Holding

The High Court’s acquittal was upheld because the procedural requirements of CrPC s.385 were satisfied and the appropriate Government is the State of conviction, not the State where the offence occurred.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined an appeal by Hanumant Dass, the father of the deceased Asha, against the acquittal of Vinay Kumar and his mother Chhano Devi by the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The case arose from a murder allegedly committed in Himachal Pradesh but tried in Punjab after a Supreme Court‑ordered transfer. The principal issues were whether the State of Himachal Pradesh, where the offence occurred, had to be impleaded as a necessary party, whether notice to the Advocate‑General of Punjab satisfied the mandatory provisions of CrPC s.385, and whether the High Court could dispose of the appeal without summoning the record. The Court held that the appropriate Government is the State in which the conviction and sentence were passed (Punjab), that notice to the Punjab Advocate‑General fulfilled s.385, and that the record was evidently before the court, making the High Court’s disposal valid. Consequently, the appeal and the special leave petition were dismissed, and the acquittal stood.

Issues considered

The State where the offence was committed is a necessary party in an appeal after transfer of trial.
Whether notice to the Advocate‑General of Punjab satisfies the mandatory requirements of CrPC section 385.
Whether a High Court may dispose of an appeal without summoning the case record under the proviso to s.385(2).
Whether procedural irregularities amount to a failure of justice under CrPC section 465 warranting reversal of the acquittal.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 225, s. 2(4), s. 24, s. 378, s. 385, s. 432(7), s. 465

Subjects

criminal appealtransfer of trialnecessary partypublic prosecutorsection 385section 432circumstantial evidencedying declarationprocedural irregularityfailure of justice

Judgment

'
\"·

·'

S95 A
•
HANUMANT DASS
••
VINAY KUMAR & ORS.

, Apri~ 5, "1982
I

!
I
(0. CHINNAPPA REDDY AND R.B. MISRA, JJ.]

'
Party to an appeal against coNViction/acquittal-Necessary party-Occur-
rence of offence taking place in the te"itorial limits of_ one State, but' the trial C
takeJ place in anather State, pursuant to an order ·of transfer by the Supreme
Court-In the aPpeal by the accused before the High Court, which·is _the necessary ,....
party respondent-Public Prosecutor ofthe State where the-offence 'took p/Oce or
of the State__where_ the trial took ·place-Code of Criminal ~Procedure, 1973,
i' sections 2(4), 24_, 224, '178, 38S and 432(7), scope of.
' ' . - ' . . -
Records, summanlng of-Whfther non-summoning of f.ecords ~itiates the
order in appeal, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 section 385(2), exp/ained- D
Setting aside OJ the judgment i.r not passible unless tM ingredients of section 465
,Criminal Procedure Code are sati3fted• .- · ·

Vinay Kumar, the husband of the deceased Asha and his mother
Chhano Devi were charged; convicted' for the offence of burning alive the
deceased and sentenced to life ia:iprisonment on a complaint by Hanumant .Dass
' the father of the deceased _and the 3.ppellant in Criminal Appeal 4S of 1982 by E
-the Sessions Judge. Gurdaspur, Punjab. ·The Offence is alleged -to have been
Committed within th~· territorial limits or the State Of Himachal . Pradesh. but on
an application of the complainant the case was transferred by an order Or the
Supreme Court inasmuch as the accused were the brother-in-law· and ni.other-in- .
law of a Judge. of the High Court of. Himachal Pradesh. lo appeal by the
accused the High Court of Punjab issued. oa 22-6-1981, noiice for 6-7-1981 to the
Advocate General of Punjab only aad on that date heard the appeal and acquit- · F
ted both the accused. Hence the appeal by the complainant and the special leave·
by the State of Himachal Pradesh. · ·

Dismissing the appeal and tbC S~ci~l Leave Petition, the - Court,
HELD : 1. The charge levelled against the High Court· that it 'was in
a bot ha.Ste to decide the appeal at the earJiest possible is incofrect in- view of the G
order dated 22-6-1981 passed by the High Court of Punjab. (600 BJ

. 2:1. Section . 385 ·or .the ~de of -Crim~nal Pr~dur~ is a ~ndatorf
,\' provision·and the requirement of the section must be· satisfied. Jn the appeal
before tho High Court -State of P.unjab was made a party and notice of the ~
appcafwas also given to the Advocate General of Punjab•. From sections 2(4). H
24. 225. 378 and 432 it is tevident that there shall be a Public Prosecutor fOr -
-conducting an~ prosecution appeal or other proceedi:r;ig on behalf of the Central
•
596 SUPREME COUR'r REPORTS · 11982) 3 s.c.il.

