Holding

Rule 7A is not ultra vires; it runs parallel to Section 2(b) of the Karnataka Societies Registration Act and is valid, subject to a reading‑down that permits a member to contest the automatic cessation before the year ends.

Summary

The Hyderabad Karnataka Education Society filed an appeal against a Karnataka High Court judgment that struck down its Rule 7A, which automatically terminates an ordinary member’s membership if the annual subscription of Rs.25 is not paid by the end of March. The respondents, former ordinary members, argued that the rule was ultra‑vires Section 2(b) of the Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960, and that it was harsh and violative of natural‑justice principles. The Supreme Court examined the statutory scheme and held that Rule 7A merely implements the admission and subscription requirements of Section 2(b) and therefore runs parallel to, not against, the Act. The Court read down the rule to allow a member to raise a defence of payment or sufficient cause before the year ends, thereby removing any claim of arbitrariness. Consequently, the High Court’s judgment and its consequential directions were set aside and the writ petitions dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether Rule 7A (and its predecessor Rule 7) is ultra vires Section 2(b) of the Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960.
Whether Rule 7A is harsh, arbitrary and violative of the principles of natural justice.
Whether the consequential directions issued by the Karnataka High Court are legally sustainable.

Legislation cited

Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960s. 10, s. 11, s. 18, s. 19, s. 21, s. 22, s. 23, s. 25, s. 2(b), s. 5, s. 6(1), s. 6(2), s. 7, s. 8, s. 9

Subjects

societies registrationmembershipsubscriptionautomatic cessationRule 7Aultra viresnatural justicereading down

Judgment

HYDERABAD KARNA T AKA EDUCATION SOCIETY A
v.
REGISTRAR OF SOCIETIES AND ORS.

- DECEMBER 7, 1999

[S.B. MAJMUDAR AND A.P. MISRA, JJ.] B

Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960-Section 2b,-Rule 7
amended as 7A-Provision for automatic cessation of ordinary membership
on failure to pay yearly subscription within 3 months-Held, not violative C
of the Act-Not harsh or arbitra~Further Held, Rule runs parallel to
Section 2 (b) which provides for resignation of members.

Section 6(2)-Rule 7A-Held does not violate the provision of right of
voting by valid members-Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960-Rule
7A erstwhile Rule 7-Framed under Karnataka Societies Registration Rules- D
Providing for automatic cessation without notice to members on failure to
· pay subscription provision read down-Defaulter can apply to society to
show that he was prevented from doing so due to unavoidable reasons -An
application in this regard, held, has to be moved within the end of the year
concerned.
E
Respondents 2 to 10 who had ceased to be members of the appellant
Society due to their default in payment of subscription within the prescribed
time as laid down in Rule 7A of the Rules framed unrler Karnataka Societies
Registration Act, 1960 challenged before the High Court the validity of the
Rule 7A and erstwhile Rule 7 of the Act of 1960 wherein it was provided that
a member automatically ceases to hold membership on his failure to pay F
subscription for 3 consecutive months. A Single Judge of the High Court
dismissed the Writ Petitions holding that Rule 7A was not inconsistent with
Section 2(b) of the Act which provided that a member on resignation would
cease to be a member parallel to Section 2 (b) as the defaulter can be treated
to have resigned from membership. G
The appeal filed by the Respondents before the Division Bench was
allowed. The Division Bench held that Rule 7A and for that matter earlier
Rule 7 were ultra vires Section 2 (b) of the Act of 1960 and even otherwise
they were harsh and were liable to be struck down being arbitrary. The Division
161 H
l.

162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A bench also issued consequential directions to the Registrar of Societies.

In appeal to this Court the Appellant-Society contended that the Division
Bench had patently erred in taking the view that the impugned Rule 7A was
ultra vires Section 2(b) of the Act, that on a conjoint reading of the Rule and
other relevant provisions of the Act it could be held that Rule 7A ran parallel
B to Section 2 (b) and did not violate it, that a bye-law or a Rule is a contract
between the parties and would remain binding on the parties, that there was
no provision for issuing a notice to the member who was in default of payment
of subscription for the year in question as the thrust of the bye-laws was very
well known to all members and these bye-laws were binding on them, and if
C they by their own volition failed to pay the subscription within the three months
period allowed to them, they automatically ceased to be members, that such a
provision in the bye-law cannot be said to be contrary to any express provisions
of the Act, that there was no question of issuing a notice or hering the
defaulter concerned as it is his inaction that brings out the consequential
adverse result on him or her, that the stand of the Respondents were clearly
D contrary to the Act and the Rules and there would survive no occasion for the
Appellant to hear them on any supposed dispute regarding payment or non-
payment of relevant subscription, that there is no question of the Rule being
harsh as it operates to the full knowledge of the member concerned and it is
the in-action of the part of the member concerned which visits the automatic
E consequence of non-membership to him or her and that if after the passage of
number of years all arrears are allowed to be paid up at a time then it would
be going contrary to Rule 7A read with Section 2 (b) and would almost amount
to granting retrospective ordinary memberships to the Respondents for years
which have gone behind.

F The Respondents contended that on a correct interpretation of Section
2 (b) of the Act it has to be held that if an existing member defaults in paying
up the subscription for the concerned years within the time prescribed by
Rule 7A, it cannot be said that automatically he will become a non-member,
that all that is provided is that he will not have a right to vote nor will he be
G counted as a member in proceedings under the Act, that the High Court rightly
held Rule 7A to be ultra vires Section 2 (b), that there may be cases where
a defaulter member may have valid defence as to why he could not do so for
reasons beyond his control or that he had actually paid the amount within the
time but has not noted in the society's account books for diverse reasons,
that such a defence is also ruled out by the impugned Rule and that such
H drastic consequence of the Rule is obviously harsh and violates all cannons
HYDERABAD KARN AT AKA EDUCATION v. REGISTRAR OF SOCIETIES 163
of natural justice. The Respondents also contended that even if an ordinary A
member has not paid the subscription for a period exceeding three months in
a given year all that can result is that such a person is not entitled to vote nor
can he be counted as a member in all the proceedings and that as per Section
2 (b) the proceedings contemplated by the Act are those which take place in
the general meeting or special meeting as laid down by Section 11.
B
Allowing the Appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. The impugned Rule 7A deals with the concept of"admission"
of a person to the ordinary membership of the Society and the mode and manner
of payment of subscription by him for being treated as an ordinary member C
for the year in question. It lays down that an ordinary member who fails to
pay his subscription by the end of March of any relevant year will not be
treated to be a continued member for that year. Thus, three months period is
available to the member or pay the paltry amount of Rs. 25 by way of
subscription to remain on the roll of members for that year. This provision in
Rule 7 A, therefore, has a direct nexus with the provision of Section 2 (b ), D
which deals with admission of members to a society as per the rules and
regulations and the requirement of payment of subscription thereunder. Rule
7A laying down these conditions cannot be said to fall foul on the touchstone
of first part of Section 2 (b). (176-C-E)
E
2. The Division Bench is correct in disagreeing with the reasoning of
the Single Judge that a defaulting member, so far as the subscription is
concerned, cannot be said to have voluntarily resigned from his membership.
Rule 7A squarely falls in line with first part of Section 2 (b) which enjoins
that a member shall be treated to be a member of the society for the year
concerned if he is admitted to that membership in accordance with the rules F
and regulations and shall have paid the subscription as laid down therein. If
he does not pay his subscription for the year in question within the time
permitted by Rule 7A, then necessarily he must be held not to be duly admitted
to the membership of the society in accordance with the Rules for the year in
question. Such a Rule cannot be said to be going contrary to the requirement G
of Section 2 (b). On the country, it runs parallel to it. Rule 7A in its present
form, instead of doing violence to Section 2 (b) falls in line with it. Rule 7A
lays down the very ~ame provisions for non-membership as provided by Section
2 (b). Thus, instead of treating the said Rule to be ultra vires, it must be held
that it is quite parallel to the Section and in complete harmony with it.
(176-E-H; 177-FJ H
A
164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

