Holding

The Supreme Court held that it would be unjust to execute Harbans Singh when a co‑accused’s death sentence for the same offence had been commuted, and therefore the Court should recommend the President to commute the death sentence to life imprisonment.

Summary

Harbans Singh, along with Kashmira Singh and Jeeta Singh, was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of four persons. While Jeeta Singh was executed and Kashmira Singh's death sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment by the Supreme Court, Harbans Singh's special leave and review petitions were dismissed and his mercy petition to the President was rejected. He filed a writ petition under Article 32 seeking a stay of execution and commutation. The Court held that, because the co‑accused’s sentence for the same offence had been commuted, it would be manifestly unjust to allow Harbans Singh’s death sentence to be carried out. The Court therefore stayed the execution and, in the interest of comity, recommended that the President exercise his power under Article 72 to commute the sentence to life imprisonment.

Issues considered

Whether the Supreme Court, notwithstanding the dismissal of special leave and review petitions and the President's rejection of the mercy petition, can intervene to commute a death sentence to prevent manifest injustice.
Whether the death sentence of a co‑accused should be stayed when another co‑accused for the same offence has had his death sentence commuted to life imprisonment.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 136, s. Article 32, s. Article 72
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302

Subjects

death penaltycommutationArticle 32Article 72inherent jurisdictionequal treatmentcapital punishmentmercy petitionSupreme Court

Judgment

235 A
HARBANS SINGH
v.
STATE OF U.P. & OTHERS
B
February 12, 1982

[Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., D.A. DESAI AND
AMARENDRA NATH SEN, JJ.J
PenafCode-Death Sentence imposed on three accused for the same ojfence- c
One accused executed-Sentence of death commuted in case of another accused-
Mercy petition rejected by President in another-Court if could interfere.

By a common judgment the petitioner and the two other accused (JS and
KS) were convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of four persons. The
High Court affirmed their conviction and sentence.
D
The special leave petition filed by JS was dismissed and he was executed.
The sentence of death passed on KS was commuted by this Court into imprison·
ment fof life. The petitioner's ('HS's) speciaf leave petition and later his review
petition were dismissed by this Court and his petition to the President of India
for commutation of death sentence was dismissed, whereupon he filed the present
petition.
E
(Per Chandrachud, CJ and D.A. D~sai, J. 'A,N. Sen, J. concurring.)

HELD : The petitioner and the other two co-accused were sentenced to
death by a common judgment. No distinction could at all be made between
the part played by KS and the petitioner. Since the death s~ntence in bis case
was commuted by this Court it would be unjust to confirm the death sentence F
imposed upon the petitioner. (238 B·CJ

In view of the background of the case it would not be wrong if this Court
had Commuted the sentence of death imposed upon the petitioner but in the inte-
rest of comity between the powers of this Court and the powers of the President
it would be more in the fitness of things if this Court were to recommend that
the President be so good as to exercise his power under Article 72 of the Consti-
G
tution to commute the death sentence into impriSonment for life because the
President had already considered the mercy petition of the .Petitioner once and
had rejectod it. [238 E-G]

[The Court directed that prior to the actual execution of any death H
s111tence the Jail Superintendent should ascertain personally whether the
,sente~ce of d.:ath impose<l ppon any of the co-accused of the prisener
236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982J 3 S.C.R.

A who was due to be hanged had been commuted.·· If it had been commu-
ted, the Superintendent should apprise the superior authorities- of the
matter, who must take prompt steps for bringing the matter to the notice
of the Court concerned.] [239 A·B]

(Per A.N. Sen, J. concurring)

B It would be unjust to allow the death sentence imposed on the petitioner.
executed. [242 G]

Considering that the responsibility, involvement and complicitY of the peti-
tioner in the commission of the offence is the same as that of the other co-accu-
sed, it would be sheer travesty of justice if for the same offence the petitioner
had to pay the extreme penalty of death while the death sentence imposed on the
c co-accused, for the very same offence had been commuted to one of life
imprisonment. Had the petitfoner mentioned either in the special leave petition
or review petition or mercy petition to the President this all important and signi-
ficant fact, death sentence imposed on him would have been commuted.[242 CF]

