Holding

Service of a notice by registered post that is refused by the addressee is deemed effective, and the addressee is imputed knowledge of its contents under the presumptions of Section 27 of the General Clauses Act and Section 114 of the Evidence Act.

Summary

Harcharan Singh, a tenant of a shop in a U.P. cantonment, failed to pay rent for 1965‑66. The landlord sent a combined notice of arrears and eviction by registered post on 9 November 1966, which the tenant refused to accept on 10 November. The landlord sued for eviction under the U.P. Cantonment (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1952. The lower courts held that the notice was not properly served; the High Court reversed, holding that service by refusal imputes knowledge of the notice’s contents under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act and Section 114 of the Evidence Act, and that the suit was maintainable. On special leave, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s view, holding that a registered notice tendered and refused is deemed served and the tenant is deemed to know its contents, making him a wilful defaulter. Consequently, the appellant's appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

The legal effect of service of a notice by registered post when the addressee refuses to accept it.
Whether knowledge of the contents of a refused registered notice can be imputed to the tenant under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act.
Whether the landlord’s suit for eviction under Section 14(1) of the U.P. Cantonment (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1952 is maintainable when rent is payable yearly and the tenant is in arrears for less than four months.
Whether the High Court erred in interfering with the lower courts’ factual findings on service of notice.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 100
General Clauses Act, 1897s. 27
Income Tax Act, 1922s. 34(1)(a)
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 114
Transfer of Property Acts. 106
U.P. Cantonment (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1952s. 14(1)
U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947s. 3(1)
Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972s. 20(2)(a)

Subjects

service of noticeregistered postrefusal of serviceknowledge imputationwilful defaultevictionrent arrearsGeneral Clauses ActIndian Evidence ActU.P. Cantonment Actstatutory construction

Judgment

962

A HARCHARAN SINGH
v.
smv RANI AND ORS.
February 20, 1981
B [V. D. TULZAPURKAR, D. A. DESAI AND A. P. SEN, JJ.J

Service by refusal-Notice den1anding arrears and seeking eviction is sen'
by registered post but refused by the tenant-Whether the tenant could be
imputed rhe knowledge of the contents thereof so that upon his failure to com~
ply with the notice the tenant could be said to have committed wilful default
in payment of rent-U.P. Cantonment (Control of Rent and Eviction), (Central
c Act X), 1952, section 14(1) scope of-General Clauses Act 1897, section 27,
Jndtan Evidence Act, section 114.
The appellant was inducted in the year 1964 as a tenant of the suit premises
on an yearly rental payable by December 31, every year. Since the appellant
did not pay the rent for the years 1965, 1966 a combined notice dated November
9, 1966 demanding payment of arrears and seeking ejectment on tern1ination
0 of tenancy, was sent by registered post by the respondents. The appellant
refused to receive the notice on November 10, 1966. On his failure to comply
with the requisitions contained in the notice, the respondents filed a suit
against the appe11ant seeking eviction as well a'i recovery of rents and mesne
profits.

Having lost before the trial court and the first appellate court, the respon·
dents came up before the High Court in second appeal. The High Court
E accepted the findin of fact recorded by the first appellate court that there was
i:tervice of the notice on the appellant by refusal and held that when notice was
tendered to the tenant and when the latter refused to accept the same know-
ledge of the contents of the notice must be imputed to him. The High Court
allowed the landlords' appeal and granted three months time to the appellant
to vacate the shop. Hence, the tenant's appeal after obtaining special leave
from this Court.
F
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: (By majority) Pu Tulzapurkar, J. (On behalf of A. P. Sen, J.
and himself).

1 : t. The presumptiom that are raised under section 27 of the General
G Chtuseli .Act, 1897 and section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, make it clear
that, when service is effected by refusal of a postal communication, the
addressee must be imputed with the knowledge of the contents thereof. [971
E-Fl
1:2. Before the knowledge of the contents of the notice could be imputed1
it is not necessary tlmt the sealed envelope must be opened and read by the
addres•ee or when the addressee happens to be an illiterate pef'on the contents
H ihould be read over to him by the post·man or someone else. Such things do
·not occur when the addressee is determined to decline to accept the sealed
<0nvelopo. [971 D-EJ
HARCHARAN SINGH V, SHIVRANI 963

Van1an Vithal Kulkarni and Ors. v. Khanderao Ram Rao Sholapurkar. A
A.I.R. 1935 Bom. 247, explained and dissented from.

Mahboob Bi v. Alva/a Lachmiah, A.I.R. 1964 A.P. 324, held inapplicable.

Sltri J.Vath and another v. Smt. Sartuwati Devi Jaiswal, A.I.R. 1964 All. 52;
Fanni Lal v. Smt. Chironja, (1972) Allahabad Law Journal 499; Ganga Ram
v. Smt. Phulwati, (1970) Allahabad Law Journal 336 (FB); Kodali Bapayya B
... and Ors. v. Yadavalli Venkataratnam and Ors., A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 884, approved.
>
Harihar Banerji and Ors. v. Ramshashi Roy and Ors., A.I.R. 1918 P.C. 102,
referred to.

---.\ 2: I. The suit under section 14(1) of the U.P. Cantonment (Control of
Rent & Eviction) Act (Central Act X of 1952), in the instant case was main-
tainabae. Under section 14(1) of the Central Act, which in pari materia with 0
section 3(1) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947,
permission of the District Magistrate was required if the landlord sought evic-
tion of the tenant on any ground other than those specified in clauses (a) to
(f) and not when it was sought on any of the grounds specified in clauses
(a) to (f). [973 E-F]
B/wgwa11 Dass v. Paras Nath, [1969] 2 SCR 297, followed. D
2 : 2. All the courts rightly dealt with the matter as being governed by the
U.P. Cantonments (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, X of 1952--a Central
Act and not by U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947
much less by the later U.P. (Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972. [966 E-FJ
Per Desai, J. Contra.
!. Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction)
E
Act, 1972 is a socially beneficient statute and should be construed according to
well recognised canons of construction. The words used in the statute, if they
are plain and unambiguous must be applied as they stand, however, strongly it
may be suspected that the result does not represent the real intention of the
legislature. However, if two constructions are possible and legitimate ambi-
guity arises from the language employed that which enlarges the protection of
a socially beneficient statute rather than one which restricts it should be pre- F
ferred and adopted. In other words the construction which would be more
consistent with the policy and attainment of the legislation which is to protect
the possession of the tenant unless the landlord establishes a ground for evic-
tion should be preferred. Further where two constructions are possible the one
which would accord with reason and justice must be preferred. [975 G-H,
976 A, D, G]
G
Inland Revenue Comn1issio11ers v. Hinchy, 1960 A.C. 748, H. L. at 767=
F (1960) 1 All India Reports 505 at 512; River Wear Commissioners v. Adam-
"' son, (1877) 2 A.C. 743 & 765, quoted with approval.

