Holding

Handcuffing of under‑trial prisoners without express magistrate authorisation is unlawful and contrary to Supreme Court precedent, but contempt requires wilful knowledge of the order, so the contempt notices were discharged with only disapproval recorded.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined the handcuffing of under‑trial prisoners, members of the Khedut Mazdoor Chetna Sangath, while being transferred between jail and court, which was done without written authorisation from a magistrate as required by Madhya Pradesh Police Regulation 465. Earlier Supreme Court judgments (Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration, Sunil Gupta v. State of M.P., Baradakanta Mishra v. Bhimsen Dixit) had categorically disapproved such handcuffing. The Court held that handcuffing without magistrate authorisation violates the law and Supreme Court precedent, but contempt of court requires wilful knowledge of the order, which the police officials and magistrate claimed they lacked. Consequently, the contempt notices against the seven officials were discharged, but the Court recorded strong disapproval of the conduct of five police officers and the judicial magistrate, directing that notes of disapproval be placed in their personal files. The Court also directed amendment of the M.P. Police Regulations and issuance of guidelines to ensure compliance with human‑rights standards.

Issues considered

The legality of handcuffing under‑trial prisoners without magistrate authorisation under Regulation 465 of the Madhya Pradesh Police Regulations.
Whether such handcuffing constitutes contempt of the Supreme Court despite claimed ignorance of prior judgments.
The applicability of Supreme Court precedents (Prem Shankar Shukla, Sunil Gupta, Baradakanta Mishra) to the present facts.
The appropriate sanction for officials who violated the regulations but claim lack of knowledge of the law.

Legislation cited

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

Subjects

handcuffingunder‑trial prisonerscontempt of courtMadhya Pradesh Police Regulation 465human rightsjudicial oversightpolice authoritySupreme Court precedent

Judgment

IN RE - M.P. DWIVEDI AND ORS. A

JANUARY 11, 1996

[S.C. AGRAWAL ANDS. SAGHIR AHMAD, JJ.]

Contempt (}f Court : Under Trial Prisoner>~Handcuffed while being B
taken from court to jail and jail to court without permission (}f the
Magistrat~bi clear disregard of the Law laid down by the Supreme
Court-Plea ~f justification on the basis of Regulation 465 (}f Madhya
Pradesh Police Regulation;~Further plea of ignorance of Law-Held, not
guilty <Jf contempt of court since written order (}f Magistrate not obtained C
conduct held to be violative of the Regulatim>-Hence disapproved-Contempt
of Courts Act, 1971-Madhya Pradesh Police Regulation;~Regulation 465.

Under Trial prisoners produced beforejudicial Officer in handcuffs-His
not taking any action.for removal <Jfhandc~ffs-Allegation that contemner was
D
, apprised of Supreme Court judgmenl--Denied--Unconditional apology ten-
dered by co11te1nner-Held, contemner expected to be aware of Law laid down
by Supreme Court--Conduct of contemner was serious lapse on the part of his
duties-Hence, strong disapproval recordecJ.-Refresher Course at regular
intervals to 1nake the judicial officers aware of the law laid down by Supreme
Court and High Court-Especially those connected with the basic hu1nan E
rights (}f the peopl~Need for-Emphasis laid
,.• The writ petitioners brought to the notice of the Supreme Court that
some members of the Khedoot Majdoor Chetna Sangath, were arrested
and were handcuffed while being taken from jail to court and from court F
to jail and were also paraded handcuffed through the streets. The court, in
view of the judgment in Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration and in
Swiil Gupta and Ors. v. State <Jf M.P. & Ors., wherein the court had strongly
disapproved the act of handcuffing of under trial prisoners, in this case,
issued suo motu contempt notice to the contemners.
G
Contemners Nos. 1 & 2, the Superintendent of Police and the SDO
(Police), stated that they were not present at the spot and were given to
understand that accused had attempted to resist the arrest and a large
number of members of Sangath had gathered and, therefore, under para
465 of M.P. Police Regulations, handcuffing was essential. They also pleaded H
347
1
\

348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] l S.C.R.
A ignorance of the law laid down by Supreme Court.

Contemners Nos. 3, 4 & 5, the inspector, Sub-inspector and
Constable, respectively, who were directly involved in the incident, stated
that they were not aware of the law laid down by Supreme Court and
further justified their act on the basis of para 465 of M.P. Police
B
Regulations.

