Holding

Non‑supply of Urdu translations of all documents within the statutory five‑day period, without justified exceptional circumstances or communication of such circumstances, breaches Article 22(5) and Section 3(3) of COFEPOSA, rendering the detention illegal.

Summary

Ibrahim Ahmad Batti, a Pakistani national, was detained under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act (COFEPOSA) on 1 July 1982 for alleged smuggling. The grounds of detention were served in English and Urdu within five days, but Urdu translations of the bulk of the documents relied upon were supplied only on 15 July, exceeding the statutory five‑day limit, and some documents were never translated. Batti contended that this breach of Article 22(5) of the Constitution and Section 3(3) of COFEPOSA, together with the failure to inform him of any exceptional circumstances causing the delay, invalidated his detention. The Supreme Court held that the delay without justified exceptional circumstances and without communicating the reasons violated the constitutional safeguard, and that a duty to inform the detainee arises by necessary implication. Consequently, the detention was declared illegal and Batti was ordered to be released.

Issues considered

Whether failure to supply Urdu translations of all documents within the prescribed five‑day period breaches Article 22(5) read with Section 3(3) of COFEPOSA.
Whether the detaining authority must inform the detainee of the exceptional circumstances causing any delay and record the reasons in writing.
Whether partial compliance with the translation requirement and delay beyond five days vitiates the detention order.
Whether the detainee's knowledge of English, Hindi or Gujarati affects the requirement for translation into his mother tongue.

Legislation cited

Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1947 (COFEPOSA)s. Section 3(1), s. Section 3(3), s. Section 8(f)
Constitution of Indias. Article 22(5)
Customs Act, 1962

Subjects

preventive detentionArticle 22(5)COFEPOSAtranslation of groundsexceptional circumstancesright to representationconstitutional safeguarddetention order quashed

Judgment

'
I
A 540

IBRAHIM AHMAD BATTI

v.

B STATE OF GUJARAT & OTHERS
October 13, 1982

[V.0. TULZAPURKAR AND R.B. MISHRA, JJ.)

Constitution of India, 1950, Article 22(5) and Section 3(3) of the Conser-
c vation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1941-
Meaning and import of-Failure to supply the translations of the documents etc.
relied on, in the ·language knOwn to the detenu and/or delayed-Supply without
0

communication of ihe reasons recorded for the delay Would b'e a clear violation of
the coustitutionai mandate of Article 22(5).

On April 15, 1982, the Customs Officers raided bungalow No. 3, Sweta
D Park SoCiety, Bhuderpura, Ambawadl, Ahmedabad,' allegedly belonging to the
petitioner-detenu, but standing in the name of Rekhaben Champaklal Seth and
during the search that followed in the presence of the p'etitioner and one
Hasmukh Prabhudas Sharm~ contraband ··Of several items were ·recovered arid
seized under the reasonable 1Jelief that they were smuggled goods liable to be
oonsficated under the Customs Act, 1962. This seizure was followed by recording
of confessional statements of t~e petitioner ·and his co-conspir~tors. During
E the foliow up action certain other premises were searcbCd and further
contrabaitd was seized. By an order dated April 19, 1982, issued by the State
•
of Gujarat under Section 3(1) of COFEPOSA, the petitioner was detaioeQ in
Abmedabad Central Prison, with a view to preser.ving him from keeping and
transporting smuggled goods.· Grounds of detention dated April 23, 1982
aloogwith copies of statements and documents relied upon by the detaining
authority were served on the petitioner. The petitioner's represCntation to the
Advisory Board was accepted, since the failure on the part of the detaining ,_
authority to supply the translations in Urdu of the grounds and documents relied
upon,• amounted to a clear "'.iolation of the constitutional mandate of Article
22(5) vitiating the order of detention. Consequently, the order of detention
was revoked by the State under section 8(f) of COFEPOSA and directed his
release forthwith, unless he was required to be retained in custody under orders
of any competent Court.gr Law. Ho~ever, on the same day i.e. on lst of
G July 1982, the State Government passed another order of detention against the
petitioner under section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA and served it on him on 2nd of
July 1982 whilst he was in judicial custody under Court's Order in two cases,
one under the Arms Act and another under the Foreigrier's Act. This detention
order was also passed with a' view to preventing him from smuggling goods and
engaging himself in transporting smuggled goods and keeping smuggled goods."
H Gr~unds of detention tunning into 32 typed pages in.~nglish together with copies
IBRAHIM V. GUJARAT 541

of all the statements arid documents referred to and relied upon in the grounds, A
in regional language, were served upon the petitioner on 7th July, 1982. Urdu.
,. translations of only some .of these docuoients were supplied on 15th of July 1982
without furnishing the recorded reasons for the delay in supplying them. The
petitioner's representations made tbrollgb his counsel ori '5th August· 1982,
having been rejected on 13th August, 1982 the petitioner has filed this writ
petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, contending that , non-supply of
Urdu trRnslations of some of the statements and documents relied upon by the B
detaining authority. In spite of the revocation. of an earlier order on this
ground, and the non-communication of the reasons for the delayed supply of
Urdu translations in respect of the rest of the documents, have resulted in viola-
tion of Article 22(5) of the Constitution read with section 3(3) of the
COFEPOSA. '

~ Aliowing ihe Petition, the Court, c
HELD : Jn section 3(3) of the COFEPOSA, the concept of "reasonable
' time" 1 or "the shortest possible time" or reasonably requisite time", predicated
by the expression "as soon as may be" ·bas beCn retained b~t it is only with a
view to.meet the practical exigeticies of administrative affairs that the. detainiDg
authority is permitted to· communicate the grounds of detention, not latter'thin
5 days ordinarily, and not later than 15 days, if there are exceptional circum- D
~tanccs and that too with a safeguard of reasons being recorded in writing.
In other words, section 3(3) provideS 1 for the outer limits and the grounds of
detention must, therefore, be furnished to the detenu ortinarily within 5 days
from tlle date of detention bui in exceptional Circumstances and for reasons to \.
be recorded in writing, the time may stand extended but in any event it cannot
be later than 15 days from the date of detention. Unless the first duty imposed
/
upon the detaining authority under Article 22(5) is discharged within the E
prescribed time, it would Dot be possible for the detenu to exercise his right of
'o;iaking .a representation against bis detention-a corresponding right arising
from the second duty cast on the detaining authority. ~amely, to afford the
detenu 1he earliest opportunity of making Such representation against bis
detention. (549 D-H, 550 A-Bl

Abdul Jabbar Butt v_. State of Jammu & Kashmir, (1957] S.C.R. 51; F
A.K. Ray's case (198Z] I s.c.i:;. Z71, referred to.

