Holding

Section 311 CrPC grants wide discretionary power to summon or examine witnesses, with a mandatory duty to do so when evidence is essential, and the High Court’s order of 20‑Feb‑2006 is set aside due to procedural irregularities, allowing impleadment of the appellants.

Summary

The case arose from a dowry‑related dispute in which the complainant’s statement before the trial court differed from the statement recorded during investigation. An application under Section 311 of the CrPC seeking a fresh recording of the complainant’s statement was rejected by the trial court as an attempt to fill gaps in the prosecution’s case. The respondent filed a Section 482 application to set aside that order, which the Rajasthan High Court allowed. The appellants then applied to recall the High Court’s order, alleging they were not heard and not impleaded; the High Court dismissed the recall application. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the scope of Section 311, holding that it confers wide discretionary power to summon or examine witnesses, with a mandatory duty to do so when evidence is essential, and that although a High Court cannot normally recall its own order, the order was set aside due to the procedural irregularities. The Court directed that the parties be impleaded if not already done and allowed the appeal.

Issues considered

What is the scope and nature of the power conferred by Section 311 CrPC – discretionary or mandatory?
Can a High Court recall or review its own order passed under Section 482 CrPC without hearing the affected parties?
Should the order of the High Court allowing the setting aside of the trial court’s Section 311 order be set aside on the ground of lack of notice and non‑impleadment of the appellants?

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 311, s. 482
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 60, s. 64, s. 91
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120B, s. 376, s. 406, s. 498A

Subjects

Section 311 CrPCSection 482 CrPCre‑recording witness statementdiscretionary judicial powerHigh Court order recallimpleadmentcriminal procedureevidence

Judgment

A IDDAR AND ORS.
v.
AABIDA AND ANR.

JULY 25, 2007

B [DR. ARIJIT PASAY AT AND D.K. JAIN, JJ.]

Code of Criminal Procedure, I973:

ss. 3I I and 482-Application uls 31 I for re-recording statement of
C complainant-Rejection of by trial court-High Court setting aside order of
trial court in exercise of power u/s 482-Without hearing other party-
Applications by other party recalling the orde:· of High Court and for their
impleadment in the application uls 482-Denied by High Court-On appeal,
held: Though High Court has no power to review/recall its order, but in view
D of peculiar facts of the case, previous order of High Court set aside--
Direction to implead the other party.

s. 3 I I-Nature, object and scope of-Held: The provision is
supplementary· and discretionary-It is general provision which applies to
all proceedings-The object thereof is to safeguard failure of justice on
E account of mistake of either party in bringing valuable evidence on record
or leaving ambiguity of statements of examined witnesses-The object is to
bring on record evidence from the point ofview ofthe accused, the prosecution
and also the orderly society-Powers under it are very wide and hence the
discretion is to be exercised judiciously.

F The statement of a complainant before Trial Court was at variance with
the statement recorded during investigation. Thereafter an application u/s
311 Cr.P.C. requesting for recording the statement of the complainant afresh
was filed. Trial Court rejected the application on the ground that it was a case
where prosecution was trying to fill up lacunae of prosecution version.
G Respondent No. 1 filed application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. for setting aside order of
trial court. High Court by order dated 20.2.2006 allowed the application.
Thereafter appellants herein filed an application to recall the order dated
20.2.2006 as the same was decided without hearing them. They also filed an
application to be impleaded. High Court rejected the application. Hence the

H 518
-~
__,.

IDDAR v. AABIDA 519
present appeal A
J
""' Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: l. Section 311 Cr.P.C. is a supplementary provision enabling,,
and in certain circumstances imposing on the Court the duty of examining a,
material witness who would not be otherwise brought before it. It is couched B