It was alleged against contemner No. 6, the SDM, that handcuffing
took place in his presence, while he stated that he was on medical ieave
on the alleged date.
c
With regard to contemner No. 7, the Judicial Magistrate, it was
alleged that on being apprised about the judgment of the Supreme Court,
he had stated that the same did not apply to the case and the police had
power to transport the accused as they wished. However, the Contemner
stated that no complaint of this case was made to him, nor was he apprised
D of the Supreme Court judgment and further denied to have made the
alleged statement. In support of his statement, he filed affidavit of the
advocate of the accused. Coutemner further tendered unconditional
apology for not having taken immediate action in removing handcuffs in
certain cases and submitted that he was an young officer and the lapse was
E not intentional.

·Disposing of the petition, th" Court

HELD : 1.1. Contempt of court in disobedience to the court, by
acting in opposition to the authority, justice and dignity thereof. It signifies
F
a wilful disregard or disobedience of the court's order, it also signifies such
conduct as tends to bring authority of the court and the administration
of law into disrepute. Wilful disregard or disobedience to the court's order
presupposes an awareness of the order that has been disregarded or
disobeyed. In view of the affidavit filed by contemners No. 1 to 5 stating
G that they were not aware of the law laid down by this Court, they cannot
be punished for the contempt of this Court. [360-E-G]

Baradkanta Mishra, Ex. - Co1n1nissioner of Endownients v. Bhimserz
Dixit, [1976] 2 SCR 495; Prem Shwikar Shukla v. Delhi Admn., (1980] 3
H SCR 855 and Sunil Gupta v. State qf M.P, [1990] 3 SCC 119, referred to.
IN RE : M.P. DWIVEDI 349
1.2. The handcuffing of under trial prisoners cannot be justified A
• _,.i under the provisions of Regulation 465 of M.P. Police Regulations in as
much as the said regulation requires an express authorisation from the
Magistrate/Jail Officer for the purpose of taking the accused to court from
jail and from jail to court. As regards the role and responsibility of the
contemners 1 to S in the actions involving handcuffing of under trial B
prisoners, contemners No. 3 to S are directly involved in the incidents of
handcuffing because handcuffing was done under their directions or in
their presence. Contemners No. 1 & 2 even though not directly involved
in the said incident, since they were not present, are held responsible for
having not taken adequate steps to prevent such actions aud even after the
said actions came to their knowledge, they condoned the same by not c
taking stern action against persons found responsible for this illegality.
Therefore, the conduct of all the live contemners No. 1 to S, is disapproved
and it is directed that a note regarding the disapproval of their conduct
by this court be placed in their personal files. [360-H; 361-A-C]
D
2. In view of the statement of contemner No. 6, no responsibility
attaches to the contemner in respect of the Incident of handcuffing and
notice issued against him is discharged. [362-A]

3. The conduct of Contemner No. 7 of note having taken any action
for the removal of handcuffs is a serious lapse on the part of the contemner E
in the discharge of his duties as a judicial officer, who is expected to ensure
that the basic human rights of the citizens are not violated. In view of
the fact that the contemner is a young judicial officer, punishment is not
imposed on him, but his conduct is strongly disapproved and it is directed
that a note of this disapproval by this court be kept in the personal file F
of the contemner. The contemner, being a judicial officer, is expected to
be aware of law laid down by this court. In his affidavit also he does not
say that he was not aware of the said decision. Apart from that, there
were provisions in Regulation 465 of M.P. Police Regulations prescribing
the conditions in which under trial prisoners could be handcuffed and
they contain the requirement regarding authorisation for the same by the G
Magistrate. [363-D-F; C-D]

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Suo Motu Contempt Petition No.
10 of 1996.

IN H
350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1996] I S.C.R.
A Writ Petition (C) No. 239 of 1993.

(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.)

G.L. Sanghi, Prashant Bhushan, Sakesh Kumar, Uma Nath Singh and
S.K. Gambhir for the appearing parties.
B
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ·-
S.C. AGRAWAL, J. These contempt proceedings have been initiated
in pursuance of the order dated June 4, 1993 passed in Writ Petition No. 239
of 1993, Khedut Mazdoor Chetna Sangath v. State of Madhya Pradesh &
C Ors. The said order dated June 4, 1993 for issuing notices for contempt
against the contemners was passed in the following circumstances.

Khedut Mazdoor Chetna Sangath (hereinafter referred to as the
'Sangath'), is a registered trade union of tribals of Alirajpur Tehsil in District
Jhabua of the State of Madhya Pradesh. It started functioning in October
D 1985 and has been working for the upliftment of the tribals in the region. It
is opposed to the construction of Sardar Sarovar Darn on river Narmada on
the ground that the construction of the Dam would be prejudicial to the
'
interests of the tribals residing in the catchment area of the Darn since their
lands would be submerged in water and they would be displaced. The
E members of the Sangath have been agitating against the construction of the
Dam. In connection with the said agitation, the members of the Sangath were
arrested by the police authorities on various dates in connection with criminal
cases registered against them and after their arrest, the arrested persons were
handcuffed while being taken from jail to the court and from court to jail or
F from jail/court to civil hospital and back to jail/court. On some occasions
they were paraded while handcuffed through the streets of Alirajpur. In the
Writ petition, mention is made of the following incidents of handcuffing of
under trial prisoners :

"17.11.92 & 19.11.92 - Khemla Aujanharia was handcuffed and paraded in
G Alirajpur.