3. It is not possible to agree with the contention of the Respondents that
even if an ordinary member has remained in arrears for a period of three
..
months so far as subscription for that year is concerned all that he will lose
will be right to vote or act as a member only in the general meetings or special
meetings contemplated by Section 11 and for all other purposes he would ......1
continue to be a member. Such a contention would squarely conflict with the
B statutory provision of Section 6(2) read with the very first part of definition
of Section 2(b). It is not possible to agree with the reasoning and conclusion
of the Division Bench of the High Court that Rule 7A is violative of section
2(b) of the Karnataka Societies Registration Act. (178-D-FI
•
c 4. The view of the High Court that Rule 7A cannot be sustained for the
additional reasons that it violates the proviso to Section 6(b) of the Act is
f

incorrect. All that the said proviso guarantees is that no Rule or bye-law of a
society can deprive a member of his right to vote, but before the said proviso
can be pressed in service, the concerned member who makes a grievance
regarding his deprivation of right to vote as a member has to be found to have
D subsisted on the roll of the society as a member. If he had validly ceased to be
a member of the society because of the operation ofany Rule or bye-law then
he cannot be said to have been deprived of the right to vote as he is no longer
a member. All that the proviso guarantees is that if a person is validly
registered as an existing member on the rolls of the society then no Rule can 't'
deprive him of his right to vote. Consequently, on the touchstone of this proviso
E also the legal efficacy of a Rule treating a person not to be a member under
given contingencies cannot be said to have got vitiated. (178-G-H; 179-AI

T.P. Daver v. Lodge Victoria No. 363, S.C. Belgaum, [1964] 1 SCR 1;
The Co-operative Central Bank Ltd and Ors. v. The Addi. Industrial Tribunal,
F Andhra Pradesh and Ors., (1969) 2 SCC 43; Kulchinder Singh and Ors. v.
Hardayal Singh Brar and Ors., (1976] 3 SCR 680; Tekraj Vasandi Alias K.L.
Basandhi v. Union of India and Ors., [1988] 2 SCR 260 and Sri Konaseema
Co-operative Central Bank Ltd Amalapuram and Anr., v. N. Seetharama Raju, ,,
AIR (1990) Vol. 77 A.P. 171, cited.

G "The Interpretation of Statutes". Maxwell, 12th Edn. Pages 150, 151
and Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 19 item 215 page 118, referred to.

5. Society is not expected to give a member a notice to show cause why
he should not be treated to be an ordinary member for an year because he has
not paid his subscription during the period of first three months and has not
H availed of that opportunity. Such a notice is implicit in the Rule itself which
HYDERABAD KARNATAKA EDUCATION v. REGISTRAR OF SOCIETIES 165
is well known to all members who are enrolled as such in previous years. It A
is the member's own inaction which makes him get out of ordinary
membership for that year once the forth month starts. Consequently, there
would remain no occasion for any member of the society to complain about
failure of natural justice in not being issued a notice to show cause why he
should not be treated as a non-member from April of that year. He is not being B
removed as an ordinary member on account of any alleged misconduct for
which a show cause notice may be required on the principles of natural justice.
Therefore, on that score also the Rule cannot be treated to be harsh or
arbitrary. [180-G-H; 181-A-B)

6. Rule 7A when reasonably construed must mean that it will apply if it C
is sho~ that an ordinary member, by his own volition, wilfully and consciously
without any real impediment and not for reasons beyond his control, had not
paid his subscription before the end of March of any given year, and
consequently he would automatically cease to be a member for that year. In
order to show that he is not hit by Rule 7 A, it will be open to the alleged
defaulter ordinary member to point out to the society relevant grounds of D
defence and if be does so before the year in question runs out, and if his defence
is accepted by the authorities concerned of the society then his membership
would not be hit by the provisions of Rule 7A. To that extent, while sustaining
• Rule 7 A, appropriate reading down of the said provision for saving it from
the vice of unreasonableness and arbitrariness has to be resorted to. If it is E
not so read down, then Rule 7A would obviously fall on the touchstone of
reasonableness and would become void and inoperative. [181-G-H; 182-A-B]

7. Rule 7A has to be read down to sustain its legality and validity. Ifan
ordinary member is shown not to have paid up his annual subscription of Rs.
25 for a given year by the end of March of that year and if he disputes the F
allegation of non-payment of subscription by applying to the society before
the expiry of the year concerned or ifhe proves to the satisfaction of the society
that there was any sufficient cause which prevented him from paying up Rs.
25 by the end of March of that year, then he will not be deemed to have
automatically ceased to be such an ordinary member for that year. However, G
for that purpose even without the society being required to issue any show
cause notice, it will be for the member concerned to apply to the society by
raising a dispute about automatic cessation of his ordinary membership by
putting forward for consideration of the society his relevant defence against
the aJJeged non-compliance of Rule 7A by the end of March and if an application
raising such a dispute is filed and if any valid ground is made out by the H
166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A member concerned and if the society accepts such application and the ground
made therein, then for that year, Rule 7 A will not be treated to have
dismembered him from his ordinary membership. However, such an application

B
has to be moved by him, latest before the end of the year concerned.
(182-F-H; 183-A-B]

8. The submission of the Appellants that if after passage of number of
-
years all arrears are allowed to be paid up at a time then it would be going
contrary to Rule 7A read with Section 2(b) and would almost amount to
granting retrospective ordinary memberships to the Respondents for years
which have gone behind since long and during all these past years they had
c ceased to be ordinary members and could not have taken part in the
proceedings of the society under the Act and the Rules and bye-laws as
members is accepted. Many resolutions of the society and even elections for
the relevant years of office bearers of the society would get adversely affected
if such retrospective back membership is given to the Respondents. Such an
exercise in the scheme of the Act and the Rules is certainly contraindicated.
D [184-C-E)

(The Court further directed that the consequential directions issued by
the High Court fall through alongwith the main Judgment, and that the
Appellant society will be bound to comply with Rule 7A in future transactions ~
and claims of ordinary members subject to the reading down of the said Rule
E as per the judgment.) (185-A-B]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 6983-6984 of
1999.

