HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA, THROUGH R.G.versusSHYAM DEO SINGH & ORS.

                     [2014) 4 S.C.R. 541


  HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA, THROUGH                       A
                      R.G
                               v.
                SHYAM DEO SINGH & ORS.
               (Civil Appeal No. 2529 of 2002)
                                                                   B
                      MARCH 28, 2014
      [P. SATHASIVAM, CJI, RANJAN GOGOi AND
                  N.V. RAMANA, JJ.]

     Service Law - Judicial Service - Entitlement to               C
continuation! extension of service beyond the age of 58 years
- Manner of determination - Bihar Superior Judicial Service
- Denial of extension to respondent-Judicial Officer beyond
the age of 58 years - If justified - Held: The entitlement to
continuation! extension of service of a judicial officer beyond    D
the age of 58 has to be determined on the basis of the service
record of the particular officer under consideration and not on
a comparative assessment with the record of other officers -
Even if the ACRs of another officer were decidedly inferior to
those of the respondent, the same, at best, may have               E
relevance to the grant of extension to such officer without
conferring any right or entitlement to the respondent for a
similar extension - In the present case, though there were
adverse remarks/comments dated 15. 12. 1995 against the
respondent, but the same were not acted upon and moreover,         F
the subsequent ACRs of respondent were sufficiently positive
and depicted him as an efficient Judicial Officer with good
reputation for honesty and impartiality - Also, promotion to
the highest level in the District judiciary as well as selection
grade in the said cadre was granted to the respondent - The        G
said promotions had the effect of wiping out the adverse
remark dated 15. 12. 1995 - The High Court, on the
administrative side, therefore, was not justified in refusing to
continue with the service of the respondent beyond the age
                             541                                   H
    542     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014) 4 S.C.R.

A of 58 years - However, a period of nearly 14 years has
  elapsed in the meantime and it will be highly inequitable to
  request the High Court to redo the exercise at this belated
  stage - Besides such a course of action will also be
  unnecessary - Respondent to be treated to have retired from
B service on completion of 60 years of age and all
  consequential benefits, including pay and pension on that
  basis, directed to be made available to him forthwith and
  without any delay.

       Service Law - Judicial Service - Potential for continued
C useful service of Judicial Officer beyond the age of 58 years
  - Evaluation and assessment - Judicial Review - Scope -
   Held: Evaluation of service record of a judicial officer for the
  purpose of formation of an opinion as to his/her potential for
  continued useful service is required to be made by the High
D Court which means the Full Court on the administrative side
  - The ultimate decision is always preceded by an elaborate
  consideration of the matter by Hon'ble Judges of the High
   Court who are familiar with the qualities and attributes of the
  judicial officer under consideration - The very process by
E which the decision is eventually arrived at, should permit a
  limiteq judicial review - It is only in a rare case where the
  decision taken is unsupported by any material or the same
  reflects a conclusion which, on the face of it, cannot be
  sustained that judicial review would be permissible.
F
       By a communication issued by the Registrar General
  of the Patna High Court, the respondent was informed
  that he would retire from the service on completion of 58
  years of age. The said communication of the Registrar
  General was, inter alia, based on a decision of the High
G Court on the administrative side taken in a meeting of the
  Full Court wherein the decision of its Evaluation
  Committee not to extend the service of the respondent
  beyond the age of 58 years was approved. All the
  aforesaid decisions being challenged, were set aside by
H
 HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA, THROUGH              543
           R.G. v. SHYAM DEO SINGH

the High Court by the impugned order dated 20-2-2001            A
and the matter was directed to be reconsidered.

     Two reasons, in the main, had prevailed upon the
High Court to arrive at the impugned conclusion. The first
is that the negative rei:narks/adverse comments recorded        8
in the Annual Confidential Report (ACR) of the
respondent on 15.12.1995 were not communicated to the
respondent and that the standing committee of the High
Court on 03.01.1997 had decided not to pursue the matter.
The High Court also took the view that notwithstanding          C
the said remarks the respondent was subsequently
promoted to the post of District & Sessions Judge and
also granted_ the selection grade, which, according to the
High Court, had the effect of wiping out the adverse
remarks dated 15.12.1995. The High Court, in the
impugned order, also took note of the fact that the ACRs        D
of the respondent for the subsequent years indicated
that the respondent, over all, is a good officer with nothing
adverse as to his integrity and reputation. The other
reason for which the High Court had come to the
impugned conclusion was that while extension of service         E
was refused to the respondent, one 'U' whose ACRs were
decidedly inferior to that of the respondent was granted
continuation after 58 years.