2.2.93 Revji was handcuffed and paraded in Alirajpur.

3.2.93 Ravi Hemadri, Amit Bhatnagar, Khajan, Tilia, Vesta,
Bava Kaharia, Bamita were handcuffed and taken
H from the police station to the hospital and back, and
IN RE: M.P. DWIVEDI [AGRAWAL, J.] 351
from court to the police station and back. A
3.2.93 Ram Singh and Vanjara were handcuffed and
taken from Alirajpur Police Station to Sondwa
Police Station.

5.2.93 Ram Singh and Vanjara were handcuffed and B
paraded on the streets of Alirajpur.

·• 7.2.93 Rahul Ram and Ashwini Chhatre were handcuffed
and paraded on the streets of Alirajpur and were
then taken in a truck to Sondwa.
c
8.2.93 All the above, as well as Rahul Ram And Ashwini
Chhatre were handcuffed and taken into the hospi-
tal. Handcuffs were removed during the examina-
tion. They were handcuffed again and taken to ·
court and then to the police station, then back to D
court.

8.2.93 Molla and Punia were taken through Alirajpur in
handcuffs.

24.2.93 Rahul Banerjee was handcuffed and paraded in E
Alirajpur.

25.2.93 Rahul Banerjee produced before the Magistrate in
handcuffs (Noted by JMFC, Alirajpur in his or-
der)."
F
The fact about the handcuffing of these aforementioned persons on the
dates referred to above was not disputed by the respondents in the said writ
petition. Having regard to the decisions of this Court in Prem Shankar Shukla
v. Delhi Administration, [1980] 3 SCR 855; Sunil Gupta & Ors. v. State of
Madhya Pradesh & Ors., [1990] 3 SCC 119, and Baradakanta Mishra, Ex-
Commissioner of Endowments v. Bhimsen Dixit, [1976] 2 SCR 495, this
G
Court was satisfied that a prima facie case is made out for taking action for
contempt of Court against persons responsible for the aforementioned acts
of handcuffing of under trial prisoners. A direction was, therefore, given by
order dated June 4, 1993 to issue notic_e to the contemners to show cause why
they should not be punished for having committed contempt of this Court. H
352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] 1 S.C.R.
A In response to the said notice, affidavits have been filed by the
aforementioned contemners. Before we deal with the explanation offered by }.
the contemners, it would be necessary lo refer to the provisions of Regulation
465 of the M.P. Police Regulations which prescribes as follows :

"465. Hand-cuffs when Used - Hand-cuffs shall be used only if they
B
are necessary.

The following instructions regulate their use - Instructions re- .
garding the use of Handcuffs :

c (I) When a prisoner has to be taken in custody from a court to a jail
or vice-versa, the magistrate or the Jail Officer should give a direction
in writing to the Commander of the escort as to whether the prisoner
should or should not be hand-cuffed and the escort Commander shall
obey that direction, provided that if the direction is not to hand-cuff
the prisoner and at any time thereafter the escort Commander has
D
reason to consider it necessary to hand-cuff the prisoner, he should
do so, notwithstanding such directions. ,
(2) (i) x x x x x x x x

E (ii) x x x x x x x x

(3) The escort Commander must, without fail, ask for and obtain
orders in writing from the Magistrate or the Jail Officer in regard to
hand-cuffing of the prisoners committed to his custody before taking
over the prisoner from the Court or jail. Any neglect of these
F instructions must be dealt with most severely.

(4) x x x x x x x x x

(5) • x x x x x x x x x
G (6) x x x x x x x x x

A. List of prisoners who must be hand-cuffed :

!. Every person arrested by a police officer or remanded to custody
H by a Magistrate on a charge of having committed one of the following
l
IN RE: M.P. DWIVEDI [AGRAWAL, J.] 353
offences shall be hand-cuffed unless by reason of age, sex or infirmity A
he can easily and securely be kept in custody without hand-cuff :

(a) Offences relating to coin, sections 23 l to 254 Indian Penal Code.

(b) Murder and culpable homicide, Section 302 to 304 Indian Penal
Code. B
(c) Attempt to commit rriurder and culpable homicide, Sections 307
and 308 Indian Penal Code.

