Holding

The Supreme Court held that the State complied with the procedural requirements of Section 5A, that no actionable discrimination under Article 14 existed, that the settlement does not render the appeals infructuous, and that the doctrine of merger does not bar the appeals, thereby allowing the appeals and setting aside the High Court’s order.

Summary

The Haryana Urban Development Authority (HUDA) sought to acquire 952.18 acres of land in Panchkula for a mixed‑use development, but the landowners objected under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, claiming exemption for fruit trees and alleging that their structures were authorized. The High Court quashed the acquisition, holding that the objections were not properly considered and that the State had discriminated against similarly situated owners. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the mandatory procedure under Section 5A was complied with, whether the acquisition violated Article 14, whether the settlement between the parties rendered the appeals infructuous, and whether the doctrine of merger applied. The Court held that the State had followed the four‑stage procedure mandated by Section 5A, that the Collector’s recommendation is not binding, and that the alleged discrimination was unsubstantiated and later remedied. It also found the State’s later decision to release the land arbitrary and rejected the doctrine of merger by invoking Article 142. Consequently, the appeals were allowed, the High Court’s judgment set aside, and the acquisition proceeded with directions for award and development.

Issues considered

Whether the mandatory procedure contemplated under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was complied with.
Whether the acquisition proceedings are vitiated on the ground of violation of Article 14 due to differential treatment of similarly placed landowners.
Whether the appeals are infructuous in view of the subsequent settlement between the parties.
Whether the doctrine of merger applies given the earlier dismissal of State appeals against the same impugned judgment.

Legislation cited

Constitution of India
Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975
Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 18, s. 4, s. 48, s. 5A, s. 6
Punjab New Capital (Periphery) Control Act, 1952

Headnote

Issue for Consideration (i) Whether the mandatory procedure under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was followed while considering objections against the acquisition; (ii) Whether the acquisition proceedings were vitiated on grounds of violation of Article 14 of differential treatment of similarly placed landowners; (iii) Whether appeals are liable to be dismissed as infructuous in view of subsequent developments like ‘settlement’ between the parties; (iv) Whether the doctrine of merger applies, given prior dismissal of other appeals by the

Subjects

s.5A of the Land Acquisition ActObjections under s.5APublic interestUnauthorized structuresArticle 14 of the Constitution of IndiaDiscriminationDoctrine of mergerPublic trust doctrine

Judgment

[2024] 10 S.C.R. 2278 : 2024 INSC 796

Haryana Urban Development Authority
v.
Abhishek Gupta etc.
(Civil Appeal No(s). 7420-7421 of 2010)
21 October 2024
[Surya Kant* and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
(i) Whether the mandatory procedure under Section 5A of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was followed while considering
objections against the acquisition; (ii) Whether the acquisition
proceedings were vitiated on grounds of violation of Article 14 of
the Constitution due to differential treatment of similarly placed
landowners; (iii) Whether appeals are liable to be dismissed as
infructuous in view of subsequent developments like ‘settlement’
between the parties; (iv) Whether the doctrine of merger applies,
given prior dismissal of other appeals by the State against the
same impugned judgment.

Headnotes†
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [‘LA Act’] – s.5A, LA Act codifies the
fundamental safeguard of audi alteram partem – Landowners
have the opportunity to demonstrate that the acquisition is
against public purpose or marred by mala fides – Appropriate
government may exempt such land from acquisition – s.5A
envisions a modus of deliberation and consultation – Must
be construed to be mandatory, akin to a right – Objections
under s.5A proceed in four distinct stages – Discussed –
Procedure mandated, not a particular outcome – Collector
has no power to “decide” the case and can only give
“recommendations” to the Government which is the ultimate
arbiter – Government decision not beyond judicial review – Can
be challenged as arbitrary or passed without due application
of mind – Respondents have not placed any evidence on
record to lay such foundation – Decision to go ahead with
acquisition as Respondents’ structures were unauthorised
was not whimsical – Predicated on findings of a High-Powered
Committee – Departure from Collector’s recommendations

* Author
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 2279

Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Abhishek Gupta etc.

made in public interest, with due application of mind and was
fully justified – Appeal allowed:
Held: Respondents failed to substantiate claims under Section 5A –
State Government followed the four-stage procedure – Section 5A
mandates a procedure, not a particular outcome – Respondents
guaranteed a hearing and consideration, not relief – Interpretation of
bare text of Section 5A – Legislature intended different roles for the
collector and the Government – Collector has no power to “decide”
the case and can only give ‘recommendations” to the Government
who is the ultimate arbiter – Government’s decision not beyond
judicial review – Can be challenged as arbitrary or passed without
due application of mind – Onus on Respondents to point flaws in
procedure – Respondents did not place any evidence on record to
lay such foundation – Government/Appellant have demonstrated
that their decision was not whimsical but was predicated on the
findings of a High-Powered Committee which found Respondents’
structures to be unauthorized and not in conformity with the
Development Plan – Government’s departure from the Collector’s
recommendation made in public interest, with due application of
mind and was fully justified. [Paras 4,5,7, 14,15, 17, 18, 20]

Land Acquisition – Construction on land – Orders of
Commissioner and ADJ permitting constructions specifically
for agricultural land, not residential land – Respondents’
usage of land not limited to ‘agricultural purposes’ and it
was intended to be ‘residential’ in nature as well – Orders
permitting agricultural structures do not preclude the State
Government from conducting an on-ground inspection as to
the actual useof land – Serious doubts raised on jurisdictional
competence of the Civil Court in holding that agriculture
related structures could be raised without prior permission:
Held: Orders of the Commissioner and ADJ were caveated
approvals for prospective construction of the agricultural
structures – Respondents admitted that the usage of the land
was not limited to ‘agricultural purposes’ and that it was intended
to be ‘residential’ in nature as well – The Respondents had not
produced any reliable material to prove that the constructions on
their land were authorised – In any case, exempting lands bearing
constructions from acquisition is a matter of State Policy, not of
law – Outcome would not be materially affected if construction
was authorised – Prior authorization of the constructions is also
2280 [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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not the definitive saving grace – State of Haryana v. Vinod Oil &
General Millsrelied on. [Paras 12-26]