    Dismissing the appeal, the Court                            F
     HELD: 1.1. The entitlement to continuation/extension
of service of a judicial officer beyond the age of 58 has
to be determined on the basis of the service record of the
particular officer under consideration and not on a
comparative assessment with the record of other officers.       G
Therefore, even if the ACRs of 'U' were decidedly inferior
to those of the respondent, the same, at best, may have
relevance to the grant of extension to the aforesaid
officer without conferring any right or entitlement to the
respondent for a similar extension. [Para 4) [547-F-H]          H
    544    SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2014) 4 S.C.R.


A      1.2. The evaluation of the service record of a judicial
  officer for the purpose of formation of an opinion as to
  his/her potential for continued useful service is required
  to be made by the High Court which obviously means the
  Full Court on the administrative side. In all High Courts
B such evaluation, in the first instance, is made by a
  committee of senior Judges. The decision of the
  Committee is placed before the Full Court to decide
  whether the recommendation of the Committee should be
  accepted or not. The ultimate decision is always preceded
c by an elaborate consideration of the matter by Hon'ble
  Judges of the High Court who are familiar with the
  qualities and attributes of the judicial officer under
  consideration. The very process by which the decision
  is eventually arrived at, should permit a limited judicial
  review and it is only in a rare case where the decision
0
  taken is unsupported by any material or the same reflects
  a conclusion which, on the face of it, cannot be sustained
  that judicial review would be permissible. [Para 8) [550·
  D·H]
E      1.3. In the present case, the adverse remarks/
  comments dated 15.12.1995 had not been communicated
  to the respondent. It is also clear from the materials on
  record that the standing committee of the High Court in
  its meeting held on 3.1.1997 had decided to close the
F matter instead of proceeding any further. The
  subsequent ACRs of the respondent for the years 1997-
  1998 and 2000-2001 are sufficiently positive and depicts
  the respondent as an efficient judicial officer with a good
  reputation for honesty and impartiality. The respondent
G was promoted to the post of District and Sessions Judge
  on 5.9.1998. By Notification dated 17 .2.2000 he was
  promoted to the selection grade of the Bihar Superior
  Judicial Service with effect from 1.1.1997. Therefore, not
  only the adverse remark dated 15.12.1995 was not acted
H upon but subsequent thereto promotion to the highest
 HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA, THROUGH               545
           R.G. v. SHYAM DEO SINGH
level in the district judiciary as well as selection grade in    A
the said cadre was granted to the respondent. The said
promotion(s), therefore, would have the effect of wiping
out the adverse remark dated 15.12.1995. In the light of
the facts, the High Court, on the administrative side, was
not justified in refusing to continue with the service of the    B
respondent beyond the age of 58 years. The order dated
20.2.2001 passed by the High Court setting aside the said
decision, therefore, will have to be affirmed. [Para 9] [551-
G-H; 552-H-F]

     Bishwanath Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar & Ors. (2001)    C
2 SCC 305: 2000 (5) Suppl. SCR 718; Syed T.A.
Naqshbandi vs. State of J&K (2003) 9 SCC 592: 2003
(1) Suppl. SCR 114 and Br(j Mohan Singh Chopra vs. State
o~ Punjab AIR 1987 SC 948 : 1987 (2) SCR 583 - relied on.
                                                                 D
     All India Judges' Association & Ors. vs. Union of India &
Ors. (1993) 4 SCC 288: 1993 (1) Suppl. SCR 749 - referred
to.

     2. However, a period of nearly 14 years has elapsed         E
in the meantime. It will be highly inequitable to request
the High Court to redo the exercise at this belated stage.
Besides such a course of action will also be
unnecessary. It is deemed fit to order that the respondent
be treated to have retired from service on completion of
60 years of age and all consequential benefits, including        F
pay and pension on that basis, be made available to him
forthwith and without any delay. [Para 10) [552-G-H; 553-
A-B]·                                      -

                     Case Law Reference:                         G
    2000 (5) Suppl. SCR 718       relied on        Para 6
    1993 (1) Suppl. SCR 749       referred to      Para 6
    2003 (1) Suppl. SCR 114       relied on        Para 8
    1987 (2) SCR 583              relied on        Para 9        H
    546      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 4 S.C.R.