Mohd. Shafi v. Additional District & Stssions Judge (VII), Allahabad antl
Others, [1977] 2 S.C.C. 226; Gurucharan Singh v. Kamla Singh & Ors.,
[1976] 2 S.C.C. 152; H. H. Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia B
B"/:_°!_uedr of Gwalior & Ors. v. Union of India & Another, [1971] 1 S.C.C. 85,
...,...,,.1 .
964 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1981] 2 S.C.R.
,
A 2 : 1. The substitution of the expression, "arrears of rent for not less than
four months'" in sub-clause (a) of sub·section (2) of section 20 of the Uttar
Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972 is
a contemporaneous legislative exposition bringing out clearly the legislative in·
tention that the landlord would be entitled to evict the tenant if the rent is ill
arrears for not less than four months. Before the landlord can commence
action under sub-clause (a): (i) the tenant must have committed default in
B payment of rent for a period of four months, and (ii) a notice has to be

.,.•
served, giving the tenant locus poenitentiae to repair the default within month.
[978 B-CJ
2 : 2. Two ingredients emerge from the expression "the tenant is in arrears.
of rent for not less than four months" : (i) that the rent is payable by month
and (ii) the tenant has committed default in payment of rent for four different
months and that this default subsists and continues on the date when the land·
lord invokes the provision of clause (a) and proceeds to serve a notice of.
demand. Again, if within a period of one month from the date of receipt of
notice, the tenant pays up thy arrears of rent he does not lose the protection of
the R~nt Act. [978 G-H, 979 Al
2 : 3. It is implicit in the expression "the tenant is in arrears of rent for not
less than four months" that the legislature clearly intended to cover those cases
D of default in payment of rent under clause (a) where the contract of lease pro--
vided for payment of rent every month meaning thereby that the unit for liabi·
lity to pay rent is one month and secondly the tenant has committed default on

E
four different occasions of four different months or four different units agreed
upon for payment of rent and that too after the liability to pay the same has
acoepted. [979 A-CJ
2 : 4. Section 20(2) (a) of the Rent Act, 1972 does not attract cases whert•
the landlords ac:cept rent on an yearly basis. The language of the section does-
-
not admit of a construction, namely, that even if the rent is payable by year,
once the year is over and a period of four months has elapsed he could be said
to be "a tenant in arrears of rent for not less than four months". In tbe
instant case, the parties are ad idem that the rent is payable by year at the rate
of Rs. 100/· per annum. In such a <:ase it could not be said that this tenant
was in arrears of rent for not less than four months. His case would not be
F covered by section 20(2) of the Rent Act and, therefore, the landlord would
not be entitled to a decree for eviction on this ground and that was the sole
ground on which eviction has been ordered. [980 C-D, 981 A·B]
3. The amended section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code restricted the juris- '

G
diction of the High Court to entertain a second appeal only if the High Court
was satisfied that the case involved a substantial question of law. Sub-section
(4) cast a duty on the court to formulate such substantial questiOn of law and
-
the appeal has to be heard on the question so formulated. It would also be
open to the respondent at the hearing of he appeal to contend that the case
does not involve such a question. Thus, the High C.Ourt ordinarily <:annot and
did not interfere with the concurrent :findings of fact arrived at by the courts
below. [981 G-H, 982 A]
In the facts of this case, there was a concurrent :finding that the statutory
H notice as required by section 20(2)(a) was not served upon the tenant and,
therefore, the High Court was in error in interfering with this finding of fact.
[982 B-C]
HARCHARAN SINGH V. SHIVRANI 965

R. Ramachandrmi Ayyar v. Ramalingam Chettiar, [1963] 3 S.C.R. 605; Mst. A
Durga Chaudhrain v. lawahar Choudhary, 1890 LR 17 IA, 122; Goppulal v.
Dwarkadhishji, [1969] 3 S.C.R. 989, reiterated.

4 : 1. Mere refusal of a registered letter would not permit a presumption to
be raised that not only the service was legal, but the refusal was the conscious
act flowing from the knowledge of the contents of the Jetter. [987 CJ B

4 : 2. This concept that the registered envelope properly addressed and re-
turned with an endorsement of refusal must permit a rebuttable presumption
that the addressee refused it with the knowledge of the contents is wholly
borrowed from the western jurisprudence. Not considering the specific Indian
• \
conditions and the approach of rural Indian to registered letters, but merely go-
ing in with the technical rules of Evidence Act would cause more harm and c
lead to injustice through Jaw. [985 G-H, 986 A]

4 : 3. The Rent Act does not seek to evict a mere defaulter. That is why
a provision for notice has been made. H even after notice the default conti-
nues, the tenant can be condemned as wilful defaulter. He could not be dub-
bed guilty of conscious, wilful, contumacious, intentional conduct even when he D
did not know what was in the registered envelope. It would be atrocious to
impute any such knowledge to a person who has merely been guilty of. refusing
to accept the registered notice. Where service of notice is a condition prece-
• dent, a dubious service held established by examining the postman who must be
delivering hundreds of postal envelopes and who is ready to go to the witness
box after a long interval to say that he offered the envelope to the addressee
and he refused to accept the same, would be travesty of justice. And if this E
condition precedent is not fully satisfied, the subsequent conduct cannot be said
to be wilful. [987 E-G]

Fanni/al v. Smt. Chironja, (1972) All. Law J. 499 (D.B.) dissented to.

Appabhai Motibhai v, Laxmichand Zaverchand & Co., A.I.R. 1954 Bom. F'
159, held inapplicable.
··~
Mahboob Bi v. Alvala Lachmiah, A.I.R. 1964 A.P. 314; Amarjit Singh Ber/I
v. Lachman Das; Waman Vithal Kulkarni &: Others v. Khant!era Ram Rao
• Sholilpurkar, A.I.R. 1935 Born. 247, quoted with approval.
G
5. The argument that it would be impossible to serve the notice as statu-
torily prescribed, once it is held that no knowledge of the contents of the
refused letter could be imputed to the tenant, is incorrect. The notice is re-
quired to be served in the manner prescribed by section 106 of Transfer of
Property Act which, inter alia, provides for affixing a copy of the notice on the
premises in possession of the tenant. Therefore, it cannot be said that the
approach of the Court would render it impossible for the landlord to meet with H
the statutory requirement of service of notice before commencing the action fot
- r oeviction. [988 B-C]
966 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C,R.

A CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1402 of
1979. ....-:. . : l
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
16-2-1979 of the Allahabad High Court in Second Appeal No. 430/
70.
B P. C. Bhartari for the Appellant.
L. M. Singhvi and Pramod Swarup for the Respondent.

The Jndgment of V. D. Tulzapurkar, J. and A. P. Sen, J. was deli-
vered by Tulzapurkar, J. D. A. Desai, J. gave a dissenting Opinion.
c
TULZAPURKAR, J. This is a tenant's appeal by special leave directed
against the judgment and decree passed by the Allahabad High Court
on February 16, 1979 in Second Appeal No. 430 of 1970 whereby
the High Court decreed the respondents' (landlords) suit for ejectment
against the appellant (t~nant) and the only question of substance raised
D in the appeal is whether when the landlords' notice demanding arrears
and seeking eviction is sent by registered post and is refused by the
tenant the latter could be imputed the knowledge of the contents thereof
so that upon his failure to comply with the notice the tenant could be
ilaid to have committed wilful default in payment of rent ?
E The question arises in these circumstances : The appellant occupied
shop No. 5 in Ivanhoe Estate, situated at Landure Cantonment, Mus-
sorie, originally owned by one Parvij Waris Rasool, on an yearly rental
of Rs. 250 payable by December 31, every year. The property at
all material times was admittedly governed by the U.P. Cantoment,.
(Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, X of 1952-a Central Act and, in
I'
my view, all the Courts below rightly dealt with the matter as being
governed by that Act and not by U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent
and Eviction Act, 1947, much less by the later U.P. (Rent and Evic-
tion) Act, 1972. The respondents purchased the aforesaid EState
form its previous owner on November 27, 1964 and the previous owneI
G attomed the tenancy of the appellant to the respondents along with
the rental due from him for the year 1964. The appellant continued
to be the tenant of the shop during the years 1965 and 1966 as well
but since he did not pay the rent the respondents on November 9, 1966
gave a combined notice demanding paym_ent of arrears and seeking
ejectment on termination of tenancy which was refused by him on
B November, 10, 1966. On his failure to comply with the requisitions
contained in the notice the respondents filed a suit against the appel-
lant seeking eviction as well as recovery of rents and mesne profits. i.
HARCHARAN SINGH v. SHIVRANI (Tulzapurkar, J.) 967

The suit was resisted by the appellant, inter alia, on the ground A
that the rent of the accommodation payable to the previous owner was
Rs. 250 per annum less 10% rebate on account of repairs; that in
1964 at the intervention of some common friends he agreed to vacate
and did surrender the residential portion of the shop comprising two
rooms, one kitchen, one bath room and one varandah at the back of
the shop in consideration of respondents relinquishing the rental of Rs. B
250 due from him for the year 1964; that for the years 1965 and
1966 the rental for the remaining shop was reduced by agreement to
Rs. 50 per annum less rebate for repairs and that he had sent a cheque
for the amount due to the respondents. He denied that he has com-
mitted default in payment of rents and averred that no notice of de-
mand and ejectment was served on him and consequently prayed for
c
dismissal of the suit.

