Holding

The High Court's order granting bail to the accused was set aside as it failed to consider essential factors and amounted to a perverse, illegal exercise of discretion.

Summary

Harjit Singh filed an FIR alleging that his father was murdered by a group of accused, including Inderpreet Singh (respondent No.1), who was alleged to have orchestrated the conspiracy from jail using a mobile phone. The High Court granted bail to Inderpreet Singh, reasoning that he was not physically present at the crime scene and had been in custody for several months. The appellant contended that the High Court ignored the seriousness of the charge, the severity of the punishment, the accused’s habitual criminal record, and the threat he posed to the complainant and his family. The Supreme Court held that the High Court failed to apply its mind to these material considerations, rendering the bail order perverse, illegal and unjustified. Consequently, the bail was cancelled and the appeal was allowed.

Issues considered

The High Court erred in granting bail to the accused without considering the nature and gravity of the offence, the severity of the punishment, and the accused's antecedents.
Whether the appellate court must set aside a bail order that is passed without application of mind or in contravention of established bail principles.

Legislation cited

Arms Act, 1959s. 25
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 439
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120-B, s. 201, s. 302, s. 34
Prisons Act, 1897s. 52-A

Subjects

bailgrant of bailappellate court discretionnon-application of mindhabitual offenderconspiracy from jailmurderSection 439 CrPCIPCArms Actthreat to complainant

Judgment

258 [2021]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 8 S.C.R. 258 [2021] 8 S.C.R.

A HARJIT SINGH
v.
INDERPREET SINGH @ INDER AND ANOTHER
(Criminal Appeal No. 883 of 2021)
B AUGUST 24, 2021
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD AND
M. R. SHAH, JJ.]
Bail: Grant of bail – Exercise of power while granting bail,
scope of – Duty of appellate court particularly when bail was refused
C
by lower courts and principles and considerations for granting or
refusing the bail – Discussed – In the instant case, complainant
had lodged FIR alleging that his father was murdered by the accused
in connivance with respondent no.1 who was undergoing sentence
on account of a case registered at the instance of the complainant
D party – Respondent no.1 filed bail application before High Court –
High Court released respondent no. 1 on bail by observing that it
was not disputed that he had not fired nor had participated directly
in the incident as he was in custody – Original informant, son of
the deceased filed instant appeal – Held: Material on record showed
that as and when respondent no.1 was granted bail, he came out of
E
the jail, committed another offence and again went to jail – High
Court failed to notice that earlier also respondent no. 1 had been
involved in criminal cases and was convicted and while on bail
during the pendency of appeal against conviction, again committed
the offence – Thus, there was a high possibility of threat and danger
F to the life and safety of the appellant/complainant and his family
members, as is evident from the criminal history of respondent no.1
– High Court failed to appreciate and consider the nature of
accusation and the severity of the punishment in case of conviction
and nature of supporting evidence – There was, thus, non-application
of mind to the seriousness of the crime and circumstances which
G
ought to have been taken into consideration while granting bail –
High Court’s order granting bail set aside.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: The High Court has failed to appreciate and
H consider the nature of the accusation and the severity of the
258
HARJIT SINGH v. INDERPREET SINGH @ INDER AND 259
ANOTHER

punishment in case of conviction and the nature of supporting A
evidence. The High Court has also failed to appreciate the facts
of the case; the nature of allegations; gravity of offence and the
role attributed to the accused. As per the allegations, the accused
- respondent no.1 is the main conspirator who hatched the
conspiracy along with other co-accused and that too from the jail.
B
The High Court has also failed to notice the serious allegation of
hatching conspiracy from the jail. The High Court ought to have
considered that if respondent no.1 – accused can hatch the
conspiracy from jail, what he will not do if he is released on bail.
As such, in the present case, the High Court failed to notice that
earlier respondent no.1 - accused has been involved in four cases C
and has been convicted and even while on bail during the
pendency of the appeal against the conviction, again he indulged
into similar activities and committed the offence. Respondent
no.1 is a habitual offender. On number of occasions, he has tried
to kill the complainant/appellant and his family. He has repeatedly
D
committed offence of attempting to murder the appellant
complainant thrice and has been convicted in all the three FIRs.
From the material on record, it is clear that as and when he is
granted bail, he came out of the jail, committed another offence
and again went to jail. Even the High Court cancelled the bail in
another case specifically observing that while on bail during the E
pendency of the appeal, they were involved in other cases of
heinous crime. Thus, there is a high possibility of threat and
danger to the life and safety of the appellant herein/complainant
and his family members, as is evident from the criminal history of
respondent no.1. The said relevant considerations are not at all
F
considered by the High Court in its true perspective. Grant of
bail to respondent no.1 does not appear to be in order. The
antecedents of respondent no.1; the threat perception to the
appellant and his family members are also not considered by the
High Court. [Paras 10, 11, 12][277-E-H; 279-A-E]
Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court G
of A.P. (1978) 1 SCC 240 : [1978] 2 SCR 371; Ash
Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh (2012) 9 SCC 446 : [2012]
7 SCR 584; State of Maharashtra v. Sitaram Popat Vetal
(2004) 7 SCC 521 : [2004] 3 Suppl. SCR 696; Mahipal
H
260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 8 S.C.R.

