Holding

The presumption under Section 113-A cannot be invoked on slender, uncorroborated allegations, and therefore the conviction under Section 306 IPC is set aside while the conviction under Section 498A IPC is upheld.

Summary

Hans Raj was convicted under Section 306 IPC for abetting the suicide of his wife, Jeeto Rani, and also under Section 498A IPC for cruelty. The prosecution’s case relied on the presumption in Section 113-A of the Evidence Act, asserting that the wife’s suicide within seven years of marriage and alleged cruelty implied abetment. However, the Supreme Court found that many of the alleged cruelties (e.g., calling the wife not good‑looking, intent to remarry, liquor addiction, beatings) were introduced for the first time at trial and were not recorded in the FIR or police investigation, constituting an impermissible improvement of the case. The Court held that such slender evidence could not satisfy the discretionary test for invoking Section 113-A, and the nature of the alleged cruelty was not shown to be of a kind likely to drive the wife to suicide. Consequently, the conviction under Section 306 was set aside, while the conviction under Section 498A was upheld and the appellant was sentenced to one year of rigorous imprisonment.

Issues considered

The applicability of the presumption under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act when alleged cruelty is not proved to be of a nature likely to drive a woman to suicide.
Whether improvements to the prosecution case at trial, introducing facts not recorded in the FIR or police investigation, can be used to invoke Section 113-A.
Whether the evidence on record sustains a conviction under Section 306 IPC for abetment of suicide.
Whether the evidence justifies a conviction under Section 498A IPC for cruelty.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 31, s. 313, s. 428
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 113-A
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 107, s. 306, s. 498A

Subjects

suicideabetment of suicideSection 306 IPCSection 498A IPCcrueltypresumptionSection 113-Aevidentiary standardscriminal appeal

Judgment

A HANS RAJ
_.....;...
v.
STATE OF HARYANA

FEBRUARY 26~ 2004

B [N. SANTOSH HEGDE AND B.P. SINGH, JJ.]

Penal Code, 1860-Sections 306 and 498-A-Evidence Act, 1872-
- ,._

Section 113-A-Suicide by wife-Allegations of cruelty against husband but
no direct evidence that suicide abetted by husband-Case sought to be made
c out at trial not stated in the course of investigation-Conviction of husband
........
under section 306 taking aid of presumption-Justification of-Held: Having
regard to the evidence on record, prosecution is guilty of improving its case ·-
from stage to stage-Further on slender evidence presumption under section
113A cannot be invoked-Mere fact that woman subjected to cruelty by her
D husband does not automatically give rise to presumption that suicide was
abetted by her husband-Cruelty is to be of such a nature driving her to
commit suicide-Hence, conviction under section 306 set aside but having
regard to the evidence on record conviction under section 498-A justified.

According to the prosecution, appellant's wife committed suicide on
E account of cruelty and harassment meted out to her by the appellant. Father
of the deceased lodged FIR. It was alleged that there were frequent quarrels
sometimes resulting in physical assaults between appellant and his wife
___ .
whenever deceased attempted to prevent her husband from taking 'bhang'
and that he was aggrieved of the fact that his sister married to his wife's
brother was not looked after properly by her husband. However, the father
F
of the deceased did not state during the course of investigation that the
·.~
appellant used to taunt the deceased because she was not good looking, or
that he was going to re-marry, or that he was addicted to liquor and even
used to beat her or that the deceased had r~ported these matters to her parents
and others or that the deceased had once come to her father's house in an
G injured condition. Also the brother of the deceased did not state during
investigation that appellant was addicted to liquor, or that the appellant had
told him that his sister was not good looking or that his sister told him that
appellant was aggrieved by this fact. Trial court found that though there were
improv~ments in.the statements of the prosecution witnesses, it could not be .......
H 676
,.
HANS RAJ v. STATE OFHARYANA 677

disbelieved that the appellant treated his wife with cruelty. It took the view A
that since the deceased committed suicide and appellant did not disclose as
to what conversation preceded her committing suicide and that there were
allegations of cruelty against the appellant, it must be presumed under s,ection
113-A of the Evidence Act that the suicide had been abetted by him. Trial
Court convicted and sentenced the appellant under Section 306 IPC. High B
Court upheld the order. Hence the present appeal.

