Holding

There was a single tenancy and the landlord's bona‑fide residential requirement, including incidental use of part of the premises as an office or library, falls within proviso (e) to section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, and the High Court could not disturb the Rent Controller's factual findings.

Summary

The landlord, an advocate, orally let a part of his residential premises comprising servants' quarters and a ground‑floor hall to the tenant for Rs 600 per month, with rent thereafter paid by two cheques—Rs 250 by the tenant and Rs 350 by a trust (Balkunj) of which the tenant was secretary. The landlord sought eviction under proviso (e) to section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, claiming a bona‑fide residential requirement and the need to use the hall as his office and library. The tenant contended that two separate tenancies had arisen—one for the trust—and that the hall’s use as an office was non‑residential, thus outside the proviso. The Rent Controller held there was a single tenancy and allowed eviction of the entire premises; the Delhi High Court, on revision, reversed this, limiting eviction to the servants' quarters on the basis of two tenancies. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, restored the Rent Controller’s order, held that the rent‑payment arrangement did not create a second tenancy, that the landlord’s incidental use of part of the residence as an office falls within the residential requirement under the Act, and that the High Court could not disturb the factual findings of the Rent Controller under the revision power.

Issues considered

Whether the payment of rent by two cheques, one in the name of a trust, created two separate tenancies.
Whether the landlord's intended use of the hall as an office and library is covered by the 'bona fide residential requirement' under proviso (e) to section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to overturn the Rent Controller's factual findings under Section 25(B)(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act and the revision provisions of the Civil Procedure Code.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 115
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958s. 14(i)(e), s. 25, s. 25(B)(8)

Subjects

Rent ControlEvictionResidential requirementTenancyRevision jurisdictionSection 14(1) proviso (e)Delhi Rent Control Act

Judgment

A HIRALAL KAPUR y
v.
PRABHU CHOUDHURY

FEBRUARY 19, 1988

B [SABYASACHI MUKHARJI AND S. RANGANATHAN, JJ.J

Civil Procedure Code, 1908-Section 115-High Court-Powers
of revision under Rent Control Acts-Not entitled to enter into merits of
factual controversies between parties and reverse findings of fact.

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958-Section 14(i)(e) and section 25 J
-
n

c B(8)-Landlord-An advocate-Whether entitled to possession of pre-/\
mises for bonafide personal residential requirement of himself and for .
setting up an office in a part thereof-Premises let out pursuant to oral
agreement-Monthly. rent Rs.600 tenant paying rent by two separate
cheques-Rs.250 drawn by himself and Rs.350 drawn in the name of
D trust-Whether there are two separate tenancies.

The appellant is an advocate. Pursnant to an oral agreement, he
let ont to the respondent a part of his residential premises comprising of
two rooms above the garage, referred to as "servants' quarters" and a
hall on the ground floor, in July 1976 at Rs.600 p.m. Since November
E 1976 the respondent started paying two separate amounts of Rs.250 and
Rs.350 the latter amount by means of cheques in the name ofBalkunj, a
registered trust, of which he was the Secretary.

In Jannary 1980 the landlord filed an eviction petition nnder pro-
viso (e) to section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 on the
F ground that he required the servants' quarters for his servants and. the
hall for his office and library. The respondent resisted the petition on a
number of grounds. The two grounds with which this Court is con-
cerned are that ( t) two separate tenancies came to be created in respect
of the premises in dispute and hence the petition as filed was not main-
tainable and (2) the intended nse of the hall as office constitnted a
G non-residential use, and therefore outside the purview of proviso (e) to
section 14(1).

The Rent Controller held that there was a single tenancy,
that the landlord bona fide required the premises for his nse, and
that setting up his office and library fell within the scope of the relevant
H statutory provision. The High Court in the revision petition under snb-
1058
HIRALAL KAPUR v. PRABHU 1059

section (8) of section 2SB of the Act, reversed the findings of the Rent
A
Controller and modified the eviction order passed by him restricting it
to the servant's quarters only.

