Holding

The complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of cheating or any of the other alleged offences, and therefore the criminal proceeding is an abuse of process and must be quashed under Section 482 CrPC.

Summary

The three Verma brothers sold land to a cooperative society, received part payment, and later the society's cheques bounced. The society filed a criminal complaint alleging cheating and related offences, claiming the brothers concealed a pending partition suit. The brothers filed a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash the complaint, arguing that the allegations did not disclose the ingredients of cheating under Section 420 IPC. The Supreme Court held that the complaint, even on its face, failed to show fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of the transaction and therefore did not prima facie constitute any offence. Applying the Bhajan Lal test, the Court exercised its inherent power to quash the proceeding as an abuse of process, set aside the Patna High Court order and dismissed the criminal case.

Issues considered

The applicability of the inherent power under Section 482 CrPC to quash a criminal proceeding where the complaint does not prima facie disclose an offence.
Whether the allegations in the society's complaint satisfy the ingredients of cheating under Section 420 IPC and allied sections.
Whether the case falls within any of the categories enumerated in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal for exercising the quashing power.
Whether non‑disclosure of a pending partition suit amounts to dishonest intention required for cheating.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 482
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120B, s. 406, s. 415, s. 418, s. 420, s. 423, s. 469, s. 504

Subjects

Section 482inherent powersquashing criminal proceedingscheatingIPC 420abuse of processBhajan Lal testfraudulent intentioncontract breach

Judgment

-
---- HRIDAYA RANGAN PD. VERMA AND ORS.
v.
STATE OF BIHAR AND ANR.
A

MARCH 31, 2000

[K.T. THOMAS AND D.P. MOHAPATRA, JJ.] B

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-Section 482-Inherent powers-
Exercise of-He Id, the extraordinary power under Section 482 Cr.P. C. is to be
exercised either to prevent abuse ofprocess of the Cou11 or othenvise to secure
the ends of justice-Held futther, power of quashing of a criminal proceeding C
is to be exercise very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the
rarest of rare cases.

Indian Penal Code, 1860-Sections 415, 418, 420, 423, 469, 504 and
120B-Offence of cheating-Ingredients of, enumerated-Held, to hold a per-
son guilty of cheating, it is necessary to show that he had fraudulent or D
dishonest intention right at the beginning of the transaction-Mere breach of
contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating-In the preserf_t
case, the allegtion that the appellants did not disclose at the time of sale of the
propetty in question, the fact that one of their brothers had filed a pattition suit
which was pending, held, did not constitute (he offence of cheating or-other
E
offences alleged in the complaint-Reading the averments in the complaints in
entirety and accepting the allegations to be true, the ingredients of intentional
deception on the pa11 of the accused right at the beginning of the negotiations
for the transaction has neither been expressly stated nor indirectly suggested in
the complaint-In such a situation, continuing the criminal proceeding against
the accused/appellants will be an abuse of process of the Coutt-Complaint F
pending against the appellants quashed.

The three appellants herein succeeded to the property in question
along with their three other brothers after the death of their father. They
agreed to sell the land to respondent No. 2, a co-operative society in
pursuance of which the respondent made a part payment to the appel- G
lants. Thereafter, the appellants executed a registered sale deed in favour
of the society wherein two other brothers of the appellants signed as
witnesses. By way of a further safeguard, the appellant executed a sepa-
rate indemnity deed on the same day in which they undertook to indem-
nify any loss caused to the society on account of any objection which may H
859
860 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 2 S.C.R.
A be raised by any co-sharer against transfer of the land in future. The land
was delivered to the society on the same day.

Prior to the execution of the sale deed, one the brothers of the
appellants had filed a suit for partition of the properties left by their
-
father and division by metes and bounds.
B
On registration of the sale deed, the respondent society handed over
three cheques to the appellants for the balance amount. However, the said
cheques were dishonoured on presentation on account of insufficiency of
amount. Repeated requests to the respondent society to pay the balance
amount were not acceded to. Finally, the appellants sent a notice to the
c respondent society through their advocate but to no avail. The appellants
lodged an FIR under Sections 406, 420 and 120B IPC against the respond-
ent society. They also filed three suits for realisation of the amount due to
them.

