluntarily seek citizenship and such an immigrant has to wait,
     indefinitely, for a reference to be made to the foreigners tribunal.
176. Similarly, in the absence of any specified date for availing the
     benefit of citizenship under Section 6A sub-section (3), the object of
     expeditious deletion of immigrants from the electoral roll is not met.
177. Manifest arbitrariness also encompasses the aspect of temporal
     unreasonableness that a statute may acquire with the efflux of
     time. As was held by this Court in Joseph Shine v. Union of
     India reported in (2019) 3 SCC 39, the arbitrariness present in the
     mechanism devised under Section 6A has evidently been brought
     to light with efflux of time, and the provision can no longer serve the
     purpose with which it was enacted. The very objective of having a
     category of immigrants who are to be deleted from the electoral rolls
     for a period of ten years has disappeared with more than 40 years
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                          1215

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     having passed since the enactment of the provision. The relevant
     observations read as under: -
          “103. Further, the real heart of this archaic law discloses
          itself when consent or connivance of the married woman›s
          husband is obtained — the married or unmarried man
          who has sexual intercourse with such a woman, does
          not then commit the offence of adultery. This can only
          be on the paternalistic notion of a woman being likened
          to chattel, for if one is to use the chattel or is licensed to
          use the chattel by the “licensor”, namely, the husband,
          no offence is committed. Consequently, the wife who
          has committed adultery is not the subject-matter of the
          offence, and cannot, for the reason that she is regarded
          only as chattel, even be punished as an abettor. This is
          also for the chauvinistic reason that the third-party male
          has “seduced” her, she being his victim. What is clear,
          therefore, is that this archaic law has long outlived its
          purpose and does not square with today’s constitutional
          morality, in that the very object with which it was made has
          since become manifestly arbitrary, having lost its rationale
          long ago and having become in today’s day and age,
          utterly irrational. On this basis alone, the law deserves
          to be struck down, for with the passage of time, Article
          14 springs into action and interdicts such law as being
          manifestly arbitrary. That legislation can be struck down
          on the ground of manifest arbitrariness is no longer open
          to any doubt, as has been held by this Court in Shayara
          Bano v. Union of India [Shayara Bano v. Union of India
          (2017) 9 SCC 1 : (2017) 4 SCC (Civ) 277] …”
                                                 (Emphasis supplied)
178. In my considered opinion, the aforesaid departure of the scheme
     of Section 6A from the Constitutional and statutory framework and
     the prevalent international practice coupled with the absence of any
     temporal limits on the applicability of Section 6A has the effect of
     rendering it manifestly arbitrary and constitutionally invalid.
179. While the test of manifest arbitrariness entails a two-prong test
     which requires that first, there is a reasonable classification based
     on an intelligible differentia; and second that such classification
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     has a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by
     such classification. The test of temporal unreasonableness, on the
     other hand, would involve a further examination into whether the
     aforesaid two prongs have continued to remain relevant with the
     passage of time.
180. Thus, the test of temporal unreasonableness would require examining
     the provision in two different time frames – first, when the provision was
     enacted, and second when such provision comes to be challenged
     on the ground of temporal unreasonableness. Even if a provision
     passes the two-prong test in the first time-frame, it may still fail
     the test in the subsequent time-frame if the efflux of time renders
     either the classification, or the object sought to be achieved by such
     classification, or both as arbitrary and thus violative of Article 14
     of the Constitution. This could be said to be the third prong in the
     test of manifest arbitrariness under Article 14 as envisaged by the
     doctrine of temporal unreasonableness.

     G.    Damage Caused by the Scheme of Section 6A
181. From the discussion above, it can be seen that the mechanism by
     which the implementation of Section 6A is to take place is riddled by
     two serious problems – absence of a temporal limit as to the period
     of application, and shifting of the onus of identification and detection
     of an immigrant as a foreigner on the state.
182. In my view, the absurd and faulty mechanism that has been prescribed
     under Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, constitutes the genesis of
     the controversy before us. The legislature, instead of providing for a
     one-time process to avail the benefits of Section 6A to all those who
     are eligible has instead provided a process where each immigrant
     of the 1966-71 category has to be first identified and then referred
     to the foreigners tribunal. The tribunal is then required to determine
     in each individual case whether the person referred is an illegal
     migrant, his date of entry in Assam, whether he is entitled to any
     benefits under Section 6A, etc.
183. The determination by the foreigners tribunal in each individual
     case introduces judicial-element in the process of determination of
     nationality of suspected persons. However, I emphasize that the
     infirmity of Section 6A lies not in the judicial determination of the
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                          1217

                In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     status of each immigrant individually, but in the steps preceding such
     determination, that is, identifying suspected immigrants and referring
     them to the foreigners tribunal. The onus of referring suspected
     immigrants to the tribunal lying solely on the state; absence of any
     provision for self-declaration or registration by the immigrant; and
     absence of any time-limit during which the benefit of Section 6A
     may be availed – collectively have the effect of making the provision
     constitutionally invalid when subjected to the three-prong test of
     temporal unreasonableness as elucidated above.
184. The result of the aforesaid infirmity has been that, to this date, the
     benefit of Section 6A can be availed if an immigrant shows that he or
     she falls within Section 6A sub-sections (2) and (3). This has added
     another layer of complexity in the very detection process of illegal
     migrants, who have mingled amongst those who have legitimately
     availed the benefit under Section 6A.
185. Even a person who is otherwise not eligible under Section 6A can
     put-up a false claim that he or she is covered under Section 6A, and
     the foreigners tribunal would have to examine the legitimacy of the
     such a claim, thereby slowing down the entire process of detection
     and deportation in Assam.
186. We find substance in the submission of the petitioners that the
     stipulation of the condition ‘ordinarily resident in Assam’ created a
     vortex that attracted other illegal immigrants located in West Bengal
     or other bordering states also to come into Assam in the hope of
     securing citizenship, all because of the faulty mechanism coupled
     with poor implementation of conferring the benefit under Section 6A.
187. It is also pertinent to observe that the regime under the Citizenship
     Act has been made more stringent over the years by a slew of
     amendments. Significantly, the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2003
     introduced the definition of an ‘illegal immigrant’. The Statement of
     objects and reasons accompanying the Citizenship (Amendment)
     Bill, 2003, reads as under: -
          “[...] 2. The above objects are proposed to be achieved,
          inter alia, by amending provisions of the Citizenship Act
          so as to —
          (i)     make acquisition of Indian citizenship by registration
                  and naturalisation more stringent;
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          (ii)   prevent illegal migrants from becoming eligible
                 for Indian citizenship;
          (iii) simplify the procedure to facilitate the re-acquisition
                of Indian citizenship by persons of full age who are
                children of Indian citizens, and former citizens of
                independent India;
          (iv) provide for the grant of overseas citizenship of India
               to persons of Indian origin belonging to specified
               countries, and Indian citizens who choose to acquire
               the citizenship of any of these countries at a later date;
          (v)    provide for the compulsory registration and issue of
                 a national identity card to all citizens of India;
          (vi) enhance the penalty for violation of its provisions, as
               well as the rules framed under it; and
          (vii) to omit all provisions recognizing, or relating to the
                Commonwealth citizenship from the Act.”
                                                  (Emphasis supplied)
188. A perusal of the above would show that one of the objects of the
     2003 amendment to the Citizenship Act was to exclude illegal
     immigrants from the benefit of citizenship. Thus, while on the one
     hand the legislature has gradually moved towards a regime which
     bars illegal immigrant from the benefit of Indian citizenship, Section
     6A, on the other hand, continues to be present on the statute book
     endlessly, and owing to its abuse-prone and temporally unlimited
     mechanism, goes against the present-day statutory position and
     policy with regard to the illegal immigrants.
189. More than 38 years having elapsed since Section 6A came into
     effect, with the benefit of retrospect, we find force in the submission
     of the petitioners that Section 6A, which was meant to dispel and
     discourage incoming illegal immigrants, turned out to be a beacon
     for the illegal immigrants from Bangladesh to come into Assam, by
     taking advantage of the poor mechanism which is prone to open
     abuse. There can be no denying that the provision has far exceeded
     the time-limit within which it should have been made applicable, and
     has become vulnerable to misuse owing to the inherent arbitrariness,
     as pointed above.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                          1219

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


190. Assam Accord was a one-time political settlement, arrived at in the
     specific context of widespread violence and agitation in Assam. The
     extraordinary conditions existing in the years 1979-85 cannot provide
     a permanent and perennial ground for continuation of a manifestly
     arbitrary provision, which is uncertain and indeterminable owing to
     its sui-generis mechanism.
191. I shall now refer to the decision of a three-Judge Bench of this Court
     in Sarbananda Sonowal (supra), by which the IMDT Act was struck
     down. One of the primary reasons for which the IMDT Act was struck
     down was that this Court was of the view that instead of achieving
     the avowed object of the legislation, the IMDT Act was defeating the
     very purpose for which it was enacted. Relevant portions of the said
     decision are reproduced hereinbelow: -
          "70. As mentioned earlier, the influx of Bangladeshi
          nationals who have illegally migrated into Assam pose
          a threat to the integrity and security of North-Eastern
          region. Their presence has changed the demographic
          character of that region and the local people of Assam
          have been reduced to a status of minority in certain
          districts. In such circumstances, if Parliament had enacted
          a legislation exclusively for the State of Assam which
          was more stringent than the Foreigners Act, which is
          applicable to rest of India, and also in the State of Assam
          for identification of such persons who migrated from the
          territory of present Bangladesh between 1-1-1966 and
          24-3-1971, such a legislation would have passed the test
          of Article 14 as the differentiation so made would have
          had rational nexus with the avowed policy and objective
          of the Act. But the mere making of a geographical
          classification cannot be sustained where the Act instead
          of achieving the object of the legislation defeats the very
          purpose for which the legislation has been made. As
          discussed earlier, the provisions of the Foreigners Act
          are far more effective in identification and deportation of
          foreigners who have illegally crossed the international
          border and have entered India without any authority of
          law and have no authority to continue to remain in India.
          For satisfying the test of Article 14, the geographical factor
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          alone in making a classification is not enough but there
          must be a nexus with the objects sought to be achieved.
          If geographical consideration becomes the sole criterion
          completely overlooking the other aspect of “rational
          nexus with the policy and object of the Act” it would be
          open to the legislature to apply enactments made by it
          to any sub-division or district within the State and leaving
          others at its sweet will. This is not the underlying spirit or
          the legal principle on which Article 14 is founded. Since
          the classification made whereby the IMDT Act is made
          applicable only to the State of Assam has no rational
          nexus with the policy and object of the Act, it is clearly
          violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and is liable to
          be struck down on this ground also.”
                                                  (Emphasis supplied)
192. There have been various judgments of this Court wherein directions
     were issued for reconsideration of the impugned provision on the
     ground that with the passage of time, the provision had become
     temporally unreasonable and rather than fulfilling the object with
     which it was enacted, the same was proving to be counter-productive.
193. In Narottam Kishore Deb Varman v. Union of India, reported in
     (1964) 7 SCR 55, a five-Judge Bench of this Court was called upon
     to decide a batch of petitions challenging the validity of Section 87B
     of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The said section required
     that before a suit could be filed against a former ruler of a Princely
     State, prior sanction of the Union Government had to be obtained.
     This Court, relying upon its previous decision, stopped short from
     holding the provision as unconstitutional. However, it called upon
     the Government to examine if the provision was to be allowed to
     continue for all times. It further noted that Section 87B being a
     result of a political settlement reached between the Government
     and former rulers, its continuance forever was something that the
     Government ought to reconsider. The relevant observations read
     as under:
          "9. The legislative background to which we have referred
          cannot be divorced from the historical background which is
          to be found for instance, in Article 362. This article provides
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                           1221

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


          that in the exercise of the power of Parliament or of any
          legislature of any State to make laws or in the exercise
          of the executive power of the Union or of a State, due
          regard shall be had to the guarantee or assurance given
          under any such covenant or agreement as is referred to in
          clause (1) of Article 291 with respect to the personal rights,
          privileges and dignities of a Ruler of an Indian State. This
          has reference to the covenants and agreements which
          had been entered into between the Central Government
          and the Indian Princes before all the Indian States were
          politically completely assimilated with the rest of India.
          The privileges conferred on the Rulers of former Indian
          States has its origin in these agreements and covenants.
          One of the privileges is that of extra-territoriality and
          exemption from civil jurisdiction except with the sanction of
          the Central Government. It was thought that the privilege
          which was claimed by foreign Rulers and Rulers of Indian
          States prior to the independence was attained and the
          States had become part of India, and that is how in 1951,
          the Civil Procedure Code was amended and the present
          Sections 86, 87, 87-A and 87-B came to be enacted in
          the present form.
          10. Considered in the light of this background, it is difficult
          to see how the petitioners can successfully challenge
          the validity of the provisions contained in Section 87-B.
          In the case of Mohan Lal Jain [(1962) 1 SCR 702] this
          Court has held that the ex-Rulers of Indian States form
          a class by themselves and the special treatment given
          to them by the impugned provisions cannot be said to
          be based on unconstitutional discrimination. There is, of
          course, discrimination between the ex-Rulers and the rest
          of the citizens of India, but that discrimination is justified
          having regard to the historical and legislative background
          to which we have just referred. If that be so, it would
          follow that the restriction imposed on the petitioners’
          fundamental right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(f) cannot
          be said to be unreasonable. The restriction in question
          is the result of the necessity to treat the agreements
          entered into between the Central Government and the
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        ex-Rulers of Indian States as valid and the desirability
        of giving effect to the assurances given to them during
        the course of negotiations between the Indian States
        and the Central Government prior to the merger of the
        States with India. We have to take into account the
        events which occurred with unprecedented swiftness
        after 15th August, 1947 and we have to bear in mind
        the fact that the relevant negotiations carried on by the
        Central Government were inspired by the sole object of
        bringing under one Central Government the whole of this
        country including the former Indian States. Considered
        in the context of these events, we do not think it would
        be possible to hold that the specific provision made by
        Section 87-B granting exemption to the Rulers of former
        Indian States from being sued except with the sanction
        of the Central Government, is not reasonable and is not
        in the interests of the general public. It is true that the
        restriction works a hardship so far as the petitioners are
        concerned; but balancing the said hardship against the
        other considerations to which we have just referred, it
        would be difficult to sustain the argument that the section
        itself should be treated as unconstitutional.
        11. Before we part with this matter, however, we would
        like to invite the Central Government to consider seriously
        whether it is necessary to allow Section 87-B to operate
        prospectively for all time. The agreements made with
        the Rulers of Indian States may, no doubt, have to be
        accepted and the assurances given to them may have to
        be observed. But considered broadly in the light of the basic
        principle of the equality before law, it seems somewhat
        odd that Section 87-B should continue to operate for all
        time. For past dealings and transactions, protection may
        justifiably be given to Rulers of former Indian States; but
        the Central Government may examine the question as to
        whether for transactions subsequent to 26th of January,
        1950, this protection need or should be continued. If
        under the Constitution all citizens are equal, it may be
        desirable to confine the operation of Section 87-B to past
        transactions and not to perpetuate the anomaly of the
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                         1223

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


          distinction between the rest of the citizens and Rulers
          of former Indian States. With the passage of time, the
          validity of historical considerations on which Section 87-B
          is founded will wear out and the continuance of the said
          section in the Code of Civil Procedure may later be open
          to serious challenge.”
                                                (Emphasis supplied)
194. In H.H. Shri Swamiji of Shri Amar Mutt v. Commr., Hindu
     Religious and Charitable Endowments Deptt., reported in (1979)
     4 SCC 642, a five-Judge Bench of this Court was called upon to
     determine the constitutionality of applicability of the Madras Hindu
     Religious Charitable Endowments Act to the South Kanara district.
     The South Kanara district, which was formerly a part of the State
     of Madras, became a part of the State of Mysore as a result of the
     reorganisation of states on 01.11.1956 and by reason of Section
     119 of the States Reorganisation Act, the Madras Hindu Religious
     and Charitable Endowments Act continued to apply to South Kanara
     notwithstanding the fact that it was no longer a part of the State of
     Madras. The appellants urged that the application of the Madras
     Act to only one district of the State of Karnataka offended Article
     14. The Court held that even after passage of 23 years, no serious
     attempts were made to remove the inequality between the South
     Kanara district and other districts of the State of Karnataka. The
     relevant observations read as under:
          “31. But that is how the matter stands today. Twenty-three
          years have gone by since the States Reorganisation Act
          was passed but unhappily, no serious effort has been
          made by the State Legislature to introduce any legislation
          — apart from two abortive attempts in 1963 and 1977 —
          to remove the inequality between the temples and Mutts
          situated in the South Kanara District and those situated in
          other areas of Karnataka. Inequality is so clearly writ large
          on the face of the impugned statute in its application to
          the district of South Kanara only, that it is perilously near
          the periphery of unconstitutionality. We have restrained
          ourselves from declaring the law as inapplicable to the
          district of South Kanara from today but we would like to
          make it clear that if the Karnataka Legislature does not
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          act promptly and remove the inequality arising out of the
          application of the Madras Act of 1951 to the district of
          South Kanara only, the Act will have to suffer a serious
          and successful challenge in the not distant future. We do
          hope that the Government of Karnataka will act promptly
          and move an appropriate legislation, say, within a year
          or so. A comprehensive legislation which will apply to all
          temples and Mutts in Karnataka, which are equally situated
          in the context of the levy of fee, may perhaps afford a
          satisfactory solution to the problem. This, however, is a
          tentative view-point because we have not investigated
          whether the Madras Act of 1951, particularly Section 76(1)
          thereof, is a piece of hostile legislation of the kind that
          would involve the violation of Article 14. Facts in regard
          thereto may have to be explored, if and when occasion
          arises.”
                                                (Emphasis supplied)
195. This Court, has on many occasions, struck down provisions for
     having become temporally unreasonable, that is, for having become
     obsolete and discriminatory with the passage of time.
196. In Motor General Traders v. State of A.P., reported in (1984) 1 SCC
     222, a two-Judge Bench of this Court was examining the validity of
     Section 32(b) of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control
     Act, 1960. The impugned provision exempted all buildings constructed
     after 26.08.1957 from the application of the said Act. This Court held
     that a temporary exemption having nexus with the object of the Act
     to promote new builders had become obsolete with the passage of
     time, and was acting in the form of a permanent bonanza without any
     rational basis. The Bench proceeded to strike down the impugned
     provision. The relevant observations read as under:
          "24. It is argued that since the impugned provision has been
          in existence for over twenty-three years and its validity has
          once been upheld by the High Court, this Court should not
          pronounce upon its validity at this late stage. There are
          two answers to this proposition. First, the very fact that
          nearly twenty-three years are over from the date of the
          enactment of the impugned provision and the discrimination
          is allowed to be continued unjustifiably for such a long time
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                          1225

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


          is a ground of attack in these cases. As already observed,
          the landlords of the buildings constructed subsequent to
          August 26, 1957 are given undue preference over the
          landlords of buildings constructed prior to that date in
          that the former are free from the shackles of the Act while
          the latter are subjected to the restrictions imposed by it.
          What should have been just an incentive has become a
          permanent bonanza in favour of those who constructed
          buildings subsequent to August 26, 1957. There being no
          justification for the continuance of the benefit to a class
          of persons without any rational basis whatsoever, the evil
          effects flowing from the impugned exemption have caused
          more harm to the society than one could anticipate. What
          was justifiable during a short period has turned out to be a
          case of hostile discrimination by lapse of nearly a quarter
          of century. The second answer to the above contention is
          that mere lapse of time does not lend constitutionality to
          a provision which is otherwise bad. “Time does not run
          in favour of legislation. If it is ultra vires, it cannot gain
          legal strength from long failure on the part of lawyers to
          perceive and set up its invalidity. Albeit, lateness in an
          attack upon the constitutionality of a statute is but a reason
          for exercising special caution in examining the arguments
          by which the attack is supported. [See W.A. Wynes :
          Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers in Australia, Fifth
          Edition, p 33] We are constrained to pronounce upon the
          validity of the impugned provision at this late stage because
          the garb of constitutionality which it may have possessed
          earlier has become worn out and its unconstitutionality is
          now brought to a successful challenge.”
                                                 (Emphasis supplied)
197. In Satyawati Sharma (supra) a two-Judge Bench of this Court was
     examining the constitutional validity of Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi
     Rent Control Act, 1958. This Court partly read down the provision
     on the ground that the blanket protection from eviction given to
     tenants of non-residential buildings, with the passage of time, had
     become unreasonable and was liable to be taken away. The relevant
     observations read as under: -
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           "32. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite
           reasonable and rational at the time of its enactment
           may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of
           circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and
           violative of the doctrine of equality and even if the validity
           of such legislation may have been upheld at a given
           point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation,
           strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of
           classification has become non-existent. In State of M.P.
           v. Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. [AIR 1964 SC 1179] this
           Court while dealing with a question whether geographical
           classification due to historical reasons could be sustained
           for all times observed : (AIR p. 1182, para 6)
                "6. ... Differential treatment arising out of the
                application of the laws so continued in different regions
                of the same reorganised State, did not, therefore
                immediately attract the clause of the Constitution
                prohibiting discrimination. But by the passage of
                time, considerations of necessity and expediency
                would be obliterated, and the grounds which justified
                classification of geographical regions for historical
                reasons may cease to be valid. A purely temporary
                provision which because of compelling forces justified
                differential treatment when the Reorganisation Act was
                enacted cannot obviously be permitted to assume
                permanency, so as to perpetuate that treatment without
                a rational basis to support it after the initial expediency
                and necessity have disappeared.””
                                                   (Emphasis supplied)

     H.    Doctrine of Prospective Overruling
198. The doctrine of prospective overruling was originally developed by
     American jurists. This doctrine was first applied in an Indian context in
     I.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1967 SC 1643.
     It was decided by this Court therein that the power of amendment
     under Article 368 of the Constitution did not allow the Parliament
     to abridge the fundamental rights contained in the Part III of the
     Constitution. However, while holding thus, this Court made the
     decision operative with prospective effect.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                          1227

              In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


199. The decision was given prospective effect in recognition of the fact
     that from the coming into force of the Constitution upto the date
     of the decision in Golak Nath (supra), the Parliament had in fact
     exercised the power of amendment in a way which, as per the
     decision in Golak Nath (supra), was void. This Court observed that
     if retrospectivity were to be given to the decision, it would introduce
     chaos and unsettled conditions in the country. On the other hand,
     this Court also recognized that such a possibility of chaos might be
     preferable to the alternative of a totalitarian rule. This Court, therefore,
     sought to evolve a reasonable principle to meet the extraordinary
     situation. The reasonable principle which was evolved was the
     doctrine of prospective overruling.
200. The decision in Golak Nath (supra) was overruled by subsequent
     decision in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala reported in
     (1973) 4 SCC 225. However, the observations of this Court regarding
     the evolution of the doctrine of prospective overruling, which hold to
     this day, are as follows:
           "45. There are two doctrines familiar to American
           Jurisprudence, one is described as Blackstonian theory
           and the other as “prospective over-ruling” which may
           have some relevance to the present enquiry. Blackstone
           in his Commentaries, 69 (15th Edn., 1809) stated the
           common law rule that the duty of the Court was “not to
           pronounce a new rule but to maintain and expound the
           old one”. It means the Judge does not make law but
           only discovers or finds the true law. The law has always
           been the same. If a subsequent decision changes the
           earlier one, the latter decision does not make law but only
           discovers the correct principle of law. The result of this
           view is that it is necessarily retrospective in operation.
           But Jurists, George F. Canfield, Robert Hill Freeman,
           John Henry Wigmore and Cardozo have expounded the
           doctrine of “prospective over-ruling” and suggested it as
           “a useful judicial tool”. In the words of Canfield the said
           expression means:
                 “… a court should recognize a duty to announce a
                 new and better rule for future transactions whenever
                 the court has reached the conviction that on old rule
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             (as established by the precedents) is unsound even
             though feeling compelled by stare decisis to apply
             the old and condemned rule to the instance case
             and to transactions which had already taken place”.
        Cardozo, before he became a Judge of the Supreme Court
        of the United States of America, when he was the Chief
        Justice of New York State addressing the Bar Association
        said thus:
             “The rule (the Blackstonian rule) that we are asked
             to apply is out of tune with the life about us. It has
             been made discordant by the forces that generate a
             living law. We apply it to this case because the repeal
             might work hardship to those who have trusted to
             its existence. We give notice however that any one
             trusting to it hereafter will do at his peril.”
        The Supreme Court of the United States of America in the
        year 1932, after Cardozo became an Associate Justice
        of that Court in Great Northern Railway v. Sunburst Oil &
        Ref. Co. [(1932) 287 US 358, 366 : 77 LEd 360], applied
        the said doctrine to the facts of that case. In that case the
        Montana Court had adhered to its previous construction
        of the statute in question but had announced that that
        interpretation would not be followed in the future. It was
        contended before the Supreme Court of the United States
        of America that a decision of a court overruling earlier
        decision and not giving its ruling retroactive operation
        violated the due process clause of the 14th Amendment.
        Rejecting that plea, Cardozo said:
             “This is not a case where a Court in overruling
             an earlier decision has come to the new ruling of
             retroactive dealing and thereby has made invalid
             what was followed in the doing. Even that may
             often be done though litigants not infrequently have
             argued to the contrary…. This is a case where a
             Court has refused to make its ruling retroactive,
             and the novel stand is taken that the Constitution
             of the United States is infringed by the refusal. We
             think that the Federal Constitution has no voice
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                          1229

