HIMANI ALLOYS LTD.versusTATA STEEL LTD.
- Citation
- 2011 INSC 457
- Decided
- 5 July 2011
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- R V RAVEENDRAN
Holding
A judgment on admission under Order 12 Rule 6 can be granted only when there is a clear, categorical, and unambiguous admission; the minutes in this case did not contain such an admission, rendering the judgment on admission unjustified.
Summary
Tata Steel (respondent) sued Himani Alloys Ltd. (appellant) for recovery of a sum and filed an application for a decree on admission under Order 12 Rule 6, claiming the appellant had admitted liability for Rs 74.57 lakhs in minutes of a meeting dated 9 December 2000. The Calcutta High Court, finding an admission for Rs 47.06 lakhs in the same minutes, passed a judgment on admission. Himani Alloys appealed, contending that the minutes contained only tentative figures and no clear, categorical admission, and that the amount of Rs 74.57 lakhs actually related to a different company. The Supreme Court examined whether the minutes satisfied the requirement of a conscious, deliberate, unconditional admission necessary for a judgment on admission and held that they did not. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court orders, and clarified that a judgment on admission may be granted only when a clear and unambiguous admission is present.
Issues considered
- Whether minutes of a meeting can constitute a clear and categorical admission sufficient for a judgment under Order 12 Rule 6 of the CPC.
- Whether the court may pass a judgment on admission when the alleged admission is tentative and not expressly binding.
- Whether the discretion under Order 12 Rule 6 can be exercised in the absence of a pleaded specific admission.
Legislation cited
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order 12 Rule 6
Subjects
Judgment
[2011] 7 S.C.R. 60
A HIMANI ALLOYS LTD.
v.
TATA STEEL LTD.
(Civil Appeal No. 5077 of 2011)
JULY 05, 2011
B
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN AND A.K. PATNAIK, JJ.]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Or. 12 r. 6 - Judgment
on admission - Recovery suit - Respondent filed application
C praying for decree alleging that appellant had admitted
liability for sum of Rs. 74. 57 lakhs as per minutes of the
meeting held between representatives of the respondent and
the appellant - High Court holding that the minutes of the said
meeting recorded an admission by the appellant in respect
o of a sum of Rs.47. 06 lakhs and made a judgment on
admission u!Or. 12 r. 6 in regard to the said amount in favour
of the respondent - Justification of - Held: Not justified - A
judgment can be given on an 'admission' contained in the
minutes of a meeting - But the admission should be
E categorical - It should be a conscious and deliberate act of
the party making it, showing an intention to be bound by it -
Or. 12 r. 6 being an enabling provision, it is neither mandatory
nor pre-emptory but discretionary - Since a judgment on
admission is a judgment without trial which permanently
F denies any remedy to the defendant, by way of an appeal on
merits, the discretion should be used only when there is a
clear 'admission' which can be acted upon - On facts, the sum
of Rs. 74.57 lakhs actually figures in minutes of a subsequent
meeting held between the parties, thus, the specific case of
G admission put forth by the respondent in its application
seeking a judgment on admission, incorrect - Respondent
did not refer to or rely upon any other admission, nor sought
judgment in regard to any other admission - High Court could
not have embarked upon an enquiry as to whether there was
some oth~ admission nor given a judgment on the basis of
H r 60 .
HIMANI ALLOYS LTD. v. TATA STEEL LTD. 61
such other admission, not pleaded by the respondent - In any A
event, on examination it is found that the minutes of the
meeting (as relied on by the respondent) did not refer td any
admission by appellant to pay any amount to respondent
which could result in a judgment on admission u/Or. 12 r. 6 -
Thus, ori:Jers of the High Court are set aside. B
Uttam Singh Duggal and Co. Ltd. vs. United Bank of
India 2000 (7) SCC 120; Karam Kapahi vs. Lal Chand Public
Charitable Trust 2010 (4) SCC 753; Jeevan Diesels and
Electricals Ltd. vs. Jasbir Singh Chadha 2010 (6) SCC 601 - C
relied on. '
Case Law Reference:
2000 (7) sec 120 Relied on Para 10
2010 (4) sec 753 Relied on Para 10 D
2010 cs> sec 601 Relied on Para 10
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
5077 of 2011.
