HUKUM CHAND GUPTAversusDIRECTOR GENERAL, ICAR & ORS.

                     [2012] 8 S.C.R. 831


                  HUKUM CHAND GUPTA                                 A
                            v.
           DIRECTOR GENERAL, ICAR & ORS.
             (Civil Appeal No. 3580 of 2009)

                   SEPTEMBER 25, 2012
                                                                    B
 [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR AND H.L.GOKHALE, JJ.]

     Service Law - Pay scale - Revision in - Tribunal
rejected appellant's claim for upgradation in pay scale -
Propriety - Held: Proper - The appellant failed to establish        C
that the action of the respondents was either discriminatory
or beyond the purview of the Service Rules.

      Service Law - Pay scale - Equation of posts I pay scales
- Distinction in pay scales between the employees working           D
at the Headquarters and the employees working at the
institutional level - Propriety - Held: On facts, it was a matter
Qf record that the employees working at the Headquarters and
at the institutional level were governed by completely different
set of rules - Even the hierarchy of the posts and the channels     E
of promotion were different - Also, merely because any two
posts at the Headquarters and the institutional level had the
same nomenclature, did not necessarily require that the pay
scales on such two posts should also be the same -
Prescription of two different pay scales would not violate the
principle of equal pay for equal work - Such action would not       F
be arbitrary or violate Articles 14, 16 and 390 of the
Constitution - Even though, the two posts were referred to by
the same name, it would not lead to the necessary inference
that the posts were identical in every manner - There cannot
be any strailjacket formula for holding that two posts having       G
 the same nomenclature would have to be given the same pay
scale - Constitution of India, 1950 - Articles 14, 16 and 390.

     Service Law - Pay scale - Prescription of - Held:
                         831                                        H
    832     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2012) 8 S.C.R.


A Prescription of pay scales on particular posts is a very
  complex exercise - It requires assessment of the nature and
  quality of the duties performed and the responsibilities
  shouldered by the incumbents on different posts - These
  matters are to be assessed by expert bodies like the
B employer or the Pay Commission - Neither the Central
  Administrative Tribunal nor a Writ Court would normally
  venture to substitute its own opinion for the opinions rendered
  by the experts.

      Service Law - Pay scale - Assured Career Progression
C Scheme - Object and features of - Discussed.
        The appellant was initially appointed as a Laboratory
   Assistant in Group D in the National Dairy Research
   Institute ('NORI'). Later, he was promoted as a Lower
D Division Clerk (Junior Clerk) and thereafter further
   promoted as a Senior Clerk. Subsequently, on 15th June,
   1988, he was promoted to the post of Superintendent in
   the pay scale of Rs.1640-29001-. On 17th March, 1994, he
  was promoted as Assistant Administrative Officer (AAO)
E on the basis of seniority-cum-fitness. The respondent
  revised the pay scale of Assistants on 17th June, 1995
  to Rs.1640-29001- w.e.f. 1st January, 1986. However, the
  pay scale of Superintendent was not revised. At that
  stage, the appellant submitted a representation
F requesting that his pay scale may be revised on the
  ground that in the Headquarters of Indian Council of
  Agricultural Research (ICAR), the post of Superintendent
  was a promotional post from that of Assistant which
  carried the pay scale of Rs.1640-2900/-. The
  representation not having been decided, the appellant
G filed OA before the Central Administrative Tribunal. The
  Tribunal declined to entertain the claim of the appellant.
  Subsequently, the Screening Committee of respondent
  institute recommended the case of one Shri J.l.P. Madan
  for financial upgradation in the scale of Rs.8000-13500/-
H
 HUKUM CHAND GUPTA v. DIRECTOR GENERAL, 833
              ICAR & ORS.
on the basis of the instructions of the ICAR by which the A
post of Superintendent was merged with the post of
Assistant as the post of Superintendent was treated as
'dying cadre'. In the meanwhile, the appellant reached the
age of superannuation and retired from service.
Thereafter, Shri J.1.P. Madan was granted second financial B
upgradation w.e.f. 8th February, 2001 in the pay scale of
Rs.8000-13500. At this stage, the appellant again moved
the Tribunal claiming that Shri J.l.P. Madan being junior
to him could not be put in a higher pay scale. The Tribunal
held that the post at the Headquarters could not be c
compared with the post at Institutional level as both were
governed by different sets of Service Rules and rejected
the prayer with regard to the higher pay scale given to
Shri J.l.P. Madan on the ground that he had been given
the benefit of second upgradation in pay since he had D
earned only one promotion throughout his professional
career. Aggrieved, the appellant filed a writ petition which
was dismissed by the High Court and therefore the
instant appeal.