A v. Rajesh Kumar (2020) 2 SCC 118; Ramesh Bhavan
Rathod v. Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana (koli) 2021
(6) SCALE 41; Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. (2004) 7
SCC 525 : [2004] 3 Suppl. SCR 584; Sonu v. Sonu
Yadav (2021) SCC Online SC 286 – relied on.
B Case Law Reference
[1978] 2 SCR 371 relied on Para 7.1
[2012] 7 SCR 584 relied on Para 7.2
[2004] 3 Suppl. SCR 696 relied on Para 7.3
C (2020) 2 SCC 118 relied on Para 7.4
2021 (6) SCALE 41 relied on Para 8
[2004] 3 Suppl. SCR 584 relied on Para 8
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
D No.883 of 2021.
From the Judgment and Order dated 18.03.2021 of the High Court
of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Crl. Misc. No. M-11809 of
2021.
Ish Puneet Singh, Subhasish Bhowmick, Advs. for the Appellant.
E
Sant Pal Singh Sidhu, Karanjeet Singh Brar, Zubin Chhura,
Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Mrs. Jaspreet Gogia, Ms. Mandakini Singh,
Karanvir Gogia, Ms. Shivangi Singhal, Ms. Ashima Mandla, Advs. for
the Respondents.

F The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
M. R. SHAH, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
and order dated 18.03.2021 passed by the High Court of Punjab &
G Haryana at Chandigarh in CRM-M No. 11809 of 2021, by which the
High Court has released respondent no.1 herein – original accused on
bail in connection with FIR No. 245 dated 21.09.2020 at Police Station
Sadar Jalandhar, District Jalandhar under Sections 302, 120-B, 34, 201
IPC and Section 25 of Arms Act, 1959, the original informant – son of
H the deceased has preferred the present appeal.
HARJIT SINGH v. INDERPREET SINGH @ INDER AND 261
ANOTHER [M. R. SHAH, J.]

3. That the appellant herein – Harjit Singh son of late Mann Singh A
lodged an FIR being FIR No. 245 at Police Station Sadar Jalandhar,
District Jalandhar on 21.09.2020 against the accused persons including
respondent no.1 herein for the offences under Sections 302, 120-B, 34,
201 IPC and Section 25 of Arms Act, 1959 alleging inter alia that on
21.09.2020 at about 5:45 p.m. when his father Mann Singh was present
B
near the gate of Gurudwara Sahib, a white colour Maruti Car stopped
near his father from which three persons alighted. The persons alighted
from the car were (1) Jaskaran Singh @ Jassa son of Bahadur Singh;
(2) Bahadur Singh son of Santokh Singh; and (3) Satvinder Singh son of
Karam Singh, residents of Jamsher Khas. It was alleged that Bahadur
Singh and Satvinder Singh caught hold of his father and Jaskaran Singh C
@ Jassa, who was armed with a pistol, fired 4-5 shots at his father, who
died on account of said fire arm shots. It was specifically alleged that his
father has been murdered by the assailants in connivance with Inderpreet
Singh (respondent No.1 herein), who is undergoing sentence on account
of a case registered at the instance of the complainant party. It was
D
further alleged that the motive for the said occurrence is that FIR No.
12 dated 30.01.2020 at Police Station Jalandhar under Sections 307,
326, 323, 324, 452, 506, 148 and 149 IPC and FIR No. 33 dated 14.2.2011
at Police Station Jalandhar under Sections 307, 308, 326, 325,
323,324,148, 149 and 427 IPC had been lodged against the accused and
the complainant’s father had been pursuing the said cases to get them E
convicted and on account of which his father had been murdered.
3.1 That during the investigation, it was revealed that though
Inderpreet Singh (respondent No.1 herein) was not physically present at
the spot, but it has been revealed that the deceased was murdered at the
instance of the accused – Inderpreet Singh (respondent no.1 herein) F
who hatched criminal conspiracy along with other co-accused to kill
Mann Singh – father of the complainant; that during the interrogation
the accused Inderpreet Singh (respondent no.1 herein) confessed that
he was in touch with co-accused through a mobile phone from jail which
he destroyed after the occurrence; that during the course of investigation
it was revealed that Inderpreet Singh (respondent no.1 herein) and co- G
accused Jaskaran Singh were convicted in FIR No. 67 dated 08.05.2016;
that Inderpreet Singh (respondent no.1 herein) filed appeal in the High
Court against his conviction and sentence in FIR No. 67 of 2016 and by
order dated 30.04.2019 the High Court suspended the sentence of
respondent no.1 herein – Inderpreet Singh, pending his appeal; that the H
262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 8 S.C.R.

A complainant herein filed an application under Section 439 (2) Cr.P.C.
before the High Court for cancellation of bail of Inderpreet Singh
(respondent no.1 herein) and co-accused Jaskaran Singh @ Jassa since
they had been calling the complainant and the injured on their phones
and threatening them and vide order dated 26.07.2019 the High Court
was pleased to cancel the bail of Inderpreet Singh (respondent no.1
B
herein) and co-accused Jaskaran Singh @ Jassa and directed the Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Jalandhar to take them into custody; that Inderpreet
Singh (respondent No.1 herein) and co-accused Jaskaran Singh @ Jassa
challenged the order passed by the High Court cancelling their bail before
this Court and this Court dismissed the special leave petition vide order
C dated 11.09.2019; that thereafter Inderpreet Singh (respondent No.1
herein) surrendered, however co-accused Jaskaran Singh @ Jassa
jumped the bail and is absconding since then and he has been declared
proclaimed offender.
3.2 That during the investigation it was revealed that taking
D advantage of the situation, Inderpreet Singh (respondent No.1 herein)
while being lodged in Central Jail, Kapurthala hatched conspiracy with
co-accused Jaskaran Singh @ Jassa, Bahadur Singh and Satvinder Singh
to commit the murder of the father of the complainant while being in
touch with them on mobile phones, mobile phone of his co-prisoner from
jail, namely, Rajvir Singh; that during the course of investigation it was
E revealed that regular calls were made from mobile phone 8283904306
to phone numbers of his co-accused to hatch the conspiracy; that during
the investigation it was also revealed that tower location of the said
mobile phone being used by respondent no.1 herein – Inderpreet Singh
was near Central Jail, Kapurthala; according to the investigating agency
F that during detailed investigation it came to the fore that one Harjinder
Singh was lodged in Kapurthala Jail in a NDPS case who was co-villager
of another prisoner namely Rajvir Singh lodged in the same jail and after
being released on bail, Harjinder Singh on demand gave sim card and
phone to Rajvir Singh inside the jail and this phone was being used by
respondent no.1 – Inderpreet Singh to hatch conspiracy with other co-
G accused; that thereafter on completion of the investigation the investigating
officer has filed the chargesheet against the accused including respondent
no.1 herein for the offences under Sections 302, 120-B, 34, 201 IPC and
Section 25 of Arms Act, 1959 in the court; that respondent no.1 herein –
Inderpreet Singh thereafter filed an application under Section 439 Cr.P.C.
H in the Court of Learned Sessions Judge, Jalandhar; that by order dated
HARJIT SINGH v. INDERPREET SINGH @ INDER AND 263
ANOTHER [M. R. SHAH, J.]