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


                upon the subject. A state in defining the elements of
                adherence to precedent may make a choice for itself
                between the principle of forward operation and that
                of relation backward. It may be so that the decision
                of the highest courts, though later overruled, was
                law nonetheless for intermediate transactions…. On
                the other hand, it may hold to the ancient dogma
                that the law declared by its Courts had a platonic or
                ideal existence before the act of declaration, in which
                event, the discredited declaration will be viewed as
                if it had never been and to reconsider declaration as
                law from the beginning……The choice for any state
                may be determined by the juristic philosophy of the
                Judges of her Courts, their considerations of law, its
                origin and nature.”
          The opinion of Cardozo tried to harmonize the doctrine of
          prospective over-ruling with that of stare decisis.

                     xxx              xxx                 xxx
          47. Though English Courts in the past accepted the
          Blackstonian theory and though the House of Lords
          strictly adhered to the doctrine of ‘precedent’ in the earlier
          years, both the doctrines were practically given up by the
          “Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent)” issued by the
          House of Lords, recorded in (1966) 1 WLR 1234. Lord
          Gardiner L.C., speaking for the House of Lords made the
          following observations;
                “Their Lordships nevertheless recognise that too rigid
                adherence to precedent may lead to injustice in a
                particular case and also unduly restrict the proper
                development of the law. They propose, therefore,
                to modify their present practice and, while treating
                former decisions of this House as normally binding,
                to depart from a previous decision when it appears
                right to do so.
                In this connection they will bear in mind the danger of
                disturbing retrospectively the basis on which contracts,
                settlements of property and fiscal arrangements have
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             been entered into and also the especial need for
             certainty as to the criminal law.
             The announcement is not intended to affect the use
             of precedent elsewhere than in this House.”
             It will be seen from this passage that the House of
             Lords hereafter in appropriate cases may depart from
             its previous decision when it appears right to do so and
             in so departing will bear in mind the danger of giving
             effect to the said decision retroactivity. We consider
             that what the House of Lords means by this statement
             is that in differing from the precedents it will do so only
             without interfering with the transactions that had taken
             place on the basis of earlier decisions. This decision,
             to a large extent, modifies the Blackstonian theory
             and accepts, though not expressly but by necessary
             implication the doctrine of “prospective overruling.”

                xxx                 xxx                  xxx
        49. It is a modern doctrine suitable for a fast moving society.
        It does not do away with the doctrine of stare decisis, but
        confines it to past transactions. It is true that in one sense
        the court only declares the law, either customary or statutory
        or personal law. While in strict theory it may be said that
        the doctrine involves making of law, what the court really
        does is to declare the law but refuses to give retroactivity
        to it. It is really a pragmatic solution reconciling the two
        conflicting doctrines, namely, that a court finds law and
        that it does make law. It finds law but restricts its operation
        to the future. It enables the court to bring about a smooth
        transition by correcting its errors without disturbing the
        impact of those errors on the past transactions. It is left
        to the discretion of the court to prescribe the limits of the
        retroactivity and thereby it enables it to mould the relief
        to meet the ends of justice.
        50. In India there is no statutory prohibition against the
        court refusing to give retroactivity to the law declared
        by it. Indeed, the doctrine of res judicata precludes any
        scope for retroactivity in respect of a subject-matter that
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                        1231

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


          has been finally decided between the parties. Further,
          Indian Courts by interpretation reject retroactivity to
          statutory provisions though couched in general terms
          on the ground that they affect vested rights. The present
          case only attempts a further extension of the said rule
          against retroactivity.
          51. Our Constitution does not expressly or by necessary
          implication speak against the doctrine of prospective
          overruling. Indeed, Articles 32, 141 and 142 are couched
          in such wide and elastic terms as to enable this Court to
          formulate legal doctrines to meet the ends of justice. The
          only limitation thereon is reason, restraint and injustice.
          Under Article 32, for the enforcement of the fundamental
          rights the Supreme Court has the power to issue suitable
          directions or orders or writs. Article 141 says that the law
          declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all
          courts; and Article 142 enables it in the exercise of its
          jurisdiction to pass such decree or make such order as
          is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or
          matter pending before it. These articles are designedly
          made comprehensive to enable the Supreme Court to
          declare law and to give such directions or pass such
          orders as are necessary to do complete justice. The
          expression “declared” is wider than the words “found or
          made”. To declare is to announce opinion. Indeed, the latter
          involves the process, while the former expresses result.
          Interpretation, ascertainment and evolution are parts of the
          process, while that interpreted, ascertained or evolved is
          declared as law. The law declared by the Supreme Court
          is the law of the land. If so, we do not see any acceptable
          reason why it, in declaring the law in supersession of the
          law declared by it earlier, could not restrict the operation
          of the law as declared to future and save the transactions,
          whether statutory or otherwise that were effected on the
          basis of the earlier law. To deny this power to the Supreme
          Court on the basis of some outmoded theory that the Court
          only finds law but does not make it is to make ineffective
          the powerful instrument of justice placed in the hands of
          the highest judiciary of this country.
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          52. As this Court for the first time has been called upon
          to apply the doctrine evolved in a different country under
          different circumstances, we would like to move warily
          in the beginning. We would lay down the following
          propositions : (1) The doctrine of prospective overruling
          can be invoked only in matters arising under our
          Constitution; (2) it can be applied only by the highest
          Court of the country i.e. the Supreme Court as it has
          the constitutional jurisdiction to declare law binding on
          all the courts in India; (3) the scope of the retroactive
          operation of the law declared by the Supreme Court
          superseding its “earlier decisions is left to its discretion
          to be moulded in accordance with the justice of the
          cause or matter before it.”
                                                  (Emphasis supplied)
201. Although the doctrine of “prospective overruling” has been drawn
     from American jurisprudence, yet this Court, through its decisions,
     has imbued it with indigenous characteristics. The parameters of
     the power concerned were sought to be laid down in Golak Nath
     (supra) itself wherein it was observed: -
          “52. As this Court for the first time has been called upon
          to apply the doctrine evolved in a different country under
          different circumstances, we would like to move warily in the
          beginning. We would lay down the following propositions :
          (1) The doctrine of prospective over-ruling can be invoked
          only in matters arising under our Constitution;
          (2) It can be applied only by the highest court of the
          country, i.e., the Supreme Court as it has the constitutional
          jurisdiction to declare law binding on all the courts in India;
          (3) the scope of the retroactive operation of the law declared
          by the Supreme Court superseding its earlier decisions is
          left to its discretion to be moulded in accordance with the
          justice of the cause or matter before it.”
202. This doctrine was also applied by this Court in the case of Synthetics
     and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of UP (supra). In the said case
     originally, this Court in State of UP v. Synthetics and Chemicals
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                             1233

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     Ltd. reported in (1980) 2 SCC 441, had upheld the validity of the
     State legislature to impose tax on industrial alcohol.
203. Subsequently, this matter was referred to a Seven-Judge Bench, by
     the 2nd Synthetics Case, and this Court struck down the validity of
     the provisions of the said Act, permitting levy of excise duty in the
     form of vend fee, prospectively.
204. The significance of the prospective overruling was dealt with by a
     five- Judge Bench of this Court in Somaiya Organics (India) Ltd.
     & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Anr. (supra). This Court had elaborated
     upon the term “prospective overruling” as follows: -
          “24. The word “prospective overruling” implies an earlier
          judicial decision on the same issue which was otherwise
          final. That is how it was understood in Golak Nath
          [AIR 1967 SC 1643 : (1967) 2 SCR 762] . However, this
          Court has used the power even when deciding on an
          issue for the first time. Thus in India Cement Ltd. v. State
          of T.N. [(1990) 1 SCC 12] when this Court held that the
          cess sought to be levied under Section 115 of the Madras
          Panchayats Act, 1958 as amended by Madras Act 18 of
          1964, was unconstitutional, not only did it restrain the
          State of Tamil Nadu from enforcing the same any further,
          it also directed that the State would not be liable for any
          refund of cess already paid or collected.
          25. This direction was considered in Orissa Cement Ltd. v.
          State of Orissa [1991 Supp (1) SCC 430] at p. 498 where
          it was held that: (SCC para 69)
                "The declaration regarding the invalidity of a provision
                and the determination of the relief that should be
                granted in consequence thereof are two different things
                and, in the latter sphere, the court has, and must be
                held to have, a certain amount of discretion. It is a
                well-settled proposition that it is open to the court to
                grant, mould or restrict the relief in a manner most
                appropriate to the situation before it in such a way as
                to advance the interests of justice. It will be appreciated
                that it is not always possible in all situations to give
                a logical and complete effect to a finding.”
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        26. Again in Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan
        [(1991) 1 SCC 588 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 612 : (1991) 16
        ATC 505] it was held that non-furnishing of a copy of
        the enquiry report to an employee amounted to violation
        of the principles of natural justice and any disciplinary
        action taken without furnishing such report was liable
        to be set aside. However, it was made clear that the
        decision would have prospective application so that no
        punishment already imposed would be open to challenge
        on this count. (See also Managing Director, ECIL v. B.
        Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 :
        (1993) 25 ATC 704] .)
        27. In the ultimate analysis, prospective overruling, despite
        the terminology, is only a recognition of the principle that
        the court moulds the reliefs claimed to meet the justice
        of the case — justice not in its logical but in its equitable
        sense. As far as this country is concerned, the power has
        been expressly conferred by Article 142 of the Constitution
        which allows this Court to “pass such decree or make
        such order as is necessary for doing complete justice
        in any cause or matter pending before it”. In exercise of
        this power, this Court has often denied the relief claimed
        despite holding in the claimants’ favour in order to do
        “complete justice”.
        28. Given this constitutional discretion, it was perhaps
        unnecessary to resort to any principle of prospective
        overruling, a view which was expressed in Narayanibai v.
        State of Maharashtra [(1969) 3 SCC 468] at p. 470 and in
        Ashok Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P. [(1997) 5 SCC 201 :
        1997 SCC (L&S) 1299] In the latter case, while dealing
        with the “doctrine of prospective overruling”, this Court
        said that it was a method evolved by the courts to adjust
        competing rights of parties so as to save transactions
        “whether statutory or otherwise, that were effected by the
        earlier law”. According to this Court, it was a rule
             “…of judicial craftsmanship with pragmatism and
             judicial statesmanship as a useful outline to bring
             about smooth transition of the operation of law
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                           1235

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


                without unduly affecting the rights of the people who
                acted upon the law operated prior to the date of the
                judgment overruling the previous law”.
          Ultimately, it is a question of this Court’s discretion and
          is, for this reason, relatable directly to the words of the
          Court granting the relief.

                     xxx               xxx                 xxx
          32. The doctrine of prospective overruling was applied
          in Belsund Sugar Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar [(1999) 9
          SCC 620] . The question which arose for consideration
          there was whether market fee could be levied under the
          Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960 in respect
          to transactions of purchase of sugarcane, sugar and
          molasses by sugar mills. In view of the provisions of the
          Bihar Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act,
          1981 read with the Sugar (Control) Order, 1966 issued
          under the Essential Commodities Act, it was held that
          the provisions of the Sugarcane Act and the Sugarcane
          Order, on the one hand, and the Bihar Market Act on the
          other could not operate harmoniously and, therefore, the
          Sugarcane Act and the Sugarcane Order prevailed over
          the Market Act. It was then contended that the appellants
          therein should be allowed to get refund of the market fee
          which they had paid under the Market Act subject to their
          showing that they had not passed on the burden on the
          principle of unjust enrichment. Dealing with the above
          contentions, it was observed as follows: (SCC pp. 667- 68,
          paras 112-13)
                “112. Under these circumstances, keeping in view the
                peculiar facts and circumstances of these cases, we
                deem it fit to direct in exercise of our powers under
                Article 142 of the Constitution of India that the present
                decision will have only a prospective effect. Meaning
                thereby that after the pronouncement of this judgment
                all future transactions of purchase of sugarcane by
                the sugar factories concerned in the market areas as
                well as the sale of manufactured sugar and molasses
1236                                                      [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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                produced therefrom by utilising this purchased
                sugarcane by these factories will not be subjected
                to the levy of market fee under Section 27 of the
                Market Act by the Market Committees concerned.
                All past transactions up to the date of this judgment
                which have suffered the levy of market fee will not be
                covered by this judgment and the collected market
                fees on these past transactions prior to the date of
                this judgment will not be required to be refunded to
                any of the sugar mills which might have paid these
                market fees.””
                                                 (Emphasis supplied)
205. Taking a clue from the above referred decisions, it could be said
     that this Court has been endowed with the power to mould the relief
     so as to do complete justice in a given situation, and to avoid the
     possibility of chaos and confusion that may be caused in the society
     at large. In the present case, a number of immigrants who came into
     the State of Assam from Bangladesh, have already been conferred
     with citizenship under Section 6A of the Citizenship Act. Further, as
     discussed, the unconstitutionality of Section 6A is attributable to the
     efflux of time.
206. Section 6A being manifestly arbitrary, temporally unreasonable
     and, demonstrably unconstitutional cannot be allowed to continue
     for all times to come. Hence, in my opinion it would be appropriate
     to declare Section 6A as unconstitutional with prospective
     effect. This would ensure that the benefit which has already
     been derived by the immigrants in Assam is not taken away, more
     particularly when the challenge to Section 6A has been made after
     a considerable delay.

     VI.   CONCLUSION
207. The distinction drawn between the State of Assam and other states
     for the grant of citizenship to immigrants was on the basis of special
     circumstances prevailing in Assam at the time of enactment of Section
     6A. Section 6A was a statutory codification of a political settlement
     reached between the Government and the people of Assam and thus
     was not violative of the equality clause enshrined under Article 14
     at the time of its enactment in 1985.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                         1237

              In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


208. However, Section 6A has acquired unconstitutionality with the efflux
     of time. The efflux of time has brought to light the element of manifest
     arbitrariness in the scheme of Section 6A(3) which fails to provide
     a temporal limit to its applicability.
209. The prescribed mechanism also shifts the burden of detection of a
     foreigner solely on the State, thus, counter-serving the very purpose
     for which the provision was enacted, that is, the expedient detection
     of immigrants belonging to the 1966-71 stream, their deletion from
     the electoral rolls, and conferment of de-jure citizenship only upon
     the expiry of ten-years.
210. Justice Surya Kant has said in so many words that although
     Section 6A might not have been constitutionally invalid from its
     inception, yet the possibility of the provision incurring such invalidity
     anytime in future should not be ruled out. In light of the discussion
     in the foregoing paragraphs, I am of the clear view that Section 6A
     suffers from the vice of manifest arbitrariness on account of the
     “systematic failure of the legislative vision”, if I may put it in the very
     words of my learned brother.
211. Justice Surya Kant has also acknowledged the fact that despite
     the enactment of Section 6A, the influx of illegal immigrants into
     the State of Assam did not abate after 1985. He has relied upon
     the report published by the then Governor of Assam in 1998, to
     underscore that there are hordes of immigrants who have illegally
     entered Assam and are residing there. However, the ultimate view
     taken by him is that such illegal immigration cannot be attributed to
     Section 6A which is limited in its ambit and does not by itself create
     unabated immigration. As discussed earlier, Section 6A owing to its
     inherent problems of absence of temporal limit and the sole onus
     of detection upon the State, has indeed resulted in the influx and
     continued presence of illegal immigrants into the State of Assam,
     to this date.
212. One another issue on which I would like to respectfully disagree
     with Justice Surya Kant pertains to the fundamental premise
     that Section 6A aligns with the fundamental purpose of Articles 6
     and 7 respectively of the Constitution – that is, Section 6A also
     confers citizenship rights on those affected by the partition of India.
     However, a careful perusal of Section 6A vis-à-vis Articles 6 and 7
     respectively would reveal that despite a few similarities between the
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     two, the crucial difference lies in the fact that in Article 6, the onus
     of registration for a person seeking citizenship lies on that person
     and not on the State. Additionally, all those persons who migrated
     to India from Pakistan after 19.07.1948, had to make an application
     before the commencement of the Constitution. The permit system
     which was introduced as per Article 7 was also brought to an end
     in 1952 as discussed in the foregoing paragraphs. However, as
     discussed, both these conditions i.e., the onus of registration as
     well as the specification of a cut-off date till which such applications
     could have been made are absent from the very scheme of Section
     6A. Seen in the context of temporal unreasonableness, this glaring
     absence renders the scheme of Section 6A arbitrary and as a result
     unconstitutional.
213. Justice Surya Kant has emphasized on the importance of
     distinguishing between the prescribed mechanism under the
     provisions of Section 6A and its actual implementation. After
     examining the mechanism prescribed under Section 6A, he has
     held that when Section 6A is read with the complimentary statutes
     more particularly, the Foreigners Act, 1946, Passport Act, 1967,
     IEAA, 1950 and the Foreigners (Tribunals Order), 1964, the same
     is adequate and sufficient to address the issue of illegal immigration
     into Assam. However, the ultimate conclusion drawn by him is that
     despite of there being sufficient measures, the problem of illegal
     immigration has persisted in Assam till this date because of the
     inadequacies in Section 6A and its faulty implementation. I am of
     the view, that the inadequate implementation of Section 6A(3) of
     the Act is inextricably linked to the fallacious mechanism that has
     been prescribed under it.
214. Justice Surya Kant in paragraph 298 of his judgment, has observed
     that by virtue of Article 19(1)(e), Section 6A does not compel
     pre-1971 immigrants to keep residing in the territory of Assam once
     they have obtained citizenship thereunder. While the aforesaid may
     be true for the immigrants belonging to the pre-1966 stream who
     were conferred citizenship automatically, and thus became citizens
     of India for all purposes from the date of commencement of Section
     6A itself, the same does not hold true for the immigrants belonging
     to the 1966-71 category. I say so, because, in the absence of any
     temporal limit, within which all immigrants belonging to the 1966-71
     category are to be detected, deleted and registered as citizens, the
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                     1239

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     immigrants of this category are tethered to the territory of Assam,
     so as to satisfy the criteria of “ordinarily resident in Assam” on the
     date when they eventually happen to get detected.
215. Lastly, Justice Surya Kant, in paragraph 304, has observed that
     Section 6A when read along with the larger statutory regime
     surrounding citizenship and immigration, has mandated timely
     detection and deportation of illegal immigrants. In my view, although
     the mandate of timely detection and deportation of illegal immigrants
     was the fundamental premise on which the Assam Accord was signed,
     yet, this intention recorded in the Accord, was never translated
     statutorily, due to a faulty mechanism prescribed under Section 6A(3),
     either due to inadvertence or advertence of the legislature.
216. Before, I proceed to draw my final conclusion, I must refer to R.W.M.
     Dias’s “Jurisprudence” Fifth Edition Chapter 15. Dias says that one
     of the tasks in the achievement of justice is adapting to change.
     Just as consonance with accepted ideas is an inducement to obey,
     so also when these change, tensions arise between the law on the
     one hand, and needs and outlook on the other, and there is then an
     inducement to ignore the law or to disobey. Failure to use power to
     adapt to change is, in its own way, an abuse of power. The issue is
     thus not one of change or no change, but of the direction and speed
     of change. According to Dias, no society is static. Changes develop
     gradually over the years in practically every sphere brought about
     by evolution in environmental, economic and political circumstances,
     national and global, as well as in religious and moral ideas. In the
     words of Dias “…They may occur slowly or rapidly; they may be
     ephemeral as with passing fashions, or permanent. What happens
     is that practices evolve which influence the ways in which laws
     actually operate, e.g. trade practices. When the behaviour of
     people has moved away from the law with a sufficient degree of
     permanence, tensions arise with varying results. The law itself
     may be stretched to take account of the development, or it may be
     ignored until it becomes a dead letter, or it may be repealed and
     a new law substituted. In these ways evolution gives direction to
     future development.”
217. For all the foregoing reasons, I have reached to the conclusion that
     Section 6A of the Citizenship Act deserves to be declared invalid
     with prospective effect and the same is accordingly declared so.
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218. I summarize my final conclusions as follows: -
     a.   Immigrants who migrated before 01.01.1966 and were conferred
          deemed citizenship on the date of commencement of Section
          6A(2), subject to fulfilment of all the conditions mentioned
          therein, shall remain unaffected.
     b.   Immigrants who migrated between 01.01.1966 and 24.03.1971
          (both inclusive) and have been granted citizenship after following
          the due procedure prescribed under Section 6A(3) shall remain
          unaffected.
     c.   Immigrants who migrated between 01.01.1966 and 24.03.1971
          (both inclusive) and who have been detected as foreigners
          and have registered themselves with the registering authority
          as per the prescribed rules, shall be deemed to be citizens of
          India for all purposes from the date of expiry of a period of ten
          years from the date on which they were detected as foreigners.
     d.   Immigrants who migrated between 01.01.1966 and 24.03.1971
          (both inclusive) and who have been detected as foreigners but
          have not registered themselves with the registering authority
          within the prescribed time limit as per the Citizenship Rules,
          2009 will no longer be eligible for the benefit of citizenship.
     e.   Immigrants who migrated between 01.01.1966 and 24.03.1971
          (both inclusive) and whose applications are pending for
          adjudication before the Foreigners Tribunal, or who have
          preferred any appeal against any order of such tribunal which
          is pending before any court will continue to be governed by
          Section 6A(3) as it stood immediately prior to the pronouncement
          of this judgment, till their appeals are disposed of.
     f.   From the date of pronouncement of this judgment, all immigrants
          in the State of Assam shall be dealt with in accordance with
          the applicable laws and no benefit under Section 6A shall be
          available to any such immigrant. To be precise, if someone is
          apprehended as an illegal immigrant after the pronouncement
          of this judgment, Section 6A of the Citizenship Act will have
          no application.
219. The petitions are disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
220. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                                     1241

                   In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI
                                          Table of Contents*

      A. Background ............................................................................            4
      B. Issues ........................................................................................ 10
      C. Analysis ..................................................................................... 12
            i.      Legislative competence of Parliament to enact
                    Section 6A ......................................................................... 12
                    a. The scope of the constitutional provisions on Indian
                       citizenship ..................................................................... 12
                    b. Section 6A of the Citizenship Act 1955 does not conflict
                       with Articles 6 and 7 of the Constitution ...................... 24
                    c. The scope of Article 11 of the Constitution ................... 26
            ii.     Section 6A is not violative of Article 14 of the
                    Constitution ..................................................................... 34
                    a. The legal regime under the Citizenship Act 1955
                       governing migrants ...................................................... 35
                    b. The legal regime governing migrants from East and
                       West Pakistan to Assam .............................................. 40
                    c. The scope of judicial review under Article 14 ............. 46
                    d. The scope of judicial review of under-inclusive
                       provisions ..................................................................... 48
                    e. The legislative objective of Section 6A of the Citizenship
                       Act ................................................................................ 54
                    f.   Section 6A is not violative of Article 14 ........................ 57
            iii.         The challenge under Article 355 ............................... 60
            iv. Section 6A does not violate Article 29(1) of the
                Constitution ..................................................................... 68
            v.      Section 6A(3) is constitutional ......................................... 75
                    a. The interplay of NRC and the citizenship regime ....... 77
                    b. Section 6A(3) is not unconstitutional on the ground of
                       temporal unreasonableness ....................................... 83
            vi. Section 6A(2) cannot be held unconstitutional for not
                prescribing a procedure for registration ...................... 90
      D. Conclusion ................................................................................ 91
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1.     Section 6A of the Citizenship Act 19551 confers citizenship on a
       specific class of migrants from Bangladesh to Assam. In Assam
       Sanmilita Mahasangha v. Union of India,2 a two-Judge Bench
       referred the issue of the constitutional validity of Section 6A to a
       Constitution Bench. The petitioners have assailed the constitutional
       validity of Section 6A on the ground that it violates Articles 6,7,14,
       29 and 355.
2.     I have had the benefit of the opinions of my learned brothers,
       Justice Surya Kant and Justice J B Pardiwala. Having regard to the
       constitutional importance of the issues raised, I deem it necessary
       to author my own opinion.