E
From the Judgment & Order dated 22.9.2008 of the High
Court of Calcutta in CS No. 12 of 2003 and APO No. 89 of 2008
and GA No. 940 of 2008.
WITH
F
S.l.P. (C) CC. No. 7879-7880 of 2009.
K.V. Vishwanathan, Shyam Divan, Gitika Panwar, Kavita
Wadia, Ajay Agg·arwal, Mohit Mudgal, Nimita Kaul , Rajan
Narain for the appearing parties. G
The Order of the Court was delivered by
ORDER
R.V.RAVEENDRAN, J. 1. Leave granted. H
62 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 7 S.C.R.
A 2. The respondent ('TISCO' for short) filed a suit
(C.S.No.12/2003) in the Calcutta High Court against the
appellant for recovery of a sum of Rs.2,02,72,505/40 in regard
to supply of steel. In the said Suit, the respondent filed an
application on 8.8.2003 praying for a decree upon admission
B for Rs.74,57,074/50 alleging that the appellant had admitted
liability for such sum, as per minutes of the meeting held on
9.12.2000 between representatives of respondent and
appellant. The said application was resisted by the appellant
contending that there was no such admission on 9.12.2000 or
c any other date and pointing out that what transpired on
9.12.2000 was only a tentative agreement to have the accounts
verified and not a final settlement or admission of liability.
3. A learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court by
order dated 22.2.2008, granted a judgment on admission
D under Order 12 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code ('Code' for
short) for a sum of Rs.47,06,775/- in favour of the respondent-
plaintiff, subject to respondent furnishing a bank guarantee for
a sum of Rs.48,00,000/- in favour of thf' Registrar of the High
Court. The intra appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed
E by the Division Bench of the High Court by judgment dated
22.9.2008. The said judgment is under challenge in this appeal
by special leave.
4. Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code provides that where
F admission of facts have been made in the pleadings or
otherwise, whether oral or in writing, the Court may at any stage
of the suit either on the application of any party or of its own
motion and without waiting for the determination of any other
question between the parties, make such order or give such
G judgment as it may think fit, having regard to such admissions.
5. The specific case of the respondent-plaintiff in the
application was that at a meeting held on 9.12.2000 for
reconciling the accounts as on 31.3.1999, the appellant
admitted that a sum of Rs.74,57,074/50 was outstanding to the
H respondent and therefore it was entitled to a judgment on
HIMANI ALLOYS LTD. v. TATA STEEL LTD. 63
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
admission for that amount. The learned single Judge found that A
there was no such admission in regard to Rs.74,57,074/50 in
the minutes of the meeting dated 9.12.2000. He however held
that the minutes of the meeting dated 9.12.2000 recorded an
admission by the appellant in respect of a sum of
Rs.47,06,775/70 and consequently made a judgment on B
admission in regard to Rs.47,06,775/70 against the appellant.
The question is whether such judgment on admission was
justified.
6. The sum of Rs.74,57,074/50 described as the amount
admitted to be due by the appellant, has nothing to do with C
appellant (Himani Alloys Ltd.). It is an amount that actually
figures in the minutes of a meeting held on 23.2.2001 between
the representatives of the respondent and another company by
name Himani Ferro Alloys Ltd. Thus the specific case of
admission put forth by the respondent in its application seeking D
a judgment on admission, was found to be incorrect. The
respondent did not refer to or rely upon any other admission,
nor sought judgment in regard to any other admission. Once
the claim of the respondent regarding admission was proved
to be incorrect, its application for judgment on admission ought E
to have been rejected by the High Court. The High Court could
not have embarked upon an enquiry as to whether there was
some other admission nor given a judgment on the basis of
such other admission, not pleaded by the respondent-plaintiff.