In regard to the first ground, the respondent submits that the fact
. that the landlord was aware of the use of the hall by the trust and his
acceptance of the cheques on behalf of the trust prove that the trust had B
i been accepted as the tenant in respect of the hall. In this connection the
respondent relies on the appellant's letter dated 26. l l. 1978 to the

-
"
respondent, in which the landlord specifically refers to the fact that five
of the dishonoured cheques being returned by him "belong to the
trust". The appellant, on the other hand, submits that acceptance of
. two cheques alone cannot lead to the conclusion that a separate tenancy
c
.l., had been created in respect of the hall between Balkunj and the
( 'petitioner. The appellant further relies on the two letters dated 5.8.1977
and 15. l.1978 written by him to the respondent categorically denying
the tenancy on behalf of Balkunj. He further submits that the finding of
the Rent Controller that there was only a single tenancy was essentially
,, a finding of fact, based on material and circumstances, with which the D
High Court should not have interfered.

In regard to the second ground the respondent urges that the
intended use of the hall by the appellant as office and library could not
amount to a residential requirement.
E

- Allowing the appeal this Court,

HELD: (l) It is no doubt true that the rent has been paid by two
cheques since November 1976 but the mere payment of rent by two
cheques, in the circumstances of this case, cannot mean that there were
two tenancies. The landlord was entitled to a rent of Rs.600 p.m. and so F
>- ~.long as he got this amount it was immaterial for him whether the
r · amount was paid in a lump sum or by one cheque or more than one
' cheque and who the makers of the cheques were. It is not unusual to
come across cases where a tenant pays the rent not by a cheque drawn
by himself but by a cheque drawn by some other concern in which he
has an interest such as a partnership concern, a limited company etc. It G
is also true that the landlord might have been aware that certain
activities of Balkunj were being carried on in the hall. But this can only
mean that the landlord permitted the tenant to use a portion of the
premises for running the activities of the trust. Even assuming that
these two facts might have been sufficient to draw any such inference
as is suggested, the two letters of the landlord, dated 5.8. 77 and IS. I.78 H
1060 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988) 2 S.C.R.

A place the matter beyond all doubt. The landlord had categorically y •
asserted in these letters that he did not recognize Balkunj as his
tenant. [1063G-H; 1064A-E]

(2) The finding of the Rent Controller that there was only a single
tenancy was essentially a finding of fact with which the High Court
B should not have i.nterfered. Though under Section 25(B)(8) of the Delhi
Rent Control Act the powers of the High Court are somewhat wider
than similar powers of revision under section 115 of the Civil Procedure

C
Code, it is well established by a series of decisions of this Court that the
power of revision under the Rent Control Act does not entitle the High
Court to enter into the merits of the factual controversies between the
parties and to reverse findings of fact in this regard. [1064F-H; 1065A) j_
-
•
r

(3) Any professional man of standing would necessarily have to / ':
set apart a portion of his residence as a study, office or library and the
premises do not cease to be his residence because of that. In ascertain-
ing the bona fide need of residence, in the case of a lawyer, the fact that
D a room has to be used as an office cannot be a consideration extraneous
to the scope and content of clause(e) of the proviso to s. 14(1). It may be
that in a case where a lawyer seeks to evict a tenant on the ground that
the entire premises sought to be got vacated are solely needed by him
for use as his office and library, his requirement may not satisfy the
requirements of clause(e) of the proviso to s. 14(1). [1066A-B; 1065F-G I
E
y
(1) Sheodhari Rai v. Suraj Prasad Singh, AIR 1954 S.C. 758;
(2) Helper Girdharbhai v. Saiyed Mohmad, [1987) 3 SCC 538;
(3) Sushi/a Devi v. Avinash Chandra Jain, [1987) 2 S.C.C. 219;
(4) Mohan/al v. Kondi, [1979) 3 S.C.R. 12; (5) Subramania Muda/iar
v. Kolapur Traders, [1981) 4 SCC 511 and (6) Khanna v. Batra, [1966]
F ·2 D.L. T. 306, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3015 ~A
of 1987.