On an appreciation of the evidence led by the parties before it the
Trial Court came to the conclusion that initially the rent fixed was
Rs. 250 per year but after the respondents' purchase of the property D
• the appellant vacated the residential portion of the shop under an agree-
ment arrived at between the parties whereunder there was relinquish-
ment of rent due for 1964 and that the rent for the main shop was fixed
at Rs. 100 per annum and that no rebate of any kind had been agreed
to at any time on account of repairs. Regarding the arrears of rent
E
outstanding against the appellant the Trial Court held that rent for the
years 1965 and 1966 had not been paid and was due from him but it
held that the notice dated November 9, 1966 was not served on the
appellant and hence he could not be held to have committed wilful
default in payment of arrears of rent. In this view of the matter the
Trial Court dismissed the suit insofar as the relief of eviction was
. /
concerned but decreed 1t for arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 100 per
F
annum. Aggrieved by that judgment and decree the respondents filed
an appeal to the District Court, Dehradun. The learned District Judge
concurred with the findings of the Trial Court that the rental for the
year 1964 h.ad been relinquished and that the rental of the front portion
of the shop had been fixed at Rs. 100 per annum. He further held G
that the notice was tendered to the appellant on November 10. 1966
but he declined to accept it and hence there was service by refusal, but
in his opinion despite such service it could not be presumed that the
appellant had knowledge about the contents of that notice and conse-
quently he could not be said to have committed any wilful default in
the payment of rent. In the result the appeal was dismissed. The H
reS1POndents preferred Second Appeal No. 430 of 1970 to the High
Court. In that appeal the tenant sought to reagitate the question
968 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1981] 2 S.C.R.

A whether or not the notice was tendered to him and was refused by him
on the ground that the finding had been recorded by the District Court
without application of mind to the statement on oath made by him to
the effect that no postman had ever gone to him with a registered letter
either on 9th or 10th November, 1966 and he had not declined to receive
any registered letter but the High Court refused to entertain the con-
B tention inasmuch as it found that the learned District Judge had referred
I
to this part of the appellant's evidence as also the postman's evidence
on the point and that on an appreciation of such rival evidence on re-
cord he had recorded a finding that the notice was tendered to the
'
appellant but it was refused by him; in other words in the absence of
animus being attributed to the postman the District Judge had preferred
the postman's evidence to that of the appellant's. The High Court,
therefore, accepted the finding of fact recorded by the District Court
that there was service of the notice on the appellant by refusal. On the
further question as to whether when such refusal had been established,
the appellant could be imputed with the knowledge of the contents of
the notice, the High Court, following its two previous decisions in
D
Shri Nath and another v. Smt. Saraswati Devi Jaswal(I) and Fanni Lal
v. Smt. Chironja("), held that when notice was tendered to the tenant
and when the latter refused to accept the same, knowledge of the con-
tents of the notice must be imputed to him. The District Judge's view
in this behalf was thus reversed and since there was failure on the part
of the appellant to pay the rent within one month of the service of
notice upon him, the High Court held that he had committed wilful
default within the meaning of s. 14(a) of the Act. Accordingly the
High Court allowed the appeal and the respondents' prayer for eject-
ment was granted but the appellant was given three months' time to
vacate the accommodation. The tenant has come up in appeal to this
.r Court.
Counsel for the appellant venement!y contended before us that the }.
High Court was in error·in taking the view that when service by refusai
had been effected the tenant must be deemed to have knowledge about
the contents of the notice, for, no such presumption could be drawn
G especially wheu it was clear ou evidence that neither the registered en-
velope was opened either by the tenant or by the postman nor the cone
tents thereof read before the same was returned to the postman. He
further urged that the envelope bore the seal of Shri S. P. Singh, Advo- ,_
cate and the appellant could not, therefore, know that the notice was
from his landlords; he also pointed out that the appellant was illiterate
and did not know English and since ·the address on the envelope as
(I) A.LR. 1964 All. 52.
(2) 1972 A.L.J. 499.
HARCHARAN SINGH v. SHIVRANI (Tulzapurkar, l.) 969

well as the seal of the lawyer were in English the appellant could not A
even know who the sender of the notice was. Counsel, therefore, urged
that in the peculiar circumstances of the case the learned District Judge
had rightly recorded a finding that the knowledge of the contents ct the
notice could not be imputed to the appellaut and, therefore, the appel-
lant could not be regarded as a wilful defaulter in the matter of pay-
ment of rent. In support of this contention strong reliance was placed B
I
by him on the decision of the Bombay High Court fo. the case of Vaman
Vithal Kulkarni and Ors. v. Khanderao Ram Rao Sholapurkar(') where
the following observations of Beaumont, C. J., appear at page 251 :
"In case of defendants 4 and 5 a registered letter contain-
ing the notice was sent to them duly addressed, and service c
is alleged to have been refused. In fact the refusal was not
proved, as the postman who took the letter and brought it
back was not called. But in any case, even if the refusal had
been proved, I should not be prepared to hold that a register-
ed letter tendered to the addressee and refused and brought
back unopened, was well served. There are, I know, some D
authorities in this Court to the contrary, but it seems to me
impossible to say that a letter has been served so as to bring
the contents to the notice of the person to whom the letter
is addressed, if the agent for service states that in fact the
notice was not served, although the reason may have been
that the addressee declined to accept it. One cannot assume E
that because an addressee declines to accept a particular
·sealed envelope he has guessed correctly as to its contents."

Counsel also referred to some other decisions including that of the
Andhra Pradesh High Court in Mahboob Bi v. Alvala Lachmiah(')
but. these other decisions do not touch the aforesaid aspect of visiting F
the addressee with the knowledge of the contents of the refused notice
but have expressed the view that refusal of registered notice without
more may not amount to proper service and hence it is unnecessary to
consider them. But placing strong reliance upon the observations of
Chief Justice Beaumont quoted above counsel for tile appellant urged
G
that the High Court ought to have confirmed the finding of the learned
District Judge that the appellant could not be presumed to have known
• the contents of the notice or that the notice was one demanding arrears
<Jf rent simply because he refused to accept the same.
On the other hand, counsel for the respondents contended before us
t that both under s. 2 7 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and s. 114 of H
• (I) A.J.R. 1935 Born. 247.
(2) A.I.R. 1964 A.P. 324.
970 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1981] 2 S.C.R.

A the Indian Evidence Act presumption of due service could arise if the
notice was sent to the tenant by properly addressing the same, pre-
paying and sending the same by registered post and it was pointed out
that in the instan~ case as against the denial by the appellant there was
positive oath of postman (Kund Ram P.W. 2) who was examined by the
respondents to prove the fact that the registered letter containing ~e
B
notice was tendered to the appellant and when he declined to accept it
the postman bad made endorsement in his hand on the envelope "Re-
fused. Returned to the sender". Counsel, therefore, urged that in
view of such positive evidence of postman led by the respondents which
had been accepted by the learned District Judge, the High Court was
justified in holding that the appellant must be imputed wit)1 the know-
c ledge of the contents of the notice. In this behalf counsel for the
respondents placed reliance on the Privy' Council decision in Harihar
Banerji and Ors. v. RamshciShi Roy and Ors.(') and Madras decision
in Kodali Bapayya and Ors. v. Yadaval/i Venkataratnam and Ors.(')
and the two decisions of the Allahabad High Court relied upon by the
D IUgh Court. Counsel pointed out that the Madras High Court in
Koda/i Bapayya's case (supra) and the Allahabad High Court in its
Full Bench decision in Ganga Ram v. Smt. Phulwati( 8 ) have dealt with
the Bombay decision and have expressed their disagreement with the
view expressed therein.

E Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 deals with the topic-
'Meaning of service by post' and says that where any Central Act or
Regulation authorises or requires any document to be served l)y post,
then unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed
to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting it by re-
gistered post, a letter containing the document, and unless the contrary
F is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would
be delivered in the ordinary course of post. The section thus arises a
presumption of due service or proper service if the document sought to
be served is sent by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting by re-
gistered post to the addressee and such presumption is raised irrespec-
tive of whether any acknowledgement due is received from the addressee
G or not. It is obvious that when the section raises the presumption that
the service shall be deemed to have been effected it means the addressee
to whom the communication is sent must be taken to have known the
eontents of the document sought to be served upon him without any-
thing more. Similar presumption is raised under Illustration (f) to
s. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act whereunder it is stated that the Court
H
(I) A.I.R. 1918 P.C. 102.
(2) A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 884.
(3) 1970 A.L.J. 336.
HARCHARAN SINGH v. SHIVRANI (Tulzapurkar,l.) 971

may presume that the common course of business has been followed in
a particular case, that is to say, when a Jetter is sent by post by pre-pay-
ing and iProperly addressing it the same has been received by the add-
reseee. Undoubtedly, the presumptions both under s. 27 of the
General Clauses Act as well as under s. 114 of the Evidence Act are
rebuttable but in the absence of proof to the contrary the presumption
g.
of proper service or effective service on the addressee would arise.
In the instant case, additionally, there was positive evidence of the
• postman to the effect that the registered envelope was actually
tendered by him to the appellant on November 10, 1966 but the
appellant refused to accept. In other words, there was due service
effected upon the appellant by refusal. In such circumstan-
ces, we are clearly of the view, that the High Court was
right in coming to the conclusion that the appellant must be imputed
with the knowledge of the contents of the notice which he refused to
accept. It is impossible to accept the contention that when factually
there was refusal to accept the notice on the part of the appellant
he could not be visited with the knowledge of the contents of the
registered notice because, in our view, the presumption raised under
s. 27 of the General Clauses Act as well as under s. 114 of the Indian
Evidence Act is one of proper or effective service which must mean
• service of everything that is contained in the notice. It is impossible
to countenance the suggestion that before knowledge of the contents
of the notice could be imputed the sealed envelope must be opened
and read by the addressee or when the addressee happens to be an
illiterate person the contents should be read over to him by the post-
man or someone else. Such things do not occur when the addressee
is determined to decline to accept the sealed envelope. It would,
therefore, be reasonable to hold that when service is effected by
refusal of a postal communication the addressee must be imputed.
with the knowledge of the contents thereof and in our view, this
follows upon the presumptions that are raised unde.r s. 27 of the
General Clauses Act, 1897 and s. 114 of the Indian Evidence
Act.
Turning to the. Bombay decision in Vaman Vithal's case (supra), G~
we would like to point out two aspects that emerge clearly from the
very observations which have been strongly relied upon by counsel
for the appellant. In the first place, the observations clearly show
that the refusal to accept the notice was not satisfactorily proved in
!he case inasmuch as the postman who took the letter and brought Hi
1t back had not been examined; consequently the further observations

--' . made by the leaned Chief Justice were unnecessary for decision on
the point and as such will have to be regarded as obiter.
972 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

A Secondly, while making those observations the learned Chief Justice
was himself conscious of the fact that there were some authorities
of that Court taking the contrary view. Having regard to these as-
pects it is difficult to hold that the concerned observations lay down
the correct legal position in the matter. In any event we approve
of the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in its three decisions,
B namely, Sri Nath's case, Fanni Lal's case and Ganga Ram's case
(supra) and would confirm the High Court's finding on the point in •
favour of the respondents.
Counsel for the appellant then faintly argued that the respondents
suit was not maintainable under s. 14 (1 ) of the Act inasmuch as
no permission of the District Magistrate had been obtained by the
respondents before filing the suit as required by s. 14 and in this
behalf reliance was placed on s. 14(a) of the Act which ran
thus :
·'14. Restrictions on eviction.-No suit shall, without the
permission of the District Magistrate, be filed in any Civil
D Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommo-
dation except on one or more of the following grounds,
namely :
(a) that the tenant has wilfully failed to make payment
to the landlord of any arrears of rent within one
month of the service upon him of a notice of de·
-
E
mand from the landlord."
According to counsel for the appellant the aforesaid provision cleady
shows that under the Act two safeguards were available to a tenant-
(i) eviction could not be had by any landlord except on one or more
of the grounds specified in els. (a) to (f) of s. 14 and (ii) no suit
F for eviction even on those gronnds specified in els. (a) to (f) could
be instituted without the permission of the District Magistrate, and
admittedly the landlords in the instant case had filed the suit against
the appellant without obtaining the permission of the District Magis-
trate. He, therefore, urged that the Civil Court ha.d no jurisdiction
to entertain the suit and the decree was without jurisdiction.
It must be observed that no such contention was raised by the
appellant in any of the Courts below presumably because the appellant
as well as this lawyer knew how an identical provision contain~
ed in s. 3 (I) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction
Act, 1947,-an allied· enactment, had been judicially interpreted by
H this Court in Bhagwan Dass v. Paras Nath('). Section 3 of the U.P.
Act 3 of 1947 ran thus : l , ...
(1) [19691 2 S.C.R. 297.
HARCHARAN SINGH v. SHIVRANI (Desai,/.) 973

"3. Restrictions 011 evictions.-Subji;ct to any order passed
under sub-section ( 3), no suit shall without the permission
of the District Magistrate, be filed in any Civil Court
• against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation,
except on one or more of the following groun\is :
(a) that the tenant is in arrears of rent for more than B
• three months and has failed to pay the same to the
landlord within one month of the service upon him
of a notice of demand."
This Court in Bhagwa11 Dass case Asupra) has explained at page 305
Of the report the legal position arising on a grammatical construction
c
of s. 3(1) thus :
"Section ( 3) 1 does not restrict the landlord's right to evict
his tenant on any of the grounds mentioned in els. (a)
to (g) of that sub-section. But if he wants to sue his tenant
for eviction on any ground other than those mentioned in
those clauses then he has to obtain the permission of the D
District Magistrate whose discretion is subject to any order
passed under sub-s. (3) of s. 3 by the Commissioner. These
are the only restrictions placed on the power of a landlord
to institute a suit for eviction of his tenant."
It would be conducive to judicial discipline to interpret an identical B
provision contained in s. 14(1) of the U.P. Cantonment (Control of
Rent & Eviction) Act, 1952 in a similar manner. In other words,
under s. 14(1) of the concerned Central Act permission of the Dis-
trict Magistrate was required if the landlord sought eviction of his
tenant on any ground other than those specified in els. (a) to ( f)
and not when it was sought on any of the grounds specified in els. (a) F
\ to (f). (If may be stated that both the enactments have since been
·<i. repealed). It is, therefore, not possible to accept the contention of
the counsel for the appellant that the instant suit filed by the res-
pondents against the appellant could not be entertained by the
Civil Court.
G
In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. However, having
regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no

...•
order as to costs and we grant the appellant six months time to
vacate.

DESAI, J.-I have very carefully gone through the judgmen~ 8i
prepared by my learned brother Mr. Justice V. D. Tulzapurkar, but
I regret my inability to agree with the same.
974 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1981] 2 S.C.R.

A The relevant facts leading to the appeal by special leave have
been succinctly set out in the main judgment and therefore, I would
straightway proceed to deal with the three important questions raised
in this appeal. '
The first and the principal question which goes to the root of
the matter is about the construction of section 20(2) (a) of the
Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & •
Eviction) Act, 1971 ('Rent Act' for short). It reads as under: <
"20. Bar of suit for eviction of tenant except on specified

c
grounds;-
(2) A suit for the eviction of a tenant from a building
after the determination of his tenancy may be
r
instituted on one or more of the following grounds
namely:
(a) that the tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than
four months, and has failed to pay the same to the
D landlord within one month from the date of service
upon him of a demand : "
There is a proviso to this sub-section which is not material for
the purpose of this appeal.