A       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
    2529 of 2002.

        From the Judgment & Order dated 20.02.2001 of the High
    Court of Judicature at Patna in C.W.J.C. No. 6459 of 2000.

B        P.H. Parekh, Rajeev Kumar Bansal, Kamakshi S. Mehlwal,
    Ritika Sethi, Vishal Prasad, Himanjali Gautam, Ambhoj Kumar
    Sinha, Gopal Singh, Manish Kumar Chandan Kumar for the
    appearing parties.

c         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

       RANJAN GOGOi, J. 1. By a communication dated
  17.5;2000 issued by the Registrar General of the Patna High
  Court the respondent herein was informed that he would retire
  from the service on completion of 58 years of age. The said
D communication of the Registrar General was, inter alia, based
  on a decision of the High Court on the administrative side taken
  in a meeting of the Full Court held on 6.5.2000 wherein the
  decision of its Evaluation Committee dated 2.5.2000 not to
  extend the service of the respondent beyond the age of 58
E years was approved. All the aforesaid decisions being
  challenged, were set aside by the High Court by its order dated
  20.2.2001 and the matter was directed to be reconsidered.
  Aggrieved, the High Court is in appeal before us.

F         2. A perusal of the order under challenge goes to show
    that two reasons, in the main, had prevailed upon the High Court
    to arrive at the impugned conclusion.

       The first is that the negative remarks/adverse comments
  recorded in the Annual Confidential Report {ACR) of the
G respondent on 15.12.1995 were not communicated to the
  respondent and the foundational facts for the said remarks are
  wholly unsubstantiated. It was also found by the High Court that
  the standing committee of the High Court on 03.01.1997 had
  decided not to pursue the matter but to treat the same as
H closed. The High Court also took the view that notwithstanding
 HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA, THROUGH                      54 7
   R.G. v. SHYAM DEO SINGH [RANJAN GOGOi, J.)
the said remarks the respondent was subsequently promoted                A
to the post of District & Sessions Judge and also granted the
selection grade. The aforesaid facts, according to the High
Court, had the effect of wiping out the adverse remarks dated
15.12.1995. The High Court, in the impugned order, also took
note of the fact that the ACRs of the respondent for the                 B
subsequent years indicated that the respondent, over all, is a
good officer with nothing adverse as to his integrity and
reputation.

     The other reason for which the High Court had come to
the impugned conclusion is that while extension of service was           C
refused to the respondent, one Mr. Udai Kant Thakur whose
ACRs were decidedly inferior to that of the respondent was
granted continuation after 58 years. It is on the aforesaid twin
basis that the High Court had concluded that the denial of
extension to the respondent necessitated interference in                 D
exercise of power of judicial review under Article 226 of the
Constitution.

    3. We have heard Shri P.H. Parekh, learned senior
counsel for the appellant and Mr. Ambhoj Kumar Sinha, learned            E
counsel appearing for the respondent No.1.

     4. It is convenient to deal, at the first instance, with the
second ground that had prevailed upon the High Court to set
aside the orders passed by it on the administrative side. Having
considered the matter, we do not think it is necessary for us to
                                                                         F
go into the said question inasmuch as the entitlement to
continuation/extension of service of a judicial officer beyond the
age of 58 has to be determined on the basis of the service
record of the particular officer under consideration and not on
a comparative assessment with the record of other officers.              G
Therefore, even if we hold that the ACRs of Shri Udai Kant
Thakur were decidedly inferior to those of the respondent, the
same, at best, may have relevance to the grant of extension to
the aforesaid officer without conferring any right or entitlement
to the respondent for a similar extension. It is, therefore, the first   H
    548       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 4 S.C.R.


A   ground that had weighed with the High Court to grant relief to
    respondent which really needs to be examined by us.

          5. The adverse remarks dated 15.12.1995 being the
    center of focus may be conveniently set out hereunder:
B         "Of late I have heard quite disturbing reports about the
          integrity of Sri S.D. Singh, A.D.J., Dhanbad. I had a talk
          with the District Judge there and he also expressed his
          dissatisfaction about the working of Sri Singh in the
          discharge of his duties as a Judicial Officer. Recently, I
c         heard about a criminal case lodged by C.B.I. (in which one
          Sri Modi and Sri Gandhi figure as accused) where the
          conduct of Sri Singh is not beyond reproach."