(d) Being a Thug, Section 311 Indian Penal Code.
c
(e) Robbery, Section 311 Indian Penal Code.

(f) Dacoity, Section 395 Indian Penal Code and all sections relating
to dacoity.

(g) Any other offence against property, if the offender has been D
previously convicted of any offence against property or has been
ordered to find security for good behaviour.

(h) Persons accused of an offence punishable under section 148
Indian Penal Code."
E
In the present case, it is not disputed that provisions of sub-clause (3)
Regulation 465 of the M.P. Police Regulations were not complied with inas-
much as no orders were obtained from the concerned Magistrate/Jail Officer
by the concerned police personnel with regard to handcuffing of the prisoners
while taking them to and from court or jail. Handcuffing of the under trial F
prisoners has been sought to be justified on the ground that (i) the accused
persons attempted to resist the arrest and made attempts to run away; and (ii)
a large number of supporters of the Sangath had reached Alirajpur on knowing
about the arrest of accused persons and there was strong possibility that they
would have attempted to free the accused persons from the police custody. It G
has also been stated that two cases involving offences under Section 307 !PC
had been registered against the accused persons.

In Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration (supra) this Court has
considered the matter of handcuffing of prisoners under trial as well as
convicts in the context of the provisions contained in Punjab Police Rule, H
)
354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1996] 1 S.C.R.
A 1934, Krishna Iyer J., speaking for himself and Chinnappa Reddy J., has
observed that "handcuffing is prima facie inhuman and, therefore, unreason-
able, is over-harsh and at the first flush, arbitrary."

Examining the justification offered by the State for this mode of
restraint, the learned Judge has said :
B
"Surely, the competing claims of securing the prisoner from fleeing
and.protecting his personality from barbarity have to be harmonised.
To prevent to escape of an under-trial is in public interest, reasonable,
just and cannot, by itself be castigated. But to bind a man hand-and-
c foot, fetter his limbs with hoops of steel, shuffle him along in the
streets and stand him for hours in the courts is to torture him, defile
his dignity, vulgarise society and foul the soul of our constitutional
culture, " (p. 872)

"Insurance against escape does not compulsorily require handcuffing.
D There are other measures whereby an escort can keep safe custody
of a detenue without the indignity and cruelty implicit in handcuffs
or other iron contraptions. Indeed, binding together either the hands
or the feet or both has not merely a preventive impact. but also a
punitive hurtfulness. Manacles are mayhem on the human person
E and inflict humiliation on the bearer. The Encyclopedia Britannica,
Vol. 11 (1973 Edn.) at p. 53 states "handcuffs and fetters are
instruments of securing the hands or feet of prisoners under arrest
or as a means of punishment." The three components of irons forced
on the human person must be distinctly understood. Firstly, to
F handcuff is to hoop harshly. Further, to handcuff is to punish
humiliatingly and to vulgarise the viewers also. Iron straps are insult
and pain writ large, animalising victim and keeper. Since there are
other ways of ensuring security, it can be laid down as a rule that
handcuffs or other fetters shall not be forced on the person of an
under trial prisoner ordinarily." (pp. 872-73)
G
"The only circumstance which validates incapacitation by irons- an
extreme measure-is that otherwise there is no other .reasonable way
of preventing his escape, in the given circumstances. Securing the
prisoner being a necessity of judicial trial, the State must take, steps
H in this behalf. But even here, the policeman's easy assumption or any
f

t
IN RE: M.P. DWIVEDI [AGRAWAL, J.] 355

scary apprehension or subjective satisfaction of likely escape if fetters A
are not fitted on the prisoner is not enough. The heavy deprivation of
personal liberty must be justifiable as reasonable restriction in the
circumstances. Ignominy, inhumanity and affliction, implicit in chains
and shackles are permissible, as not unreasonable, only if every other
less cruel means is fraught with risks or beyond availability. So it is B
that to be consistent with Arts. 14 and 19 handcuffs must be the last
refuge, not the routine regimen. If a few more guards will suffice, then
no handcuffs. If a close watch by armed policemen will do, then no
handcuffs. If alternative measures may be provided, then no iron
bondage. This is the legal norm." (p. 874)
c
"The conclusion lowing from these considerations is that there
must first be well-grounded basis for drawing a strong inference that
the prisoner is likely to jump jail or break out of custody or play the
vanishing trick. The belief in this behalf must be based on anteced-
ents which must be recorded and proneness to violence must be D
authentic. Vague surmises or general averments that the under-trial
is a crook or desperado, rowdy or maniac, cannot suffice. In short
save in rare cases of concrete proof readily available of the
dangerousness of the prisoner in transit - the onus of proof of which
is on him who puts the person under irons - the police escort will
be conunitting personal assault or mayhem if he handcuffs or E
fetters his charge." (p. 874)

