Holding

The appellant is a "person interested" under Section 18(1) and has standing, but the acquisition is void as it was not complete and therefore cannot be cured by Section 7 of the 1962 Amendment Act.

Summary

Himalayan Tiles & Marbles (P) Ltd., a private manufacturing company, sought acquisition of land for its business and the Government issued notifications under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The acquisition was challenged by the landowner on the ground that it was not a public purpose, leading a Single Judge of the High Court to quash the acquisition. The High Court’s Letters Patent Bench dismissed the company's appeal, holding it had no locus standi as it was not a "person interested" under Section 18(1). The Supreme Court held that the company is indeed a "person interested" because it had a direct claim to compensation and a future interest in the land, thus possessing standing. However, the Court found that the acquisition was never complete as possession had not been taken by the Government, so Section 7 of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1962 could not validate it, rendering the acquisition void. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

The appellant's status as a "person interested" under Section 18(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and its locus standi to appeal.
Whether the acquisition made before 20 July 1962, which was not completed, could be validated by Section 7 of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1962.
Whether acquisition for a private company constitutes a public purpose under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act.

Legislation cited

Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 12, s. 16, s. 17(1), s. 18(1), s. 4, s. 6
Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1962s. 40, s. 41, s. 44A, s. 44B, s. 5A, s. 7

Subjects

Land acquisitionPerson interestedLocus standiPublic purposeCompensationAmendment Act 1962PossessionValidation of acquisition

Judgment

235

HJ.MAIAYAN TILES & MARBLES (P) LTD. A
v.
• FRANCIS VICTOR COUTINHO (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS .
March 28, 1980
• [S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.] B

Land Acquisition Act 1894 (I of 1894) Section 18(1) & Land Acquisition
(Amendment) Act 1962 (31 of 1962) S<etion 7 Scope of.

Land acquisition proceedings 'person interested' who is.

,,.fcquisitio11 for company before July 20, 1962-Po.rsession not vesting in
c
government-acquisition not complete-Invalidity nor cured by Section 7 of amen·
ding Act.

The appellant a private company was carrying on the business of manufac-
ture and sale of artificial marbles and tiles. In or about 1957 the company
moved the Government for acquiring additional land for purposes of the com-
D
peny and the Government on January 7, 1958 issued a notification under section
4 of the Land Acquisition .Act, 1894, which was followed by a separate notice
by the Land Acquisition Officer acquiring the land in dispute. This was followed
by another notification under section 6 of the Act which was served on the
respondent on January 25, 1960. The purpose of the acquisition was mentioned
in the notification, as "public purposes for which the land is needed for Himalayan
Tiles and Marble (Pvt) Ltd." The acquisition proceedings culminated in an
award made under section 12 of the Act on April 11, 1961, which was published
E
in the State Gazette on April 18, 1961. On December II, 1961 a letter was
written on behalf of the Government inlforming the owner of the acquired
llllld that possession would be taken on or about tho 12th of January, 1962.

The first respondent in his writ petition to the High Court, contended that
, tho Government was not competent to acquire the land for purposes of a
'~nte company which could not be said to ho a public purpose under section F
4 of the Act and prayed that the entire land acquisition proceedings shoold bo
quashed. A Single Judge of the High Court accepted the plea, allowed the writ
petition and quashed tho land acquisition proceedings along with the notifica-
tiOllS.

The appellant filed an appeal before the Letters Patent Bench which confirmed
• the view of the Single Judge and dismissed the appeal on the ground that the G
appellant had no locus standi to file the appeal, as it was not 'a person interest-
ed' within the meaning of section 18(1) of the Act.

