HARBEER SINGHversusSHEESHPAL & ORS.

                            [2016) 8 S.C.R. 380


A                           HARBEER SINGH
                                     v.
                           SHEESHPAL & ORS.
                 (Criminal Appeal Nos. 1624-1625of2013)
8                           OCTOBER 20, 2016
       [PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE AND AMITAVA ROY, JJ.]
          Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s. 161 and Explanation
  to s.162 - Murder - On accou/lf of previous enmity - Four accused
     Chance Witnesses - Interested Witnesses - Prosecution case, that
c -while  driving Jeep, accused persons with intention to kill the victim
   hit him and dragged him from one place to another - Victim died on
  the spot - There was delay in recording the statement of witnesses -
   Trial court convicted the accused persons and sentenced them to
  life imprisonment - High Court however, acquitted all the accused
D persons - On appeal, held: Prosecution was not able to prove its
  case beyond all reasonable doubt since the eye-witnesses were
   interested in the complainant and hence unreliable, while most other
   prosecution witnesses ll'ere chance witnesses - Evidence of the eye
   witnesses both as to fact of the alleged conspiracy and murder of
   the deceased, did not inspire confidence; there were inconsistencies
E
   and improvements in the deposition of the prosecution witnesses
   made over their statements recorded - Further, there was
   unexplained delay in recording the evidence of certain prosecution
  witnesses as well as many important and basic lapses in investigation
  that made the prosecution case suspicious - No ground to interfere
F with the judgment passed by High Court - Penal Code, 1860 -
  ss. 302, 149, I 20B.
          Constitution of India -Art.136 - Scope of - Interference in
    criminal appeal against acquittal - Supreme Court not to interfere
    with the judgment of the High Court unless High Court has acted
G   perverse~y or improperly.

          Dismissing the appeals, the Court
          HELD: 1. In an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution
    of India, Supreme Court will not interfere with the judgment of
    the High Court unless the same is clearly unreasonable or
H
                                   31!0
          HARBEER SINGH v. SHEESHPAL & ORS.                        381


perverse or manifestly illegal or grossly unjust. The mere fact    A
that another view could also have been taken on the evidence on
record is not a ground for reversing an order of acquittal.[Para
10][388-C-D)
     Himachal Pradesh Administration v. Shri Om Prakash
     (1972) 1 SCC 249 : 1972 (2) SCR 765; State of U.P. v.          B
     Harihar Bux Singh & Anr. (1975) 3 SCC 167; State of
     Uttar Pradesh v. Ashok Kumar & Anr. (1979) 3 SCC 1
     : 1979 (3) SCR 1; State of U.P. v. Gopi & Ors. (1980)
     Supp. SCC 160; State of Karnataka v. Amajappa &
     Ors. (2003) 9 SCC 468; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bmme
     @ Baijnath & Ors. (2009) 4 SCC 271; State of U.P. v.
                                                                   c
     Gurucharan & Ors. (2010) 3 SCC 721 : 2010 (2)
     SCR 1110; State of Haryana v. Shakuntla & Ors. (2012)
     5 SCC 171 : 2012 (5) SCR 276; Hamza v.
     Muhammadkutty @ Mani & Ors. (2013) 11 SCC 150 :
     2013 (10) SCR 867 - referred to.                              D
      2. PW3 and PW9 were not witnesses to the alleged
conspiracy between the accused persons since not only the
details of the conversation given by these two prosecution
witnesses were different but also their presence at the alleged
spot at the relevant time seems unnatural. Besides, it appears E
that there have been improvements in the statements of PW3.
The Explanation to s.162 Cr.P.C. provides that an omission to
state a fact or circumstance in the statement recorded by a
police officer u/s.161 Cr.P.C., may amount to contradiction if
the same appears to be significant and otherwise relevant F
having regard to the context in which such omission occurs
and whether any omission amounts to a contradiction in the
particular context shall be a question of fact. Thus, while it is
true that every improvement is not fatal to the prosecution
case, in cases where an improvement creates a serious doubt
about the truthfulness or credibility of a witness, the defence may G
take advantage of the same. The High Court had rightly
considered these omissions 11rc material omissions amounting
to contradictions covered by the Explanation to s.162 Cr.P,C.
[Para 15][389-F-H; 390-A, B-C]
                                                                   H
382            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2016] 8 S.C.R.