-
in the widest possible terms and calls for no limitation, either with regard to
the stage at which the powers of the Court should be exercised, or with regard
to the manner in which it should be exercised. It is not only the prerogative
;..
but also the plain duty of a Court to examine such of those witnesses as it
considers absolutely necessary for doing justice between the State and the
subject. There is a duty cast upon the Court to arrive at the truth by all lawful c
means and one of such means is the examination of witnesses of its own accord'
when for certain obvious reasons either party is not prepared to call witnesses
who are known to be in a position to speak important relevant facts.
[Para 10) (523-B-DJ
D
2. The object underlying Section 311 Cr.P.C. is that there may not be
---(
.., failure of justice on account of mistake of either party in bringing the valuable
evidence on record or leaving ambiguity in the statements of the witnesses
examined from either side. The determinative factor is whether it is essential
to the just decision of the case. The section is not limited only for the benefit
of the accused, and it will not be an improper exercise of the powers of the E
Court to summon a witness under the Section merely because the evidence
supports the case for the prosecution and not that of the accused. The section
is a general section which applies to all proceedings, enquiries and trials
under Cr.P.C. and empowers Magistrate to issue summons to any witness at
any stage of such proceedings, trial or enquiry. In Section 311 the significant
expression that occurs is "at any stage of inquiry or trial or other proceeding
F
-_,+
under this Code". lt is, however, to be borne in mind that whereas the section
confers a very wide power on the Court on summoning witnesses, the
discretion conferred is to be exercised judiciously, as the wider the power the
greater is the necessity for application of judicial mind. [Para 11) (523-E-H)

_, d
3. The Section is manifestly in two parts. Whereas the word used in
the first part is "may", the second part uses "shall". In consequence, the
first part gives purely discretionary authority to a Criminal Court and enables
it at any stage of an enquiry, trial or proceeding under the Code; (a) to
summon any one as a witness, or (b) to examine any person present in Court,
or (c) to recall and re-examine any person whose evidence has already been H
i-- .
520 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 8 S.C.R.

A ,recorded. On the other hand, the second part is mandatory and compels the >- L,
Court to take any of the aforementioned steps ifthe new evidence appears to
· it essential to the just decision of the case. (Para 10] [523-A-B]

4. It is a cardinal rule in the law of evidence that the best available
evidence should be brought before the Court. Sections 60, 64 and 91 of the
B Evidence Act, 1872 are based on this rule. The Court is not empowered under
the provisions of Cr.P.C. to compel either the prosecution or the defence to
examine any particular witness or witnesses on their side. This must be left
)._
.....
to the parties. But in weighing the evidence, the Court can take note of the
fact that the best available evidence has not been given, and can draw an adverse
c inference. The Court will often have to depend on intercepted allegations made
by the parties, or on inconclusive inference from facts elicited in the evidence.
In such cases, the Court has to act under the second part of the Section.
Sometimes the examination of witnesses as directed by the.Court may result
in what is thought to be "filling of loopholes". That is purely a subsidiary
factor and cannot be taken into account. Whether the n~w evidence is essential
D or not, must of course depend on the facts of each case, and has to be
).
determined by the Presiding Judge. (Para 12) (524-A-D) ·Y ·,

5. The object of Section 311 is to bring on record, evidence not only .
from the point of view of the accused and the prosecution but also from the
point of view of the orderly society. If a witness called by Court gives evidence
E against the complainant he should be allowed an opportunity to cross-examine.
The right to cross-examine a witness who is called by a Court arises not under
the provision of Section 311, but under the Evidence Act which gives a party 1--·

the right to cross-examine a witness who is not his own witness. Since a
witness summoned by the Court could not be termed a witness of any
F particular party, the Court should give the right of cross-examination to the
complainant. (Para 13) (524-E-F) -r::
Jagat Roi v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1968) SC 178, relied on.

6. It is true that the High Court has no power to review/recall its order..
G But in view of the peculiar factual scenario that the appellants were not heard >-
~
before the order dated 20.2.2006 and they were also not impleaded as parties,
the order dated 20th February, 2006 is set aside. The petition filed by the
respondent No. 1 shall be heard on merits. If the appellants have already been
~
impleaded in the application, there shall be no need of respondents impleading
them. If it has not been done, the same shall be done.
H (Paras 14, 15) (524-G.,.H; 525-A-B)
,, IDDARv. AABIDA[PASAYAT,J.) 521
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 934, of A
2007.

From the Judgment & Order dated 20.02.2006 & 02.03.2006 of the High
Court of Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur in S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No.
199 of2006.
B
Wasim A. Qadri and Lakshmi Raman Singh for the Appellants.