D Shortly thereafter, the Respondent society filed complaint in the
Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate against the appellants alleging
commission of offences under Sections 418, 420, 423, 469, 504 and 120B of
Indian Penal Code. The respondent society alleged that the appellants had
cheated the society by giving false, concocted and wrongful information
and assurances thereby inducing the society to enter into negotiations and
E also to advance them a heavy amount with ulterior design to acquire
wr~ngful gain to themselves and for wrongful loss to the Society.

The petition filed by the appellants before the High Court for quash-
ing the aforesaid complaint was dismissed. ~ence the present appeals.
F On behalf of the appellants it was contended that the complaint
against them by the respondent society was a counter blast to the criminal
case and the civil suits filed by them against the respondent society.

Allowing the appeals, this Court.

G HELD : 1. The power of quashing a criminal proceeding should he
exercised 'very sparingly and '~ith circumspection and that too in the
rarest of rare cases.' .Jhe extraordinary power under Article 226 of the
Constitution or the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. could be
exercised either to prevent abuse of process of Court or otherwise to
H secure the ends of justice. Thus, where the allegations made in the first

i-
R.R. PD. VERMA v. STATE 861
information report or the complaint, even if taken at their face value and A
_.. accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or
make out a case against the accused, such a case warrants interference by
the Court in exercise of its inherent powers. [868-D-F]

State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others, [1992) Supp. 1
sec 335, relied on. B

Ruppan Deol Bajaj (Mrs.) and Another v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill and
Another, [1995] 5 SCC 194; Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi and Others,
. [1999] 3 SCC 259; State of Kerala and Others v. O.C. Kuttan and Others,
[1992] 2 SCC 651; P.S. Rajya v. State of Bihar, [1996] 9 SCC 1 and State of
Orissa v. Bansidhar Singh, [1996] 2 SCC 194, referred to.
c
2.1. On a reading of the complaint made by the respondent society, it
is clear that the main offence alleged to have been committed by the appel-
lants is 'cheating' punishable under Section 420 IPC. However, the ingre-
dients of the offence of cheating punishable under Section 420 IPC and its D
allied offences under Sections 418 and 423 have not been made out. So far
as the offences under Sections 469, 504 and 120B are concerned even the
basic allegations making out a case thereunder are not contained in the
complaint. That being the position, the present case as such warrants inter-
ference by the Court. Reading the averments in the complaint in entirety
and accepting the allegations to be true, the ingredients of intentional de- E
ception on the part of the accused right at the beginning of the negotiations
for the transactions has neither been expressly stated nor indirectly sug-
gested in the complaint. All that the respondent society has alleged against
the appellant is that they did not disclose that one of their brothers had filed
a partition suit which was pending. The requirements that the information F
was not disclosed by the appellants intentionally in order to make the re-
spondent society part with the property is not alleged expressly or even
impliedly in the complaint. Therefore, the core postulate of dishonest inten-
tion in order to deceive the complainant-respondent society is not made out
even accepting all the averments in the complaint on their face value. In
such a situation continuing the criminal proceedings against the accused
G
will be an abuse of process of the Court. [868-G; 870-B-F]