Constitution of India, Article 14 – Acquisition of Appellant’s
land not discriminatory – Acquisition of 99.78% of the initially
notified land shows State’s intention to acquire uniformly –
Mere Plea regarding differential treatment insufficient –
Article 14 cannot be ordinarily employed as a ground to
claim negative equality– Illegality, if any, has since been
remedied – Material subsequent event should have been
noted by High Court:
Held: Respondents claimed that land belonging to Maharaja
Harinder Singh ‘Khalaf’ Maharaja Varinder Singh had been
exempted from acquisition – The High Court accepted this
argument and quashed the acquisition, holding that similarly
placed landowners had been left out of acquisition process – Held,
order patently erroneous – Acquisition of 99.78% of the initially
notified land shows State’s intention to acquire uniformly – Mere
plea regarding differential treatment insufficient; burden lies on the
Respondents to not only prove disparate treatment of equals, but
that it amounts to hostile discrimination as well – Article 14 cannot
be used to claim negative equality – Solution to some lands being
unjustifiably left out is to direct their acquisition, not encourage the
exclusion of more lands – High Court should have annulled illicit
benefit received by the similarly placed person – Land of Maharaja
Harinder Singh ‘Khalaf’ Maharaja Varinder Singh subsequently
acquired before impugned order – Illegality, if any, has since been
remedied – Material subsequent event should have been noted
by High Court. [Paras 27-31]

Land Acquisition – State Government’s decision to release
Respondents’ land from acquisition – If suffers from manifest
arbitrariness:
Held: During the pendency of proceedings, the State Government
conveyed its decision to release the Respondents’ land from
acquisition on the condition that a portion be used for building of
roads and other public amenities and the rest only for charitable,
i.e. non-commercial, purposes, and the Respondents agreed –
Perusal of records casts cloud of doubt on legal necessity of release
of land – Crucial policy decisions finalised by very junior officials;
files receiving approval at exceptional speed; important issues not
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 2281

Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Abhishek Gupta etc.

considered – Decision manifestly arbitrary – State Government
possesses the power to release the land for lawful considerations –
Cannot do so whimsically, irrationally, without any application of mind,
or selectively – Parties’ compromise not accepted. [Paras 32-46]
Doctrine/ Principles – Doctrine of Merger – Effect of previous
SLPs against same impugned judgment being dismissed
after grant of leave – Doctrine of merger neither adoctrine of
constitutional law nor of statutory recognition – Common law
principle directed towards judicial propriety should not be
applied in a straitjacket manner – Exercise of powers under
Article 142 of the Constitution used to carve out exception
to doctrine of merger:
Held: Earlier SLPs by the State challenging the same impugned
judgment of the High Court had been dismissed after grant of
leave – Arguably doctrine of merger would be attracted – However,
impugned judgement of the High Court found to be patently unjust
and could adversely affect the subject acquisition, leading to
significant harm to the public at large –Fit case to invoke powers
under Article 142 and carve out an exception to do complete justice
to the parties –Reliance on Kunhayammed, Khoday Distilleries and
GNCTD v BSK Realtors. [Paras 47-53]

Case Law Cited
Shri Mandir Sita Ramji v. Lt. Governor of Delhi [1975] 1 SCR 597 :
(1975) 4 SCC 298; Women's Education Trust v. State of Haryana
(2013) 8 SCC 99 – referred to.
NOIDA v. Darshan Lal Bohra, 2024 SCC Online SC 1690;
Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala [2000] Supp. 1 SCR 538 :
(2000) 6 SCC 359; Anand Buttons Ltd. v. State of Haryana (2005)
9 SCC 164; State of Haryana v. Vinod Oil & General Mills [2014]
SCR 13 524 : (2014) 15 SCC 410; Khoday Distilleries Limited v.
Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Limited, Kollegal
[2019] 3 SCR 411 : (2019) 4 SCC 376; GNCTD v. BSK Realtors,
2024 INSC 455 : [2024] 5 SCR 1159; Gurcharan Singh & Ors. v.
New Delhi Municipal Committee & Ors. [1996] 1 SCR 1154 :
(1996) 2 SCC 459; Vivek Coop. House Building Society Ltd. v.
State of Haryana, 2016 SCC OnLine P&H 15802; Chandigarh
Administration v. Jagjit Singh [1995] 1 SCR 126 : (1995) 1 SCC
745 – relied upon.
2282 [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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List of Acts
Constitution of India; Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Haryana
Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975

List of Keywords
s.5A of the Land Acquisition; Objections of s.5A; Public interest;
Unauthorized structures; Article 14 of the Constitution of India;
Discrimination; Doctrine of merger; Public trust doctrine.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 7420-7421
of 2010
From the Judgment and Order dated 15.07.2008 of the High Court
of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CWP Nos. 12510 and 12513
of 2000

Appearances for Parties
Lokesh Sinhal, Sr. A.A.G., Samar Vijay Singh, Nikunj Gupta,
Ms. Himanshi Sakhya, Keshav Mittal, Fateh Singh, Manish Verma,
Varun Prasad, Advs. for the Appellant.
Rajive Bhalla, Dr. Bharat Bhushan Parsoon, Sanjeev Sharma,
Sr. Advs., Sanjay Sarin, Shekhar Verma, Vikram Sharda,
Ms. Sonam Priya, Ayush Singh, Ms. Aditi Singh, Shantanu Tyagi,
Ms. Neha Goel, S. S. Shroff, Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the S.upreme Court

Judgment

Surya Kant, J.