Apart f~om the very wide jurisdiction and powers conferred on this Court
under Arts. 32 and 136 of the Constitution this Court retains and must retain,
D an inherent power atid jurisdiction for dealing with.any extra·ordinary situation
in the larger interests of administration of justice and for preventing manifest
injustice being done. This power must necessarily be sparingly used for further-
ing the ends of justice. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this
and interfere case, this is a fit case where this Court· should entertain the present
petition. [243 A·C]
E
Since in the instant case the petitioner's mercy petition had earlier been
considered by the President propriety and decorum require that the matter should
be referred back to the President. [243 D]

F · ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 7453
of 1981.

(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)

A.P. Mohanty for the Petitioner.
G
R.K. Bhatt for the Respondent.

The following judgments of the Court were delivered

H CHANDRACHUD C.J. By this writ· petition the petitioner Harbans
.Singh prays that the death sentence imposed upon him sb.olJl<! not b~
executed in view of the following circumstances.
HARBANS SINGH v. U.P. STATE (Chandrachud, C.J.) 237

The petitioner and three other persons, Mohinder Singh, A
Kashmira Singh and Jeeta Singh were involved in the murder
of Jindi Singh, Surjeet Singh, Bira Singh and Gnrmeet Singh.
Mohinder Singh died in an "encounter" with the police. The
petitioner and the other two accused, Kashmira Singh and
Jeeta Singh, were committed to stand their trial for the murder ,of
the aforesaid four persons. By a judgment dated May 1, 1975 the B
leari;ted Additional Sessions Judge, Pilibhit, convicted all of them
for the murder of Jindi Singh, Surjeet Singh and Bira Singh and
sentenced them to death. On October 20, 1975 the High Court of
Allahabad affirmed the judgment of the Trial Court in Criminal
Appeal No. 1080 of 1975.
c
Jeeta Singh filed Special Leave Petition No. 343 of 1976 in this
Court which was dismissed on April 15, 1976. Kashmira Singh
filed Special Leave Petition No. 104 of 1976 from jail and obtained
leave on the question of sentence. By an order dated April JO,
1977 his appeal (No. 172 of 1977) was allowed by a Bench consisting
of Bhagwati and Fazal Ali, JJ. who commuted his sentence of death D
into imprisonment for life. The petitioner, Harbans Singh, filed
Special Leave Petition No. 658 of 1978 from jail which was dis-
missed by Sarkaria and Shinghal, JJ. on October 16, 1978. His
·Review Petition (No. l 40/79) was dismissed by Sarkaria and A.P.
Sen, JJ. on May 9, 1980. It appears that though the Registry of
this Court had mentioned in its Office Report that Kashmira Singh's
E
death sentence was already commuted, that fact was not brought to
the notice of tlie Court specifically when the petitioner's Special
Leave Petition and his Review Petition were dismissed.

The petitjoner had filed a petition to the President of India F
· for commutation of his sentence, which was dismissed on August 22,
1981. Upon the dismissal of that petition, the execution of the
death sentence imposed upon the petitioner was fixed for October 6,
1981, whereupon he filed this petition in this Court. ·

The course which this case has taken makes a sad reading.
G
Thre~ persons were sentenced to death by a common judgment and,
regretfully, each one has .eventually met with a. different fate. One
of those three persons, Jetta Singh, who did not file any Review
Petition or Writ Petition in this Court was executed ou October 6,
•
1981. The other person, Kasltmira Singh, succeeded in having his
death sentence commuted intCI life imprisonmen\, The petitionei:
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) 3 s.c.~.

A was to be executed on the same day on which Jeeta Singh was
executed but, fortunately, he filed this Writ Petition on which we
passed an order staying ·the execution of his death sentence.