2.2. On a reading of Section 415 Cr.P.C. which defines cheating, it is
manifest that in the defi~tion there are set forth two separate classes of
acts which the person deceived may be induced to do. In the first place he H
862 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 2 S.C.R.
A may be induced fraudulently or dishonestly to deliver any property to any
person. The second class of acts set forth in the Section is the doing or
omitting to do anything which the person deceived would not do or omit ,
to do if he were not so deceived. In the first class of cases, the inducing
must be fraudulent or dishonest. In the second class of acts, the inducing
must be intentional but not fraudulent or dishonest. (869-E-F]
B
2.3. The distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence
of cheating is a fine one. It depends upon the intention of the accused at
the time of inducement which may be judged by his subsequent c~nduct,
but the subsequent conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract
c cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or
dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction, that
is the time when the offence is said to have been committed. Therefore it is
the intention which is the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of
cheating it is necessary to show that he had fraudulent or dishonest inten-
tion at the time of making the promise. From his mere failure to keep up
D promise subsequently such a culpable intention right at the beginning,
that is, when be made the promise cannot be presumed. (869-G-H]

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos.
313-314 of 2000.
E
From the Judgment and Order dated 13.4.99 of the Patna High Court
in Cd.Misc. No. 22880/98 and 24068 of 1998.

U .R. Lalit, Ejaz Maqbool, Ms. Apama Jha and Braj Ki shore Mishra for
the Appellants.
F
P.S. Misra, Ms. Sunita Rani Singh and R.P. Singh for the Respondent
No. 2.

H.L. Aggarwal and B.B. Singh for the Respondent No. 1.

G The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

D.P. MOHAPATRA, J. Leave granted.

The three appellants, -Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma, Manoranjan Prasad
Verma and Rajiv Ranjan Prasad Verma are sons of Late Shri Kashi Nath
H Prasad Veq,na. They have three other brothers who are not directly involved
H.R. PD. VERMA v. STATE [D.P. MOHAPATRA, J.) 863
in the present proceedings. Late Kashi Nath Prasad Verma was the owner of A
Khasra No. 213, Plot No. 1172, in Village Srinagar, within Siwan Police
Station. On his death his six sons succeeded to the property. Appellant No. 1
is a neuro-surgeon at Patna; appellant no.2 is the Manager of Pathar Thora Tea

- Gardens in Jalpaiguri and appellant no. 3 is a retired marketing manager of
Jay Shree Tea and Industries Ltd., Delhi. Respondent No. 2, Manish Prasad
Singh, an advocate, is the secretary of Kanishka Sahkari Grih Ni1man Samiti
B
Limited, Sewan, (hereinafter referred to as the Society) a cooperative socieity
engaged in purchasing land from different persons and after developing and
dividing it into small pieces selling the plots to different customers. The
appellants agreed to sell the land in village Srinagar to respondent no. 2 for
a consideration of Rs. 16,00,000. The respondent paid a sum of Rs. 11,00,000 c
to the appellants by way of drafts drawn in their favour on 7.12.92. The
appellants executed a registered sale deed in respect of the land in favour of
the Society. It is the case of the appellants that on insistence of respondent
no.2 two other brothers of the appellants signed the sale deed as witnesses. By
way of a further safeguard the appellants executed a separate indemnity deed
D
on the same day in which they undertook to indemnify any loss caused to the
society on account of any objection which may be raised by any co-sharer
against transfer of the land in future. The appellants assert that they have
delivered possession of the land to the society on the same day. Another
brother of the appellants Priya Ranjan Prasad Verma also executed a sale deed
in favour of the society alienating his portion of the land. E
On registration of the sale deed respondent No. 2 handed over three
cheques to the appellants for the sum of Rs. 5,50,000. When the appellants
presented the said cheques in the bank, the same were dishonoured on
account of insutliciency of amount in the account of the drawer. The F
respondent no. 2 had issued a separate cheque in favour of Priya Ranjan
Prasad Verma which was also dishonoured for the same reason.

Prior to the execution of the sale deed Akhil Ranjan Prasad Verma
brother of the appellants had filed a suit, Title Suit No. 118 of 1990 for
partition alleging inter alia that though the properties left by their father had G
been partitioned amongst the brothers in 1971 no division by metes and
bounds had taken place. On 5 .12.1992 on the applicaton filed under Order
39 Civil Procedure Code the learned subordinate judge, Siwan passed an
interim order restraining the apoellants from disturbing the status quo or
transferring the land of Schedule I to the plaint but no i~junction was passed H
864 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 2 S.C.R.
A in respect of the land described in Schedule-VI of the plaint in which the
property in dispute in the present proceeding is included. According to the
appellants the plaintiff Akhil Ranjan Prasad Verma did not press his prayer
for injunction in respect of the Schedule IV properties. It is the further case
of the appellants that between 9.12.92 to ]8.12.92 the respondent No. 2 sold
B portions of the land sold by them to several other persons.