In the appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant :
(1) the Letten Patent Bench of the High Court was wrong in holding that the
appellant was not 'a person interested' and therefore had no locus standi to
file an appeal, and (2) in view of the various amendments in the Land Acquisi- H
tion Act, 1894 particularly in sections 40 and 41 it could not be said that the
acquisition under section 4 was ultra vlru Olf the Act.
SUPREME COURT REPQRTS [1980] 3 S.C.R
.A Dismissing the appeal,
I

HELD : 1 (i) The appellant was undoubtedly 'a person interested' as con- "t-
templated by section 18(1) of the Act. 'Ihe ~gh Court committed an error
in throwing out the appeal of the appellant on fthe ground that it had no locus •
standi · to file an appeal before the Bench. [243F]

B
(ii) The 'definition of 'a pemon interested' given in Section 18 is an inclusiVe
definition and must be liberally coll8trued so as ~o embrace all persons· who may .•
be directly or indirectly interested, either in the title tO the land or in the
quantum of compensation. [240D]
In the instant case, the lands were actually acquired for the pnrpose of the
Company and once the land vested in the <(iovernment, after acquisition, it
stood transferred to the Company under' the agreement entered into
between the Company and tho Government. Thus it cannot be said
c that the Company had no claim or tide to the land at all. Secondly, since under
the agreement the Company had to pay tho cof1pensation, it was most certainly
interested in seeing that a proper quantum of. compensation was fixed so that
the Company may not have to pay a very heavy amount of money. For this
pnrpose, the Company could undoubtedly appear and adduce evidence on the
question of the quantnrn of compen.ation. ~240E-F]
(iii) The preponderance of judicial opinion seem,s to favour the view that
D the definition of person interested must be liberally construed so as to include
a body, local authority, or a company for w~ose benefit the land is acquired
and who is bound under an agrume11t to ~ay the compensation. This view
accords with the principles of equity, justice and good conscience. [243 B]
(iv) The view taken by the Ori1Sa High Court or even by the Calcutta High
Court that a company, Local authority or a r_e:rson for whose benefit the land
E is acquired is not an interested person is not 1correct. Such a person is vitally
interested both in the title to the property rui also in the compensation to be paid
ther~of because both these factors concern its future course of action and if
decided against him seriously prejudice hi• ri~ts. [243EJ
Sunder Lal v. Paramsukhdas [1968] 1 S.C.R. 362 referred to; The Hindu-
stan Sanitaryware and Industries Ltd. Bahadurgarh. & Anr. v. The State of
llaryana & Ors. A.I.R. [1972] Punjab & llaryana 59, M. Kuppu>wami v. The .
F Special Tahsildar (L.A.) 11 Industrial &taff, Ambathur ai. Saidapet, Madria....J
[1967] 1 M.L.J. 329 approved; Comil/a Eleetric Supply Ltd. v. East Bengal "
Bank Ltd. Comilla & Ors. A.I.R. [1939} Calcutta 669; State of Orissa through
the Land Acquisition Collecto1',. Sambalpur v. Amarandra Pratap Singh & Anr.
A.I.R. [1967] Orissa, 180 over-ruled.
I
2(i)The properties not having vested in the Government the acquisition was
not complete and its invalidity could not be cured by section 7 of the amendment
G
Act. [246 G] •
(ii) The basis of the decision in R. L. A~ora v. State of U. P. [1962] Supp.
2 SCR 149 was removed by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1962. By
virtue of Section 7 of the amending Act, retrospective effect was given to the
amendment superseding any judgment, decree or order passed before July
20, 1962. The validity of the amending Actl was upheld in R. L. Arortl v. State
H of Uttar Pradesh [1964] 6 S.C.R. 784. [239 A, El
(iii) Even under section 7 of the amending Act; an acquisition made by a
company prior to July 20, 1962 must fulfill the following conditions : (a) that
HIMALAYAN TILES v. FRANCIS VICTOR (Fazal Ali, !.) 237