A Gove~nment or State GovCrnment in the High'eourt•. ~r notice h1s been given
to the Public Prosecutor, namely, the Advocate-General of_ Punjab the require-_ •
ment of law has _been fulfilled. (601 Jl.C, 603 C-D] .

-: 2:2. Section 432 of the Criminal Procedure Code: defines ••approptjate
GoVem.me:Ot~' as meaning (a) in cases where the sentence is for an offence against, •
or the order referred to in sub-section (6) is passed under_ any law relating to a
B matter ·to which the executive power of the Union extends, the Central
Government;· (b) in other cases, the Government of the St3.te within which the
offender iS sentenced or-tbC-said otder is passed.· -According to this section the
appropriate Government is the Government of the State ·of conviction and not
the Government of the State where the offence was Committed. L603 C-D]

'
State of Madhya Praduh v. Ratan Singh & Ors., (1976] Supp. S.C.R.
c SS:Z. applied.

- 3. TO contend that the High Court disPOsed or the appeal CveD without
sumt:D.onirig the ·record is incorrect. No specific allegation has been made ·in the
Special Leave Petition that the. record waS not summonCd.~- The· tenor or_
the judgment of the High Court indicates that the record must have been there
·before the High Court. There is copious reference to the materials On. the record
D which could be. possible only when the record· was there biefore the court.
Bcsid.;:s, the counsel for the appellant made a statement before the- court that
on the finding of fact recorded by the High Court he was entitled to an-· acquitial
and in this view of the matter even if the record had not been summoned that
would not be fataL- Further -proviso. to· sub--section (2) of section 38S itself
provides·.-•..the court may dispose of the apPeal without sending for the record:•
in a cCrtain- -situation; The rigou'r of sub-sCction- (Zj of- section· 385, which
E provides that "the Appellate Collrt shall then send for the record of the case•• ~:·
has been taken away by the proviSo in a- -cCrtain situation. If the ·api)Cuant him·
self says that the appeal can be allowed on the findings recorded by the Sessions
Judge, tho non-summoning of the record,.ifit was at all so. wouJd not be fatal.
The complainant was present ·with his· counsCI, the State Advocaie-General was
also present. If there had been any grievance about _the rCcord, they would havo
raised an objection. Their non-objection on this point is also an" indicator that
F the -record was there or in any case, the summoning of the record was not
thought to be necessary by the parties. (604 E·H, 60S A-Bl

4. On merits also there is no case for the appellants . since each and
every aspect of the matter has been ihorougbly discussed by the High Court
which has referre~ to the error committed by the Sessions Judge in the approach
G · of the case and also in making unwarranted assumptions. There is no eye witness.
The fate of the case hinges upon the circumstantial evidence. · The High Court
has dealt with the two dying declarations, one recorded by the Doctor and the
other by the Assistant Sub-Inspector. _The High Court also took into considera..
tion the oral dying-declaration on which the prosecution strongly relied. But
even that declaration does not implicate the accused. [605 G~H, 606 A ..B],..:
H
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 45.
of 1982.
·•
HANUMANT DASS v. VINAY KUMAR (Misra, J.) 597

From the Judgment and Order dated the 9th July, 1981 of the A
Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal
No. 333-DB of 1981. ,

AND

S,L.P. (Cr/.) No. 2948 of 1982. B

R.L. Kohli and R. C. Kohli for the Appellants.

T.U. Mehta and A.G. Ratnaparkhi for Respondent No. 1.

N.C. Talukdar and R.N. Poddar for Respondent No. 3. c
N.C. Talukdar and R.N. Poddar for the Petitioner in S.L.P.
(Crl.) No. 2498/81.