    Dismissing the appeal, the Court                          E

     HELD: 1. The claim made by the appellant is wholly
misconceived. There is no comparison between the
appellant and Shri J.l.P. Madan. The appellant had duly
earned promotion in his cadre from the lowest rank to the     F
higher rank. Having joined in Group D, he retired on the
post of AAO. On the other hand, Shri J.l.P. Madan had
been working in the same pay scale till his promotion on
the post of AAO. Therefore; he was held entitled to the
second upgradation after 24 years of service. He had          G
joined as an Assistant by Direct Recruitment and
promoted on 24th August 1990 as a Superintendent. After
the merger of the post of Assistant with the
Superintendent, the earlier promotion of Shri Madan was
nullified, as Assistant was no longer a feeder post for the   H   ii
 promotion on the post of Superintendent. Thus, a
    834      SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2012] 8 S.C.R.

A financial upgradation, in view of Assured Career
  Progression (ACP) Scheme, was granted to him since he
  had no opportunity for the second promotion. [Para 15)
  [843-F-H; 844-A)

B         Union of India v. P. V Hariharan & Anr. (1997) 3 SCC
    568 1997 (2) SCR 1050 - referred to.

        2.1. The ACP Scheme for the civilian employees was
   introduced on the recommendations of the Vth Central
   Pay Commission. It was introduced with a view to provide
C a 'Safety Net' to deal with problems of genuine
   stagnation and hardship faced by the employees due to
   lack of adequate promotional avenues. Under this
  scheme, it was decided to grant two financial
  upgradations on completion of 12 years and 24 years of
D regular service respectively. It was further provided that
  isolated posts in Group A, 8, C and D categories which
  have no promotional avenues shall also qualify for similar
  benefits. Grant of financial upgradations under the ACP
  Scheme was, however, made subject to the conditions
E mentioned in Annexure-1 of the Office Memorandum
  No.35034/1/97-Estt(D) dated 9th August, 1999. The
  conditions in An11exure-I indicate that ACP Scheme
  envisages only a placement in the higher pay-scale/grant
  of financial benefits (through financial upgradation). This
F is given to the Government servant concerned, on
  personal basis only. It neither amounts to functional/
  regular promotion nor requires creation of new posts for
  the purpose. The aforesaid clarification makes it
  abundantly clear that the financial upgradation was
G granted to Shri Madan strictly in conformity with the
  aforesaid scheme. Therefore, the objections raised by the
  appellant were without any basis and wholly
  misconceived. [Para 16] [844-8-F]