       A.      Background
3.     The judgment of Justice Surya Kant traces the background and the
       submissions of the counsel with sufficient clarity. To avoid prolixity,
       I will briefly advert to the background.
4.     In 1985, the Citizenship (Amendment) Act 1985 was enacted to
       include Section 6A to the Citizenship Act.3 The provision grants


1    “Citizenship Act”
2    [2014] 14 SCR 744 : (2015) 3 SCC 1
3    “6A. Special provisions as to citizenship of persons covered by the Assam Accord.―
     (1) For the purposes of this section―
     (a) “Assam” means the territories included in the State of Assam immediately before the commencement
     of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 1985 (65 of 1985);
     (b) “detected to be a foreigner” means detected to be a foreigner in accordance with the provisions of the
     Foreigners Act, 1946 (31 of 1946) and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 by a Tribunal constituted
     under the said Order;
     (c) “specified territory” means the territories included in Bangladesh immediately before the
     commencement of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 1985 (65 of 1985);
     (d) a person shall be deemed to be Indian origin, if he, or either of his parents or any of his grandparents
     was born in undivided India;
     (e) a person shall be deemed to have been detected to be a foreigner on the date on which a Tribunal
     constituted under the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 submits its opinion to the effect that he is a
     foreigner to the officer or authority concerned.
     (2) Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (6) and (7), all persons of Indian origin who came before
     the 1st day of January, 1966 to Assam from the specified territory (including such of those whose names
     were included in the electoral rolls used for the purposes of the General Election to the House of the
     People held in 1967) and who have been ordinarily resident in Assam since the dates of their entry into
     Assam shall be deemed to be citizens of India as from the 1st day of January, 1966.
     (3) Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (6) and (7), every person of Indian origin who―
     (a) came to Assam on or after the 1st day of January, 1966 but before the 25th day of March, 1971 from
     the specified territory; and
     (b) has, since the date of his entry into Assam, been ordinarily resident in Assam; and
     (c) has been detected to be a foreigner; shall register himself in accordance with the rules made by the
     Central Government in this behalf under section 18 with such authority (hereafter in this sub-section
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                                          1243

                   In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       citizenship to persons of Indian origin who migrated to Assam from
       Bangladesh. The provision classifies the class of migrants into two
       categories based on when they entered Assam: those who entered
       Assam before 1 January 1966 and those who came to Assam after
       1 January 1966 but before 25 March 1971.
5.     Section 6A(2) provides that a person would be deemed to be a
       citizen of India as on 1 January 1966 if the following conditions
       are fulfilled:



     referred to as the registering authority) as may be specified in such rules and if his name is included in
     any electoral roll for any Assembly or Parliamentary constituency in force on the date of such detection,
     his name shall be deleted therefrom.
     Explanation.―In the case of every person seeking registration under this sub-section, the opinion of the
     Tribunal constituted under the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 holding such person to be a foreigner,
     shall be deemed to be sufficient proof of the requirement under clause (c) of this sub-section and if any
     question arises as to whether such person complies with any other requirement under this subsection,
     the registering authority shall,―
          (i) if such opinion contains a finding with respect to such other requirement, decide the question in
               conformity with such finding;
          (ii) if such opinion does not contain a finding with respect to such other requirement, refer the
               question to a Tribunal constituted under the said Order hang jurisdiction in accordance with
               such rules as the Central Government may make in this behalf under section 18 and decide the
               question in conformity with the opinion received on such reference.
     (4) A person registered under sub-section (3) shall have, as from the date on which he has been detected
     to be a foreigner and till the expiry of a period of ten years from that date, the same rights and obligations
     as a citizen of India (including the right to obtain a passport under the Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967)
     and the obligations connected therewith), but shall not entitled to have his name included in any electoral
     roll for any Assembly or Parliamentary constituency at any time before the expiry of the said period of
     ten years.
     (5) A person registered under sub-section (3) shall be deemed to be a citizen of India for all purposes
     as from the date of expiry of a period of ten years from the date on which he has been detected to be
     a foreigner.
     (6) Without prejudice to the provisions of section 8―
     (a) if any person referred to in sub-section (2) submits in the prescribed manner and form and to the
     prescribed authority within sixty days from the date of commencement of the Citizenship (Amendment)
     Act, 1985 (65 of 1985), a declaration that he does not wish to be a citizen of India, such person shall not
     be deemed to have become a citizen of India under that sub-section;
     (b) if any person referred to in sub-section (3) submits in the prescribed manner and form and to the
     prescribed authority within sixty days from the date of commencement of the Citizenship (Amendment)
     Act, 1985(65 of 1985), or from the date on which he has been detected to be a foreigner, whichever is
     later, a declaration that he does not wish to be governed by the provisions of that sub-section and sub-
     sections (4) and (5), it shall not be necessary for such person to register himself under sub-section (3).
     Explanation.―Where a person required to file a declaration under this sub-section does not have the
     capacity to enter into a contract, such declaration may be filed on his behalf by any person competent
     under the law for the time being in force to act on his behalf.
     (7) Nothing in sub-sections (2) to (6) shall apply in relation to any person―
     (a) who, immediately before the commencement of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 1985 (65 of 1985),
     is a citizen of India;
     (b) who was expelled from India before the commencement of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 1985,
     under the Foreigners Act, 1946 (31 of 1946).
     (8) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this section, the provisions of this section shall have effect
     notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force.”
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      a.      The person must be of Indian origin. A person is deemed to
              be of Indian origin if they or either of their parents or their
              grandparents were born in undivided India;4
      b.      The person should have come to Assam from a ‘specified
              territory’ before 1 January 1966. ‘Specified territory’ is defined
              as territories included in Bangladesh immediately before the
              commencement of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act 1985.5 All
              those persons who were included in the Electoral roll used for
              the purpose of the General Election to the House of People in
              1967 must be considered; and
      c.      The person should have been an ordinary resident in Assam
              since the date of entry into Assam.
6.    Section 6A(3) states that a person must register to secure citizenship
      in accordance with the rules made by the Central Government under
      Section 18 if the following conditions are fulfilled:
      a.      The person must be of Indian origin;
      b.      The person must have entered Assam on or after 1 January
              1966 but before 25 March 1971 from the specified territory,
              that is, Bangladesh;
      c.      The person must have been ordinarily resident in Assam since
              the date of entry into Assam; and
      d.      The person must be detected as a foreigner in accordance with
              the provisions of the Foreigners Act 19466 and the Foreigners
              (Tribunals) Order 19647.8
7.    The Explanation to Section 6A(3) stipulates that the opinion of the
      Tribunal constituted under the Foreigners Tribunals Order declaring
      a person to be a Foreigner is deemed as sufficient proof for
      requirement (d). Whether the person satisfies the other requirements
      must be decided on the basis of the opinion of the Tribunal, if there is
      a finding in the opinion with respect to that requirement. If the opinion


4    Citizenship Act; Section 6A(1)(d)
5    Citizenship Act; Section 6A(1)(c)
6    “Foreigners Act”
7    “Foreigners Tribunals Order”
8    Read with Section 6A(1)(b) of the Citizenship Act 1955
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                                     1245

                   In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


      does not have a finding with respect to the other requirement(s),
      the registering authority must refer the questions to the Tribunal.9
8.    Section 6A(4) states that if the person who has registered under
      sub-Section (3) is included in the electoral roll for any assembly or
      parliamentary constituency, their name must be deleted from the roll
      for a period of ten years from the date of detection as a foreigner.
      However, a person who has been registered will have the same
      rights and obligations as a citizen of India except having their name
      included in the electoral roll for ten years.10 They will also have the
      right to obtain passport under the Passport Act 1967. Upon the
      completion of ten years from the date of detection as a foreigner, a
      person who has registered would deemed to be a citizen of India.11
9.    The petitioners 12 initiated proceedings under Article 32 of the
      Constitution, inter alia,13 for challenging the constitutional validity of
      Section 6A of the Citizenship Act. By an order dated 17 December
      2014, a two-Judge Bench of this Court referred the following thirteen
      issues to a Constitution Bench:
              a.      “Whether Articles 10 and 11 of the Constitution of India
                      permit the enactment of Section 6A of the Citizenship
                      Act in as much as Section 6A, in prescribing a cut-
                      off date different from the cut-off date prescribed in
                      Article 35 Page 36 6, can do so without a “variation”
                      of Article 6 itself; regard, in particular, being had to the
                      phraseology of Article 4(2) read with Article 368(1);
              b.      Whether Section 6A violates Articles 325 and 326
                      of the Constitution of India in that it has diluted the
                      political rights of the citizens of the State of Assam;


9    Citizenship Act 1955; Explanation to Section 6A(3)
10   Citizenship Act 1955; Section 6A(4)
11   Citizenship Act 1955; Section 6A(5)
12   WP (C) 562 of 2012; WP (C) 274 of 2009; WP (C) No. 876 of 2014
13   In WP (C) No. 876 of 2014, the prayer included (a) challenging the constitutional validity of Rule 4A of
     the Citizenship (Registration of Citizens and Issue of National Identity Cards) Rules 2003 as ultra vires
     Section 6A of the Citizenship Act; (b) direction to complete fencing of the entire stretch of the Border
     with Bangladesh; (c) to step up the process of identification, detection and deportation of foreigners in
     the State of Assam in accordance with the provisions of the Foreigners Act 1946 and constitute more
     Tribunals under the Foreigners (Tribunals) Orders 1964; and (d) direction to remove encroachers from
     protected tribal lands. In WP 562 of 2012, the prayer included a direction that the National Register of
     Citizens with respect to Assam.
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        c.   What is the scope of the fundamental right contained
             in Article 29(1)? Is the fundamental right absolute in
             its terms? In particular, what is the meaning of the
             expression “culture” and the expression “conserve”?
             Whether Section 6A violates Article 29(1);
        d.   Whether Section 6A violates Article 355? What is the
             true interpretation of Article 355 of the Constitution?
             Would an influx of illegal migrants into a State of
             India constitute “external aggression” and/or “internal
             disturbance”? Does the expression “State” occurring
             in this Article refer only to a territorial region or does
             it also include the people living in the State, which
             would include their culture and identity;
        e.   Whether Section 6A violates Article 14 in that, it
             singles out Assam from other border States (which
             comprise a distinct class) and discriminates against
             it. Also whether there is no rational basis for having a
             separate cut-off date for regularizing illegal migrants
             who enter Assam as opposed to the rest of the
             country;
        f.   Whether Section 6A violates Article 21 in that the
             lives and personal liberty of the citizens of Assam
             have been affected adversely by the massive influx
             of illegal migrants from Bangladesh;
        g.   Whether delay is a factor that can be taken into
             account in moulding relief under a petition filed under
             Article 32 of the Constitution;
        h.   Whether, after a large number of migrants from East
             Pakistan have enjoyed rights as Citizens of India for
             over 40 years, any relief can be given in the petitions
             filed in the present cases;
        i.   Whether section 6A violates the basic premise of
             the Constitution and the Citizenship Act in that it
             permits Citizens who have allegedly not lost their
             Citizenship of East Pakistan to become deemed
             Citizens of India, thereby conferring dual Citizenship
             to such persons;
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                           1247

               In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


          j.     Whether section 6A violates the fundamental basis of
                 section 5(1) proviso and section 5(2) of the Citizenship
                 Act (as it stood in 1985) in that it permits a class of
                 migrants to become deemed Citizens of India without
                 any reciprocity from Bangladesh and without taking
                 the oath of allegiance to the Indian Constitution;
          k.     Whether the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam)
                 Act, 1950 being a special enactment qua immigrants
                 into Assam, alone can apply to migrants from East
                 Pakistan/Bangladesh to the exclusion of the general
                 Foreigners Act and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order,
                 1964 made thereunder;
          l.     Whether Section 6A violates the Rule of Law in
                 that it gives way to political expediency and not to
                 Government according to law; and
          m.     Whether Section 6A violates fundamental rights in
                 that no mechanism is provided to determine which
                 persons are ordinarily resident in Assam since the
                 dates of their entry into Assam, thus granting deemed
                 citizenship to such persons arbitrarily.”
10. On 13 December 2022, the Constitution Bench directed the counsel
    to jointly formulate issues which arise for the consideration of the
    Bench. On 10 January 2023, the Constitution Bench framed the
    following primary issue for determination: “Whether Section 6A of
    the Citizenship Act suffers from any constitutional infirmity.”
11. The issue of the constitutional validity of Section 6A of the Citizenship
    Act is the only issue which falls for the consideration of this Bench.

     B.   Issues
12. The challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 6A of the
    Citizenship Act gives rise to the following issues:
     a.   Whether the grant of citizenship to migrants from Bangladesh
          to Assam was within the legislative competence of Parliament
          under Article 11 of the Constitution;
     b.   Whether Section 6A of the Citizenship Act adopts unreasonable
          cut-off dates and singles out the State of Assam thereby violating
          Article 14 of the Constitution ;
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      c.      Whether Section 6A of the Citizenship Act can be regarded
              to be violative of Article 355 on the ground that the provision
              does not curb undocumented immigration which amounts to
              ‘external aggression’;
      d.      Whether Section 6A of the Citizenship Act is violative of
              Article 29(1) of the Constitution on the ground that the Assamese
              cultural identity is lost as a direct consequence of granting
              citizenship to migrants from Bangladesh residing in Assam;
      e.      Whether Section 6A(3) of the Citizenship Act is unconstitutional
              on the ground of temporal unreasonableness; and
      f.      Whether Section 6A(2) of the Citizenship Act is unconstitutional
              on the ground that it neither provides a method for implementation
              nor empowers the executive to implement the provisions.

      C.      Analysis

      i.      Legislative competence of Parliament to enact Section 6A
13. The petitioners submitted that Parliament did not have the competence
    to enact Section 6A because: (a) the legislative field with respect
    to granting citizenship to migrants from Bangladesh to India is
    occupied by Articles 6 and 7; and (b) any alteration of the cut-off date
    prescribed by Articles 6 and 7 for migrants from Bangladesh could
    only be through a constitutional amendment and not by parliamentary
    legislation. The respondents submitted that even if it is accepted that
    Section 6A amends Articles 6 and 7, the amendment is permissible
    in view of Article 11.
      a.      The scope of the constitutional provisions on Indian citizenship
14. Section 6A confers citizenship to migrants of Indian origin from the
    specific territory of Bangladesh. The legal regime on citizenship, in
    particular the provisions governing citizenship status to migrants
    from East and West Pakistan in the aftermath of the partition of
    India must be laid bare to understand the context in which Section
    6A was inserted in the Citizenship Act.
15. The Constitution of India upon its adoption guaranteed fundamental
    rights to the citizens of India.14 It is but natural that the provision on


14   Articles 14, 20, 21, 22,25,27, 28 guarantees rights to persons. Articles 15,16, 19, and 29(2) guarantees
     rights to citizens.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                                   1249

                   In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       who would be citizens of the newly independent nation produced
       one of the most contentious of discussions in the Constituent
       Assembly.15 On 30 May 1947, Mr BN Rau, the Constitutional Advisor
       prepared the Memorandum on the Union Constitution and Draft
       Clauses. The Part on Citizenship consisted of three provisions.
       The first provision prescribed who would be citizens of India on
       the date of the commencement of the Constitution.16 The second
       provision stipulated who would be citizens after the commencement
       of the Constitution.17 The provision recognised citizenship by birth,
       citizenship by naturalization and citizenship by descent. The third
       provision stipulated that further provisions governing the acquisition
       and termination of federal citizenship may be made by Federal law.18
       It was, however, observed in the Note appended to the Memorandum
       that the second clause was not necessary since (a) it would be
       impossible to exhaustively define the conditions of nationality, birth or
       naturalisation in the Constitution; and (b) there may be some difficulty
       in the interpretation of the provisions of legislation on citizenship if
       the provisions were entrenched in the Constitution.19 The ad-hoc
       Committee on Citizenship slightly altered the first clause,20 agreed


15   BR Ambedkar in Constituent Assembly Debates (10 August 1949). “Except one other Article in the Draft
     Constitution, I do not think that any other article has given the Drafting Committee such a headache as
     this particular article. I do not know how many drafts were prepared and how many were destroyed as
     being inadequate to cover all the cases which it was thought necessary and desirable to cover.”
16   B Shiva Rao, The framing of India’s Constitution: Select Documents (Part II), 472
     “At the date of commencement of this Constitution:-
     Every person domiciled in the territories subject to the jurisdiction of the federation-
          (a) Who has been ordinarily resident in those territories for not less than five years immediately
               preceding that date, or
          (b) Who, or whose parents, or either of whose parents, was or were born in India,
     Shall be a citizen of the Federation.
      Provided that any such person being a citizen of any State may, in accordance with Federal law, elect
     not to accept the citizenship hereby conferred.”
17   B Shiva Rao, The framing of India’s Constitution: Select Documents (Part II), 472
     “After the commencement of this Constitution-
         (a) Every person who is born in the territories subject to the jurisdiction of the federation;
         (b) Every person who is naturalized in accordance with Federal law; and
         (c) Every person, either of whose parents was, at the time of such person’s birth, a citizen of the
                Federation”
18   B Shiva Rao, The framing of India’s Constitution: Select Documents (Part II), 473
     “Further provisions governing the acquisition and termination of Federal citizenship may be made by
     Federal Law.”
19   See the Constitution of the Irish Free State; Article 3
20   B Shiva Rao, The framing of India’s Constitution: Select Documents (Part II), 683
     “At the date of commencement of this Constitution, every person who:
          (a) Who or whose parents or either of whose parents, was or were born in the territories of the
               Federation and subject to its jurisdiction, or
          (b) who is domiciled in the territories subject to the jurisdiction of the federation.” The clause
               granting citizenship to those who have been ordinarily resident for five years was removed.
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       to the second clause and recommended that in addition to the law
       making power on acquisition and termination of citizenship, a provision
       for avoiding dual citizenship may be included in the third clause.21
16. The provision on conditions for acquiring citizenship after the
    commencement of the Constitution, that is, the second clause in
    the memorandum, was not included in the Draft Constitution of India
    194822 submitted by the Drafting Committee on 21 February 1948. The
    Draft Constitution only included provisions on who would be citizens
    on the date of the commencement of the Constitution,23 and granted
    Parliament the power to make provision on acquisition and termination
    of citizenship and “all other matters relating thereto”.24 Article 5 of
    the Draft Constitution 1948 included provisions for refugees from
    East and West Pakistan. Clause (b) of Article 5 provided that every
    person who or either of whose parents or any of whose grandparents
    were born in India as defined in the Government of India Act 1935
    or in Burma, Ceylon or Malaya and who is domiciled in the territory
    of India as defined by the Constitution will be a citizen upon the
    commencement of the Constitution, provided that the person has
    not acquired the citizenship of any foreign State. The explanation to
    the provision stated that a person is deemed to be domiciled in the
    territory of India on depositing a declaration to acquire such domicile
    after having resided for at least one month in the territory of India.25
    According to the explanation, the declaration had to be deposited
    before the commencement of the Constitution. Thus, migrants from
    East or West Pakistan to India could be citizens by virtue of Article
    5(b) of the Draft Constitution if they submitted a declaration after
    having resided in India for a month.
17. Dr Ambedkar, as the Chairperson of the Drafting Committee
    introduced amendments to draft Articles 5 (corresponding to Article 5
    of the Indian Constitution) and 6 (corresponding to Article 11).
    He further introduced Articles 5-A (corresponding to Article 6),
    5-B (corresponding to Article 7) and 5-C (corresponding to Article 10)



21   B Shiva Rao, The framing of India’s Constitution: Select Documents (Part II), 683
22   “Draft Constitution”
23   Draft Constitution of India 1948, Article 5
24   Draft Constitution of India 1948, Article 6.
25   Draft Constitution of India 1948, Explanation to Article 5(b)
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                                        1251

                   In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       which provided separate provisions for migrants to acquire
       citizenship.26 While introducing these amendments, Dr Ambedkar
       noted that the object of the above provisions was not to lay down a
       permanent law of citizenship but to decide who would be citizens as
       on the date of the commencement of the Constitution.27 The drafting
       history of the provisions on citizenship (in particular the deletion
       of clause 2 of the Memorandum) elucidates that after extensive
       deliberation in the Constituent Assembly and the Drafting Committee,
       it was decided that the Constitution would only stipulate who would
       hold citizenship “on the commencement of the Constitution”. This
       is also clear from the language and the substantive portions of the
       provisions included in Part II of the Constitution, which deals with
       Citizenship.
18. Article 5 of the Constitution deals with “Citizenship at the
    commencement of the Constitution”. The Article stipulates that
    every person who has their domicile in the territory of India will be
    a citizen of India at the commencement of the Constitution, if any
    of the following criteria is fulfilled:
       a.      The person was born in the territory of India; or
       b.      Either of their parents were born in the territory of India; or
       c.      The person was ordinarily resident in the territory of India for not
               less than five years immediately preceding the commencement
               of the Constitution.
19. Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Constitution begin with a non-obstante clause,
    overriding the provisions of Article 5. Articles 6 and 7 recognise the
    largest migration in human history28 following the partition of undivided
    India into India and Pakistan. Article 6 deals with the citizenship of
    those who migrated from Pakistan to India. The provision states
    that notwithstanding anything in Article 5, a person who migrated to


26   BR Ambedkar, Constituent Assembly Debates (10 August 1949)
27   BR Ambedkar, Constituent Assembly Debates (10 August 1949) “Now, Sir, this article refers to,
     citizenship not in any general sense but to citizenship on the date of the commencement of this
     Constitution. It is not the object of this particular article to lay down a permanent law of citizenship for
     this country. The business of laying down a permanent law of citizenship has been left to Parliament, and
     as Members will see from the wording of article 6 as I have moved the entire matter regarding citizenship
     has been left to Parliament to determine by any law that it may deem fit.”[emphasis supplied]
28   UNHRC, The State of the World’s Refugees 2000L Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action (Oxford University
     Press) 59
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       the territory of India from Pakistan would deemed to be a citizen of
       India at the commencement of the Constitution if the following two
       conditions are satisfied:29
       a.      he or his parents or grandparents were born in India as defined
               in the Government of India Act 1935 (which included the present
               Pakistan and Bangladesh) [Article 6(a)]; and
       b.      if (i) he migrated before 19 July 1948, he must have been an
               ordinary resident since then [Article 6(b)(i)]; or (ii) he migrated
               on or after 19 July 1948, he must register as a citizen of India
               on an application made by him before the commencement
               of the Constitution in the manner prescribed. A person can
               be registered under this provision only if he has resided in
               the territory for at least six months before the application.
               [Article 6(b)(ii)].30
20. A brief historical background is necessary to understand the objective
    of this provision and in particular, the division of the migrants into
    two classes: those who migrated before and after 19 July 1948. The
    significance of the date 19 July 1948 can be traced to the provisions
    of the Influx from West Pakistan (Control) Ordinance 1948.31 The
    West Pakistan Ordinance which came into force on 19 July 1948
    introduced a system by which any person from West Pakistan could
    enter the territory of India only on the possession of a permit.32
    Thus, while persons who entered India before the permit system


29   “6. Rights of citizenship of certain persons who have migrated to India from Pakistan
     Notwithstanding anything in article 5, a person who has migrated to the territory of India from the
     territory now included in Pakistan shall be deemed to be a citizen of India at the commencement of this
     Constitution if—
     (a)he or either of his parents or any of his grand-parents was born in India as defined in the Government
     of India Act, 1935 (as originally enacted); and
     (b)(i)in the case where such person has so migrated before the nineteenth day of July, 1948, he has
     been ordinarily resident in the territory of India since the date of his migration, or
     (ii)in the case where such person has so migrated on or after the nineteenth day of July, 1948, he has
     been registered as a citizen of India by an officer appointed in that behalf by the Government of the
     Dominion of India on an application made by him therefore to such officer before the commencement of
     this Constitution in the form and manner prescribed by that Government:
     Provided that no person shall be so registered unless he has been resident in the territory of India for at
     least six months immediately preceding the date of his application.”
30   This provision is a modification of Article 5(b) of the Draft Constitution.
31   “West Pakistan Ordinance”
32   Pakistan also enacted a similar legislation introducing the permit system for persons to enter into
     Pakistan from India; See the Pakistan (Control of Entry) Ordinance 1948
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                                         1253