D. D. Sharma for the State.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by D

MISRA, J. The appeal as well ~s the special leave petition
are directed against the judgment of. the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana at Chandigarh dated 9th July, 1981. Criminal appeal has
been filed by the complainant while the special leave petition has
been filed by the State of Himachal Pradesh. Vinay Kumar and his E
mother Chhano Devi were convicted for the murder of Asha, the
wife of Vinay Kumar by burning her alive and sentenced to life
imprisonment by the learned Sessions flldge, Gurdaspur. On appeal
by the accused, the High Court acquitted them by the impugned
judgment.
F
The prosecution case set up at the trial was that the deceased
Asha was married with Vinay Kumar in July, 1972. The marriage
was an arranged marriage. It did not prove to be a success, the
apparant cause for the failure of marriage was that Asha was only
a matriculate and not cultured enough to move about in th~
G
society with the husband. To make up this deficiency the deceased
again resumed her studies ,and started attending college at Nagrota
Bhagwan. While prosecuting her studies she was rebuked and
abused and sometimes even thrashed, whenever she visited the house
of her-in-laws. She however, kept on suffering in the vain hope H
that in due course of time things might improve. There was, however,
110 improvement and she was fed·up wit[J the m!lltreatment and
598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 3 S.C.R.

A cruelty meted out to her in the in-laws house. She left the matri·
monial home and started living with her parents sometime in the
year 1975 or early 1976.

In 1977 Vinay Kumar filed a petition in the court of the
District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala under section 13 of the
B Hindu Marriage Act for the dissolution of his marriage with the
deceased on various grounds including one of desertion. The District
Judge in the first instance tried for reconciliation between the spouse
and as an interim arrangement Asha returned to her-in-laws house
in June 1978 on trial basis, while divorce petition was kept pending
and adjourned to July 29, 1978. As the parties did not appear in
c the Court on the date fixed, it was presumed that they were living
happily and the proceedings were, therefore, consigned to the
record.

On 5th of August, 1978 at about 11 a.m. Kanwal Nain P.W. 4,
Bil Bhandur P.W. 14, employee of the Post Office, which was just
D in front of the house of the accused at a distance of 10/12 feet, and
a number of other persons saw smoke coming out of the window
of the house of the accused.~ When Bil Bhandur and others went
to the house, they found the outer door locked. There was no other
means of ingress to the house. After a short while one Raj brought
the key from Chhano Devi accused with which the lock was opened
and entry gained into the house. Asha was found burning and
after extinguishing the fire, she was removed to the local hospital.

Dr. 0. P. Dutta attended her and sent an intimation of the
incident to the Incharge local· Police Post. He recorded the state-
ment of Asha on the out-patient register Ex. PL. Meanwhile Kesar
F Singh, Assistant Sub-Inspector, arrived there and after getting a
certificate from Dr. Dutta, he also recorded her statement Ex. PU.
From Civil Hospital, Kangra Asha was removed in a truck to a
.-
Civil Hospital in Dharamshala (H.P.) where .she breathed her last.

In her statements recorded by Dr. Dutta and Kesar Singh,
G
the deceased disclosed that her clothes caught fire, while she was
preparing tea. The police suspected no foul play and did not
register any case. The father of the deceased Hanumant Dass,
however, made a report on 7th August, 1978 and a case was regis-
H tered on that basis. The accused were sent up for trial. When the
case was pending in the Court of Sessions Judge, Dharamshala in
ftimach~l Pradesh, the comjllainant moved an ajljllication \o th~
llANUMANT DASS '" VINAY KUMAR (Misra, J.) 599

Supreme Court for transfer of the case from Himachal Pradesh to
A
· some other province. The case was transferred to a Court ·of
competent jurisdiction at Gurdaspur in Punjab. The Sessions Judge,
Gurdaspur convicted both the accused under section 302 read with
section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced them to life
imprisonment. This conviction was based only on the circum-
stantial evidence. Accused went up in appeal to the High Court.
The High Court in its turn set aside the order of conviction and
acquitted the accused of the charge.