1. These appeals have been preferred by the Haryana Urban
Development Authority (HUDA, now HSVP) (hereinafter, ‘Appellant’)
against the judgement dated 15.07.2008 of the High Court of Punjab
and Haryana (hereinafter, ‘High Court’), whereby the land acquisition
proceedings initiated by the State of Haryana were annulled by
quashing the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter, ‘1894 Act’).
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 2283

Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Abhishek Gupta etc.

A. FACTS
2. A notification was issued on 16.03.1999 under Section 4(1) of the
1894 Act for acquiring 952.18 acres land, of which 748.56 acres fall
in Village Saketri and 203.62 acres in Village Bhainsa Tiba, both in
Tehsil and District Panchkula, Haryana. The land was being acquired
for development and utilization for residential, commercial, institutional
and recreational purposes.
3. Located between the Union Territory of Chandigarh and the Shivalik
Range, the lands are bordered on one side by the Sukhna Lake, and
a designated Forest Area on the other. It is also adjacent to several
other residential sectors that the Appellant has fully developed as
part of the Mansa Devi Complex in the Panchkula Urban Area.
4. The Respondents submitted their objections under Section 5A of the
1894 Act on 16.04.1999, contending that their portion of the land
under acquisition ought to be exempted as they contained fruit trees
and the state policy mandates the exemption of such lands from
acquisition. Additionally, they claimed that a cattle-shed, greenhouse,
and an attendant room were also erected on the land, for which
authorization had been granted by the Commissioner, Ambala, on
23.12.1992 under the Punjab New Capital (Periphery) Control Act,
1952 (hereinafter, ‘Punjab Periphery Act’). Similarly, a farmhouse
was also claimed to have been constructed with the approval of the
Additional District Judge, Ambala, (hereinafter, ‘ADJ’) vide judgement
dated 05.04.1994.
5. The Collector accepted these objections, noting that since the
Commissioner and the ADJ had authorized the construction on the
land, it could be exempted from acquisition. However, the State
Government went ahead with the acquisition, asserting that the
structures were unauthorized. A declaration under Section 6 of the
1894 Act was issued on 16.03.2000 to acquire both the land and
the constructions thereon.
6. Aggrieved, the Respondents approached the High Court, pleading
that their objections under Section 5A of the 1894 Act had not been
appropriately considered.
7. Subsequently, vide the impugned judgement dated 15.07.2008, the
High Court allowed the Respondents’ writ petition and quashed
the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the 1894 Act.
2284 [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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This finding stood on two primary legs: (i) the Respondents’
objections were wrongfully rejected as the constructions were
duly authorized; and (ii) it was discriminatory to acquire the
Respondents’ land when similarly situated land belonging to
Maharaja Harinder Singh ‘Khalaf’ Maharaja Varinder Singh had
been exempted from acquisition.
8. Discontented with the quashing of the notifications issued under
Sections 4 and 6 of the 1894 Act, the Appellant—beneficiary of the
acquisition, is before us in these appeals. This Court, vide order
dated 01.09.2008, directed the parties to maintain status quo which
is operating till date.

B. CONTENTIONS
9. Mr. Lokesh Sinhal, Learned Senior Additional Advocate General of
Haryana, appearing on behalf of the Appellant—beneficiary of the
acquisition contended that the High Court erred in quashing the
aforementioned notifications. In support of this assertion, he made
the following submissions:
(a) The constructions undertaken by the Respondents were
unauthorized. Although permission was granted by the
Commissioner, Ambala, it was conditioned on the Respondents
submitting the building plan. However, there is no evidence
substantiating that such a plan was ever submitted. Hence it
cannot be presumed that the construction was duly authorized,
and consequently, the Competent Authority was justified in
repudiating the Appellant’s objections under Section 5A of the
1894 Act.
(b) The Collector did not recommend the release of the Respondents’
land. He merely stated that the State Government may consider
such release. The issue of exemption from acquisition was
consequently left open for consideration by the Competent
Authority.
(c) Even if it is assumed that the Collector recommended the
release of the land, it would not bind the State Government.
After due inspection, the High-Powered Committee had
determined that the construction was unauthorized and
not in conformity with the Developmental Plan. The State
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 2285

Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Abhishek Gupta etc.

Government, therefore, committed no error on disagreeing
with the Collector and proceeding with the acquisition, as
buttressed by this Court’s decision in Anand Buttons Ltd. v.
State of Haryana.1
(d) The land belonging to Maharaja Harinder Singh ‘Khalaf’ Maharaja
Varinder Singh had also been subsequently acquired through
the notification dated 17.05.2007. It could not be acquired
earlier on account of pending public interest litigations. It is
thus incorrect to assert that the State Government discriminated
against the Respondents by releasing similarly placed lands.
In any case, the Respondents had also not demonstrated that
this land was similarly placed as their own land. Furthermore,
the acquisition proceedings do not violate the provisions of the
Punjab Periphery Act.
10. Per contra, Mr. Rajive Bhalla, Dr. Bharat Bhushan Parsoon, and
Mr. Sanjeev Sharma, Learned Senior Counsels representing the
Respondents, have supported the impugned judgement by arguing
that:
(a) The burden of proving that the constructions were not supported
by the building plan lies on the Appellant. Since the same has not
been proved, there cannot be any adverse presumption against
the legality of the construction. In any case, as confirmed by
the order dated 05.04.1994 of the ADJ, the Appellant was not
obligated to seek any permission and hence, non-submission
of the building plan is not material.
(b) There is a flagrant violation of Section 5A as the Respondents’
objections have not been considered in accordance with law.
Since Section 5A of the 1894 Act provides a valuable safeguard
to an expropriated land owner, it warrants mandatory compliance
and cannot be treated as an empty formality.
(c) Furthermore, doubt can be cast on the thoroughness of
the inspection conducted by the High-Powered Committee
constituted by the State Government, given that a vast tract of
land is claimed to have been inspected in a very short duration.