From the Judgment and Order dated December 11, 1985 of the
G Delhi High Court in Civil Revision (R) No. 47 of 1984.

Rajinder Sachhar, P.C. Mudgal and S.P. Gupta for the ~
Appellant.

Anil Nauria and Mrs. Rekha Pandey for the Respondent.
H
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
HIR,\LAL KAPUR v. PRABHU [RANGANATIIAN, J.] 1061

RANGANATHAN, J. The appellant is an advocate. He is the A
owner of premises No. H-2/6 Model Town, Delhi. He let out a part of
this premises comprising a set of rooms above the garage (which may
be briefly referred to as 'servants' quarters') and a hall on the ground
floor of the building to the respondent. The letting was oral and on a
monthly rent of Rs.600 (exclusive of electricity and water charges)
from July 1976. B

2. In January 1980, the landlord filed an eviction petition under

- j proviso (e) to section 14(1fof the Delhi Rent Control Act. He claimed
that he needed the premises bona fide for the personal residential
requirements of himself and the members of his family. His case was
; that he was having his office at Chandni Chowk on a first floor but, as
/1..lie had been advised by the doctor not to climb upstairs, he desired to
c
I move the office and library to the ground floor hall of the premises in
' question. He also claimed that the servants' quarters were required for
the use of his servants and their families.

3. The petition was resisted by the respondent on a number of D
grounds. We are, however, concerned here only with two of the
grounds put forward by the tenant. Hi!; first submission was that
though the premises had initially been taken only for the residential
use of himself, subsequently two separate tenancies had been created
'r in respect of premises in dispute. He claimed that he was the tenant
only of the servants' quarters and that the hall or the ground floor had E
been let out to Bal Kunj (a society registered under the Societies
Registration Act, 1860) of which he was the Secretary. It was pointed
out that from November 1986 onwards, the petitioner was being paid
two sums, a sum of Rs.250 by the respondent and another sum of
Rs.350 per month by the respondent on behalf of Bal Kunj. It was,
therefore, contended that the petition as filed was not maintainable. F
>- ..,1The second plea taken by the respondent was that the intended use of
'!·the ground floor hall as the office of the petitioner-lawyer constituted a
non-residential use and was, therefore, outside the purview of proviso
(e)tos.14(1).

Ill ~ ' 4. The Rent Controller rejected the contentions of the tenant. G
l He held that there had been a single tenancy. The premises had been
Y let out by the landlord only to the respondent, Prabhu Chaudhury, on
a Ient of Rs.600 per month. On the second aspect, the claim of the
landlord that he required the entire premises for use by himself and his
servants and that the ground floor was needed for setting up his office
and library was held by the Rent Controller to fall within the scope of H
1062 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988) 2 S.C.R.

the relevant statutory provision. The Rent Controller, therefore, y
A
directed eviction as prayed for by the petitioner.
j.

5. The above order had been passed under the provisions of
section 258 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The landlord having suc-
ceeded in his eviction petition, the tenant filed a revision petition
B before the Delhi High Court under sub-section (8) of that section. The
learned Judge who heard the petition reversed the findings of the Rent )-
Controller. He held that the landlord would be entitled to be put in
possession only of the servants' quarters and that the petitioner could 1
not claim the use of the hall on the ground floor. In the result, there- -
fore, the learned Judge modified the order passed by the Rent Con-
troller. He restricted the eviction order granted by the Rent Controller )
c to the servants' quarters. We may mention here that, in compliance ,J-·
with the order of the learned Judge, the respondent has since vacated· \
and delivered vacant possession of the servants' quarters to the land-
lord. The controversy before us is restricted to the hall on the ground
floor.
D
6. The first question that arises for our consideration is whether
the High Court was right in holding that there were two separate
tenancies, one in respect of the servants' quarters and the other in
respect of the hall on the ground floor. The position is this. There was
oral evidence let in by the petitioner to show that the premises had
been let out to the respondent in July 1976 at Rs.600 p.m. It appears