If the respondent wanted to rely upon some other admission, it F
ought to have made a separate application, so that the appellant
could have filed its objections to the same. That was not done.
7. Assuming that the High Court could have examined
whether there was some other 'admission' in the minutes of the G
meeting dated 9.12.2000 relied on by the respondent, let us
examine whether there was in fact any admission, on the basis
of which a judgment on admission could have been passed.
The minutes of the meeting dated 9.12.2000 no doubt starts
by noting that the "As per Himani's records: credit TISCO
H
64 SUPKEME COURT REPORTS [2011] 7 S.C.R.
A Rs.47,06,789.00" as on 31.3.1999. It also records that as per
TISCO's records, as on 31.3.1999, the· amount due by
Himani(appellant) was Rs.61,49,449/30 and if three deductions
(which were yet to be checked) were made, the amount due
would be Rs.47,06,775/70. Thereafter, in paragraphs 3,4 and
B 5, there is a reference to both parties agreeing to provide
particulars, agreeing to hold further discussions on 26.12.2000
and respondent agreeing to check up its records to find out the
correctness of certain entries. Thereafter the minutes conclude
that the "final figure will be arrived at the meeting accordingly".
C When the minutes merely notes certain figures and states that
they are tentative and both parties will verify the same and says
that the final figure will be arrived at the next meeting, after
discussions, we fail to understand how the same could be
termed as an "admission" for the purpose of Order 12 Rule 6
D of the Code.
9. Another aspect regarding the minutes dated 9.12.2000
requires to be noticed. The Minutes do not refer to any
admission by HIMANI (appellant) to pay any amount to TISCO
E (respondent). If a buyer states on 9.12.2000 that his account
as on 31.3.1999 shows a balance of amount 'X' to the credit
of the supplier, it can not be treated as an admission that the
said amount 'X' was due to the supplier on 9.12.2000. In a
continuing account, it may be possible that between 31.3.1999
and 9.12.2000, there may be debits to the account, or 'reveral
F of credits' or 'settlement of the account'. We therefore hold that
there was no admission on 9.12.2000 which could result in a
judgment under Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code.
10. It is true that a judgment can be given on an
G "admission" contained in the minutes of a meeting. But the
admission should be categorical. It should be a conscious and
deliberate act of the party making it, showing an intention to
be bound by it. Order 12 Rule 6 being an enabling provision, it
is neither mandatory nor peremptory but discretionary. The
H court, on examination of the facts and circumstances, has to
HIMANI ALLOYS LTD. v. TATA STEEL LTD. 65
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
exercise its judicial discretion, keeping in mind that a judgment A
on admission is a judgment without trial which permanently
denies any remedy to the defendant, by way of an appeal on
merits. Therefore unless the admission is clear, unambiguous
and unconditional, the discretion of the Court should not be
exercised to deny the valuable right of a defendant to contest B
the claim. In short the discretion should be used only when there
is a clear 'admission' which can be acted upon. (See also
Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. vs. United Bank of India [2000
(7) SCC 120], Karam Kapahi vs. Lal _Chand Public Charitable
Trust [2010 (4) SCC 753] and Jeevan Diesels and Electricals c
Ltd. vs. Jasbir Singh Chadha [2010 (6) SCC 601]. There is
no such admission in this case.
11. In view of the above, we allow this appeal, set aside
the orders of the learned Single Judge and the division bench
of the High Court dated 22.2.2008 and 22.9.2008. We make D
it clear that we have not recorded any finding nor expressed
any opinion in regard to the merits of the case or in regard to
any part of the suit claim. It is possible that on evidence being
led, the respondent is able to establish that Rs.47,06,775/70
was in fact due as on 31.3.1999 and that it continues to be due. E
We request the High Court to dispose of the suit expeditiously.
N.J. Appeal allowed.
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