As we have stated earlier, the petitioner and the two other co.
accused were sentenced to death by a common judgment. We have
B seen the facts from which it is clear that no distinction at all can be
made between the part played by Kashmira Singh on the one hand
and the petitioner on the other. Since Kashmira Singh's death
sentence was commuted by this Court, it would be unjust to comirm

c
the death sentence imposed upon the petitioner. That will involve
the Court as well as the authorities concerned in the violation of
rudimentary norms governing the administration of justice. -
----
It is unfortunate that Jeeta Singh could not get the benefit of
the commutution of Kashmira Singh's sentence. Were he to
approach this Court like the petitioner, the sentence imposed upon
D him would have been commuted into life imprisonment because no
distinctio.n could have been made between his case and that of
Kashmira Singh whose sentence was commuted prior to the execu·
tion of Jeeta Singh.

The question which then arises for consideration is as to the
E proper course to be adopted in the circumstances of the case. In
view of the background of the case, to which we have referred
above, it would not be wrong if we were ourselves to commute the
sentence of death imposed upon the petitioner to imprisonment for

-
life. But in the interest of·comity between the powers of this Court
an.ct the powers of the .President of India, it will be more jn the
F fitness o~ things if we were to recommend that the President of
India may be so good as to exercise his power under Article 72 of i----
the Constitution to commute the death sentence imposed upon the
petitioner into imprisonment. for life. This is so because the
_f-'
President of India has already considered the mercy petition of the
petitioner once and has rejected it. We, therefore, recommend
G that for reasons aforesaid, which could' not have been before the
President of India when be rejected the mercy petition, he may
commute the death sentence imposed upon the petitioner.

H The fate of Jeeta Singh ha• a posthumous moral to tell. He
cannot-profit by the direction which we propose to give because he
,is now beyond the prO!'esses of human tribunals. But we direct
HAil.BANS SINGH v. U.P. STATE (A.N. Sen, J.) 239

that prior to the actual execution of any death sentence, the Jail A
Superintendent should ascertain personally whether the sentence of
death imposed upon any of the co-accused of the prisoner who is
due to be hanged. has been commuted, If it has been commuted,
the Superintendent should apprise the superior authorities of the
matter, who, in turn, must ta1ke prompt steps for bringing the matter
to the notice of the Court concerned. B
Order accordingly. The execution of the death sentence is
stayed until the decision of the President to w.hom a: copy of this
judgment should be forwarded forthwith,

AMARBNDRA NATH SEN, J .. I have l\ad the benefit of reading c
the judgment to be delivered by the learned Chief Justice, T agree
with the order proposed by him, I, however, wish to make some
observations of my own.

The relevant facts of the case have been succinctly· and briefly
stated by the learned Chief Justice in his judgment. Three persons, D
namely, the petitioner, Kashmira Singh ani Jeeta Singh were convic-
ted under S. 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to death
by the Additional Sessions Judge, Pilibhit by his judgment dated !st
May, 1975. The High Court of Allahabad affirmed the judgment of
the Trial Judge in Crimina1 Appeal No. 1080 of 1975 and confirmed
the death sentence of the said three accused by its judgment dated E
20th October, 1975. Jeeta Singh filed in this Court a Special Leave
Petition (No. 343 of 1976) which was dismissed by this Court on
15th April, 1976, It appears that after the dismissal of the Special
Leave Petition of Jeeta Singh by this Court, Jeeta Singh was executed
on the 6th of October, 1981. Kashmira Singh filed a Special Leave
Petition No, 104 of 1976 in this Court and leave was granted by this
Court on the question of sentence only. By an ?rder passed by this
Court on the I 0th April 1977 this Court allowed the appeal of Kash-
mira Singh (172/1976) by leave of this Court and this Court commu-
ted his sentence of death to one of imprisonment of life. The other
accused Harbans Singh who has filed this petition had also filed a
special leave petition No.658of1978. The Sj)ecial Leave Petition filed G
by Harbans Singh was dismissed by this Court on 16th October 1978,
It appears that Harbans Singh had, applied for review of the said
order of this Court and the review petition of Harbans Singh (140
of 1979) was also dismissed by this Court on 9th May, 1980, H
Harbans Singh had thereafter filed a petition to the President of 1

India under Art, 72 of the Constitution, The Petition of Harbans
240 SuPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) 3 S.C.R.