2:1 The principle clearly enunciated in Smt lcchu Devi's case[l980] 4 S.C.C.,
53 is that copies of all documents, statemants and materials referred t9 or relied
upon in the grounds of detention (meaning thereby which has influenced the
mind of the detaining authority in arriving at its subjective satisfaction about
the necessity to detain the detenu) must be communicate~ to him within the G
time prescribed under section 3(3) of the COFEPOSA and that without this the
right to make representation cannot be meaningfully exercised. [552 D-E]

2:2 From the decided cases, it would follow that if the grounds together
with copies of all documents, statements and other materials i~corrorated in H
the gro_unds by reference on which the detaining authority ha's relied are required
542 sUJ>llllMll COlrltT Rlll>OltTS (1983) 1 S.C.R
to be communicated to the detenu un~er Art. 22(5) rc2d ~ ilh ~tclif'n ~(3) of
COFEPOSA within the prescribed time, then, not n:erely Jhe grcunds o·r
detention but also the copies of all incorporated documents, statements and
other materials must be supplied to the detenu in a script or language which he
understands and failure to do so would amount to a breach of the mandate
contained in Article 22(5) read wit~ section 3(3) ofCOFEPOSA. [553 C-D]

B La//ubhai Jogibhai Patel's case [1981] 2 S.C.R. 427, Hariklsan's case [1962]
Supp. 2 S.C.R. 918, Hadlba•dhu Das's case [1969) 1. S.C.R. 227, Smt. Raz/a Umar
Bakshi's case [1980] Supp sec 195; Kamala ·K••»•lal Klrushala•i's COJe [l98l]
l·S.C.C. 748 and Sunll Dutt's case A.l.R. 1982 SC l3.• referred to.

2:3 Not merely the exceptional circumstances must exist justifying the
c delay in communicating to the detenu all the material'i relied upon, but these
should be communicated to the detcnu to enable him io make an effectfve
representation. [554 G-HJ

Blshwa Mohan Kumar Sinha v. State of Bihar & Ors I.L.R. (1974) 53
Pat. 884; Blshawanath Prasad .Keshari v. State of Blhar & prs. I.L.R. (1975)
54 Pat. 72; approved.
D
3:1. Preventive detention is a serious invasion of Personal Hberty and the
normal methods open to a person charged with com.mission of any offence
to" disprove the Charge or tO prove his innocence at the trial are not available to
the person preventively•detairled and, therefore, in preventive, detention juriS.
prudence whatever little safeguards the constitu'tion and the enactments
authorising. such" de_tention provide assume utmost importance and must be
strictly adherCd to and one of such safeguards is that unless exceptional Circum-
. /stances really obtain the delay in supply of grourids of d_etention as also thC
documents and statements incorporated therein by reference beyond the normal
period of five day~ would ·be fatal. [556 P.FJ

Jn all the faCts and circumstances no exceptional circtimstances obtained
in the case justifying the delay and as such the same constitutes a breach of the ,_
F constituti9nal as well as legislative mandate. (1) Upon revocation of th~ earlier
detention order on 1st of July 1982, there was no urgency to issue the imp~gn'ed
· . order on the same day or serve it on the detenu on the following day since
he was already in judicial custody in other two cases, one under the Arms Act
and the other under the Foreigners Act jand no bail having been granted .to him,
there was no fear ·of his absconding from Ablnedabad, there bCing no urgency
G the detaining, authority could have kept <1-ll the material ready in Unlu and
supplied the same to him immediately after detaining him second time; (2) In
tlic absence of information as, to· the number of UrOu traiisJators put on the job_
except vaguely stating "handful translators were available" and the reasons for
not entrusting to others who do not observe Ramzan. it is difficult to sw:illow
the proposition that the State Government (with all its power and resources
H could not find req'uisite number of qualified persons to do .that job so as to
\ make Urdu translations of.the concerned do~uments and statements available ·
'o the detenu within the normal period of five days; and (iii) With the previous
IBRAHIM '· GUJARAT 543

detention order having bceri vitiated on the very ground, greater vlgil.ance and A
expedition was expected from the detaining authority. [556 G-H, 557A-El

1 3:2. It is true that neither Article 22(5) of the Constitution nor dries the
COFEPOSA contain any· provision which casts ,a duty ''upon ·the detaining.
authority to . inform the detenu anything about the exceptionaJ circumstantes
due to which delay may occur Or about the fact whether reasons have been ·
recorded in 'writing or not for the delay. It is also true that the court wUJ, B-
of course, go into and satisfy itself :about these mafters .when any issue in that
behalf is raise4 before it. [557 H, 558 A]

3:3. Under the scheme i of COFEPOSA, against his detention the detenu
has a right to make a· representation to an aU.thority as well as to ~the Advisory
. Board-and such' representation against .bis detention Can be on merits of the
grollnds of detentio_n as alsb for the failure on the part of the detaining~ autborl.ty c
to observe strictly the . requisite safegua.rds and on satisfying the _superior
authority or the· Advisory. Board on -either count he. is entitl~d to have1his
'detention_ revoked or .quashed. - In other words, the detenu iS entitled to sati~fy
either the superior autbOrity oi' the Advisory Board that the delay that has
occurred in the supply of requisite materiai" to ·him was not juStified because
exceptional circumstances did not exist or those put forward were unreal or
·invalid. Obviously, the detenu;:will not "be in·a position 1to do soJf the alleged D
·exceptional· circumstances are not communicated .to- him-_ Therefo.re, duty to ·
inform the detenu about the existence of ~xceptional circumstances ·and what
they were for delay in supplying grounds of detention and/of the documents
and statements inCorporated therein arises by neCessafy implication and! flows
from the right which is conferred upon~the detenu to make representation against
the detention. The impugned failure in this case constitutes anothe_r breach of
the safeguard contained •in; Article i2(5)-0f the Constitution read With section .3(3)' E
of COFEPOSA and vitiates the cOntinued detention of the petitioner.
[558 B·G, 559 A·B]

(4) ~9n·siJpply of Urd~ translalion Of the documents bas clearly pre·
judiced th~ petitioner in the exercise of his riij;ht , to make an effective represeDta·.
ti on against bis detention and· hence the safeguard contained in· Article 22(5) is
clearlf violated. The petitioner is a Pakistani ~national alld Urdu seems to be F
his mother tongue and a .little knowledge of English 1:figiires, !ability.' t~ read
~.· ~nglish words written in capitai)letters and a sµiattering· knowledge ·:or Hindi or
"--' Gujarati would not justify the, denial 1 of tUrdu)ranslation to lhim: of thei material
doCuments· and statements referred to as incriminating ~documents in the grounds
. and relied upo.n by the 1 ide_taining authority in arriving at )ts subjective
satisfaction. [559 E-G, 560 E-D]
G
ORJOINAL JURISDICTION: Writ' Petition (CRL) No. 1077 of
• 1982. ..._

(Under Article 32 of the Constitution· of India)
,., H
Ram Jethmalanni, P._H. Parekh, _Bhaskarbhai Mehta,· C. A.
Shah.and J.M. Parekhfor,.tho petioner.
544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1983) 1 s.c.a.