     2.2. The ACP Scheme was introduced in the ICAR by
H making the necessary provision in the statutory Service
 HUKUM CHAND GUPTA v. DIRECTOR GENERAL,                   835
              ICAR & ORS.
Rules. Admittedly, Shri J.1.P. Madan has been given the          A
benefit under the ACP Scheme. Therefore, the decision
taken by the respondent was within the purview of the
Service Rules and can not be said to be arbitrary. That
being so, the claim made by the appellant is clearly
misconceived. [Para 19] [845-G-H; 846-A]                         B
      Council of Scientific and Industrial Research & Anr. v.
K. G. S. Bhatt &Anr. (1989) 4 SCC 635; State of Tripura & Ors.
v. K.K. Roy (2004) 9 sec 65: 2003 (6) Suppl. SCR 781 -
referred to.
                                                                 c
     3.1. It cannot be said that there can be no distinction
in the pay scales between the employees working at
Headquarters and the employees working at the
institutional level. It is a matter of record that the
employees working at Headquarters are governed by a              D
completely different set of rules. Even the hierarchy of the
posts and the channels of promotion are different. Also,
merely because any two posts at the Headquarters and
the institutional level have the same nomenclature, would
not necessarily require that the pay scales on the two           E
posts should also be the same. The prescription of two
different pay scales would not violate the principle of
equal pay for equal work. Such action would not be
arbitrary or violate Articles 14, 16 and 390 of the
Constitution of India. It is for the employer to categorize
                                                                 F
the posts and to prescribe the duties of each post. There
cannot be any straitjacket formula for holding that two
posts having the same nomenclature would have to be
given the same pay scale. Prescription of pay scales on
particular posts is a very complex exercise. It requires         G
assessment of the nature and quality of the duties
performed and the responsibilities shouldered by the
incumbents on different posts. Even though, the two
posts may be referred to by the same name, it would not
lead to the necessary inference that the posts are
 identical in every manner. These are matters to be              H
    836     SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2012] 8 S.C.R.


A assessed by expert bodies like the employer or the Pay
  Commission. Neither the Central Administrative Tribunal
  nor a Writ Court would normally venture to substitute its
  own opinion for the opinions rendered by the experts.
  The Tribunal or the Writ Court would lack the necessary
B expertise to undertake the complex exercise of equation
  of posts or the pay scales. [Para 20] [846-8-G]

       3.2. The doctrine of 'equal pay for equal work' is not
   an abstract doctrine and is capable of being enforced in
   a court of law. But equal pay must be for equal work of
C equal value. The principle of 'equal pay for equal work'
   has no mechanical application in every case. Article 14
  of the Constitution permits reasonable, classification
   based on qualities or characteristics of persons recruited
  and grouped together, as against those who were left
D out. Of course, the qualities or characteristics must have
  a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved.
  In service matters, merit or experience can be a proper
  basis for classification for the purposes of pay in order
  to promote efficiency in administration. A higher pay scale
E to avoid stagnation or resultant frustration for lack of
  promotional avenues is also an acceptable reason for pay
  differentiation ..... A mere nomenclature designating a
  person as say a carpenter or a craftsman is not enough
  to come to the conclusion that he is doing the same work
F as another carpenter or craftsman in regular service. The
  quality of work which is produced may be different and
  even the nature of work assigned may be different. It is
  not just a comparison of physical activity. The application
  of the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' requires
G consideration of various dimensions of a given job. The
  accuracy required and the dexterity that the job may
  entail may differ from job to job. It cannot be judged by
  the mere volume of work. There may be qualitative
  difference as regards reliability and responsibility.
H Functions may be the same but the responsibilities make
 HUKUM CHAND GUPTA v. DIRECTOR GENERAL,                   837
              ICAR & ORS.
a difference. Thus normally the applicability of this           A
principle must be left to be evaluated and determined by
an expert body. These are not matters where a writ court
can lightly interfere. Normally a party claiming equal pay
for equal work should be required to raise a dispute in
this regard. In any event, the party who claims equal pay       B
for equal work has to make necessary averments and
prove that all things are equal. Thus, before any direction
can be issued by a court, the court must first see that
there are necessary averments and there is a proof. [Para
20A] [847-B-H; 848-A-B]                                         C
    3.3. In the instant case, the appellant has failed to
establish that the action of the respondents is either
discriminatory or beyond the purview of the rules. [Para
11] [842-A]
                                                                D
     State of Punjab v. Surjit Singh (2009) 9 SCC 514: 2009
(12) SCR 394 - relied on.
                    Case Law Reference:

     1997 (2) SCR 1050         referred to        Para 5        E
     (1989) 4 sec 635          referred to        Para 17

     2003 (6) Suppl. SCR 781 referred to          Para 18

     2009 (12) SCR 394          relied on         Para 20A      F

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
3580 of 2009.