A            Ashok Vishnu Davare v. State Of Maharashtra (2004)
             9 SCC 431; Radha Kumar v. State of B ihar (no11'
             Jharkhand) (2005) 10 SCC 216; Sunil Kumar
             Sambhudayal Gupta (Dr.) & Ors. v. State of
             Maharashtra (2010) 13 SCC 657 : 2010 (15) SCR
             452; Baldev Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 12 SCC
 B           473: 2013 (9) SCR 547 - referred to.
         3. In the present case, the date of occurrence was
   21.12.1993 but the statements of PWl and PW5 were recorded
   after two days of incident, i.e., on 23.12.1993. The evidence of
 c PW6   was recorded on 26.12.1993 while the evidence of PWll
   was recorded after 10 days of incident, i.e., on 31.12.1993. There
   was a delay of 15-16 days from the date of the incident in recording
   the statements of PW3 and PW9. There is no reason to interfere
   with the observations of High Court on the point of delay and its
   corresponding impact on the prosecution case. Further, the High
 D Court has also concluded that these witnesses were interested
   witnesses and their testimony were not corroborated by
   independent witoesses.[Paras 15,16,17 and 18)(390-C, E; 391-
      A-C]
             Ganesh/al v. State of Mahrashtra (1992) 3 SCC 106:
 E           1992 (2) SCR 502; Mohd. Khalid 1~ State of W.B. (2002)
             7 SCC 334 : 2002 (2) Suppl. SCR 31; Prithvi (Minor)
             v. Mam Raj & Ors. (2004) 13 SCC 279 : 2004 (2)
             SCR 530; Sidhartha Vashisht @ Manu Sharma v. State
             (NCT of Delhi) (2010) 6 sec 1: 2010 (4) SCR 103;
             Ganesh Bhavan Patel v. State Of Maharashtra (1978)
 F           4 SCC 371 : 1979 (2) SCR 94; Balakrushna S1Min v.
             State Of Orissa (1971) 3 SCC 192; Maruti Rama Naik
             v. State of Mahrashtra (2003) 10 SCC 670; Jagjit Singh
             v. State of Punjab (2005) 3 SCC 68; Darya Singh v.
             State of Punjab 1964 (7) SCR 397 - referred to.
 G       4. Deposition of a chance witness, whose presence at
   the place of incident remains doubtful, ought to be discarded.
   Therefore, for the reasons recorded by the High Court that
   PW5 and PW6 were chance witnesses and their statements
   have been rightly discarded. The evidence of the eye witnesses
 H is not truthful, reliable and trustworthy and hence cannot
          HARBEER SINGH v. SHEESHPAL & ORS.                       383


form the basis of conviction. Their presence at the scene of A
occurrence at the time of the incident is highly unnatural as also
their ability to individually and correctly identify each of the
accused from a considerable distance, especially when it was
dark at the alleged place of occurrence, is itself suspect.
[Paras 24, 25][392-G, H; 393-A]
                                                                   B
     Puran v. The State of Punjab AIR 1953 SC 459; Mousam
     Singha Roy and Ors. v. State of W.B. (2003) 12 SCC
     377; Shankarlal v. State of Rajastahan (2004) 10 SCC
     632; Jarnail Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab (2009) 9
     SCC 719 : 2009 (13) SCR 774 - relied on.
                                                                   c
       6. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that
the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond all reasonable
doubt. The burden of proving its case beyond all reasonable doubt
lies on the prosecution and it never shifts. Another golden thread
which runs through the web of the administration of justice in
criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence D
adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and
the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the
accused should be adopted. In the instant case, the prosecution
has also been unable to convincingly connect the jeep of the
accused Sheeshpal with the incident beyond reasonable doubt. E
Further, owing to other lapses in investigation, as recorded by
the High Court, the prosecution has been unable to prove its
case beyond all reasonable doubt. The view taken by the High
Court in the facts and circumstances of the case appears to be
a reasonably plausible one. [Paras 11, 26][388-F-G; 393-B-C]
                                                                    F
       Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC
       808 : 1974 (1) SCR 722; State of Rajasthan v. Raja
       Ram (2003) 8 SCC 180 : 2003 (2) Suppl. SCR 445;
       Chandrappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC
       415 : 2007 (2) SCR 630; Upendra Pradhan v. State of
       Orissa (2015) 11 SCC 124 : 2015 (5) SCR 214; Go/bar          G
       Hussain & Ors. v. State of Assam and Anr. (2015) 11
       SCC 242: 2015 (5) SCR 525 - referred to.
                     Case Law Reference
1972 (2) SCR 765              referred to           Para9
                                                                   H
384              SUPREME COURT REPORTS        (2016] 8 S.C.R.