E A brief resume of concurrently found facts which would high-
light the question of construction would be advantageous. Appel-
lant was inducted as a tenant of the premises by its former owner
on a rent of Rs. 250 /- per annum in the year 1964, on a request
by the then landlord, appellant-tenant surrendered a portion of the
premises, comprising two rooms, a kitchen, a bathroom and a
F verandah at the back of the shop; retaining only possession of the
shop, consequently reducing the rent by agreement between the ._ .
I

parties at the rate of Rs. 100/- per annm11. It is thus an agreed
and incontrovertible fact that the appellant-tenant is a tenant of a
shop on an yearly rent of Rs. 100/-, payable at the end of every
year.
G
The focus should immediately be turned to the provision of Jaw
under which the landlord seeks to evict this tenant. According to
respondent-landlord she served notice dated Nov~ber 9, 1966,
terminating the tenancy of the appellant as the appellant-tenant was
a defaulter within the meaning of s. 20(2) (a) and, therefore, she
8 was entitled to a decree for eviction as she has satisfactorily proved
all the requirements or ingredients of s. 20(2)(a). Accepting the
finding of fact that the appellant is a tenant liable to pay rent
HARCHARAN SINGH v. SH!VRANI (Desai, J.) 975

(ii! Rs. 100/- per annum, the crux of the matter is whether his case A
is covered by s. 20(2) (a).

What does s. 20(2) (a) postulate and what are its components
which when satisfied, the landlord would be entitled to evict the
tenant? On analysis following ingredients of s. 20(2)(a) would
emerge each of which will have to be satisfied before the landlord B
• would be eligible to obtain a decree for eviction, viz :
(i) Tenant must be a tenant of premises governed by
the Rent Act;
(ii) That the tenant is in arrears of rent for not less
than four months; c
(iii) That such a teua\1t has to pay rent in arrears within
a period of one month from the date of service
upon him of a notice of demand.

, In this case, the tenant is a tenant of premises governed by the
Rent Act. D
The crucial question is whether the second ingredient, as ex-
tracted above, is satisfied by the landlord. The attention has to be
focused on the expression 'in arrears of rent for not less than four
months'. What does this expression signify? As contended on
behalf of the respondent that whatever be the default in payment of E
rent, the notice can be served after the default has continued for a
period of four months, and failure to comply with the requisition in
the notice would disentitle the tenant to the protection of Rent Act.
Altednatively it was contended that the expression in arrears of rent
for not less than four months' on a literal grammatical construction
would signify that rent is payable by the month and that the tenant F
has committed a default in payment of four monthi' rent and further
~ failed to comply with the requisition made in the notice within the
stipulated period of one month and only then the protective umbrella
of the Rent Act would be removed and the tenant would be exposed
to a decree for eviction.
G
The two rival constructions raised a question of construction of
a sub-section in a statute primarily enacted as can be culled out from
• the long and shon title of the Rent Act, being regulation of letting
J and rent and arbitrary eviction of tenant from the premises to which
the rent Act would apply. It is a socially benefi.cient statute and
in construing such statute cenain well recognised canons of construe- n
tion have to be borne in mind. Undoubtedly, the dominant purpose
;.
in construing the statute is to ascertain the intention of the legisla-
976 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ll981] 2 S.C.R.

A ture. This intention, and, therefore, the meaning of the statute, is
primarily to be sought in the words nsed in the statute itself, which
must, if they are plain and unambiguous, be applied as they stand,
however strongly it may be suspected that the result does not re-
present the real intention of legislature (see Inland Revenue Com-
missioner v. Hinchy) Cl. In approaching the matter from this angle,
B it is a duty of the Court to give fair and full effect to statute which
is plain and unambiguous without regard to the particular conse- • ...
quence in a special case. Even while giving liberal construction to I\ (
socially beneficient legislation, if the language is plain .and simple (
the making of a law being a matter for the legislature and not cowts,
the Court must adopt the plain grammatical construction (see River
c Wear Commissioners v. Adamson).(') The Court must take the
law as it is. And, accordingly, it is not entitled to pass judgment on
the propriety or wisdom of making a law in the particular form and
further the Court is not entitled to adopt the construction of a
statute on its view of what Parliament ought to have done. How-
D ever, when two constructions are possible and legitimate ambi-
guity arises from the language employed, it is a plain duty of the
Court to prefer and adopt that which enlarges the protection of a
socially beneficient statute rather than one which restricts it. In
Mohd. Shafi v. Additional District & Sessions Judge (VII), Allaha-
bad and Others,( 3 ) this Court while interpreting the explanation (iv)
E to s. 21 of the Rent Act observed that where the language is suscep-
-
tible of two interpretations, the Court would prefer that which en-
larges the protection of the tenants rather than one which restricts
it. It was further observed that the construction that the Court
adopted would be more consistent with the policy and attainment of
the legislation which is to protect the possession of the tenant unless
F the landlord establishes a ground for eviction. Similarly in Guru-
charan Singh v. Kamla Singh & Ors.,(4) while interpreting the provi-
sion of s. 6 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, this Court observ-
ed that the Court was called upon to interpret a land refQmls
law are not just an ordinary state and, therefore, the socio-econo-
mic thrust of the law in these areas should not be retarded by
• ·,

G '
judicial construction but filliped by the legal process without parting
from the object of the Act. It must also be emphasised that where
two constructions are possible, the one that must be preferred is one
tI
which would accord with reason and justice (see H. H. Mahara;a-
(1) 1960 A.C. 748, H.L. at 767; (1960) I All E.R. 505 at 512
. !

I-
'
B (2) [1877] 2 A. C. 743 & 765
~
(3) [1977] 2 s.c.c. 226
t ...
(4) [1976] 2 s.c.c. 152. -~

i
. e
HARCHARAN SINGH v. Sll!VRANI (Desai, .I.) 977

dhiraja Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur of Gwalior & Ors. A
v. Union of India & Another.(')
Bearing in mind this interpretative approach let us hark back to
• the expression used in s. 20(2) (a) and ascertain whether the ex-
ception is susceptible of one construction only or more than one
construction and whether there is ambiguity and if so, in which
direction the interpretative jurisprudence must move . B
• The expression "the tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than
• four months" may suggest that the tenant is in arrears of rent for
one or any number of months and that the tirrears have fallen due
four months back meaning thereby that within four months there
was no attempt on the pan of the tenant to pay up the arrears and c
cure the default. This construction would imply that if the tenant
fa in arrears of rent for one month only, an action under the rele-
vant clause can be commenced against him if this infault has conti-
nued for a period of four months even if the tenant has paid rent
for subsequent months and on the expiry of the period of four months
from the date on which the rent had become due and payable D
for one month a notice of demand can be served and on the failure
.,,-· of the tenant to comply with the requisition made in the notice he
would be liable to be evicted. In other words, a period of four
months must elapse between the date of default and the service of
notice irrespective of the fact whether the default is in payment of
one month's rent or more than one month's rent. In this construc- E
tion it is implicit that failure to pay rent for four different months
is not a sine qua non for commencing action under s. 20(2) (a).
What is of the essence of matter is that a period of four months
must elapse between the date of default complained of and service
of notice under s. 20(2) (a). It was said that the legislature has
given locus poenitentiae to the tenant to repair the default within F
the period of four months. This approach overlooks the obvious
that before action can be commenced under s. 20(2 )(a) a notice
has to be served and tenant is given locus poenitentiae to repair
the default withiu one month. It appears that by s. 43 Qf the Rent
Act the United Provinces (Temporary) Control of Rent and Evic-
G
tion Act, 1947 ('Repealed Act' for short) was repealed. Section 3
of the Repealed Act enumerated grounds on which a tenant could
~ be evicted. Sub-clause (a) of s. 3 provided that the landlord would
~ be entitled to eviction of a tenant if the tenant was 'in arrears of
rent for more than three months' and had failed to pay the same to
the landlord within one month of the service upon him of the notice H
of demand. The language employed in the repealed provition led
---·---
(!) [1971 J 1 s.c.c. 85
978 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