A D. V. Patel and R. N. Poddar, fot the Respondent . (State of
Gujarat).

Ashwani Kumar and Miss A. Subhrishini for the Respondent-
Union of India.

B The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
'
TULZAPURKAR, J. By this petition lb~abim Ahmad Batti, the
detenu herein, is seeking to- challenge the detention order dated !st
. July, 1982 issued by the respondent No. 1 (State of Gujarat) under
s. 3 '( 1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange & Prevention of
c Smuggling Activities Act, 1947 (for short, 'the COFEPQSA') and
praying for a ·writ of habeas corpus directing bis release after qua-
sliing the same. ·

On 15th.April, 1982, ,the Custom Officers raided Bungalow
~o; 3, Sweta Park Society, Bhuderpura, Ambawadi, Ahmedabad,
D allegedly belonging tel the petitioner but standing benami in the name
of Rekbaben. Cbampaklal Sheth and during the search that followed
in the presence of the petitioner and one Hasmukb Prabbudas
Sharma contraband comprising 700 pieces of gold with foreign
markings weighing 7000 tolas, radios, camera, Video cassette recor-
E der, colour.T.V, synthetic fabrics, crockery, etc. of considerable value
and Indian curreney of Rs. 72,766 were recovered; the said gold and
other a1 ticles were seized under the ·reasonable_ belief that the same
were smuggled goods liable to confiscation under the Customs Act,
1962. This seizure was followed by recording ·of confessional
statements of the petitioner and bis co-conspirators. During the
F follow up action· certain other premises were searched and further
--~.contraband was seized. .BY an order dated 19th April, 1982 issued
by the Respondent No. 1 under s. 3 (I) of the· COFEPOSA, the
petitioner was detained in Ahmedabad Central Prison with.a view to
preventing him from transporting smuggled goods and keeping
smuggled goods. Grounds of detention dated 23rd April, 1982
G alongwith copies of statements and documents relied upon by the
detaining authority were served on the petitioner. The.petitioner
made a representation against the said order of detention, which
.was considered by the Advisory Board, who opined thus :

H " ... although at the date when the det.ention order was
passed there was sufficient cause for reaching the subjective '
' IBRAHIM V, GUJARAT, (Tulzapurkar, J.) 545
.
satisfaction that it was absolutely necessary to detain the A
detenu under s. 3 (I) of the Act, the subsequent failure on
th.e part of the detaining authority to supply the translations
.in Urdu of the ground, and documents relied upon was·a dear
violation of the ~onstitutional mandate of Art.· 22 (5) so as to
vitiate the order of detention and hence, in our view, there
exists no sufficent cause for the continued detention of said
B
dr.tenu."

f•)llowing the above opinion of the Advisory Board, the res-
pondent No. I by its order dated !st of July, 1982 revoked the
. detention of the petitioner under s. 8 (f) of the COFEPOSA ,and
directed him to ·be released forthwith, unless he was required to be
, c
retained in . custody .·under the orders of ·any competent court
. of law. · However, on the same day i.e. lst«)f July, 1982, the
respond~nt No. I issued the impugned order of detention against
the petitioner under s. 3 (I) of' the COFEPOSA 'and served, it
on him on 2nd July, 1982 whilst be was "in judicial c;ustody D
under Courts order in . two cases, one under the Arms Act and
the other under the Foreigners Act ·pending against him and
after taking'' hiin. in custody again under the impugned order
detained him in Ahmedabad Central prison under tbe COFEPOSA.
This detention was effected "with a view .to preventing him from
smuggling goods and engaging himself in transporting smuggled "; E
goods and keeping smuggled goods:" Grounds of detention running
into 32 typed pages in English· as well as translated in Urd.u, toge"
tber with copies of all the statements and documents, .referred to and
relied upon in the grounds; in regional language were served upon
the petitioner on 7th July, 1982. Urdu translations· of the bulk of
the statements and documents referred to and relied upon in the F
grounds were supplied to the petitioner on 15th July, 1982, though
such supply did not include translations of all the statements and
documents relied upon by the detaining . authority. The petitioner's
representation mage through .his. Advocate on 5th of August 1982
having been rejected on 13th of August, 1982, the petitioner has G
filed this writ petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution challenging·
bis ~etention on several grounds.