A     (1975) 3 sec 167          referred to     Para 10
      1979 (3) SCR 1            referred to     Para 10
      (1980) Supp. sec 160      referred to     Para 10
      (200~) 9 sec 468          referred to     Para 10
 8    (2009) 4 sec 211          referred to     Para 10
      2910 (2) SCR 1110         referred to     Para 10
      2012 (5) SCR 276          referred to     Para 10
      2013 (10) SCR 867         referred to     Para 10
c     1974 (1) SCR 722          referred to     Para 11
      2003 (2) Suppl. SCR 445   referred to     Para 11
      2007 (2) SCR 630          referred to     Para 11
      2015 (~) SCR 214          referred to     Para 11
D
      2015 (5) SCR 525          referred to     Para 11
      (2004) 9 sec 431          referred to     Para 15
      (2005) 10 sec 216         referred to     Para 15
      ~010 (15) SCR 452         referred to     Para 15
 E
      2013 (9) SCR 547          referred to     Para 15
      1992 (2) SCR 502          referred to     Para 16
      2002 (2) Suppl. SCR 31    referred to     Para 16

 F    2004 (~) SCR 530          referred to     Para 16
      2010 (4) SCR 103          referred to     Para 16
      1979 (2) SCR 94           referred to     Para 17
      (1971) 3 sec 192          referred to     Para 17
 G    (2003) 10 sec 670         referred to     Para 17
      (2005) 3 sec 68           referred to     Para 17
      1964 (7) SCR 397          referred to     Para 19
      (1972) 3 sec 79           referred to     Para 21
H
           HARBEER SINGH v. SHEESHPAL & ORS.                                 385



AIR 1953 SC 459                  relied on                 Para 23           A
(2003) 12 sec 377                relied on                 Para 24
(2004) 10 sec 632                relied on                 Para 24
2009 (13) SCR 774                relied on                 Para 24
      CRJMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal                        B
Nos. 1624-1625 of2013.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 25.11.2011 of the High Court
of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench, Jaipur in D. B. Criminal
Appeal No. 290 of 1995 and D. B. Criminal Appeal No. 375of1995.
                                 WITH
                                                                              c
      Crl.A. Nos. 217-218 of2013.
     K. K. Rai, Sr. Adv, Krishnanad Pandeya, Anshul Rai, Chandra
Shekhar, Jayant Bhatt P. L, Hamid Khan, Ms. Ruchi Kohli,
Ms. Madhurima Tatia, Advs. for the appearing patties.                         D
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
       PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J. I. These appeals, by special
leave, are directed against the judgment and order dated 25th November,
2011, passed by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench,
Jaipur, in D.S. Criminal Appeal No.290/1995 and D.S. Criminal Appeal          E
No.375/1995, whereby the High Court has quashed and set aside the
conviction of the accused respondents. Criminal Appeal Nos.1624-1625
of2013 are filed by the son of the deceased and Criminal Appeal Nos.217-
218of2013 are filed by the State of Rajasthan challenging the acquittal
order passed by the High Court.                                               F
       2. The brief facts of the case as unfolded by the prosecution are
as follows: On 21.12.1993, at 7.55 P.M., Bhagwara Ram (PW-8), the
brother of the deceased Balbir Singh, gave a written report at P.S.
Kotwali Sikar, stating that on 21.12.1993 in the evening at about 6.00
P.M., when his younger brother Balbir (deceased) was returning to.his         G
house, two men were standing near the Dhaba ofShankar and he started
talking to them. In the meantime, Sheeshpal (son ofKhuba Ram) came
from the side of Sikar driving his Jeep and with an intention to kill, hit
Balbir and dragged him upto the Dhaba of Suresh as a result of which
Balbir died on the spot. The owner of the Dhaba- Suresh Kumar chased
                                                                              H
386            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2016] 8 S.C.R.