15.01.2021, the learned Sessions Judge, Jalandhar dismissed the said A
application and refused to release respondent no.1 herein on bail; that
thereafter respondent no.1 – Inderpreet Singh approached the High Court
seeking grant of regular bail by way of application being CRM-M
No.11809/2021; that by the impugned judgment and order the High Court
has released respondent no.1 herein – accused on bail by observing that
B
it is not in dispute that the accused had not fired or had participated
directly in the occurrence as he was in custody and that the factum of
the accused using a mobile phone within the jail premises is a fact which
would be debatable as the possession of a mobile phone by him in jail
premises would be required to be established and that he has been behind
bars since the last about five months and was present in jail when the C
occurrence took place and further detention of the accused in such
circumstances would not be justified.
3.3 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
and order releasing respondent no.1 – Inderpreet Singh on bail in
connection with FIR No. 245 dated 21.09.2020 at Police Station Sadar D
Jalandhar, District Jalandhar for the offences under Sections 302, 120-
B, 34, 201 IPC and Section 25 of Arms Act, 1959, the original informant
– complainant and son of the deceased Mann Singh has preferred the
present appeal.
4. Shri Ish Puneet Singh, learned Advocate has appeared on behalf E
of the appellant, Mrs. Jaspreet Gogia, learned Advocate has appeared
on behalf of the State of Punjab and Shri Sant Pal Singh Sidhu, learned
Advocate has appeared on behalf of the accused Inderpreet Singh –
respondent no.1 herein.
4.1 Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant – original F
complainant has vehemently submitted that in the facts and circumstances
of the case the High Court has committed a grave error in releasing
respondent no.1 herein on bail.
4.2 It is submitted that while releasing respondent no.1 on bail the
High Court has not at all considered the seriousness of the offence; the G
specific allegation in the FIR that even while in jail he hatched the
conspiracy along with other co-accused and that he was the master
mind and the main conspirator.
4.3 It is submitted that the High Court has also not at all considered
the antecedents of the accused and motive behind commission of the
H
offence and threat perceptions to the complainant and his family members.
264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 8 S.C.R.

A 4.4 It is submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the
complainant that earlier respondent no.1 has been convicted in three
other cases and while he was on bail granted by the High Court while
suspending the sentence, the accused – respondent no.1 herein had
committed one other offence and has tried to kill the complainant and his
family members. It is submitted that in fact the accused who has been
B
convicted in other cases had earlier been granted bail in other case and
on account of having misused the concession of bail, his bail was
cancelled. It is submitted that therefore there is a very likelihood that the
accused if granted bail would misuse the concession again.
4.5 It is submitted that the High Court has failed to take into
C consideration the antecedents of respondent no.1 – accused, while
granting him bail. It is submitted that he has been convicted in four other
FIRs.
4.6 It is submitted that the High Court has materially erred in not
considering the relevant material/evidence collected during the course
D of investigation connected to respondent no.1 – accused and the High
Court has failed to notice that there is ample material collected during
the investigation establishing that from the jail respondent no.1 has hatched
conspiracy along with other co-accused.
4.7 It is submitted that the High Court has failed to consider that
E respondent no.1 – accused is a habitual offender and therefore it would
not be proper to release him on bail.
4.8 It is submitted that one of the grounds on which the High
Court has released respondent no.1 on bail is that he has been behind
bars since last 4-5 months. It is submitted that looking to the seriousness
F of the offence and his antecedents and he being the habitual offender,
merely because he was behind bars since last about 4-5 months cannot
be a ground to release him on bail in a serious offence of committing the
murder and destroying the evidence.
4.9 Making the above submissions, it is prayed to allow the present
G appeal and quash and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed
by the High Court releasing respondent no.1 - accused on bail.
5. Mrs. Jaspreet Gogia, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of
the State of Punjab has supported the appellant. She has relied upon a
detailed counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State. It is submitted that
H
HARJIT SINGH v. INDERPREET SINGH @ INDER AND 265
ANOTHER [M. R. SHAH, J.]