Though counsel for tJie petitioner indicated three or four
- grounds on the basis of which he desired to challenge the impugned
9rder, he. pressed into service only one pertaining to the breach of
H
546 SUPllEMB COURT RB'PORTS (1983] ! S.C.R.
I
A the constitutional safeguards contained in Art. 22 (5), which accor·
ding to him, was sufficient to quash the impugned order. According
to counsel in the matter of supply of Urdu translations of documents
and statements referred to and relied upon in the grounds by the
detaining authority for the purpose of arriving at the requisite sub-
jective satisfaction, t~ detaining authority .(respondent No. I ha;
B committed breach of Art. 22 (5) read with · section 3 (3) of the
COFEPOSA resulting in non-observance of the constitutional safe-
guards conferred on the detenu and therefore, the impugned order was
liable to be set aside. He pointed out that.the grounds together with
all the documents and staiements )ncorporated in the grounds by
reference are required to be 'communicated' to the detenu; that is to
c say, are required to be brought home to hiin in the language lie
understands, ordinarily .within S days of his detention and only in
exceptional circumstances and ·for reasons fo be recorded in writing
within 15 days from ·the date of his detention under s. 3 (3) of tlie
COFEPOSA, in other words, the delay beyond S days is justifiabie
only in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be record.ed in
.D writing, but in ·the instant case Urdu translations of the bulk of
documents and statements i!Jcorporated in the ground and relied
upon· by the detaining authority in reaching the requisite subjective ·
satisfaction were not supplied to the detenu within the normal
period of 5 days but the supply thereof \vas delayed upto 13 days
without any exceptional circumstances obtaining in the case and
E without r_ecording any reasons, as neitlier the existence of exceptional
circumstances nor the fact .whether the reasons had been recorded in
writing was communicated to the detenu. Counsel urged that the
petitioner was deprived of an opportunity to make effective repre-
sentation to satisfy the Advisory Board that no exceptiOnal circum-
F stances existed or that the delay in supply of Urdu translations that
. were given to him was neither reasonable nor justified. Counsel
further urged that ihe. explanation trotted out now at the l:iearing,
namely, that due to Ramzan. month transl~tors in Urdu were not
available earlier is no justification whatever for the delay has occur-
red and hence the dnty to communicate the. grounds together with
G documents and statements in support thereof within prescribed time ·
has been breached. In any case, Urdu translations of all the docu-
·ments and statements referred to and relied upon in the ground&-' for
reaching the. subjective satisfaction have not been supplied to. the
petitioner at all and quite a few of such documents and statements,_
H Urdu translations whereof. have not been . supplied at all, are ~ele· ·'
JBRAHIM v. GUJARAT (Tu/zapurklJ'· J.) 547

vant and material and such as have influenced the· mind .of the A
detaining authority in reaching its conclusion about the necessity to
,,, detain the petitioner. In other words, mere service of the gr-0unds
in Urdu accompanied by copies of material documen,ts and state·
· ments in English, Hindi or Gujarati on the petitioner on 7th July is
no sufficient compliance of the duty to comm.unicate co,ntemplated , B
b}" Art. 22 (5) according to counsel and he insisted that only on 15th
July, 1982 'when Urdu translations of the bulk of documents and
statements were served it could be said that the grounds were
communicated to the detenu i. e. after 13 days of his detention
without there being any exceptional circumstances and even on that
date all Urdu translations were not furnished and this has happened
notwithstanding the revocation of the earlier order precisely for ·
failure to supply Urdu translations. It is in this manner that the
constitutional safeguards ·conferred on the petitioner under Art.
22 (5) read with s. 3 (3) ·of the COFEPOSA have been denied to
him and, · therefore, the continued _detention of the petitioner is
illegal. D

On the other hand, counsel for the responents have contended
that no breach of Art. 22 (5) read with s. 3 (3) of the COFEPOSA
has been committed as alleged. ·Counsel for rhe respondents pointed ·
out that after the earlier detention order was revoked· by the detain-
ing autho,rity under ,s, 8 (f) of the COFEPOSA, the petitioner was E
actually detained on 2nd July 1982 under the impugned order dt. 1st ·
July, 1982 and within 5 days of his detention the grounds in English
language as well as in Urdu together with copies of all documents
and statements referred to in the grounds in their regional· language
were served on the petltioner·and what is more translations of the
bulk of the documents and statements so referred in the grounds ..F
were supplied to him on 15th July, 1982 i.e. within 13 days ot his
detention, and, according to counsel, this delay in supply of the Urdu
translations beyond the normal peribd of 5 days was due to excep-
tional circumstances and reasons therefor have been recorded in
writi11g as stated by Shri P. M. Shah, Deputy Secretary of the res-
G
pondent No. I in his affidavit filed on 10th of September, 1982. Shri
Shah has stated in his affidavit that "time was taken as large number
of documents were to be translated", while .an office noting. appro·
ved and signed by the Home Minister (copy whereof was produced at
the time .of hearing) indicates that on account of the month of
. Ramza,n handful Urdu trn11slators w~r~ l'Vailable to do the \"(Or]>
548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1983l l S.C.R.

A from 12 noon to 4.00 p. m. and, therefore, as a special case Urdu
translations were decided to be furnished to the detenu within 15
days as· prescribed by the COFEPOSA and accordingiy Urdu
translations of bulk of documents and statements were furnished
within 13 days of the detention. Counsel further contended that
neither Art. 22 (5) nor s. 3 (3) of the COFBPOSA casts an obliga·
B tion upon the detaining authority to inform the detenu anything
• about the exceptional circumstances due to which delay might occur or
about the fact whether the reasons have been recorded in writing or
not and these are matters for the Court's satisfaction when any issue
in that behalf is raised before it! As regard the non· supply of Urdu
translations of some of the documents and statements referred to in
c the grounds it was contended that most of these documents compri·
sed statements of account, which were in English figures and some of
them contained. English words in capital letters, and words in Hindi
and Gujarati and the material on record clearly shows that the peti·
tioner knows English figures, understands l;!nglish words in capital
letters and can also converse in Hindi and Gujarati and as such no
D prejudice was caused to him in the matter of making representation·
against his detention. In these circumstances, counsel for the res·
pondents contended that the impugned order could not be quashed
on the ground suggested by the petitioner. ,

'
Since breach of constitutional safeguards contained in Art.
E 22(5) and s. 3(3) of the COFEPOSA has been the main ground for
attacking the continued detention of the detenu as illegal, it will be
desirable to consider the true meaning and import of these two pro-
visions. Art. 22(5) of the Constitution runs thus :

"When any person is detained in pursuance of an
F order made under any law providing for preventive deten·
lion, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may
be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the
order has been made and shall afford him the earliest oppor-
tunity of making a representation against the order."

G Section 3(3) of the COFBPOSA provides as under:

''For the purposes of clause (5) of Art. 22 of the Con-
stitution; the communication to a ·person detained in pur·
suance of a detention order of the grounds on which the
H order has been made shall be made as soon as may be after
tbe detentio11, but ordinarily not later than five days, and in
IBitAHIM v. GUJARAT (Tulzapurkar, J.) 549

exceptional circumstan_ces and for reasons to be recorded in A
writing, not later than fifteen ~ays, from the date of deten-
tion."