A     them on his motorcycle. It was further stated that the act was committed
      by Sheeshpal in furtherance of his old enmity with Balbirin connivance
      with Bhanwarlal, Dhanvir, Mangal (sons of Khuba Ram) and
      Bhanwarlal's brother-in-law Nemichand and Shiv Bhagwan of Village
      Gothura Tagalan. It is also mentioned in the written report that at the
      time of the incident, Sheeshpal was driving the jeep and Nemichand,
 8
      Shiv Bhagwan, Rajendra and Prakash were with him in the Jeep and it
      is not mentioned that Bhanwarwal was present in the jeep or at the
      place of occurrence. The names of Dhanvir and Mangal were dropped
      later on.
             3. The Police registered a case under Section 302 of the Indian
 c    Penal Code and began investigation. Formal FIR was registered, place
      of occurrence was inspected, site plan was prepared, post-mortem of
      the dead body was done, Panchnama of the dead body was prepared
      and the vehicle used in the crime along with number plate of the vehicle
      and broken parts was seized. Statements of the witnesses were recorded
 D    and during investigation accused persons were taken into custody. After
      completion of the investigation, accused Bhanwar Lal was declared
      absconding. Charge sheet was filed against the accused persons before
      the learned Magistrate and the case was committed to the Sessions
      Court for trial. On Bhan war Lal's presence, his case was also committed
      as above and both the cases were amalgamated and trial commenced.
 E    Charges under Sections 149, 302, 1208 of the !PC were framed against
      all the accused persons except Bhanwar Lal. Accused Bhanwar Lal
      was charged under Sections 302, 1208 of !PC. All the accused persons
      pleaded 'not guilty' and hence they were tried by the Court of Sessions.
      The Trial Court convicted the accused persons and sentenced them to
 F    life imprisonment under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the !PC.
      They were also sentenced severally under various sections.
             4. Aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 17.06.1995, passed
      by the Trial Comi, the accused persons filed appeals before the High
      Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur. The High Court
 G    allowed the appeals, set aside the judgment and order passed by the
      Trial Court and acquitted all the accused persons. Hence, these appeals,
      by special leave, are filed before this Court.
             5. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the Appellant
      as also the learned counsel appearing for the Respondents and perused
 H    the oral and documentary evidence on record.
           HARBEER SINGH v. SHEESHPAL & ORS.                                 387
               [PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.]

      6. The Trial Court convicted the accused relying upon the              A
successful establishment of the following facts by the prosecution:
      (a) Death of the deceased due to unnatural reasons vide the
      evidence of PW4 (medical jurist who conducted the post-mortem
      of the deceased), Ext. P-12 (post-mortem report), Ext. P-15
      (Panchnama), and the evidence of PW8 (complainant);                    B
      (b) Hatching of criminal conspiracy to commit the murder of the
      deceased by accused Bhanwar Lal along with Sheespal, Nemi
      Chand, Shiv Bhagwan and Rajendra Kumar vide the evidence of
      PW3 and PW9;
      (c) Existence of enmity between accused persons and the                c
      deceased;
      (d) Formation of an unlawful assembly by the accused Sheeshpal,
      Nemichand, Shiv Bhagwan, Rajendra Kumar and Prakash having
      the common object of committing the murder of the deceased
      vide the evidence of PW8, PW!, PWS, PW6 and PW! I;                      D
      (e) Use of force and violence in furtherance of the common object
      by using vehicle RJ-23-C-0203 ofSheeshpal and commission of
      the offence defined under Section 300, fourthly, ofIPC.
       7. However, the High Court gave the benefit of doubt to the
                                                                              E
Respondents and acquitted them on the ground that the prosecution was
not able to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt since the eye-
witnesses were interested in the complainant and hence unreliable, while
most other prosecution witnesses were chance witnesses. The evidence
of the eye-witnesses both as to the fact of the alleged conspiracy and
the murder of the deceased, did not inspire confidence; there were            F
inconsistencies and improvements in the deposition of the prosecution
witnesses made over their statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C.
Further, there was unexplained delay in recording the evidence of certain
prosecution witnesses as well as many important and basic lapses in
investigation that made the prosecution case suspicious.
                                                                              G
       8. Before proceeding with an analysis of various contentions raised
by the parties or expressing opinion on the appreciation and findings of
fact and law recorded by the Courts below, we wish to reiterate the
scope of interference by this Court in a criminal appeal against acquittal
under Article 136 of the Constitution oflndia.
                                                                             H
388             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2016) 8 S.C.R.