The complainant has filed the present appeal. Shri Kohli
appearing for the complainant has strenuously contended that the
appeal before the High Court bas been allowed in the absence of c
the State of Hima~bal Pradesh and without any notice to that State
and as such the impugned judgment of the High Court is a nullity
and should be set aside 'on that ground alone. The accused had
impleaded only the State of Punjab as a party and the High Court
has issued notice to the Advocate-General of Punjab. As a second
limb to this argument it has been contended by Sbri Kohli that the
D
appeal was filed in the High Court on 15th June, 198J and while
considering the application for bail on 22nd of June, 1981, posted
the appeal for hearing on 6th of July, 1981 after service of notice
· on the Advocate-General of Punjab and the appeal was decided on
9th July, 1981 without even summoning the record. Thus the High
· Court was in a hot haste to dispose of the appeal even without
m.
reasonable opportunity being afforded to the counsel for the State

•
•
and without impleading the appropriate State as a party to the
appeal and without notice to tbe counsel for th~ State of Himachal
Pradesh.
F

-
We may first deal with the criticism of the learned counsel
about the undue haste _in the disposal of the appeal by the High
Court. It appears that Shri M.R. Mahajan, counsel for the
appellants while moving the application for bail made a statement.
before the High Court and it is on his statement that the case was
posted for bearing at the earliest possible. This will be apparent G
from the order dated 22.6.1981 passed by the High Court while
disposing of the application for bail. · The order insofar as it is
material for consideration of the point reads :

" ... Mr. Mahajan, Advocate states that on the findings
H
of fact recorded by the learned trial Judge, the conviction
of the appellants can110\ be sµs(aiued. Notice for 6.7.81,
600 ~UPRBMB COURT REPORTS (1982) 3 S.C.R.
A to the Advocate-General, Punjab. Copy of the grounds
1 of appeal and the judgment rendered by the learned trial
Judge be delivered in the office· of the A. C. Punjab within
two days, The case is likely to be disposed of on that
date ............... "
B Therefore, the charge levelled against the High Court that it was
in a hot haste to decide the appeal at the earliest possible appears
to be uncalled for.

This leads 'us to the main contention raised by Shri Kohli that
the transfer of the case from Dharamshala lying within the teqi-
c torial jurisdiction of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh to
Gurdaspur lying within the jurisdiction of the· Punjab and Haryana
High Court, does not change the parties and the 'parties remain the
same even after the transfer of the case from Dharamshala to
· Gurdaspur. In this view of the legal position, the State of Himachal
Pradesh where the offence was committed was a necessary party and
D should have been impleaded in appeal. In the absence of the State
of Himachal Pradesh as a party and in the absence of notice to the
counsel for the State of Himachal Pradesh, the High Court was not
justified in disposing of the appeal and its judgment is only a
nullity.
E This contention is based on section 385 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. Insofar as it is material for the purpose of the case it
reads:
•
"385(1) : If the Appellate Court does not dismiss the
appeal summarily, it shall cause notice of the time and
F
place at which such appeal will be heard to be given-

(i) to the appellant or his pleader;

(ii) to such officer as the State Government m~y appoint in
__ _,,,,.-'' -
this behalf;
G
(iii) if the appeal is from a judgment of conviction in a
case instituted up'on complaint, to the complainant;

(iv) if the appeal is under section 377 qr section 378, to
H the accused, and shall also furnish such officer, com-
plainant and accused with a copy of the grounds of
appeal.
·r--1·
HANUMANT DASS v. VINAY KUMAR ((Misra, J) 601

(2) The Appellate Court shall then send for the record of A
the case, if such record is not already available in that
• Court, and hear the parties :

Provided that if the appeal is only as to the extent or
the legality of the sentence, the Court !)lay dispose of the
appeal without sending for the record. . 8
(3) ........................... .

There is no denying the fact that section 385 of the Code is a
mandatory provision and the requirement of the section must be
satisfied. In the appeal before the High Court, State of Punjao
was made a party and notice of the appeal was also given to the c.
Advocate-General of Punjab. According to Shri Kohli this does
not satisfy the requirement of law.

It would be appropriate at this stage to refer to other relevant
provisions of the Code :
D
Section 225 provide~ that-"In every trial before a
Court of Session, the prosecution shall be conducted by a
Public Prosecutor."