                   In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       was introduced could become Indian citizens if they were domiciled
       in India, those who entered after the cut-off date had to satisfy the
       following criteria:
       a.      They must have resided in India for six months since 19 July
               1948; and
       b.      They had to make an application upon the completion of six
               months but before the commencement of the Constitution.
21. Article 394 provides when different provisions of the Constitution
    commence. The provision states that Article 394 and Articles 5,6,7,
    8,8,9,60,324,366,367,379,380,388,391,392 and 392 will come into
    force “at once” and the remaining provisions will come into force on
    26 January 1950. The provision also states that the commencement
    of the Constitution, where used in the Constitution means 26 January
    1950. In terms of Article 394, Article 6 came into force on “at once”, that
    is, immediately after the Constitution was adopted. The Constitution
    was adopted on 26 November 1949. Thus, for migrants after 19 July
    1948 to secure citizenship in terms of Article 6, the application ought
    to have been filed before 26 January 1950. Since the application
    could only be filed if the person had resided in India for at least six
    months before that, the provision only covered those who migrated
    to India after 19 July 1948 but before 26 July 1949. The ad-hoc/
    temporary nature of the provision is evident from the provision itself.
    In addition to the use of the phrase ‘at the commencement of the
    Constitution’, the substantive portion also prescribes a temporal limit.
22. Article 6 grants citizenship to all persons who migrated from
    Pakistan to India till 26 July 1949. Article 7 carves out an exception
    to Article 6.33 The provision stipulates that notwithstanding the
    provisions of Articles 5 and 6, any person who migrated from India
    to Pakistan after 1 March 1947 shall not deemed to be a citizen.
    1 March 1947 signifies the date from when the intense communal


33   “7. Rights of citizenship of certain migrants to Pakistan.- Notwithstanding anything in Articles 5 and
     6, a person who has after the first day of March, 1947, migrated from the territory of India to the territory
     now included in Pakistan shall not be deemed to be a citizen of India:
     Provided that nothing in this article shall apply to a person who, after having so migrated to the
     territory now included in Pakistan, has returned to the territory of India under a permit for resettlement
     or permanent return issued by or under the authority of any law and every such person shall for the
     purposes of clause (b) of Article 6 be deemed to have migrated to the territory of India after the nineteenth
     day of July, 1948.”
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      violence broke out in India, particularly in Punjab.34 Article 7 deals with
      re-migration. That is, the deeming citizenship conferred by Article 6
      shall not apply to a person who before migrating from Pakistan to
      India had earlier migrated from India to Pakistan immediately after
      partition. The proviso to Article 7 provides an exception to those who
      remigrated to India under a ‘permit for resettlement or permanent
      return issued by or under the authority of any law’. According to the
      proviso, irrespective of the date when persons entered the Indian
      territory, it shall be deemed that they entered after 19 July 1948 for
      the purposes of Article 6(b). Thus, any person who falls under this
      category (migration must be completed between 1 March 1947 and
      before the commencement of the Constitution35) would have to register
      as citizens upon the submission of an application as prescribed by
      Article 6(b)(ii) of the Constitution.
23. Thus, the following conditions must be fulfilled to secure citizenship
    in terms of the proviso to Article 7:
      a.      The person must have migrated from the Indian territory to the
              territory of Pakistan after 1 March 1947;
      b.      The person must have migrated back from the territory of
              Pakistan to the Indian territory under a permit for resettlement
              or permanent return issued under the authority of any law; and
      c.      The person, in terms of Article 6(b)(ii), must apply for citizenship
              to such officer of the Government before the commencement
              of the Constitution (that is, 26 January 1950). The person must
              have resided in India for a minimum of six months before the
              application. Thus, the proviso covers those who remigrated to
              India between 1 March 1947 and 26 July 1949.
24. The distinction between Article 6 and Article 7 is that the former
    provision does not specifically refer to the permit system while
    the latter does. Though the significance of the date 19 July 1948
    is traceable to the permit system, Article 6 does not mandate that
    citizenship would be granted only if the person entered the Indian
    territory on a permit. As opposed to this, Article 7 provides citizenship



34   Yasmin Khan, The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan (Penguin India) 168
35   See Kulathil v. State of Kerala, AIR 1966 SC 1614 [Justice Shah, 32]
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                                      1255

                  In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


      only to those who entered India through a valid permit. Article 7,
      like Article 6 is temporary in nature because (a) persons covered
      by the proviso to Article 7 must have registered as a citizen under
      Article 6(ii)(b) which prescribes a time limit; and (b) the guarantee
      is dependent on a parliamentary legislation (that is, the permit must
      be issued under authority of law) which itself indicates that it is not
      a permanent code.
25. The legislation(s) which introduced the permit system must be referred
    to understand the scope of the proviso to Article 7. On 26 July 1949,
    the Governor General promulgated the Influx from West Pakistan
    (Control) Ordinance 1948. The Ordinance stipulated that persons
    can enter India from any place in West Pakistan only if they are in
    possession of permits. ‘Permit’ was defined as a permit for the time
    being in force issued or renewed by the prescribed authority after
    satisfying the described conditions relating to the class of permits to
    which it belongs.36 The Central Government was conferred the power
    to issue rules, inter alia, prescribing the authorities by whom permits
    may be issued or renewed and the conditions to be satisfied for such
    permits. It is crucial to note that the Ordinance only applied to the
    influx from the part of Pakistan which lies to the west of India (that
    is, the present day Pakistan).37 It did not apply to migrants from East
    Pakistan (that is, present day Bangladesh). On 7 September 1948,
    the Government of India in exercise of its power under the West
    Pakistan Ordinance issued rules for the implementation of the permit
    system. The rules introduced three kinds of permits: the permit for
    temporary visits, the permit for resettlement or permanent return and
    the permanent permit. The proviso to Article 7 only covers those who
    remigrated to India under the resettlement or permanent return permit.38
26. On 10 November 1948, the Governor General promulgated the Influx
    from Pakistan (Control) Ordinance 1948 by which a permit system


36   West Pakistan (Control) Ordinance 1948, Section 2(c)
37   West Pakistan (Control) Ordinance 1948, Section 3(2)
38   See Speech by Dr BR Ambedkar and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru in the Constituent Assembly on 12 August
     1949: [Nehru]“There are three types of permits, I am told. One is purely a temporary permit for a month
     or two, and whatever the period may be, a man comes and he has got to go back during that period. This
     does not come into the picture. The other type is a permit, not permanent but something like a permanent
     permit, which does not entitle a man to settle here, but entitles him to come here repeatedly on business.
     He comes and goes and he has a continuing permit. I may say; that, of course, does not come into the
     picture. The third type of permit is a permit given to a person to come here for permanent stay, that is
     return to Indian and settle down here.”
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      was introduced for a person from ‘any’ place in Pakistan to enter
      India. This Ordinance introduced a permit system for persons entering
      India from East Pakistan also (that is, present day Bangladesh). The
      Ordinance also repealed the Influx from West Pakistan (Control)
      Ordinance 1948. The Pakistan (Control) Ordinance 1948 was
      repealed and replaced by the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act 1949
      which contained provisions pari materia to the Pakistan (Control)
      Ordinance 1948. Section 4 of the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act
      1949 conferred the Central Government the power to make Rules
      prescribing, among other things, the conditions to be satisfied by
      applicants for permits. On 20 May 1949, the Central Government
      issued Rules in exercise of the power conferred by Section 4. The
      Rules called the ‘Permit System Rules 1949’ prescribed elaborate
      provisions only regarding the permit system introduced between
      Western Pakistan (that is, current day Pakistan) and India. Though
      the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act 1949 applied to the whole
      of Pakistan (including the current day Bangladesh), the Central
      Government did not frame any Rules to implement the permit system
      for the movement from East Pakistan to India.
27. The reason for not implementing the permit system for the migrants
    from East Pakistan to India was explained by Mr. Gopalaswami
    Ayyangar while introducing the Undesirable Immigrants (Expulsion
    from Assam) Bill 1950.39 The Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Bill
    granted the Central Government, the power to expel persons who
    come into Assam. Mr. Ayyangar stated that the Central Government
    examined the suggestion to introduce a permit system between East
    Pakistan and India but decided against it because it would restrict
    the freedom of movement of a large number of persons who, in
    their ordinary avocations, had to pass between East Pakistan and
    either Assam or West Bengal.40 Thus, the geographical placement of


39   The word undesirable was removed from the short title after extensive discussion.
40   Shri Gopalaswami while introducing the Undesirable Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Bill,
     Parliamentary Debates: Official Report (Volume 1, 1950), 313 “The obvious suggestion that was put
     forward at the beginning was that we should introduce a permit system as between Assam and East
     Pakistan. The Central Government examined this suggestion and studies its repercussions on other parts
     of India particularly on West Bengal and the restrictions it would impose on the freedom of movement of
     a large number of persons who, even in their ordinary avocations, had to pass between East Pakistan
     and either Assam or West Bengal. If restrictions by way of a permit system had been imposed, it was
     feared that there would have been difficulties experienced which it would not have been easy to get over,
     and after further discussions with the Government of Assam, it was settled in consultation with them that
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                                  1257

                  In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


      Bangladesh (East Pakistan) prevented the Indian Government from
      replicating the permit system that was applied for movement in the
      Western border. The proviso to Article 7 which dealt with persons
      who remigrated to India did not apply to those who came from East
      Pakistan because the permit system was not implemented there.
28. On 1 January 1952, the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act was
    repealed41 putting an end to the permit system governing the travel
    between West Pakistan and India. In October 1952, the India-Pakistan
    Passport and Visa Scheme regulated the travel between India and
    Pakistan. The scheme proposed a specific passport system between
    India and Pakistan.42

      b.      Section 6A of the Citizenship Act 1955 does not conflict with
              Articles 6 and 7 of the Constitution
29. It is in the above background that the argument of the petitioners that
    Section 6A is unconstitutional for prescribing a cut-off date different
    from the date in Articles 6 and 7 has to be decided. Two issues
    arise for the consideration of this Court: (a) whether Section 6A
    prescribes a cut-off date different from that prescribed by Articles 6
    and 7 for migrants from Bangladesh to Assam; and (b) if (a) is in the
    affirmative, whether Article 11 of the Constitution confers Parliament
    with the power to ‘alter’ the provisions in Part II of the Constitution
    conferring citizenship.
30. The following position emerges from our discussion of Articles 5, 6
    and 7 in the preceding section:
      a.      The Constitution only prescribes who would be citizens upon
              the commencement of the Constitution. This is evident from
              the language of Articles 5 and 6 which uses the phrase ‘at the
              commencement of the Constitution’ and the drafting history of
              the provision;



     instead of introducing a permit system which would control the entry of outsiders into Assam, we might
     take power to expel from Assam such foreign Nationals who entered that State and whose continuance
     was likely to cause disturbance to its economy.”
41   See the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Repealing Act 1952; the Statement of Objects and Reasons stated
     that it was agreed “with the Government of Pakistan that with effect from prescribed date, the permit
     system should be replaced by a system of passports.”
42   See paper Rights: The emergence of Documentary Identities in Post-Colonial India, 1950-67 (2016),
     History Faculty Publications.129
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     b.   Article 6 covers a limited class of migrants from both Pakistan
          and Bangladesh to India (including Assam). The provision only
          covers those who migrated to India till 26 July 1949 (based on
          the six months residence requirement);
     c.   The benefit of citizenship to the class covered by the proviso
          to Article 7 depended on the permit system prescribed by
          law. The Permit System Rules 1949 framed in exercise of the
          power under the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act 1949 did
          not cover those who remigrated from East Pakistan (today’s
          Bangladesh) to India. It only covered those who remigrated
          from West Pakistan (today’s Pakistan) to India. Thus, though
          the proviso to Article 7 does not distinguish between migrants
          from West Pakistan and East Pakistan, migrants from the latter
          were unable to secure the benefit of citizenship in the absence
          of Rules on the implementation of the permit system along the
          eastern border. Thus, the proviso to Article 7 only covered those
          who remigrated to India from West Pakistan after 1 March 1947
          but before 26 July 1949; and
     d.   Article 6 and the proviso to Article 7 confer citizenship on a
          limited class upon the commencement of the Constitution:
          (i) migrants from West Pakistan and East Pakistan till 26 July
          1949; and (ii) persons who re-migrated from West Pakistan to
          India (who had earlier migrated from India to Pakistan after
          partition) under the permit system till 26 July 1949.
31. As opposed to Articles 6 and 7, Section 6A confers citizenship on
    those who migrated from Bangladesh to Assam until 24 March
    1971. Article 6 and the proviso to Article 7 confer citizenship on
    a limited class. Section 6A deals with those who are not covered
    by the constitutional provisions, that is those who migrated (or
    re-migrated) after 26 July 1949. The provision also covers those
    who migrated in the period covered by the constitutional provisions
    but who were not covered by the substantive stipulations in the
    provisions. For example, Article 6 does not cover a person who
    migrated from east Pakistan to Assam after 19 July 1948 but did
    not apply to register as a citizen before the commencement of
    the Constitution. Section 6A confers citizenship on such persons.
    There is thus, a certain degree of overlap between Section 6A and
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                          1259

             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     the constitutional provisions. However, that does not amount to
     an ‘alteration or amendment’ of the constitutional provisions. This
     is for the simple reason that Article 6 and the proviso to Article 7
     confer citizenship on the ‘commencement of the constitution’. That
     is, they only deal with who shall be citizens on 26 January 1950.
     In contrast, Section 6A confers citizenship from 1 January 1966 to
     those who migrated before that date. Those who migrated between
     1 January 1966 and 24 March 1971, are conferred citizenship upon
     the completion of ten years from the date of detection as a foreigner.
     Thus, Section 6A confers citizenship on a later date to those who
     are not covered by Articles 6 and 7. Section 6A could be interpreted
     to alter or amend Articles 6 and 7 only if it conferred citizenship
     retrospectively, as at the commencement of the Constitution which
     is not the case.

     c.   The scope of Article 11 of the Constitution
32. Article 11 stipulates that the provisions of Part II shall not ‘derogate’
    from the power of Parliament to make any provision with respect to
    (a) acquisition of citizenship; (b) termination of citizenship; and (c)
    all other matters relating to citizenship:
          "11. Parliament to regulate the right of citizenship by
          law.- Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this Part
          shall derogate from the power of Parliament to make any
          provision with respect to the acquisition and termination
          of citizenship and all other matters relating to citizenship.”
                                                 (emphasis supplied)
33. Article 10 is also related to Parliament’s law making power on
    citizenship. The provision provides that every person who is or
    is deemed to be a citizen under the provisions of Part II of the
    Constitution shall continue to be so, subject to the provisions of any
    law made by Parliament:
          "10. Continuance of the rights of citizenship.- Every
          person who is or is deemed to be a citizen of India
          under any of the foregoing provisions of this Part shall,
          subject to the provisions of any law that may be made by
          Parliament, continue to be such citizen.”
                                                 (emphasis supplied)
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34. Article 24643 read with Entry 17 of List I of the Seventh Schedule
    to the Constitution confers Parliament the power to make laws with
    respect to ‘citizenship, naturalisation and aliens’. What then is the
    purpose and scope of Article 11? The earlier draft of Article 11 read
    as follows:
              “Further provisions governing the acquisition and
              termination of Union citizenship, and avoidance of double
              citizenship may be made by Union law.”
                                                                     (emphasis supplied)
      When the draft of Article 11 read as above, there was also a provision
      on who would hold citizenship ‘after’ the commencement of the
      Constitution.44 Thus, in the earlier scheme, the Constitution was to
      stipulate the conditions for securing citizenship and Parliament was
      conferred with the power to make ‘further’ provisions. However, the
      Draft Constitution of India 1948 did not consist of a provision on
      acquisition of citizenship after the commencement of the Constitution.
      Part II of the Draft Constitution only consisted of provisions on
      citizenship at the commencement of the Constitution and Parliament’s
      power to make “further” provisions.45 Dr BR Ambedkar introduced an
      amendment to draft Article 6 (as Article 11 exists in the current form)
      when it was taken up for discussion. The phrase “further provision”
      was used when the Draft dealt with the acquisition of citizenship
      after the commencement of the Constitution. However, once that
      was deleted, the language of Article 11 was amended.
35. Article 246 read with the Seventh Schedule delimits the legislative
    competence of Parliament and the legislature of the States. The
    inference that can be drawn from the inclusion of Entry 17 in List
    I of the Seventh Schedule is that Parliament (and not the state
    legislatures) has the legislative competence to enact laws with respect
    to citizenship. The legislative subject to enact laws on citizenship


43   “Subject matter of laws made by Parliament and by the Legislatures of States: (1) Parliament has the
     exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I in the Seventh
     Schedule.[…]”
44   B Shiva Rao, The framing of India’s Constitution: Select Documents (Part II) 683; See BN Rao,
     Memorandum on the Union Constitution and Draft Clauses (May 30 1947); Ad-hoc Committee on
     Citizenship (12 July 1947)
45   Draft Constitution of India, 1948; Article 6 “Parliament may, by law, make further provision regarding
     acquisition and termination of citizenship and all other matters relating thereto”.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                                       1261

                   In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       is thus, traceable to Entry 17. Provisions of Part II (Articles 10 and
       11, in particular) do not confer Parliament the power to enact laws
       relating to citizenship. The provisions operate in a different sphere.
       The provisions clarify the scope of the legislative power.
36. The question is whether Parliament’s power under Article 11 is
    restricted by other provisions in Part II. The provision stipulates that
    “nothing in the foregoing provisions of this Part”, meaning Articles
    5-10, shall derogate from the power to make any provision with
    respect to citizenship. The word ‘derogate’ may have two meanings:
    (a) to diminish or reduce; and (b) to diverge or depart.46 The phrase
    “derogate” is used in six other instances in the Constitution. In one of
    the instances (Article 1347), the phrase takes the meaning of diverge
    or depart. In all the other usages,48 the provision takes the meaning
    of ‘diminish or reduce’.
37. The distinction between a non-obstante clause and the words
    ‘shall not derogate from’ lies in the fact that the former is used as
    an expression providing overriding effect while the latter is used
    as a clarificatory expression. The non-obstante clause is used
    when there is a link between two clauses/provisions and the link is
    sought to be detached by carving out an exception. For example, if
    the provision states that notwithstanding A, B has the power to do
    action C, it means that the provision confers power on B to do C,
    and this is an exception to provision A. In contrast, the phrase ‘shall
    not derogate from’ is used to indicate that certain provisions do not
    reduce the effect or scope of the provision, thereby, de-linking the
    two provisions. For example, a provision which states that A shall
    not derogate B’s power to do C is used when B’s power to do C is
    conferred elsewhere and it is clarified that the scope of A and the
    scope of B do not overlap. This is evident on an analysis of the
    provisions which use the phrase ‘shall not derogate’. The usage
    indicates that (a) the Constitution confers power elsewhere; and (b)
    another provision does not override or in any manner impact the
    power. For example:


46   P Ramanatha Aiyar, Advanced Law Lexicon (6th Edition Volume 2 D-1)1587, (a) Derogate: to lesson
     in estimation; to invalidate; degenerate; degrade; (b) Derogation: Derogation is the partial repeal or
     abrogation of a law by a later act that limits its scope or impairs its utility and force.
47   The heading to Article 13 states “laws inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamental rights”.
48   See second proviso to Article 200, Article 226(4), Article 239AA(3)(b), Article 241, Article 371-F(m)
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      a.      Clause (4) to Article 226 stipulates that the power conferred upon
              High Courts to issue certain writs shall not be in derogation of
              the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by Article 32(2).49
              It provides that the former shall not have an impact on the later
              since they operate in separate fields;
      b.      Article 239-AA(3)(a) provides the Legislative Assembly of the
              National Capital Territory with legislative competence over
              certain matters in the State List and the Concurrent list. Article
              239-AA(3)(b) states that nothing in sub-clause (a) shall derogate
              from the powers of Parliament to make laws for the Union
              territory. This provision must be read in the context of Article
              246(4) which provides Parliament the power to enact laws on
              matters enumerated in all three lists for Union territories. Article
              239-AA(3)(b) states that the power conferred in clause (a) shall
              not impact the law making power of Parliament with respect to
              Union territories;
      c.      Article 241(1) stipulates that Parliament may by law constitute
              a High Court for a Union territory. Clause (4) of Article 241
              stipulates that nothing in the Article shall derogate from the
              power of Parliament to extend or exclude the jurisdiction of a
              High Court to, or from any Union territory. This provision must be
              read in the context of Entry 79 of List I which provides Parliament
              the power to legislate on the “extension of the jurisdiction of a
              High Court to, and exclusion of the jurisdiction of a High Court
              from, any Union territory.” Clause (4) states that Clause (1) does
              not impact the legislative competence exercised by Parliament
              under Article 245 read with Entry 79 of List I; and
      d.      Article 371F(m) provides that no court would have the jurisdiction
              to deal with any dispute arising out of an agreement or treaty
              relating to Sikkim but that nothing in the provision shall be
              ‘construed to derogate from the provisions of Article 143’. Here,
              the phrase is used to ensure that the provision does not have
              any impact on the power under Article 143.



49   “(4) The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the power conferred
     on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of article 32.”
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                            1263

                 In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


38. Thus, the use of the phrases ‘notwithstanding’ and ‘shall not derogate
    from’ produce different effects. Article 11, when interpreted on the
    basis of the above analysis produces the following meaning:
      a.     The legislative competence of Parliament to enact laws related
             to citizenship is traceable to Entry 17 of List I and not Article
             11; and
      b.     The provisions in Part II do not impact or limit the legislative
             competence of Parliament.
39. A non-obstante clause cannot be artificially read into Article 11. In Izhar
    Ahmed v. Union of India,50 the constitutional validity of Section 9(2)
    of the Citizenship Act and Rule 3 in Schedule III of the Citizenship
    Rules 1956 were challenged. Before dealing with the challenge,
    Justice Gajendragadkar writing for the Constitution Bench delineated
    the scope of the provisions in Part II of the Constitution. With respect
    to Article 11, the learned Judge observed that the provisions of the
    parliamentary law on citizenship cannot be challenged on the ground
    of a violation of the provisions in Part II. The relevant part of the
    observations is extracted below:
             "11. That takes us to Article 11 which empowers the
             Parliament to regulate the right of citizenship by law.
             It provides that nothing in the foregoing provisions of
             Part II shall derogate from the power of Parliament to
             make any provision with respect to the acquisition and
             termination of citizenship and all other matters relating
             to citizenship. It would thus be noticed that while making
             provisions for recognising the right of citizenship in the
             individuals as indicated by the respective articles, and
             while guaranteeing the continuance of the said rights of
             citizenship as specified by Article 10, Article 11 confers
             and recognises the power of the Parliament to make any
             provision with respect to not only acquisition but also the
             termination of citizenship as well as all matters relating to
             citizenship. Thus, it would be open to the Parliament to
             affect the rights of citizenship and the provisions made



50   [1962] Supp. 3 SCR 235 : 1962 SCC OnLine SC 1
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               by the Parliamentary statute in that behalf cannot be
               impeached on the ground that they are inconsistent
               with the provisions contained in Articles 5 to 10 of
               Part II. In this connection, it is important to bear in mind
               that Article 11 has been included in Part II in order to
               make it clear that the sovereign right of the Parliament
               to deal with citizenship and all questions connected with
               it is not impaired by the rest of the provisions of the said
               Part. Therefore, the sovereign legislative competence of
               the Parliament to deal with the topic of citizenship which
               is a part of Entry 17 in List I of the Seventh Schedule is
               very wide and not fettered by the provisions of Articles
               5 to 10 of Part II of the Constitution. This aspect of the
               matter may have relevance in dealing with the contention
               raised by the petitioners that their rights under Article 19
               are affected by the impugned provisions of Section 9(2)
               of the Act.”
                                                                          (emphasis supplied)
40. By the above observations, the Court did not read in a non-obstante
    clause in Article 11. This is clear from the observations in the
    subsequent paragraph where this Court discusses the alleged conflict
    between Article 9 of the Constitution and Section 9 of the Citizenship
    Act. Section 9 of the Citizenship Act provides that any person who has
    acquired citizenship of another country between the commencement
    of the Constitution and the commencement of the Act shall cease to
    be a citizen of India. While dealing with Section 9, this Court observed
    that Article 9 dealt with the acquisition of citizenship of a foreign
    State prior to the commencement of the Constitution. As opposed
    to Article 9, Section 9 dealt with the acquisition of citizenship after
    the commencement of the Constitution.51 Thus, the possibility of the
    provisions of parliamentary law conflicting with Article 9 (and other
    provisions of the Constitution) would not arise.52 In Izhar Ahmed


51   Also see State of UP v. Shah Mohammed (1969) 1 SCC 771 [5]
52   “12. […] There is no ambiguity about the effect of this Section. It is clear that the voluntary acquisition by
     an Indian citizen of the citizenship of another country terminates his citizenship of India, provided the said
     voluntary acquisition has taken place between 26th January, 1950 and the commencement of the Act or
     takes place thereafter. It would thus be seen that whereas Article 9 of the Constitution dealt with the
     acquisition of citizenship of a foreign State which had taken place prior to the commencement of
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                                1265