Eromthe Judgment and Order dated 25.3.97 of the Kamataka High Court
F in W.A. No. 7486 and 7487of1996.

S.B. Sanyal, Naresh Kaushik, Subhash Chand Kingi and Mrs. Lalita
Kaushik for the Appellants.

S.P. Shankar and Ms. Kiran Suri for the Respondents.
G
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 1-·

S.B. MAJMUDAR, J. Leave granted.

Both these appeals under Article 136 of the Constitution of India seek
H to challenge a common judgment and order dated 25.3.1997 rendered by a
HYDERABAD KARNATAKA EDUCATION v. REGISTRAR OF SOCIETIES [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.) 167

Division Bench of the High Court of Kamataka at Bangalore in Writ Appeal A
Nos. 7486 and 7487 of 1996, whereby two Writ Petition Nos. 3630 and 33463
of 1994 filed in the High Court by Respondent Nos. 2 to 10 herein came to
be allowed against the common appellant-Hyderabad Kamataka Education
Society (for short 'appellant-society'). By the impugned judgment it was also
held by the High Court that Rule 7 as well as the substituted Rule 7(A) framed
by the appellant-society ran counter to Section 2(b) of the Karnataka Societies B
Registration Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). These Rules were,
therefore, struck down. An additional reason for striking down the Rules,
according to the High Court, was the fact that the Rules were harsh in their
operation. In order to appreciate the grievance of the appellant-society regarding
the impugned Rules, it is necessary to note a few relevant introductory facts. C
Background Facts :

The appellant-society was earlier registered on 3.4.1958 under the
provisions of the Hyderabad Societies Registration Act, 1958. At that time it
was functioning in the territory of Ex-Nizam State at Gulbarga. After the said D
territory became part of the Kamataka State, the Act became operative and
governed the functioning of the appellant-society. On 6th of June, 1961, the

- Hyderabad Societies Registration Act was repealed by the present Act of
1960 which came into force with effect from 6.6.1961. The appellant-society,
therefore, became "deemed to be registered" under the present Act. Respondent E
Nos. 2 to 10 original writ petitioners in the two writ petitions before the High
Court were admitted as ordinary members of the appellant-society during the
period from 1975-1979. The appellant-society's contention was that they became
defaulters in payment of annual subscription for the relevant years and,
therefore, ceased to be treated as ordinary members of the society and their
membership automatically ceased as per earlier Rule 7 as well as the subsequent F
• substituted Rule 7(A). Their names were, therefore, removed from the roll of
members. Rule 7, which earlier stood on the Statute Book, wa~ substituted by
Rule 7(A) with effect from 30.3.1981. Though both the Rules are in pari
materia, the operative Rule 7(A), which has been struck down by the High
Court in the impugned judgment, squarely falls for our consideration. G

Some of the members, who according to the appellant-society had
ceased to be members of the society due to their default in Rayment of
subscription within the prescribed time as laid down by the rel~ant Rule,
challenged the said Rule 7(A) in the Civil Court at Gulbarga. That suit came
to be dismissed on 9.2.1991. In the meantime, some other members similarly H
168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A situated challenged the validity of the Rule by filing Writ Appeal Nos. 725
to 727 of 1992 which were dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court
on 4.3.1991 holding that the appellant-society could not be subjected to writ
jurisdiction. So far as the civil suit is concerned, its dismissal came to be
confinned by the App~llate Court, but in second appeal the suit itself was
B pennitted to be withdrawn. It is thereafter that the present Respondent Nos.
2 to 10 moved the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution
oflndia by filing Writ Petition Nos. 3630 and 33463 of 1994 challenging the
validity of Rule 7(A). The learned Single Judge, after hearing the parties,
dismissed the writ petitions on merits holding that Rule 7(A) was not
inconsistent with Section 2(b) of the Act. The learned Single Judge took the
C view that Section 2(b) provided that a member on resignation would cease to
be a member, therefore, Rule 7(A) which laid down automatic ceasing of the
membership of a defaulter ran parallel to Section 2(b) as the defaulter can be
treated to have resigned from membership and, therefore, the Rule was not
inconsistent with Section 2(b) of the Act.

D It is this common judgment of the learned Single Judge in two writ
petitions moved by Respondent Nos. 2 to 10 herein that resulted in two writ
appeals on their part before the Division Bench of the High Court. These two
writ appeals being Writ Appeal Nos. 7486 and 7487of1996, as noted earlier,
came to be allowed by the Division Bench, which took the view that Rule
E 7(A), and for that matter the earlier Rule 7, were ultra vires Section 2(b) of
the Act and even otherwise they were harsh and were liable to be struck
down being arbitrary. Certain consequential directions were issued by the
Division Bench of the High Court in the impugned judgment to the Registrar
of the Societies functioning under the Act. It is obvious that these
consequential directions would not survive if the main basis of the impugned
F judgment is found to be unsustainable.

Rival Contentions :

Learned senior counsel for the appellant, Shri Sanyal, submitted that the
G writ petitions against the appellant-society were not maintainable in law.
However, he did not pursue this point further and attacked the impugned
judgment on merits. He submitted that the Division Bench had patently erred
in taking the view that the impugned Rule 7(A) was ultra vires Section 2(b)
of the Act. He submitted that on a conjoint reading of the Rule and other
relevant provisions of the Act, it could be held that Rule 7(A) ran parallel to
H Section 2(b) and did not violate it. He also contended placing reliance on
HYDERABAD KARNATAKA EDUCATION 1•. REGISTRAR OF SOCIETIES [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.) 169