"Merely because the offence is serious, the inference of escape
proneness or desperate character does not follow. Many other
conditions mentioned in the Police Manual are totally incongruous F
with what we bave stated above and must fall as unlawful. Tangible
testimony, documentary or other, or desperate behaviour, geared to
making good his escape, alone will be a valid ground for handcuff-
ing and fettering, and even this may be avoided by increasing the
strength of the escorts or taking the prisoners in well protected
vans." (p. 875) G

"The nature of the accusation is not the criterion. The clear and
present danger of escape breaking out of the police control is
the determinent. And for this there must be clear material not glib
assumption, record of reasons and judicial oversight and summary H
356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] l S.C.R.
hearing and direction by the court where the victim is produced."
(p. 876)

In Sunil Gupta & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., (supra) this
Court, while dealing with Regulation 465 of the M.P. Police Regulations, has
observed :
B
"This Court on several occasions has made weighty pronouncements
decrying and severely condemning the conduct"of the escort police
in handcuffing the prisoners without any justification. In spite of it,
it is very unfortunate that the courts have to repeat and re-repeat its
c disapproval of unjustifiable handcuffing." (p. 128)

"One should not lose sight of the fact that when a person is remanded
by a judicial order by a competent court, that person comes within
the judicial custody of the court. Therefore, the talcing of a person
a
from prison to the court ,or back from court to the prison by the
D escort party is only under the judicial orders of the court. Therefore,
.
even if extreme circumstances neeessitaie the. escort party to bind the
prisoners in fetters, the escort party should record the reasons for •
d~ing s~ in w~ting and intimate the court so that lhe court considering
the circumstances either approve or disapprove the action of the
E escort party and issue necessary directions." (p. 129)

That was a case where social activists demanding the appointment of
regular teachers in schools located in tribal hamlets had been arrested and were
taken to the Court by handcuffing them and this Court expressed its strong
disapproval of .the said action.
F
The position in law with regard to handcuffing of prisoners - convicted
or undertrial - has been reiterated in the recent decision in Citizens for
Democracy v. State of Assam & Ors., [1995] 3 SCC 743, wherein it has been
held :

G "We declare, direct and lay down as a rule that handcuffs or other
fetters shall not be forced on a prisoner - convicted or undertrial -
while lodged in a jail anywhere in the country or while transporting
or in transit from one jail to another or from jail to court and back.
The police and the jail authorities, on their own, shall have no
H .. authority to direct the handcuffing of any inmate of a jail in the
f-
IN RE: M.P. DWIVEDI [AGRAWAL, J.] - .357
country or during transport from one jail to another or from jail to A
court and back.

Where the police or the jail authorities have well-grounded basis
for drawing a strong inference that a particular prisoner. is likely to
jump jail or break out of the custody then the said prisoner be
B
produced before the Magistrate concerned and a prayer for permis-
si.on to handcuff the prisoner be made before the said Magistrate,
Save in rare cases of concrete proof regarding proneness of the
prisoner to violence, his tendency to escape, he being so dangerous/
•
desperate and the finding that no other practical way of forbidding
escape is available the Magistrate may grant permission to handcuff C
the prisoner.

In all the cases where a person arrested by police, is produced before
the Magistrate and remand - judicial or non-judicial - is given by the
Magistrate the person concerned shall not be handcuffed unless, D
special orders in that respect are obtained from the Magistrate at the
· time of the grant of the remand.

When the police arrests a person in execution of a warrant of arrest
obtained from a Magistrate, the person so arrested shall not be
handcuffed unless the police has also obtained orders from the E
Magistrate for the handcuffing of the person .to be so arrested.

Where a person is arrested by the police without warrant the police
officer concerned, may if he ·is satisfied, on the basis of the
guidelines given by us in para above, that it is necessary to handcuff F
s~ch a person, he may do so till the time he is taken to the police
station and thereafter his production before the Magistrate. Further
use of fetters thereafter can only be under the orders of the
Magistrate as already. indicated by us.