the land has been acquired and is vested in Government, (b) that the acquisi- A
tion has been made under Clauses (a) and \b) of section 41, (c) ftrat wery such
acquisition and any proceeding, order etc. shall be deemed always as valid as
if the provisions of sections 40 and 41 of the Act, as amended by tho amending
• Act, were in force at all material times; and (d) that by virtno of section 7
validity to the acquisition is given to all actions taketi in connection tQerewith
in spite of any judgment, decree or order of any court to the contrary. {244F·H]
B
In the instant case the first condition that there must be a complete acquisition
before section 7 could validate the same has not been fulfilled at all. [245A]
(iv) Until the possession of the entire land acquired was taken by the
Government, the acquisition could not be a complete acquisition so as to attract
the operation of section 7 of the amending Act. [246H-247A]
,/>, In the instant case the appellant did not appear before the Single Judge in C
the writ petition filed by th' respondents and the petition was contested only by
the State. Perhaps the appellant may have thought that as his interests were
fully safeguarded by the Government, it was not necessary for it at that stage to
appear before the High Court. The pleas of both the parties taken together
clearly show that the entire possession of the property did not pass to the
Government and thus no title vested in the Government despite the notification
acquiring the land. [246F-G] D
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1098 of
1971.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
23-7-1970 of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 13 of 1965.
Y. S. Chitale, P. G. Gokhale and B. R. Agarwala for the
Appellant. E
V. S. Desai, Mrs. Urmila Sirur far the Respondent Nos. 2 & 3.
Ex-parte for the RR 4 and.5.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
FAZAL1Au,'J. :-This appeal'!by special leave is directed'against a
judgment dated November 3, 1970 of the Bombay High Court dis- p
missing the Letters Patent Appeal filed by the appellant against a
decision of a Single Judge allowing a writ petition filed by the first
respondent.
The facts of the case lie within a narrow compass and may
briefly summarised as follows : G
The appellant was a private company which was carrying on the
+
business of manufacture and sale of artificial marbles and tiles
and other accessories at village Majas Mogra, Jogeshwari, East
Bombay. The company was spread over about 10 acres ofland.
Sometime in 1957 or 1958 the company moved the Government for
acquiring additional land for purposes:of the company. Accordingly, H
on the 7th January 1958, the Government issued a notification under
section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, )894 (hereinafter referred to
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.R

A as the 'Act') which was followed by a separate notice by the Land
Acqnisition Officer acquiring the land in dispute. This was followed by
another notification under s. 6 of the Act which was served on the
respondent on the 25th January, 1960. In pursuance of these notifi-' •
cations the acquisition proceedings went on which culminated in an
award mad~ under s. 12 of the Act on April 11, 1961, which was pub-
- B lished in the State Gazette on April 18, 1961. On December 11,
1961, a letter was written on behalf of the Government informing the
owner of the acquired land that possession would be taken on or
about the 12th of January 1962. The purpose of the acquisition,
as mentioned in the notification, was 'public purposes for which the
land is needed for Himalayan Tiles & Marbles (Pvt.) Ltd'. The first
c respondent in the writ petition filed in the High Court before a Single
Judge prayed that the entire land acquisition proceedings should
be quashed because the land was not acquired for any public purpose
as contemplated by s. 4 of the Act. It was contended before the
Single Judge that the Government was not competent to acquire
the land for purposes of a private company which could not be said to
D
be a public purpose under s. 4 of the Act. The plea taken by the
first respondent found favour with the Single Judge who af!owed the
writ petition and quashed the land acquisition proceedings alongwith
the notifications mentioned above.

Thereafter, the appellant filed an appeal before the Letters Patent
E
Bench which confirmed the view taken by the Single Judge and dis-
missed the appeal mainly on the ground that the appellant had no
locus standi to file the appeal before the Bench inasmuch as it was
not a person interested within the meaning of s. 18(1) of the Act.
In support of this appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant,
F Dr. Chitale, has argued two points before us. In the first place,
it was submitted that the Division Bench of the High Court was wrong
in holding that the appellant was not a person interested and therefore
had no locus to file an appeal before the Letters Patent Bench. Secon-
dly, it was argued that in view of the various amendments in the Act,
particularly in ss. 40 and 41, it could not be said that the acquisition
G
under s. 4 was ultra vires of the Act. We might mention here that in
the case of R.L. Arora v. State of U.P.(1) majority of the Judges of this
Court took the view that a mere acquisition for the benefit of a com-
pany was not a public purpose and therefore the notification made
in that case was strnck down. Sarkar, J., however, took a contrary
n· view. In view of the decision Parliament amended certain provisions
of the Act particularly ss. 40, 41, 44A, 44B and added a new sub-
(1) [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R.149.

