Supreme Court of India
HARBANS SINGH & ORS.versusSANT HARI SINGH & ORS.
- Citation
- 2009 INSC 28
- Decided
- 13 January 2009
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- S B SINHA
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the decree in the Managing Committee suit had attained finality and, under Section 11 of the CPC, res judicata bars the appellants from relitigating the matter.
Summary
The dispute concerned the management of Gurudwara Sant Bela Sahib Patshahi, where the Mohtim, Sant Hari Singh, claimed exclusive control and the Managing Committee claimed joint management. Two suits—one by the Mohtim and one by the Managing Committee—were consolidated and heard together; the trial court granted an injunction in favor of the Mohtim and dismissed the Managing Committee’s suit. The appellants (Harbans Singh et al.), who were Vice‑President and members of the Managing Committee, appealed the Mohtim suit but did not appeal the Managing Committee suit, which therefore became final. On a second appeal, the High Court held that the un‑appealed judgment in the Managing Committee suit was binding on the appellants under the doctrine of res judicata. The Supreme Court affirmed this view, holding that the Vice‑President is deemed a plaintiff in the Managing Committee suit and that the earlier un‑challenged decree had attained finality, barring any fresh challenge. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.
Issues considered
- Whether the doctrine of res judicata bars the appellants from challenging the order in the suit filed by the Managing Committee, given that no appeal was filed against that order
- Whether the appellant, as Vice‑President of the Managing Committee, is deemed a party to the Managing Committee suit for the purposes of res judicata
Legislation cited
Subjects
res judicataSection 11 CPCconsolidated suitsmanagement of religious institutionappealfinalityGurudwara
Judgment
[2009] 1 S.C.R. 250
A HARBANS SINGH & ORS.
II.
SANT HARi SINGH & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 100 of 2009)
JANUARY 13, 2009
B
[S.B. SINHA AND DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, JJ.]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - s.11 - Res-judicata -
Applicability of - Consolidated suits with common dispute -
c Order passed in one of the suits not challenged in appeal -
Permissibility to challenge the order passed in the other suit
- Held : Such challenge is barred by res-judicata as the order
in the other suit having not been challenged attained finality.
D Pursuant to a dispute between Management
Committee and Mohtmim of a Gurudwara, over the
management rights of the Gurudwara, Management
Committee as well as respondent-Mohtmim filed separate
suits. Appellant No.1 was the Vice - President of the
Managing Committee. Both the suits were heard together.
E
Trial Court decided both the suits in favour of
respondent-Mohtmim. Management Committee filed
appeals against order in both the suits.
Appellants and the Managing Committee preferred 1-
F separate appeals against the order passed in suit filed by
the respondent-Mohtmim. They did not prefer appeal
against the order passed in the suit filed by Managing
Committee. First Appellate Court affirmed the decree.
G Appellants filed second appeal against the order
passed by First Appellate Court. High Court dismissed
the appeal holding that since the findings recorded in
y
other suit attained finality having not been challenged in
first appeal, appellants were barred to challenge the
H 250
HARBANS SINGH & ORS. v. SANT HARi SINGH & ORS. 251
propriety of the orders of the Courts below. A
In appeal to this Court, appellants contended that
principles of res - judicata was not applicable in the
present case as in the suit filed by the Managing
Committee the appellant was not a party. 8
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD : Appellant does not claim any right, title and
interest in his individual capacity. He was the Vice
President of the Managing Committee. Thus, for all intent C
and purport, he was also a plaintiff in the suit filed by
Managing committee. The judgment and decree passed
in the suit filed by respondent No.1 might not have been
binding upon the appellant, had he claimed any right or
interest over the said property in his individual capacity o
-1 and not as a member of the Managing Committee.
Indisputably, the Managing Committe~ did not file any
second appeal against the judgment and decree passed
against.it. The said judgment and decree, therefore,
attained finality. Appellants, in law, were required to prefer E
another second appeal against the judgment and decree
passed in the said suit. The principle of res-judicata in the
aforementioned fact situation, has rightly been applied by
the High Court. [Paras 12 and 13] [255-G-H; 256-C-D]
Premier Tyres Ltd. vs. Kera/a State Road Transport F
Corpn. 1993 Suppl. (2) SCC 146 and Union of India Vs. V.
Pundarikakshudu and Sons and Anr. (2003) 8 SCC 168,
relied on.
Case Law Reference: G
1993 Suppl. (2) SCC 146 Relied on Para 15
(2003) 8 sec 168 Relied on Para 15
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 100
H
252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 1 S.C.R.
A of 2009.
From the Judgment and final order dated 2.3.2006 of the
High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh, in Regular
Second Appeal No. 4657 of 2003.
B S.S. Chahar, Sanjeev V.K. Pabbi, Shikha Roy Pabbi,
Pradeep Kumar Dahiya, Ajit Kumer, S.K. Sabharwal and P.N.
Puri for the Appellants.
P.S. Patwalia, Tushar Bakshi, D.K. Tripathi and Jagjit
C Singh Chhabra for the Respondents.