various judgments of this Court and on a decision of the full Judge Bench A
of the Andhra Pradesh High Court to which we will make reference hereinafter,
that a bye-Jaw or a Rule is a contract between the parties and would remain
binding on the parties. That there was no provision for issuing a notice to
the member who was in default of payment of subscription for the year in
question as the thrust of the bye-laws was very well known to all members
and these bye-laws were binding on them and if they, by their own volition, B
failed to pay up the subscription within the three months period allowed to
them, they automatically ceased to be members. That such a provision in the
bye-law cannot be said to be contrary to any express provisions of the Act.
That there was no question of issuing a notice or hearing the defaulter
concerned as it is his in-action that brings out the consequential adverse C
result on him or her. It was, therefore, contended that the impugned judgment
was erroneous in law and the consequential directions issued by the Registrar
of the Societies were also unsustainable. Learned senior counsel Shri Sanyal
for the appellant further contended that the concerned respondents were in
arrears of subscription for a number of years and that· they never disputed
this fact but years thereafter all of a sudden they came out with a case that D
they were prepared to pay all arrears at a time for all the past years and they
should be treated to have continued as members. That such a stand of the
respondents was clearly contrary to the Act and the Rules and there would
survive no occasion for the appellant to hear them on any supposed dispute
.regarding payment or non-payment of relevant subscription for the years in E
question. That such an occasion would have arisen if at all the respondents
had contended that either they had actually paid the subscription for each
year within the permissible three months as laid down by the bye-law or that
they were prevented from making 'such payment for reasons beyond their
control and volition and even if such a sufficient cause for the delay was tried
to be made out, it could not have been put forward after a number of years F
when the relevant years had already expired long back. He, however, submitted
that even this question would not arise, as admittedly Respondent Nos. 2 to
10 have never contended, as aforesaid. Learned senior counsel Shri Sanyal
further contended that there is no question of the Rule being harsh as it
operates to the full knowledge of the member concerned and it is the in-action G
on the part of the member concerned which visits the automatic consequence
of non-membership to him or her. That for such a situation of member's own
creation no harshness can be alleged so far as the operation of the Rule is
concerned. He, therefore, subL1itted that these appeals deserved to be allowed.

SriShankar, Learned counsel forthe respondents-original writ petitioners, H
170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A on the other hand, submitted that on a correct interpretation of Section 2(b)
of the Act, it has to be held that if an existing member defaults in paying up
the subscription for the concerned years within the time prescribed by Rule
7(A), it cannot be said that automatically, he will become a non-member as
section 2 (b) does not contemplate such a contingency. All that is provided
therein· is that he will not have a right to vote nor will he be counted as a
B member in proceedings under the Act especially Section 11 thereof. As the
impugned Rule goes beyond he requirements of Section 2(b) and tries to laid
down automatic cessation of membership on a ground not contemplated by
Section 2(b), the High Court rightly held Rule 7(A) to be ultra vires Section
2(b). It was also contended that there may be cases wherein a member who
C might not have paid subscription for the relevant subsequent year within
three months, as provided in Rule 7(A), may have a valid defence as to why
he could not do so for reasons beyond his control or that he had actually
paid the amount within the time but was not noted in the society's account
books for diverse reasons. That such defence also is ruled out by the impugned
D Rule 7(A) by linking automatic termination of membership with the physical
fact of non-payment of a paltry subscription of Rs. 25 per year or more within
the time prescribed by the Rule. Such drastic consequence of the Rule is
obviously harsh and violates all canons of natural justice. It enjoins a member
to pay in time or perish. Even on that score, the High Court's judgment is well
sustained. He, therefore, contended that the ultimate decision rendered by the
E High Court and the consequential directions issued to the Registrar of Societies
cannot be faulted.

In the light of the aforesaid rival contentions, the following points
arise for our consideration:-
I. Whether Rule 7(A) and the earlier Rule 7 are violative of Section
F 2(b) of the Act.

2 Whether the aforesaid Rules are harsh and unconscionable.

3. Whether the consequential directions issued by the High Court
are justified in law.
G
Point No. I :

Before dealing with this point, it is necessary to note he relevant
statutory provisions and the scheme of the impugned Rules in the light of
which this point has to be decided. The Act is enacted to provide for the
H registration of literary, scientific, charitable and other societies functioning in
HYDERABAD KARNATAKA EDUCATION v. REGISTRAR OF SOCIETIES [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.] 171

·the State of Mysore/Karnataka. A
Section 2(b) defines the term 'member' as under :

"Member" mens a person who having been admitted to membership
of a Society in accordance with the rules and regulations thereof,
shall have paid his subscription and shall have signed the roll or list B
of members thereof and shall not have resigned in accordance with
such rules and regulations; but in all proceedings under this Act, no
person shall be entitled to vote or to be counted as a member whose
subscription at the time shall have been in arrear for a period exceeding
three months;"
(emphasis supplied) C
Section 5 deals with the mode of forming societies and lays down as
under:

"5. Mode of forming Societies:-Any seven or more persons, above
the age of eighteen years associated for any purpose specified in Sec D
3 may, by subscribing their names to a memorandum of association
and otherwise complying with the requirement of this Act and the
rules made thereunder, in respect of registration, form themselves into
a Society under this Act."

Section 6(1) deals with requirements with respect to Memorandum. It E
reads as under :

"6. Requirements with respect to memorandum.-{ I) The Memor~dum
of Association of every Society shall state-

(a) the name of the Society; F

(b) the object of the Society;

(c) the names, addresses and occupations of the members of the
governing body to whom, by the rules of the Society, the
management of its affairs is entrusted; G
(d) the place at which the registered office of the Society is to be
situated.

- Then follows Sub-section 2 of Section 6, which along with the proviso
is relevant and, therefore, it is extracted as under : H
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A "(2) There shall be registered with the memorandum of association,
the rules and regulations of the Society, which shall contain provisions
relating to admission of members, general meetings, proceedings at
such meetings including voting by members, the governing body and
proceedings of meetings of the governing body;

B Provided that, save as otherwise provided in this Act, no rule or
regulation of a Society shall exclude any member from being entitled
to vote."

The Registrar functioning under the Act is entrusted with the task of
registration of societies on being satisfied that all requirements of the Act and
C the Rules made thereto are complied with by the society concerned. Section
8 deals with registration of societies. Sub-Section 1, thereof, reads as under:

"(I) There shall be presented to the Registrar for registration the
memorandum of association and the rules and regulations of the·
Society along with a registration fee of one hundred rupees.
D
xxx xxx xxx xxx"

Section 9 deals with alteration of Memorandum of Association.

Section 10 deals with change of name of the society and its rules and
E regulations.

Then follows Section 11 which deals with general meeting. Sub-section
thereof reads as under :

"(I) Every Society registered under this Act shall hold every year a
F general meeting called the annual general meeting at which the report
of the management of the society for the previous year together with
an audit copy of the balance sheet, income and expenditure account
and the auditor's report shall be submitted for approval.

xxx xxx xxx xxx"
G
Special general meeting is provided by Sub-section 3 of Section 11
which reads as under :

"(3) A special general meeting may be convened at any time on the
requisition of the President or the Chairman, if any, of the governing
....
H body, or on the requisition of not less then one third of the number
HYDERABAD KARNATAKA EDUCATION v. REGISTRAR OF SOCIETIES [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.) 173

of members of the governing body, or one tenth of the total number A ·
of members of the Society, entitled to vote who shall state in writing
the business for which they wish the meeting to be convened and the
governing body shall, within ten days from the date of the receipt of
the requisition, proceed duly to call a meeting for the consideration
of the business stated on a day not later than forty days from the date B
of the receipt of the requisition."