    From the Judgment & Order dated 8.8.2008 of the High
Court of Punjab and Hayana at Chandigarh in C.W.P.No. 9595-     G
CAT of 2004.

     Hukam Chand Gupta (In-Person)

     B. Sunita Rao, Anindita Popli for the Respondents.
                                                                H
     838       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 8 S.C.R.


A          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

        SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J. 1. On 25th September,
    2012, we passed the following order:

           "Having heard the appellant-in-person and the counsel for
B          the respondent, we find no merit in the appeal and the
           same is hereby dismissed. The detailed reasons with
           conclusions shall follow."

           2. Here are the reasons.
c        3. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the
    Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at
    Chandigarh in Civil Writ Petition No.9595-CAT of 2004 decided
    on 8th August, 2008.

D      4. The appellant was initially appointed as a Laboratory
  Assistant in Group D on 29th December, 1961 in the National
  Dairy Research Institute (hereinafter referred to as 'NORI'). On
   13th January, 1966, he was promoted as a Lower Division
  Clerk (Junior Clerk) after qualifying limited departmental
E competitive examination. He was further promoted on 10th May,
  1973 as a Senior Clerk, again after qualifying limited
  departmental competitive examination. At that stage, his pay
  scale was Rs.1200-2040/-. Subsequently, on 15th June, 1988,
  he was promoted to the post of Superintendent in the pay scale
F of Rs.1640-2900/- after passing the departmental examination.
  On 17th March, 1994, he was promoted as Assistant
  Administrative Officer on the basis of seniority-cum-fitness. The
  respondent revised the pay scale of Assistants on 17th June,
  1995 from Rs.1400-2600 to Rs.1640-2900/- w.e.f. 1st January,
G 1986. However, the pay scale of Superintendent was not
  revised.

         5. At that stage, the appellant submitted a representation
    on 24th October, 1995 requesting that his pay scale may be
    revised on the ground that in Headquarters of Indian Council
H
 HUKUM CHAND GUPTA v. DIRECTOR GENERAL,                         839
   ICAR & ORS. [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR. J.)
of Agricultural Research (ICAR), the post of Superintendent is          A
a promotional post from that of Assistant which carries the pay
scale of Rs.1640-2900/-. The representation not having been
decided, the appellant filed OA No.567-HR-96 before the
Chandigarh Bench of Central Administrative Tribunal
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal'). By order dated 20th        B
May, 1997 the Tribunal disposed of OA with the following
observations :-

     "In this application, the agitation is for revision of pay scale
     of the applicant who is Superintendent in the scale of             C
     Rs.1640-2900/- to that of Rs.2000-3500/- on the ground
     that the duties and responsibilities of Superintendent are
     much higher than the Assistants working at Headquarters
     office of ICAR and he should be given the higher pay scale.
     As per the recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
     in the case of UOI and Anr. vs. P.V.Hariharan and Anr.             D
     O.A.No.7127 of 1993 arising out of OA 391/91, has
     precluded the Tribunals from adjudicating the matters of
     parity of pay or pay scales in the Government Department
      unless some discrimination is brought to the notice of the
     Court. This is a matter regarding parity of pay scales             E
     between two sets of posts, therefore, it is squarely covered
     by the directions of Hon'ble Supreme Court. In view
     thereof, this matter cannot be adjudicated by this Tribunal.

     2. However, it was also brought to our notice that the matter      F
     is engaging the attention of the authority concerned and
     the representation filed by the applicant on 24.10.1995 (A-
     3) is under active consideration.

     3. In view thereof, the OA is disposed of with· a direction
     that respondents shall expedite the decision in the matter.        G
     OA disposed of accordingly."