A Singh to the President of India was dismissed on the 22nd August,
1981. After the dismissal of the Petition of Harbans Singh to the
President, the date for execu_tion of the death sentence imposed upon
him was fixed and Harbans Singh, bas thereafter moved this Court
and bas filed this writ petition praying for commutation of his death
sentence and in. the alternative praying for a direction to the authori-
B ties to allow him the facilities to meet his near and dear ones before
the sentence of death imposed upon him is ·actually executed.

The unfortunate position appears to be that in respect of the
very same offence committed, one of the accused persons, namely,
Jeeta Singh has already been hanged; the death sentence imposed on
c another accused, namely, Kashmir& Singh, has been commuted to
one of life imprisonment; and Harbans Singh, the present petitioner,
is now awaiting death sentence to be executed.

When this Court dismissed the special leave petition of Jeeta
D Singh by its order dated 15th April, 1976, the decision of this Court
in the case of Bachan Singh v: State of Panjab,(1) was not there. It
appears from the report that Bachan Singh' s case in which constitu-
·tional validity of the qeath penalty wa~ upheld by this Court came to
be decid~d by this Court on 9th May, 1980. It further appears that
in that case the validity. of the death sentence was upheld by four of
E
ihe learned Judges on the Bench, but Bhagwati J. dissented from the
view expressed by the majority and he was of the opinion that "S.
302 of the IPC in so far as it provides for imposition of death
penalty as an alternative to life sentence, is ultra vires and void as
being violative of Art. 14 and 21 of the Constitution, as it does
not provide any legislative guidelines as to when life should be
F
·extinguished by imposition of death sentence". The majority
judgment of the Be11ch was delivered by Sarkaria, J. on behalf of
himself, Chandrachud, C.J. and Gupta and Untwalia, JJ. While
upholding the constitutio.nal validity of death sentence, this Court
in Bachan Singh' .«case laid down certain principles on the basis of
G which capital punishment may normally be imposed, recognising at
the same time that the punishment to be inflicted was a matter of
iudicial discretion to be exercised with due care and caution.

When a bench of this Court dismissed the special leave
H petition of Jeeta Singh who has since been executed, this Court

(I) [I980J 2 sec 684.
liARBANS SINGH v. u. P, STATE (A.N. Sen, J.) 241

must have on a consideration of the facts and circumstances come A
to the conclusion that death penalty had been rightly imposed on
Jeeta Singh and there was no need for interference by this Court
with the judgment or the sentence imposed. The special leave peti-
. tion of Kashmira Singh was entertained by another Bench of this
Court: Though arising out of the same offence, this Court must
have felt that there were circumstances which did not justify the B
imposition of the extreme penalty of death and this Court commu-
ted the sentence of death to one of life imprisonment. It may be
noticed that at the time the special leave petition of Kasbmira Singh
was entertained by this Court' and his death sentence was commuted
by an order of this Court dated 10th April, 1977, the decision in the
case of Bachan Singh was not there, though various other decisions
c
which came to be co_nsidered' in the case of Bachan Singh were
there.

The Special Leave Petition of the Petit_ioner was dismissed by
this Court on the 16th December, 1978. The review petition was D
also dismissed by a Bench pr_esided over by Sarkaria, J. on the 9th
of May, 1980, the very day on which Bachan Singh's case appears
to have been decided.