                 In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     (supra), the observations that statutory provisions on citizenship
     cannot be challenged on the ground of violation of provisions in Part
     II cannot be interpreted as a reading in of a non-obstante clause in
     Article 11. Provisions of the Parliamentary law on citizenship cannot
     be challenged on the ground of violation of the provisions of Part II
     because the constitutional provisions on citizenship are redundant
     for all purposes after the commencement of the Constitution. Though
     in the context of Article 11 the use of the non-obstante clause and
     the phrase ‘shall not derogate from’ will produce the same result, it
     is important to clarify the distinct usage of the phrases.
41. Similarly, the reason that Article 11 does not include a clause (similar
    to Article 4(2)) that the law shall not be deemed to be an amendment
    of the Constitution for the purpose of Article 368 is because there
    is no possibility of the law amending the constitutional provisions in
    Part II in view of the temporal limit of all the provisions.
42. In view of the discussion above, I have reached the following
    conclusions: (a) Section 6A of the Citizenship Act does not have
    the effect of amending Articles 6 and 7; and (b) Article 11 is not
    a non-obstante clause. However, since the Constitution confers
    citizenship only at the commencement of the Constitution, the law
    enacted in exercise of the power under Article 246 read with Entry
    17 of List I and the constitutional provisions on citizenship operate
    in different fields.

     ii.     Section 6A is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution
43. The petitioners submitted that Section 6A is violative of Article 14 on
    three grounds: (a) Section 6A is under-inclusive because it confers
    citizenship only to migrants to Assam; (b) there was no justification to
    single out Assam to the exclusion of other border States that border
    Bangladesh since they all form a homogenous class; and (c) the
    provision prescribes a different cut-off date for granting citizenship
    to migrants who enter Assam as opposed to other States.


    the Constitution, Section 9 of the Act deals with acquisition of foreign citizenship subsequent to
    the commencement of the Constitution. There is, therefore, no doubt that the Constitution does
    not favour plural or dual citizenship and just as in regard to the period prior to the Constitution,
    Article 9 prevents a person who had voluntarily acquired the citizenship of foreign country from
    claiming the status of an Indian citizen, so does Section 9(1) make a similar provision in regard to
    the period subsequent to the commencement of the Constitution. [Emphasis supplied]
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44. Thus, while deciding the Article 14 challenge, this Court must decide
    on the following three issues:
      a.      Whether Section 6A is underinclusive because it grants
              citizenship only to migrants from Bangladesh to Assam;
      b.      Whether all Indian States bordering Bangladesh form a
              ‘homogenous class’ for the purposes of the law such that Assam
              alone could not have been singled out; and
      c.      Whether the cut-off date of 25 March 1971 is arbitrary.

      a.      The legal regime under the Citizenship Act 1955 governing
              migrants
45. In this section, I will discuss the provisions of the Citizenship Act,
    in particular the provisions relating to migrants of Indian origin.
    There was a legal limbo on the acquisition of citizenship between
    the commencement of the Constitution and the enactment of the
    Citizenship Act in 1955. Parliament enacted the Citizenship Act to
    provide for the acquisition and determination of Indian citizenship.
    The Citizenship Act provides the following methods for acquiring
    citizenship, namely by: (a) birth;53 (b) descent;54 (c) registration;55
    (d) naturalisation;56 and (e) incorporation of territory.57 Section 5(1)
    provides a fairly simple and easy method for acquiring citizenship.
    Citizenship could be acquired through registration if any of the
    following conditions are satisfied:
      a.      Persons of Indian origin who are ordinarily resident in India
              and have been so resident for six months immediately before
              making an application for registration;
      b.      Persons of Indian origin who are ordinarily resident in any
              country or place outside undivided India;
      c.      Women who are, or have been, married to citizens of India;
      d.      Minor children of persons who are citizens of India; and


53   Citizenship Act 1955; Section 3
54   Citizenship Act 1955; Section 4
55   Citizenship Act 1955; Section 5
56   Citizenship Act 1955; Section 6
57   Citizenship Act 1955; Section 7
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                               1267

                    In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


      e.      Persons of full age and capacity who are citizens of a country
              specified in the First Schedule.
      According to the provision, a person shall be deemed to be of Indian
      origin if he, or either of his parents, or of his grand-parents were
      born in undivided India.58 Thus, refugees from either West or East
      Pakistan would undoubtedly be covered within the meaning of the
      word ‘Indian origin’. Section 5(1) creates two classes with respect
      to persons of Indian origin. Section 5(1)(b) deals with persons of
      Indian Origin who are ordinarily resident in undivided India. Any
      person of Indian Origin who is an ordinary resident of any country
      other than West and East Pakistan can acquire citizenship through
      registration in terms of Section 5(1)(b). Indian origin migrants from
      either West or East Pakistan who were ordinarily resident in India
      for six months could acquire citizenship through registration in terms
      of Section 5(1)(a). Section 5(1)(e) enables a citizen of any of the
      countries listed in the First Schedule of the Act to acquire citizenship
      through registration. Pakistan was one of the countries listed in the
      Schedule. Section 5(1)(e) read with the First Schedule enabled a
      migrant who was a citizen of Pakistan to acquire citizenship. Thus,
      migrants from Pakistan could acquire citizenship in terms of Section
      5(1)(a) and Section 5(1)(e).
46. In exercise of the power conferred by Section 18 of the Citizenship
    Act, the Central Government notified the Citizenship Rules 1956.59
    The 1956 Rules prescribed a form in which an application for
    registration as a citizen of India under Section 5(1)(a) would have to
    be made. The form requested the submission of, inter alia, passport
    and visa details, if any.60 The form had a separate part (Part II) for
    migrants from Pakistan. It requested, inter alia, the following details:
    (a) profession or occupation while residing in Pakistan; (b) whether
    the applicant applied for long term visa for permanent resettlement
    earlier; (c) whether the applicant was residing in the territory now
    included in India or Pakistan at the time of partition; and (e) places
    of residence in India prior to migration. The 1956 Rules (in particular
    the details required in the Part II of Form I) make it clear that


58   Citizenship Act 1955; Explanation to Section 5(1)
59   “1956 Rules”
60   Requests the name of the father, mother, address of ordinary residence, profession, description of
     immovable property(s) and details of family members who are staying in India.
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       migrants from East and West Pakistan could apply for citizenship
       under Article 5(1)(a). Even before the 1956 Rules were framed,
       the Deputy Secretary (Home Affairs) issued ‘urgent’ instructions to
       the various state governments directing them to make ‘immediate
       arrangements for registration of ‘displaced persons’ under Section 5(1)
       (a) of the Citizenship Act.61 In 1958, another notification was issued
       by the Ministry of Home Affairs that it was not necessary to insist on
       acceptance of surrender of Pakistani passports before registration is
       made.62 In a reply issued in 1958 to a query, the Ministry of Home
       Affairs also clarified that authorities can register minorities without
       Pakistani passports or travel documents.63 Thus, Section 5(1)(a)
       along with the 1956 Rules and the various executive notifications
       facilitated the registration of migrants (including undocumented
       migrants) from East and West Pakistan as citizens. The 1956 Rules
       did not prescribe Rules for registration under Section 5(1)(e) of the
       Citizenship Act. Irrespective of the manner in which Section 5(1)(a) and
       Section 5(1)(e) of the Citizenship Act were implemented, the provisions
       enabled the registration of both documented and undocumented
       migrants to India from East and West Pakistan.
47. In fact, the Citizenship Act was viewed by the members of the
    Parliament as an enactment that would put an end to the limbo
    on granting citizenship to migrants from East and West Pakistan.
    Sentiments that refugees should not even be required to register also
    prevailed in Parliament. Thakurdas Bhargava noted that “registration
    is only for those who are not real citizens of India nor are rooted in
    the land of India not having a domicile in this country, not wanting to




61   See the Executive instructions issued in the letter from the Deputy Secretary (Home) dated 14 June
     1956. File no. 10/1/56, MHA-IC, NAI. Also see Anupama Roy, Mapping Citizenship in India,
62   See Express letter dated 11 April 1958 from the government of West Bengal to the Minisitry of Home
     Affairs, IC Section. File no. 4/65/58, MHA-IC, NAI
63   See Note dated 18 July 1958, Ministry of Home Affairs (IC Section) File no. 4/65/58, MHA-IC, NAI
     “the persons about whom the present reference has been made belong to the minority community in
     Pakistan and are stated to have sworn declarations renouncing their Pakistani nationality. It is also stated
     in the M.E.A.’s letter no. F6(44)/57-PSP, dated 14.4.58 that in most of these cases their permanent
     settlement in India would eventually be granted. Their present ineligibility for registration under section
     5(10(a) of the Citizenship Act is therefore only technical… in cases where the applicants belonging to the
     minority community in Pakistan are staying on in India swearing affidavits that they have surrendered/lost
     their Pakistani passports, it was for the authorities to satisfy themselves that the intention was to permit
     the persons concerned to stay on indefinitely in India or the applicants have severed all connections
     with Pakistan and intend to settle down permanently in India; and in cases where the authorities are so
     satisfied, the applicants can be registered under section 5(1)(a).”
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                                       1269

                   In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       return to any other country.”64 HN Mukherjee, a member from north-
       east Calcutta claimed that registration would involve substantial cost
       and travel which would create difficulties for refugees.65
48. In National Human Rights Commission v. State of Arunachal
    Pradesh,66 proceedings under Article 32 were initiated, inter alia,
    claiming that the citizenship applications under Article 5(1)(a) of
    persons belonging to the Chakma group were not being processed.
    The people belonging to the Chakmas were migrants from
    Bangladesh. The Union Government had conveyed its decision to
    confer citizenship to persons belonging to the Chakma group under
    Section 5(1)(a) of the Citizenship Act. A three-Judge Bench observed
    that they can seek citizenship under Article 5(1)(a) and directed that
    the applications must be forwarded by the Collector to the Registering
    Authority. In Committee for Citizenship Rights of the Chakmas of
    Arunachal Pradesh v. State of Arunachal Pradesh,67 proceedings
    under Article 32 were instituted requiring the State to comply with
    the earlier directions on grant of citizenship to Chakma and Hajong
    refugees who migrated from Assam to Arunachal Pradesh. The
    petition was allowed directing the Government of India and the State
    of Arunachal Pradesh to finalise the conferment of citizenship rights
    to persons of the Chakmas and Hajong groups.68
49. This was the position of law until the enactment of the Citizenship
    (Amendment) Act 200369 which was notified on 7 January 2004. The
    2003 Citizenship Amendment Act amended Section 2(1)(b) to define
    the term illegal migrant.70 An illegal migrant was defined to mean
    a foreigner who entered India (a) without a valid passport or other


64   Citizenship Bill, Parliamentary Debates, New Delhi, 3 December 1955, p.1176.
65   Ibid, p. 1089; See Haimanti Roy, Partitioned Lives: Migrants, Refugees, Citizens in India and Pakistan,
     1947-1965 Pg. 134-135
66   [1996] 1 SCR 278 : (1996) 1 SCC 742
67   [2015] 9 SCR 1020 : (2016) 15 SCC 540
68   Also see the decision of the Gauhati High Court in Shah Muhammad Anwar Ali v. State of Assam, 2014
     SCC OnLine Gau 103. The High Court held that Section 5(1)(a) of the Citizenship Act permitted the
     registration of the undocumented migrants of Indian Origin until the amendment in 2003.
69   “2003 Amendment Act”
70   “illegal migrant means a foreigner who has entered into India- (i) without a valid passport or other travel
     documents and such other document or authority as may be prescribed by or under any law in that
     behalf; or (ii) with a valid passport or other travel documents and such other document or authority
     as may be prescribed by or under any law in that behalf but remains therein beyond the permitted
     period of time.”
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       travel documents prescribed by law; or (b) with a valid passport and
       travel documents but has overstayed. The 2003 Amendment Act also
       amended Sections 5 and 6 of the Act to exclude illegal immigrants from
       acquiring citizenship by naturalisation and registration. Sections 5
       and 6 of the Citizenship Act, after the amendments introduced by
       the 2003 Amendment Act now expressly bar illegal migrants from
       acquiring citizenship by registration or naturalisation.71 In addition to
       the amendments excluding illegal immigrants, the enactment also
       deleted Section 5(1)(e) which permitted the registration by citizens
       of countries specified in the First Schedule.
50. It is clear from the above discussion that undocumented migrants
    could be registered as Indian citizens under the Citizenship Act until
    the enactment of the 2003 Amendment Act which came into force
    on 3 December 2004 by which the class of ‘illegal immigrants’ was
    excluded from acquiring citizenship.

       b.      The legal regime governing migrants from East and West
               Pakistan to Assam
51. The legal regime on citizenship must be read alongside other laws
    that deal with migrants. On 23 November 1946, the Foreigners
    Act 194672 was enacted to confer upon the Central Government
    certain powers in respect of foreigners. A ‘foreigner’ was defined
    as a person who is not a natural born British subject as defined in
    Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 1 of the British Nationality and
    Status of Aliens Act of 1914 or who was not granted a certificate
    of naturalization as a British subject under Indian law.73 Section 3
    conferred the Central Government the power to make provisions
    for prohibiting, regulating or restricting the entry of foreigners to
    India.74 In exercise of the power under Section 3, the Central


71   Citizenship Act 1955; Section 5: “Subject to the provisions of this section and such other conditions and
     restrictions as may be prescribed, the Central Government may, on an application made in this behalf,
     register as a citizen of India any person not being an illegal migrant […]”; Section 6” Where an application
     is made in the prescribed manner by any person of full age and capacity not being an illegal migrant […]”
72   “Foreigners Act”
73   The Foreigners Act 1946, Section 2(a)
74   Section 3(2): In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, orders made
     under this section may provide that the foreigner—
     (a) shall not enter [India] or shall enter [India] only at such times and by such route and at such port or
     place and subject to the observance of such conditions on arrival as may be prescribed;
     (b) shall not depart from [India], or shall depart only at such times and by such route and from such port
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                                        1271

                   In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       government notified the Foreigners Order 1948.75 In terms of the
       Foreigners Order, foreigners can enter India only at such port or
       other place of entry on the borders of India as the registration
       officer having jurisdiction at that port or place may appoint.76 The
       Order also provides that a foreigner can enter only with the leave
       of the civil authority having jurisdiction77 and leave will be refused
       if the foreigner is not in possession of a valid passport or visa.78
       Thus, every migrant without a valid visa, irrespective of the country
       from which they migrated and the Indian State to which they have
       migrated, was refused permission to enter India.
52. However, the Foreigners Act when it was enacted did not apply to
    migrants from West and East Pakistan since they were also British
    subjects. The definition of ‘Foreigner’ in the Act was amended by
    Act 11 of 1957 to mean a person who is not a citizen of India. This
    amendment came into force from 19 January 1957.79 Thus, until
    1957, the Foreigners Act which provided the Central Government
    with the power to remove a migrant without legal documentation



     or place and subject to the observance of such conditions on departure as may be prescribed;
     (c) shall not remain in [India] or in any prescribed areas therein;
     [(cc) shall, if he has been required by order under this section not to remain in India, meet from any
     resources at his disposal the cost of his removal from India and of his maintenance therein pending
     such removal;]
     (d) shall remove himself to, and remain in, such area in [India] as may be prescribed;
     (e) shall comply with such conditions as may be prescribed or specified— (i) requiring him to reside in a
     particular place; (ii) imposing any restrictions on his movements; (iii) requiring him to furnish such proof
     of his identity and to report such particulars to such authority in such manner and at such time and place
     as may be prescribed or specified; (iv) requiring him to allow his photograph and finger impressions to be
     taken and to furnish specimens of his handwriting and signature to such authority and at such time and
     place as may be prescribed or specified; (v) requiring him to submit himself to such medical examination
     by such authority and at such time and place as may be prescribed or specified; (vi) prohibiting him from
     association with persons of a prescribed or specified description; (vii) prohibiting him from engaging
     in activities of a prescribed or specified description; (viii) prohibiting him from using or possessing
     prescribed or specified articles; (ix) otherwise regulating his conduct in any such particular as may be
     prescribed or specified;
     (f) shall enter into a bond with or without sureties for the due observance of, or as an alternative to the
     enforcement of, any or all prescribed or specified restrictions or conditions;
     [(g) shall be arrested and detained or confined;] and may make provision [for any matter which is to
     be or may be prescribed and] for such incidental and supplementary matters as may, in the opinion
     of the Central Government, be expedient or necessary for giving effect to this Act. 4 [(3) Any authority
     prescribed in this behalf may with respect to any particular foreigner make orders under clause (e) 5 [or
     clause (f)] of sub-section (2).]
75   “Foreigners Order”
76   Foreigners Order 1948; Paragraph 3 (1)(a)
77   Foreigners Order 1948; Paragraph 3 (1)(b)
78   Foreigners Order 1948; Paragraph 3(2)(a)
79   Act 11 of 1957, Section 2
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      from the soil of India did not apply to migrants from West and
      East Pakistan. However, even before the immigrants from West
      and East Pakistan were considered ‘foreigners’ for the purpose of
      the Foreigners Act, Parliament enacted the Immigrants (Expulsion
      from Assam) Act 1950. The Statement of Objects and Reasons
      states that the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act 1950 was
      enacted to deal with the large scale immigration of migrants from
      East Bengal to Assam:
              "During the last few months a serious situation had arisen
              from the immigration of a large number of East Bengal
              residents into Assam. Such large migration is disturbing
              the economy of the Province, besides giving rise to a
              serious law and order problem. The Bill seeks to confer
              necessary powers on the Central Government to deal
              with the situation.”
53. The enactment granted the Central Government the power to remove
    any person or class of persons who came into Assam and whose
    stay is detrimental to the interests of Assam.80 The enactment carved
    out an exception with respect to any person who was displaced from
    any area in Pakistan (which includes the present day Pakistan and
    Bangladesh) on account of civil disturbances or the fear of it.81 It is
    crucial to note that this Act only applied to immigrants in Assam and
    not the rest of India. Shri Gopalaswami, while introducing the Bill,
    explained the objective for singling out Assam as follows:
              "The Bill itself is a simple one. In the State of Assam,
              particularly after the Partition, the influx of persons
              from outside Assam into that State has been assuming
              proportions which have caused apprehensions to the
              Government and the people of Assam as to the disturbance
              that such an influx would cause to their economy. The
              Assam Government brought this fact to the notice of the
              Central government in 1949, and since then, the matter
              has been under examination; a number of conferences
              and discussions have been held, some with Pakistan,
              others between central Government and the State


80   The Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act 1950; Section 2
81   The Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act 1950; proviso to Section 2
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                              1273

                  In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


              Government. Various suggestions were considered. […]
              it was finally settled in consultation with them that instead
              of introducing a permit system which would control the
              entry of outsiders into Assam, we might take power to
              expel from Assam such foreign nationals who entered
              that State and whose continuance was likely to cause
              disturbance to its economy.”
54. The earlier draft of the Bill did not include an exception for ‘refugees’
    from East and West Pakistan. However, members of Parliament felt
    that the enactment must only cover those who migrate for “economical”
    reasons and not refugees who migrate because of civil disturbance
    caused due to the political instability in the aftermath of the partition.82
    The Parliamentary debates on the Bill elucidate that: (a) there were
    more migrants from Bangladesh because of the absence of a permit
    system for travel between East Pakistan and India; and (b) the influx
    was most profound in the Indian State of Assam compared to the other
    bordering states. It is crucial to note that the Immigrants (Expulsion
    from Assam) Act 1950 was enacted because the Foreigners Act did
    not include immigrants from Pakistan.83
55. The provisions of the Foreigners Act before the amendment in
    1957 and the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act 1950 indicate
    the lenient policy of India towards the refugees of West and East
    Pakistan in the aftermath of the partition of India. This must be read
    along with the legal regime governing citizenship in India upon the
    enactment of the Citizenship Act 1955 that permitted the registration
    of migrants from East and West Pakistan as citizens.
56. However, the huge influx of migrants from East Pakistan to Assam was
    not receding. On 25 December 1983, the Illegal Migrants (Determination
    by Tribunals) Act 198384 came into force. The preamble to the Act stated
    that the Act provided for the establishment of Tribunals to determine
    illegal immigrants. The Act was deemed to have come into force in
    Assam on 15 October 1983 and in any other State on such date as




82   Shri RK Choudhuri (Assam), Parliamentary Debates: Official Report (Volume 1, 1950), 318
83   See the response of Shri Gopalaswami to the question from Dr Deshmukh, Parliamentary Debates:
     Official Report (Volume 1, 1950), 336
84   “IMDT Act”
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      may be notified by Central Government.85 Thus, unlike the Immigrants
      (Expulsion from Assam) Act 1950, the IMDT Act applied to the whole
      of India. Section 3(c) of the IMDT Act defined an illegal migrant as
      a person who has satisfied each of the following criteria (a) entered
      India on or after 25 March 1971; (b) is a foreigner; and (c) entered
      India without being in possession of a valid passport or other travel
      document or any other lawful authority. The date on which a person
      becomes an illegal immigrant according to the IMDT Act, that is 25
      March 1971 is the same as the date prescribed in Section 6A of the
      Citizenship Act for acquiring citizenship. Section 4 gave the IMDT Act
      overriding effect notwithstanding anything in the Passport (Entry into
      India) Act 1920, the Foreigners Act 1946, the Immigrants (Expulsion
      from Assam) Act 1950 or the Passports Act 1967. In terms of Section
      1, the Act applies to the whole of India. The Central Government in
      exercise of the power under Section 1 of the Act, however, did not
      enforce the Act in any other Indian State. The special provisions in the
      form of the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act 1950 and the IMDT
      Act clearly elucidate that the huge influx of migrants from Bangladesh
      to Assam has always been a ‘cause for concern’ and Parliament has
      taken steps to address the issue previously.
57. The above discussion of the provisions governing migrants, and in
    particular, migrants from Bangladesh elucidates the balance that
    Parliament has sought to draw between its humanitarian view towards
    migrants of Indian origin from Bangladesh and the impact of the huge
    influx on the economic and cultural resources of Indian States. With
    this background, I proceed to determine the constitutional validity of
    Section 6A on the anvil of Article 14.

      c.      The scope of judicial review under Article 14
58. Before I proceed to deal with the issues, it is necessary that I summarise
    the scope of judicial review under Article 14. Courts have traditionally
    tested laws and executive actions for violation of Article 14 on the




85   The Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act 1983; Section 1(3): “It shall be deemed to have
     come into force in the State of Assam on the 15th day of October, 1983 and in any other State on such
     date as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint and different dates
     may be appointed for different States and references in this Act to the commencement of this Act shall be
     construed in relation to any State as reference to the date of commencement of this Act in such State.”
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                                1275

                  In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


      grounds of unreasonable classification86 and arbitrariness.87 Courts
      have adopted the two-prong test for unreasonable classification88 and
      the manifest arbitrariness standard.89 In Association for Democratic
      Reforms v. Union of India,90 writing for three other Judges of the
      Constitution Bench, I explained that the test of manifest arbitrariness
      includes the following two applications:91
      a.      The determination of whether the provision lacks an “adequate
              determining principle” or if the adequate determining principle
              is not in consonance with constitutional values; and
      b.      If the provision does not make a classification by identifying
              the degrees of harm.
      These two applications have in the past also been subsumed in
      the traditional two-prong Article 14 analysis. In State of West
      Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar,92 Justice S R Das observed that
      there must be a yardstick to differentiate those included in and
      excluded from the class.93 Since then, in addition to inquiring if
      there is a yardstick, this Court has also adopted a more intensive
      analysis of the yardstick adopted in the backdrop of constitutional
      values and provisions. For example, in the context of determining
      the backward class for the purpose of Article 15(4), this Court has
      held that a yardstick which measures social backwardness must
      be adopted.94 The degree of scrutiny of the yardstick used hinges
      on the nature of the right alleged to be violated. For example,
      the legislature has a greater latitude to choose the yardstick for
      classification in fiscal matters.95 However, the Court has adopted
      a stringent standard in determining the ‘rationality’ of the yardstick


86   See Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri SR Tandolkar 1958 SCC OnLine SC 6; Moorthy Match Works v.
     CCE (1974) 4 SCC 428; State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952) 1 SCC 1
87   EP Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974) 4 SCC 3; Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Seheravardi (1981) 1
     SCC 722; State of Andhra Pradesh v. McDowell (1996) 3 SCC 709
88   Anwali Ali Sarkar (supra)
89   Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 1; Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) 10 SCC 1
90   [2024] 2 SCR 420 : 2024 INSC 113
91   [2024] 2 SCR 420 : 2024 INSC 113 [194-195]
92   [1952] 1 SCR 284 : (1952) 1 SCC 1
93   Anwali Ali Sarkar (supra) [66]
94   State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, 2024 INSC 562
95   Kerala Hotel and Restaurant Association v. State of Kerala (1990) 2 SCC 502
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       in matters which deal with constitutional rights.96 The standard of
       review to be adopted by courts must thus depend on the nature
       of the right which is alleged to be infringed.
59. A classification is constitutionally permissible if the following two prong
    test is satisfied: First, there must be an intelligible differentia between
    those forming a group and those left out. Second, the differentia must
    have a reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved. The
    Court now, within the traditional two-prong test has advocated for a
    more substantial inquiry that subsumes the following prongs:
       a.     Objective: The Courts test the (i) genuineness of the objective
              by making a distinction between the ostensible objective and the
              real objective.97 The ostensible purpose is the purpose which
              is claimed by the State and the real purpose is the purpose
              identified by Courts based on the surrounding circumstances;98
              and (ii) unreasonableness of the objective by determining if it
              is discriminatory.99
       b.     Means: The Courts undertake the following analysis while
              identifying the means: (i) whether there is a yardstick (that is,
              the basis) to differentiate those included and others excluded
              from the group;100 (ii) whether the yardstick is in compliance
              with constitutional provisions and values;101 (iii) whether all those
              similarly situated based on the yardstick have been grouped
              together;102 and (iv) whether the yardstick has a rational nexus
              with the objective.103