A           9. In Himachal Pradesh Administration Vs. Shri Om Prakash,
      (1972) I SCC 249, it was held by this Court:
             "In appeals against acquittal by special leave under Article
             136, this Court has undoubted power to interfere with the
             findings of fact, no distinction being made between
B            judgments of acquittal and conviction, though in the case of
             acquittals it will not ordinarily interfere with the appreciation
             of evidence or on findings of fact unless the High Court
             'acts perversely or otherwise improperly'."
             I 0. The above principle has been reiterated by this Court in a
 c    number ofjudicial decisions and the position of law that emerges from a
      comprehensive survey of these cases is that in an appeal under Article
      136 of the Constitution of India, this Court will not interfere with the
      judgment of the High Court unless the same is clearly unreasonable or
      perverse or manifestly illegal or grossly unjust. The mere fact that another
      view could also have been taken on the evidence on record is not a
D     ground for reversing an order of acquittal. [See State ofU .P. Vs. Harihar
      Bux Sin_gh & Anr., ( 1975) 3 SCC 167; State of Uttar Pradesh Vs.
      Ashok Kumar & Anr., (1979) 3 SCC I; State of U.P. Vs. Gopi &
      Ors., ( 1980) Supp. SCC 160; State of Karnataka Vs. Amajappa &
      Ors., (2003) 9 SCC 468; State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Banne @
 E    Baijnath & Ors., (2009) 4 SCC 271; State ofU.P. Vs. Gurucharan
      & Ors., (20 I 0) 3 SCC 721; State ofHaryana Vs. Shakuntla & Ors.,
      (2012) 5 SCC 171 and Hamza Vs.Muhammadkutty@Mani & Ors.,
      (2013) 11 sec I50J.
              11. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that the guilt
 F    of the accused must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. The burden
      of proving its case beyond all reasonable doubt lies on the prosecution
      and it never shifts. Another golden thread which runs through the web
      of the administration ofjustice in criminal cases is that if two views are
      possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of
      the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable
 G    to the accused should be adopted. [Vide Kali Ram Vs. State of
      Himachal Pradesh, ( 1973) 2 SCC 808; State ofRajasthan Vs. Raja
      Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180; Chandrappa & Ors. vs. State ofKarnataka,
      (2007) 4 SCC 415; U1>endra Pradhan Vs. State of Orissa, (2015) 11
      SCC 124 and Golbar Hussain & Ors. Vs. State of Assam and Anr.,
H     c201 s) 11 sec 242).
           HARBEER SINGH v. SHEESHPAL & ORS.                                  389
               [PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.]

        12. Keeping in mind the aforesaid position of law, we shall examine A
the arguments advanced by the parties as also the evidence and the
materials on record and see whether in view of the nature of offence
alleged to have been committed by the Respondents, the findings of fact
by the High Court call for interference in the facts and circumstances of
the case.
                                                                            8
        I 3. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the Appellant
that the High Court had erred in ignoring the prosecution evidence which
conclusively proved the guilt of the accused persons who had conspired
to kill the deceased in a garb of accident. Further, the High Court had
also erred in reversing the conviction of the accused persons despite
presence of sufficient evidence which indicated involvement of all the c
accused persons and a complete chain of incriminating circumstances
 proved by the prosecution.
       14. Per contra, the learned counsel for the Respondents has
primarily reiterated the reasons that found favour with the High Court in
recording an order of acquittal in favour of the Respondents viz. failure      D
of prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused persons
Bhanwarlal, S, .eeshpal, Nemichand and Shiv Bhagwan hatched criminal
conspiracy at the Dhani ofSheeshpal at around 7-8 p.m. on 19.12.1993
and that the prosecution case suffered from contradictions, discrepancies
and inconsistencies and, in particular, that the testimony of eye witnesses    E
did not inspire confidence due to the reasons recorded by the High Court.
       15. We have given careful consideration to the submissions made
by the parties and we are inclined to agree with the observations of the
High Cou11 that PW3 and PW9 were not witnesses to the alleged
conspiracy between the accused persons since not only the details of F
the conversation given by these two prosecution witnesses were different
but also their presence at the alleged spot at the relevant time seems
unnatural in view of the physical condition of PW9 and the distance of
Sheeshpal's Dhani from Sikar road. Besides, it appears that there have
been improvements in the statements of PW3. The Explanation to Section
 162 Cr.P.C. provides that an omission to state a fact or circumstance in G
the statement recorded by a police officer under Section 161 Cr.P.C.,
may amount to contradiction ifthe same appears to be significant and
otherwise relevant having regard to the context in which such omission
occurs and whether any omission amounts to a contradiction in the
particular context shall be a question of fact. Thus, while it is true that H
390             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2016] 8 S.C.R.