the Court to hold that whatever be the default in payment of rent,
a period of three months should have expired from the date of
default whereafter alone the landlord would be entitled to serve a
notice as provided in the relevant sub-clause. It was so held by the
•
Allahabad High Court in Ram Swan Das v. L. B.ir Sain,(') but
this decision was overruled in Jitendra Prasad v. Mathur Prasad.(•)
B
In order to avoid any such controversy, in the Repealing statute the
expression 'arrears of rent for more tlmn three months' has been
substituted by the expression 'arrears of rent for not less than four .• .
months'. This is contemporaneous legislative exposition which
clearly brings out the legislative intention that the landlord would
c be entitled to evict the tenant if the rent is in arrears for not less
than four months. Therefore, it would clearly imply that before ·~·
I •

the landlord can commence action under sub-clause (a), the tenant
must have committed default in payment of rent for a period of
four months. Therefore, the first suggested construction is not
borne out by the language employed in the section.
E
The question still remains : what does the expression 'in arrears
of rent for not less than four months' signify ? It is implicit in tho
expression that the rent must be payable by month. Irrespective of
the fact whether the tenancy is a yearly tenancy or a monthly
tenancy, it is implicit in sub-clause (a) that either by the contract
D of lease or by oral agreement or by long usage the tenant is liable
to pay rent at the end of every month. In other words, the
unit for computation of rent is one month, that is, rent btcomes due
and payable every month. It is only such a tenant who may fa]J
in arrears for a period of four months. Every month the tenant
would be liable to pay the rent in the absence of a contract to the
F contrary. Thus the rent becomes due and payable at the end of
every month. As soon as the month is over the rent becomes duci l
and payable and failure on the part of the tenant to pay the same ~·
would dub him as a tenant in arrear of rent for one month. If thia-
process goes on meaning thereby that a period of four months having
expired and for each o[ the four months the rent when 1t became
G due and payable was not paid, then alone the tenant could be
said to be a tenant in arrears of rent for not less than four months,
Two definite ingredients emerge from the expression 'the tenant is
in arrears of rent for not Jess than four months' ' (i) that the rent
is payable by month; and (ii) the tenant has committed default iJJ
payment of ren1 for four different months and that this default sub-
sists and continues on the date when the landlord invokes tbCi
,~
(1) 1958 A11ahaharl Weekly Reports 62.
121 1960 A1lahabad Law Journal 21L
HARCHARAN SINGH v. SHIVRANI (Desai, J.) 979

provision of clause (a) and proceeds to serve a notice of demand. A
Again, if within a period of one month from the date of receipt
of the notice the tenant pays up the arrears of rent he does not
I06e the protection of the Rent Act. . The legislature clearly intend•
ed to cover those cases of Qefault in payment of rent under clause
(a) where the contract of lease provided for payment of rent every
month meaning thereby that the unit for liability to pay rent is one B
month and secondly the tenant has committed default on four
different occasions of four different months or four different units
agreed upon for payment of rent and that they differ the facility to
pay the same has accrued. As stated earlier this is implied in the

I expression 'the tenant is, in arrears of rent for not less than four
months.

In this connection one can profitably refer to s. 12(3)(a) of the
Bombay Rents, Hotel & Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947,
c

which reads as under :
D
"Where the rent is payable by the month and there is
no dispute regarding the amount of standard rent or per-
~·
mitted increases, i! such rent or increases are in arrears for
a period of six months or more and the tenant neglects to
make payme:it thereof until the expiration m the period
of one month after notice referred to in sub-section (2), E
the (2) (Court shall pass a decree) for eviction in any
such suit for recovery of possession."

The expression used there is that the rent is payable by month
and the tenant is in arrears for a period of six months. In the
Rent Act under discussion, a conjoint expression is used that a F
tenant is in arrears of rent for a period of not Jess than four months.
It only means that where the rent is payable by month and the
tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than four months, and that
i' the clearest intention discernible from the language used in the
relevant clause.
G
It was, however, contended that this construction would give an
undeserved advantage to the defaulting tenant where the rent is not
• payable by month. The contention is that a landlord who had
agreed to accept rent on an yearly basis would be at the mercy of
the tenant because even if the default is contumacious the landlord
would not be entitled to evict the tenant and that such could not H
be the intention of the legislature. It was, therefore, said that the
expression 'the tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than four
980 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l98Jj 2 S.C.R. ..
A months' is also susciptible of the meaning that where the rent i5
payable by year and after the year is over and the rent has become
due and payable if the tenant has not paid the rent for four months
his case would be covered by "Clause (a). If a tenant is llllder a
contract with the landlord to pay rent at the end of a specific year
B agreed to between the parties, could he be said to be a tenant m
arrears for not less than four months even if he has defaulted in
payment of rent at the end of one year 7 How can a tenant who
is to pay rent on the expiry of a specified year be in arrears of rent
for not less than four months ? And if that construction is adopted,.
a tenant who has committed default in payment of rent for qne
c month and the default has continued without repair for a period of
tour months even though he has paid rent for subsequent montM
he would be liable to be evicted, a construction which ought to be
rejected on legislative exposition by change in expression adopted
in the repealed Act and substituted in the present Act discussed
herein above. If that construction is re1ected it would be difficult
D to accept the construction that even of the rent is payable by year
once the year is over and a period of four months .has elapsed he,
could be said to be a tenant in arrears of rent for not less than
four months. The language does not admit of this construction.
Therefore, where the rent is payable by the year clause (a) is not
E attracted. Now the wild apprehension expressed on behalf of the
landlord that such a construction would give an unfair advantage to a
tenant who is liable to pay yearly rent need not detain us because the
wisdom of enacting a law in a certain manner is for the legislature to
decide and not for the court to impose. It may be that the legis-
lature would have intended that such landlords who relied on the
F income from rent month after month must have a sanction which can
be applied if the tenant commits default in payment of rent of four
different months but a landlord who apparently does not depend upon
the rental income hy agreeing to accept yearly rent need not have
that sanction and it would be still open to such a landlord to file a
suit merely for recovery of rent and not for eviction. Such a thing
G is not unknown to law because in permanent tenancy and in tenan-
cies of long duration the landlords can only sue for rent and not for
eviction on the tenant committing default in payment of rent. There-
fore, on examining both the rival constructions one which extends
the protection deserves to be accepted in view of the fact that the
legislature never intended to provide a ground for eviction for failure
H to pay rent in case of leases where yearly rent was reserved. Rent
Act was enacted to fetter the right of re-entry of landlord and tim
construction accords with the avowed obje<;t of the Rent Act.
HARCHARAN SINGH v. SHIVRANI (Desai, !.) 981

In the instant case the parties are ad idem that the rent is payable A
by year at the rate of Rs. 100 /- per annum. In such a case it could
not be said that this tenant was in arrears of rent for not less than
• .four months. His case would not be covered by s. 20(2) (a) of the
Rent Act and, therefore, the landlord wovld not be entitled to a
decree for eviction on this ground and that was the sole ground on
B
• whicl1 eviction has been ordered .