respondent no.1 – accused is a habitual offender and is after the life of A
the complainant/appellant herein and his family members. It is submitted
that he repeatedly committed offence of attempt to murder of the
complainant herein thrice and was convicted in all the three FIRs and is
undergoing sentence in those cases.
5.1 It is submitted that every time he was granted bail in the said B
FIRs, he came out of the jail, committed another offence and then again
went to jail. It is submitted that by order dated 26.07.2019 when the bail/
suspension of sentence of respondent no.1 and co-accused Jaskaran
Singh @ Jassa was cancelled by the High Court, respondent no.1
surrendered back to the jail but co-accused Jaskaran Singh @ Jassa
jumped the bail and is absconding since then; he has been declared C
proclaimed offender. It is submitted that taking advantage of the situation,
respondent no.1 while being lodged in Central Jail, Kapurthala hatched
conspiracy with other co-accused Jaskaran Singh, Bahadur Singh and
Satvinder Singh to commit murder of the father of the appellant herein.
5.2 It is submitted that during the course of the detailed investigation, D
it was revealed that mobile phone was used by the accused and others
while in jail. Thereafter, further enquiry was conducted by the jail
authorities and the SSP, Kapurthala and it was found during the said
enquiry that the mobile in question was being used by prisoner Rajvir
Singh and the accused – respondent no.1 herein to make calls outside E
the jail and accordingly FIR No. 209 dated 1.8.2021 is registered under
Section 52-A Prisons Act, 1894 at P.S. Kotwali, Kapurthala.
5.3 It is submitted that after completion of investigation in case
FIR No. 245 dated 21.09.2020 all the accused persons including
respondent no.1 herein have been chargesheeted for the offences under F
Sections 302, 120-B, 34, 201 IPC and Section 25 of Arms Act, 1959
before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jalandhar and the learned
Sessions Court is to frame the charges. It is submitted that there is
ample evidence against the accused Inderpreet Singh – respondent no.1
herein.
G
6. The present appeal is vehemently opposed by Shri Sant Pal
Singh Sidhu, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no.1 –
accused. It is submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case,
no error has been committed by the High Court in releasing the accused
on bail.
H
266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 8 S.C.R.

A 6.1 It is submitted that it is not in dispute that when the incident in
question took place, respondent no.1 herein was in jail and nothing is on
record to show that respondent no.1 had participated directly in the
occurrence. It is submitted that as rightly observed by the High Court
the factum of the accused Inderpreet Singh using a mobile phone within
the jail premises is a fact which would be debatable as the possession of
B
a mobile phone by the accused in jail premises would be required to be
established. It is submitted that therefore and when the investigation
was completed and the chargesheet was already filed, no further custodial
investigation was required and therefore the accused – Inderpreet Singh
has been rightly released on bail by the High Court.
C 6.2 It is further submitted that after grant of bail to respondent
no.1 herein in the present case, he has never misused the concession of
bail. It is submitted that as per the settled law, different parameters are
there for grant of bail and to cancel the bail. It is submitted that once the
bail is granted by the Court of law, the same can be cancelled on account
D of misuse of bail. It is submitted that as in the present case after
respondent no.1 herein – accused Inderpreet Singh was released on bail
he has not misused the concession of bail granted to him and therefore
this is not a fit case to cancel the bail. Therefore, it is prayed to dismiss
the present appeal.
E 7. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties
at length.
Before considering the rival submissions on behalf of the respective
parties, few decisions of this Court on how to exercise the discretionary
power for grant of bail and the duty of the appellate court, particularly
F when bail was refused by the court(s) below and the principles and
considerations for granting or refusing the bail are required to be referred
to and considered.
7.1 In the case of Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor,
High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240, this Court has observed and
G held that deprivation of freedom by refusal of bail is not for punitive
purposes but for the bifocal interests of justice. The nature of the charge
is a vital factor and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The
severity of the punishment to which the accused may be liable if convicted
also bears upon the issue. Another relevant factor is whether the course
of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction
H of the Court to be freed for the time being. The Court has also to consider
HARJIT SINGH v. INDERPREET SINGH @ INDER AND 267
ANOTHER [M. R. SHAH, J.]

the likelihood of the applicant interfering with the witnesses for the A
prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is further
observed that it is rational to enquire into the antecedents of the man
who is applying for bail to find out whether he has a bad record,
particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious
offences while on bail.
B
7.2 In the case of Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh, (2012) 9
SCC 446, this Court in paragraphs 17 to 19 observed and held as under:
“17. We are absolutely conscious that liberty of a person should
not be lightly dealt with, for deprivation of liberty of a person has
immense impact on the mind of a person. Incarceration creates a C
concavity in the personality of an individual. Sometimes it causes
a sense of vacuum. Needless to emphasise, the sacrosanctity of
liberty is paramount in a civilised society. However, in a democratic
body polity which is wedded to the rule of law an individual is
expected to grow within the social restrictions sanctioned by law.
The individual liberty is restricted by larger social interest and its D
deprivation must have due sanction of law. In an orderly society
an individual is expected to live with dignity having respect for
law and also giving due respect to others’ rights. It is a well-
accepted principle that the concept of liberty is not in the realm of
absolutism but is a restricted one. The cry of the collective for E
justice, its desire for peace and harmony and its necessity for
security cannot be allowed to be trivialised. The life of an individual
living in a society governed by the rule of law has to be regulated
and such regulations which are the source in law subserve the
social balance and function as a significant instrument for
protection of human rights and security of the collective. It is F
because fundamentally laws are made for their obedience so that
every member of the society lives peacefully in a society to achieve
his individual as well as social interest. That is why Edmond Burke
while discussing about liberty opined, “it is regulated freedom”.
18. It is also to be kept in mind that individual liberty cannot be G
accentuated to such an extent or elevated to such a high pedestal
which would bring in anarchy or disorder in the society. The
prospect of greater justice requires that law and order should
prevail in a civilised milieu. True it is, there can be no arithmetical
formula for fixing the parameters in precise exactitude but the H
268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 8 S.C.R.