>. Sudhir Nandrajog, Aruneshwar Gupta, Naveen Kumar Singh, Mukul
Sood and Shashwat Gupta for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by c
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. I. Leave granted.

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single
Judge of the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench dated 20.2.2006 pass;d
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the D
'Code') and order dated 2.3.2006 refusing to recall the said order i.e. 20.2.2006.

3. Background facts need to be noted in brief.

On 17.2.2005 the elder sister of the complainant lodged a complaint
before the police station alleging that she was married to one Shri Sakeel. E
After sometime, the family of the husband of her sister started demanding
dowry and torturing her. When the complainant went to meet her sister, she
saw several wounds Qn her person. It was stated that both sisters were
beaten and the complainant was raped by her family members and friends of
in-laws. First Information Report (in short the 'FIR') was lodged for allegep F
- --~- commission of offences punishable under Section 498A, 406 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 in short the 'IPC'). Since no case was found for alleged
commission of offence punishable under Section 376 IPC, the said offenc:e
was not registered.

4. Another complaint was lodged on 24.4.2005 in respect of the same G
alleged event in another police station where the case was registered for
alleged commission of offence under Sectio~ 376 read with Section 120B IPC.
The appellants were arrested and an application for bail was moved. The High
Co.urt rejecud the bail application. According ti) the appellant matter was
, amicably settled and the complainant appeared before the trial court and her
statement was recorded. Her statement was at variance with the statement H
+-
522 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 8 S.C.R.

A recorded during investigation. Thereafter an application in tenns of Section >- {-I

311 of the Code was filed requesting for recording statement ofthe complainant fii
afresh. This according to the appellants was at the behest of some local
persons and enemies of the appellants. The trial court by Order dated 13.1.2006
held that it was a case where prosecution was trying to fill up lacunae of
prosecution version and it was rejected.
B
5. Respondent No. 1 preferred application under Section 482 of the
f'""
Code for setting aside the order of the trial court.
~

6. On 20th February, 2006 the application was allowed. Thereafter an
application was filed to recall the said order as no notice was issued to
c respondents in the petition. They also filed an application to be impleaded.
The High Court by order dated 2.3.2006 rejected the application filed to recall
the order dated 20.2.2006.

7. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellants submitted
that the High Court's orders cannot be maintained because no reason has
D
been indicated as to why the order of the trial court rejecting the prayer in
··'T'
r:
tenns of Section 311 of the Code was set aside. It was also submitted that
since no notice has been issued to the appellants before the order was
passed, the High Court erroneously rejected the prayer to recall the order.

E 8. Learned counsel for the respondent N0. 1 however submitted that
this is a case where the High Court's order cannot be faulted even though
when the first order was passed on 20th February, 2006, no notice had been
issued to the appellants. They had sought to be impleaded on their own
motion before the order rejecting the prayer for recalling the order was
passed.
F
9. In this context, reference may be made to Section 311 of the Code
which reads as follows:

"311. Power to summon material witness, or examine person present.

G Any Court may, at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding
under this Code, summon any person as a witness or examine any
person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness or recall
and re-examine any person already examined, and the Court shall \-·
summon and examine or recall and re-examine any such person if his
evidence appears to it to be essential to the just decision of the case."
H
JDDARv. AABJDA[PASAYAT,J.] 523

10. The section is manifestly in two parts. Whereas the word used in • A
the first part is "may", the second part uses "shall". In consequence, the first
part gives purely discretionary authority to a Criminal Court and enables it
at any stage of an enquiry, trial or proceeding under the Code: (a) to summon ,
any one as a witness, or (b) to examine any person present in Court, or (c)
to recall and re-examine any person whose evidence has already been recorded. B
On the other hand, the second part is mandatory and compels the Court to ,
take any of the aforementioned steps if the new evidence appears to it
essential to the just decision of the case. This is a supplementary provision
enabling, and in certain circumstances imposing on the Court the duty of 1

examining a material witness who would not be otherwise brought before it.
It is couched in the widest possible terms and calls for no limitation, either C
with regard to the stage at which the powers of the Court should be exercised,
or with regard to the manner in which it should be exercised. It is not only
the prerogative but also the plain duty of a Court to examine such cf those
witnesses as it considers absolutely necessary for doing justice between the
State and the subject. There is a duty cast upon the Court to arrive at the D
truth by all lawful means and one of such means is the examination of
witnesses of its own accord when for certain obvious reasons either party is'
not prepared to call witnesses who are known to be in a position to speak
important relevant facts.