• The second contention is that the High Court was in error in
interfering with the concurrent finding of facts while hearing second
appeal in February, 1979 and that too without framing the point of
law which arose in the appeal. The disputed fiuding of fact is about
the service of notice. If a landlord seeks eviction on the ground of c
tenant's default in payment of rent under s. 20(2) (a) it is obligatory
upon him to serve a notice of demand of the rent in arrears on the
tenant and can only seek eviction if the tenant fails to comply with
the requisition made in the notice. The appellant tenant in terms
<:ontended that no notice was served upon hint. On the assertion of
D
the respondent landlord that notice dated November 9, 1966, was
1ie£Ved upon the appellant tenant on November 10, 1966, but he
refused to accept the same and the refutation thereof by the tenant
that no notice was offered to him by the postman nor was any notice
rnfused by him, a triable issue arose between the parties. The learned
trial judge framed Issue No. 7 on the question of service of notice. E
He recorded a finding that the appellant tenant was not served a
notice of demand and of ejectment and answered the issue in favour
of the appellant tenant. On appeal by the respondent landlord the appel-
late court framed point no. 2 on the question of ser'(ice of notice and
answered it by observing that the defendant tenant refused to accept
the registered notice but no knowledge can be attributed to him of F
the contents of the registered envelope and, therefore, the tenant
could not be said to be guilty of wilful default on the expiry of one
month after the service of notice. He accordingly confirmed the
finding of the trial court that the plaintiff landlord is not liable to a
decree of eviction on the ground mentioned in s. 20(2) (a). The
landlord approached the High Conrt in second appeal. G

When this appeal was heard, section 100 of the Civil Procedure
• Code after its amendment of 1976 was in force. It restricted the
)
jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a second appeal only if
the High Court was satisfied that the case involved a substantial ques-
tion of law. Sub-section 4 cast a duty on the court to formulate H
such a substantial question of law and the appeal has to be heard on
'the question so formulated. It would also be open to the respondent
982 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

A at the hearing of the appeal to contend that the case does not involve
such a question. Even prior to the amendment of Section 100, the
High Court ordinarily did not interfere with the concurrent findings
of fact. This position has been repeatedly asserted and one need •
not go in search of precedent to support the proposition. However
one can profitably refer to R. Ramachandran Ayyar v. Ramalingam
B
Chettiar. (') After examining the earlier decisions and the decision
of the Privy Council in Mst. Durga Chaudhrain v. lawahar •
Choudhary(') Gajendragadkar J. speaking for this Court in terms.
spelt out the jurisdiction of the High Conrt in second appeal as
•
under :
c "Bnt the High Court cannot interfere with the conclu-
sions of fact recorded by lower appellate Court however
erroneous the same conclusions may appear to be to the
High Court, because, as the Privy Council observed, how- .
ever gross or inexecusable the error may seem to be, there
is no jurisdiction under s. 100 to correct th'lt error".
D
This view was re-affirmed in Goppulal v. Dwarkadhishji(') wherein
after reproducing the concurrent finding of fact this Court observed
that this co'ncurrent finding of fact was binding on the High Court in
second appeal and the High Court was in error in holding that there
was one integrated tenancy of six shops.
E
In the facts of this case, there was a concurrent finding that the
statutory notice as required by s. 20(2) (a) was not served upon the
tenant and, therefore, the High Court was in error in interfering with
this finding of fact. However, it is not necessary to base the judg-
ment on this conclusion because it was rightly said on behalf of the
respondent that whether the notice was offered to the petitioner
tenant and he refused to accept the same the finding is not concurrent
because the appellate court has held that the notice was offered but
the tenant refused to accept the same and, therefore, on the refusal to
accept the notice there was no concurrent finding. This contention
is legitimate because the appellate court held that notice as required
G by law was not served because even if the tenant refused to accept
the notice the knowledge of the contents of the . registered envelope
not opened by him cannot be imputed to him, and, therefore, there
was no service of notice as :required bys. 20(2) (a). The first appellate
court was of the view that in the absence of knowledge of the demand
of rent in arrears as alleg(:d in the notice the tenant cannot be !aid
H (I) [1963] 3 S.C.R. 605
(2) 1890 LR 17 IA 122
(3) [ 1969] 3 S, C.R. 989
HARCHARAN SINGH v. SHIVRANI (Daai, !.) 983

to be guilty of wilful default so as to be denied the protection of the A
Rent Act.

This accordingly takes me to the third contention in this appeal.
• The third contention is that even if this Conrt agrees with the High
Court in holding that the notice in question was tendered by the
postman to the appellant tenant and he refused to accept the same B
and, therefore, this refusal amounts to service within the meaning of
s. 20(2)(a), yet as the knowledge of the contents of the noJice
would reflect on subsequent conduct as wilful or contumacious, it is
not sufficient that a notice is served or tendered and refused but it
must further be shown that in the event of refusal the tenant did it
with the knowledge of the contents of the registered envelope and his c
subseque'nt conduct is motivated. The question then is; Wh~t would
be the effect of a notice sent by registered post and refused by a
tenant on the question of his knowledge about the contents of the
notice and his failure to act? Would it tantamount to an inten-
tional conduct evidencing wilful default on his part ? This aspect
cannot be merely examined in the background of some precedents D
or general observations. One has to examine this aspect in the
background of Indian conditions or in the words of Krishna Iyer, J.,
'the legal literacy in rural areas and the third world jurisprudence.'

Before we blindly adhere to law bodily imported from western
E
countries we must not be oblivious to the fact that the statutes
operating in the western countries are meant for a society if not
100 per cent., 99 per cent. literate. We must consciously bear in
mind that our society especially in the semi-urban and rural areas is
entirely different and wholly uncomparable to the western society.
A literate mind will react to a problem presented to him in a manner
other than an illiterate mind because illiteracy breeds fear and fear
I

• oriented action cannot be rationally examined on the touchstone of
legal presumptions. To articulate the point as it arises in this case,
let one put his feet in the shoes of a rural illiterate person to whom
a registered envelope by a postman is presented. Does it require
too much of imagination to conclude that be will be gripped with fear G
and he may react in a manner which will be his undoing ? He
would believe that by refusing to accept the registered envelope he
• would put off the evil rather than accept the same and approach a
) person who can advise him and meet the situation. Can this action
of fear gripped mind inflict upcn the person an injury !lowing from
the assumption that he not only refused the registered envelope with H
the conscious knowledge of the fact that it contained a notice by a
• lawyer on behalf of his landlord and that it accused him of wilful
984 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1981] 2 S.C.R.

A default in payment of rent and that if he would act rationally he
wo·uld repair the default by tendering the rent within the period of
one month granted by the statute? If he is deemed to have acted
consciously is it conceivable that he would invite injury by sheer
refusal to accept the registered envelope rather than know the con- •
tents or make them knowable to him and meet the charge of wilful
8 default. As was said, again by Krishna Iyer, J., which bears quota-
tion :
"The Indian Courts interpret laws the Anglo-Indian
way, the rules of the game having been so inherited. The
basic principles of jurisprudence are borrowed from the
c sophisticated British system, with the result that there is an
exotic touch about the adjectival Jaw, the argumentative
method and the adversary system, not to speak of the Evi-
dence Act wirh all its technicalities".(')

Lord Devlin recently said :
0 "If our business methods were as antiquated as our
legal methods, we would be a bankrupt country .... There
is need for a comprehensive enquiry into the rules of our
procedure backed by a determination to adopt it to fit the
functions of the welfare State".

E Thio is much more apposite in the conditions of our society and this
was noticed by Beaumost, C. J. way back in fourth decade of this
century in Waman Vithal Kulkarni & Others. v. Khanderao Ram
Rao Sholapurkar. (2) An exactly identical question arose before the
Division Bench of the Bombay High Court. The facts found were
that the registered letter containing the notice was sent to defendants
F 4 & 5 duly addressed and service was alleged to have been refused.
The contention was two-fold that the refusal was not proved but
alternatively it was contended that even if it was proved, the addressee
could not be imputed with the knowledge of the contents of the regis-
tered envelope. The pertinent observation is as under :
G "In the case of defendants 4 and 5 a registered Jetter
containing the notice was sent to them duly addressed, and
service is alleged to have been refused. In fact the refusal
was not proved, as the postman who took the Jetter and •(
brought it back was not called. But in any case, even if
the refusal had been proved, I should not be prepared to hold
u (I) The Social Dimensions of Law and Justice in Contemporary India by
Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, p. 207
(2) AIR 1935 Born. 247
HARCHARAN SINGH v. SHIVRANI (Desai, J.) 985