A adjudication should express not only application of mind but also
exercise of jurisdiction on accepted and established norms. Law
and order in a society protect the established precepts and see to
it that contagious crimes do not become epidemic. In an organised
society the concept of liberty basically requires citizens to be
responsible and not to disturb the tranquillity and safety which
B
every well-meaning person desires. Not for nothing J. Oerter stated:
“Personal liberty is the right to act without interference
within the limits of the law.”
19. Thus analysed, it is clear that though liberty is a greatly
C cherished value in the life of an individual, it is a controlled and
restricted one and no element in the society can act in a manner
by consequence of which the life or liberty of others is jeopardised,
for the rational collective does not countenance an anti-social or
anti-collective act.”

D 7.3 In the case of State of Maharashtra v. Sitaram Popat Vetal,
(2004) 7 SCC 521, it is observed and held by this Court that while
granting of bail, the following factors among other circumstances are
required to be considered by the Court:
1. The nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in
E case of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence;
2. Reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witness or
apprehension of threat to the complainant; and
3. Prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the charge.
It is further observed that any order dehors such reasons suffers
F
from non-application of mind.
7.4 In the case of Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar (2020) 2 SCC 118,
where the High Court released the accused on bail in a case for the
offence under Section 302 of the IPC and other offences recording the
only contention put forth by the counsel for the accused and further
G recording that “taking into account the facts and circumstances of the
case and without expressing the opinion on merits of case, this Court
deems fit just and proper to enlarge/release the accused on bail”, while
setting aside the order passed by the High Court granting bail, one of us
(Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud) observed in paragraphs 11 and 12 as
H under:
HARJIT SINGH v. INDERPREET SINGH @ INDER AND 269
ANOTHER [M. R. SHAH, J.]

“11. Essentially, this Court is required to analyse whether there A
was a valid exercise of the power conferred by Section 439 CrPC
to grant bail. The power to grant bail under Section 439 is of a
wide amplitude. But it is well settled that though the grant of bail
involves the exercise of the discretionary power of the court, it
has to be exercised in a judicious manner and not as a matter of
B
course. In Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh (2002) 3
SCC 598, Umesh Banerjee, J. speaking for a two-Judge Bench
of this Court, laid down the factors that must guide the exercise
of the power to grant bail in the following terms:
“3. Grant of bail though being a discretionary order — but,
however, calls for exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner C
and not as a matter of course. Order for bail bereft of any cogent
reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that
the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the
matter being dealt with by the court and facts, however, do always
vary from case to case. … The nature of the offence is one of D
the basic considerations for the grant of bail — more heinous is
the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though,
however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.
4. Apart from the above, certain other which may be attributed to
be relevant considerations may also be noticed at this juncture, E
though however, the same are only illustrative and not exhaustive,
neither there can be any. The considerations being:
(a) While granting bail the court has to keep in mind not only
the nature of the accusations, but the severity of the punishment,
if the accusation entails a conviction and the nature of evidence F
in support of the accusations.
(b) Reasonable apprehensions of the witnesses being tampered
with or the apprehension of there being a threat for the
complainant should also weigh with the court in the matter of
grant of bail. G
(c) While it is not expected to have the entire evidence
establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt
but there ought always to be a prima facie satisfaction of the
court in support of the charge.
H
270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 8 S.C.R.

A (d) Frivolity in prosecution should always be considered and it
is only the element of genuineness that shall have to be
considered in the matter of grant of bail, and in the event of
there being some doubt as to the genuineness of the prosecution,
in the normal course of events, the accused is entitled to an
order of bail.”
B
12. The determination of whether a case is fit for the grant of bail
involves the balancing of numerous factors, among which the
nature of the offence, the severity of the punishment and a prima
facie view of the involvement of the accused are important. No
straitjacket formula exists for courts to assess an application for
C the grant or rejection of bail. At the stage of assessing whether a
case is fit for the grant of bail, the court is not required to enter
into a detailed analysis of the evidence on record to establish beyond
reasonable doubt the commission of the crime by the accused.
That is a matter for trial. However, the Court is required to examine
D whether there is a prima facie or reasonable ground to believe
that the accused had committed the offence and on a balance of
the considerations involved, the continued custody of the accused
subserves the purpose of the criminal justice system. Where bail
has been granted by a lower court, an appellate court must be
slow to interfere and ought to be guided by the principles set out
E for the exercise of the power to set aside bail.
7.5 That thereafter this Court considered the principles that guide
while assessing the correctness of an order passed by the High Court
granting bail. This Court specifically observed and held that normally
this Court does not interfere with an order passed by the High Court
F granting or rejecting the bail to the accused. However, where the
discretion of the High Court to grant bail has been exercised without the
due application of mind or in contravention of the directions of this Court,
such an order granting bail is liable to be set aside. This Court further
observed that the power of the appellate court in assessing the correctness
G of an order granting bail stand on a different footing from an assessment
of an application for cancellation of bail. It is further observed that the
correctness of an order granting bail is tested on the anvil of whether
there was a proper or arbitrary exercise of the discretion in the grant of
bail. It is further observed that the test is whether the order granting bail
is perverse, illegal or unjustified. Thereafter this Court considered the
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difference and distinction between an application for cancellation of bail A
and an appeal before this Court challenging the order passed by the
appellate court granting bail in paras 13, 14, 16 and 17 as under:
“13. The principles that guide this Court in assessing the correctness
of an order [Ashish Chatterjee v. State of W.B., CRM No. 272 of
2010, order dated 11-1-2010 (Cal)] passed by the High Court B
granting bail were succinctly laid down by this Court in Prasanta
Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee (2010) 14 SCC 496. In that
case, the accused was facing trial for an offence punishable under
Section 302 of the Penal Code. Several bail applications filed by
the accused were dismissed by the Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate. The High Court in turn allowed the bail application C
filed by the accused. Setting aside the order [Ashish Chatterjee v.
State of W.B., CRM No. 272 of 2010, order dated 11-1-2010
(Cal)] of the High Court, D.K. Jain, J., speaking for a two-Judge
Bench of this Court, held:
“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere D
with an order [Ashish Chatterjee v. State of W.B., CRM No.
272 of 2010, order dated 11-1-2010 (Cal)] passed by the High
Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is
equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion
judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic E
principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on
the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances,
the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application
for bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground F
to believe that the accused had committed the
offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;
G
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if
released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing
of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; H
272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 8 S.C.R.