    A perusal of the aforesaid shows that the Tribunal declined
to entertain the claim of the appellant by relying upon the
judgment rendered by this Court in Unio·n of India Vs.                  H
    840       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2012] 8 S.C.R.


A P. V.Hariharan &Anr. 1 The Tribunal, however, directed that the
  respondent shall expedite the decision on the representation
  submitted by the appellant. Subsequently, NORI sent a copy of
  the memorandum to the appellant on 2nd April, 1998 which
  reads as under:
B
                           MEMORANDUM

          "With reference to the Court Case filed by Sh.Hukum
          Chand Gupta Asstt. Administrative Officer, NORI, Kamal,
          under OA No.567/HR/96 in the Central Administrative
c         Tribunal, Chandigarh, regarding upgradation of the post of
          Superintendent in the higher scale of that the proposals
          based upon the recommendations of Dr. Raman
          Committee involving upgradation of posts including the
          Superintendent/S~perintendent (A &A) and Sr.
D         Stenographer in the existing pay scale of RS.1640-2900
          (revised to Rs.5500-175-9000) to the next higher grades,
          the same have not yet been concurred to by the Ministry
          of Finance. Deptt. of Expenditure. Thus the decision in the
          matter is pending.
E
               This issue with reference to the ICAR letter No.9-16/
          96 Law dated the 11-March-1998.
                                                              Sd/-
                                                (J.K.Kewalramani)
F                            Senior Administrative Officer Admn.)"
       6. On 4th August, 2000, the appellant was further informed
  that ICAR, on the basis of the recommendation of the Cadre
  Review Committee, had directed for upgradation of seven
  posts of Superintendents to the post of AAO, by letter dated
G 17th December, 1998. Therefore, no further decision was
  required to be taken by the respondent on the representation
  of the appellant.


H 1. (1997) 3 sec 568.
 HUKUM CHAND GUPTA_v. DIRECTOR GENERAL,                     841
   ICAR & ORS. [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
     7. It appears that on 12th December, 2000, the Screening A
Committee of respondent institute recommended the case of
Shri J.1.P. Madan for financial upgradation in the scale of
Rs.8000-13500/-. The aforesaid decision was taken on the
basis of the instructions of the ICAR by which the post of
Superintendent was merged with the post of Assistant as the B
post of Superintendent was treated as 'dying cadre'. In the
meantime, the appellant reached the age of superannuation on
31st July, 2001 and duly retired from service. On 17th April,
2002, Shri J.l.P. Madan was granted second financial
upgradation w.e.f. 8th February, 2001 in the pay scale of c
Rs.8000-13500. At this stage, the appellant again moved the
Tribunal through OA No.299/HR/2003. The appellant claimed
that Shri J.l.P. Madan being junior to him cannot be put in a
higher pay scale. The OA was dismissed on 2nd December,
2003.                                                         D
     8. By a detailed order, the Tribunal rejected both the
claims. It was observed that the post at Headquarters cannot
be compared with the post at Institutional level as both are
governed by different sets of Service Rules. The second prayer
with regard to the higher pay scale given to Shri J.l.P. Madan      E
was rejected on the ground that he had been given the benefit
of second upgradation in pay since he had earned only one
promotion throughout his professional career.

      9. Aggrieved by the aforesaid, the appellant filed a writ     F
petition C.W.P. No. 9595 CAT of 2004 before the High Court.
The writ petition has also been dismissed by judgment dated
8th August, 2008. This judgment is impugned in the present
appeal.
    1O. We have heard the appellant, in person, and Mrs.            G
Sunita Rao, on behalf of the respondents.

     11. We see no reason to differ with the conclusion reached
by the High Court. It is a matter of record that the claim of the
appellant had been negated way back in 1997, when the               H
     842     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 8 S.C.R.