96   Navtej Singh Johar (supra), See opinion of Justice Indu Malhotra [14.9]
97   Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2019) 3 SCC 39
98   See Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 113 [194]; Also see the opinions
     of Justice Chandrachud, Justice Malhotra and Justice Nariman in Navtej Singh Johar (supra) and Justice
     Chandrachud and Nariman in Joseph Shine (supra).
99   See Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao, 1973 1 SCC 500 “26. […] The object itself cannot be
     discriminatory, for otherwise, for instance, if the object is to discriminate against one section of the
     minority the discrimination cannot be justified on the ground that there is a reasonable classification
     because it has rational relation to the object sought to be achieved.”
100 Anwar Ali Sarkar (supra) (1952) 1 SCC 1, [Das J, 66].
101 See State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, 2024 INSC 562; Opinion of Justice Malhotra in Navtej Singh
    Johar (supra)
102 See Arun Kumar v. Union of India (2007) 1 SCC 732; G Sadasivan Nair v. Cochin University of Science
    and Technology (2022) 4 SCC 404
103 Anwar Ali Sarkar (supra)
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                                        1277

                    In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


        d.      The scope of judicial review of under-inclusive provisions
60. To determine if Section 6A is violative of Article 14 on the ground of
    under-inclusiveness, the scope of judicial review on the ground of
    under-inclusion first needs to be set out.
61. A provision is under-inclusive if it fails to regulate all those who
    are part of the problem that the legislature seeks to address and is
    over-inclusive if it regulates somebody/something that is not a part of
    the problem.104 That is, under-inclusiveness and over-inclusiveness
    depends on whether those who are similarly situated have not
    been included or those who are not similarly situated have been
    included. In State of Gujarat v. Ambica Mills,105 this Court dealt
    with the argument of under-inclusiveness for the first time. In this
    case, the definition of the phrase ‘establishment’ in the Bombay
    Labour Welfare Fund Act 1953 was challenged on the ground of
    under-inclusiveness. The enactment defined an ‘establishment’ to
    mean (a) a factory; (b) a tramway or motor omnibus service; and
    (c) any establishment including a society or a trust which employs
    more than fifty persons but not to include an establishment (not
    being a factory) of the Central or State Government. The enactment
    provided for the constitution of a Fund to finance activities to promote
    labour welfare. The definition of ‘establishment’ was challenged for
    being under-inclusive since it excluded places that employed less
    than fifty persons.
62. Justice K K Mathew, writing for the Constitution bench observed that
    to identify if a provision is under-inclusive or over-inclusive, the Court
    must determine if all persons similarly situated for the purpose of law
    have been grouped.106 This Court observed that while dealing with a
    challenge on the ground of under-inclusiveness, the administrative


104 See State of Tamil Nadu v. National South Indian River Inter-linking,(2021) 15 SCC 534 [32] ; State
    of Gujarat v. Ambica Mills (1974) 4 SCC 656 [55] “A classification is under-inclusive when all who are
    included in the class are tainted with the mischief but there are others also tainted whom the classification
    does not include. In other words, a classification is bad as under-inclusive when a State benefits or
    burdens persons in a manner that furthers a legitimate purpose but does not confer the same benefit
    or place the same burden on others who are similarly situated. A classification is over-inclusive when
    it includes not only those who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose but others who are not
    so situated as well. In other words, this type of classification imposes a burden upon a wider range of
    individuals than are included in the class of those attended with mischief at which the law aims.”
105 [1974] 3 SCR 760 : (1974) 4 SCC 656
106 [1974] 3 SCR 760 : (1974) 4 SCC 656 [55]
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       convenience of the State must be taken into consideration. The
       learned Judge referred to the observations of Justice Oliver Wendell
       Holmes in Missouri Kansas & Texas Railway v. May107 that the
       Courts must be deferential to under-inclusive legislation.
63. On the facts of the case, Justice Mathew observed that the justification
    of the State for under-inclusion, that unpaid accumulations will be
    less in establishments which employ less than fifty persons and it
    would not be sufficient to meet administrative costs, was fair and
    reasonable.108 In Ambica Mills (supra), this Court tested whether
    the under-inclusiveness was justified.
64. The reference to Missouri Kansas & Texas Railway (supra) must
    not be read detached from the context.109 In multiple places in the
    judgment, this Court observed that a deferential approach must
    be adopted in challenges to laws dealing with economic activity.110
    This is also evident from the manner in which this Court dealt with
    the argument of over-inclusion. It was contended that the definition
    of ‘establishment’ was over-inclusive because it included tramways
    and omnibuses The Court rejected the argument on the ground
    that judicial deference must be shown in challenges dealing with
    economic policy.111 Thus, the observations of this Court in Ambica
    Mills (supra) on judicial deference to under-inclusive provisions must
    be read in light of the established position of this Court that it must
    defer in matters relating to economic policy.112
65. In Missouri Kansas & Texas Rly (supra), the constitutional validity
    of a Texas Statute113 imposing penalty on railroad companies for


107 194 US 297, 269
108 [1974] 3 SCR 760 : (1974) 4 SCC 656 [69]
109 [1974] 3 SCR 760 : (1974) 4 SCC 656 [56] […] “Mr Justice Holmes, in urging tolerance of under-inclusive
    classifications, stated that such legislation should not be disturbed by the Court unless it can clearly see
    that there is no fair reason for the law which would not require with equal force its extension to those
    whom it leaves untouched.”
110 [1974] 3 SCR 760 : (1974) 4 SCC 656 [64-67]; “64. Laws regulating economic activity would be viewed
    differently from laws which touch and concern freedom of speech and religion, voting, procreation, rights
    with respect to criminal procedure, etc.”
111   [1974] 3 SCR 760 : (1974) 4 SCC 656 [72]; Also see John Sebastian, Under inclusive Laws and
      Constitutional Remedies- An Exploration of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act 2019, Indian Law Review
      [Volume 7 Issue 3 (2023)]
112 Ugad Sugar Works Limited v. Delhi Administration (2001) 3 SCC 635; State of Tamil Nadu v. National
    South Indian River Inter-linking,(2021) 15 SCC 534
113 Fourteenth Amendment of chapter 117 of the Laws of Texas of 1901
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                                   1279

                   In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       permitting the spread of Johnson grass and Russian thistle was
       challenged. The law was challenged on the ground that it was
       under-inclusive since it only penalised railroad companies to the
       exclusion of others. Justice Holmes writing for the majority of the US
       Supreme Court observed that Court should interfere only when there
       is no fair reason for the under-inclusion. The Court then identified
       numerous reasons for why the Railway Company may be singled
       out when compared to owners of farms who have an element of
       self-interest.114 Thus, Missouri Kansas & Texas Rly (supra) is also
       not an authority for the proposition that the scope of judicial review
       for under-inclusive law is limited.
66. The degree of judicial deference to any provision, including
    under-inclusive provisions depends on the subject matter of the case.
    In Joseph Shine v. Union of India,115 the constitutional validity of
    Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 was challenged on the
    ground of violation of Articles 14 and 15. Section 497 defined the
    offence of adultery as when a person has sexual intercourse with a
    woman, whom he knows or has reason to believe to be the wife of
    another man, without the consent of that man. One of the contentions
    was that the provision was under-inclusive since it only dealt with a
    situation where a man had sexual intercourse with a married woman
    without the consent of the husband but not the other way around, that
    is a woman having sexual intercourse with a married man without the
    consent of his wife. The Constitution Bench tested the provision by
    applying a high standard of review. This Court held that there was
    no rational yardstick for the classification116 and that the yardstick
    was steeped in gender stereotypes where a woman is considered
    to not have any agency.117 In my concurring opinion, I noted that the
    problem with Section 497 was not just its ‘under inclusion’ but the
    impact of the under-inclusion of subjugating a woman to a position



114 “But it may have been found […] that the seed is dropped in such quantities as to cause special trouble.
    It may be that the neglected strips occupied by railroads afford a ground where noxious strips occupied
    by railroads afford a ground where noxious weeds flourish, and that whereas self-interest leads to the
    owners of farms to keep down pests, the railroad companies have done nothing in a matter which
    concerns their neighbors only.”
115 [2018] 11 SCR 765 : (2019) 3 SCC 39
116 See [2018] 11 SCR 765 : (2019) 3 SCC 39 [Chief Justice Misra, writing for himself and Justice Khanwilkar
    [23]]
117 [2018] 11 SCR 765 : (2019) 3 SCC 39 [Justice DY Chandrachud [35]]
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       of inferiority.118 A high standard of scrutiny was applied to test the
       validity of an under-inclusive provision.
67. In Basheer v. State of Kerala,119 the constitutional validity of the
    proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 41 of the Narcotic Drugs and
    Psychotropic Substances (Amendment) Act 2001120 was under
    challenge. By the 2001 Amendment, the sentence for offences
    under the NDPS Act was altered. Section 41, included by the 2001
    Amendment, provided that the amended provisions shall apply to
    all pending cases before the court as on 2 October 2001 and all
    cases under investigation. The proviso to the provision excluded
    cases pending in appeal. The exclusion of the category of cases in
    the proviso was challenged on the ground of under-inclusiveness.
    Justice B N Srikrishna, writing for the two-Judge Bench observed
    that the classification could not be held to be unreasonable due
    to ‘marginal over-inclusiveness or under-inclusiveness’. 121 This
    principle flows from the established judicial position that Article 14
    does not require classifications with ‘mathematical precision’.122 This
    observation does not lead to the conclusion that under-inclusive
    provisions must be met with judicial deference. In Basheer (supra),
    this Court observed that the guiding principle of the provision was
    the conclusion of the trial since the application of the amended
    provision to pending appeals would reopen concluded trials.123 In
    this case, the court determined the yardstick of classification based
    on the reading of the provision(s) and observed that the yardstick
    was reasonable. Based on the yardstick, it was concluded that there
    was no case for under-inclusion.
68. The following principles emerge from the discussions above:
       a.     There is no general principle that the constitutional validity
              of under-inclusive provisions must be assessed with judicial
              deference;



118 [2018] 11 SCR 765 : (2019) 3 SCC 39 [Justice DY Chandrachud [11]
119 [2003] Supp. 1 SCR 580 : (2004) 3 SCC 609
120 “2001 Amendment”
121 [2003] Supp. 1 SCR 580 : (2004) 3 SCC 609 [20]
122 Gauri Shanker v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 349; Anant Mills v. State of Gujarat (1975) 2 SCC 175
123 [2003] Supp. 1 SCR 580 : (2004) 3 SCC 609 [23].
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                In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


     b.       The degree of judicial scrutiny of an under-inclusive provision
              depends on the subject matter. The Courts must adopt a higher
              degree of judicial scrutiny if the law deals with core rights of
              individuals or groups (as opposed to economic policy); and
     c.       The determination of the yardstick for classification will help
              in the assessment of whether a provision is under-inclusive or
              over-inclusive. The yardstick must have a nexus with the object
              and must be in consonance with constitutional principles. If the
              yardstick satisfies the test, then the State must determine if
              all persons/situations similarly situated based on the yardstick
              have been included. The State must on the submission of
              cogent reason justify if those who are similarly situated have
              not been included (under-inclusiveness) or those who are not
              similarly situated have been included (over-inclusiveness). The
              degree of justification that the State is required to discharge
              depends on the subject-matter of the law, that is whether the
              matter deals with economic policy or fiscal matters, whether it
              is a beneficial provision such as a labour provision or whether
              it deals with the core or innate traits of individuals. The degree
              of justification is the least for economic policy, higher for a
              beneficial provision and the highest if it infringes upon the core
              or innate trait of individuals.

     e.       The legislative objective of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act
69. The preamble to the Citizenship (Amendment) Act 1985 by which
    Section 6A was included states that the amendment was made for the
    “purpose of giving effect to certain provisions of the Memorandum of
    Settlement relating to the foreigners issue in Assam (Assam Accord)
    which was laid before the Houses of Parliament on the 16th day of
    August 1985.” The Assam Accord was entered into in the backdrop
    of numerous agitations led by All Assam Students Union124 and
    All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad125 against the migration from
    Bangladesh to Assam. The movement saw foreigners as a threat to
    Assamese political power and as contenders of the scarce economic


124 “AASU”
125 “AAGSP”
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       opportunities.126 In January 1980, the student leaders met Ms Indira
       Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India for negotiation talks and
       demanded the detection and deportation of foreigners who had
       come to live in Assam since 1951.127 On 15 August 1985, the Union
       Government and the leaders of the movement signed the Assam
       Accord.128
70. The preamble to the Accord stipulates that the settlement was reached
    “keeping all aspects of the problem including constitutional and legal
    provisions, international agreements, national commitments and
    humanitarian consideration”. On the foreigners issue, the following
    settlement was arrived at:
                "5.1 For purposes of detection and deletion of foreigners,
                1.1.1966 shall be the base date and year.
                5.2 All persons who came to Assam prior to 1.1.1966,
                including those amongst them whose names appeared
                on the electoral rolls used in 1967 elections, shall be
                regularised.
                5.3 Foreigners who came to Assam after 1.1.1966
                (inclusive) and upto 24th March, 1971 shall be detected
                in accordance with the provisions of the Foreigners Act,
                1946 and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order 1964.
                5.4 Names of foreigners so detected will be deleted from
                the electoral rolls in force. Such persons will be required to
                register themselves before the Registration officers of the
                respective districts in accordance with the provisions of the
                Registration of Foreigners Act, 1939 and the Registration
                of Foreigners Rules, 1939.
                5.5 For this purpose, Government of India will undertake
                suitable strengthening of the governmental machinery.
                5.6 On the expiry of a period of ten year following the date
                of detection, the names of all such persons which have
                been deleted from the electoral rolls shall be restored.


126 Arupjyoti Saikia, The Quest for Modern Assam, (Penguin and Allen Lane) 455
127 Ibid, 449
128 Ibid, 489
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             In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


          5.7 All persons who were expelled, earlier, but have since
          re-entered illegally into Assam, shall be expelled.
          5.8 Foreigners who came to Assam on or after March 25,
          1971 shall continue to be detected, deleted and expelled
          in accordance with law. Immediate and practical steps
          shall be taken to expel such foreigners.
          5.9 The Government will give due consideration to certain
          difficulties expressed by the AASU/AAGSP regarding the
          implementation of the Illegal Migrants (Determination by
          Tribunals) Act, 1983.”
71. The provisions of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act are traceable to
    the Assam Accord. The Assam Accord, as explained above, was a
    political settlement between the Union of India (‘the executive’) and
    students groups in Assam. In an Article 14 challenge to a legislative
    provision, the court must identify the ‘legislative’ objective. The
    objective, against which this Court must test the validity of the law
    must be identified based on the circumstances surrounding the
    Assam Accord and the enactment of the legislation. Section 6A was
    included with the objective of reducing the influx of migrants to India
    and dealing with those who had already migrated. The Assam Accord
    was a political solution to the issue of growing migration and Section
    6A was a legislative solution. Section 6A must not be read detached
    from the previous legislation enacted by Parliament to deal with the
    problem of influx of migrants of Indian Origin that I have traced in
    the preceding sections. Section 6A is one more statutory intervention
    in the long list of legislation that balances the humanitarian needs
    of migrants of Indian Origin and the impact of such migration on
    economic and cultural needs of Indian States.

     f.   Section 6A is not violative of Article 14
72. Section 6A confers citizenship to migrants from Bangladesh to
    Assam before 25 March 1971. Two yardsticks are discernible
    from Section 6A: (a) migrants must have entered Assam; and (b)
    the entry of migrants must be before the cut-off date of 25 March
    1971. It first needs to be determined if the above two yardsticks are
    reasonable, have a nexus with the object and are in compliance
    with constitutional principles.
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73. Parliament, even before the enactment of the Citizenship (Amendment)
    Act 1995 has treated migration to the State of Assam as a cause of
    concern. Previous sections of this judgment trace the enactment of
    the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act 1950 and the IMDT Act
    which dealt with the specific problem of undocumented migration to
    Assam. The Central Government could have extended the application
    of the IMDT Act to any other State by a notification. However, no
    such notification was issued indicating that the immigration to Assam
    presented the Union with a unique problem in terms of magnitude
    and impact. Though other states such as West Bengal (2216.7 km),
    Meghalaya (443 km), Tripura (856 km) and Mizoram (318 km) share
    a larger border with Bangladesh as compared to Assam (263 km),
    the magnitude of influx to Assam and its impact on the cultural and
    political rights of the Assamese and Tribal populations is higher. The
    data submitted by the petitioners indicates that the total number of
    immigrants in Assam is approximately forty Lakhs, fifty seven Lakhs
    in West Bengal, thirty thousand in Meghalaya and three Lakh and
    twenty five thousand in Tripura.129 The impact of forty lakh migrants
    in Assam may conceivably be greater than the impact of fifty seven
    lakh migrants in West Bengal because of Assam’s lesser population
    and land area compared to West Bengal.
74. Similarly, the cut-off date of 25 March 1971 is also rational. Even
    before the enactment of Section 6A, the IMDT Act defined an
    ‘illegal immigrant’ as a person who entered India on or after 25
    March 1971 without travel documents. As noted above, the IMDT
    Act was not specific in its application to Assam. The enactment
    defined the phrase illegal immigrant for all States though the Central
    Government did not extend the provisions of the Act to other States.
    On 25 March 1971, the Pakistani Army launched Operation Search
    Light to curb the Bengali nationalist movement in East Pakistan.130
    The migrants before the operation were considered to be migrants
    of partition towards which India had a liberal policy. Migrants from
    Bangladesh after the said date were considered to be migrants of
    war and not partition. Thus, the cut-off date of 25 March 1971 is
    reasonable.


129 See Report of Governor of Assam Lt. Col S.K Sinha dated 8.11.1998 and Statement of Indrajeet Gupta,
    Union Home Minister in the Parliament dated 14.07.2004
130 M Rafiqul Islam, A Tale of Millions: Bangladesh Liberation War, 1971 (Bangladesh Books International)
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                  In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


75. Having held that both the cut-off date and the singling out of Assam
    is based on rational considerations, the next question is whether the
    yardsticks have a rational nexus with the object of the provision. The
    answer is in the affirmative. Since the migration from East Pakistan
    to Assam was in great numbers after the partition of undivided
    India and since the migration from East Pakistan after Operation
    Search-Light would increase, the yardstick has nexus with the
    objects of reducing migration and conferring citizenship to migrants
    of Indian origin. Section 6A would be under-inclusive only when all
    those who are similarly situated with respect to the object and on
    the application of the rational yardstick are not included. Similarly,
    the provision would be over-inclusive only when those who are not
    similarly situated with respect to these two parameters are included.
    That not being the case, Section 6A is neither under-inclusive nor
    over-inclusive.
76. Over-inclusiveness and under-inclusiveness must be determined
    based on whether there are similarly situated persons/situations
    who or which have not been included or have been included based
    on the yardstick identified. The determination cannot be made with
    reference to the objective without a reference to the yardstick. Doing
    so would limit the ability of the Legislature to identify the degrees
    of harm. The yardstick can be challenged where another yardstick
    affects or is related to the objective in a comparable manner.131
77. The last question which is required to be considered is whether
    granting ‘citizenship’ has any relevance to the problem identified,
    that is, migration crisis. It was submitted that if Assam is facing a
    migration crisis, the State must focus on removing the migrants
    instead of conferring them citizenship. To elucidate this point, the
    petitioners submitted that undocumented migrants in other States
    will not receive the benefit of citizenship and this would lead to a
    situation where migrants in other states would also move to Assam
    to secure the benefit of citizenship. This, it has been argued would
    not satisfy the object of the provision.
78. In the preceding section of this judgment, I have held that the
    Citizenship Act and the notifications issued by the Ministry of Home
    Affairs allowed the acquisition of citizenship by undocumented


131 See Williums-Yulee v. The Florida Bar, 575 US (2015) [opinion of Roberts J]
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       citizens through registration under Section 5(1)(a). This was the
       position until Section 5(1) was amended by the 2003 Amendment
       Act to exclude applications from ‘illegal immigrants’. Thus, the claim
       that undocumented migrants to other Indian States were not able to
       secure citizenship is erroneous. Section 6A carves out an exception
       in that regime for the State of Assam for the reasons discussed
       above. Even otherwise, conferring citizenship has a nexus since
       the legislative object of introducing Section 6A was not just to deal
       with the migration from Assam but to balance it with humanitarian
       considerations (including conferment of citizenship) for partition
       refugees.

       iii.    The challenge under Article 355
79. The petitioners urged that Section 6A violates Article 355 of the
    Constitution because: (a) Article 355 casts a duty on the Union to
    prevent external aggression; (b) the expression “external aggression”
    has been construed by a three-Judge Bench in Sarbananda
    Sonowal v. Union of India132 to include aggression caused due to
    external migration; and (c) instead of preventing external migration,
    Section 6A induces more migration into Assam. The judgment in
    Sarbananda Sonowal (supra) was cited to support the submission
    that the constitutional validity of a provision can be challenged for
    violation of Article 355.
80. Article 355 provides that it is the duty of the Union to protect States
    against external aggression and internal disturbance and ensure
    that the Government of every State is carried on in accordance
    with the provisions of the Constitution.133 In Sarbananda Sonowal
    (supra), proceedings were initiated under Article 32 to challenge
    the constitutional validity of the IMDT Act and the Illegal Migrants
    (Determination by Tribunals) Rules 1984.134 Their validity was
    challenged on the ground that the enactment and Rules which dealt
    with the detection of undocumented migrants in Assam were not as


132 [2005] Supp. 1 SCR 472 : (2005) 5 SCC 665
133 “355. Duty of the Union to protect States against external aggression and internal disturbance.- It shall
    be the duty of the Union to protect every State against external aggression and internal disturbance
    and to ensure that the government of every State is carried on in accordance with the provisions of this
    Constitution.”
134 “IMDT Rules”
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                  In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       effective as the Foreigners Act which applied to the rest of India. A
       three-Judge Bench of this Court allowed the writ petition and struck
       down the provisions of the IMDT Act and the IMDT Rules.
81. This Court observed that the Union has a constitutional obligation (or
    ‘duty’) to protect states from external aggression in view of Article 355.
    The three-Judge Bench held that the expression ‘aggression’ in
    Article 355 is of wide import and includes actions other than war,
    such as the inflow of a large number of persons from a neighbouring
    country.135 Referring to the Report of Lt. Colonel SK Sinha, the
    Bench observed that migration from Bangladesh to Assam has led
    to an alteration of the demographic pattern of the State, thereby
    reducing the Assamese into a minority in their own State. The Bench
    noted that since the State of Assam is facing “external aggression
    and internal disturbance” due to large-scale illegal migration of
    Bangladesh nationals, the Court must determine if the Union had
    “taken any measures for that purpose” in view of the constitutional
    mandate under Article 355.136 This Court then held that the IMDT
    Act and IMDT Rules are unconstitutional for violating Article 355:
              "67. The above discussion leads to irresistible conclusion
              that the provisions of the IMDT Act and the Rules made
              thereunder clearly negate the constitutional mandate
              contained in Article 355 of the Constitution, where a duty
              has been cast upon the Union of India to protect every
              State against external aggression and internal disturbance.
              The IMDT Act which contravenes Article 355 of the
              Constitutional, is therefore, wholly unconstitutional and
              must be struck down.”
82. The IMDT Act and Rules were held to be unconstitutional on the
    following grounds:
       a.     The procedure under the Foreigners Act and the Foreigners
              (Tribunals) Order 1964 is more effective for the identification
              and deportation of foreigners than the procedure prescribed by



