Holding

Entries in the Jamabandi showing the plaintiff as tenant are presumed true under Section 44, and the burden to prove termination of tenancy rests on the appellant under Section 109, leading to affirmation of the decree in favour of the plaintiff.

Summary

The plaintiff, a respondent in a suit for pre-emption, claimed he was a tenant of the disputed land at the time it was sold to the appellants in 1967. The appellants contended they had been tenants since 1965 under a lease from the vendor. The revenue records (Jamabandi for 1959‑60 and subsequent Khasra‑Girdawaris) listed the plaintiff as tenant, and no evidence was adduced to rebut these entries. The Supreme Court held that under Section 44 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, such entries are presumed true, and under Section 109 of the Indian Evidence Act the burden to prove cessation of the landlord‑tenant relationship lies on the party asserting it. Since the appellants failed to displace the presumption, the plaintiff’s tenancy was accepted, and the decree in his favour was upheld. The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Issues considered

The presumption of truth attached to entries in the Jamabandi under Section 44 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act.
The burden of proving cessation of a landlord‑tenant relationship under Section 109 of the Indian Evidence Act.
Whether the plaintiff was a tenant of the land at the relevant date for the purpose of a pre‑emption suit.

Legislation cited

Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 109
Punjab Land Revenue Acts. 44

Subjects

pre-emptiontenancypresumption of truthrevenue recordsburden of proofSection 44 Punjab Land Revenue ActSection 109 Indian Evidence Actpossessioncivil appeal

Judgment

•
HARISH CHANDER & ORS . A

• v.
QHISA MM, AND ANR.
Decembu 18, 1980
[A. D. Kosiw. AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.] B
Puniab Land Revenue Act, Section 44 and Rule I contained in Section 109
Evidence Act-Scope of-Suit of pre-emption of land on the ground that the
plai11tiff was a tenant-Presumption of truth of entries in favour of the revenue
records like lamabandi and Khasra Girdawaris.

• Dismissing the defendant's appeal and affirming the decree in favour of tho c
plail)).iff, the Court.

HELD : A presumption of truth attaches to the entries in the Jamabandi
• for the year 1959-60 showing the defendant-respondents as a tenant, in view of
the provisions of Section 44 of the, Punjab Land Revenue Act. That presump-
tion is no doubt rebuttable, but, in the instant case, no attempt has been made
to displace it. [407C-D] D
Further, once that presumption is raised, still another comes. to the aid of
respo_ndent No. 1 by reason of the rule contained iu Section 109 of the Indian
. Evidence Act, namely, that when two persons have been shown to stat;Ld to each
other in the relatibnship of landlord and tenant. the burden of proving that such
relationship has ceased, is on the party who so asserts. It may, therefore, be
• legitimately presumed that the plaintiff continued to possess the land as a tenant E
till the institution of the suit. [407D"E]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2150 of 1970.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
27-7-1980 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in R.S. No. 737/
F
7P.
,:.I Harbans Singh for th>~ Appellant.
Hardayal Hardy and B. Datta, for the R,e1pondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G
KOSHAL, J.-This appeal by special leave is dir~cted against the
judgment dated July 27, 1970 of the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana affinning the decrees passed by the trial court and the first
appellate court in a suit for possession by way of pre-emption of the
land in dispute in favour of plaintiff-respondent No. 1 on the ground
• that he was a tenant of the disputed land when it was sold to the. H
appellants by respondents Nos. 2 to 4 through a registered sale deed
dated September 29, 1967.
1 10-57 SCl/81
406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1981] 2 S.C.R.