Partly allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1. In the instant case, there is no direct evidence to establish
that the appellant either aided or instigated the deceased to commit suicide C
or entered into any conspiracy to aid her in committing suicide. In the absence
of direct evidence the prosecution has relied upon section 113-A of the
Evidence Act under which the Court may presume on proof of circumstances
enumerated therein, and having regard to all the other circumstances of the
case, that the suicide had been abetted by the accused. Section 113-A gives a
discretion to the court to raise such a presumption, having regard to all the D
other circumstances of the case, which means that where the allegation is of
cruelty, it must consider the nature of cruelty to which the woman was
subjected, whether it was of such nature as was likely to drive the woman to
commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health of
the woman, having regard to the meaning of word cruelty in Section 498-A
'--·
JPC. The mere fact that a woman committed suicide within seven years of E
her marriage and that she had been subjected to cruelty by her husband, docs
not automatically give rise to the presumption that the suicide had been
abetted by her husband. [683-F; 684-C-D)

-- Rameshkumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, [2001) 9 SCC 618; Sanju Alias
Sanjay Singh Sengar v. State of MP., [2002) 5 SCC 371 and West Bengal v.
Orilal Jaiswal and Anr., (1994) 1 SCC 73, referred to.
F

1.2. Having gone through the evidence on record it is clear that the
prosecution has sought to improve its case at the trial by introducing new
facts and allegations which were never stated in the course of investigation G
as such the finding of the trial court cannot be accepted. The allegations that

--
the appellant did not like to keep the deceased with him because she was not
good looking, or that he was addicted to liquor or that the deceased had

..
reported these matters to her parents and others, or that the appellant
intended to r~marry and had told his wife about it, or that the deceased had
once come to her father's house in an injured condition, or even the allegations H
678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] 2 S.ic:.R.

A regarding beatings, do not find place in the statements recorded by the police
in the course of investigation. These allegations have been made at the trial
for the first time. All that was alleged in the FIR or even at the stage of
investigation was that there were frequent quarrels between the husband and
wife sometimes resulting in physical assault, on account of the husband being
addicted to consumption of'Bhang'. That the appellant was aggrieved of the
B fact that his sister was not being properly treated by her husband, who is the
brother of the deceased, also appears to be untrue because there is nothing
on record to show that there was any disharmony in the martial life of his
sister. In fact, her husband, himself stated on oath that he was living happily
with his wife, sister of the appellant. On such slender evidence the presumption
C under Section 113-A cannot be invoked to find the appellant guilty of the
offence under Section 306 IPC. (686-D-H]

1.3. Trial Court found that there was material to support the charge
under Section 498-A IPC. but did not pass a sentence under the section on a
finding that the same will be overlapping, the appellant having been found
D guilty of the offence under Section 306 IPC. Having regard to the facts of the
case, though the prosecution has failed to establish the offence under Section
306 IPC., the evidence on record justifies the conviction of the appellant under
Section 498-A IPC. Therefore, conviction and sentence of the appellant under
Section 306 IPC, is set aside but he is convicted and sentenced under Section
E 498-A IPC. f687-A, B]

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
609 of 1997.

From the Judgment and Order dated 21.1.1997 of the Kerala High
F Court in Cr!. A. No. 633-SB of 1986.
Dhruv Mehta and S.K. Mehta for the Appellant.

Ms. Avneet Toor, D.P. Singh and Vinay Kumar Garg for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court _was delivered by
G
B.P. SINGH, J. In this appeal by special leave the appellant Hans Raj
has impugned the judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature of
Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh dated January 21, 1997 in Criminal Appeal
No.633 - SB of 1986 affirming the judgment and order of the learned -
H Additional Sessions Judge, Kurukshetra dated September 24, 1986 convicting

-
HANS RA.Iv. STATE OF HARYANA [SINGH. J.] 679
..+--
and sentencing the appellant to seven years rigorous imprisonment and a fine A
of Rs.300/- under Section 306 l.P.C. We have carefully perused the judgments
of the learned Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court and we are
constrained to observe that the High Court while disposing of the appeal did
not even apply its mind to the facts of the case. A disturbing feature noticed
by us is that the High Court merely repeated paragraphs after paragraphs
from the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge as if those
B
conclusions were its own, reached on an appreciation of the evidence on
record. Many of the paragraphs are word from word borrowed from the
judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge without acknowledging
that fact. We are, therefore, left with the impression that the High Court
...._
failed to apply its mind to the facts of the case as it was required to do, and c
was content with repeating what was stated in the judgment of the Trial
Court. In these circumstances we found it necessary to carefully scrutinize
the evidence on record since the High Court even though the first court of
appeal failed to do so.