1 (2005) 9 SCC 164.
2286 [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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Additionally, the composition of the committee formed for the
inspection indicates a complete abdication of power by the
State government.
(d) Even if the land of Maharaja Harinder Singh ‘Khalaf’ Maharaja
Varinder Singh was re-acquired, it was done at a rate prevalent
in 2007, which was higher in comparison to 1999. Denying
the higher rate to the Respondents amounts to arbitrary and
discriminatory conduct.
(e) In any case, there is a significant subsequent development, as
during the pendency of the proceedings, the State of Haryana
has agreed on releasing the subject land, provided that the
Respondents provide a part of the land for basic amenities
free of cost and use the remaining for charitable purposes.
Since the Respondents have consented to put their land to
such conditional use, this Court should give effect to such a
conscionable agreement between the parties and may, therefore,
dismiss the instant appeals in light thereof.
(f) Since this Court has dismissed the previous appeals filed by
the State of Haryana against the same impugned order, the
present set of appeals are not maintainable and attract the
auspices of the doctrine of merger.

C. ISSUES
11. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions at
length, we find that the following four issues are to be analysed:
i. Whether the mandatory procedure contemplated under Section
5A of the 1894 Act has been complied with?
ii. Whether the land acquisition proceedings deserve to be vitiated
on the ground that similarly placed landowners have been
treated differently?
iii. Whether the instant appeals are liable to be dismissed as
infructuous in view of the subsequent developments like
`settlement’ between the parties?
iv. Whether doctrine of merger is attracted in view of the fact that
State appeals against the same impugned judgment have
already been dismissed?
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 2287

Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Abhishek Gupta etc.

D. ANALYSIS

D.1 Evaluation of objections under Section 5A of the 1894 Act
12. The focal contention of the Respondent-landowners is that the
acquisition proceedings stand vitiated and ought to be quashed
as they were carried out in violation of Section 5A of the 1894 Act,
which mandates due consideration of their objections.
13. It would be pertinent to understand the object that Section 5A
of the 1894 Act seeks to fulfil. A plain reading of the provision
indicates that it codifies the fundamental safeguard of audi altrem
partem. Landowners have the opportunity to demonstrate that the
acquisition is against public purpose or marred by mala fides. In
the event the landowner presents a cogent case, the appropriate
government may exempt such land from acquisition. By enabling
landowners to put forward their perspective and elucidate their
remonstrances, Section 5A envisions a modus of deliberation and
consultation, which must therefore be construed to be mandatory,
akin to a right.2
14. Objections under Section 5A of the 1894 Act most often proceed in
four distinct stages:
i. The filing stage: Landowners can file objections within thirty
days of the notification issued under Section 4 of the 1894 Act;3
ii. The hearing stage: The Collector must provide an oral hearing to
the objecting landowners, either in person or through a pleader/
authorized representative;4
iii. The recommendation stage: The Collector—after hearing
objections and upon further inquiry—makes a report to the
appropriate government containing their recommendations; and
iv. The decision stage: The appropriate government considers the
Collector’s report and takes a final decision on the objections.
15. Reverting to the case in hand, although the Respondents have
averred that their right under Section 5A has been infringed, however,

2 Women’s Education Trust v. State of Haryana (2013) 8 SCC 99, para 1.
3 Section 5A (1), 1894 Act.
4 NOIDA v. Darshan Lal Bora, 2024 INS 508.
2288 [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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they have failed to substantiate such claim. Onus was on the
Respondents to identify any fault in the procedure adopted by the
State, which we find tracks closely with the aforementioned four-stage
process. When the Section 4 notification was issued on 16.03.1999,
objections were invited from the landowners. These objections
were duly heard, and a report was prepared by the Collector.
Subsequently, the State Government constituted a High-Powered
Committee, and based on its findings and opinion, the Government
ultimately took a final decision to acquire the Respondents’ land.
Section 5A mandates a procedure, not a particular outcome. The
landowners in this case were thus certainly guaranteed a hearing
and consideration, not relief.
16. Regarding the fourth stage, the Respondents have specifically argued
that since the Collector had recommended the release of their land
and the State Government deviated from such recommendation
without any valid and sufficient reasons, its decision is bad in law. In
effect, their claim seems to be that the Collector’s recommendation
ought to be final and binding on the Government. However, such
an interpretation is at odds with the bare text of Section 5A, which
states that the Collector shall “either make a report in respect of the
land which has been notified under Section 4, sub-section (1), or
make different reports in respect of different parcels of such land,
to the appropriate Government, containing his recommendations
on the objections, together with the record of the proceedings
held by him, for the decision of that Government. The decision
of the appropriate Government on the objections shall be final.”
[Emphasis supplied]
17. The choice of different terminologies for the role of the Collector and
the role of the Government makes it evident that the Legislature
intended different roles for each of them. The Collector has no
power to “decide” the case and can only give “recommendations” to
the Government. It is the Government which is the ultimate arbiter
for determining whether the land is to be released or not. No other
authority can dictate the outcome of Section 5A proceedings—neither
the Collector nor the landowner.5 While the Collector’s report can form

5 Shri Mandir Sita Ramji v. Lt. Governor of Delhi (1975) 4 SCC 298, para 5.
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 2289

Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Abhishek Gupta etc.