          6. In Bishwanath Prasad Singh Vs. State of Bihar & Ors. 1
D which coincidently arises out of the same resolution of the Full
  Court as in the present case, this Court had the occasion to
  consider whether continuance in service beyond 58 years is a
  right or a benefit conferred and also the norms that should
  govern the decision to grant or refuse such continuance. The
E aforesaid consideration by this Court was necessitated by the
  different interpretations that seem to have emerged from the
  directions in A/I India Judges' Association & Ors. Vs. Union
  of India & Ors. 2• In paragraph 18 of the report in Bishwanath
  Prasad Singh (supra) the conclusions of this Court were
F summed up as follows:

          "1. Direction with regard to the enhancement of
          superannuation age of judicial officers given in All India
          Judges Assn. v. Union of India does not result in
          automatic enhancement of the age of superannuation. By
G         force of the judgment a judicial officer does not acquire
          a right to continue in service up to the extended age of
          60 years. It is only a benefit conferred on the judicial

    1.   c2001) 2 sec 305.
H   2.   (1993) 4 sec 288.
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA, THROUGH                     549
  R.G. v. SHYAM DEO SINGH [RANJAN GOGOi, J.)

  officers subject to an evaluation as to their continued             A
  utility to the judicial system to be carried out by the
  respective High Courts before attaining the age of 58
  years and formation of an opinion as to their potential for
  their continued useful service. Else the judicial officers
  retire at the superannuation age appointed in the service           B
  rules governing conditions of services of the judicial
  officers.

  2. The direction given in 1993 case is by way of ad hoc
  arrangement so as to operate in the interregnum,                    C
  commencing the date of judgment and until an
  appropriate amendment is made in the service rules by
  the State Government. Once the service rules governing
  superannuation age have been amended, the direction
  ceases to operate.
                                                                      D
  3. The High Court may, before or after the normal age
  of superannuation, compulsorily retire a judicial officer
  subject to formation of an opinion that compulsory
  retirement in public interest was needed. The decision to
  compulsorily retire must be in accordance with relevant             E
  service rules independent of the exercise for evaluation
  of judicial officer made pursuant to 1993 casez..
  Recommendation for compulsory retirement shall have
  to be sent to State Government which would pass and
  deliver the necessary orders.                                       F
  4. If the High Court finds a judicial officer not entitled to
  the benefit of extension in superannuation age he would
  retire at the age of superannuation appointed by the
  service rules. No specific order or communication in that
  regard is called for either by the High Court or by the             G
  Governor of the State. Such retirement is not acompulsory
  retirement'' in the sense of its being by way of penalty in
  disciplinary proceedings or even by way of "compulsory
  retirement in public interest''. No right of the judicial officer
                                                                      H
    550      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 4 S.C.R.


A         is taken away. Where the High Court may choose to
          make any communication in this regard, it would be
          better advised not to use therein the expression
          "compulsory retirement". It creates confusion. It would
          suffice to communicate, if at all, that the officer
B         concerned, having been found not fit for being given the
          benefit or extended age of superannuation, would stand
          retired at the normal age or date of superannuation."

       7. It is in the light of the above propositions laid down in
C Bishwanath Prasad Singh (supra) that the entitlement of the
  respondent as claimed and the decision of the High Court on
  the administrative side to the contrary will have to be examined,
  particularly, in the context of the extent of the power of judicial
  review that would be available to examine the impugned refusal
  made by the High Court.
D
        8. The importance of the issue can hardly be gainsaid. The
  evaluation of the service record of a judicial officer for the
  purpose of formation of an opinion as to his/her potential for
  continued useful service is required to be made by the High
E Court which obviously means the Full Court on the
  administrative side. In all High Courts such evaluation, in the
  first instance, is made by a committee of senior Judges. The
  decision of the Committee is placed before the Full Court to
  decide whether the recommendation of the Committee should
F be accepted or not. The ultimate decision is always preceded
  by an elaborate consideration of the matter by Hon'ble Judges
  of the High Court who are familiar with the qualities and
  attributes of the judicial officer under consideration. This is also
  what had happened in the present case. The very process by
G which the decision is eventually arrived at, in our view, should
  permit a limited judicial review and it is only in a rare case
  where the decision taken is unsupported by any material or the
  same reflects a conclusion which, on the face of it, cannot be
  sustained that judicial review would be permissible. An
  enumeration of the extent of permissible judicial review has
H
     HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA, THROUGH 551
       R.G. v. SHYAM DEO SINGH [RANJAN GOGOi, J.]
been made by this Court in Syed T.A. Naqshbandi Vs. State           A
of J&K. 3 Paragraph 10 of the report which highlights the above
position may be specifically noticed:-