Section 18 deals with recovery of penalty accruing under bye-law and
lays down as under :

"18 Recovery of penalty accruing under bye-law. Whenever by any
bye-law duly made in accordance with the rules and regulations of the C
Society, or, if the rules passed at a general meeting of the members
of the Society, convened for the purpose by a majority of not less
than three-fifths of the members present at such meeting, any pecuniary
penalty is imposed for the breach of any rule or bye-law of the
Society, such penalty, when accrued, may be recovered in any court D
having jurisdiction where the defendent shall reside, or the Society
shall be situated, as the governing body thereof shall deem expedient."
Section 19 deals with members liable to be sued as strangers and which
provides a remedy to the society to recover the arrears of subscription of any
member, who according to the rules of the society, falls to pay arrears of E
subscription.

Section 21 deals with procedure for amalgamation of societies. It reads
as under :

"21. Procedure for amalgamation of Societies.-Whenever it shall
appeal to the governing body of any Society registered under this F
Act, which has been established for any particular purpose or purposes,
that it is advisable to amalgamate such Society, either wholly or
partially with any other Society, such governing body may submit the
proposition to the members of the society in a written or printed
report, and may convene a special general meeting for the consideration G
there of according to the rules and regulations of the Society. But no
such proposition shall be deemed to have been approved unless such
report shall have been delivered or sent by post to every member of
the Society, twenty-one, days previous to the date of the special
general meeting convened by the governing body for the consideration
thereof, and unless such proposition shall have been agreed to by the H
174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A votes, cast in favour of the proposition by members who being entitled
so to do, vote in person, or where proxies are allowed, by proxy, and
such votes are not less than three times the number of votes, if any,
cast against the resolution by members so entitled and voting and
confirmed by a similar majority of votes at a second special general
meeting convened by governing body after an interval of thirty days
B after the former meeting."

Section 22 deals with provision for dissolution of societies and adjustment
of their affairs.

Section 23 deals with the disability of the member to receive any profits
C on dissolution.

Section 25 deals with enquiry by the registrar, etc. Sub-section 1, thereof,
reads as under :

'~(l) The Registrar may, on his own motion and shall on the application
D of the majority of the members of the governing body or of not less
than one-third of the members of the Society, hold an enquiry or direct
some person authorised by him by order in writing in accordance with
the rules made in this behalf to hold an enquiry into the constitution,
working and financial condition of a registered Society.

E xxx xxx xxx xxx"

It is in the light of the aforesaid relevant statutory scheme that we hav~
to examine the scope and ambit of impugned Rule 7(A). The said Rule will
have to be read in the light o(preceding Rules 3 to 6, which read as under:

F "3. The Society consists of Patrons, Life Members and Ordinary
Members.

4. Any person who contributes Rs. 5,000 or more to the Society is
a Patron of the Society.

5. Any person who contributes not less than Rs. 2,500- shall be a
G Life Member of the Society.
6. Any person who contributes not less than Rs. 25- per annum
shall be ari Ordinary Member of the society.
7. (A) The Membership fee of an Ordinary Member is payable in
H advance annually in the monfu of December. An Ordinary member'
HYDERABADKARNATAKAEDUCATIONv. REGISTRAR OF SOCIETIES (S.B.MAJMUDAR,J.) 175

who fails to pay his subscription before the end of March of any A
year will automatically cease to be a member."
7(B) deals with admission of new members with which we are not concerned.
The aforesaid Rules framed by the society clearly show that there are three
types of members of the appellant-society. Their status will depend upon the
amount of contribution which they pay. If a person pays Rs. 5,000 or more B
to the society in lumpsum, he will be a patron of the society who has not to
contribute anything more to the society. If a person contributes Rs. 2,500 upto
Rs. 4,999 he will become a life member of the society. He has also not to pay
anything further to be continued on the roll of the ·society as a life member.
The aforesaid two categories of members, having paid the respective amounts
once and for all, will remain permanent members of the society subject to not C
incurring any disqualification laid down by the Rules.

In the present proceedings, we are concerned with Respondent Nos. 2
to 10 who were once upon a time enrolled as ordinary members of the
appellant-society. Their liability was to contribute not less than Rs. 25 per
year to be continued as ordinary members for the year in question. Even if D
such a paltry amount is not paid by the ordinary member, the consequences
thereof will be as laid down by the impugned Rule 7(A). It enjoins that
' membership fee of an ordinary member is payable in advance annually in the
'
month of December. Meaning thereby, if a person is enrolled as an ordinary
member for the year 1999, if he wants to continue as a member for the next E
year i.e. 2000, he can pay Rs. 25 or more as he chooses by December, 1999
so that he will be treated as a continued ordinary member for the next year
i.e. 2000. But ~hen follows second part of Rule 7(A) which lays down that if
an ordinary member fails to pay this subscription of Rs. 25 per year or more
as he may choose before the end of the month of March of the year concerned,
namely year, he will automatically cease to be an ordinary member of the F
society for that year. Meaning thereby, if such an ordinary member of 1999
does not pay up Rs. 25 for the year 2000 ·latest by March 2000, then, from
April 2000 he will automatically cease to be a member. Respondent Nos. 2 to
10 vehemently contended before the High Court and that too successfully
that this type of automatic ceasing of an ordinary member for the next year G
runs counter to Section 2(b) of the Act, as noted earlier. The very first part
of the said Section lays down that a 'member' is a person who having been
admitted to membership of a society in accordance with the rules and
regulations thereof, shall have paid his subscription. It is obvious that
membership of an ordinary member has to be seen in connection with the year
in question because as per Rule 6, an ordinary member has to contribute not H
176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 1 S.C.R.

A less than Rs. 25 per year to be treated as an ordinary member of the society.
Thus, if a person has to be treated as an ordinary member for the year 2000,
it should be shown by him that he was initially admitted to the ordinary
membership of the society in accordance with the rules and regulations. The
said section further provides that such a member shall have paid his
subscription. Now, this obviously means that even though a person may have
B been enrolled as an ordinary member in an earlier year if he has not paid his
subscription for the year in question, he would not be treated to be a member
for that year. Thus in order to remain a member of a society, amongst others,
the very first requirement of Section 2(b) is that he should have been admitted
to the membership of the society in accordance with the rules and regulations
C and shall have paid his subscription. That obviously should also be as per
the rules and regulations of the society. The impugned R11le 7(A) deals with
the concept of "admission" of a person to the ordinary membership of the
society and the mode and manner of payment of subscription by him for
being treated as an ordinary member for the year in question. It lays down
D that an ordinary member who fails to pay his subscription by the end of march
of any relevant year will not be treated to be a continued member for that year.
Thus, three months period is available to the member to pay the paltry amount
of Rs. 25 by way of subscription to remain o~ the roll of members for that
year. This provision in Rule 7(A), therefore, has a direct nexus with the
provision of Section 2(b), which deals with admission of members to a society
E as per the rules and regulations and the requirement of payment of subscription
thereunder. It is difficult to appreciate how Rule 7(A) laying down these
conditions can be said to fall foul on the touchstone of first part of Section
2(b). There is no dispute between the parties that such an enrolled member
shall have to sign the roll and list of members of the societ>'. The Division
Bench of the High Court was right when it took the view disagreeing with
F the reasoning of the learned Single Judge that a defaulting member, so far as
the subscription is concerned, cannot be said to have voluntarily resigned
from his membership. It must, therefore, be held that Rule 7(A) squarely falls
in line with first part of Section 2(b) which enjoins that a member shall be
treated to be a member of the society for the year concerned if he is admitted
G to that membership in accordance with the rules and regulations and shall
have paid the subscription as laid down therein. If he does not pay his
subscription for the year in question within the time permitted by Rule 7(A),
then necessarily he must be held not to be duly admitted to the membership
of the society in accordance with the Rules for the year in question. Such a
Rule cannot be said to be going contrary to the requirement of Section 2(b).
H On the contrary, it runs parallel to it.
HYDERABAD KARNATAKA EDUCATION v. REGISTRAR OF SOCIETIES [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.) 177