The real import of cl. (5) of Art. 22 including the true Q\eaning of
the expression "as soon as may be" occurring therein was \'xplained
8
by this Court in Abdul Jabar Butt v. State of Jammu & Kashmir(')
After noting that s. 8(1) of the Jammu & Kashmir Preventive Deten-
tion Act was nothing but a reproduction in substance of the provi-
sions of cl. (5) of Art. 22 of the Constitution, this Court pointed out
that the said provision imposes upon the detaining authority two
duties, namely, (i) the duty of communicating 'to. the detenu the
grounds on which the order bas been made and (ii) the duty of
c
affording him the carllcs.t opportunity of making a representation
against the detention order and that the first duty is to be performed
"as soon as may be", meaning thereby "within a reasonable time
with an understanding to do it within the shortest possible time"
the Court, however, pointed out that what could be regarded as D
'reasonable time' or the 'shortest ·possible tim_e' would depend upon
the facts and circumstances of the case in which the question arises
for decision, but the time predicated by the expression 'as soon as
may be, was what was 'reasonably convenient' or 'reasonably requi-
site'. In s. 3(3) of tlie COFf!POSA the concept of "reasonable time"
or the "shortest possible time" or "reasonably requisite, time" pre- E
dicated by the expression "as soon as may be" has ·been retained
but .as explained in A.K. Roy' s( 2 ) case it is only with a view to meet
the practical 'exigencies of administrative affairs that the detaining .
.· authority is per~itted to communicate the grounds of detention not
later than 5 days ordinarily and not later than 15 days if there are
exceptional circumstance~ and that too with a safeguard of reasons F
being recorded in writing. In other words s. 3(3) provides for the
outer limits and the grounds of detention must, therefore, be furni-
shed to the detenu ordinarily within 5 days from the date of deten-
tion but in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to he recorded
in writing the time for furnishing the grounds may stand extended G
.but in any event it cannot be later than 15 days from the date of -
detention. It is also clear that uriless the first duty imposed upon
the detaining authority under Art. 22(5) is discharged within the

(ll [1957] SCR SI.
(2) [1982] I s.c.c. 271.
550 . . SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1983) I S.C.R •

A prescribed time it would not be possible for the detenu .to ·exercise
his right of. making a representation against his detention-a cor-
responding right arising from the ·second duty c~st on the detaining ·
authority, namely, to afford the ·detenu the earliest ·opportunity of
making su~h representation against his detention. ·

.B . . In Khudi Ram's(1) case this Court has explained what is meant
by "grounds on which the order is made" in the context· of the
aforesaid duties - cast upon the detaining ·authority and the corres- ·
ponding rights accruing to the·detenu under Art. 22(5). The Court
has ruled_that in· that :context the expression 'grounds' 'does not
. merely mean a recital or reproduction of a ground of satisfaction of
.c the authority in the language of s. 3 nor is its connotation restricted
to a bare statement of conclusion of fact but "nothing less than at!
the basic facts and materials which. influenced the detaining .au tho~
· rity in making the order of· detention must be communicated to the ·
detenu" and "that is the plain requirement .of the firsfsafeguard in
Art. 22(5)". Again, what would be compi:ised in "all the basic
D ·facts and materials" has been elaborated by this Cciurt in Smt. Icchu
Devi's (2 ) case where this Court has taketi the view that documents, .
.
., ·statements and other materials referred to or relied upon in the
grounds of detention by the detaining authority in arriving at its
• subjective satisfaction get incorporated and become part of the •
grounds of detention by' reference and the'right of the. detenu to be
E supplied copies of such documents, statements and. other materials
flows directly as a necessary corollary . from the' right conferred on
the detenu to be afforded the ·earliest opportunity of making a'upre-
sentation against the , detention. because unless the former right is
available the latter cannot' be meaningfully exercised ·.and in that
behalf the court has gone on to observe that "on a proper construc-
tion of cl. (5) of Article. 22 · read with section 3, sub-section (3)
· · of the COFEPOSA Act, it is necessary for the valid continuance of
detention that; subject to clause (6) of Article 22, copies of the docu- .
. . _. ments;statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of
·G detention should be fur'oished to ,Jhe detenu alongwith the grounds·
of detention or in any event not later than five days and in excep-
tio~al circumstances and for reasons to be- recordCd iri writing. not
·later than 15 days from the· date· of detention. If this requirement
of clause (5) of Articl.e 22 read with section 3, sub-section (3) is not
·H
(I) [1975] 2 S.C.R. 832.
(21 ! 9BOJ 4 s.c.c. s31,
, IllRAl!ll.! v. GUJARAT {'rulzapurkar, J.) · SSI
. '
satisfied the continued detention of detenu would be . illegal and
void." It may be stated that in Shalini Soni' s(') case this Court has
taken the view that Smt. lc~hu Devi's case (supra) is a further
development and elaboration of what wa! said e.arlier in Khudi Ram's
case '(supra) and the Court confirmed the position that the grounds
communicated to the detenu must reveal the whole of the factual'
material considered by the detaining authority and not merely the - B
inferences of !'acts a'rrived at by the detaining authority and that.
'
- copies of documents to· which .reference . is made in the 'grounds'
niust be supplied to the detenu as a part of the 'grounds'.
\
•
• Counsel for the' respondents,· however, referred to three deci- c
sions of this Court, nam'ely, Ramchandra Kamat's(')case, Hansmukh's
case (3) and Mst. Ummu Saleema's (') case, but in our view, none of
these decisions detracts from or affects the validity of. the principle
clearly enunciated in Smt. /cchu Devi's case . (supra) and confirmed
in Shalini Soni's case (supra).·. In the first case the detaining autho-
' rity had raised a _contention that it was not incumbent , upon it to . D
supply copies of all. the · documents relied upon in the grounds of .' ·
I detention alongwith the grounds within five days of the deteriiion be-·
cause the grounds were sufficiently detailed so as to enable'the peti~ .·
- tioner to make an effective representation• against the detention and ·
it was in that context that this Court' made observations to the effect
. that "it may not be necessary for the detaining authority to stipply,. E
'eo'pies of all the documents relied upon in the grounds of detention· ·
at the time when the grounds are. furnished to ihe detenu but once
, the detenu states that for effecti~e representation it is necessary that : ·
he should have copies of statements and 'document referred to in the - ..' .

grounds of detention it is the duty of the detaining authority to fur-
nish them with reasonable expedition; the detaining authority cannot
i ..
I
decline .to· furnish the copies of the documents on the ground that
·the grounds were suflicintly detailed to enable· the petitioner to make
an effective representation."-· In fact, the real point decided was that
once a demand was made by the detenu for copies of statements and_
doeuments relied. upon in- the grounds ·of detention for making an
effective representation the detaining· authority was bound to supply G

co [1980J 4 sec S44.
c2> [1980J 2 sec 210.
131 [19s112 sec 11s.
<4l [1981] 3 sec 317, H