that a registered Jetter tendered to the addressee and refused A
and brought back unopened, was well served. There are,
I know, some authorities in this Court to the contrary, but
it seems to me impossible to say that a letter has been
• served so as to bring the contents to the notice of the per-
son to whom the letter is addressed, if the agent for service
states that in fact the notice was not served, although the B
. reason may have been that the addressee declined to accept
• it. One cannot assume that because an addressee declines
to accept a particular sealed envelope he has guessed
eorrectly as to its contents. Many people in this country
make a practice of always refusing to accept registered
letters, a practice based, I presume, on their experience
c
that such documents usually contain something unpleasant.
So that, it is clear that this notice was not served on three
of the defendants".
Ll:arned counsel for the respondent tried to distinguish this deci-
·siOll by observing that the court did hold that the refusal was not D
proved and, therefore, the rest of the observation was obiter. It is
not for a moment suggested that the decision of the Division Bench
of the Bombay High Court is binding on this Court but the reason-
ing which appealed to the Division Bench in 1935 is all the more
appoiite at present. The Division Bench noticed that in the society E
from which the defendants came, there was a feeling that such regis-
tered letters usually contained something unpleasant. Is there any-
thing to suggest that this feeling is today displaced or destroyed?
The Division Bench further noticed that many people in India make
a practice of always refusing to accept registered letters and the
practice according to the Division Bench was based on their F
-experience that such documents usually contained something un-
pleasant. The reaction is to put off the evil by not accepting the
envelope. Could such ignorant illiterate persons be subjected to a
legal inference that the refusal was conscious knowing the contents
·of tire document contained in the registered envelope ? To answer
' it in the affirmative is to wholly ignore the Indian society. And this G
concept tllat the registered envelope properly addressed and returned
with an endorsement of refusal must permit a rebuttable presumption
that the addressee refused it with the knowledge of the contents is
•
) wholly borrowed from the western jurisprudence. I believe it is time
that we ignore the illusion and return to reality. Reference was also
'!Ude to Appabhai Motibhai v. Laxmichand Zaverchand & Co.,( 1) H
G>nt !hat case does not touch the point. In Mahboob Bi v. Alva/a
• (l) AIR 1954 Born. 159
986 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 (!.C.R.

A Lachmiah,(') an almost identical question figured before the Andhra
Pradesh High Court. In that case the Rent Controller issuro a
notice in respect of the proceedings initiated before him by the land-
lord for the eviction of the tenant, to the tenant by registered post
and the envelope was returned with the endorsement of refusal and •
the Rent Controller set down the proceedings for exparte hearing and
B passed a decree for eviction. The tenant under the decree of eviction

"•.
preferred an appeal in the City Small Causes Court. A preliminary
objection was raised by the respondent-landlord that the appeal was
. barred by limitation as it was filed six days after the time allowro for
filing the appeal. The appellant-tenant countered this by saying that
he had no knowledge of the proceedings before the Rent Controller
c and that he was never served with the notice of proceedings before
the Rent Controller. The relevant rule permitted service of 11otice
by registered post. After examining the relevant rule the Court
accepted the contention of the tenant observing as under :
"Moreover nothing has been placed before me to show
D that there is any duty cast upon any person to receive every
letter or notice. sent by registered post, nor does the refusal
to receive has been made the subject-matter of any pre-
sumption which may arise under sec. 114 of the Evidence
Act. Then again, there is the practical difficulty of having
to import the knowledge of the date of hearing or the pre-
E cise proceedings with which the registered notice is con-
cerned in the case of a mere refusal to receive a registered
notice".
The Court thus was of the view that even if refusal amounted to
service, yet it is not service as required by law to fasten a liability o'n
F the tenant because no presumption can be raised that the refu!al
was With the conscious knowledge of the contents of the registered
envelope. Undoubtedly, our attention was also drawn to a contrary
view taken by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in
Fanni/al v. Smt. Chironja.(') It was contended that even if the
registered letter was refused no presumption of knowledge of the /

G contents of the letter could in law the raised against the tenant. In •
support of the submission reliance was placed on Amariil Singh Btdi
v. Lachchman Das, an unreported decision of a single judge of the
Allahabad High Court, and the decision of Beaumont, C. J. in
Waman Vithal Kulkarn;'s case. The Division Bench of the Allahabad
•(
High Court did not accept the view of Beaumont, C.J. Tho Court
H was of the opinion that a presumption of fact would arise under
(I) A1R 1964 A.P. 314.
(2) (1972) 70 Allahabad Law Journal 499.
HARCHARAN SINGH v. SHIVRANI (Desai,!.) 987

s. 114 of the Evidence Act that the refusal was with the knowledge
of the contents of the registered envelope. The Court has not consi-
dered the specific Indian conditions, the approach of rural Indians to
• registered letters and has merely gone by the technical rules of Evi-
dence Act, which, as experience would show, could sometimes cause
more harm and lead to injustice through law. The contrary
Allahabad decision does not commend to me. On the contrary, the
Bombay view is in accord with the conditions of society in rural
India and I do not propose to make any distinction even with regard
to urban areas where also there are a large number of illiterates.
Even in the case of a semi-literate person who is in a position to read
and write he could not be accused of legal literacy. Therefore, it is c
not possible to accept the submission that mere refusal would permit
a presumption to be raised that not only the service was h:gal but
the refusal was the conscious act flowing from the knowledge of the
contents of the letter.

How dangerous this presumption is can be easily demonstrated,
and how it would lead to miscarriage of justice can be manifestly
established. Once knowledge of the contents of the registered enve-
lope is attributed to a person to whom a registered envelope is sent
and who has refused to accept the same, that this was an act accom-
panied by the conscious knowledge of the contents of the letter he
who may be an innocent defaulter or presumably no defaulter at all, E
would be charged with a contumacious conduct of being a wilful
defaulter. The Rent Act does not seek to evict a mere defaulter.
That is why a provision for notice has been made. If even after
notice the default continues, the tenant can be condemned as wilful
defaulter. Could he be dubbed guilty of conscious, wilful, contuma-
cious, intentional conduct even when he did not know what was F
in the registered envelope ? In my opinion, it wonld be atrocious
to impute any such knowledge to a person who has merely been
guilty of refusing to accept the registered notice. Where service of
notice is a condition precedent, a dubious service held established by
examining the postman who must be delivering hundreds of postal
G
envelopes and who is ready to go to the witness box after a long
interval to say that he offered the envelope to the addressee and he
refused to accept the same, would be travesty of justice. And if this
condition precedent is not fully satisfied, the consequent conduct can-
not be said to be wilful. In a slightly different context in Commis·
sioner of Income-tax, Keral,a v. Thayaballi Mulla Jeevaji Kapasi
(deed.),(') this Court held that service of the notice under
(1) [1968] 8 Supreme Court Journal 91.
988 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

A s. 34(1) (a) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, within the period of limi-
tation being a condition precedent, to the exercise of jurisdiction, if
no notice is issued or if the notice issued is shown to be invalid, then
the proceedings taken by the Income-tax Ollicer without a notice or
in pursuance of an invalid notice would be illegal and void.
B It was, however, contended that if the Court accepts the legal
contention as canvassed on behalf of the appellant it would be im- •
possible tc serve the notice as statutorily prescribed. This wild it ,
apprehension is wholly unfounded. The notice is required to be
served in the manner prescribed by s. 106 of Transfer of Property
Act which, inter-alia, provides for affixing a copy of the notice 011 the
premises in possession of tenant. Therefore, it cannot be said that
the approach of the Court would render it impossible for the landlord
to meet with the statutory requirement of service of notice before
commencing the action for eviction.
Having, therefore, examined the three vital contentions, in my
·n opinion the suit of the landlord must fail on the ground that the rent
was not payable by month and, therefore, section 20(2) (a) i~ not
attracted. And further, even if it is attracted, as the statutory notice
as required by s. 20(2) (a) was not served, a decree for eviction
cannot be passed on the only ground of default in payment of rent.

E I would accordingly allow this appeal and dismiss the suit of the
respondent for eviction but with no order as to costs in the circums-
tances of the case.

S.R. Appeal dismissed.

•(

,.