A (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant
of bail.
10. It is manifest that if the High Court does not advert to
B these relevant considerations and mechanically grants bail, the
said order would suffer from the vice of nonapplication of mind,
rendering it to be illegal.”
14. The provision for an accused to be released on bail touches
upon the liberty of an individual. It is for this reason that this Court
C does not ordinarily interfere with an order of the High Court
granting bail. However, where the discretion of the High Court to
grant bail has been exercised without the due application of mind
or in contravention of the directions of this Court, such an order
granting bail is liable to be set aside. The Court is required to
D factor, amongst other things, a prima facie view that the accused
had committed the offence, the nature and gravity of the offence
and the likelihood of the accused obstructing the proceedings of
the trial in any manner or evading the course of justice. The
provision for being released on bail draws an appropriate balance
between public interest in the administration of justice and the
E protection of individual liberty pending adjudication of the case.
However, the grant of bail is to be secured within the bounds of
the law and in compliance with the conditions laid down by this
Court. It is for this reason that a court must balance numerous
factors that guide the exercise of the discretionary power to grant
F bail on a case-by-case basis. Inherent in this determination is
whether, on an analysis of the record, it appears that there is a
prima facie or reasonable cause to believe that the accused had
committed the crime. It is not relevant at this stage for the court
to examine in detail the evidence on record to come to a conclusive
finding.
G
16. The considerations that guide the power of an appellate court
in assessing the correctness of an order granting bail stand on a
different footing from an assessment of an application for the
cancellation of bail. The correctness of an order granting bail is
tested on the anvil of whether there was an improper or arbitrary
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exercise of the discretion in the grant of bail. The test is whether A
the order granting bail is perverse, illegal or unjustified. On the
other hand, an application for cancellation of bail is generally
examined on the anvil of the existence of supervening
circumstances or violations of the conditions of bail by a person to
whom bail has been granted. In Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P.(2014)
B
16 SCC 508, the accused was granted bail by the High Court
[Mitthan Yadav v. State of U.P.[ 2014 SCC OnLine All 16031]. In
an appeal against the order [Mitthan Yadav v. State of U.P., 2014
SCC OnLine All 16031] of the High Court, a two-Judge Bench of
this Court surveyed the precedent on the principles that guide the
grant of bail. Dipak Misra, J. held: C
“12. … It is well settled in law that cancellation of bail after it
is granted because the accused has misconducted himself or
of some supervening circumstances warranting such
cancellation have occurred is in a different compartment
altogether than an order granting bail which is unjustified, illegal D
and perverse. If in a case, the relevant factors which should
have been taken into consideration while dealing with the
application for bail have not been taken note of, or bail is
founded on irrelevant considerations, indisputably the superior
court can set aside the order of such a grant of bail. Such a
case belongs to a different category and is in a separate realm. E
While dealing with a case of second nature, the Court does not
dwell upon the violation of conditions by the accused or the
supervening circumstances that have happened subsequently.
It, on the contrary, delves into the justifiability and the soundness
of the order passed by the Court.” F
17. Where a court considering an application for bail fails to
consider relevant factors, an appellate court may justifiably set
aside the order granting bail. An appellate court is thus required to
consider whether the order granting bail suffers from a non-
application of mind or is not borne out from a prima facie view of G
the evidence on record. It is thus necessary for this Court to assess
whether, on the basis of the evidentiary record, there existed a
prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had
committed the crime, also taking into account the seriousness of
the crime and the severity of the punishment. The order [Rajesh
H
274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 8 S.C.R.

A Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, 2019 SCC OnLine Raj 5197] of the
High Court in the present case, insofar as it is relevant reads:
“2. Counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has been
falsely implicated in this matter. Counsel further submits that, the
deceased was driving his motorcycle, which got slipped on a sharp
B turn, due to which he received injuries on various parts of body
including ante-mortem head injuries on account of which he died.
Counsel further submits that the challan has already been
presented in the court and conclusion of trial may take long time.
3. The learned Public Prosecutor and counsel for the complainant
C have opposed the bail application.
4. Considering the contentions put forth by the counsel for the
petitioner and taking into account the facts and circumstances of
the case and without expressing opinion on the merits of the case,
this Court deems it just and proper to enlarge the petitioner on
D bail.” Thereafter this Court set aside the order passed by the
High Court releasing the accused on bail.”
Thereafter, this Court set aside the order passed by the High Court
releasing the accused on bail.
8. At this stage, a recent decision of this Court in the case of
E Ramesh Bhavan Rathod v. Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana (koli) 2021
(6) SCALE 41 is also required to be referred to. In the said decision, this
Court considered in great detail the considerations which govern the
grant of bail, after referring to the decisions of this Court in the case of
Ram Govind Upadhyay (Supra); Prasanta Kumar Sarkar (Supra);
F Chaman Lal vs. State of U.P. (2004) 7 SCC 525; and the decision of this
Court in Sonu vs. Sonu Yadav 2021 SCC Online SC 286. After considering
the law laid down by this Court on grant of bail, in the aforesaid decisions,
in paragraphs 20, 21, 36 & 37 it is observed and held as under:
“20. The first aspect of the case which stares in the face is the
singular absence in the judgment of the High Court to the nature
G
and gravity of the crime. The incident which took place on 9 May
2020 resulted in five homicidal deaths. The nature of the offence
is a circumstance which has an important bearing on the grant of
bail. The orders of the High Court are conspicuous in the absence
of any awareness or elaboration of the serious nature of the
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offence. The perversity lies in the failure of the High Court to A
consider an important circumstance which has a bearing on
whether bail should be granted. In the two-judge Bench decision
of this Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudharshan Singh, the
nature of the crime was recorded as “one of the basic
considerations” which has a bearing on the grant or denial of bail.
B
The considerations which govern the grant of bail were elucidated
in the judgment of this Court without attaching an exhaustive nature
or character to them. This emerges from the following extract:
“4. Apart from the above, certain other which may be attributed
to be relevant considerations may also be noticed at this
juncture, though however, the same are only illustrative and C
not exhaustive, neither there can be any. The considerations
being:
(a) While granting bail the court has to keep in mind not
only the nature of the accusations, but the severity of the
punishment, if the accusation entails a conviction and the D
nature of evidence in support of the accusations.
(b) Reasonable apprehensions of the witnesses being
tampered with or the apprehension of there being a threat
for the complainant should also weigh with the court in the
matter of grant of bail. E

(c) While it is not expected to have the entire evidence
establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt but there ought always to be a prima facie satisfaction
of the court in support of the charge.
F
(d) Frivolity in prosecution should always be considered and
it is only the element of genuineness that shall have to be
considered in the matter of grant of bail, and in the event of
there being some doubt as to the genuineness of the
prosecution, in the normal course of events, the accused is
entitled to an order of bail.” G
21. This Court further laid down the standard for overturning an
order granting bail in the following terms:
“3. Grant of bail though being a discretionary order — but,
however, calls for exercise of such a discretion in a judicious
H
276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 8 S.C.R.

A manner and not as a matter of course. Order for bail bereft of
any cogent reason cannot be sustained.”
xxx xxx xxx
36. Grant of bail under Section 439 of the CrPC is a matter
involving the exercise of judicial discretion. Judicial discretion in
B granting or refusing bail - as in the case of any other discretion
which is vested in a court as a judicial institution - is not
unstructured. The duty to record reasons is a significant safeguard
which ensures that the discretion which is entrusted to the court
is exercised in a judicious manner. The recording of reasons in a
C judicial order ensures that the thought process underlying the order
is subject to scrutiny and that it meets objective standards of reason
and justice. This Court in Chaman Lal v. State of U.P (2004) 7
SCC 525 in a similar vein has held that an order of a High Court
which does not contain reasons for prima facie concluding that a
bail should be granted is liable to be set aside for nonapplication of
D mind. This Court observed:
“8. Even on a cursory perusal the High Court’s order shows
complete non-application of mind. Though detailed examination
of the evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits of
the case is to be avoided by the Court while passing orders on
E bail applications. Yet a court dealing with the bail application
should be satisfied, as to whether there is a prima facie case,
but exhaustive exploration of the merits of the case is not
necessary. The court dealing with the application for bail is
required to exercise its discretion in a judicious manner and
F not as a matter of course.
9. There is a need to indicate in the order, reasons for prima
facie concluding why bail was being granted particularly where
an accused was charged of having committed a serious
offence…”
G 37. We are also constrained to record our disapproval of the
manner in which the application for bail of Vishan (A-6) was
disposed of. The High Court sought to support its decision to grant
bail by stating that it had perused the material on record and was
granting bail “without discussing the evidence in detail” taking
into consideration:
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(1) The facts of the case; A
(2) The nature of allegations;
(3) Gravity of offences; and
(4) Role attributed to the accused.”
9. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid B
decisions on grant of bail to the facts of the case on hand, the impugned
order passed by the High Court releasing the accused on bail is not
sustainable for the following reasons:
(i) that respondent no.1 – accused Inderpreet Singh along with
other co-accused has been chargesheeted for the offences under sections C
302, 120-B, 34, 201 IPC and Section 25 of Arms Act, 1959 for having
killed the father of the complainant – appellant herein;
(ii) that while in custody in jail, respondent no.1 – accused
Inderpreet Singh hatched the conspiracy with the other co-accused;
D
(iii) that during the course of the investigation, the investigating
officer collected relevant material on hatching the conspiracy from jail
along with other co-accused; and
(iv) that respondent no.1 – accused Inderpreet Singh was in
constant touch on mobile with the other co-accused.
E
10. The High Court has failed to appreciate and consider the nature
of the accusation and the severity of the punishment in case of conviction
and the nature of supporting evidence. The High Court has also failed to
appreciate the facts of the case; the nature of allegations; gravity of
offence and the role attributed to the accused. As per the allegations,
the accused Inderpreet Singh, respondent no.1 herein is the main F
conspirator who hatched the conspiracy along with other co-accused
and that too from the jail. The High Court has also failed to notice the
serious allegation of hatching conspiracy from the jail. The High Court
ought to have considered that if respondent no.1 – accused Inderpreet
Singh can hatch the conspiracy from jail, what he will not do if he is G
released on bail. As such, in the present case, the High Court has failed
to notice that earlier respondent no.1 - accused has been involved in
four cases and has been convicted and even while on bail during the
pendency of the appeal against the conviction, again he indulged into
similar activities and committed the offence. The details of the
antecedents of respondent no.1 – accused are as under: H
278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 8 S.C.R.