A     every improvement is not fatal to the prosecution case, in cases where
      an improvement creates a serious doubt about the truthfulness or
      credibility of a witness, the defence may take advantage of the same.
      [See Ashok Vishnu Davare Vs. State Of Maharashtra, (2004) 9
      SCC 431; Rad ha Kumar Vs. State of Bihar (now Jharkhand), (2005)
      IO SCC 216; Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta (Dr.) & Ors. Vs.
 B    State of Maharashtra, (2010) 13 SCC 657 and Baldev Singh Vs.
      State of Punjab, (2014) 12 SCC 473]. In our view, the High Court had
      rightly considered these omissions as material omissions amounting to
      contradictions covered by the Explanation to Section 162 Cr.P.C.
      Moreover, it has also come in evidence that there was a delay of 15-16
 c    days from the date of the incident in recording the statements of PW3
      and PW9 and the same was sought to be unconvincingly explained by
      reference to the fact that the family had to sit for shock meetings for 12
      to 13 days. Needless to say, we are not impressed by this explanation
      and feel that the High Court was right in entertaining doubt in this regard.
 D            16. As regards the incident of murder of the deceased, the
      prosecution has produced six eye-witnesses to the same. The argument
      raised against the reliance upon the testimony of these witnesses pertains
      to the delay in the recording of their statements by the police under
      Section 161 of Cr.P.C. In the present case, the date of occurrence was
      21.12.1993 but the statements of PW I and PW 5 were recorded after
 E    two days of incident, i.e., on 23.12.1993. The evidence of PW6 was
      recorded on 26.12.1993 while the evidence of PW! I was recorded after
       I 0 days of incident, i.e., on 31.12.1993. Further, it is well-settled law that
      delay in recording the statement of the witnesses does not necessarily
      discredit their testimony. The Court may rely on such testimony if they
 F    are cogent and credible and the delay is explained to the satisfaction of
      the Court. [See Ganeshlal Vs. State of Mahrashtra, ( 1992) 3 SCC
       I 06; Mohd. Khalid Vs. State of W.B., (2002) 7 SCC 334; Prithvi
      (Minor) Vs. Mam Raj & Ors., (2004) 13 SCC 279 and Sidhartha
      Vashisht @ Manu Sharma vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2010) 6 SCC
      I].
 G
             17. However, Ganesh Bhavan Patel Vs. State Of Maharashtra,
      (1978) 4 sec 371, is an authority for the proposition that delay in recording
      of statements of the prosecution witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C.,
      although those witnesses were or could be available for examination
      when the Investigating Officer visited the scene of occurrence or soon
 H
            HARBEER SINGH v. SHEESHPAL & ORS.                                   391
                [PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.]