To illustrate the working of Rule 7(A) read with Section 2(b), it is easy A
to visualise, as noted earlier, that if an ordinary member who has paid Rs. 25
and more for subscription of membership for the year 1999 fails to pay the
further amount of Rs. 25 or more as he would like to contribute for ordinary
membership for the year 2000 up to the end of March 2000 then in April 2000,
he will cease to be an ordinary member of the society for the year 2000. If
that happens he will not be entitled to vote or be counted as a member. B
Subscription at that time shall have been in arrears for a period excef:ding
three months as laid down in latter part of Section 2(b). Even this provision
is not violated by Rule 7(A). The reason is obvious. If an ordinary member,
enrolled for the year 1999, has not paid Rs. 25 for the year 2000 by the end
of March 2000 then in April 2000 he is said to be in arrears for a period C
exceeding three months, as April is the fourth month of the year 2000. Section
2(b) lays down that such a person shall not be entitled to vote at any of the
meetings of the society convened during the year nor will he be counted as
a member provided it is shown that his subscription at the relevant time in
the year 2000 is in arrear for a period exceeding three months. Thus Section
2(b), by itself, lays down the nullifying consequences on the membership of D
an ordinary member if he remains in arrears of subscription for that year
beyond March of that year. Rule 7(A) also lays down the same consequences.
Therefore, it cannot be said that Rule 7(A) is violative of even last part of·
Section 2(b). On the country, it runs parallel to the same. To highlight this
position another illustration may be taken. If Rule 7(A) had provided that an E
ordinary member who fails to p_ay subscription before the end of February of
any year, will automatically cease to be a member, then it could be visualised
that the Rule would make him non-member from March of that year being in
arrears for a period exceeding two months in that year. Then it would have
directly conflicted with the thrust of Section 2(b) which would not permit any-
society to treat a person to be a non-member for a given year if he is in arrears F
of subscription for that year for a period not exceeding three months. But Rule
7(A), in its present form, instead of doing violence to Section 2(b ), falls in line
with it. Rule 7(A) lays down the very same provision for non-membership as
provided by Section 2(b ). Thus instead of treating the said Rule to be ultra
vires, it must be held that is quite parallel to the section and in complete G
harmony with it.

Before parting with the discussion on this point, it is necessary to note
one submission of learned counsel for the respondents, Shri Shankar. He
submitted that even if an ordinary member has not paid the subscription for
a period exceeding three months in a given year all that can result is that such H
178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A a person is not entitled to vote at the meeting of the society, whether annual
general meeting or special general meeting, as laid down by Section I I nor
can he be counted as a member in all the proceedings under the Act. He
submitted that as per Section 2(b), the proceedings contemplated by the Act
are those which take place in the general meeting or special meeting as laid
down by Section I I. It is difficult t-o agree with this contention. Various
B proceedings are contemplated by the Act. Section 6(2) deals with registration
of Memorandum of Association along with registration of rules and regulations
of the society, which shall contain provisions relating to admission of members.
These requirements and proceedings pertaining thereto would naturally contain
provisions for admission of members for given years, which in their tum,
C would also include the provisions regarding non-payment of subscription by
such members for given years treating them as non-members if they are
defaulters in paying subscription for the year in question. Therefore, Section
I I is not the only provision which deals with the right of a person to be
counted as a member in connection with the general meetings or special
meetings dealt with by the said section. Apart from Section 6(2), other relevant
D Sections are Sections I 8, 21, 22 and 23, as noted earlier, wherein also the
capacity of a person to act as a member would go under cloud if he is found
to be in arrears for a period exceeding three months for the year in question.
It is, therefore, not possible to agree with the contention of learned cou!lsel
for the respondents that even if an ordinary member has remained in arrears
E for a period of three months so far as subscription for that year is concerned
all that he will lose will be a right to vote or act as a member only in the
general meetings or special meetings contemplated by Section I 1 and for all
other purposes he would continue to be a member. Such a contention would
squarely conflict with the statutory provision of Section 6(2) read with the
very first part~of definition section 2(b), as discussed earlier. For all these
F reasons, therefore, with respect, it is not possible to agree with the reasoning
and conclusion of the Division Bench of the High Court that Rule 7(A) is
violative of Section 2(b) of the Act.

The High Court in the impugned judgment has also taken the view that
G Rule 7(A) cannot be sustained for the additional reason that it violates the ·
proviso to Section 6(2) of the Act. It is difficult to appreciate this line of
reasoning. All that the said proviso guarantees is that no Rule or bye-law of
a society can deprive a member of his right to vote, but before the said
proviso can be pressed in service, the concerned member who makes a
grievance regarding his deprivation of right to vote as a member has to be
H found to have subsisted on the roll of the society as a member. If he had
HYDERABAD KARNATAKA EDUCATION v. REGISTRAR OF SOCIETIES [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.) 179

~alidly ceased to be a member of ttie society because of the operation of any A
Rule or bye-law then he cannot be said to have been deprived of the right
to vote as he is no longer a member. All that the proviso guarantees is that
if a person is validly registered as an existing member on the rolls of the
society, then no Rule can deprive him of his right to vote. Consequently, on
the touchstone of this proviso also the legal efficacy of a Rule treating a
person not to be a member under given contingencies cannot be said to have B
got vitiated.