·•

. "
552 SUPRBMB COURT REPORTS (1983) 1 S.C.R.
A the same with reasonable expedition and could not deny the same
on the ground that sufficient details had been furnished in the
grounds of detention. The earlier observation cannot be regarded
as a ratio of the case. In the second case this Court made a distinc-
tion between 'basic facts' and '.subsidiary facts' er 'further particulars
of basic facts' and held that a little delay in supplying the• latter
8
category of facts was not fatal to the detention. In the third case
all that th.i's Court decided was that failure to supply the documents
and materials casually or passingly referred to in the course, of
narration of facts in the grounds of detention and which are not
c relied upon by the detaining authority in making the detention order
would not render the detention illegal. Nobody has suggested that
.J

docupients and materials to which casual or passing reference is
made in the grounds and which have not influenced the mind of the
detaining authority in making the order of detention should also be
supplied to the detenu. The principle clearly enunciated in Smt.
D /cchu Devi's case (supra) is that copies of all documents, statements
and materials referred to or relied upon in the grounds of detention
(meaning thereby which have influenced the mind of the detaining •
authority in arriving at its subjective satisfaction about the necessity
to detain the detenu) must be communicated to the detenu within
the time prescribed under s. 3(3) of the COFEPOSA and that with-
out this the right to make representation cannot be meaningfully
E exercised.

Apropos the true connotation of the expression 'communicate' •
the latest decision of this Court in Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel's (')·case
is significant. Io that case the detenu did not know English while
F the grounds of detention were drawn up in English and an affidavit
filed on behalf of the detaining' anthority stated that the Police
Inspector while serving the grounds of detention fully explained the
grounds in Gujarati to the detenu hut the Court held that that was
not a sufficient compliance with the mandate of Art. 22(5), which
requires that the grounds of detention must be communicated to the
G detenu. The Court observed: "Communicate" is a strong word
which means that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting
the 'grounds' should be imparted effectively and fully Iv the detenu
in writing in a language which . he understands. The whole purpose
of communicating the 'grounds' to the detenu is to enable him to
H ·•
(I) [1981) 2 sec 427.
lllR.AillM v. GUJARAT (Tuizapurkar, i.)

make a purposeful and effective representation. If the 'grounds' A
are only verbally explained to the detenu and nothing in writing is
_, left with him, in a language which he underst~nds, then that purpose
is not served, and the constitutional mandate in Art. 22(5) is infrin-
ged." In taking this view the Court relied. upon its three earlier
decisions, namely, Harikishan' s °(1) case, Hadibandhu Das's (') case
and Smt. Raziya Umar Bakshi's (8) case. In Hadibandhu's case (supra)
B
this Court specifically held that mere oral explanation of the deten-
, tion order which ran into 14 typed pages, without supplying the
detenu a translation· in a script or language which he understood,
amounted to denial of the right of being communicated the grounds
and of being afforded the opportunity of making a representation
against the order. It would thus follow that .if the grounds together
c
with copies of all documents,· statements and other materials incor-
porated in the grounds by reference on which the detaining authority
has relied are required to ~e communicated to the detenu under Art.
22(5) read with s, 3(3) of COFEPOSA within the prescribed time
then not merely the grounds of detention but also the copies of all D
incorporated documents, statements and other materials must be
supplied to the detenu in a script or language which he understands
and failure to do so' would amount to a b~each of the mandate con:
tained in Art. 22(5) read with s. 3(3) of the COFEPOSA.

T,wo more decisions of this Court in the context of the obliga- E
'tion to· supply documents, statements and other materials referred to
in the grounds of detention may be noted. In Kam/a Kanya/a/
Khushalani's (')case and Sunil Dutt's(') case this Court has taken the
view that all the documents,,statements and other materials referred
to or relied upon either in the order of detention or in the grounds of
detention mnst be served upon the detenu akingwith the grounds.
The Court has held that where the documents and materials in
support of the grounds on the basis of which the detention order has
been made, the same being ex-hypothesiin existence· at the time of
the issuance of the detention order and framing of th~ grounds, were
not supplied to the deteim alongwith the grounds and consequently
the detenu was ·prevented from making effective representation G,
against his detention, the continued detention of the detei:m would

(I) [1962] Suppl. 2 SCR 918 ..
(2) [1969] I SCR 227.
(3) [1980J Suppl. sec 195. H
(4) [1981J 1 sec 748.
(5) A.J.R. 1982 S.C. 53.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ' (1983) l s.c.R..

A be illegal inasmuch as such. non-supply of documeO:ts, statements and
materials alongwith the grounds of detention amounted to a viola-
tion of the safeguard available to the detenu under Art. 22(5).
'
Two propositions having a bearing on the points at issue in the
case before us, clearly emrge ·from the aforesaid resume of decided .
B . cases : (a) all documents, statements and other materials incorpo-
' rated in the grounds by reference ·and which have influenced the
mind of the detaining "authority in arriving at the requisite subjective
satisfaction must lie furnished to the detenu along with the 'grounds
or in any event not later than five days ordinarily and in the. excep- \
tional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in . writing not•.
c later than 15. days_ from the date of his detention and (b) an ·such t
material must be furnished to him In a script or ·language which he
unde~stands and fail~re. to do either of'ihe two things would amount
to a breach of the two duties cast. on the detaining authority under

D
Art. 22 (5) of the . Constitution. Relying upon· this legal position
counsel for the petitioner urged before us that in the Instant case a .....
breach of the mandate contained in Art. 22 (5) read withs. 3 (3) of.
the COFEPOSA is clearly involved because of three things that
have happened, namely, (i) supply of Urdu· translations· of the
.~bulk of documents and staiements incorporated in the grounds and
. relied ·upon by . the detaining authority . was delayed 'beyond the·
E normal' period of 5 days without any e~ceptional circumstances •
obtaining in the matter, (ii) the alleged exceptional circumstances
. purporting to justify the delay_ and the fact that the reasons had been '
recorded in writing were not communicated to the detenu which has
prevented him from making 'effective representation · against his
·continued detention and (iii) Urdu _traslations of quite a few docu-
F ments and statements incorporated in the grounds and relied upon by
the detaining authority have not been ·supplied to him at all. As
regards the first two aspects counsel relied upon two decisions of the.
Patna High Court,' namely; Bishwa ·Mohan Kumar Sinha v. State of
Bihar and Ors.(') and Bishwanath Prasad Keshari v. State of Bihar &
Ors.(') where the Patpa High Court has ta:ken the view that not mere- .
G ly should the. exceptional circumstance~ exist justifying the'delayed'
supply of the grounds ,of detention but these should be communicated
to the detenu to enable him to make an effective representation.
Counsel urged that because of the .aforesaid failure the continued

·tt (I) ILR (1974) 53 Pat. 884.
'(2) ILR, (1975) 54 Pat. 72.
IllRAllIM v. GUJARAT (Tulzapurkar, J.j SSS
detention of the petitioner must be held to be illegal. We find
considerable force_.in these sumbissions made by the counsel. for the
,
>
petitioner.