the “basis” of such decision, the Government is free to independently
evaluate and take a final decision, of course, based on relevant and
lawful considerations.
18. It is therefore patently clear that the State Government possessed
the ability to disagree with the Collector’s report and decide a
different course. This is not to say that the Government’s decision
cannot be challenged or is beyond judicial review. Indeed, had the
Respondents demonstrated that the decision was arbitrary or passed
without due application of mind, then they could have been victorious
in their challenge. However, the Respondents have not placed any
evidence on record to lay such foundation. On the contrary, the
State Government/Appellant have demonstrated that their decision
was not whimsical but was predicated on the findings of a High-
Powered Committee, which comprised qualified individuals, like
officers of the Indian Administrative Services, officials working with
the Appellant, experts from the Town Planning Department and the
Department of Agriculture, etc. Having duly inspected the subject
land, this Committee deduced that the building structures on the
land were unauthorized and not in conformity with the Development
Plan. Relying on this analysis, the Government deviated from the
Collector’s recommendation and proceeded with the acquisition. We
are of the considered view that such departure was made in public
interest, with due application of mind and was fully justified.
19. The Respondents have also assailed that the State Government’s
decision was at odds with the earlier orders of the Commissioner
and the ADJ, who had authorized such constructions. We find this
submission disingenuous. These orders of the Commissioner and
ADJ permitted constructions that were to be erected specifically for
agricultural purposes, not residential. The order dated 23.12.1992,
specifically notes that only structures like cattle sheds and green
houses would be permitted, as they are subservient to agricultural
activities, whereas a modern farm house would be unauthorized
under the Punjab Periphery Act. Similarly, the order dated 05.04.1994
noted that no such authorization would be necessary, provided
the land was to be utilized for agricultural purposes. However, the
submissions proffered by the Respondents undermine their own
case. While attempting to attack the public purpose element of the
acquisition proceedings, they admitted that the usage of the land
2290 [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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was not limited to ‘agricultural purposes’ and that it was intended to
be ‘residential’ in nature as well. This disharmony is visible in the
Respondents’ Section 5A objections:
“6. That the above said land of the objector is situated
adjacent to sector 4 Mansa Devi Complex and the
objector has purchased this costly land with a view to
set up a farm house thereon, since the purpose of
Acquisition is also residential, it would be against
the principal of natural justice to uproot the objector
first and then to develop the same land for residential
purpose meaning thereby the State would be providing
residential accommodation to one of after taking away
the residential land from the objector, which would
serve no public purpose as stated in the notice. Hence,
the notice under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act
is liable to be withdrawn qua the above said land of the
objector.”
[Emphasis supplied]

20. Given how the Respondents have themselves admitted to the
intention of developing their lands and structures for non-agricultural
activities, we do not wish to second guess the fact-finding exercise
conducted by the High-Powered Committee. We must also note that
the orders of the Commissioner and ADJ were caveated approvals
for prospective construction of the agricultural structures. We do not
see how these would preclude the State Government from conducting
an actual on-ground inspection and coming to a different conclusion
as to their actual use. It is indeed possible that following the said
orders, the land may have had unauthorized structures, which were
being used beyond mere agricultural purposes. This possibility is
only further enhanced by the Respondents’ own stated intention of
putting the lands to residential use.
21. Regardless, we may also hasten to add here that there are serious
doubts on the jurisdictional competence of the Civil Court, in
holding that agriculture related structures could be raised without
prior permission. Such a hasty declaration by the ADJ was ex facie
uncalled for and beyond its jurisdictional authority, given that it was
expressly barred under the Punjab Periphery Act.
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 2291

Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Abhishek Gupta etc.

22. However, the Respondents’ strategy of arguing that their constructions
were authorized (being agricultural), while simultaneously seeking
exemption from acquisition on the ground that their lands were
subserving the same intention as the acquisition (being residential),
is not only contradictory but also ill-advised. Furthermore, in first
placing themselves at par with the object of acquisition, and then
vitiating that very purpose by claiming that it contravenes the Punjab
Periphery Act, the Respondents have effectively shot themselves
in the foot.
23. The Respondents have also failed to discharge their burden of
proof. They have not produced any reliable material to prove that the
constructions on their land were authorized, and if anything, have
further created doubts, as to whether these structures are indeed
permitted under the auspices of the Punjab Periphery Act.
24. On the contrary, there is ample material on record to show that the
High-Powered Committee comprised of senior officials, made their
assessment after having properly inspected the site. This Committee
emphatically recommended that the whole of the land, including the
unauthorized structures, be acquired for the proposed regulated
development. Such a decision, in our considered view, is in conformity
with the legislative object behind the Haryana Development and
Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975, whereunder no construction on
an agricultural land is permissible save and except when the change
of land use is granted by the appropriate authority, in accordance
with the procedure prescribed therein.
25. In any case, even if the constructions were to be authorized, it
would not materially affect our outcome. As has been held by this
Court on several occasions, exempting lands bearing constructions
from acquisition is a matter of State Policy, and not of law.6 In case
the Government finds that exempting such lands would adversely
affect the larger Development Plan or any other purpose behind the
acquisition, then it can still continue with the acquisition.7 Private
interest of a few, should give way to the public interest of the many.

6 NOIDA v. Darshan Lal Bohra, 2024 SCC Online SC 1690.
7 Anand Buttons Ltd. v. State of Haryana (2005) 9 SCC 164.
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Prior authorization of the constructions is also not the definitive
saving grace that the Respondents imagine it to be. In fact, this
Court has repeatedly allowed acquisitions even in cases where
the construction was specifically authorized by the government
beforehand, as was the case in State of Haryana v. Vinod Oil &
General Mills:8
“8. Acquisition of the respondents’ lands was held
to be vitiated on the ground that the State having
granted permission to the respondents for change of
land use and develop the area as an industry cannot
turn around after twenty-six years to acquire the land
saying that the same is required to be developed for
residential purposes and the action of the respondent
State was held to be arbitrary. Of course, the Director
of Town and Country Planning, Haryana earlier granted
permission to the respondents herein for change of land
use for construction of Oil and General Mills in their lands
in 23 kanals 6 marlas in Khasra Nos. 148/1, 148/2 and
149/10. The fact that the factory and building was put
up in the land with the approval of the authority cannot
be a bar for acquisition of the land. Public interest
overrides individual interests. In our view, the High
Court was not justified in saying that the acquisition
is bad since permission was earlier granted for change
of land use and developing the area as an industry
and that the Government is estopped from initiating
acquisition proceeding”
[Emphasis supplied]

26. The existence of constructions on the Respondents’ land, whether
authorized or not, legal or not, cannot be by themselves an absolute
embargo on the Government’s power of eminent domain. The
challenge brought by the Respondents on the anvil of Section 5A
of the 1894 Act, therefore, falls flat.