11. The object underlying Section 311 of the Code is that there may not E
be failure of justice on account of mistake of either party in bringing the
valuable evidence on record or leaving ambiguity in the statements of the
witnesses examined from either side. The determinative factor is whether it i$
essential to the just decision of the case. The section is not limited only for
the benefit of the accused, and it will not be an improper exercise of the F
powers of the Court to summon a witness under the Section merely because
the evidence /supports the case for the prosecution and not that of the
accused. The section is a general section which applies to all proceedings,
enquiries and trials under the Code and empowers Magistrate to issu~ summons
to any witness at any stage of such proceedings, trial or enquiry. In Sectiol[l G
311 the significant expression that occurs is "at any stage of inquiry or trial
or other proceeding under this Code". It is, however, to be borne in mind that
whereas the section confers a very wide power on the Court on summonin~
witnesses, the discretion conferred is to be exercised j•;diciously, as the wider
the power the greater is the necessity for application of judicial mind.
H
+· ....
524 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 8 S.C.R.

A 12. As indicated above, the Section is wholly discretionary. The second . )... l'-
part of it imposes upon the Magistrate an obligation: it is, that the Court shall
"·
summon and examine all persons whose evidence appears to be essential to
the just decision of the case. It is a cardinal rule in· the law of evidence that
the best available evidence should be brought before the Court. Sections 60,
64 and 91 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short, 'Evi~pce Act') are based
B on this rule. The Court is not empowered under the provisions of the Code
to compel either the prosecution or the defence to examine any particular
witness or witnesses on their side. This must be left to the parties.· But in <'
,.)._
weighing the evidence, the Court can take note of the fact .that the best
available evidence has not been given, and can draw an adverse inference.
c The Court will often have to depend on intercepted allegations made by the
parties, or on inconclusive inference from facts elicited in the evidence. In
such cases, the Court has to act under the second part of the section.
Sometimes the examination of witnesses as directed by the Court may result
in what is thought to be "filling of loopholes". That is purely a subsidiary
'
D factor and cannot be taken into account. Whether the new evidence is.
essential or not, must of course depend on the. facts of each case, and has
to be determined by the Presiding Judge.
....
~

13. The object of the Section 311 is to bring on record evidence not only
from the point of view of the accused and the prosecution but also from the
E point of view of the orderly society. If a witness called by Court gives
evidence against the complainant he should. be allowed an opportunity to
cross-examine. The right to cross-examine a witness who is called by a Court
arises not under the provision of Section 311, but under the Evidence Act
which gives a party the right to cross-examine a witness who is not his own
p witness. Since a witness summoned by the Court could not be termed a
witness of any particular party, the Court should give the right of cross-
examination to the complainant. These aspects were highlighted in Jagat Rai
v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1968) SC178.
>,

14. It is undisputed that the appellants were not heard before the order
G dated 20.2.2006 was passed. A specific ground taken in application to recall
the order was that even no notice was issued and they were not impleaded
as parties. It appears to have been brought to notice of the High Court that
the appellants were heard before the trial court when the application in terms
of Section 311 of the Code. was decided by the trial court. It is true that the
H High Court has no power to review/recall its order. But in view of the peculiar
IDDARy. AABIDA[PASAYAT,J.) 525

factual scenario highlighted above, we set aside the order dated 20th February, A
2006. The petition filed by the respondent No. I shall be heard on merits.

15. It is stated that the appellants have already been impleaded in the
application. If that is so, there shall be no need of respondents impleading
then. If it has not been done, the same shall be done. We make it clear that
·we do· not express any opinion on the merits of the case. B
16. Appeal is allowed.

K.K.T. Appeal allowed.

c

... ....

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