We direct all ranks of police and the prison authorities to meticu- G
lously obey the above-mentioned _directions. Any violation of any
of the directions issued by us by any rank of police in the country
or member of the jail establishment shall be summarily punishable
under the Contempt of Courts Act apart from other penal conse-
quences under law." (p. 751). H
358 SUPREME COlJIIT REPOIITS (1996] 1 S.C.R.
A The justification for handcuffing that has been offered about the under
trial prisoners trying to escape from custody does not stand scrutiny because
the accused were social activists who were agitating for the protection of the
rights of the tribals and at the time of arguments on the bail application of the
accused persons, bail was not opposed by the prosecution on the ground of
B seriousness of the charges against them or the likelihood of their absconding.
•
It is not disputed that no orders were obtained from the concerned Magistrate
with regard to handcuffing of the prisoners before taking them to court from
jail and to the jail from the court. The handcuffing of the members of the
Sangath who were under trial prisoners, was, therefore, not justified and was
in clear dis-regard of the law laid down by this Court in the decisions referred
c to above. The question that arise is whether the said actions of the contemners
in handcuffing the prisoners constitute contempt of this Court. We will first
take up the case of the five police personnel who are contemners Nos. 1 to
5.

D Contemner No. 1, M.P. Dwivedi, was· Superintendent of Police of
District Jhabwa at the relevant time. He was not personally present in Alirajpur
when the incidents of handcuffing had taken place. He is, therefore, not
directly involved in the said incidents. In the order dated June 4, 1993 it is
stated that notice was being issued to him for the reason that, being over all
incharge of the police administration in the district, he was responsible to
E
ensure strict compliance with the directions given by this Court in the matter
of handcuffing of under trial pri~oners by police personnel under his charge
and instead of taking action against the police personnel responsible for such
violation, he appears to have approved the said action.· In the affidavit filed
by the contemner in response to the said notice, he has stated that there was
F no complaint about handcuffing from any member of the public· or from the
affected persons and he had not come across even any press report about
handcuffing and that only on February 26, 1993 Dbarmendra Choudhary, SDO
(Police) had informed him about the handcuffings and thereafter he visited
Sondwa Police Station on March 5, 1993 and inquired into ti\e incidents and
G the police case diaries in respect of the incidents of handcuffings which
showed that the accused persons had attempted to resist the arrest and made
attempts to run away and a large number or supporters of the Sangath had
reached Alirajpur on knowing the arrest of the accused persons and there was
a strong possibility that they would have attempted to free the accused
H persons.froln the police custody. The conteniner has further stated that he
IN RE: M.P DWIVEDI [AGRAWAL, l] 359
called a meeting of all gazetted police officers and station officers on March A
23, 1993 and gave strict directions to the effect that handcuffing was to be
resorted to only in rare and exceptional situations and they should try to get
written orders from concerned Magistrate in accordance with the provisions
of M.P. Police Regulations. He has further stated that he was not aware of
the decision of this Court in Prem Sha11kar Shukla v. Delhi Administration B
.•
(supra), but even without knowledge of the said decision and on the basis
of M.P. Police Regulations, he had indicated to his subordinate officers that
handcuffing was not to be resorted to except in exceptional cases and that
this happens to be in accordance with the exceptions given by the judgment
of this Court in that case.
c
Contemner No. 2, Dharmendra Choudhary, was posted as SDO (Police)
at Alirajpur at the relevant time. In the affidavit filed on behalf of the
petitioners in writ petition No. 239 of 1993 it has been claimed that he was
personally present at the time of handcuffings of the under trial prisoners on
February 3, 1993. In his affidavit filed in response to the notice issued to him, D
the contemner has denied this allegation and has stated that his office at
Alirajpur is situate far away from Police Station Alirajpur and on February 3,
1993 he was busy with supervision of investigation in heinous offences (Crime
No. 6/93 of P.S. Sorwa and Crime No. 8/93 of P.S. Chandpur both under
Section 307 I.P.C.). He has also stated that he has no precise knowledge of E
law laid down by this Court in the matter of handcuffing and that the
subordinate officers involved in the incidents had given him to understand that
they had handcuffed the under trials prisoners due to prevailing circumstances
at the relevant time as recorded in the police case diary and also on the basis
of Paragraph 465 of M.P. Police Regulations. According to him, the only lapse
F
that appears on their part was that the respective officials did not take the
written orders from the learned judicial Magistrate and· they acted as per
guidelines mentioned in Police Regulations paragraph 465 of M.P. Police
Regulations under title 'the list of prisoners who must be handcuffed.'

Contemner No. 3, S.S. Ansari, was posted as Town Inspector at Police G
Station Alirajpur at the relevant time. He was admittedly present at the time
the incidents of handcuffing took place during the period from February 2,
1993 to February 25, 1993. In his affi<)avit filed in response to the f.otice, the
contemner has stated that he himself did not participate in the said incidents
and that it was the Investigating Officer who was responsible for the H
360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] I S.C.R.
A handcuffing of the accused persons. He has sought to justify the handcuffing
on the basis of the entries in the police case diary by the Investigating Officer
that the accused persons were likely to escape.