A Sl. No. FIR Proceedin gs
1. FIR No.12 dated Convicted vide Judgment dated 13.03.2018 and
20.01.2010 u/s 307, 323, ordered to undergo 10 years RI vide order of
324, 326, 452, 148, 149 Sentence dated 15.03.2018
IPC – P.S. Sadar, CRA – S – 1897 – SB – 2018 pending before the
Jalandhar Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court.
Sentence suspended vide order dated 29.01.2019
2. FIR No.203 dated Convicted vide judgment dated 08.09.2017 and was
B 25.08.2010 u/s 341, 506, sentenced to the period already undergone
34 IPC – P.S. Sadar,
Jalandhar
3. FIR No.33 dated Convicted and ordered to undergo 7 years RI vide
14.02.2011 u/s 307, 323, Judgment and order of Sentence dated 25.09.2014
325, 427, 148, 149 IPC CRA-S-4855-SB-2014 pending before the Hon’ble
– P.S. Sadar, Jalandhar Punjab and Haryana High Court.
Sentence suspended vide order dated 22.04.2015
C Application for cancellation of bail preferred on
account of threats issued to the complainant and
other members and on account of registrati on of
FIR No.67 dated 08.05.2016.
Bail/suspension of sentence granted vide order
dated 22.04.2015 is cancelled vide order dated
26.07.2019
SLP against order dated 26.07.2019 cancelling the
D bail/suspension of sentence is dismi ssed vide order
dated 11.09.2019.
Despite the cancellation of bail respondent
no.1/accused and co-accused Jaskaran Singh @
Jassa did not surrender.
Respondent No.1/accused was finally arrested, after
issuance of repeated arrest warrants, on 18.07.2020.
Fresh application for suspension of sentence was
E dismissed by the Hon’ble High Court vide order
dated 01.09.2020 considering the antecedents of
respondent no.1/accused and concealment of facts.
4. FIR No.67 dated Convicted and ordered to undergo 3 years RI vide
08.05.2016 u/s 323, 324, Judgment and order of Sentence dated 30.03.2019
326, 307, 341, 506, 148,
149 IPC – P.S. Sadar,
Jalandhar
F
It is also required to be noted that earlier while respondent no.1
was released on bail by the High Court suspending the sentence in FIR
No. 67 of 2016 by order dated 30.04.2019, again he committed the offence
while on bail and his bail came to be cancelled by the High Court against
which a special leave petition was preferred before this Court which
G came to be dismissed. It is to be noted that though the High Court
cancelled the bail on 26.07.2019 and directed the Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Jalandhar to take the accused into custody, despite issuance of arrest
warrants against respondent no.1 herein and the co-accused Jaskaran
Singh @ Jassa, they could not be arrested and respondent no.1 herein
was finally arrested on 18.07.2020, and even the co-accused Jaskaran
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Singh @ Jassa is still absconding. From the aforesaid, it can be seen that A
respondent no.1 herein is a habitual offender. On number of occasions,
he has tried to kill the complainant/appellant herein and his family. He
has repeatedly committed offence of attempting to murder the appellant
herein/complainant thrice and has been convicted in all the three FIRs.
11. From the material on record, it is clear that as and when he is B
granted bail, he came out of the jail, committed another offence and
again went to jail. Even the High Court cancelled the bail in another
case vide order dated 26.07.2019 specifically observing that while on
bail during the pendency of the appeal, they were involved in other cases
of heinous crime. From the material on record, it appears that there is a
high possibility of threat and danger to the life and safety of the appellant C
herein/complainant and his family members, as is evident from the criminal
history of respondent no.1, detailed above.
12. The aforesaid relevant considerations are not at all considered
by the High Court in its true perspective. Grant of bail to respondent
no.1 herein does not appear to be in order. The antecedents of respondent D
no.1 herein; the threat perception to the appellant and his family members
are also not considered by the High Court. We are of the opinion that the
High Court has erred in granting bail to respondent no.1 herein without
taking into consideration the overall facts, otherwise having a bearing on
exercise of its discretion on the issue. The order passed by the High E
Court fails to notice material facts and shows non-application of mind to
the seriousness of the crime and circumstances, which ought to have
been taken into consideration.
13. Considering the overall facts and circumstances of the case
and the circumstances noted hereinabove and applying the law laid down F
by this Court in the aforesaid decisions on grant of bail, we are of the
firm opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High
Court has committed a grave error in releasing respondent no.1 – accused
Inderpreet Singh on bail and therefore the impugned judgment and order
passed by the High Court is unsustainable and the same deserves to be
quashed and set aside and is accordingly quashed and set aside. G
Consequently, the bail granted by the High Court to respondent no.1
herein – Inderpreet Singh in connection with FIR No. 245 dated
21.09.2020 at Police Station Sadar Jalandhar, District Jalandhar for the
offences under Sections 302, 120-B, 34, 201 IPC and Section 25 of
Arms Act, 1959 is hereby cancelled. Respondent no.1 herein – Inderpreet H
280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 8 S.C.R.

A Singh is directed to surrender forthwith, failing which the learned trial
Court is directed to take respondent no.1 – Inderpreet Singh into custody
by issuing arrest warrants against him. Needless to say, that the
observations made herein are only for the purpose of deciding the issue
of granting bail to respondent no.1 herein and will have no bearing on the
trial of the case and the learned trial Court shall decide the case on its
B
own merits, in accordance with law.
14. The appeal is accordingly allowed to the aforesaid extent.

Devika Gujral Appeal allowed.
C

D

E

F

G

H