. As regards the first aspect pressed into service by counsel for
the petitioner the undisputed facts are that the impugned order of
detention was.issued on !st of July, 1982, that the same was served
B
on the detenu on 2nd July, 1982; and immediately thereafter he
was put under detention in Ahmedabad Central Pri~on; the grounds
• ·of detention drawn up in English ·and translated in Urdu together
with copies of ali documents and statem,ents incorporated in the '
grounds in original language (English and Hindi) were served upori the
detenu on Jth July, 1982 i. e. within 5 days of his detention. Obvi-
c
~·· ously, serving"'Copies of all the documents and statements in English
· and Hindi on him on 7th July, 1982 was of no use and it was only
on 15th of July, 1982 that Urdu translations of the bulk of such
documents and statements were suppied to him. In other words
effectively the grounds of detention together with b';ilk of documents. D
and statements incorpotated in the grounds in the script or language
understood by him were served or supplied on 15th July, 1982 which
was beyond th.e normal period of five days. In any event supply of
bulk of documents and statements incorporated in the grounds in the
script or language understood by the detenu was delayed beyond the
normal period of 5 days. The question is whether such delay was E
justified by existence of any exceptional circu!"slances as required
by s. 3 (3) of the COFEPOSA for in the · absence of exceptional
J circumstances delay beyond normal period of five days would be a
breach of the constitutional as well as the legislative mandate.
Counsel for the respondents invited our attention to the affidavit of
I •
Shri P.. M. Shah Deputy Secretary (Home Department), Government, F
of Gujarat filed on· 10th September, 1982 and an office noting
app;oved and signed .by the Home · Minister which have set out the
-·tiircumstances occasioning· the delay. ·In.his affidavit all ihat Shri
Shah has. stated is "time was taken as a large number of documeuts
were to be translated" while in ihe office noting dated 2-7-82 it has
been stated : G

"It may be mentioned here on account of Holy month
of Ramzan, Urdu translators are not available. Handful
translators who are available have expressed that they would H
t work from 12 noon to 4 p. m. because of Ramzan fasts
. .

SS6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1983) 1 s.c.~ ..
· they observe. Under· the circumstances it is proposed as
under:

' (I) .. .

' (2) .. .
8
· (3) The Urdu translations of documents and other
·' materials referred to at (2) above may be 'furnished I
<
to the detenu as· soon as they are prepared by a
batch of Urdu translators engaged for the purpose
but not later than 15 days as prescribed in the Act.
c .. as a special case on account of the utmost difficulties ·1
. pointed out above." '
'.
Below this noting the . Home Minister has made his endorsement
approving the proposal under the date 2·7-1982. In other. words,
D .according to the respondents there were a large number of documents , ...
requiring translation and on account of the Holy month of
Ramian Urdu translators were not available and those handful (
translators who were available and were 'put 'on the job were
prepared to work only from 12 noon to 4 p. m. because of Ramzan

E
fasts they observed: Preventive detention is a serious invasion of
a
personal liberty and the normal method~ open to person charged
with commission of any offence to disprove the charge or to prove
..
. his innocence at the trial are not available to the person preventively
detained and therefore in preventive detention . jurispruden9e what·
ever little safeguards the constitution and the enactment authorising
such detention provide assume utmost importance and must be .
F strictly adhered to and one of such safeguards is that unless excep·
tional circumstances really obtain the delay in supply of grounds of
'· , detention as also the' documents and statements inq<>rporated . therein· •
• by reference beyond the normal period of five days would be fatal.
Looked at from this angle the aforesaid explanation ·given by the ·
. - detaining authority cannot, in our view, be regarded as constituting I

G · exceptional circumstances justifying the delay in the supply of bulk
of documents and statements to the 'detenu in the script cir ianguage
lie understood. In the first piace, on admitted facts in the case upon
revocation of the earlier detention order on !st July, 1982 there. was
•. 'no urgency to issue the impugned order of detention on the sa.me day
H . or serve it ori the detenu on the following day, the·detenu was in .
judical custody then in. other two cases, one under .the Arms Act and
- the other under the Foreigners Act and no.bail having been granted

.•
,mRAHIM v. GUJARAT (Tulzapurkor, J.) 557

to him there was no fear of his 'absconding from Ahmedabad, there A
being no urgency the detaining authority could have kept all the
material ready in Urdu and supplied the same to him immediately
after detaining him second time. Secondly, the office noting does·
not give particulars of how many Urdu translators were put on the
job except vaguely stating 'handful translators' were available. B
Thirdly the office noting clearly suggests that the translation job was
entrusted to Urdu translators belonging to a particular ·community
• who observed Ramzan fast, instead of. restricting the ohoice in this
· manner additional Urdn translators who had nothing to do with the
observance of Ramzan fasts could have been but on the job, but
nothing is indicated whether and if so what efforts were made in . c
that behalf. It is difficult. to swallow the proposition that the State
Government (which is detaining authority here) with all its power
and resources could not find requisite number of qualified persons to
do that job so as to make Urdu translations ot the concerned docu-
ments and statements avail,ble to the, detenu within the normal
period of.five days. With the previous detention order having been
vitiated on the very ground( greater vigilance · and expedition was D
expected from the detaining authority. In all the facts and circum·
stances it is impossible to hold that exceptionai circumstances
'obtained in the case justifying the delay and as' such the si.me consti-
tutes a breach of the constitutional as well as the legislative mandate.