A Tribunal rejected the claim. The aforesaid order of the Tribunal
  was not challenged by the appellant. However, leaving aside
  the question of !aches, we are of the opinion that the appellant
  has failed to establish that the action of the respondents is either
  discriminatory or beyond the purview of the rules.
B
        12. According to the appellant, the decisions rendered by
  the Tribunal as well as the High Court are based on a
  misconception. According to him, there can be no distinction
  in the pay scales of the posts in Headquarters on one hand and
  at institutional level on the other. He claims that the persons
C holding identical posts performing identical and similar duties
  under the same employer cannot be treated differently in the
  matter of pay and allowances, depending on whether the
  employees are posted at Headquarters or at the Institution level.
  This, according to the appellant, violates Article 14, 16 and 390
D of the Constitution of India.

         13. Mrs. Sunita Rao, learned counsel appearing for the
    respondent has submitted that Shri J.1.P. Madan was appointed
    as a Lab Assistant w.e.f. 3rd May, 1976 at NORI. He was
E   directly recruited thereafter on 9th February, 1977 as an
    Assistant in the pay scale of Rs.425-700. This was not a case
    of promotion from the post of Lab Assistant, a technical post
    to the post of Assistant which is in the general cadre. She,
    however, accepts that Shri Madan was further promoted as
F   Superintendent on 24th August, 1990 in the pay scale of
    Rs.1640-2900 revised to Rs.5500-9000 with effect from 1st
    January, 1996. He was further promoted to the post of AAO
    on 1st November, 1996 in the pay scale of Rs.6500-10500.
    She, however, points out that there was a merger of the post
G   of Superintendent and Assistant in 1998. Therefore, the post
    of Superintendent was declared a dying cadre. Assured Career
    Progression Scheme (hereinafter referred to as 'ACP Scheme')
    was introduced in 1999. Some institutes had raised a point of
    doubt as to whether the promotion of Assistant to
H   Superintendent may be ignored in terms of DOPT's clarification
 HUKUM CHAND GUPTA v. DIRECTOR GENERAL,                       843
   ICAR & ORS. [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
vide O.M. dated 10th February, 2000. Reference was,                   A
therefore, made to the DOPT for the necessary clarification.
The clarification given by the DOPT was communicated to the
respondent institute by letter dated 1st March, 2002. Learned
counsel brought to our notice the relevant extract of the
aforesaid letter, which is as under : -                               B

    "In the given facts, the post of Assistant and
    Superintendent have been brought at par as incumbents
    of both are eligible for promotion directly to the grade of
    AAO and Assistant is no longer the feeder grades for
    Superintendent. Since, financial upgradation under AGP            C
    schemes are to be allowed as per the hierarchy available
    as on 9.8.1999, the promotion earned to the grade of
    Superintendent prior to 9.8.99 may have to be ignored in
    terms of clarification to point of doubt No.1 in O.M. dated
    10.2.2002."                                                       D

     14. According to the learned counsel, the promotion of Shri
Ma~an from the post of Assistant to the post of Superintendent
had to be ignored on the basis of the above clarification.
Consequently, he had been given the second upgradation                E
under the ACP on 26th March, 2000.

       15. In our opinion, the explanation given by Mrs. Sunita Rao
does not leave any room for doubt that the claim made by the
appellant is wholly misconceived. There is no comparison
                                                                      F
between the appellant and Shri J.l.P. Madan. The appellant had
duly earned promotion in his cadre from the lowest rank to the
higher rank. Having joined in Group D, he retired on the post
of AAO. On the other hand, Shri J.l.P. Madan had been working
in the same pay scale till his promotion on the post of AAO.
Therefore, he was held entitled to the second upgradation after       G
24 years of service. He had joined as an Assistant by Direct
Recruitment and promoted on 24th August 1990 as a
Superintendent. After the merger of the post of Assistant with
the Superintendent, the earlier promotion of Shri Madan was
 nullified, as Assistant was no longer a feeder post for the          H
    844       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 8 S.C.R.


A promotion on the post of Superintendent. Thus, a financial
  upgradation, in view of ACP Scheme, was granted to him since
  he had no opportunity for the second promotion.