thereafter, would cast a doubt upon the prosecution case. [See also             A
Balakrushna Swain Vs. State OfOrissa, (1971) 3 SCC 192; Maruti
Rama Naik Vs. State of Mahrashtra, (2003) I 0 SCC 670 and Jagjit
Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (2005) 3 SCC 68]. Thus, we see no reason
to interfere with the observations of the High Court on the point of delay
and its corresponding impact on the prosecution case.
                                                                                B
18. Further, the High Court has also concluded that these witnesses were
interested witnesses and their testimony were not corroborated by
independent witnesses. We are fully in agreement with the reasons
recorded by the High Court in coming to this conclusion.
      19. In Darya Singh Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 328 =                  c
1964 (7) SCR 397, this Court was of the opinion that a related or'
interested witness may not be hostile to the assailant, but ifhe is, then his
evidence must be examined very carefully and all the infirmities must be
taken into account. This is what this Court said:
      "There can be no doubt that in a murder case when evidence                 D
       is given by near relatives of the victim and the murder is
      alleged to have been committed by the enemy of the family,
      criminal courts must examine the evidence of the interested
      witnesses, like the relatives of the victim, very
       carefully........ But where the witness is a close relation of
       the victim and is shown to share the victim's hostility to his            E
       assailant, that naturally makes it necessary for the criminal
       courts examine the evidence given by such witness very
       carefully and scrutinise all the infirmities in that evidence
       before deciding to act upon it. In dealing with such evidence,
       Courts naturally begin with the enquiry as to whether the                 F
       said witnesses were chance witnesses or whether they
       were really present on the scene of the offence ...... If the
      -criminal Cow1 is satisfied that the witness who is related to
       the victim was not a chance-witness, then his evidence has
       to be examined from the point of view of probabilities and
       the account given by him as to the assault has to be carefully            G
       scrutinised."
      20. However, we do not wish to emphasise that the corroboration
by independent witnesses is an indispensable rule in cases where the
prosecution is primarily based on the evidence of seemingly interested
                                                                                 H
392             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2016) 8 S.C.R.



A     witnesses. It is well settled that it is the quality of the evidence and not
      the quantity of the evidence which is required to be judged by the Court
      to place credence on the statement.
             21. Further, in Raghubir Singh Vs. State ofU.P., ( 1972) 3 SCC
      79, it has been held that the prosecution is not bound to produce all the
 B    witnesses said to have seen the occurrence. Material witnesses
      considered necessary by the prosecution for unfolding the prosecution
      story alone need be produced without unnecessary and redundant
      multiplication of witnesses. In this connection general reluctance of an
      average villager to appear as a witness and get himself involved in cases
      ofrival village factions when spirits on both sides are running high has to
 c    be borne in mind.
            22. The High Court has further noted that there were chance
      witnesses whose statements should not have been relied upon. Learned
      counsel for the Respondents has specifically submitted that PW5 and
      PW6 are chance witnesses whose presence at the place of occurrence
 D    was not natural.
             23. The defining attributes ofa 'chance witness' were explained
      by Mahajan, J., in the case of Puran Vs. The State of Pun.jab, AIR
      1953 SC 459. It was held that such witnesses have the habit of appearing
      suddenly on the scene when something is happening and then disappearing
 E    after noticing the occurrence about which they are called later on to
      give evidence.
            24. ln Mousam Singha Roy and Ors. Vs. State ofW.B., (2003)
      12 SCC 377, this Court discarded the evidence of chance witnesses
      while observing that certain glaring contradictions/omissions in the
 F    evidence of PW2 and PW3 and the absence of their names in the FIR
      has been very lightly discarded by the Courts below. Similarly, Shankarlal
      Vs. State of Ra.iastahan, (2004) I 0 SCC 632, and Jarnail Singh &
      Ors. Vs. State of Punjab, (2009) 9 SCC 719, are authorities for the
      proposition that deposition of a chance witness, whose presence at the
 G    place of incident remains doubtful, ought to be discarded. Therefore, for
      the reasons recorded by the High Court we hold that PW5 and PW6
      were chance witnesses and their statements have been rightly discarded.
             25. In the light of the above and other reasons recorded by the
      High Court, we hold that the evidence of the eye witnesses is not truthful,
 H    reliable and trustworthy and hence cannot form the basis of conviction.
                HARBEER SINGH v. SHEESHPAL & ORS.                                   393
                    (PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.]

  Their presence at the scene of occurrence at the time of the incident is          A
  highly unnatural as also their ability to individually and correctly identify
  each of the accused from a considerable distance, especially when it
  was dark at the alleged place of occurrence, is itself suspect.
        26. Besides these, the prosecution has also been unable to
  convincingly connect the jeep of the accused Sheeshpal with the incident           B
  beyond reasonable doubt. Further, owing to other lapses in investigation,
  as recorded by the High Court, we are convinced that the prosecution
  has been unable to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt. The view
  taken by the High Court in the facts and circumstances of the case
• appears to be a reasonably plausible one.
                                                                                     c
          27. Thus, in the light of the above discussion, we are of the view
   that the present appeals are devoid of merits, and we find no ground to
   interfere with the judgment passed by the High Court. The appeals are,
   accordingly, dismissed.

                                                                                     D
   Ankit Gyan                                                  Appeals dismissed.