When the cheques issued by the respondent No. 2 in their favour
bounced the appellants made several requests to the said respondent for
payment of the amount. On each such occasion the said respondent avoided
to pay the amount promising to do so within a short time. Finally on
c 21.10.1995 the appellants through their advocate sent a notice to respondent
No. 2 reminding him that the cheques issued by him in favour of the
appellants had bounced due to insufficiency of funds. Finding that respond-
ent no. 2 had no intention to pay the amount, the appellants lodged a first
information report under sections 406, 420 and 120 B IPC with the Siwan
D Police Station on 11.11.1995 which was registered as Siwan Mafsil Case No.
191/95. In the said FIR the respondent No. 2 and Avdesh Narayan Rai who
was the Vice President of the cooperative society were named as the accused.
The police after investigating into the allegations made in the FIR filed a
charge-sheet against respondent no. 2 and Avdesh Narayan Rai. The appel-
E lants also filed three suits for realisation of the amount due to them.

Shortly thereafter on 14.12.1995 the respondent no. 2 filed complaint
no. 1282/95 in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Siwan against the
appellants alleging commission of offences under section 418 (Cheating with
-
F · knowledge that wrongful loss may ensue to person whose interest offender
is bound to protect), section 420 (Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery
of property), section 423 (Dishonest or fraudulent execution of deed of
transfer containing false statement of consideration), section 469 (Forgery for
purpose of harming.reputation), section 504 (intentional insult with intent to
provoke breach of the peace) and section 120B IPC (criminal conspiracy).
G It is the case of the appellants that the FIR was filed as a counter
blast to the criminal case and the civil suits filed by them against
the respondent No. 2.

In the complaint respondent no. 2 alleged inter alia that by conspiring
H together all the accused have defaulted and cheated the society and the

......
H.R. PD. VERMA v. STATE [D.P. MOHAPATRA, J.] 865
complainant by giving false, concocted and wrongful information and assur- A
ances saying to have a Sada "Kora" and thus they induced the complainant
to enter into negotiations and also to advance them a heavy amount with their
ulterior design to acquire wrongful gain to themselves and for wrongful loss
to the society and the complainant - both monitory and reputational. Some
averments in the complaint relevant for the purpose of this proceeding are
B
extracted hereunder :

"That at the time of giving proposal to the complainant for buying
the said land, accused No. 1 asserted that the said land has fallen
exclusively to the share and possession of three brothers (all accused)
after the partition of the estate left by late Kashi Nath Prasad Verma C
among all his six sons and a "Kora" to this effect has also been
prepared and signed by all the brothers. Accused No. 1 also said that
the said Kora was not available at that time and he would show as
and when need be.

That all accused hail from a very sound and respectable family and D
accused No. 1 specially being a renowned doctor, appeared le;> be more
trustwrothy to the complainant. The complainant showing due respect
to accused No. 1 believed him and entered into negotiation with him
for purchase of said land.
E
That ultimately all the accused appeared at Siwan for executing the
sale deeds in favour of the Society on a date fixed earlier by them.
Just before the execution of the sale deed the complainant asked the
accused to show the "Kora" prepared and signed by them (all the six
brothers). The accused did not show the "Kora" and assured that all
the brothers will join the deed. The accused will execute the sale F
deeds and rest three brothers will join the sale deeds as attesting
witnesses.

That the sale deeds in question were scribed at the direction and
dictation of the accused in favour of the Society in respect of entire G
land but only two brothers out of rest three came to join the deeds
as attesting witnesses and one of them i.e. sixth brother namely Praful
, Ranjan Prasad Verma did not appear to do the same as assured by
accused No. 1 to the complainant.