'
HIMALAYAN TILES v. FRANCIS VICTO!l (Fazal Ali, J.) 239

section 5A after section 5. In other words, by virtue of the amend- A
ments, the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court in the first Arora
case was removed. By virtue of s. 7 of the amending Act, retros-
pective effect was given to the amendment superseding any judg-
ment, decree or order passed before July 20, 1962. Section 7 of the
• l amending Act may be extracted thus :
B
Validation of certain acquisitions
"7. Notwithstanding any judgment, decree or 01 der
of any court, every acquisition of land for a Company made
or purporting to have been made under Part VII of the
principal Act before the 20th day of July 1962, shall, in
so far as such acquisition is not for any of the purposes c
mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (I) of
section 40 of the principal Act, be deemed to have lJeen
made for the purpose mentioned in clause (aa) of the said
sub-section, and accordingly every such acquisition shall
be, and shall be deemed always to have been, as valid as if
the provisions of sections 40 and 41 of the principal Act, D
as amended by this Act, were in force at all material times
when rnch acquisition was made or proceeding was held or
order was made or agreement was entered into or action
was taken . ... "
Thls amending Act was also challenged in the case of R.L. Arora
E
v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.,(1) 'where this Court:upheld its consti-
tutional validity subject to certain conditior.s. The appellar.t crnten-
ded before us that in view of the later decision of the Supreme Court
the previous decision of this Court stood superseded and the land
acquisition proceedings taken even before the amendments were
validated. In support of this argument, Dr. Chitale drew our atten- F
tion to various provisions of the Act.
Defore, however, deciding the question as to whether or not the
proceedings taken under s. 4 were cured by the amending Act, we
would first deal with the contention of Dr. Chitale that the High
Court w1s wrong iu holding that the company had no locus standi to
file an appeal befo1 e the Letters Patent Bench. Learned counsel G
submitted that the definition of 'a person interested' ins. 18 is an in-
clusive one and is wide enough to include the appellant for whose
benefit the land was acquired and who had to pay the entire compen-
sation in accordance with the agreement entered into by the Govern-
ment with the appellant. He argued that it could not be said that the
B
appellant was not interested in defending the acquisition or in the
(I) [1964] 6 S.C.R. 784.
240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.Jl

A quantum of compens~tion which was to be awarded by the
Court on a reference made by the Collector. The High Court was
of the view that as the land was acquired by the Government, the •
company had no interest in the same and was, therefore, not entitled
either to appear or to defend the proceedings before the court. In
order to decide this question it may be necessary to extract the relevant
B part of s. 18(1) which runs thus :-
" 18(1). Any person interested who has not accepted
the award may, by written application to the Collector,
require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the
determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the
c measurement of the land, the amount of the compensa-
tion, the persons to whom it is payable, ot the apportion-
ment of the compen~ation among the persons i11terested."

It seems to us that the definition of 'a person inte1ested' given
in s. 18 is an inclusive definition and must be liberally construed so
D as to embrace all persons who may be directly or indirectly interested
either in the title to the land 01· in the quantum of compensat10n.
In the instant case, it is not disputed that the landi were actually
acquired for the purpose of the company and once the land vested in
the Government, after acquisition, it stood transferred to the com-
pany under the agreement entered into between the company and the
E Government. Thus, it cannot be said that the company had no claim
or title to the land at all. Secondly, since under the agreement the
company had to pay the compensation, it was most certainly interested
in seeing that a proper quantum of compensation was fixed so that
the company may not have to pay a very heavy amount of money.
For this purpose, the company could undoubtedly appear and adduce
I!' evidence on the question of the quantum of compep,ation. y
So far as this aspect of matter is concerned, there appears to be
a general consensus of judicial opinion that even though the company
may not have any title to the property yet it certainly has a right to
appear and put forward its case in the matter of determination of the
G quantum of compensation. In the case of Sunder Lal v. Paramsukh-
das(l) this Court observed as follows :
"It will be noticed that it is an inclusive definition.
Jt is not necessary that in order to fall within the definition a
person should claim an interest in land, which has been
Ii acquired. A person becomes a person interested if lie
claims an interest in compens1tion to be awarded. It seems
(I) [1968] I S.C.R. 362.
IIlMALAYAN TILES v. FRANCIS VICTOR (Fazal Ali, J.) 241

to us that Paramsukhdas is a "persou interested" within A
s. 3(b) of the Act because he claims an inte1est in com-
pensation.