          16. The Assured Career Progression Scheme for the
   civilian employees was introduced on the recommendations of
8
   the Vth Central Pay Commission. It was.introduced with a view
   to provide a 'Safety Net' to deal with problems of genuine
  stagnation and hardship faced by the employees due to lack
  of adequate promotional avenues. Under this scheme, it was
  decided to grant two financial upgradations on completion of
C 12 years and 24 years of regular service respectively. It was
  further provided that isolated posts in Group A, B, C and D
  categories which have no promotional avenues shall also
  qualify for similar benefits. Grant of financial upgradations under
  the ACP Scheme was, however, made subject to the conditions
D mentioned in Annexure-1 of the Office Memorandum No.35034/
  1/97-Estt(D) dated 9th August, 1999. The conditions in
  Annexure-1 indicate that ACP Scheme envisages only a
  placement in the higher pay-scale/grant of financial benefits
  (through financial upgradation). This is given to the Government
E servant concerned, on personal basis only. It neither amounts
  to functional/regular promotion nor requires creation of new
  posts for the purpose. The aforesaid clarification makes it
  abundantly clear that the financial upgradation was granted to
  Shri Madan strictly inconformity with the aforesaid scheme.
F Therefore, the objections raised by the appellant were without
  any basis and wholly misconceived.
       17. We may notice here that the provisions contained in
  ACP Scheme are inconsonance with the observations made
G by this Court in Council of Scientific and Industrial Research
  & Anr. Vs. K. G. S. Bhatt & Anr. 2 in the following words:

        "It is often said and indeed, adroitly, an organisation public
        or private does not "hire a hand" but engages or employs

H 2.   (1989) 4 sec 635.
 HUKUM CHAND GUPTA v. DIRECTOR GENERAL,                     845
   ICAR & ORS. [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
     a whole man. The person is recruited by an organisation A
     not just for a job, but for a whole career. One must,
     therefore, be given an opportunity to advance. This is the
     oldest and most important feature of the free enterprise
     system. The opportunity for advancement is a requirement
     for progress of any organisation. It is an incentive for B
     personnel development as well. (See Principles of
     Personnel Management, Flipo Edwin B.. 4th Edn., p. 246)
     Every management must provide realistic opportunities for
     promising employees to move upward. "The organisation
     that fails to develop a satisfactory procedure for promotion c
      is bound to pay a severe penalty in terms of administrative
     costs, misallocation of personnel, low morale, and
      ineffectual performance, among both non-managerial
     employees and their supervisors." (See Personnel
      Management, Dr. Udai Pareek, p. 277) There cannot be
                                                                  D
      any modern management much less any career planning,
      manpower development, management development etc.
      which is not related to a system of promotions. (See
      Management of Personnel in Indian Enterprises, Prof.
      N.N. Chatterjee, Ch. 12. p. 128)"
                                                                    E
                                                                3
     18. In the case of State of Tripura & Ors. Vs. K.K. Roy,
this Court again observed that "it is not disputed that the other
States in India/Union of India having regard to the
recommendations made in this behalf by the Pay Commission
introduced the Scheme of Assured Career Promotion in terms          F
whereof the incumbent of a post if not promoted within a period
of 12 years is granted one higher scale of pay and another upon
completion of 24 years if in the meanwhile he had not been
promoted despite existence of promotional avenues."
     19. As noticed earlier, the ACP Scheme was introduced          G
in the ICAR by making the necessary provision in the statutory
Service Rules. Admittedly, Shri J.1.P. Madan has been given
the benefit under the ACP Scheme. Therefore, the decision

3.   c20041 g sec 65                                                H
    846      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 8 S. C.R.

A taken by the respondent was within the purview of the Service
  Rules and can not be said to be arbitrary. That being so, the
  claim made by the appellant is clearly misconceived.