That in order to avoid future comrlications the complainant proposed H ,
866 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000) 2 S.C.R.
A the accused either to retain I/6th share of land for themselves and to
execute sale deeds in respect of only five shares of land.or to refund
the money to the complainant given t<;> them as advance consideration
money. But the accused did not agree to the proposals of the
complainant saying that they will execute an agreement to the effect
that in case of any future trouble to the Society, the executant i.e. the
B
accused will be liable to compensate the Society. Thus the complain-
ant, seeing no alternative, agreed to the proposal of the accused to
execute sale deeds in respect of entire lands and sale deeds were
executed accordingly.

c That in the meantime, some days after the execution of the said sale
deed, the complainant came to know that Title Suit No. 118/90 filed
by Akhil Ranjan Prasad Verma, ·one of the six brothers of the accused
as plaintiff against Priya Ranjan Prasad Verma & five others as
defendants was subjudice in the court of Sub-Judge-III, Siwan, long
before the starting of the negotiation for the sale and purchase of said
D
land. Besides, all.other suit bearing no 68/83, Nagendra Nath Sinha
& Others-plaintiffs v. Singhashani Devi and Ors., defendants has also
b.een pending in the Court of Munsif-1 Siwan from long before the
starting of the negotiation of sale and purchase of the said land. The
accused had concealed these facts from the complainant at the time
E of negotiation and execution of the aforesaid sale deeds.

That from the facts detailed above, it is quite clear that accused have
deliberately and intentionally defrauded and cheated the Society and
. the complainant by suppressing some facts and giving false and
F concocted information and assurances to the complainant so as to
make him believe that the deal is a fair one and free of troubles. The
accused did so with an intention to acquire wrongful gain for
themselves and to cause wrongful loss to the society and the
complainant. The accused have always kept the complainant in wrong
box and thus they have induced the complainant to enter into
G negotiation and advance consideration money to them.

That by suppressing facts relating to two pending cases from before
and filing criminal case against the complainant and civil cases
against the Society the accused have lowered down the prestige and
H reputation of the Society and the complainarit in the eyes of the
H.R. PD. VERMA v. STATE [D.P. MOHAPATRA, J.] 867
members, customers and the public at large, although the complaillimt A
has committed no fault since the amount due to the accused has
already been entered into the Cash Book of the Society and it has
come in the audit Report done for the year 1994-95."
.....
In the case of State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others,
[1992] Supp. 1 SCC 335, this <;,ourt in the back drop of interpretation of B
various relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure under Chapter
XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of
decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226
or the inherent powers under · ection 482 of the Cr.P.C. gave the following
categories of cases by way o illustration wherein such power could be c
exercised either to prevent abus of the process of the Court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice, makin it clear that it may not be possible to lay
down any precise, clearly defined d sufficiently channelised and inflexible
guidelines or rigid formulae and to ·ve an exhaustive list to myriad kinds of
cases wherein such power should be xercise :
D
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or
the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted
in their entirety do not primafacie constitute any offence or make out
a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other E
materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable
offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section
1560) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the
purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
F
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not
disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against
the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a G
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no
investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so
•
absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent H
868 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 2 S.C.R.
A person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground
for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal
proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the
B proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or
the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of
the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala
fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
c ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a
view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.

In the decision this Court added a note of caution to the effect that the
power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised 'very sparingly
D and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases'.

The principles laid down in this decision have been followed in several
decisions of this Court like [1995] 5 SCC 194 Rupan Deal Bajaj (Mrs.) and
another v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill and another, [1999] 3 SCC 259; Rajesh
Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi and others, [1992] 2 SCC 651; State of Kerala
E and others V. O.C. Kuttan and others, [1996] 9 sec 1 and P.S. Rajya V. State
of Bilzar, [1996] 2 SCC 194 State of Orissa v. Bansidhar Singh.