It unfortunately appears that the attention of the Bench which
dismissed the special leave petition and also the review petition of E
the petitioner was not drawn to the fact that special leave petition of
the co-accused Kashmira Singh had already been entertained by
this Court and the death sentence imposed on Kashmira Singh had

---
been commuted by this Court to one of life imprisonment. The
Bench which dismissed the special leave petition and also the review
petition of the present petitioner Harbans Singh must have felt on F
'- consideration of the facts and circumstances that death penalty· had
been rightly imposed on Harbans Singh and no interference by this
Court was called for. Though the Bench must have come to its
decision on a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the
case, yet, to. my mind, the Bench would not have dismissed the G
special leave petition and the review petition of Harbans Sfngh and
would have commuted his death sentence to one of life im·prison-
ment, had the Bench been informed that in the identical case, the
co-accused of the petitioner had earlier filed a special leave petition
which had already been entertained by this Court and the capital H
punishment of the co-accused Kashmira Singh had been commuted
by this Court to one of. life imprisonment. It may be noticed that
242 SIJPRBME COIJRT REPORTS (i982) 3 S.C.R,

A the responsibility, involvement and complicity of the petitioner
Harbans Singh in the commission of the offence is the same as that
of the co-accused Kashmira Singh. As I· have earlier noticed,
Harbans Singh had filed a petition to the President of india after
the dismissal of his petition for Special Leave and hi~ petition for
review by this Court for commu talion of death sentence and the
B said Petition of Harbans Singh has also been rejected by the
President.

To my mind, it will be a sheer travesty of justice and the
course of justice will he perverted, if for the very same offence, the
c petitioner has to swing and pay the extreme penalty of death whereas
the death sentence imposed on bis co-accused for the very same
offence is commuted to one of life imprisonment and the life of the
co-accused is shared. The case of the Petitioner Harbans Singh
appears, indeed, to be unfortunate, as neither in his special leave
petition and the review petition in this Court nor in his mercy
D petition to the President of India, this all important and significant
fact that the life sentence imposed on his co-accused in respect of
the very same offence has been comprnted to one of life imprison-
ment has been mentioned. Had this fact been brought to the notice
of this Court at the time when the Court dealt with the special leave
petition of the petitioner or even his review petition, I have no doubt
E in my mind that this Court would have commuted his death sentence
to one of life imprisonment. For the same offence and for the same
kind of involvement, responsibility and complicity, capital punish-

-
ment on one and life imprisonment on the other would never have
been just. I also feel that had. the. petitioner in his mercy petition
to the President of India made any mention of this fact of commuta-
tion of death sentence to one of life imprisonment on his co-accused
in respect of the very same offence, the President might have been
inclined to take a different view on his petition.

In the circumstances hereinabove stated, I am of the opinion
that it will be manifestly unjust to allow the death sentence ·imposed
G
on the petitioner to be exe~uted. The ·question that, however,
troubles me is weather this Court retains any power and jurisdiction
'to entertain and pass any appropriate orders on the question of
sentence imposed on the petitioner in view of the fact that not only
his special leave petition and review petition have been dismissed by
H
this Court but also the further fact that his petition for clemency
bas also been rejected by the President.
llARBANS SINGH v. u.P. stATE (A.N. Sen, J.) 243
'
Very wide powe.rs have been conferred on this Court for due A,
and proper administration of justice. Apart from the jurisdiction
and powers conferred on this Court under Arts. 32 and 136 of the
Constitution T am of the opinion that this Court retains and must
retain, an inherent power and jurisdiction for dealing with any
extra-ordinary situation in the larger interests of administration of
justice and for preventing manifest injustice being done. This power B
must necessarily be sparingly u11ed only in exceptional circumstances
for furthering the ends of justice. Having regard to the facts and
·circumstances of this caae, I am of the opinion that this is a fit case
where1 this Court should entertain the present petition of Harbans
Singh and this Court should interfere.
c
In the facts and circumstances of this case, this Court would
have been justified in commuting the death sentence imposed on the
petitioner to one of life imprisonment. As, however, the case of the
Petitioner had earlier been considered by the President of India to
whom the petitioner had presented the petition for mercy, I am of
Ille opinion that propriety and decorum require that the matter D
should be referred back to the President instead of this Court
deciding to commute the death sentence of the petitioner to one of
life imprisonment.

With these observations, I respectfully agree with the order
passed by the learned Chief Justice.

P.B.R. Petition allowed.