-
E
the respondent started paying two separate amounts of Rs.250 and
Rs.350 since November 1976. It also appears that the former amount
was paid by the respondent and the letter by means of cheques in the
name of the trust. It also seems to be common ground that the respon-
dent was occupying the servants' quarters and the Bal Kunj was
F occupying the hall on the ground floor though it is not clear at what
point of time this happened. Counsel for the respondent relies on . .A.
these circumstances. He wants to use the fact that the petitioner who~
was also occupying a hall on the ground floor adjacent to the hall
occupied by the trust clearly must have been aware of the use of the
hall to submit that the trust had been accepted as a tenant in respect of
G the hall at Rs.350 p.m. He also relies on a fact-which he says the Rent
Controller completely missed-that in 1978, when a number of
cheques given to the landlord had been returned dishonoured, the -~
landlord wrote a letter dated 26.11.1978 to the tenant in which he
specifically referred to the fact that five of the cheques "belong to
Balkunj." It is submitted that these facts clearly put the matter beyond
H all doubt that, though initially the premises had been taken only by the
HIRALAL KAPUR v. PRABHU IRANGANAIT!AN, J.J 1063

-y respondent, it had subsequently been converted into two tenancies.
Learned counsel for the landlord on the other hand submitted that the A
question whether there was a single tenancy or two tenancies is essen-
tially a question of fact. The Rent Controller, after appreciating all the
circumstances, had come to the conclusion that there was a single
tenancy. There was clear evidence to show that initially, in July 1976,
the landlord had let out the premises only to the respondent for a B
1 monthly rent of Rs.600. It is true that subsequently, after a few
months, the tenant paid the rent by way of two cheques- one drawn

- 1 by himself and the other drawn on behalf of Balkunj. But, learned
counsel submits, relying on the decision in Sheodhari Rai v. Suraj
Prasad Singh, AIR 1954 S.C. 758, this alone cannot lead to the conclu-
' sion that a separate tenancy had been created in respect of the hall
1
J...between Balkunj and the petitioner. Learned counsel also pointed out C
-, that the Rent Controller had referred to two important documents,
' AW 8/18 and AW 8/20. These were two letters dated 5.8.1977 and
15.1.1978. In these two letters the landlord had specifically and
categorically denied the tenancy on behalf of Balkunj. What had hap-
pened was that the respondent on behalf of Balkunj had written to the D
• • landlord making certain claims for repairs etc. in respect of the hall
occupied by Balkunj. Immediately the landlord wrote back saying that
he had nothing to do with Balkunj, that the tenancy was only in favour
of the respondent, and that he did not recognise Balkunj as his tenant.
These two letters remained unanswered. Learned counsel for the land-
f lord, therefore, submitted that there was ample material and clinching E
evidence before the Rent Controller to come to the conclusion that
there was a single tenancy and that was between Prabhu Chowdhary
and the landlord and that, therefore, there was no question of there
being two tenancies as held by the High Court.

7. We are inclined to agree with this submission of the landlord. F
}- . The initial tenancy was only an oral tenancy. Nevertheless there were
!two witnesses who deposed that the original tenancy agreement was
' only between the petitioner and the respondent. At that time, admit-
tedly, there was no question of Balkunj being the tenant in respect of
any portion of the premises. All that the respondent says is that subse-
~ • quently cheques were being issued in the name of Balkunj also and G
that this must be taken to lead to an inference that the petitioner had
)., accepted Balkunj as its tenant. It is very difficult to accept this argu-
ment. It is no doubt true that the rent has been paid by two cheques
since November 1976 but the mere payment of rent by two cheques, in
the circumstances of this case, cannot mean that there were two
tenancies. The landlord was entitled to a rent of Rs.600 p.m. and so H
'

1064 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 2 S.C.R.