       "Neither the High Court nor this Court, in exercise of its
       powers of judicial review, could or would at any rate
                                                                     8
       substitute themselves in the place of the Committee/Full
       Court of the High Court concerned, to make an
       independent reassessment of the same, as if sitting on an
       appeal. On a careful consideration of the entire materials
       brought to our notice by learned counsel on either side, C
       we are satisfied that the evaluation made by the
       Committee/Full Court forming their unanimous opinion is
       neither so arbitrary or capricious nor can be said to be so
       irrational as to shock the conscience of the Court to
       warrant or justify any interference. In cases of such
       assessment, evaluation and formulation of opinions, a vast D
       range of multiple factors play a vital and important role and
       no one factor should be allowed to be overblown out of
       proportion either to decry or deify an issue to be resolved
       or claims sought to be considered or asserted. In the very
       nature of things it would be difficult. nearing almost an E
     · impossibility to subject such exercise undertaken by the
       Full Court. to judicial review except in an extraordinary
       case when the Court is convinced that some monstrous
       thing which ought not to have taken place has really
       happened and not merely because there could be another F
       possible view or someone has some grievance about the
       exercise undertaken by the Committee/Full Court."

                                             (Emphasis is ours)

     9. In the light of the above, we may now advert to the facts   G
of the present case.

      It is not in dispute that the adverse remarks/comments

3.   c2003) 9 sec 592.                                              H
    552      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2014] 4 S.C.R.


A dated 15.12.1995 had not been communicated to the
  respondent. It is also clear from the materials on record that
  the standing committee of the High Court in its meeting held
  on 3.1.1997 had decided to close the matter instead of
  proceeding any further. The subsequent ACRs of the
B respondent for the years 1997-1998 and 2000-2001 are
  sufficiently positive and depicts the respondent as an efficient
  judicial officer with a good reputation for honesty and impartiality.
  The respondent was promoted to the post of District and
  Sessions Judge on 5.9.1998. By Notification dated 17.2.2000
C he was promoted to the selection grade of the Bihar Superior
  Judicial Service with effect from 1.1.1997. Therefore, not only
  the adverse remark dated 15.12.1995 was not acted upon but
  subsequent thereto promotion to the highest level in the district
  judiciary as well as selection grade in the said cadre was
  granted to the respondent. Promotion to the higher post of
D District Judge and placement in the selection grade is on an
  assessment of positive merit and ability. The said promotion(s),
  therefore, would have the effect of wiping out the adverse
  remark dated 15.12.1995. Such a view has in fact been
  expressed in Brij Mohan Singh Chopra Vs. State of Punjab4
E (Para 10). In the light of the above facts, we do not see how
  the High Court, on the administrative side, can be found to be
  justified in refusing to continue with the service of the
  respondent beyond the age of 58 years. The order dated
  20.2.2001 passed by the High Court setting aside the said
F decision, therefore, will have to be affirmed and the present
  appeal dismissed. We order accordingly.

       10. What should be the consequential relief that ought to
  be granted? A period of nearly 14 years has elapsed in the
G meantime. It will be highly inequitable to request the High Court ·
  to redo the exercise at this belated stage. Besides such a
  course of action will also be unnecessary, particularly, when the
  entire service record of the respondent had been placed before
  us, details whereof is also available in the impugned judgment
H 4. AIR 1987 SC 948.
 HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA, THROUGH               553
   R.G. v. SHYAM DEO SINGH [RANJAN GOGOi, J.]

of the High Court. Having considered the same, we deem it fit    A
to order that the respondent be treated to have retired from
service on completion of 60 years of age and all consequential
benefits, including pay and pension on that basis, be made
available to him forthwith and without any delay.

B.B.B.                                    Appeal dismissed.
                                                                 B