E
On the second aspect the contention of counsel for the peti:
tioner has been that the detaining anthority while supplying the
Urdu translations of the bulk do.cuments and statements beyond the
normal period of 5 days ought to have given indication to the detenu
that the delay was caused due to exceptional circumstances and what
the exceptional circup:istances were, as also of the fact that reasons F
for the delay had been recorded in writing but · this was not done
and this failure prevented tbe detenu from making effective represen-.
talion against his detention. Counsel for the respondents, however,
contended that neither Art. 22(5) nor s. 3(3) of the COFEPOSA
casts any obligation or duty on the detaining authority to inform
the detenu anything about the exceptional circumstances due to' G
which delay might occur nor about the fact whether reasons have
been recorded in writing or not and, according to counsel, these are
matters for the Court's satisfaction when any issue in that behalf is
raised before it. It is true that neither Art. 22(5) nor does the
COFEPOSA contain any provision which casts such a duty upon H
SSS SUPREME dli.Jll.T RllPoRtS (19S3) I s.c.R.
A the detaining authority in express terms; it is also true that the Court
will of course go into and,' satisfy itself about these matters when any
issue in that behalf is raised before it. But the question fs whether
such a duty is cast.on the detaining authority by necessary implica-
tion ? Does it or does it not flow from the right conferred upon the
the detenu to make r_epresentation against his detention? Jn this
B behalf it cannot be disputed that under the scheme of the COFE-
POSA against his detention the detenu ha·s a right to make a repre-
sentation to:.an authority which is superior to the detaining authority
(e.g. to the State Government when the detai.ning authority happens
to be an officer of that Government or to the Central Government
where the detaining authority happens to be the State Government)
c as well as to the Advisory Board' and such representation against his
detention can be on merits of the grounds of detention as also for.
failure on the part of the detaining authority to observe strictly the
requisite safeguards and on satisfying the superior authority or the \ .
Advisory Board on either count he is entitled to have his detention 1
D revoked or,quashed .. We have alreadly indicated above that one of
such safeguards is that unless exceptional circumstances really obtain
i_n a case the delay in supply of grounds of detention and/or the
documents and statements incorporated therein by reference beyond
the normal period of live days would be fatal to the continued deten-.
tion of the detenu. In other words, the detenu is entitled to satisfy
E either the-superior authority or· the Advisory Board that the delay
that has occurred in the. supply of requisite material to him was not
jusiified because exceptional circumstances did not exist or those put
forward were unreal or invalid. Obviously, the detenu will not be
in a position to do so if the alleged exceptional circumstances are
not communicated ·to him. In our v'iew, therefore, a duty to inform
.F the detenu about the ex'istence of exceptional circumstances and what
th~y were for delay in supplying grounds of detention and/or docu-
ments and statements incorporated therein arises by necessary impli-
cation and flow from the right which is conferred upon the detenu to
make representation against his . d'etention. In tbe instant case, for
instance, if the alleged exceptional Circumstances were communicated.
G to the detenu at the time of the delayed supply of the concerned docu-
ments and statements in Urdu language he could have satisfied the
superior authority or the Advisory Board that the exceptional circum-
stances did not really obtain in the case and the delay had vitiated
his detention. In other words, wi\at he has done before the Co~uit now,
8 he could have done before the superior authorities or the Advisory

I
IBRAHIM'· GUJARAT (Tulzapurkar, J.) 559

Board. For these reasons we approve of the view nltimately taken A
by the Patna High Court in the .two decisions cited .
above, particuc
'
larly the decision in Bishwa Mohan Kumar Sinha's c1,1se (supra) where ·
both the aspects have been dealt with. In our view, therefore, the
impngned failure in this case constitutes another breach of the safe-
guard contained in Art. 22(5) read. with s. 3(3) of the COFEPOSA
and vitiates the continued detention _of the petitioner .
B
•
La~tly, _ Urdu transfations of ·quite a few documents and
statements referred to in the grounds ·of detention and relied
upon by the detaining authority were admittedly not supplied
to the detenu at all and the only explanation given by the coun~el c
for the respondents at the heating has been that most of these docu-
ments (Urdu translations . whereof were not supplied) comprised
statements of accounts which had figures in English with ·some
English· words written in capital letters · and some documents
were in Hindi and Gujarati and the record (statements of Rekha, her
' sister Indu and one Jayantilal Soni, all co-conspirators of the detenu, D
recorded during the investigation) clearly· shows that the petitioner
knows English figures, underst.ands English words written in capital
letters and can also converse or talk in Hindi and Gujarati and as
' such the non-supply of Urdu translations of these·_-documents cannot
he said to have caused any· prejudice to the petitioner in. the matter
of making a representation against -his detention. In our view, the E
explanation is hardly satisfactory and .cannot .condone the non•
supply of Urdu translations of these' documents. Admittedly, . the
petitioner is a Pakistani national and Urdu seems to he his mother
tongue and a little· knowledge of English figures, ability to read
English words written in capital letters and a smattering knowledge
of Hindi or Gujarati would not justify t_he, denial of Urdu transla- F
tions ,lo him of the material documents and "statements referred to as
incriminating documents in the grounds and relied upon by the
detaining authority in arriving at its ·subjective satisfacit;on. In fact,
the claim made before us on behalf of the detenu that he only knows
Urdu cannot he brushed aside as false especially in view .of the fact
that the same was accepted on the earlier occasion by the Advisory G
Board who· had actually opined that failu"re to supply: Urdu transla-
tions of grounds of detention and documents bad vitiated the earlier
order of detention and following this opinion respondent No. I bad
revoked the said order. Moreover, with the assist.ance of counsel H
on either side we have ourselves gone through many of these docu-
ments an<l statements and it is not possible to say that most-of them
560 . ' SUPRl!ME COURT REPORTS [1983] 1 s.c.a.

A a~e merely statements of account containing figures in English with
English words written in capital letters. These documents recovered
from three fiats in three different . societies, include, for instance,
documents like bills and vouchers showing purchases made from
some shops, while a large number of documents are in Hindi and
Gujarati and relate to transactions in contraband articles like gold,
B silver, watches, etc., and comprise· accounts of such transac· .
tions, the figures as well as recitals pertaining to which are entirely
in Gujarati. All these, in our view, are· material documents which
have obviously influenced the mind of the detaining authority in
arriving at its subjective satisfaction and these are all in a script or
language not understood by detenu, and, therefore, the rion·supp)y
c of Urdu translations of these documents has clearly prejudiced the
petitioner in the exercise of his right to make an effective representa-
tion against his detention and hence the safeguard contained in Art.
22( 5) is clearly violated.

Having regard· to the ab0ve discussion it is clear to us t~at the
D continued detention of the petitioner would be illegal and we accord- >,
ingly quash the same and direct him to be released forthwith.

S.R. Petition allowed.