Section 2(4) defines public prosecutor-"Public Prose-
cutor means any person appointed ·under section 24, and
E
includes any person acting under t.he direction of a public
prosecutor."
Section 24 deals with "Public Prosecutors in the High Court" :
• "24. Public Prosecutors :-(I) For every High Court,
the Central Government or the State Government shall, F
after consultation with the High Court, appoint a Public
,'- Prosecutor and may also appoint one or more Additional
Public Prosecutors, for conducting in such Court, any
. -' prosecution, appeal .or other proceeding on bebalf of the
Central Government or State Government, as ·the case
may be' G

r ,.
............
I
········· ......... ······"
Section 378 talks of an appeal in case of acquittal. Insofar as it is
material it reads thus :
"378(1) Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2)
H
and subject \o thQ provisio11~ <:>f sl\b-sections (3) and (5)1
602 I1982) ~ s.c.ll.
A the State Government may, in any case, direct the Public
Prosecutor to jlresent an appeal to the High Court from
an original or appellate order of acquittal p11$Sed by any •
Court other than a High Court, (or an order of acquittal
passed by the Court of SessiOn in revision).

8 (2) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case
in which the offence has been investigated by the Delhi
Special Police Establishment constituted under the Delhi
Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, or by any other
agency empowered to make investigation into an offence
under any Central Act other than this Code; the Central
c Government may also direct the Public Prosecutor to
present an appeal, subject to the provisions of sub-sec. (3)
to the High Court from the order of acquittal .
.
... ... ... ········· ........ .
D Section 432 authorises the appropriate Government to suspend or
remit sen fences.

"432(1) : When any person has been sentenced to
punishment for an offence, the appropriate Government
may, at any time, without conditions or upon any condi-
E tions which the person sentenced accepts, suspend the exe-
cution, of his "sentence or remit the whole or any part of
the punishment 'to which he has been sentenced.

(2) Whenever an application is made to the appropriate
Government for the suspension for remission of a sentence,
the appropriate Government may require the presiding
Judge of the Court before or by which the conviction was
had or confirmed, to state his opinion as to whether the
application should be granted or refused, together with his
reasons for such opinion........................... ·

G (3) .................. (4) ..................... (5) .......................... .

(6) The provisions of the above sub-sections shall
also apply to any order passed by a Criminal Court under
any section of this Code or of any other law which restricts
ff the liberty of any person or imposes any liability upon him
9r bis property,

t
HANUMANT DASS v. VINAY ltUMAR (Misra, J.) 603
(7) In this section and Sin section 433, the expression A
• ·"appropriate Government" means-

(a) in cases where the sentence is for an offence
against, or the order referred to in sub-section (6)
is passed under, any law relating to a matter to
which the executive power of the Union extends, B
the Central Government;

(b) in other cases, the Government of the State within
which the offender is sentenced or the said order
is passed.
c
From the various provisions extracted above it is evident that there
shall be a Public Prosecutor for conducting any prosecution appeal
or other proceeding on behalf of the Central Government or State
Government in the High Court. If notice has. been· given to the
Public Pro.secutor viz. the Advocate-Ge?eral of Punjab the require- ()
ment of law to our mind has been fulfilled.
j

Shri Kohli, however, contends that occurrence in the instant
case took place within the territorial limits of Himachal Pradesh.
That State, therefore, will continue to be a necessary party in the
apiital irrespective of the fact that the appeal was file!! in the Punjab E
High Court.
I
Section 432(7) extracted above defines "appropriate Govern-
ment". "Appropriate Government" means-(a) in cases where the
sentence is for an offence against, or the order referred to in sub-
se<:tlon (6}'is passed under any law relating to a matter to which F
the executive power of the Union extends, the Central Government;
....._ -(b) in other cases, the Government of the State within which the
offender is sentenced or th~ said order is passed.

· According to this section the appropriate Government is the
Government of the State of conviction and not the Government of
the .State where the offence was committed. A somewhat similar
G
question came up for consideration in the State of Madhya Pradesh
v. Ratan Singh & Ors.,(') where the respondent was convicted and'
~tenced to imprisonment for life by a court in the State of Madhya
Pradesh. At his request he Wa& tr1111sferred to a jail in the State
ff
604 SUPltEME COUR1· REPORTS ; (!982] 3 S.C.11. .