A long as he got this amount, it was immaterial for him whether the Y
amount was paid in a lump sum or by one cheque or more than one
. cheque and who the makers of the cheques were. It is not unusual to
come across cases where a tenant pays the rent not by a cheque drawn
by himself but by a cheque drawn by some other concern in which he·
has an interest such as a partnership concern a limited company or
B other entity in which he is interested. So, the mere fact·that for some
reason the respondent chose not to issue a single cheque for the rent of 'r
Rs.600 but that he gave two separate cheques, one for Rs.250 drawn
by himself and one for Rs.350 drawn in the name of Balkunj cannot
lead to an irresistible conclusion that the tenancy was created in favour
of Balkunj with the concurrence of the landlord. The letter dated
C 26.11. 78, far from "clinching" the respondent's claim, as held by the j
-
High Court, does not in our view improve the tenant's case at all. It_. --
only evidences the fact that the landlord was receiving the cheques \-
issued in the name of the trust in discharge of the respondent's obliga-
tion to pay the rent of Rs.600 p.m. It is also true that, since the landlord
was also occupying a part of the ground floor premises, he might have
D been aware that certain activities of Balkunj were being carried on in
the hall. But this can only mean that the landlord permitted the tenant •
to use a portion of the premises let out for running the activities of the
trust. Even assuming that, standing by themselves these ·two facts
· might have been sufficient to draw any such inference as is suggested,
the two letters of 5.8.77 and 15.1.78 place the matter beyond all doubt.
E The landlord categorically asserted in these letters that he does not
recognize Balkunj as his tenant and that the respondent alone was his
tenant. There was no reply to these letters from the respondent. In
these circumstances there can be no doubt at all that the premises had
been let out only to the respondent by the petitioner and that Balkunj
cannot be considered to be a tenant of the premises or any portion
F thereof.

8. The finding of the Rent Controller that there was only a single:\-A
tenancy was essentially a finding of fact based on the material and
circumstances to which we have adverted and we are also inclined to
accept the conclusion of the Rent Controller as the correct one. We
G also agree with the landlord that this is a finding with which the High
Court should not have interfered. Though under Section 25(B)(8) of J
the Delhi Rent Control Act the powers of the High Court are some- "I
what wider than similar powers of revision under section 115 of the
Civil Procedure Code, it is well established by a series of decisions of
this Court that the power of revision under the Rent Control Acts does
H not entitle the High Court to enter into the merits of the factual con- '.
HIRALAL KAPUR v. PRABHU (RANGANATHAN, J.] 1065

y troversies between the parties and to reverse findings of fact in this A
regard. It is sufficient, in this context, to refer to the decision of this
·< Court in Helper Girdharbhai v. Saiyed Mohmad, [1987] 3 SCC 538
which was reviewed earlier decisions. The decision in Sushi/a Devi v.
Avinash Chandra Jain, [1987] 2 S.C.C. 219 to which counsel for the
respondent referred, lays down no different principle.
B
i 9. So far as the second point is concerned, learned counsel for
the respondent relied upon two decisions of this Court in Mohan/al v.
'r Kandi, [1979] 3 S.C.R. 12 and in Subramania Mudaliar v. Kolapur
Traders, [1981] 4 SCC 511. In the former, it was held that the profes-
sion of a lawyer is "business" within the meaning of S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of
the Andhra Pradesh Building (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act,
1
j;l960. The latter is a decision to a like effect. These decisions are not of
c
f mllch help in the context of the present case and of the provisions of
clause (e) of the proviso to s. 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
Here the landlord is seeking to recover possession of a residential
premises. There is, as we have already held, a single tenancy in favour
of the respondent for a residential purpose. Though learned counsel D
• • for the respondent invited us to say that, so far as the hall was.con-
cerned, the premises were being used by a trust and, hence for a
non-residential purpose, we cannot permit him to raise this plea. Such
a plea was not taken before the High Court. Against the order of the
High Court, the respondent had also filed a special leave petition to