It seems to us that Paramsukhdas was clearly a
person interested in the objections which were pending B
before the Court in the references made to it and that
he was also a person whose interest would be affected
by the objections, within s.21. He was cccmc'.il'gly
entitled to be made a party."

In the case of The Hindustan Sanitaryware and Industries Ltd.
c
Bahadurgarh & Anr. v. The State of Haryana & Ors{l);Pandit J. observed
as follows :-
"From the facts stated above, it is apparent that the
compensation amount has to be paid by the two companies.
If the said amount is increased by the learned Additional D
District Judge on a reference under section 18 of the Land
Acquisition Act, it would be the two companies who would
be prejudiced .... No authority even was cited by him
~· that under similar circumstances any Court had ever held
that the persons who had actually to pay the compensation,
could not be allowed to lead evidence and say that the E
compensation amount be not enhanced."

In the case of Camilla Electric Supple Ltd. v. East Bengal Bank
Ltd., Comila & Ors.(2) while the High Court took the view that the
company for whose benefit the land was acquired may not strictly
F
be an interested person yet it had undoubtedly a right to appear and
adduce evidence on the quantum of compensation. In this connec-
tion, Mukherjea, J. observed thus :-
"Section 50, cl. (2) purports to remedy this disability
• and it lays down that in any proceeding held before a
Collector or Court in such cases the local authority or G
company concerned may appear and adduce evidence for
the purpose of determining the amount of compensation.
The reason is plain. It is the company or the local authority
who has got to pay the money in such cases and it would
be unjust to deny them the right to appear and adduce
B
(I) A.I.R. 1972 Punjab & Haryana 59.
(2) A.I. R. 1939 Calcutta 669.
242 SUPREME COURT REPO&TS (1980] 3 S.C.lt

evidence which would have a bearing on the amount of
the compsenation money."

Roxburgh, J, made the following observations :-
"Thus the first question for decision is clearly settled
by the above decision and there can be no doubt that in the
B circumstances at present being considered the company is a
person interested, as defined in the Act, and is entitled to
reqnire a reference under s. 18 unless that right is restricted
by the terms of the proviso to s. 50(2)."

In the case of M. Kuppuswami v. The Special Tahsildar (L.A.)
c II Industrial Estate, Ambathur at Saidapet, Madras (1) Venkatadri,
J. interpreting the definition of 'interested [person' observed as
follows:-
"The only question for consideration therefore is
whether the petitioner is a person interested, as defined
D in section 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act.
The definition section says that the expression 'person
interested' includes all persons claiming an interest in
compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of
land under the Act. The expression 'person interested' is
E very comprehensive and it does not profess to give an
exhaustive definition. The expression 'person interested'
has been interpreted, by various Courts, and the trend of
the opinion seems to be that I should give a liberal interpre-
tation ....
On a review of the case-Jaw on the subject, it seems to
F . me that the expression 'person interested' does not require
that a person must really have an interest in the land sought
to be acquired. It is enough if he claims an interest in
compensation, as distinguished from an interest in the pro-
perty sought to be acquired. As long as a person.claims an
interest in the compensation, he is a person interested within
G the meaning of the definition of that expression."

The only case which appears to have taken a contrary view is
a Division Bench decision of the Orissa Hiih Court in the case of
State of 'Orissa through the Land Acquisition Collector, Samba!pur
v. AmarandraPratap Singh & Anr., (2) where the High Court held that
H
(I) (1967) I M. L. J. 329 .
(2) A. I. R. 1967 Orissa 180.
HIMALAYAN TILES V. FRANCIS VICTOR (Fazal Ali, !.) 243

the expression 'person interested' did not include a local authority
or a company on whose behalf acquisition is made by the State. At
the same time, it was clearly held that it was open to the company
in any proceeding before the Collector or court to appear and adduce
evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation.