A of Punjab, to which State he belonged. He applied io the Govern-
ment of Punjab that under the Punjab Jail Manual he is entitled to
be released since he had completed more than 20 years of imprison-
ment. The application was sent to the Government of Madhya
Pradesh, which rejected it. In a V<rit petition filed by him the High
Court of Punjab and Haryana held that the State of Punjab was the
B appropriate authority to release him and directed the State of Punjab
to consider the matter; This Court in appeal observed "a perusal
of this provision clearly reveals that the test to de,termine the appro-
priate Government is to locate the State where the accused was
convicted ahd sentenced and the Government of that State would
be the appropriate Government within the meaning of sec. 401 of the
c Code of Criminal Procedure. Thus since the prisoner in the instant
case was tried, convicted and· sentenced in the State of Madhya Pra-
desh, the State of Madhya Pradesh \'ould be the appropriate
Government to exercise the discretion for remission of the sentence
under sec. 401{1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure ...... ,..... " That
wd a case based on section 40 I of the old Criminal Procedure Code,
D but the Code o( Criminal Procedure, 1973 has put the matter com-
pletely beyond any controversy and reiterated the provisions of
section 402(3) in sub-section (7) of section 432.

, Lastly it was contended that. the appeal was disposed of by the
High Court\ even without summoning the record. There is no
E warrant for this assumption. No specific allegation bas been made
in the special leave petition that the record was not summoned. We
have perused the judgment of the High Court and the tenor of the
judgment indicates that the record must have been there before the
court. There is copious reference to the materials on the record
which could be possible only when the record was there before the
F
court. Besides, . the counsel for the appellant made a statement ~·
before the court that on the finding of fact recorded by the High·- ,
Court he was entitled to an acquittal and in this view of the matter
even if the record ,had not been summoned (for which there is no
basis) that would not be fatal, Proviso to sub section (2) of section
G 385 itself provides " ... the court may dispose of the appeal without I
sending for the record." in a certain situation. The rigour of sub-
section (2) of sec. 385, which provides that "the Appellate Court
shall then send for the record of the case ... " has been taken away·
by the proviso in a certain situation. If the 1appellant himself says
H that the appeal can be allowed on the findings recorded by the·
::>essions Jud?f, the non-summonin~ of the record, if it was at all so, r •
liANUi.iANt bAss v. VINAY KUMAR (Misra, J.i
1
605
would not to our mi.nd be fatal. The complainant was present with A
his counsel, the State Advocate-General was also present. If there
• had been any grievance about the record, they would hav~ raised
an objection. Their non-objection on this point is also an indicator
that the record was there or in any case, the summoning of the
• record was not thought to be necessary by the parties.
B
Assuming for the sake of argument, .that there were certain
irregularities in the procedure the judgment of the High Court could
not be set aside unless it was shown by the appellant that there has
'been failure of justice, as will be evident from section 465 of the
Criminal Procedure Code which reads :
c
"465. Finding or sentence-when reversible by reason of
error, omission or irregularity-

(I) Subject to the provisions herein before contained
no finding, sentence or order passed by a Court of compe-
tent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered by a Court of D
appeal, confirmation or revision on account of any error,
omission or irregularity in the complaint, summons,
warrant, proclamation, order, judgment or other proceed-
. ings before or during trial or in any inquiry or other pro-
ceedings under this Code, or any error, or irregularity in
any sanction for the prosecution, unless in the opinion of E
. that Court, a failure of justice has in fact .been occasioned
thereby.

(2) In determining whether any error, omission or
irregularity in any proceeding under this Code, or any
error, or irregularity in any sanction for the prosecution F
has occasioned a failure of justice, the 'Court shall have
regard to the fact whether the objection could and should
.have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings."

We have perused the judgment of the High Court which was G
placed before us in full. It shows that each and every_ aspect of the
matter has been thoroughly discussed and the High Court has also
referred to the error committed .by the Sessions Judge in the approach
of the case and also in making unwarranted assumptions.

On merits we fully agree with the appraisal of the. evidence
made by the High Court. It is not necessary to repeat the same
stJl'ki!Mil cotJkt ltili'Oiltt

OYer again. There is no eye witness. The fate of the ~ase hinges
upon the circumstantial evidence. The High Court has dealt with
the two dying declarations, one recorded by tbe Doctor and the
oilier by the Assistant Sob-Inspector. The High Court also took
into consideration the oral dying declaration ·on which the prose· '
cution strongly relied. But even that declaration does not implicate
the accused. The reason given by the High Court for acquittal
in our opinion is cogent and plausible. ' ·

For the foregoing discussion, the criminal appeal and the
special leave petition must fail and they are accordingly dismissed.
c ---~

S.R. Appeal & Petition dismissed.

--~-

•