          20. We are also not inclined to accept the submission of
   the appellant that there can be no distinction in the pay scales
8
   between the employees working at Headquarters and the
   employees working at the institutional level. It is a matter of
   record that the employees working at Headquarters are
   governed by a completely different set of rules. Even the
   hierarchy of the posts and the channels of promotion are
C different. Also, merely because any two posts at the
   Headquarters and the institutional level have the same
   nomenclature, would not necessarily require that the pay scales
   on the two posts should also be the same. In our opinion, the
   prescription of two different pay scales would not violate the
D principle of equal pay for equal work. Such action would not be
   arbitrary or violate Articles 14, 16 and 390 of the Constitution
   of India. It is for the employer to categorize the posts and to
   prescribe the duties of each post. There can not be any
   straitjacket formula for holding that two posts having the same
E nomenclature would have to be given the same pay scale.
   Prescription of pay scales on particular posts is a very complex
  exercise. It requires assessment of the nature and quality of the
  duties performed and the responsibilities shouldered by the
  incumbents on different posts. Even though, the two posts may
F be referred to by the same name, it would not lead to the
  necessary inference that the posts are identical in every manner.
  These are matters to be assessed by expert bodies like the
  employer or the Pay Commission. Neither the Central
  Administrative Tribunal nor a Writ Court would normally venture
G to substitute its own opinion for the opinions rendered by the
  experts. The Tribunal or the Writ Court would lack the necessary
  expertise undertake the complex exercise of equation of posts
  or the pay scales.

        20-A. In expressing the aforesaid opinion, we are fortified
H
 HU KUM CHAND GUPTA v. DIRECTOR GENERAL,                     84 7
   ICAR & ORS. [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
by the observations made by this Court in Slate of Punjab Vs.       A
Surjit Singh. 4 In this case, upon review of a large number of
judicial precedents relating to the principle of 'equal pay for
equal work', this Court observed as follows:

     "19 ... Undoubtedly, the doctrine of 'equal pay for equal
                                                                      8
     work' is not an abstract doctrine and is capable of being
     enforced in a court of law. But equal pay must be for equal
     work of equal value. The principle of 'equal pay for equal
     work' has no mechanical application in every case. Article
     14 permits reasonable classification based on qualities or
     characteristics of persons recruited and grouped together, C
     as against those who were left out. Of course, the qualities
     or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the
     object sought to be achieved. In service matters, merit or
     experience can be a proper basis for classification for the
     purposes of pay in order to promote efficiency in D
     administration. A higher pay scale to avoid stagnation or
     resultant frustration for lack of promotional avenues is
     also an acceptable reason for pay differentiation ..... A
      mere nomenclature designating a person as say a
     carpenter or a craftsman is not enough to come to the E
      conclusion that he is doing the same work as another
     carpenter or craftsman in regular service. The quality of
     work which is produced may be different and even the
      nature of work assigned may be different. It is not just a
      comparison of physical activity. The application of the F
      principle of 'equal pay for equal work' requires
      consideration of various dimensions of a given job. The
      accuracy required and the dexterity that the job may entail
      may differ from job to job. It cannot be judged by the mere
      volume of work. There may be qualitative difference as G
      regards reliability and responsibility. Functions may be the
      same but the responsibilities make a difference. Thus
      normally the applicability of this principle must be left to be
      evaluated and determined by an expert body. These are
4.   (2009) g sec 514.                                               H
    848       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2012) 8 S.C.R.


A         not matters. where a writ court can lightly interfere. Normally
          a party claiming equal pay for equal work should be
          required to raise a dispute in this regard. In any event, the
          party who claims equal pay for equal work has to make
          necessary averments and prove that all things are equal.
8         Thus, before any direction can be issued by a court, the
          court must first see that there are necessary averments and
          there is a proof."

                                                 (Emphasis supplied)

c      21. In our opinion, the aforesaid observations would be a
    complete answer to all the submissions made by the appellant.

        22. For the aforesaid reasons, we see no merit in this
    appeal and the same is dismissed.

D B.B.B.                                           Appeal dismissed.