• Thus, the preponderance of judicial opinion seems to favour B
the view that the definition of 'person interested' must be liberally
construed so as to include a body, local authority, or a company
for whose benefit the land is acquired and who is bound under an agree.
ment to pay the compensation. In our opinion, this view accords
with the principles of equity, justice and good conscience. How
can it be said that a person for whose benefit the land is acquired and c
who is to pay the compensation is not a person interested even though
its stake may be extremely vital ? For instance, the land acquisition
proceedings may be held to be invalid and thus a person concerned
is completely deprived of the benefit which is proposed to be given
to him. Similarly, if such a person is not beard by the Collector or
a court, he may have to pay a very heavy compensation which, in case
he is allowed to appear before a court, he could have satisfied it that
the compensation was far too heavy having regard to the nature and
extent of the land. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the view
taken by the Orissa High Court or even by the Calcutta High Court
that a company, local authority or a person or whose benefit the land E
is acquired is not an interested person. We are satisfied that such
a person is vitally interested both in the title to the property as also
in the compensation to be paid therefor because both these factors
concern its future course of action and if decided against him, seriously
prejudice his rights. Moreover, in view of the decision of this Court
referred to above, we hold that the appellant was undoubtedly a F
person interested as contemplated by s. 18(1) of the Act. The Higl1
Court, therefore, committed an errorl:in throwing out the appeal of
the appellant on the ground that it had no locus to file an appeal
before the IJench.

The next point that was argued before us was as to whether the
•+ land acquisition proceedings are cured by s. 7 of the amending Act
referred to above. Mr. V.S. Desai, appearing for the respondents,
submitted that in the second Arora case (supra) while upholding the.'
constitutional validity of s. 4 and other amendments, this Court laid
down certain conditions which had to be fulfilled if an acquisition
made prior to July 20, ·1962 was held to be valid. In this connection, B
reliance was placed by learned counsel for the respondents on.the fol-
lowing passage from R.L. Arora's case (supra) :
244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.R.

A "Therefore~ before s.p can validakan acquisition made
before July 20, 1962, it must first be shown that the acqui-
sition is complete and the land acquired has vested in
Government. This means that the land acquired has vested
in Government either under s. 16 or s. 17(1) of the Act.
Thuss. 7 of the Amendment Act validates such acquisitions
8 in which property has vested absolutely in Government
either under s. 16 ors. 17(1). Secondly s. 7 of the Amend-
ment Act provides that where acquisition has been made
for a company before July 20, 1962 or purported to have
been made under cl.(a) or cl. (b) of s. 40(1) and those
clauses do not apply in view of the interpretation put
c thereon in R.L. Arora's case [1962 (2) Supp. S.C.R. 149),
it shall be deemed that the acquisition was for the purpose
mentioned in cl. (aa) as inserted in s.40(1) of the Act by
the Amendment Act. Thirdly s. 7 of the Amendment Act
provides that every such acquisition and any proceeding,
order, agreement, or action in connection with such acqui-
D
sition shall be, and shall be deemed always to have been,
as valid as if the provisions of ss. 40 and 41 of the Act as
amended by the Amendment Act were inforce at all material
times when any action was taken for such acquisition.
Finally, this validity is given to such acquisitions and to
E all actions taken in connection therewith notwith-
standing any judgment, decree or order of any court."

A perusal of these observations would manifestly reveal that
even under s. 7 of the amending Act, an acquisition made for a company
prior to July 20, 1962 must fulfil the following conditions :-
F (a) that the land has been acquired and is vested in Govern-
ment;
(b) that the acquisition has been made under clauses (a)
and (b) of s. 40 (I)
(c) that every such acquisition and any proceeding, order,
etc., shall be deemed always as valid as if the pro- .,
visions of ss. 40 and 41 of the Act, as amended by the +
amending Act, were in force at all material times;
and
(d) that by virtue of s. 7 validity to the acquisition is given
to all actions taken in connection therewith inspite
of any judgment. decree or order of any court to the
contrary.
llIMALAYAN TILES '" FRANCIS VICTOR (Fazal Ali, J.) 245

We are, however, satisfied that in the instant case the first con- A
dition adumbrated by this Court, viz., that there must be a complete
acquisition before s. 7 could validate the same, has not been !fulfilled
at all. In this view of the matter we need not go into the other con-
ditions indicated by this Court.
It was contended by Mr. Desai that according to the unchallen- a
ged pleadings of the respondents, including the Government, which
was a party before the District Court and also before !lie Single Judge
of the High Court, there is nothing to show that after the issue of
notification the Government had taken possession of the land so that
it could be said that the land had vested in the Government in which
case alone the acquisition prcceedings would have been completed. In C
this connection, our attention was drawn to para 1 of the petition filed
by the respondents before the High Court, which runs thus :
"The petitioners have become the owners of the said
lands by inheritance, and the present lands records in respect
of the said lands stand in the name of the petitioners.
There is no dispute between the petitioners and the res- D
pondents that the ·petitioners are the owners of the said
immovable property. The petitioners were at all times
and still are in possession of the said immovable properties."