B
Contemner No. 4, S.D. Bhargava, was posted as Sub-Inspector of
Police/S.O. at Police Station Sondwa, at the relevant time. In his affidavit filed
in response to the notice, the contemner had not disputed the incidents of
j
handcuffing <,luring the period from February 2, 1993 to February 25, 1993.
He has sought to justify the said action on the basis of Paragraph 465 of M.P.
Police Regulations. He has also stated that the said incidents of handcuffings
took place due to error of judgment and due to ignorance of law laid by this
c Court in Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration (supra).

Contemner No. 5, Natvar Singh, was posted as Head Constable at Police
Station Sondwa at the relevant time. He has been placed under suspension in
connection with the incidents of handcuffings which took place on February
D 8, 1993. In his affidavit filed in response to the notice, the contemner has
stated that he had no knowledge of law laid down by this Court with regard
to use of handcuffs prior to the institution of these proceedings in this Court
and no departmental circular had been issued containing the necessary
directions in that regard.

E As laid down by this Court "Contempt of court is disobedience to the
court, by acting in opposition to the authority, justice and dignity thereof. It
signifies a wilful disregard or disobedience of the court's order; it also
signifies such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court and the
administration of law into disrepute. (See : Baradakanta Mishra, Ex.-Commis-
F sioner of Endowments v. Bhimsen Dixit, (supra) at p. 499). Wilful disregarc!
or disobedience of the court's order presupposes an awareness of the order that
has been disregarded or disobeyed. In view of the affidavits filed by contemn-
ers Nos. I to 5 stating that they were not aware of law laid down by this Court
in Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration (supra) and Sunil Gupta v.
G State ~f Madhya Pradesh & Ors. (supra), we refrain from taking action to
punish them for contempt of this Court.

The handcuffing of the under trial prisoners cannot, however, be
justified even under the provisions of Regulation 465 of the M.P. Police
Regulations inasmuch as the said regulation requires an express authorisation
H from the Magistrate/Jail Officer for the purpose of taking him to court from
IN RE: M.P. DWIVEDI [AGRAWAL, J.] 361
jail and from jail to court. Admittedly, no such authorisation was obtained in A
this case. As regards the role and responsibility of contemners Nos. 1 to 5 in
., these actions involving handcuffing of under trial prisoners, it may be stated
that contemners Nos. 3 to 5 were directly involved in the said incidents of
handcuffing because the handcuffing was done under their directions or in
their presence. Contemners Nos. 1 and 2, even though not directly involved B
in the said incidents since they were no~ present, must be he1d responsible for
having not taken adequate steps w prevent such actions and even after the
said actions came to their knowledge, they condoned the same by not taking
stem action against persons found responsible for this illegality. We, there-
fore, record our disapproval of the conduct of all the five contemners Nos.
1 to 5 in this regard and direct that a note regarding the disapproval of their
c
conduct by this Court be placed in the personal file of all of them.

We are also constrained to say that though nearly 15 years have elapsed
since this Court gave its decision in Prem Shankar Shukla (supra) no steps
have been taken by the concerned authorities in the State of Madhya Pradesh D
to amend the M.P. Police Regulations so as to bring them in accord with the
law laid down by this Court in that case. Nor has any circular been issued
laying down the guidelines in the matter of handcuffing of prisoners in the
light of the decision of this Court in Prem Shankar Shukla (supra). The Chief
Secretary to the Government of Madhya Pradesh is, therefore, directed to
ensure that suitable steps are taken to amend the M.P. Police Regulations in
E
the light of the law laid down by this Court in Prem Shankar Shukla (supra)
_J and proper guidelines are issued for the guidance of the police personnel in
this regard. The Law Department and the Police Department of the Govern-
ment of Madhya Pradesh shall take steps to ensure that the law laid down by
this Court in the matter of protection of human rights of citizens as against F
actions by the police is brought to the notice of all Superintendents of Police
in the Districts soon after the decision is given, by issuing necessary circulars
in that regard and the responsibility is placed on the Superintendent of Police
to ensure compliance with the said circulars by the subordinate police
personnel under his charge. G
Contemner No. 6, Vinod Kumar, was posted as SDM at Alirajpur at the
relevant time. It has been alleged on behalf of the petitioners in the Writ
Petition that the incident of handcuffing on February 18, 1993 took place in
his presence. In his affidavit filed in response to the notice, the contemner has,
however, stated that he was on earned leave from December 31, 1992 to H
362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] l S.C.R.

A February 17, 1993 and on November 18, 1992 he was on medical leave. In
view of the said statement, no responsibility attaches to the contemner in
respect of the incident of handcuffing on November 18, 1992 and notice issued " '.·
against him is discharged.