135 Referred to the Statement of Dr Nagendra Singh, India’s representative in the Sixth Committee of the
    General Assembly on the Definition of Aggression; [2005] Supp. 1 SCR 472 : (2005) 5 SCC 665 [52-60]
136 [2005] Supp. 1 SCR 472 : (2005) 5 SCC 665 [63] “Having regard to this constitutional mandate, the
    question arises whether the Union of India has taken any measures for that purpose.”
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              the IMDT Act and the Rules.137 In particular, Section 9 of the
              Foreigners Act places the burden of proof of being an Indian
              citizen on the person concerned. The provisions of the IMDT
              Act and Rules are silent on the onus of proof;
       b.     In Assam, where the IMDT Act is applicable, only 10,015 persons
              were declared illegal migrants until 30 April 2000 though 3,10,759
              inquiries were initiated. However, in West Bengal where the
              Foreigners Act is applicable, 4,89,046 persons were deported
              between 1983 and November 1998. Thus, the numbers indicated
              that the implementation of the IMDT Act and Rules in Assam
              has made the identification and deportation of illegal migrants
              more difficult;138 and
       c.     The IMDT Act superseded the Immigrants (Expulsion from
              Assam) Act 1950 and the Passport (Entry into India) Act 1920
              which granted the Central Government the power to remove
              any person who entered Assam and who was detrimental to
              the interests of the State, and those who entered without a
              valid passport, respectively.139
83. In addition to the violation of Article 355, this Court also found the
    IMDT Act and Rules to be violative of Article 14 on the ground that
    if the purpose was to control the influx of Bangladeshi migrants
    to Assam, provisions which are more stringent would have to be
    made. This Court noted that, the provisions of the IMDT Act and
    Rules were more lenient than the Foreigners Act which applied
    to the rest of India, where the problem was not as grave as in
    Assam.140 Thus, this Court held that there was no nexus between
    the object sought to be achieved and the means adopted by the
    enactment and Rules.
84. In Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights v. Union of India,141
    the constitutional validity of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act


137 [2005] Supp. 1 SCR 472 : (2005) 5 SCC 665 [64]
138 ibid
139 [2005] Supp. 1 SCR 472 : (2005) 5 SCC 665 [65]
140 “70. […] “In such circumstances, if Parliament had enacted a legislation exclusively for the State of
    Assam which was more stringent than the Foreigners Act, which is applicable to rest of India […] such
    a legislation would have passed the test of Article 14 as the differentiation so made would have had
    rational nexus with the avowed policy and objective of the Act.”
141 [1997] Supp. 5 SCR 469 : (1998) 2 SCC 109
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                         1289

                 In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       1958142 and the Assam Disturbed Areas Act 1955 was under challenge.
       ASFPA was enacted to confer special powers upon the members of
       the armed forces in the disturbed areas in Assam and Manipur. In
       terms of the Act, the Governor of the State had the power to issue
       a notification declaring the whole or any part of the State to which
       the Act applies as a disturbed area.143 The Act was amended by
       Act 7 of 1972 by which the power to issue a notification was also
       conferred on the Central Government. The Statement of Objects and
       Reasons of the amendment Bill stated that it was important that the
       power to issue notifications is extended to the Central Government
       (in addition to the Governor) in view of the duty cast on the Union by
       Article 355.144 One of the contentions of the petitioners for challenging
       the constitutional validity of the enactment was that Parliament had
       the competence to enact laws with respect to ‘armed rebellion’ only
       in exercise of emergency powers under Articles 352 and 356.145
       The Constitution Bench rejected this argument. Justice Agarwal,
       writing for the Bench observed that AFSPA was enacted to enable
       the Central Government to discharge its obligation under Article 355.
       The learned Judge observed that a proclamation under Article 356
       had grave consequences and thus, it was open to Parliament to deal
       with external aggression and internal disturbances through legislation
       before the Governor exercises powers under Article 356.146 Further,
       this Court also observed that the power of the Central Government
       to issue a notification under AFSPA does not violate the federal
       structure in view of Article 355.147
85. In Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights (supra) and
    Sarbananda Sonawal (supra), this Court referred to Article 355
    for the purpose of emphasising that one of the duties that is cast
    upon the Union is to protect States against external aggression and
    internal disturbance. In Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights
    (supra), the legislative object of the 1972 amendment to ASFPA was
    traced to Article 355. Similarly, in Sarbananda Sonawal (supra), the


142 “AFSPA”
143 AFSPA; Section 3
144 [1997] Supp. 5 SCR 469 : (1998) 2 SCC 109 [14]
145 [1997] Supp. 5 SCR 469 : (1998) 2 SCC 109 [28]
146 [1997] Supp. 5 SCR 469 : (1998) 2 SCC 109 [32]
147 [1997] Supp. 5 SCR 469 : (1998) 2 SCC 109 [41]
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       legislative object of the IMDT Act and the IMDT Rules was traced to
       Article 355. Though the three-Judge Bench in paragraph 67 of the
       judgment held that the IMDT Act and Rules were unconstitutional for
       violation of Article 355 of the Constitution, the scrutiny of the legislation
       and Rules was on Article 14 grounds. The reasons summarised in
       paragraph 82 of this judgment elucidate that the framework of analysis
       was limited to a comparison of the provisions of the IMDT Act and
       Rules (applicable to Assam) and the Foreigners Act (applicable to
       the rest of India). On a comparison of the provisions, it was found
       that the provisions of the Foreigners Act were more effective for
       achieving the object (that is, the detection of migrants). The Court
       held the IMDT Act and the IMDT Rules unconstitutional on the
       ground that: (a) Undocumented immigrations impacted Assam on
       a much larger scale as compared to the other States in India; (b)
       Since the State of Assam faces a graver problem, the provisions of
       the IMDT Act and the IMDT Rules ought to be more stringent than
       the Foreigners Act which applies to the rest of the States in India;
       and (c) The provisions of the IMDT Act and IMDT Rules were less
       effective compared to the provisions of the Foreigners Act. Thus, the
       classification effected by the IMDT Act and the IMDT Rules between
       the State of Assam and the other States in India was held not to
       have a nexus with the object.
86. Both in Sarbananda Sonawal (supra) and in Naga People’s
    Movement of Human Rights (supra), this Court referred to
    Article 355 to test the validity of the means adopted to achieve the
    legislative object under Article 14 of the Constitution. The test of
    ‘legitimate objective’ is one of the prongs used by the Courts in its
    rights framework analysis. The first test that the Courts adopt to
    determine if the violation of fundamental rights is justified based on
    the proportionality standard, is to assess if the law was enacted in
    pursuance of a ‘legitimate object’.148 The Constitution Bench in Naga
    People’s Movement of Human Rights (supra) and the three-Judge
    Bench in Sarbananda Sonawal (supra), relied on Article 355 for this
    purpose, that is, to test the constitutional legitimacy of the object of
    the amendment and the enactment, respectively.



148 The first prong of the proportionality test. See Madhyamam Broadcasting Limited v. Union of India (2023)
    SCC OnLine SC 366
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                  In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


87. Article 355, couched in Part XVIII of the Constitution which deals
    with emergency powers stipulates that it is the duty of the ‘Union’
    to (a) protect every State against external aggression and internal
    disturbance; and (b) ensure that the government of every State is
    carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
    It is established jurisprudentially that the correlative of a duty is a
    right.149 The question is, however, whether the duty vested in the
    Union in Article 355 confers a correlative right that a legislation can
    be challenged for violation of the constitutional provision.
88. Article 355 was absent in the Draft Constitution of 1948. Dr BR
    Ambedkar introduced the provision as a justification for the Union’s
    interference in the administration of States in exercise of the
    emergency powers conferred by the Constitution.150 Dr Ambedkar
    explained that in a federal Constitution such as the Indian Constitution
    where the States are sovereign since they also have legislative power
    in their own field, the Centre can interfere with the administration of
    States only when there is ‘some obligation which the Constitution
    imposes upon the Centre’.151 In SR Bommai v. Union of India,152
    Justice Sawant (writing for himself and Justice Singh) referring to the
    debates in the Constituent Assembly observed that Article 355 is not
    an independent source of power for interfering with the functioning
    of the State Government but is a justification for the measures
    adopted in Articles 356 and 357.153
89. The question is whether a legislative enactment can be challenged
    for contravention of Article 355 of the Constitution. For more than one
    reason, I think that such an interpretation would lead to disastrous
    consequences. Article 355 casts a duty on the Union to (a) protect
    every State against “external aggression”; (b) protect every State
    against “internal disturbance”; and (c) ensure that the “government
    of every State is carried out in accordance with the provisions of
    the Constitution”. All these three phrases (internal disturbance,
    external aggression and government of the State to be carried out


149 W.N Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as applied in Judicial Reasoning and other legal essays
    (W.W. Cook ed., Yale University Press, 1919).
150 See Constitution of India, Articles 352 and 356
151 Dr BR Ambedkar, Constituent Assembly Debates (Volume 9, 3 August 1949)
152 [1994] 2 SCR 644 : (1994) 3 SCC 1
153 [1994] 2 SCR 644 : (1994) 3 SCC 1 [57]
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       in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution) feature in Part
       XVIII of the Constitution which deals with emergency powers. If the
       duty of the Union to safeguard States against external aggression
       is justiciable in view of Article 355, then petitions could be filed
       claiming that the Union has not appropriately dealt with ‘any’ of
       the situations referred to in Article 355. It could also be contended
       that emergency powers ought to have been invoked by the Union
       to deal with the situations appropriately. Reading the duty in Article
       355 into a right would effectively place the emergency powers with
       citizens and courts. Such a consequence would be catastrophic for
       the federal structure of the Indian Constitution and would subjugate
       the constitutional status of States. Article 355 cannot be elevated
       as an independent ground of judicial review in view of the purpose
       of the provision (as a justification clause) and the impact of such a
       reading on the federal framework of the Constitution.
90. The validity of the exercise of the Presidential power under Part XVIII
    (such as Article 352 and Article 356) has been held to be amenable
    to judicial review.154 Proclamations under Articles 352 and 356 are
    amenable to review on the ground that the exercise of power is beyond
    the limits of the power prescribed by the constitutional provision. The
    petitioners in this case, however, seek to challenge the constitutional
    validity of a legislative provision (Section 6A) on the ground of Article
    355. In doing so they seek to elevate Article 355 to an independent
    ground for judicial review of legislative action. This is beyond the
    scope of the provision. Besides a lack of legislative competence and
    a violation of Part III, legislation may be challenged for breach of a
    substantive limitation on legislative power, created by a constitutional
    provision. Article 355 is not however such a provision.

       iv.    Section 6A does not violate Article 29(1) of the Constitution
91. Article 29(1) of the Constitution provides that ‘any section of citizens’
    residing in the territory of India or any part thereof and having a
    distinct language, script, or culture of their own shall have the right
    to conserve the same’. The claim of the petitioners is that Section 6A
    is violative of Article 29 because it permits people from Bangladesh
    who have a distinct culture to be ordinarily resident in Assam and


154 SR Bommai v. Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 1; In Re Article 370 of the Constitution, 2023 INSC 1058
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                                     1293

                   In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       secure citizenship which infringes upon their right to conserve
       Assamese culture.
92. The heading to Article 29(1) reads ‘protection of interests of minorities’.
    However, the text of the provision is not limited to minorities. It confers
    the right to any ‘section of citizens’ having a distinct language, script
    or culture. Thus, Article 29 applies to non-minorities as much as it
    applies to minorities, provided that (a) the section is of citizens; and
    (b) that section has a distinct language, script or culture.155 The right
    that is granted to this beneficiary class is the right to ‘conserve’ their
    language, script or culture. The people of Assam (the Assamese) are
    a section of citizens who have a distinct language, script of culture
    which they are entitled to conserve in terms of Article 29(1).
93. Two prominent points must be noted at the outset. First, Article 29(1)
    confers the right to ‘conserve’ culture, that is, the operation of the
    law must not interfere with the ability of the section to take steps to
    protect the culture from harm or destruction. Second, the provision
    must be read in light of the multi-cultural and plural nation that India is.
94. This Court has not had the opportunity to deal with the scope of
    Article 29(1) elaborately in the past. The provision has been considered
    in a limited manner when this Court had to determine the issue
    of whether the right guaranteed by Article 30 to establish minority
    educational institutions must be limited to the purpose of conserving
    language, script or culture.156 This Court held that a minority educational
    institution can be established for the purpose of conserving the
    language, culture and script but it is not necessary that it must be
    limited to that purpose.157 This Court in the context of the scope of
    the right to establish and administer minority educational institutions
    under Article 30(1) also observed that the right would include the
    choice of the medium of instruction. The imposition of the medium
    of instruction by the State would be violative of the right of minority
    educational institutions under Article 30(1) read with Article 29(1).158


155 See Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society v. State of Gujarat (1974) 1 SCC 717, (9J) [Chief Justice
    Ray writing for himself and Justice Palekar [5,6], Justice Khanna [73], Justice Mathew writing for himself
    and Justice YV Chandrachud [125, 126]; Rev. Father W Proost v. State of Bihar [5J] [1969] 2 SCR 73 [8,9]
156 Rev. Father W. Proost v. The State of Bihar [1969] 2 SCR 73; Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society
    v. State of Gujarat (1974) 1 SCC 717
157 ibid
158 See DAV College, Bhatinda v. State of Punjab, AIR 1969 SC 465; and State of Karnataka v. Associated
    Management of English Medium Primary and Secondary Schools (2014) 9 SCC 485 where the
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95. In Jagdev Singh Sidhanti v. Pratap Singh Daulta, 159 the
    question before the Constitution Bench was whether appeals
    made to the electorate to vote or refrain from voting on account of
    language constitute a corrupt practice under Section 123(3) of the
    Representation of the People Act 1951.160 The Constitution Bench
    held that the issue of whether any person was guilty of the corrupt
    practice under Section 123(3) must be determined in the backdrop
    of Article 29(1) of the Constitution. In this context, Justice JC Shah
    writing for the Bench observed that the right to conserve language
    includes the right to agitate for the protection of language and that
    political agitation for that purpose cannot be regarded as a corrupt
    practice.
96. Article 29(1) confers the right to take steps (through positive action)
    for the preservation of culture, language and script. The phrase
    ‘conserve’ in the provision denotes positive action taken towards a
    specific end.161 The provision protects those steps that have a nexus
    with the end of preservation of culture. There is sound reason to
    provide a constitutional guarantee to conserve culture, language
    or script. It is a constitutional recognition of the fact that culture,
    language and script die a natural death if positive steps are not
    taken to promote and protect them.162 This is particularly true in a
    multi-cultural and multi-linguistic country such as India.
97. The second principle is that a law or an executive action is
    unconstitutional to the extent that it prevents a section from taking
    steps to preserve their culture. At this juncture, it must be noted that
    it is now settled that the fundamental rights include both negative and
    positive rights. The negative right flowing from Article 29(1) prevents
    the State from interfering with the right of the section of citizens to
    conserve their culture. The Courts must adopt the well-established
    effects standard to test if the action of the State is violative of
    Article 29(1). The positive right flowing from Article 29(1) casts a


     Constitution Bench held that imposing mother tongue as the medium of instruction in students infringes
     upon Article 30(1) read with Article 29(1)
159 [1964] 6 SCR 750
160 “The appeal by a candidate […] to vote or refrain from voting for any person on the ground of religion,
    race, caste, community or language […]”
161 Oxford Dictionary defines the phrase as “to protect something and prevent it from being changed or
    destroyed”.
162 AIR 1950 SC 27
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                    In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


        duty on the State to create conditions for the exercise of the right
        to conserve culture.163
98. In Jagdev Singh Sidhanti (supra), this Court also observed that
    the right guaranteed by Article 29(1) is absolute.164 It is true that
    Article 29(1), unlike Article 19 of the Constitution, does not prescribe
    grounds for the reasonable restrictions of the right. It must be noted
    that the decision in Jagdev Singh Sindhanti (supra) was rendered
    in 1964 when the opinion of this Court in AK Gopalan v. State of
    Madras165 held the field on the interpretation of fundamental rights.
    In AK Gopalan (supra), the majority of this Court observed that the
    fundamental rights operate in mutually exclusive silos. In 1970, the
    decision in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India,166 rejected
    this interpretation of Part III holding that fundamental rights are not
    water-tight compartments. Once this Court has held that fundamental
    rights are not water- tight compartments, rights which are not expressly
    subject to reasonable restrictions can be restricted to give effect to
    other fundamental rights.167 For example, Article 30 which guarantees
    the right to establish and administer educational institutions, similar to
    Article 29, is not subject to an express restrictions clause. This Court
    in numerous decisions has held that the absence of a subjection
    clause does not mean that a minority educational institution cannot
    be regulated.168 Thus, the observation in Jagdev Singh Sidhanti
    (supra) that the right guaranteed by Article 29 is absolute is no more
    good law is view of the subsequent developments on the interpretation
    of Part III of the Constitution.
99. It is in this backdrop that the issue of whether Section 6A is violative
    of Article 29(1) of the Constitution must be decided. The petitioners’
    contention that Section 6A is violative of Article 29 is based on



163 For a detailed exposition on the positive and negative facets of a fundamental right, see Supriyo @
    Supriyo Chakraborty v. Union of India, 2023 INSC 920 [Chief Justice DY Chandrachud, 156-158]
164 “25 […] Unlike Article 19(1), Article 29(1) is not subject to any reasonable restrictions. The right conferred
    upon the Section of the citizens residing in the territory of India or any thereof to conserve their language,
    script or culture is made by the Constitution absolute”
165 AIR 1950 SC 27
166 [1970] 3 SCR 530 : (1970) 1 SCC 248; Also see Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248
167 See Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (2019) 11 SCC 1 [217]
168 See State of Kerala v. Very Rev. Mother Provincial (1970) 2 SCC 417; Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College
    Society v. State of Gujarat (1974) 1 SCC 717; TMA Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (2002) 8
    SCC 481
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     the following premises: (a) conferring citizenship to migrants from
     Bangladesh to Assam will increase Bengali population in Assam;
     and (b) the increase in Bengali population affects the culture of the
     Assamese population. The premise of the petitioners argument is
     not that the effect of the provision is that the people of Assam are
     prevented from taking steps to conserve their culture neither is it
     that the State is not taking effective steps to create conditions to
     enable groups to take steps to conserve culture. The argument of
     the petitioners is that the culture of Assam is infringed by the large
     influx of Bangladeshi immigrants who are conferred citizenship and
     Section 6A to the extent that it allows the influx is unconstitutional.
100. I am unable to accept this argument. First, as a matter of constitutional
     principle, the mere presence of different ethnic groups in a State
     is not sufficient to infringe the right guaranteed by Article 29(1).
     As explained above, Article 29(1) confers the right to ‘conserve’
     which means the right to take positive steps to protect culture and
     language. The petitioners ought to prove that the necessary effect
     of the law that promotes the presence of various ethnic groups in a
     State is that another ethnic group is unable to take steps to protect
     their culture or language. The petitioner also ought to prove that the
     inability to take steps to conserve culture or language is attributable
     to the mere presence of different groups.
101. Second, various constitutional and legislative provisions protect
     Assamese cultural heritage. The Constitution provides certain special
     provisions for the administration of Tribal Areas in Assam. The
     Constitution (Twenty-second Amendment) Act 1969 included Article
     244A of the Constitution. Article 244A stipulates that notwithstanding
     anything in the Indian Constitution, Parliament may by law form an
     autonomous State within Assam comprising wholly or in part of all
     or any of the tribal areas. Parliament may by law also create a body
     to function as a Legislature for the autonomous State. Article 330
     provides that seats must be reserved in the House of the People
     for the Scheduled Tribes in the autonomous districts of Assam. By
     the Constitution (Twenty-second Amendment) Act 1969, Article 371B
     was included in the Constitution which provides a special provision
     with respect to the State of Assam. According to the provision, the
     President may by an order provide for the constitution and functions
     of a committee of the Legislative Assembly of the State consisting of
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                                     1297

                   In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       the members of the Assembly elected from the tribal areas and such
       number of other members of the Assembly. The Sixth Schedule to
       the Constitution consists of provisions regarding the administration
       of tribal areas in the State of Assam, among other States.
102. Article 345 of the Constitution provides that the State Legislature
     may by law adopt any one or more language as the language to be
     used for official purposes in the State. In exercise of the power under
     Article 345, the Legislature of the State of Assam enacted the Assam
     Official Language Act 1960.169 The enactment adopts Assamese as
     the language for all official purposes of the State of Assam.170 The
     enactment further safeguards the use of languages on the basis of
     usage within the geographical limits. Section 4 provides that only
     languages which were in use immediately before the commencement
     of the Assam Official Language Act shall continue to be used for
     administrative and other official purposes up to and including the level
     of the Autonomous Region or the Autonomous District.171 The Assam
     Official Language Act also provides that the Bengali language would be
     used for administrative and other official purposes upto and including
     the “district of Cachar until the Mohkuma Parishads and Municipal
     Boards of the district.”172 In addition to the above, the State Government
     also has the power to direct the use of the language in such parts of
     the State of Assam through notification.173 The cultural and linguistic
     interests of the citizens of Assam are protected by constitutional and
     statutory provisions. Thus, Section 6A of the Citizenship Act does not
     violate Article 29(1) of the Constitution for the above reasons.

       v.      Section 6A(3) is constitutional
103. Justice Pardiwala in his opinion has concluded that Section 6A(3)
     is unconstitutional for the following reasons:


169 “The Assam Official language Act”
170 The Assam Official Language Act 1960, Section 3
171 The Assam Official Language Act 1960, Section 4. The adoption of any other language for the
    administrative or official purposes of the region must be by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the
    members present and voting.
172 The Assam Official Language Act 1960, “Section 5. The adoption of any other language for the
    administrative or official purposes of the region must be by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the
    members present and voting”
173 The Assam Official Language Act 1960, Section 7.
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        a.      The low detection of immigrants who entered Assam between
                1966-71 is attributable to the manifest arbitrariness of the
                mechanism prescribed by Section 6A(3);
        b.      Section 6A(3) mandates that for migrants to register as citizens,
                they must be detected as foreigners. However, the mechanism
                does not provide for self-declaration or voluntary detection as
                a foreigner. The process of detection can only be set in motion
                by the State.174 This is a clear departure from the scheme of the
                Citizenship Act and Articles 6 and 7 of the Constitution which
                allows acquiring citizenship through registration;175 and
        c.      Section 6A(3) does not prescribe an outer time limit for the
                detection of an immigrant to Assam as a foreigner. This militates
                against the purpose of the provision and is arbitrary for the
                following reasons:
                i.       The name of a person who is detected as a foreigner
                         today would be deleted from the electoral rolls for ten
                         years from the date of detection. This consequence is
                         not in consonance with the object of the provision which
                         was early detection, deportation and conferment of
                         citizenship;176
                ii.      Placing the onus on the State to detect a foreigner coupled
                         with the absence of temporal limit allows immigrants to
                         continue to be on the electoral rolls and enjoy being
                         de-facto citizens;177 and
                iii.     Section 6A(3) incentivizes undocumented immigrants from
                         Bangladesh to stay in Assam indefinitely until they are
                         detected as Foreigners since they will be able to acquire
                         citizenship only if they are ‘ordinarily resident’ in Assam.178


174 Paragraphs 121-123 of the judgment of Justice Pardiwala
175 Ibid, 128
176 Ibid, 159 “Thus, an immigrant whose name figures in the electoral roll, despite being a foreigner continues
    to be eligible to vote in the elections till that person is detected as a foreigner and the name of that person
    is struck off the electoral roll. There being no temporal limit to the applicability of Section 6A, this situation
    would continue in the years to come till the detection exercise is completed.”
177 Ibid, 162
178 Ibid, 163
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                   In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


104. To recall, Section 6A(2) deems all persons of Indian origin who came
     to Assam from Bangladesh before 1 January 1966 to be citizens of
     India. Section 6A(3) prescribes a procedure for persons of Indian
     origin who migrated from Bangladesh to Assam between 1 January
     1966 to 24 March 1971 to acquire citizenship. The person must
     have been:
       a.      An ordinary resident of Assam since the date of entry; and
       b.      Detected to be a foreigner, for which the opinion of the Tribunal
               constituted under the Foreigners Tribunals Order will be deemed
               as sufficient proof.
       The person who satisfies the above conditions must register in
       accordance with the Rules framed by the Central Government in
       exercise of the power under Section 18.

       a.      The interplay of NRC and the citizenship regime
105. The Central Government prepared the National Register of Citizens179
     in Assam in 1951 which consisted of information on all the citizens in
     Assam.180 In exercise of the power under Section 18(1) and (3), the
     Central Government notified the Citizenship (Registration of Citizens
     and Issue of National Identity Cards) Rules 2003181.182 Rule 3 of the
     Citizenship Rules 2003 provides that the Registrar General of Citizen
     Registration must establish and maintain the National Register of
     Indian Citizens. The register must contain, inter alia, the following
     particulars with respect to every citizen: name, sex, date of birth, place
     of birth and national identity number. Rule 4 deals with the preparation
     of the National Register of Indian Citizens. To prepare the National
     Register of Indian Citizens, the Central Government must carry a
     house to house enumeration for the collection of specific particulars
     relating to each individual, including the citizenship status.183 The
     particulars collected are then required to be verified by the Local