8 (2014) 15 SCC 410, para 8.
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 2293

Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Abhishek Gupta etc.

D.2. Discrimination and Article 14 of our Constitution
27. In addition to seeking refuge under Section 5A of the 1894 Act, the
Respondents contend that the acquisition of their land was violative
of Article 14 of the Constitution. They claim that the land of Maharaja
Harinder Singh ‘Khalaf’ Maharaja Varinder Singh had been exempted
from the acquisition. This contention was also accepted by the
High Court, which held the subject-acquisition to be discriminatory
in nature, for leaving out lands of similarly placed owners from the
process of acquisition.
28. We find this patently erroneous, for three reasons. First, the High
Court overlooked the fact that the total land proposed to be acquired
through the Section 4 notification was 952.18 acres, out of which
land admeasuring 950.14 acres eventually stood acquired. The
acquisition of 99.78% of the initially notified land demonstrated the
intention of the State to acquire the land uniformly, and not pick and
choose individual parcels of land.
29. A mere plea regarding differential treatment is insufficient; the
claimant must instead demonstrate that similarly placed classes
had been treated dissimilarly, unjustifiably.9 The burden lies on the
Respondents to not only prove disparate treatment of equals, but
that it amounts to hostile discrimination as well.
30. Second, we disagree with the remedy, even if discrimination was to
have been established. The solution to some lands being unjustifiably
left out is to direct their acquisition, not encourage the exclusion
of more lands. The latter approach only furthers the discrimination
and creates more aggrieved landowners. Moreover, it is settled
law that Article 14 cannot be ordinarily employed as a ground to
claim negative equality, i.e., it cannot be used for claiming illicit
benefits simply because someone else has been allowed such an
undue favour, especially when doing so would jeopardize the entire
acquisition by undermining its contiguity.10 Therefore, instead of
multiplying the illegality, the High Court ought to have exercised its

9 State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd., 1964 SCC Online SC 121, para 11.
10 Gurcharan Singh & Ors. v. New Delhi Municipal Committee & Ors. (1996) 2 SCC 459.
2294 [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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writ jurisdiction to annul such illicit benefit received by the similarly
placed person.11
31. Third, and most crucially, the illegality, if any, has since been remedied.
It could not be disputed before us that the land of Maharaja Harinder
Singh ‘Khalaf’ Maharaja Varinder Singh had been subsequently
acquired through notifications dated 16.05.2007 and 27.03.2008.
The very basis of discrimination, thus, stood denuded of its factual
foundation as of the date the High Court passed the impugned
judgement on 15.07.2008. The High Court ought to have taken
note of this material subsequent event which took place during the
pendency of the proceedings before it, considering its serious impact
on the outcome of the entire acquisition process.

D.3. Events before this Court
32. We may now advert to certain unpalatable events which occurred
during the pendency of these appeals before this Court. On
10.05.2023, when the matter was posted for hearing, a joint request
was made to list these matters for final hearing on 26.07.2023.
On the date fixed, learned Senior Additional Advocate General
of Haryana bona fidely conveyed the State’s consent to drop the
acquisition process qua the Respondents’ land only, if they were
to agree, to provide a part of the subject land for the building
of roads and other public amenities free of cost, along with an
undertaking that the remaining land shall be utilized only for
charitable purposes, i.e., non-commercial activities. Learned Senior
Counsel for the Respondents was consequently directed to seek
formal instructions in this regard. Respondents meanwhile filed a
formal undertaking stating that they would use the land only for
non-profit and charitable purposes.
33. On 13.09.2023, we directed the State Government / Appellant to file
an affidavit responding to the following queries:
(a) Why the State Government is agreeable to release the land of
the Respondents from acquisition?

11 Vivek Coop. House Building Society Ltd. v. State of Haryana, 2016 SCC OnLine P&H 15802; Chandigarh
Administration v. Jagjit Singh (1991) 1 SCC 745
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 2295

Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Abhishek Gupta etc.

(b) Whether such release of land will affect the acquisition of
adjoining lands or not?
(c) Whether the subject-land falls within or near the Sukhna Lake
catchment area?
(d) Whether the land in dispute falls in any non-construction zone?
(e) If not, what type of construction is permissible in and around
the area of subject-land?
34. In response thereto, the State of Haryana filed an affidavit stating,
inter alia, as follows:
(a) The land can be released because the acquisition proceedings
for the same were quashed by the High Court and are under
abeyance in view of the status quo order passed by this Court
and because the Respondents undertake to utilize the land for
charitable purposes;
(b) The present case has unique circumstances;
(c) The site does not fall within the Sukhna Catchment Area,
however, the exact area that falls under Eco Sensitive Zone
would be known once the notification for such zone is finalized;
and
(d) Construction is permissible in the land.
35. The Respondents also, without any delay, filed their affidavits in
consonance and agreement with the State Government’s affidavit.
Since the parties have reached a ‘settlement’ during the pendency
of these appeals, we are introspecting as to whether or not to allow
the Government to make such exemption for the Respondents’ land.
36. We are not oblivious to ground realities. This Court is aware that
the subject land is prime real estate. The proposed acquisition and
development is located between the Shivalik Range and the Union
Territory of Chandigarh. One side touches the Sukhna lake, while
the other side abuts a notified forest. The land is contiguous with
well-developed residential areas like the Mansa Devi Complex. Its
idyllic natural surroundings and strategic proximity to urban areas
and limited supply of similarly placed alternative areas, makes the
land priceless.
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37. Furthermore, we are also aware of the fact that the acquisition, in
its entirety, was under challenge before the High Court, with a batch
of writ petitions pending at the stage of final hearing, at the time
when the State Government agreed to release the subject land.
The High Court has meanwhile dismissed those petitions, upholding
the acquisition, and presently, Special Leave Petitions (hereinafter
‘SLPs’) are pending before this Court.
38. Be that as it may, given the land’s premium nature, and its criticality
to the subject acquisition, it is rather intriguing why the State
Government has opted to enter into a compromise, knowing full well
that doing so would weaken its case in defending the major chunk of
the acquisition. We, therefore, in order to satisfy ourselves that the
State Government has considered thoroughly all the pros and cons
and acted in a bona fide manner to serve the public interest, before
making the offer of release, deemed it imperative to delve deeper.
39. A perusal of the original record casts a cloud of doubt on the legal
necessity of the entire exercise and has disappointed us regarding
the manner in which the State Government’s decision to release
the land has been taken. The record reveals that this issue was
first discussed in the letter dated 08.09.2023, in which the Appellant
(HUDA) noted on record that the land in question cannot be spared.
Nevertheless, the Appellant deferred the final decision to the State
government. This note was authored by an official in the rank of
an Assistant. Following this, the file moved with remarkable celerity
and received approval from various departments and officials,
including as high as the office of the Additional Chief Secretary,
Urban Development on the very same date. Unfortunately, none
of the officers thought it appropriate to write even a single word
while agreeing with the proposal to release the land. This rapid
progression raises questions on whether all relevant factors were
considered before recommending such approval. The only so
called self-speaking note is of the Director General, Urban Estate
of the even date, i.e., 08.09.2023, which noted that the file may be
“submitted to govt. for approval so that Honorable Apex Court may
be informed about view of state…”. The proposal was reportedly
approved by the State Government within a period of 3 days only,
i.e., on 11.09.2023. Res ipsa loquitor.
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 2297

Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Abhishek Gupta etc.

40. Even the responses to the questions posed by this Court in its order
dated 13.09.2023, moved with extraordinary swiftness, securing
approval at an astonishingly expedited pace upwards, without the
addition of even a single word at any level. The responses the record
shows, were drafted by an Assistant.
41. We hasten to add here that we have no intention to suggest that
bureaucratic swiftness necessarily undermines the thoroughness of
the process. Indeed, our administrative setup can do with more such
alacrity. Rather, the confluence of circumstances— the land being
prime real estate and yet suddenly and inexplicably being excluded
from acquisition, crucial policy decisions with wide ranging public
interest of enormous financial ramifications being discussed and
finalized by very junior officials, files receiving approval at exceptional
speed, etc.—collectively do not inspire confidence as to the objectivity
of the entire process.
42. Despite meticulously analyzing all relevant documents appended
with the file, including the cryptic brief notes of the Assistant, we
are unable to get any qualitative assistance from the government
record. As noted above, there is little discussion about: (i) the effect
of release of the Respondents’ land on the remaining acquisition, in
light of the challenge pending before the High Court or this Court;
(ii) the cascading effect that this compromise would have on the
other landowners along with the arguments it would invite on the
question of hostility of Article 14, and if so; (iii) the basis of such
classification and whether it would be reasonable; (iv) whether the
release of the land would affect the contiguity of the land under
acquisition and if so, would it impair the planned development of the
area under acquisition; and (v) whether the State was competent to
release the land in purported exercise of its powers under Section 48
of the 1894 Act when the matter was sub judice before this Court.
43. None of these issues have been discussed, considered, or analyzed.
The decision regarding release of the Respondents’ land is, therefore,
manifestly arbitrary. While the State Government undoubtedly
possesses the power to release the land for lawful considerations,
it cannot do so whimsically, irrationally, without any application
of mind, or selectively. Condoning such action would encourage
further monocratic release of other lands in complete disregard of
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the consequences and impact on public interest. This would likely
result in the creation of small islands of unacquired lands within large
swathes of acquired land. These private enclaves would undoubtedly
upset the effectiveness of the rest of the acquisition—making it
patently unfair for all other landowners, laying to waste perhaps the
very purpose for which their lands were acquired in the first place.
Turning futile the acquisition would also render mindless dissipation
of the State Exchequer, already expended earlier in the process—
reducing returns for all. Although the State Government possesses
acknowledgeable power in the lifecycle of the acquisition process, it
also bears great responsibility of ensuring its judicious exercise. We
cannot, therefore, treat the compromise or release lightly.
44. Keeping in view the entirety of the exercise and the sum totality of
all factors, both apparent and others more insidious, we are unable
to accept the parties’ compromise, in terms whereof the disposal of
instant appeals is suggested.
45. Having held so, we are not enthused by the Respondents’ conduct
either. These unusual events create more than just suspicion that the
Respondents have been able to influence the representations of the
many, as well as twist and undermine institutions and process meant
for the protection of public interest. In their hurry to curry favour with
the Respondents, the senior bureaucrats have unfortunately failed to
visualise the serious ramifications their actions could have had on the
entire acquisition of more than 950 acres land and the law in general.
46. We are thus, of the considered view that this is a case where the
bureaucracy abdicated its duty and failed to objectively assist the
Decision-Making Authority, in arriving at a just and fair conclusion in
conformity with larger public interest. Had the senior officers flagged
all the relevant issues on file, we have no reason to doubt that the
Competent Authority would have never approved the proposal to
release the subject land.

D.4 Doctrine of merger
47. We must also note that the previous Civil Appeals preferred by the
State Government, challenging the same impugned order were
dismissed on account of non-prosecution. Hence, there arises an
important question with regard to the maintainability of the present
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 2299

Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Abhishek Gupta etc.

appeals. This issue may be conclusively determined by examining
the applicability of the doctrine of merger to the peculiar set of
circumstances of the instant case.
48. In this respect, in the landmark case of Kunhayammed v. State of
Kerala,12 it was held that:
“44. To sum up, our conclusions are:
(i) Where an appeal or revision is provided against an order
passed by a court, tribunal or any other authority before
superior forum and such superior forum modifies, reverses
or affirms the decision put in issue before it, the decision
by the subordinate forum merges in the decision by the
superior forum and it is the latter which subsists, remains
operative and is capable of enforcement in the eye of law
[…]
(vi) Once leave to appeal has been granted and
appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court has been
invoked the order passed in appeal would attract
the doctrine of merger; the order may be of reversal,
modification or merely affirmation.”
[Emphasis supplied]

49. The same principle was reiterated in the case of Khoday Distilleries
Limited v. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane
Limited, Kollegal,13 where this Court held that merger would result
if the SLPs were dismissed after granting leave, irrespective of
whether reasons were given or not:
“20. The Court thereafter analysed number of cases where
orders of different nature were passed and dealt with these
judgments by classifying them in the following categories:
(i) Dismissal at the stage of special leave petition—without
reasons—no res judicata, no merger.

12 (2000) 6 SCC 359
13 (2019) 4 SCC 376
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(ii) Dismissal of the special leave petition by speaking
or reasoned order—no merger, but rule of discipline and
Article 141 attracted.
(iii) Leave granted—dismissal without reasons—
merger results.”
[Emphasis supplied]

50. In the instant case, leave to appeal was granted vide the order
dated 27.08.2010, and the Civil Appeals preferred by the State of
Haryana were then dismissed on 16.11.2016. Therefore, since the
previous SLPs arising out of the same impugned judgement were
dismissed after granting leave, arguably, the doctrine of merger would
be attracted.
51. However, we may hasten to add that in Kunhayammed (supra),
this Court held that the doctrine of merger is neither a doctrine of
constitutional law nor of statutory recognition. Since it is a common
law principle directed towards judicial propriety, the same should
not be applied in a straitjacket manner, and the nature of facts and
circumstances of that particular case should be considered.
52. Still further, a three-judge bench of this Court—to which one of us
(Surya Kant, J.) was a member—in GNCTD v. BSK Realtors,14
analyzed the aforementioned exception to the doctrine of merger and
held that the exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution,
which enables the Court to do complete justice, would fall under the
four corners of such exception.
53. Applying the afore-cited principle to the facts and circumstances of
the instant case, we have found that the impugned judgement of the
High Court is patently unjust and could adversely affect the subject
acquisition, leading to significant harm to the public at large. In light
of this, we find it a fit case to invoke our powers under Article 142
of the Constitution and carve out an exception to the doctrine of
merger so as to do complete justice to the parties.

14 GNCTD v. BSK Realtors, 2024 INSC 455.
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 2301

Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Abhishek Gupta etc.

E. CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS
54. We, thus, deem it appropriate to allow these appeals and dispose
of the matter in the following terms and directions:
i. The Appeals are allowed; the impugned judgment dated
15.07.2008 of the High Court, which is under challenge in this
batch of appeals, is hereby set aside;
ii. If there is any other judgement or order of the High Court
which is passed following the main judgement dated
15.07.2008, thereby quashing or adversely impacting the
subject acquisition, such judgements or orders are also
deemed to be set aside;
iii. In case no ‘award’ for the land owned by the Respondents was
passed earlier, the same shall be passed expeditiously, and
in any case within a period of 3 (three) months in accordance
with the provisions of the 1894 Act;
iv. If an award in respect of the Respondent’s land has already
been passed under the 1894 Act, in that event, there will be
no necessity to pass a fresh award. However, liberty is granted
to the Respondents to avail their remedy under Section 18 of
the 1894 Act, if so advised. Such reference, if moved by the
Respondents within a period of 2 (two) months from the date
of uploading of this order on the website, the Reference Court
will not dismiss it on the ground of limitation and shall proceed
to decide the same on merits and in accordance with law;
v. In case the land of the Respondents is found to have same
potentiality and utility as that of Maharaja Harinder Singh
‘Khalaf’ Maharaja Varinder Singh (i.e., land which was acquired
vide the notifications dated 16.05.2007 and 27.03.2008), the
Respondents will also be entitled to seek compensation at the
same rate as has been granted for the said similarly located
land; and
vi. The State of Haryana and the HSVP are directed to take
possession of the subject-land in accordance with law and
commence development works without any delay. The land shall
be utilized for the public purposes for which it has been acquired.
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55. We are sanguine that the State Government is conscious of the
principles evolved by this Court in a catena of decisions in regard
to the violation of public trust doctrine15 and will thus ensure that the
acquired land is utilised in public interest in accordance with provisions
of the Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act,
1975. Consequently, the HSVP will take on the responsibility to
develop the entire acquired land strictly in accordance with the public
purpose of its acquisition.
56. In this regard, compliance report shall be filed before this Court after
six months i.e. before 30.04.2025.
57. Ordered accordingly.

Result of the case: Appeals allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Aishani Narain, Hony. Associate Editor
(Verified by: Shibani Ghosh, Adv.)

15 Uddar Gagan Properties v. Sant Singh and others (2016) 11 SCC 378; Greater Noida Industrial
Development Authority v. Devender Kumar and others (2011) 12 SCC 375