The Judgement of the Court was delivered by
5.8. SINHA, J.1. Leave granted.
D 2. The dispute between the parties in this matter is in
regard to management of Gurudwara Sant Bela Sahib Patshahi ).
Naumin (for short, "the said Gurudwara") situated in Village
Kajal Majra and in Village Shergarh Bara. Sant Surjan Singh
is the founder of the said Gurudwara. He had given Jhe right of
E management of the said Gurudwara to Jagat Singh, who died
in an accident during his life time. On or about 6.5.1982, he
executed a general power of attorney appointing (1) Balu Singh
s/o Talok Singh (Nabardar), (2) Harbans Singh s/o Ram Singh;
and (3) Sant Nand Kaur widow of Jagat Singh as his attorneys
F in terms whereof they were conferred the powers to manage
the whole of the property of the said Gurudwara.
Clauses (3) and (4) of the said power of attorney read as
under:
G "(3) If any member out of these members dies then can
elect another member with the acceptance of majority. The
elected member will have same rights as these members
have. I and the alone general power of attorney holders will
act for Gurudwara with the acceptance of majority.
H
HARBANS SINGH & ORS. v. SANT HARi SINGH & ORS. 253
[S.S. SINHA, J.)
-I-
(4) After my death the rights given by me to the alone said A
member will remain with them (sic). The contents of the
General Power of Attorney read over and heard are found
, to be correct. So the General Power of Attorney is written
with sound mind."
B
3. Sant Surjan Singh died on 2.12.1983. The Managing
Committee of the Gurudwara, however passed a resolution on
18.12.1983 in terms whereof one Sant Hari Singh was
"' appointed as Mohtniim of the said Gurudwara and In-charge
of the affairs thereof. Disputes and differences having arisen
between the parties as to who should manage the affairs of the
c
said Gurudwara, two suits were filed.
-. 4. Sant Hari Singh filed Civil Suit No. 494-T/1995 for
permanent injunction before the Court of Civil Judge (Jr.
Division), Fatehgarh Sahib claiming that he was the Mohtmim D
. • of the said Gurudwara and he was in possession, control and
management and enjoyment of the said Gurudwara. The
Managing Committee of the said Gurudwara also filed Civil Suit
No.367-T/1996 for declaration that the Managing Committee
was in management and control of the said Gurudwara and was E
entitled to manage and control the same and the respondent
was not a Mohtmim of the said Gurudwara and, thus, not
entitled to manage its affairs.
>r
Both the suits were consolidated and directed to be heard .
F
together by an order dated 28.2.1997 passed by the learned
trial judge.
5. By reason of a judgment and decree dated 11.5.2000,
the suit filed by Sant Hari Singh was decreed with costs in
terms whereof a decree of permanent injunction was granted G
restraining the Managing Committee from interfering with the
... possession, management and control of the respondent over
the land of the said Gurudwara, and consequently the suit filed
by the Managing Committee was dismissed with costs.
H
254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 1 S.C.R.
A 6. Appellant herein and the Managing Committee of the
said Gurudwara preferred appeals thereagainst.
7. The learned Additional District Judge by a judgment and
order dated 16. 7.2003 held that the possession of the suit land
8 as also the management of affairs of the said Gurudwara had
vested in Sant Hari Singh, the respondent herein, in his
capacity of a Mohtmim, and, thus, affirmed the decree for grant
of permanent injunction passed by the learned trial court. The
learned Additional District Judge furthermore opined that the
revenue record having not been corrected in regard to the
C recording of death of Sant Surjan Singh, the said omission by
itself, would not be sufficient to wash off the remaining entries
which had been entered in favour of the respondent. It was
furthermore held that the said power of attorney had ceased to
have any effect after the death of Sant Surjan Singh.
D
8. Appellants herein aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the
judgment and order dated 11.5.2000 passed by the learned trial
court in Civil Suit No. 367-T/1995 and judgment and order dated
16.7.2003 passed by the learned First Appellate Court in Civil
E Appeal No. 62/2000 preferred Regular Second Appeal bearing
No. 4657/2003 before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana
at Chandigarh.
9. By reason of the impugned judgment, the said second
F appeal has been dismissed by the High Court, holding:
"Two appeals being Civil Appeal No. 59 of 24.7.2000 and
Civil Appeal No. 62 of 24.7.2000 were filed. One appeal
was filed by Harbans Singh and others claiming that they
duly constituted a Managing Committee and were in
G control and management of Gurudwara and its property.
The other appeal was filed by the Managing Committee.
This appeal was also filed by the Managing Committee,
comprising of the aforesaid persons.
The aforesaid two appeals were dismissed by the
H
HARBANS SINGH & ORS. v. SANT HARi SINGH & ORS. 255
[S.B. SINHA, J.]
learned First Appellate Court. A
The present appellants, who were defendants in the
suit, filed by Sant Hari Singh have chosen to file the
present appeal. No appeal has been filed in the connected
suit. In these circumstances, it has to be taken that the
8
findings recorded by the learned trial court as well first
appellate court in the suit filed by the Managing Committee
and others have attained finality and Hari Singh has been
held to be in possession, control and management of the
Gurudwara and its property. Since the findings recorded
in other suit have attained finality, therefore, the appellants C
in the present appeal cannot be heard (sic) to claim that
the judgments and decree of the courts below are
erroneous in any manner."