A 2. The suit was resisted by the appellants with the counter-claim
that they, and not respondent No. 1, were in possession of the land
on the relevant date as tenants inasmuch as it had been leased out '
to them by their vendor Kanti Prasad two years prior to the sale,
i.e., in the year 1965. The decrees passed by the courts below proceed
on the basis of evidence to the effect that the name of respoudent
B No. 1 was recorded as a tenant in the Jamabandi for the year 1959-60
(Ex. P. 1) and consistently thereafter till the year 1968 (Khasra-
girdawaris Bxs. P. 2 to P. 7). Apart from the oral evidence there
is no material on the record which may indicate the falsity of any
of the entries in the revenue records and we are of the opinion that
the lower courts were fully justified in relying on them.
c •
Learned counsel for the appellants relies upon three documents
in support of his contention that the Khasra-girdawaris should not
be believed. First in point of time is an application (Ex. A31) •
which was sent to the concerned Deputy Commissioner through the
military authorities by one of the appellants who was an army hand.
D
That application is dated December 11, 1967 and states that the
land in dispute was taken by him on lease from Kanti Prasad in the
year 1965 and prays that the Khasra-girdawari should be corrected
accordingly. The second is the sale-deed itself in which appears a
recital to the effect that on the date of the sale the vendors had -
I
E been in possession of the land covered by it for the preceding two
years. The third is the plaint itself which seeks "possession by way
of pre-emption". None of these documents is of any help to the case
of the appellants. The recital in the plaint is easily explained. Il
is no more than the usual prayer made in suits for pre-emption and
may well be interpreted to mean that possession be granted !o the
F plaintiff by the decree in his capacity of a pre-emptor (and not that
of a mere tenant) . It cannot be implied therefrom that the plaintiff
was out of actual possession. In fact the case made out in the plaint
was specifically founded on the plea that the plaintiff had been in
possession of the land in dispnte as a tenant right upto the date of
the institution of the suit. Paragraph 4 of the plaint reads :
G
"4. The plaintiff has been continuously cultivating the
aforesaid land mentioned in para No. 1 of the plaint, for
a long time as non-occupancy tenant and I, the plaintiff,
•
have been cultivating the same even uptil now. The Ven-
dees are outsiders, therefore, I, the plaintiff have the pre-
H ferential right of pre-emption."
This plea clearly negatives the contention based on the recital
contained in the prayer clallse of the plaint. J
'
}-
HARISH CHANDER v. GHISA RAM (Koshal, !.) 407
•
The averments appearing in the sale deed and application Ex. A. A
31 (which was made about 2t months later) to the effect that the
appellants had been in possession of the land as tenants since 1965
appears to have been falsely made in an attempt to defeat prospective
pre-emptors. Had it been a correct statement of fact, there is no
reason why it should not have found a place in \he agreement of sale
which is dated the 24th April, 1967 but in which no mention of B '!I
delivery of possession of the land to the appellants is made. Nor is
any cogent explanation forthcoming for the fact that no attempt was
made by any of the appellants to have their possession over the land
as tenants made the subject-matter of an entry in the relevant records
at any time before the sale deed was registered.
• c
No suspicion can attach to the entries in the jamabandi for the
year 1959-60, nor have the contents of that document been assailed
before ns. A presumption of truth attaches to those entries in view
• of the provisions of s. 44 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act. That
presumption is no doubt rebuttable but no attempt has been made to
displace it. Further, once that presumption is raised, still another D
comes to the aid of respondent No. 1 by reason of the rule contained
in s. 109 of the Indian Evidence Act, namely, that when two persons
have been shown to stand to each other in the relationship of landlord
and tenant, the r'.!fden of proving that such relationship has .ceased,
is on the party who so asserts. It may therefore be legitimately
presumed that the plaintiff continued to possess the land as a tenant E
till the institution of the suit.
Even though the question of possessio.n of the plaintiff as a tenant
is a question of fact which is concluded by concurrent findings
arrived at by the courts below, we confirm these findings after consi-
deration of the relevant material. F
3. The decree passed in favour of respondent No. 1 is not
challenged on any other ground. The appeal is accordingly dismissed

.. with costs. All mesne profits deposited by respondent No. 1 in the
courts below shall be paid back to him forthwith .
G

V.D.K. Appeal dismissed.

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