1 According to this averment, it is clearly pleaded that inspite
of the notifications, the possession had not been given to the Govern- E
ment and the respondents (petitioners before the High Court) were
still in possession of the properties in question. A similar averment
has been made in para 15 of the petition which maybe extracted thus :-
"The petitioners say that they are still in possession
of the said lands and possession of the said lands has not F
been taken away from them and the tenants of the petitioners
numbering about 53 at present are in physical occupation
of the same."
It was also alleged that the Government had : threatened the peti-
tioners in the High Court that possession would be taken through
G
• police but despite such threats given by the Government, the petitioners
-+ were still in possession of the said lands and the structures were in
possession of the tenants. The Government in its reply-affidavit
did not deny these averments. On the other hand, they admitted
the same. Para 8 of the reply-affidavit may be extracted thus :
"with reference to paragraph 1 of the petition, I believe H
the contents thereof to be substantially correct though
as stated above the petitioners' names do not appear as
SUPREME COURT REPORTS Jl980] 3 S.C.R.

,A occupants or owners in the record of rights relatfog to
the land in question."

Similarly, in para 21 of the reply, the contents of para 15 of the peti-
tion were admitted and further the fact that possession was with the
petitioners, was not denied but was admitted to be correct. Para 21
B of the reply-affidavit runs thus :-
"21. With reference to paragraph 15 of the petition,
I believe the contents thereof to be substantially correct."
Learned counsel for the appellant, however, drew our attention
to a letter sent by the' respondents and went on to show that posses-
C sion of only one acre of land has been taken by the Government.
Even the High Court clearly found that. possession had not been fully
delivered to the Government after the notification. In this connection,
the Division Bench observed as follows :-
"On the question of possession being delivered to the Go-
vernment the petitioners specifically averred at the end
D of paragraph 15 of the petition. "The Petitioners further say
that notwithstanding the said letter and the threat therein
contained the petitioners are still in possession of the said
lands and their tenants are occupying the said structures
standing thereon and possession thereof has not been taken
E by the respondents". They made similar averments at the
end of paragraph I of the petition, that "the petitioners
were at all times and still are in possession of the said im-
movable properties"."

Admittedly, the appellant did not appear before the Single Judge
in the writ petition filed by the respondents and the petition was con-
F
tested only by the State. Perhaps the appellant may have thought y'
that as its interests were fully safeguarded by the Government, it
was not necessary for it at that stage to appear before the High Court.
Even so, the pleas of both the parties taken together clearly show that
the entire possession of the property did not pass to the Government
G and thus no title vested in the Government despite the notification
acquiring the land. In these circumstances, therefore, it is unmis-
takably clear that the properties not having vested in the Government,
the acquisition was not complete and its invalidity could not be cured
by s. 7 of the amendment Act as pointed out by this Court in the case
referred to above. On this ground alone the appellant must fail.
H Dr. Chitale, however, suggested that out of 2 ·2 acres, possession of
one acre may have been taken by the Government. Assuming that
to be so, until the possession of the e11tire land acquired was taken
HIMALAYAN TILES"· l'RANCIS VICTOR (Fazal Ali, l.) 247

by the Government, the acquisition conld not be a complete acquisi- A
tion so as to attract the operation of s. 7 of the amending Act. Io
this view of the matter, we are satisfied that the appellant has failed
to prove that one of the essential conditions for application of s. 1
of the amending Act, which would cure the infirmities from which the
acquisition proceedings suffer, has been fulfilled. The inescapable
conclusion, therefore, is that the land acquisition proceedings were B
void and no benefit accrued to the appellant from the amending Act.
_ The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed but in the circums-
tances of the case there will be no orders as to costs.

c

N.V.K. Appeal dismissed.