179 “NRC”
180 See Anil Roychoudhury, National Register of Citizens 1951, (Vol 16, Issue no. 8, 21 Feb 1981); Home
    and Political Department (Government of Assam), White Paper on Foreigners Issue (October 20 2012).
181 “ The Citizenship Rules 2003”
182 Vide G.S.R. 937 (E), dated 10th December, 2003, published in the Gazette of India, Extra., Pt. II, Sec.3
    (ii), dated 10th December, 2003
183 The Citizenship Rules 2003; Rule 4
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        Registrar.184 During the verification process if the citizenship of any
        person is doubtful, the Local Registrar must enter their details with
        appropriate remarks in the population registrar for further enquiry. The
        individual must be immediately informed of the doubtful citizenship.185
        Every person whose citizenship is doubtful would be given an
        opportunity of being heard before a final decision is taken to include or
        exclude their particulars in the National Register of Indian Citizens.186
        The Draft NRC must be published by the Sub-district or the Taluk
        Registrar for inviting objections or for corrections.187 The Sub-district
        or the Taluk Registrar must consider the objections within a period
        of ninety days. The Rules also provide for an opportunity to appeal
        against the order to the District Registrar of Citizen Registration.188
106. On 9 November 2009, the Central Government notified the Citizenship
     (Registration of Citizens and Issue of National Identity Cards)
     Amendment Rules 2009189 including Rule 4A to the Citizenship Rules
     2003.190 Rule 4A is a special provision for the preparation of NRC
     in the State of Assam.191 By virtue of the provision, the procedure
     prescribed in Rule 4 does not apply for the preparation of NRC in the
     State of Assam. Rule 4A(2) provides that the Central Government
     for the purpose of preparing NRC in Assam must invite applications
     from all residents including information on the citizenship status
     based on National Register of Citizens 1951 and the electoral rolls
     up to the midnight of 24 March 1971. The 2009 Amendment Rules


184 The Citizenship Rules 2003, Rule 4(3)
185 The Citizenship Rules 2003, Rule 4(4)
186 The Citizenship Rules 2003, Rule 4(5)(a)
187 The Citizenship Rules 2003, Rule 4(6)(a)
188 The Citizenship Rules 2003, Rule 4(6) and Rule 4(7)
189 “2009 Amendment Rules”
190 By G.S.R. 803(E) dated 9 November 2009
191 “4A. Special provisions as to National Register of Indian Citizens in the State of Assam—
    (1) Nothing in rule 4 shall, on and after the commencement of the Citizenship (Registration of Citizenship
    and Issue of National Identity Cards) Amendment Rules, 2009, apply to the State of Assam.
    (2) The Central Government shall, for the purpose, of the National Register of Indian Citizens in the State.
    of Assam, cause to carry out throughout the State of Assam for preparation of the National Register of
    Indian Citizens in the State of Assam by inviting applications from all the residents, for collection of
    specified particulars relating to each family and individual, residing in a local area in the State including
    the citizenship status based on the National Register of Citizens 1951, and the [electoral rolls up to the
    midnight of the 24th day of March, 1971.
    (3) The Registrar General of Citizens Registration . shall notify the period and duration of the enumeration
    in the Official Gazette.
    (4) The manner of preparation of the National Register of Indian Citizens in the State of Assam shall be
    such as specified in the Schedule appended to these rules.”
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                               1301

                  In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       included a Schedule to the Citizenship Rules 2003 prescribing
       the manner of preparation of the NRC in the State of Assam. The
       Schedule prescribes a different procedure for the preparation of the
       NRC in the State of Assam. For preparing the NRC for the rest of
       India under Rule 4, information on the citizenship status must be
       collected by the Central Government on door-to-door inspection.192
       However, in the case of Assam, an application must be made by
       the residents of Assam.193
107. According to the Schedule to the Citizenship Rules 2003, the
     procedure for the preparation of NRC in Assam is as follows:
       a.     The District Magistrate must publish the copies of NRC 1951
              and electoral rolls up to the midnight of the 24 March 1971;194
       b.     All residents of Assam must file applications to the Local
              Registrar of Citizen Registration;195
       c.     The Local Registrar of Citizen Registration must scrutinize all the
              applications and prepare a consolidated list which must contain
              the names of (i) persons who appear in electoral rolls prior to
              the year 1971 or NCR 1951, and (ii) their descendants;196 and
       d.     The name of a person who has been declared as an illegal
              migrant or a foreigner must not be included in the consolidated
              list.197
108. The NRC consolidates together the names of all citizens in relation to
     the State of Assam. At the same time, it is a process for the detection
     of foreigners. The Citizenship Act and the Rules framed thereunder
     and the Foreigners Act form a scheme on Indian citizenship which
     must be read as a whole.
109. The Central Government notified the Citizenship Rules 2009 in
     exercise of the powers conferred by section 18 of the Citizenship Act
     1955. Part IV of the Rules deals with the provisions for the citizenship



192 The Citizenship Rules 2003; Rule 4(1)
193 The Citizenship Rules 2003; Paragraph 2(2) of the Schedule and Rule 4A(2)
194 The Citizenship Rules 2003; Rule 2(1) of the Schedule
195 The Citizenship Rules 2003; Rule 2(3) of the Schedule
196 The Citizenship Rules 2003; Rule 2(3) of the Schedule
197 The Citizenship Rules 2003; Rule 3(2) of the Schedule
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          of persons covered by Assam Accord. Rule 19(1) stipulates that the
          Central Government may for the purposes of Section 6A(3) appoint
          an officer not below the rank of Additional District Magistrate as the
          registering authority. Rule 19(2) states that an application must be
          made in Form XVIII198 annexed to the Rules, thirty days from the
          date of receipt of the order from the Foreigners Tribunal declaring
          the person as a Foreigner. The period may be extended to sixty days
          by the registering authority after recording reasons.199 Rule 19(2A)




198 The Citizenship Rules 2009
    Sch. 1, Form XVIII
    This Form when completed should be forwarded in triplicate to the Chief Secretary to the Government of
    the State in which the applicant is resident.
    Note. – Serial No. in this register should correspond with the number I the registration certificate.

     FORM XVIII
     [See rule 19(2)]

     THE CITIZENSHIP RULES, 2009
     (To be filed in quadruplicate)
     APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION UNDER SECTION 6A
     OF THE CITIZENSHIP ACT, 1955




            PHOTOGRAPH




     1.     Name in full of applicant
            (Block Capitals, surname first)…………………………………………………………………………......
     2.     Father’s/ Husband’s Name………………………………………………………………………………....
     3.     Date and Place of birth………………………………………………………………………………….…….
     4.     Sex, Height, Colour of eyes…………………………………………………………………………...……
     5.     Whether of Indian origin-If so, how…………………………………………………….…………………..
     6.     Present Nationality…………………………………………………………………………………………..
     7.     Occupation or profession……………………………….……………………………………………………
     8.     Date and place of arrival in Assam from Bangladesh……………………..……………..……….……..
     9.     First address in Assam after arrival………………………………………………….......………………..
     10.    Present address in Assam…………………………………………………………………………………..
     11.    Date from which ordinarily resident in Assam……………………………………………..……………..
     12.    Date and place of detection as a foreigner……………………………………………………..………...
     13.    Name and address of the Tribunal declaring him as a foreigner; case number and date of order……
     14.    Name of husband/wife and children……………………………………………………………………….
     15.    Physical identification marks of applicant…………………………………………………..……………..
            (1)
            (2)
     16.    Signature or thumb impression of applicant…………………………………………….…………...……

     TO BE FILLED IN BY THE OFFICER OF THE REGISTERING AUTHORITY
     1. Registered at………………………………………on……………………………..20………........................
199 The Citizenship Rules 2009, Proviso to Rule 19(2)
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                                 1303

                   In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       was included by a notification dated 16 July 2013.200 Rule 19(2A)
       provides that a person who has been declared as a foreigner prior
       to 16 July 2013 and has not registered either because of the non-
       receipt of the order of the Foreigners Tribunal or the refusal of the
       registering authority to register such person as a Foreigner due to
       delay should make an application (in Form XVIII) within thirty days
       from the receipt of the order or from the date of publication of the
       notification. Form XVIII which is required to be filed by a person who
       is eligible to acquire citizenship under Section 6A(3) in terms of Rule
       4 requires the submission of details relating to the order declaring
       such person as a foreigner.201
110. As explained above, the object of Section 6A is not limited to
     conferring citizenship but also extends to excluding a class of
     migrants from securing citizenship. Section 6A is one of the provisions
     in the larger citizenship project. The legal regimes on detecting
     foreigners and the citizenship law overlap at more than one point.
     Section 6A is one pea in the pod of a long-time redressal of issues.
     The effectiveness (or the impact) of Section 6A must be viewed
     from this holistic perspective.

       b.     Section 6A(3) is not unconstitutional on the ground of temporal
              unreasonableness
111. The opinion of Justice Pardiwala refers to the doctrine of temporal
     unreasonableness to hold that even if Section 6A(3) was constitutional
     at the time of its enactment in 1985, it has acquired unconstitutionality
     by the efflux of time because the provision has not been effective
     enough to redress the problem.
112. One of the settled principles of judicial review is that an enactment
     which was reasonable and valid at the time of enactment, may
     become arbitrary over time. In Motor General Traders v. State of




200 G.S.R 488(E)
201 “[…]
    11. Date from which ordinarily resident in Assam
    12. Date and place of detection as a foreigner
    13. Name and address of the Tribunal declaring him as a foreigner; case number and date of order.”
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       Andhra Pradesh,202 the constitutional validity of Section 32(b) of
       the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control
       Act 1960 which exempted all buildings built on or after 26 August
       1957 from the purview of the Act was challenged. The petitioners
       challenged the provision on the ground that it had become
       unreasonable over the course of time. This argument was accepted
       by a two-Judge Bench of this Court. Justice ES Venkataramiah
       (as the learned Chief Justice then was), writing for the Bench
       observed that a non-discriminatory provision may in the course
       of time become discriminatory and violative of Article 14.203 The
       learned Judge noted that legislation may become arbitrary over
       the course of time if the classification does not share a nexus with
       the object anymore:

              "23. […] The long period that has elapsed after the passage
              of the Act itself serves as a crucial factor in deciding
              the question whether the impugned law has become
              discriminatory or not because the ground on which the
              classification of buildings into two categories is made is
              not a historical or geographical one but is an economic
              one. Exemption was granted by way of an incentive to
              encourage building activity and in the circumstances such
              exemption cannot be allowed to last for ever.

              30. After giving our anxious consideration to the learned
              arguments addressed before us, we are of the view that
              clause (b) of Section 32 of the Act should be declared
              as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution because the
              continuance of that provision on the statute book will
              imply the creation of a privileged class of landlords
              without any rational basis as the incentive to build
              which provided a nexus for a reasonable classification
              of such class of landlords no longer exists by lapse
              of time in the case of the majority of such landlords.
              There is no reason why after all these years they should


202 [1984] 1 SCR 594 : (1984) 1 SCC 222
203 [1984] 1 SCR 594 : (1984) 1 SCC 222 [22]
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                     1305

                 In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


              not be brought at par with other landlords who are subject
              to the restrictions imposed by the Act in the matter of
              eviction of tenants and control of rents.

                                                                (emphasis supplied)
113. In Rattan Arya v. State of Tamil Nadu, 204 the issue for the
     consideration of a three-Judge Bench of this Court was whether
     Section 30(ii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act
     1960 is constitutionally valid. Section 30(ii) exempted the application
     of the Act to any residential building occupied by any tenant if the
     monthly rent was higher than Rupees Four Hundred. Relying on
     Motor General Traders (supra), this Court held that the provision
     was unconstitutional because the justification for imposing a ceiling of
     Rupees Four Hundred in 1973 had become unreal upon the passage
     of time because of the multi-fold increase in residential rents.205 The
     premise of the principle of temporal unreasonableness is that a
     classification which was reasonable when the law was enacted could
     become unreasonable over the course of time. Due to the change
     in circumstances with time, the classification may no longer have a
     reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved. In such a
     situation, the law attracts unconstitutionality.
114. As identified above, the purpose of Section 6A was to deal with the
     influx of undocumented immigrants from East Pakistan to Assam.
     Section 6A provides that only undocumented immigrants who entered
     Assam before the cut-off date of 25 March 1971 shall be given
     citizenship. The beneficiary class of migrants is further divided into
     two sections: those who entered before 1 January 1966 and those
     who entered after 1 January 1966 but before 25 March 1971. The
     difference between Section 6A(2) and Section 6A(3) is that in the
     case of the former, the migrants are deemed to be citizens while
     in the case of the latter, they acquire citizenship after ten years
     from the date of detection. In the interim period (ten years since
     the detection), they lose their electoral rights. The consequence
     of being detected to be a foreigner who entered between 1966 to


204 [1986] 2 SCR 596 : (1986) 3 SCC 385
205 Also see Malpe Vishwanath Acharya v. State of Maharashtra (1998) 2 SCC 1
1306                                                         [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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       1971 is that they lose their right to political franchise for ten years.
       Upon their detection, they will have the same rights and obligations
       as a citizen of India including the right to obtain a passport under
       the Passports Act 1967. Thus, undocumented migrants who fall in
       this category will be citizens of India upon detection for all purposes
       except the exercise of electoral franchise. The legislature in its good
       wisdom has proceeded on the basis that a consequence of such
       a great magnitude must only ensue upon detection as a foreigner
       through a quasi-judicial proceeding.
115. In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3 of the Foreigners
     Act, the Central Government notified the Foreigners Tribunals Order.
     Once the question of whether a person is a foreigner is referred to
     the Foreigners Tribunal,206 the reference is decided based on the
     following procedure:
       a.     Upon receiving the reference from the Central Government or
              any competent authority, the Tribunal must serve a show-cause
              notice on the person to whom the question relates207 within ten
              days from the receipt of the reference;208
       b.     The notice must be served in English and the official language
              of the State. The notice must indicate that the burden is on
              the person proceeded against to prove that they are not
              foreigners;209
       c.     The individual is given ten days to reply to the show-cause
              notice and an additional ten days to produce evidence to
              support their case;210
       d.     The individual must be given a reasonable opportunity to
              make a representation and produce evidence to support their
              case;211 and



206 The Foreigners (Tribunals) Order 1964; Paragraph 2
207 The Foreigners (Tribunals) Order 1964, Paragraph 3(2)
208 The Foreigners (Tribunals) Order 1964, Paragraph 3(3)
209 The Foreigners (Tribunals) Order 1964, Paragraph 3(4)
210 The Foreigners (Tribunals) Order 1964; Paragraph 3(8)
211 The Foreigners (Tribunals) Order 1964; Paragraph 3(1)
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                        1307

                  In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       e.      The Tribunal must submit its opinion after hearing such persons
               who desire to be heard and after considering the evidence
               produced.212 The case must be disposed of within a period of
               sixty days from the date of receipt of the reference.213
116. In addition to the above, the Tribunals Order also prescribes detailed
     provisions regarding the service of notice indicating that the core
     tenets of natural justice must be provided to the person suspected
     to be a foreigner.214 The Tribunals have the powers of a civil court
     while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and the
     powers of a Judicial Magistrate First Class under the Code of Criminal
     Procedure 1973.215 The order of the Foreigners Tribunal, being an
     order of a quasi-judicial body is subject to judicial review before the
     High Court and then this Court.
117. Clause 5.4 of the Assam Accord states that the foreigners who were
     detected to have entered between 1966 to 1971 were required
     to register before the Registration Officers in accordance with
     the provisions of the Registration of Foreigners Act 1939 and the
     Registration of Foreigners Rules 1939. The Assam Accord devised
     a model in which upon detection as a foreigner, they would have to
     register in the existing mechanism.
118. However, Section 6A deviated from the Assam Accord in this regard.
     Section 6A(3) stipulates that upon detection, the person must register
     themselves in accordance with the rules “made by the Central
     Government in this behalf under Section 18”. The Citizenship Rules
     were amended by a notification dated 15 January 1987216 including
     Rules 16D, 16E and 16F. These Rules implement the substantive
     provisions of Section 6A(3). Rule 16D provides that a fresh reference
     must be made to the Foreigners Tribunal if the question of whether
     a person satisfies the condition under Section 6A arises. Rule 16E
     deals with the jurisdiction of Tribunals constituted under the Foreigners


212 ibid
213 The Foreigners (Tribunals) Order 1964; Paragraph 3(14)
214 The Foreigners (Tribunals) Order 1964; Paragraph 3(5) (a) to (j)
215 The Foreigners (Tribunals) Order 1964; Paragraph 4
216 See Notification No. GSR 25 (E), dt. 15.1.1987
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        (Tribunals) Order 1964 to deal with references under Section 6A(3).
        Rule 16F provides for the registering authority and procedure for
        registration for the purpose of Section 6A(3).217

119. The legislature by adopting Section 6A(3) in the current form required
     the State to make rules for its implementation. As explained above,
     the detection as a foreigner is an elaborate process that required the
     State to build manpower and infrastructure for its implementation.
     The Legislature conferred the State with the duty to implement the
     provision after it had built sufficient infrastructure for the same. The
     purpose of Section 6A(3) was to provide a long term solution to the
     issue of the large influx of migrants from Bangladesh to Assam. It
     is true that one of the causes of concern which led to the Assam
     Students’ Movement (and culminated with the Assam Accord) was
     the dilution of the electoral right of those native to Assam because
     of the inflow of migrants. However, the purpose of Section 6A(3)
     cannot be limited to it. The objective behind the enactment of the
     Citizenship (Amendment) Act 1985 was to deal with the larger
     problem of whether Bangladesh migrants of Indian Origin could
     secure citizenship in India. The objective of the provision must be
     understood in the backdrop of the Indian policy on post-partition
     migration and the Assam movement. The provision strives to bring
     about a balance between both the objectives. Having said that, the
     concerns of the petitioners regarding the burden on the resources
     of the State and on its demographic identity due the influx of illegal



217 “16F. The registering authority for the purpose of section 6A(3) and form of application foe registration:
    (1) The registering authority, for the purpose of sub-section (3) of section 6A of the Act shall be such
          officer as maybe appointed by each district of Assam by the Central Government.
    (2) An application for registration under sub-section (3) of section 6A of the Act shall be filed in Form
          XXIII by the person with the registering authority for the district in which he is ordinarily resident-
          a.     Whithin thirty days from the date ofhis detection as a foreigner, where such detection takes
                 place after the commencement of the Citizenship(Amendment) Rules 1986; or
          b.     Within thirty days of the appointment of the registering authority for the district concerned
                 where such detection has taken place before the coomencement of the Citizenship
                 (Amendment) Rules 1986
    (3) The registering authority shall, after entering the particulars of the application in a register in Form
          XXIV, return a copy of the application under his seals to the applicant.
    (4) One copy of every application received during a quarter shall be sent by the registering authority
          to the Central Government and the State Government of Assam along with a quarterly return in
          Form XXV.
    (5) The period referred to in sub-rule (2) may be extended for a period not exceeding sixty days by the
          registering authority for reasons to be recorded in writing.
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                                                   1309

                   In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


       migrants in large numbers is not lost to the Court and is a matter of
       serious concern. The State must effectively create adequate state
       capacity to deal with undocumented migrants who migrated after
       the cut-off date prescribed by Section 6A as well as those who have
       migrated before the cut-off date but who do not fulfill the conditions
       for the grant of citizenship under the provision.
120. In view of the above discussion, I am unable, with respect, to agree
     with the observation of my learned brother, Justice Pardiwala that
     the purpose of Section 6A(3) is merely the speedy and effective
     identification of foreigners of the 1966-71 stream. The principle of
     temporal unreasonableness cannot be applied to a situation where
     the classification is still relevant to the objective of the provision.
     The process of detection and conferring citizenship in Assam is
     a long-drawn out process spanning many decades. To strike it
     down due to lapse of time is to ignore the context and object of
     the provision.

       vi.     Section 6A(2) cannot be held unconstitutional for not prescribing
               a procedure for registration
121. The petitioners submitted that Section 6A(2) is unconstitutional
     because the provision does not prescribe a procedure for conferring
     citizenship to those who migrated before 1 January 1966, unlike
     Section 6A(3) which prescribes a procedure for conferring citizenship
     to those who migrated between 1966-1971.
122. Section 6A is a substantive provision conferring citizenship on persons
     who migrated from Bangladesh to Assam. The provision provides that
     persons who migrated from Bangladesh to Assam before 1 January
     1966 shall deemed to be citizens of India from 1 January 1966. The
     import of the use of the legal fiction is that the law assumes a fact
     that does not exist.218
123. The provisions of the Citizenship Act do not require every person to
     register to acquire citizenship. Sections 5 and 6 of the Citizenship
     Act provide for acquiring citizenship through registration and


218 See Justice GP Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation (15th edition, Lexis Nexis), 294; JK Cotton
    Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. V. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 191
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     naturalisation. These two provisions require the applicant to follow
     a process of application.
124. However, Sections 3 and 4 of the Act do not require registration
     for acquiring citizenship. Section 3 deals with citizenship by birth.
     Section 4 deals with Citizenship by descent. The law does not
     mandate that persons who are covered in the categories prescribed
     by Sections 3 and 4 must register to acquire citizenship. Thus,
     registration is not the de-facto model of securing citizenship in India.
     The use of the deeming fiction obviates the need for registration.
     Any person : (a) of Indian origin who migrated from Bangladesh to
     Assam before 1 January 1966; and (b) who has ordinarily been a
     resident in Assam since their date of entry is deemed to be a citizen
     of India. The provision does not contemplate a registration regime for
     persons who fall under this category, similar to Sections 3 and 4 of
     the Citizenship Act. Section 6A(2) cannot be held unconstitutional for
     the only reason that it does not prescribe a process of registration.

     D.   Conclusion
125. In view of the discussion above, the following are the conclusions:
     a.   Articles 6 and 7 of the Constitution prescribe a cut-off date
          for conferring citizenship for migrants from East and West
          Pakistan at the “commencement of the Constitution”, that is
          26 January 1950. Section 6A of the Citizenship Act confers
          citizenship from 1 January 1966 for those who migrated
          before that date. Those who migrated between 1 January
          1966 and 24 March 1971, are conferred citizenship upon
          the completion of ten years from the date of detection as a
          foreigner. Section 6A confers citizenship from a later date
          to those who are not covered by Articles 6 and 7 of the
          Constitution. Thus, Section 6A is not violative of Articles 6
          and 7 of the Constitution;
     b.   Section 6A satisfies the two-pronged reasonable classification
          test:
          i.    The legislative objective of Section 6A was to balance
                the humanitarian needs of migrants of Indian Origin and
                the impact of the migration on the economic and cultural
                needs of Indian States; and
[2024] 10 S.C.R.                                                         1311

                 In Re : Section 6A of The Citizenship Act 1955


          ii.      The two yardsticks employed in Section 6A, that is migration
                   to Assam and the cut-off date of 24 March 1971 are
                   reasonable. Though other states share a longer border with
                   Bangladesh, the impact of migration in Assam in terms of
                   numbers and resources is greater. Thus, the yardstick of
                   migration to Assam is reasonable. The cut-off date of 25
                   March 1971 is reasonable because the Pakistani Army
                   launched Operation Search light to curb the Bangladeshi
                   nationalist movement in East Pakistan on 26 March 1971.
                   Migrants before the operation were considered migrants
                   of the Indian partition; and
          iii.     Both the above yardsticks have a rational nexus with the
                   object of Section 6A.
     c.   Undocumented migrants could be registered as citizens
          under Section 5(1)(a) of the Citizenship Act before it was
          amended by the Citizenship (Amendment) Act 2003 to exclude
          ‘illegal immigrants’. Thus, the claim of the petitioner that
          Section 6A is unconstitutional because instead of preventing
          migration to Assam, it incentivizes migrants in other states
          to come to Assam to secure citizenship through Section 6A
          is erroneous.
     d.   The constitutional validity of a legislation cannot be tested
          for violation of Article 355. Article 355 was included in the
          Constitution as a justification for the exercise of emergency
          powers by the Union over States;
     e.   Section 6A does not violate Article 29(1) of the Constitution.
          Article 29(1) guarantees the right to take steps to protect
          the culture, language and script of a section of citizens. The
          petitioners have been unable to prove that the ability of the
          Assamese people to take steps to protect their culture is violated
          by the provisions of Section 6A;
     f.   Section 6A(3) cannot be held unconstitutional on the ground
          of temporal unreasonableness; and
     g.   Section 6A(2) cannot be held unconstitutional for not prescribing
          a procedure for registration.
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126. The reference is answered in the above terms.
127. The Registry is directed to obtain administrative instructions from
     the Chief Justice for placing the matters before an appropriate
     Bench.

     Result of the case: Reference Answered.



     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain