Holding

The High Powered Committee’s deviation was based on a reasonable principle and not arbitrary, so the High Court’s order releasing the respondent’s land with modified conditions is upheld.

Summary

The Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation (HSIDC) sought to acquire land for an industrial estate under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. A High Powered Committee recommended acquisition of the land owned by Shakuntla (respondent No.1) but released land of M/s Orient Crafts ("O") on the same evaluation parameters. Shakuntla challenged this as discriminatory under Article 14 and obtained a High Court order releasing his land subject to maintaining a green belt and paying development charges. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the Committee's differential treatment was arbitrary and whether the conditions imposed by the High Court were valid. The Court held that the release of Orient Crafts' land was based on a reasonable principle and not arbitrary, and therefore the High Court’s modified conditions—releasing Shakuntla’s land for a green belt not exceeding 50 m and payment of proportionate charges—were upheld. The appeals were dismissed with the modified order affirmed.

Issues considered

The release of land of Orient Crafts but not that of Shakuntla, on identical parameters, violates Article 14.
Whether the High Court’s conditions of maintaining a green belt and paying development charges are legally valid.
Whether the discretion exercised by the High Powered Committee and the authority to change policy must be exercised fairly and not arbitrarily.

Legislation cited

Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 4, s. 5, s. 6

Subjects

land acquisitiondiscriminationArticle 14high powered committeegreen beltdevelopment chargespolicy deviationexecutive discretionarbitrariness

Judgment

[2009] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 413

HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL DEV. CORPN. A
,,. '
v.
SHAKUNTLA & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 7020 OF 2009, Etc.)
OCTOBER 22, 2009
B
[TARUN CHATTERJEE AND V.S. SIRPURKAR, JJ.]

Land Acquisition - Release from acquisition - High
" • Powered Committee recommending release of certain land
while denying release in respect of other land on same c
parameters - Writ Petition - High Court holding the
recommendation discriminatory - Directing release of land
of writ petitioner on the conditions that land-owner maintains
the green belt and pays development charges to Industrial
'to! ~
Development Corporation - On appeal, held: The act of High D
Powered Committee in denying release of one land and
allowing that of the other was discriminatory- Implementation
of development plan is within the discretion of executive
authority - But when guidelines have been laid down for such
task, it is a matter of policy - Discretion to change a policy in E
exercis.e of executive power must be efercised fairly - Where
a particular mode is prescribed for domg an act and there is
. ~
no impediment in adopting the procedure, the deviation from
the procedure without disclosing any discernible principles
shall be labeled as arbit(ary - However, condition of F
maintaining green belt, is not correct - The condition modified
to the effect that the Corporation would maintain the green belt
- Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 14, 1894 - s.4.

Lands were acquired for the purpose of development
of a corporate complex for industrial institutional, G
~
+ commercial and recreational purposes. Respondent
No.1, being one of the owners of the acquired land
sought for release from acquisition.

413 H
414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A On the petition of respondent No.1, High Court
directed High Powered Committee to consider whether ~ ....
the lands in question could be released from acquisition.
The Committee recommended acquisition of the land of
respondent No.1 on the basis of parameters of evaluation
B formulated for it. However, it recommended release of the
land of another owner '0', on the same parameters.

Respondent No.1 filed writ petition questioning the
reco~mendation of the Committee. High Court held that • :._
C the release of land of '0' from acquisition was wrong and
also amounted to discrimination against respondent
No.1. High Court directed release of the land of
respondent No.1 on the condition that they would
maintain the green belt as desired by the Department
which was essentially required to, lay .infrastructure and
D that they would also pay extern'al and internal
development to Haryana State Industrial Development
Corporation (HSIDC) as and when assessed and
demanded. Hence, the present appeals.

E Disposing of the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1. The land belonging to the respondent was
rightly recommended for acquisition. The release of the
land of '0' would not frustrate the whole object of
F acquisition for expansion of the industrial estate since the
1
undertaking of 'O' to release land as desired by the
HSIDC amounts to fulfillment of the lands needed by the
HSIDC in that area. However, the manner in which it was
released and the grounds that were relied on for its
release are fought with defects that raise doubts
G regarding the impartiality and sincerity of the authority.
[Paras 8 and 9) [421-C-D; 422-8-C]
t· ...
2. It is not possible for the court to sit in appeal over
the exe.r-eise of such satisfaction by the authority vested
H with the task of implementing the development plan. The
HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL DEV. CORPN. v. 415
SHAKUNTLA & ORS.
task of such authority is no doubt to ensure the smooth A
•t execution of the development plans and since they have
a firsthand knowledge of the ground realities, they are
surely at a better position than any one else to decide as
to which land is to be acquired and which is to be
released. But when there has been a guideline laid down B
for the same task and it has been approved and notified,
the issue becomes a matter of policy which the authority
has to follow with a reasonable amount of uniformity. In
• .. the given facts of the case, the respondents have alleged
discrimination thereby attracting Article 14 of the c
Constitution of India. [Para 9-10] [422-F-H; 423-A-B]

Union of India vs. International Trading Co. (2003) 5 SCC
437, relied on.

-..
3. The discretion to change a policy in exercise of the D
..
executive power, must be exercised fairly and should not
give the impression that it was so done arbitrarily or by
any ulterior criteria. A question whether the impugned
action is arbitrary or not, is to be ultimately answered on
the facts and circumstances of the given case. Where a E "

particular mode is prescribed for doing an act and there
is no impediment in adopting the procedure, the deviation
to act in a different manner which does not disclose any
.,.. discernible principle which is reasonable itself shall be
labelled as arbitrary. [Para 10] [424-C-E]
- 4. In the given facts of the case, the action of the
F

Committee in releasing the lands of 'O' would not be
<
arbitrary in so far as it has deviated from the procedure
laid down in the form of guidelines approved for the same
• purpose, provided a principle discerned from the G
deviation is within the bounds of the reasonableness test.
-~
... + From a perusal of the facts of the case, it is clear that the
release of the land of '0' may be said to be based on the
logic that as the undertaking of '0' to release their land

. as desired by department had fulfilled the lands needed H
416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
)

t-i-
A by the HSIDC, so the deviation in releasing the same has
a justifiable reason. So such deviation from the \--4 '
procedural guidelines is not unjustified in the present
'1
situation. [Para 11] [424-F-H] r
I
r
5. As the deviation from the guidelines in releasing
B
the land of '0' has been found to be wrongful, there is, · '
(
no question of committing two wrongs by applying thq j
same yardstick to release the lands of the respondents; J
As such, there is nothing wrong in the decision of the
High Court to release the lands of the respondents from
• ~

c acquisition. [Para 12] (425-B-C]

6. The conditions laid down by High Court for
release of the land of the respondents are very similar to
the undertaking of '0' which was filed in the form of an
D affidavit as mentioned earlier. Thus, the intention of the
High Court is clearly to bring parity in the status of the II!
..
lands of the respondents vis-a-vis that of 'O'. This is
justifiable from the act of release from acquisition of the
land of '0'. [Para 13] (425-F; 426-A-B]
E
7. The condition of maintaining a green belt imposed
by the High Court is not correct. Leaving the land for the
HSIDC to develop a green belt is different from that of
requiring the private person to maintain the green belt
~
since that will be an unnecessary burden on that person.
F Since the Court has sought to rely on the averment made
by '0' in order to bring parity between the status of the
lands of the respondents and '0' the same criteria should
- }~
'

be applied in releasing these lands from acquisition. The
most important issue is that the process of development
G and industrialization as planned and approved by the
•'...
legislature should not meet a dead end because of a
small stretch of land. As such, the land of the + 4 '""".'-
respondents shall be released from acquisition as was
the case with '0' but the same shall be done on same

..
H
HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL DEV. CORPN. v. 417
SHAKUNTLA & ORS.
grounds as was applied for the land of '0'. Accordingly, A
• J
the conditions for fulfillment on the part of the
respondents are re-modified so that their land is released
from acquisition. These are, (1) They will release the land
which is needed by the HSIDC for maintaining the green
belt, undisturbed and such land shall be not more than B
the 50 meters prescribed for the Green Belt; and that (2)
They will pay the proportionate external and internal
charges to the HSIDC as and when it is required by the
• 1
authorities. [Paras 16 and 17] [428-F-H; 429-A-D]

Raju S. Jethmalani vs. State of Maharashtra (2005) 11
c
sec 222, relied on.
Case Law Reference:

... ~
c2003) s sec 437
c2oos) 11 sec 222
Relied on
Relied on
Para 10
Para 14
D

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
7020 of 2009.

From the Judgment & Order dated 14.12.2006 of the High E

... Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CWP No. 2479
.... of 2006 .

WITH
F
C.A. Nos. 7021, 7022, 7052 & 7023 of 2009.

A. Sharan, ASG, Mahabir Singh, Manjit Singh, AAG,
Ravindra Sana, T.V. George, S.P.S. Chauhan, Rakesh Dahiya,
Nikhil Jain, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Ajay Pal for the
appearing parties. G
I
~ ~ ;,
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

TARUN CHATTERJEE, J. 1. Delay condoned.
H
418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A 2. Leave granted.

3. These appeals by special leave have arisen from a
judgment dated 14th of December, 2006 of a Division Bench
of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh passed
in CWP No. 2479/2006 whereby the High Court had set aside
8
the Notifications dated 11th of November, 2002 and 12th of
November, 2003 issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, (in short 'the Act') respectively so far as
the acquired lands of the claimant-respondents are concerned,
C subject to certain conditions to be fulfilled by them.

4. The facts in appeal arising out of S.L.P. No. 7099/2007
are sufficient to decide the questions of law that have arisen in
these appeals. In that view of the matter, let us narrate the facts
involved in SLP)No. 7099 of 2007 in a nutshell and the decision
D of which will also govern the other Special Leave Petitions • ..
[Appeals].

5. On 15th of November, 2002, a notification under Section
4 of the Act was issued by the State Government of Haryana
E for the purpose of acquisition of lands situated in Village
Khandsa, Tehsil and District Gurgaon for the· purpose of
development of a corporate complex for industrial, institutional, ;Ja
commercial and recreational purposes. The respondent no.1; ,,_
being one of the owners of the notified acquired lands, filed •
F objections under. Section 5 of the Act, for exclusion of their
lands. The Haryana Government, later on, that is on 12 th of
November, 2003 issued a Notification under Section 6 of the
Act, in respect of the aforementioned lands declaring that the
lands notified were needed by the Government for a public
purpose.
G
6. On 16th of July, 2005, the High Court of Punjab and .. ~
Haryana at Chandigarh disposed of the petitiQ.Q.~ filed by ~
respondent no.1 and others, directing that the grievances of the
land owners be considered by a High Powered Committee,
H constituted to look into whether the lands of the owners
HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL DEV. CORPN. v. 419
SHAKUNTLA & ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.)
concerned could be released from acquisition. The High A
Powered Committee submitted its consolidated report
containing its observations and recommendations to the State
Government on 10th of November, 2005. The Committee
recommended the acquisition of the lands of respondent no.1
on the basi$ of the parameters of evaluation formulated for the B
same purpose. On the basis of the same parameters, some
other lands were released, lal)d belonging to M/s Orient Crafts
being one such plot. The recommendations of the Committee
were to be applicable to all such cases pending before the High
Court and they would not be disturbed till further orders of the c
Government. Aggrieved by the recommendations of the High
Powered Committee, respondent no.1 filed a writ petition
before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana contending that
the said report was liable to be quashed as the policy of pick
and choose was adopted in the matter of releasing lands and D
that the acquisition of lands was discriminatory. The High Court
concluded that the case of respondent no.1 was on a better
footing than that of M/s Orient Crafts since a perusal of the site
plan shows that the land of M/s Orient Crafts which is similarly
placed with the land of the respondent no.1, does not contain E
any structure unlike that of the land of the respondent no.1
containing a pucca structure. Moreover, no nullah flows through
the land of Mis Orient Crafts as averred by the appellant
Corporation. As such, the land of M/s Orient Crafts was held
to be wrongjy released from acquisition amounting to
discrimination against respondent no.1. Accordingly, the High F
Court ordered the release of the land belonging to respondent
no.1 on the following grounds:

1. That they will maintain the green belt as desired by
the Department which is essentially required to lay G
the infrastructure.

ii. That they would pay the proportionate internal and
external charges to the Haryana State Industrial
Development Corporation (in short the 'HSIDC') as H
420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A and when it is required by the authorities.

7. Before us, the learned counsel for the appellants
argued, at the first instance, that since a High Powered
Committee having been appointed to examine the cases of
land acquisition had recommended the acquisition of the lands
8
of the respondents, the decision of the High Court to quash the
particular acquisition was fallacious. The High Powered
Committee had adopted certain guiding principles for
ascertaining the status of the land notified for acquisition, the
firstthree conditions being;-
c
'· :, . ''1:'. ::: The land for which CLU (change of land use) has
_,,, : . ..:: been obtained and the Industrial unit is under
.1
. . .. '. . -.c9nstructio11/
·' .... t :C'·
constructed or running, not to be
,• ' • ".,J.•

·., .·· ·..,· i···~9qY!f~,g; -,,~~t,, i_f the CLU obtained but no
. · D · . --. .. · .. construction initiated
' !" JC.•'_
. . ~i
and duration of sanction had
' -·-,.·L~ l." I"' ~"i-..·~\

.. ,.. , ,. expired, before Jh.e issue 0"'
'"- . ..t
of notification under ' ,_, ,, • :/f-,,1• !\.~':: ···• ·~

, .-.-•. L " .Section-:4•. shall. not .be considered as a case of
•· ·~ .· ·i·,;. .I
.~ .. · ''!), ./ ... ir ;::-1i· J ~ ,,~. ;J

·.,,_ 1 ; ~·. C~~,Ob!~i~ed, keepiQg,!r,yi~.~}re;8f~Visions Of the

. _. . • , ,Punjab Scheduledt '· Roads
• I I • ' .
· _,/
.and Controlled
J
Areas
_: ' - , l. . ~ "l . I .• I • j ' ~ f

, ,. Restrictions. of. Unregulated !•'_Development.
~· .• . . (' ., . ' .
Rules,
.·• • . ,, I I_'! . ::.\ . t • • j . '. t • I '

...- . 1965 (Rule
..: :
26. ,, .
f)
~- . : : ·. ......

II.· '
1
+ne:
l~dusfrial units constructed without permission,
. iftit'iii'the overall planning and do hofinteifere in
,. • f ~ >I • - ... lo ""' , ."J ... o'"'.° ' "t, " ' ' "' ...,l. ' • j

the road network, will be adJusteEI~ as t.~ese are
F . ' t -~ ~ ~ ~ .-·~
· subject to the condition that'the'Town and Country
J· ! ' . f . .' ' . l - - - . ...... .' ' ,... ; '

: Planning Departhieiit has n6rtiled prosecfution· case
in the Court of Law forftie \(iolations, and'shall give
,,.an undertakingt- I....,
to• the.Gommitte~ that they will apply
· ·L ' · - '.,,.1 ' "J • l ': -~ · 1
• I• I~ lr , ~ ~ ' '. 11 ~ ~

G _,,, to the,Director, Town and Country.Planning
t .. ; ,
for , · 1,.. · •' , • 1 ''-.'' _.: .}- • • .I ~i~.

compounding the offe~c~s, ~na. sr~ll pay all the
charges/ fees to the Government as per policy of
:. . ':. the Department qf;Town and Qount(y P~lanning
· ·' ·J Haryana>- •' · ·
1: j':. , i.1,; • ·.~ ' ·~ -. . . ··~ ',.-~ .• - '. • , ! l·~/'~ •.';,"·-r;'~-·

H Ill. To ensure continuity of the Industrial Estate, land
HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL DEV. CORPN. v. 421
SHAKUNTLA & ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]

. ""' under acquisition, which is essential for integrated
planning, shall not be released.
A

-+ These guidelines and parameters for evaluation of the
merits of each case were approved by the Government of
Haryana and Punjab and were subsequently notified through B
the newspaper 'The Tribune' and were also made available in
the wet;>site of HSIDC .

• 't
8. The land belonging to the respondent had houses and
shops built prior to the notification issued under Section 4 of
the Act. However this does not amount to fulfilment of the 'C
conditions necessary for release of the land under the criteria
laid down in the abovementioned parameters and as such, this
particular land was rightly recommended for acquisition. On the -

... .._
other hand, the land belonging to Mis Orient Craft was
recommended for release by the High Powered Committee on D
grounds which. were beyond the scope of the criteria applied
under the parameters approved by the Government. Moreover,
as rightly pointed out by the High Court, the observation of the
Committee regarding a seasonal nullah passing through. the
lands of Mis Orient Craft are contrary to the actual facts. E
Consideration of this observation in releasing the land of. Mis
Orient Craft betrays an element of either partiality or insincerity
~
1' on the part of the Committee. Though, no construction was
raised on the land of Mis Orient Craft, the State of Haryana
sought an affidavit from the General Manager of Mis Orient Craft F
before releasing their land. In the affidavit filed by the Senior
General Manager of Mis Orient Craft, it was averred that they
would leave the land as desired by the HSIDC which is
essentially required to lay the infrastructure. Moreover, it was
averred that they would also pay the proportionate external and
G
internal developmental charges to the HSIDC. Consequent to
• ·~

the submission of this affidavit, the Director of Industry &
Commerce, Haryana, released the land belonging to Mis Orient
Craft. This procedure of release of the land notified for
acquisition clearly does not conform to the guidelines that were
H
422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A formulated and approved at the first place. l' ...

9. It appears that the release of the land of Mis Orient Craft
would not frustrate the whole object of acquisition for expansion
of the industrial estate since the undertaking of M/s Orient Craft
to release land as desired by the HSIDC amounts to fulfilment
B
of the lands needed by the HSIDC in that area. However, the
manner "in which it was released and the grounds that were
relied on for its release are fraught with defects that raise + ~

doubts regarding the impartiality and sincerity of the ,authority.
The appellant corporation has sought to justify the decision of
c the High Powered Committee to release that particular land by
referring to a judgment of this Court in the case of Anand
Buttons v. State of Haryana and others [(2005) 9 SCC 164]
wherein this court observed:

D "... reasoning of the High Court cannot be faulted for the "' (

simple reason that the authority, who has to carry out the
planned development of the industrial estate, is in the best
position to judge as to which land can be exempted from
the acquisition without jeopardizing the development
E scheme. It is not possible for the court to sit in appeal over
the exercise of such satisfaction by the authority vested
with the task of implementing the development plan."
~
7"
Thus the validity of the decision of the concerned authority
wasupheld on the ground that it has to carry out the planned
F development of the industrial estate and so it is in the best
position to judge as to whichland can be exempted from
acquisition without jeopardising the development scheme. As
such, it was rightly held by this court in Anand Buttons's Case
(supra) that it is not possible for the court to sit in appeal over
G the exercise of such satisfaction by the authority vested with the
task of implementing the development plan. ". •
10. The task of such authority is no doubt to ensure the
smooth execution of the development plans and since t.hey have
H a firsthand knowledge of the ground realities, they are surely
HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL DEV. CORPN. v. 423
SHAKUNTLA & ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
at a better position than anyone else to decide as to which land A
>-1
is to be acquired and which is to be released. But when there
has been a guideline laid down for the same task and it has
been approved and notified, the issue becomes a matter of
policy which the authority has to follow with a reasonable
amount of uniformity. In the given facts of the case, the B
respondents have alleged discrimination thereby attracting
Article 14 of the Constitution of India. As held in the case of
Union of India v. International Trading Co. [(2003) 5 SCC 437),
.. i
Article 14 applies to matters of government policy and such
policy or action would be unconstitutional if it fails to satisfy the· c
test of reasonableness. This Court observed :
"... It is law that Article 14 of the Constitution applies also
to matters of governmental policy and if the policy or any
... action of the Government, even in contractual matters, fails
,> ~ to satisfy the test of reasonableness, it would be D
unconstitutional. While the discretion to change the policy
in exercise of the executive power, when not trammelled
by any statute or rule is wide enough, what is imperative
and implicit in terms of Article 14 is that a change in policy
must be made fairly and should not give impression that it E
was so done arbitrarily on by any ulterior criteria. The wide
sweep of Article 14 and the requirement of every State
action qualifying for its validity on this touchstone
" ;'

irrespective of the field of activity of the State is an
accepted tenet. The basic requirement of Article 14 is F
fairness in action by the state, and non-arbitrariness in
essence and substance is the heart beat of fair play.
Actions are amenable, in the panorama of judicial review
only to the extent that the State must act validly for
discernible reasons, not whimsically for any ulterior G
purpose. The meaning and true import and concept of
.. .. arbitrariness is more easily visualized than precisely
defined. A question whether the impugned action is
arbitrary or not is to be ultimately answered on the facts
and circumstances of a given case. A basic and obvious H
(
424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A test to apply in such cases is to see whether there is any
discernible principle emerging from the impugned action ........
and if so, does it really satisfy the test of reasonableness.
Where a particular mode is prescribed for doing an act
and there is no impediment in adopting the procedure, the
8 deviation to act in different manner which does not
disclose any discernible principle which is reasonable itself
shall be labelled as arbitrary. Every State action must be
informed by reason and it follows that an act uninformed
~
by reason is per se arbitrary." t-

c The discretion to change a policy in exercise of the
executive power, which appears to be the case in the present
matter, must be exercised fairly and should not give the
impression that it was so done arbitrarily or by any ulterior
criteria. It has been observed by this court, as noted herein .
D above, that a question whether the impugned action is arbitrary ;. ~-
or not, is to be ultimately answered on the facts and
circumstan,9es of the given case. It was rightly held that where
a particular mode is prescribed for doing an act and there is
no impediment in adopting the procedure, the deviation to act
E in a different manner which does not disclose any discernible
prinqiple which is reasonable itself shall be labelled as arbitrary.

11. Thus in the given facts of the case, the action of the
~
Committee in releasing the lands of Mis Orient Craft would not ~

F be arbitrary in so far as it has deviated from the procedure laid
down in the form of guidelines approved for the same purpose,
provided a principle discerned from the deviation is within the
bounds of the reasonableness test. From a perusal of the facts
of the case, it is clear that the release of the land of Mis Orient
Craft may be said to be based on the logic that as the
G
undertaking of Mis Orient Craft to release their land as desired
by the department had fulfilled the lands needed by the HSIDC,
so the deviation in releasing the same has a justifiable reason.
;- .
So, we may safely say that such deviation from the procedural
guidelines is not unjustified in the present situation. This leads
H
HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL DEV. CORPN. v. 425
SHAKUNTLA & ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
us to the question as to why such a reasonable principle was A
not applied in the case of the lands of the respondent, though
the same were contiguous and adjoining the lands of Mis Orient
Craft and thereby releasing the land of the respondent also.

12. As the deviation from the guidelines in releasing the 8
land of M/s Orient Craft has been found to be not wrongful, there
is no question of committing two wrongs by applying the same
yardstick to release the lands of the respondents. As such, we
do not find anything wrong in the decision of the High Court to
release the lands of the respondents from acquisition.
c
13. Thus, let us now consider the question raised by the
respondents regarding the validity of the conditions laid down
by the High Court for release of their lands. As noted herein
earlier, the High Court had laid down the following conditions
for the release from acquisition of the lands of the respondents D

i. That they will maintain the green belt as desired by
the Department which is essentially required to lay
the infrastructure. E
ii. That they would pay the proportionate internal and
external charges to the HSIDC as and when it is
~ required by the authorities.

It is obvious that these conditions laid down are very similar F
to the undertaking of Mis Orient Craft which was filed in the form
of an affidavit as mentioned earlier. At the risk of repetition, we
would like to mention the two conditions mentioned in the
undertaking of Mis Orient Craft viz.:-

i. That they would leave the land as desired by the G
department which is essentially required to lay the
infrastructure. ·

ii. That they would also pay the proportionate external
and internal development charges to the HSIDC as H
426 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A and when assessed and demanded.
'I-·~

Thus, the intention of the High Court is clearly to bring parity in
the status of the lands of the respondents vis-a-vis that of M/s
Orient Craft. This is justifiable since the same principle has been
applied that is discernible from the act of release from
B
acquisition of the land of M/sOrient Craft, as has already been
observed.

14. However, the respondents have argued against the ·r .t,

. validity of the condition to maintain a green belt on thei_r land
c up to 50 meters on two grounds. First, they relied on a judgment
of this Court in the case of Raju S. Jethmalani v. State of
Maharastra [(2005) 11 SCC 222] wherein it was held that the
burden to make available green area cannot be put on the
citizens. Secondly, it was argued that the condition of
D maintaining 50 meters green belt is not supported by any law
in force, and also that even under Section 3 of the Punjab
... ~

Scheduled Roads & Controlled Areas (Restriction of
Unregulated Development) Act,· 1963, there is no condition of
maintaining green belt:
E
15. Before taking up the first point, we would like to clarify
one thing about the second point. It is true that Section 3 of the
Punjab Scheduled Roads & Controlled Areas (Restriction of
Unregulated Development) Act, 1963 does not explicitly require t

the maintenance of 50 meters green belt. However, ori.e must
F take into consideration the fact that the Corporation had been
appointed as a nodal agency by the State Government for rapid
industrialisation of the State and so it had to carry out the
planned development of the industrial estates. The needs of
...
industrialisation and economic development are so dynamic
G that it is not possible to limit these needs by certain legislative
provision. These needs will change according to the growing ~ ...
economic demands. In the present case in hand, the need for
rapid industrialization of the State was recognised by the State
Government and accordingly notifications were issued by it
H under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act, which was clearly done
-
HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL DEV. CORPN. v. 427
SHAKUNTLA & ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
> .. according to the applicable rules and procedures. Moreover, A
there is no law in force that categorically limits the area to which
a green belt may be extended, and this means that it is a need
based decision on the part of the authority though it has to be
within reasonable bounds. So the mere fact that Section 3 of
the Punjab Scheduled Roads & Controlled Areas (Restriction B
of Unregulated Development) Act, 1963 does not explicitly
require the maintenance of 50 meters green belt, cannot be
• i allowed to frustrate the attempt to meet the ever increasing
economic needs of rapid industrialisation. In this regard, we
may once again look back to the judgment in Anand Button's c
case (supra) and conclude that since the nodal agency is in the
best position to decide how much is needed for the
maintenance of 50 meters green belt, there is nothing wrong
in requiring the same in the given case.
16. As far as the judgment in the case of Raju S. D
Jethmalani (supra) is concerned, we need to see whether the
facts in that case are similar to the facts in the present case. In
Raju S. Jethmalani, this court held that no burden can be placed
on private citizens to provide suitable area in· the locality for
using the same as garden or park. This Court observed : E

"... We fail to understand how can the burden be placed on
.,. the appellants that they should provide suitable area in the
present locality for using the same as garden or park.
Rather, the burden should have been placed on the F
Municipal Corporation or the State Government instead of
putting it on the appellants that they must provide some
space for garden and park. This direction, in our opinion,
appears to be wholly misconceived and we set aside the
impugned order of the Division Bench ... "
G
# ~
In view of the above, therefore, the burden should have
been placed on the Municipal Corporation or the State
Government and not on the individuals. This appears to render
the judgment of the High Court in the present case fallacious
H
428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A as far as the conditions imposing maintenance of a green belt '!'- ..
on the respondents is concerned. However in the present case,
the purpose is very different from that in Raju S.Jethmalani's
case and also the applicable Acts are different. So the need
is to check whether the two situations are in pari materia or not.
B We have to take into account the observations of this Court in
Raju S. Jethmalani's case (supra) that a development plan can
be prepared of a land comprising of a private person but that
plan cannot be implemented till the land belonging to the private
person is acquired by the Planning Authority. Accordingly in
\- "'
c Raju S. Jethmalani's case (supra), the decision of the High
Court to impose burden on private individuals to provide
suitable area for park was found to be faulty because of the
fact that the Municipal Corporation had failed to acquire the land
for the said purpose even though it was planned so initially. It
is beyond any doubt that in the present case, the HSIDC is
D <
ready to acquire the land of the private persons i.e. the
respondents, and so we fail to relate the situation in Raju S.
Jethmalani with that of the present case. Moreover, we cannot
frustrate the overall purpose of the Act by relying on a judgment
that relates to a matter under the Maharashtra Regional and
E Town Planning Act, 1966. Thus, we need not be bound by the
decision in Raju S. Jethmalani's case (supra) as far as the
burdening of a private person to provide land for public utility
't
is concerned. However, so far as the question of maintaining
a green belt imposed by the High Court in the impugned order
F is concerned, we are not in a position to agree with such
directions of the High Court.

17. Leaving the land for the HSIDC to develop a green belt
is different from that of requiring the private person to maintain
G the green belt since that will be an unnecessary burden on that
person. Since we have sought to rely on the ayerment made
"'
·~

by M/s Orient Craft in order to bring parity between the status
of the lands of the respondents and Mis Orient Craft, we believe
that the same criteria should be applied in releasing these lands
from acquisition. The most important issue is that the process
H
HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL DEV. CORPN. v. 429
SHAKUNTLA & ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]

of development and industrialisation as planned and approved A
by the legislature should not meet a dead end because of a
small stretch of land. As such, the land of the respondents shall
be released from acquisition as was the case with M/s Orient
Craft, but the same shall be done on same grounds as was
applied for the land of Mis Orient Craft. Accordingly, affirming B
the judgment of the High Court, we only modify the conditions
for fulfilment on the part of the respondents so that their land is
released from acquisition. These are:-

i. They will release the land which is needed by the
HSIDC for maintaining the green belt, undisturbed C
and such land shall be not more than the 50 meters
prescribed for the Green Belt.

ii. They will pay. the proportionate external and internal
charges to the HSIDC as and when it is required D
by the authorities.

; 18. Apart from the modifications that we have made in the
conditions imposed by the High Court in the impugned judgment
as mentioned above, we do not find any merit in these appeals.
E
19. For the reasons aforesaid, the appeals are disposed
of with the aforesaid modification of the impugned judgment of
.. the High Court. There will be no order as to the costs.

K.K.T. Appeals disposed of. F

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' .~ ( J
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