-
)' this Court which has been dismissed. It is therefore not open to the E
respondent to urge this point before us. The only point taken before
the High Court was that the petitioner could not get relief because the
use of the hall by a lawyer as his office and library could not amount to
a residential requirement. We shall, therefore, confine ourselves to
this question.
F
··~. '. 10. In our opinion, the contention of the respondent cannot be
~epted in the extreme form in which it is urged here. It may be that
in a case where a lawyer seeks to evict a tenant on the ground that the
entire premises sought to be got vacated are solely needed by him for
use as his office and library, his requirement may not satisfy the re-
l. ·~ ' quirements of clause (e) of the proviso to s. 14(1). But this is quite G
different from saying that where the premises are sought to be got
~vacated for use as a residence and, the landlord being a lawyer desires
to use a part of such residence as a study, office or library, such use
would be a non-residential use. Any professional man of standing
would necessarily have to set apart a portion of his residence for such
purposes and the premises do not cease to be his residence because H
1066 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 2 S.C.R.

A of that. in the present case, the petitioner seeks eviction of the suit
premises for his bona fide residential requirement and the use of the
hall as an office is only incidental to such a requirement. In ascertain-
ing the bona fide need of residence, in the case of a lawyer, the fact
th~t a room has to be used as an office cannot be a consideration
extraneous to the scope and content of clause (e) of the proviso to
B s. 14(1).

11. To test our conclusion, we may see what the position would ~
be in the converse case. If, in the present case, the petitioner had 1
stated that he required the hall because he had no living room in the _.
premises which he was occupying as the only room there was being, or
had to be, used by him as an office, the petitioner's claim could not
C have been rejected, for he would then have needed the hall clearly as J
part of his residential requirement. The decision in Khanna v. Batra; · ~
[1966) 2 D.L. T. 306 illustrates this. There, an advocate, had asked for
eviction of a tenant from the first floor as the ground floor premises
occupied by him were not sufficient for his needs for purposes of
D residence and office. The Rent Control Tribunal held that since the
appellant intended to convert the existing residential accommodation • •
in his possession into an office and library for the use of his clerk and
clients, such a user was not permissible in law. Reversing this conclu-
sion, Grover, J observed:

"It seems to me that the Rent Control Tribunal was clearly 1

-
E
in error in thinking that merely because the awellant
wanted to use the accommodation in his possession for
professional purposes, he could not claim benefit of the
provision contained in clause (e) of the proviso to s. 14(1)
of the Act. It was this error which led to the conclusion at
F which the Rent Control Tribunal arrived upholding the
decision of the Controller on the second point, namely the.,_ ,.{
requirement of the appellant on personal grounds. I cannot)'
therefore, accede to the submission of the learned counsel
for the respondent that the finding of the Rent Controller
Tribunal with regard to the personal need or requirement
0 was one of fact and thus immune from challenge in the
second appeal."

12. Should the position is different in this case? Merely because
the petitioner has come forward with an honest plea that he intends to
use a part of his residence as an office, should a different result follow, J.'
H particularly in a case like this where ill-health compels him to have his
HIRALAL KAPUR v. PRABHU (RANGANA1HAN, J.] 1067

office at home? Should the result depend on the jugglery of pleadings A.
or the substance of the matter? We think the substance should prevail.
J
In our opinion, where a landlord applies for the possession of bis
residential premises, bis bona fide requirement of the premises for bis
residential purposes will not stand vitiated merely because he intends
to use a portion of the premises for purposes of his office, library or B
study.

13. We are, therefore, of opinion that the High Court should not

- have interfered with the findings of the Rent Controller on this point
as well. This is no doubt a mixed question of fact and law but, for the
reasons given earlier, we are inclined to agree with the conclusion of
, ~be Rent Controller. c
f 14. In the result, we bold that the High Court was in error in
granting relief to the petitioner only in respect of the servants' quarters
and in declining to grant the petitioner relief in respect of the ball. We
allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore
the order of the Rent Controller that the petitioner is entitled to the D
• possession of the entire premises in question. There will, however, be
no order as to costs.

R.S.S. Appeal allowed.

~\~,

,,
~

I
'
~