Before leaving the discussion on this point, we may mention that
learned senior counsel for the appellant, Shri Sanyal, placed reliance on some
of the decisions of this Court in T.P. Daver v. Lodge Victoria No. 363, S.C. C
Be/gaum, [1964] 1 SCR 1, The Co-operative Central Bank Ltd and Others
v. The Additional Industrial Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh and Ors., [1969] 2
SCC 43, Kulchhinder Singh and Ors. v. Hardayal Singh Brar and Ors., [1976]
3 SCR 680 and Takraj Vasandi Alias K.L. Basandhi v. Union of India and
Ors., [1988) 2 SCR 260 and on the full Bench judgment of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court in the case of Sri Konaseema Co-operative Central Bank Ltd D
Amalapuram and another v. N. Seetharama Raju, AIR ( 1990) (Volume 77) A.P.
171, and contended that bye-laws of a society are a contract between the
parties and bind both the parties. That may be so, however, the question
remains whether an illegal bye-law or an illegal contract for that matter can
bind any of the contracting parties. It is this question which has to be E
examined and answered, and as seen above, it stands answered in favour of
the appellant-society.

Mr. Sanyal also invited our attention to "The Interpretation of Statutes"
Maxwell 12th Edition pages 150 and 15 l regarding the correct rules of
interpretation of bye-laws and Halsbury's Laws of England Vol. 19, item 215 F
at page 118. The latter reads as follows :

"215. Cessation of membership by non.:payment of subscriptions. It
is usually provided in the rules of a registered society or branch that
if contributions are in arrears for a stated period membership ceases.
A collecting society is required to give twenty-eight days' written G
notice before an interest or benefit in an insurance can be forfeited,
but, in other cases, whether or not a notice is required depends only
on the provisions in the rules ....."

In our view, in the light of what we have seen earlier, once it is held
that the impugned Rule 7(A) and its predecessor Rule 7, which is in pari H
180 SUPREME COURT REPO,RTS [1999] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A materia, do not offend Section 2(b) in any manner, no further dilation on this
aspect is required. Point No. I is accordingly answered in negative in favour
of the appellant-society and against the respondent-writ petitioners.

Point No. 2:

B That takes us to the consideration of the second ground on which the
·High Court has voided Rule 7(A). It is held that the Rule is very harsh in its
operation and, therefore, it is arbitrary.

Now a mere look at the said Rule shows that whenever an ordinary l
!.
member fails to pay a paltry amount of Rs. 25 per year as subscription for
C remaining as a member for that year by the end Of March of that year despite
having got a locus paenitentiae to pay up this paltry amount from the
beginning of the year within three months, he will automatically cease to be
a member for that year. It is difficult to appreciate how an opportunity and
facility for paying a paltry amount of Rs. 25 within first three months in a
D given year can be said to be harsh from any view point. It is true that on the
expiry of three months without payment of Rs. 25 as membership fee for that
year by the beginning of April i.e. the fourth month of that year, he will
automatically cease to be a member. No notice will be required to be served
to him in this connection. It is obvious that every member knows the relevant .'
bye-law and the Rules governing his membership. He knows very well that .>

E because he has not paid Rs. 5,000 or more in lumpsum he is not a patron of
the society. He also knows that because he has not paid Rs. 2,500 or more
at a time up to Rs. 4,999 he can not be said to be a life member. The first two
>-
types of members are not required to pay anything more. Their payments are
once and for all and they always remain on he roll of the society as members
F of the concerned category unless they are removed on any proved on any
proved mis-conduct or disqualification.
Thus remains the question of ordinary member who has to pay a small

G
amount of Rs 25 for being continued as an ordinary member for the year
concerned. He has ben given three months tinie to pay up this small amount,
still if he does not do so, he has to thank himself. Then by the fourth month
he will cease to be treated as an ordinary member for that year. The society
is not expected to give him furth~r notice to show cause why he should not
-
be treated to be an ordinary member for that year because he has not paid
his subscription during the period of first three months and has not availed
of that opportunity. Such a notice is implicit in the Rule itself which is well
H known to all members who are enrolled as such in previous years. It is the
HYDERABAD KARNATAKA EDUCATION v. REGISTRAR OF SOCIETIES [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.] 181

member's own inaction which makes him get out of ordinary membership for A
that year.once the fourth month starts. Consequently, there would remain no
occasion fotany member of the society to complain about failure of natural
justice in not being issued a notice to show cause why he should not be
treated as a non-member from April of that year. He is not being removed as
an ordinary member on account of any alleged misconduct for which a show
cause notice may be required on the principles of natural justice. Therefore, B
on that score also the Rule cannot be treated to be harsh or arbitrary.

However, one aspect of the matter will have to be considered in greater
detail so as to sustain this Rule on the touchstone of reasonableness. Take
a case wherein an ordinary member on the roll of the society fot the year 1999 C
may not be treated to have paid Rs. 25 up to the end of March 2000, as Rs.
25 might not have credited to his account in the society's books during the
relevant months but he may have a good defence to show that he had already
tendered the same amount, but due to some mistake of the receiving cashier
or clerk of the society the amount may not have been credited in his account.
Such a defence would naturally be required to be considered by the society D
before treating him to have automatically ceased to be an ordinary member
for that year on the onset of the fourth month. Similarly, the defaulting
member, apart from the defence of actual payment not being noted by the
society in its books of account for any reason, may have a sufficient cause
for not paying this amount within the prescribed period from January to end E
of March of that year. He may, for reasons beyond his control, might have
been prevented from remitting the said amount due to his prolonged sickness
or absence from the place of work for unavoidable reasons or for any other
sufficient cause. If such a case is put forward for consideration of the society
and ifthe authorities of the society agree with him and hold after hearing him
that he had actually paid the amount within time but it was not noted in the F
society's books or in the alternative even if he had not paid the said amount
within the time prescribed, he had a sufficient cause for non-payment due to
unaviodable sickness or for other reasons beyond his control, then once such
a case is made out by the defaulting member to the satisfaction of the society,
it has to be held that such an ordinary member cannot be said to have failed G
to pay his subscription before the end of March. Therefore, he will not incur
automatic cessation of his membership for that year. It has to be kept in view
that Rule 7(A), when reasonably construed, must mean that it will apply if it
is shown that an ordinary member, by his own volition, wilfully and consciously
.without any real impediment and not for reasons beyond his control, had not
paid his subscription before the end of March of any given year, and H
182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A consequently he would automatically cease to be a member for that year. In
order to show that he is not hit by Rule 7(A), it will be open to the alleged
defaulter ordinary member to point out to the society relevant grounds of
defence and if he does so before the year in question runs out, and if his
defence is accepted by the authorities concerned of the society then his
membership would not be hit by the provisions of Rule 7(A). To that extent,
B while sustaining Rule 7(A), appropriate reading down of the said provision
for saving it from the vice of unreasonableness and arbitrariness has to be
resorted to. If it is not so read down, then Rule 7(A) would obviously fall on
the touchstone of reasonableness and would become void and inoperative.