10. Mr. B.S. Chahar, learned Senior Counsel appearing D
+ on behalf of the appellants would contend that the principles of
res judicata is not applicable in the instant case as in the suit
filed by the Managing Committee the appellant was not a party.
It was urged that the said principle could have been held to be
applicable only in the event the parties in both the suits were E
the same.
11. Mr. P.S. Patwalia, learned Senior Counsel appearing
on behalf of the respondents, however, supported the impugned
judgment.
F
12. Appellant herein does not claim any right, title and
interest in his individual capacity. He was the Vice-President
of the Managing Committee. Thus, for all intent and purport, he
was also a plaintiff in Civil Suit No. 367-T/1996. The judgment
and decree passed in the suit filed by Sant Hari Singh might G
not have been binding upon the appellant herein had he claimed
'i any right or interest over the said property in his individual
capacity and not as a member of the Managing Committee.
Indisputably, the Managing Committee did not file any Second
Appeal against the judgment and decree passed against it. The · H
256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 1 S.C.R.
A said judgment and decree, therefore, attained finality.
?-- f
13. Both the suits, as noticed hereinbefore, were
consolidated. They were heard together. The disputes between
the parties to both the suits were common. The issues raised
therein also were common.
8
The Managing Committee filed a suit for declaration that
it was in management and control of the said Gurudwara Sahib
and was entitled thereto as also a declaration that the "'
respondent was not a Mohtmim of the said Gurudwara and,
c thus, not entitled to manage its affairs. As the said decree had
attained finality, it is binding on the appellants also. Appellants,
therefore, in law, were required to prefer another Second
Appeal against the judgment and decree passed in the said
suit. The principle of res judicata in the aforementioned fact
D situation, in our opinion, has rightly been applied by the High
Court.
14. Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads thus:
"Section 11 - Res judicata.- - No Court shall try any suit
E or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in
issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a
former suit between the same parties, or between parties
under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the
same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit ,.,
F or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently
raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such
Court."
15. In Premier Tyres Limited vs. Kera/a State Road
Transport Corporation [1993 Suppl. (2) SCC 146], this Court
G
held:
"....The question is what happens where no appeal is filed,
as in this case from the decree in connected suit. Effect
of non-filing of appeal against a judgment or decree is that
H it becomes final. This finality can be taken away only in
HARBANS SINGH & ORS. v. SANT HARi SINGH & ORS. 257
[S.B. SINHA, J.]
accordance with law. Same consequences follow when a A
judgment or decree in a connected suit is not appealed
from.
5. Mention may be made of a Constitution Bench decision
in Badri Narayan Singh v. Kamdeo Prasad Singh. In an B
election petition filed by the respondent a declaration was
sought to declare the election of appellant as invalid and
to declare the respondent as the elected candidate. The
tribunal granted first relief only. Both appellant and
respondent filed appeals in the High Court. The appellant's
appeal was dismissed but that of respondent was allowed.
c
The appellant challenged the order passed in favour of
respondent in his appeal. It was dismissed and preliminary
objection of the respondent was upheld. The Court
observed,
D
"We are therefore of opinion that so long as the
order in the appellant's Appeal No. 7 confirming the
order setting aside his election on the ground that
he was a holder of an office of profit under the Bihar
Government and therefore could not have been a E
properly nominated candidate stands, he cannot
question the finding about his holding an office of
profit, in the present appeal, which is founded on
~ the contention that that finding is incorrect."
F
In Union of India vs. V. Pundarikakshudu & sons & anr.
[(2003) 8 SCC 168), this Court held:
"31. in this case the District Judge as also the High Court
of Madras clearly held that the award cannot be sustained
having regard to the inherent inconsistency contained G
therein. The arbitrator, as has.been correctly held by the
"I
District Judge and the High Court, committed a legal
miscomJuct in arriving at an inconsistent finding as regards
breach of the contract on the part of one party or the other.
Once the arbitrator had granted damages to the first H
258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 1 S.C.R.
A respondent which could be granted only on a finding that
the appellant had committed breach of the terms of
contract and, thus, was responsible therefor, any finding
contrary thereto and inconsistent therewith while awarding
any sum in favour of the appellant would be wholly
B unsustainable being self-contradictory."
As no appeal was preferred by the Union of India while
accepting the award made in favour of the first respondent, it
had attained finality and, thus, the principle of resjudicata was
C found to be applicable. It was opined:
"35. As the appellant failed to get that part of the award
which was made by the arbitrator in favour of the first
respondent set aside, the basic conclusion of the High
Court cannot be faulted. The Court upon setting aside the
D whole award could have remitted back the matter to the
arbitrator in terms of Section 16 of the Act or could have
appointed another arbitrator, but at this juncture no such
order can be passed as the award in part has become
final."
E
The said decision applies to the facts of the present case
also.
16. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in
this appeal. It is dismissed accordingly. No costs.
F
K.K.T. Appeal dismissed.
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