The question is whether the case of the appellants comes under any of
the categories enumerated in State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and
others (supra)? Is it a case where the allegations made in the first information
F report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted
in entirety do not make out a case against the accused? For determination of
the question it becomes· relevant to note the nature of the offences alleged
against the appellants, the ingredients of the offences and the averments made
in the complaint.
G
On a reading of the complaint portions of which have been extracted
earlier it is clear that the main offence alleged to have been committed by the
appellants is 'cheating' punishable under section 420 IPC.

Cheating is defined in Section 415 of the Code as, "Whoever, by
H deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so
H.R. PD. VERMA v. STATE [D.P. MOHAPATRA, J.] 869

- deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person
shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person SQ deceived to
A

do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so
deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or
harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to "cheat".

.Explanation - A dis/wnest concealment offacts is a deception within the B
meaning of this section.

The section requires - (I) Deception of any person.

(2) (a) Fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person
c
(i) to deliver any property to any person; or

(ii) to consent that any person shall retain any property; or

(b) intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to do anything
which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which D
act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that
-person in body mind, reputation or property.

On a reading of the section it is manifest that in the definition there are
set forth two separate classes of acts which the person deceived may be
E
induced to do. In the first place he may be induced fraudulently or dishonestly
to deliver any property to any person. The second class of acts set forth in the
section is the doing or omitting to do anything which the person. deceived
would not do or omit to do if he were not so deceived. In the first class of
cases tl1e inducing must be fradulent or dishonest. In the second class of acts,
the inducing must be intentipnal but not· fraudulent or dishonest. F

In determining tl1e question it has to be kept in mind that the distinction
between mere breach of contract and the offence of cheating is a fine one. It
depends upon the intention of the accused at the time to inducement which
may be judged by his subsequent conduct but for this subsequent conduct is
G
not the sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal
prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown
right at the beginning of the transaction, that is the time when the offence is
said to have been committed. Therefore it is the intention which is the gist of
the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that
he had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. H
A
870 . SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 2 S.C.R.
.From his mere failure to keep up promise subsequently such a· culpable
intention right at the beginning, that is; when he made the promise cannot be
-
presumed.

Judged on the touchstone of the principles noted above, the present
case, in our considered view warrants interference inasmuch as the ingredients
B of the offence of cheating punishable under section 420 IPC and its allied
offences wider sections 418 and 423 has not been made out. So far as the
offences under sections 469, 504 and 120B are concerned even the basic
allegations making out a case therewider are not contained in the complaint.
That being the position the case comes within the first category of cases
c enumerated in State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. (Supra) and
as such warrants inte1forence by the Court. Reading the avernments in the
complaint in entirety and accepting the allegations to be true, the ingredients
of intentional deception on the part of the accused right at the beginning of
the negotiations for the transaction has neither been expressly stated nor
indirectly suggested in complaint. All that the respondent No. 2 has alleged
D against the appellants is that they did not disclose to him that one of their
brothers had filed a partition suit which was pending. The requirement that.
tl1e information was not disclosed by the appellants intentionally in order to
make the respondent No. 2 part with porperty is not alleged expressly or even
impliedly in the complaint. Therefore the core postulate of dishonest intention
E in order to deceive the complainant-respondent no.2 is not made out even
accepting all the averments in the complaint on their face value. In such a
situation continuing the criminal proceeding against the accused will be, in
our considered view, an abuse of process of the court. The High Court was
not right in declining to quash tl1e complaint and the proceeding initiated on
the basis of the same.
F
Accrdingly the appeals are allowed. The Judgment/Order dated 13-4-
1999 of the Patna High Court in Criminal Misc. No. 22880/1998 and Criminal
Misc. No. 24068 of 1998 is set aside and the proceeding in Criminal Case No.
22/96 pending in the Comt of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Siwan is quashed.
G M.P.• Appeals allowed.