C In this connection, we may refer to the American jurisprudence second
edition by Jurisprudence Publishers, Inc. volume 6. In chapter dealing with
"Associations and Clubs" at page 463 in para 35 the topic of 'necessity and
sufficiency of notice and hearing' is considered. While dealing with a Rule
or bye-law of an association, society, or club providing for the automatic
suspension of membership, the following observations are made :
D
--~!A rule or bylaw of arl association, society, or club providing for the
automatic suspension, without notice, of a member who fails to pay
his dues or assessments is generally considered to be valid and
enforceable by the organization. But this principle has been limited to
situations where relevent facts are not disputed, and has been held
E not to be applicable where the facts are in dispute or the accused
denies the charges,· or where the penalty for an offence admitted by
him is not automatic and fixed by the rules, since in the latter case the
member has a right to present mitigating evidence and to state other
facts which have a bearing on the punishment to be imposed ...... "
F It must, therefore, be held that Rule 7(A) has to be read down as under
to sustain its legality and validity.

I. If an ordinary member is shown not to have paid up his annual
subscription of Rs. 25 for a given year by the end of March of that
year and if he disputes the allegation of non-payment of subscription
G
by applying to the society before the expiry of the year concerned or
if he proves to the satisfaction of the society that there was any·
sufficient cause which prevented him from paying up Rs. 25 by the
end of March of that year, then he will not be deemed to have
automatically ceased to be such an ordinary member for that year.
H However, for that purpose even without the society being required to
HYDERABAD KARNATAKA EDUCATION"· REGISTRAR OF SOCIETIES [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.) 183
issue any show cause notice, it will be for the member concerned to A
apply to the society by raising a dispute about automatic cessation
of his ordinary membership by putting forward for consideration of
the society his relevant defence against the alleged non-compliance
'of Rule 7(A) by the end of March and if an application raising such
a dispute is filed and if any valid ground· is made out by the member B
concerned and if the society accepts such application and the ground
made therein, then for that year, Rule 7(A) will not be treated to have
dismembered him from his ordinary membership. However, such an
application has to be moved by him, latest before the end of the year
concerned.

We may now illustrate the working of the read down Rule. If an ordinary
c
member duly registered for the year 1999 is alleged to have violated Rule 7(A)
for the next year 2000 by not tendering Rs. 25 by way of subscription for
being continued as an ordinary member for that year, and if the period during
which he can pay up as per the Rule by 31st March of 2000 is over, such an
application can be moved by the member, latest before 3 lst December, 2000. D
If he satisfies the concerned authorities of the society about genuineness of
his case by either showing that he had actually paid up Rs. 25 or more by
31st March, 2000, or that he had sufficient cause for not tendering that
amount within that time, then Rule 7(A) will not dismember him. But such an
application has to be submitted by him for consideration latest by 31st E
December, 2000. In other words, if such a member allows the concerned years
· to expire, then he would miss the bus and would lose the locus paenitentiae
for being continued as an ordinary member for the year 2000 and cannot move
an application for being continued as an ordinary member for the year 2000
at any time after 31st December, 2000. If he thereafter applies in the next year
i.e. 200 l his application can be processed for being considered as a new F
member to be enrolled and for being granted admission as such after following
the procedure of Rule 7{B). Only up to the foresaid extent Rule 7(A) shall be
treated to have been read down.

Before parting with discussion on this point, it must be held that on the G
facts of the present case there will remain no occasion for us to remand the
proceedings to the appellant-society for considering the cases of Respondent
Nos. 2 to l 0 for being saved from the operation of Rule 7(A) for the years
in question for the simple reason that it is an admitted position on record, as
we have noted earlier, that the Respondents never came forward with a case
that they had failed to pay the subscription of Rs. 25 per year by the end of H
184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A March of that year by making out any sufficient cause for the delay and that
too before the expiry of the year concerned. On the contrary, their case is that
they were admittedly in arrears for a number of years. They had no case for
consideration about having either paid up the amounts or having made out
sufficient cause before the expiry of the year concerned as to why they could
B not do so in time. All that they wanted to submit was that they were at a time
paying in lumpsum past arrears of subscription for a number of years. That
obviously would not entitle them to get the benefit of even the read down
Rule 7(A). They have obviously missed the bus. All that they can now submit
is applications for fresh membership subject to following the procedure laid
down by Rule 7(B) for admission as fresh and new members.
c
Learned senior counsel for the appellant-societ)', Shri Sanyal, fairly
stated that if such applications are moved for fresh membership for a new year
they would be processed as per the rules and regulations of the. society. He
was right when he contended that no other relief can be granted to the
respondents. He rightly submitted that if the contention of learned counsel
D ·for the respondents is accepted and if after passage of number of years all_
arrears are allowed to be paid up at a time, then it would be going contrary
to Rule 7(A) read with Section 2(b) and would almost amount to granting
retrospective ordinary memberships to the respondents for years which have
gone behind since long and during all these past years they had ceased to
E be ordinary members and could not have taken part in the proceedings of the
society under the Act and the Rules and bye-laws as members. That many
resolutions of the society and even elections for the relevant years of office
bearers of the society would get adversely affected if such retrospective back
membership is given to the respondents. That such an exercise in the scheme
of the Act and the Rules is certainly contra-indicated. The said submission
F of learned senior counsel for the appellant society is well sustained and must
be accepted. Accordingly, point No. 2 is held in negative in favour of the
appellant-society and against the respondent-writ petitioners subject to the
aforesaid reading down of Rule 7(A) or for that matter earlier Rule 7.

G Point No. 3 :
As a result of our findings on Point Nos. I and 2 in favour of the
appellant-sociefy, it has to be held that the impugned judgment of the Division
Bench of the High Court cannot be sustained and will have to be set aside:
We, however, observe that for the purpose of the present proceedings we
H have assumed that writ petitions filed by the respondents were maintainable
HYDERABAD KARNA TAKA EDUCATION 1•. REGISTRAR OF SOCIETIES [S.B. MAJMUDAR,J .] J85

against the appellant-society as learned senior counsel Shri Sanyal for the A
appellant-society, having raised this contention had not pressed it further and
had invited our decision on merits-. We have, accordingly, examined the same
on merits. Once the conclusion is reached that Rule 7(A) and its predecesssor
Rule 7 were legal and valid subject to the reading down as aforesaid, the
consequential directions issued by the High Court in the impugned judgment B
would obviously fall through along with the main judgment. The appellant-
society, of course, will be bound to comply with Rule 7(A) in future transactions
and claims of ordinary members subject to the reading down of the said Rule
as per this judgment. Point No.3 is also, therefore, answered in negative in
favour of the appellant-society and against the respondent-writ petitioners.

In the result, these appeals are allowed. The interim order passed earlier
c
in these proceedings shall stand vacated. The impugned judgment of the
Division Bench of the High Court is set aside. The writ petitions filed by the
respondent-writ petitioners in the High Court will stand dismissed subject to
the reading down of impugned Rule 7(A) and its predecessor Rule 7.
D
In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to
costs.

VM Appeals allowed.