Contemner No. 7, B.K. Nigam, was posted as Judicial Magistrate First
B Class, Alirajpur, at the relevant time. In the order dated June 4, 1993 it is
stated that the under trial prisoners were produced before him but he did riot
take any action against handcuffing of those prisoners by the police. In the
said order, reference has also been made to the rejoinder affidavit of Dr.
Arnita Baviskar filed on June I, 1993 wherein it is stated that the contemner
c was apprised about the decisions of this Court and he is reported to have
stated that " ..................... the Supreme Court decision has no application
there and that the police has the right to transport the accused as they want,
with or without handcuffs". The contemner has filed two affidavits in re-
sponse to the notice. In the affidavit dated July 31, 1993, he has denied
D having made the statement as alleged by Dr. Arnita Baviskar in her affidavit
dated June I, 1993 regarding handcuffing of the under trial prisoners.and has
said that on February 8, 1993, two complaints were made before him by '
accused Ravi and Rahul Narsimha Ram about the handcuffing of prisoners
and that on these applications he had passed orders on the same day for
E Incharge of Police Station Alirajpur to submit explanation and that besides
these two complaints, no complaint whatsoever, orally or in writing, was
made to him regarding handcuffing of the under trial prisoners. In support of
'--
his aforesaid submission, the contemner has also filed the affidavits of Shri
Betulla Khan and Shri Girdhari Lal Vani, Advocates who were representing
the accused persons before him in those cases and who had appeared in his
'
F
court on February 8, 1993. In these affidavits the deponents have stated that
no decision of this Court was cited before the contemner on that date regard-
ing handcuffing of under trial prisoners and that the contemner did not say
that the decision of this Court has no application and the police has the right
to transport the accused as they want, with or without handcuffs. In the
G second affidavit dated September 18, 1993 the contemner has tendered his
unconditional and unqualified apology for the lapse on his part that when
under trial prisoners in Crime No. 11/93, 12/93, 17/93 and 19/93 of Police
Station Sondwa, who were agitating against the construction of Sardar Sarovar,
were produced in handcuffs in his court, immediate action was not taken by
H him for the removal of their handcuffs and against the escort party for
IN RE: M.P. DWIVEDI [AGRAWAL, J.] 363
bringing them in Court or taking them away from Court in handcuffs. The A
contemner has submitted that he is a young judicial officer and that the lapse
was not intentional.

We have carefully considered the two affidavits of the contemner as
well as the affidavits of Shri Betulla Khan and Shri Girdhari Lal Vani,
Advocates. We would assume that on February 8, 1993 the contemner did not B
make the state.ment about the judgments of this Court having no application
there and the police having the right to transport the accused as they want,
with or without handcuffs. But the contemner, being a judicial officer, is
expected to be aware of law laid down by this Court in Prem Shankar Shukla
v. Delhi Administration (supra) and Sunil Gupta & Ors. v. State of Madhya c
Pradesh & Ors. (supra). Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration
(supra) was decided in 1980, nearly 13 years earlier. In his affidavits also he
does not say that he was not aware of the said decisions. Apart from that,
there were provisions in Regulation 465 of the M.P. Police Regulations
prescribing the conditions in which under trial prisoners could be handcuffed D
and they contain. the requirement regarding authorisation for the same by the
Magistrate. It appears that the contemner was completely insensitive about
the serious violations of the human rights of the under trial prisoners in the
matter of their handcuffing in as much as when the prisoners were produced
before him in Court in handcuffs, he did not think it necessary to take any
action for the removal handcuffs or against the escort party for bringing them
E
to the Court in handcuffs and taking them away in handcuffs without his
aut)lorisation. This is a serious lapse on the part of the contemner in the
discharge of his duties as a judicial officer who is expected to ensure that the
basic human rights of the citizens are not violated. Keeping in view that the
contemner is a young judicial officer, we refrain from imposing punishment F
on him. We, however, record our strong disapproval of his conduct and direct
that a note of this disapproval by this Court shall be kept in the personal file
of the contemner. We also feel that judicial officers should be made aware
from time to time of the law laid down by this Court and the High Court,
more especially in connection with protection of basic human rights of the G
people and, for that purpose, short refresher courses may be conducted at
regular intervals so that judicial officers are made aware about the develop-
ments in the law in the field.

In the result, the contempt notices issued against the contemners are
discharged subject to the directions regarding disapproval of the conduct of H
364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] l·S.C.R.
A contemners Nos. 1 to 5 and 7 and directions regarding placing the note of
the said disapproval in the personal files of all of them. The contempt )

proceedings will stand disposed of accordingly. A copy of this order be sent
to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Madhya ·Pradesh and the
Registrar, Madhya Pradesh High Court.
B K.K.T. Petition disposed of.