The case of the prosecution is that the wife of the appellant, namely, D
Jeeto Rani committed suicide on 24.8.1986 on account of the cruelty and
harassment meted out to her by the appellant herein.

The case of the prosecution is that in the year 1982 the appellant
married Jeeto Rani, daughter of Munshi Ram, PW-2. It is also not in dispute
that Naro, sister of the appellant was married to Fateh Chand, PW-3 the E
.._ brother of the deceased. The appellant lived in village Kheri Sahidan with the
deceased while Naro and Fateh Chand resided in the house of Munshi Ram,
PW-2 at village Laha Majri. The appellant was blessed with a daughter only
seven months before the death of Jeeto. On August 24, 1986 Munshi Ram,
PW-2 father of Jeeto (deceased) lodged the FIR which was recorded by ASI F
- Chaman Lal, PW-5 of Police Station Ismailabad at 2.50 p.m. The allegations
in the FIR were to the following effect.

The appellant was addicted to 'Bhang' and did not pay any attention
towards his domestic affairs. Whenever Jeeto attempted to prevent her husband
from taking 'Bhang' she used to be assaulted by him. Jeeto (deceased) had G
reported this matter to her parents but they all persuaded her to go back to
her matrimonial home. On Friday last the appellant and Jeeto (deceased)
came to the house of Munshi Ram (PW-2) when the appellant stated that he
- would not keep Jeeto (deceased) with him because his sister Naro was being
harassed by Fateh Chand, PW-3, the brother of Jeeto (deceased). Munshi
H
680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] 2 S.C.R.

A Ram and members of his family persuaded the appellant not to do so but
Jeeto (deceased) was frightened and refused to accompany her husband. The
appellant and Jeeto (deceased) stayed at the house of Munshi Ram for two
days and on the third day with great difficulty Munshi Ram, PW-2 persuaded
his daughter Jeeto to accompany the appellant to her matrimonial home. It
B was alleged by Munshi Ram in the FIR that the appellant had told them that
since Fateh Chand, PW-3 was harassing his sister he would take revenge.

On the date of occurrence at about 10 a.m. Munshi Ram, PW-2 was
informed by one Shana Ram that Jeeto was seriously ill and asked him to
reach village Kheri immediately. The informant alongwith his brothers and
C others reached village Kheri and found that his daughter was dead. In the
report he stated that he entertained a suspicion that Jeeto had committed
suicide by taking poison being fed up by the beatings and the harassment
caused to her by her husband.

On the basis of the said report a case was registered and the matter was
D investigated by ASI, Chaman Lal, PW-5. The medical evidence on record as
well as the chemical examiner's report established the fact that Jeeto died of
poisoning. Apparently, therefore, the case of the prosecution was that she
had committed suicide by consuming poison. The record also discloses that
Jeeto was treated by Dr. Ram Gopal Shanna when she was in a precarious
condition at the house of the appellant. He gave her an injection and thereafter
E she was shifted to his clinic at Ismailabad on his advice. It appears that
thereafter Dr. Kaushal also treated her but her life could not be saved.

In the FIR only two allegations were made by Munshi Ram, PW.-2,
firstly, that there were frequent quarrels, sometimes resulting in physical
assault, between the appellant and Jeeto on account of his being addicted to
F
consumption of 'Bhang', and secondly, that the appellant was aggrieved by
the fact that his sister was not being properly looked after by his brother-in-
law namely, Fateh Chand, PW-3.

Munshi Ram was examined by the prosecution as PW-2. In his
G deposition he stated that the appellant was addicted to liquor and bhang and
whenever Jeeto attempted to persuade him to desist from this addiction he
used to misbehave with her and even beat her. According to him, 8-9 days
before her death Jeeto had come to his house alongwith the appellant. The
appellant had then complained to him that Jeeto was not good looking and
therefore he was not going to take her back and that he intended to perform
H a second marriage. However, on their persuasion he stayed at his village for
HANS RAJ v. ST ATE OF HARY ANA [SINGH . .I.] 681

2-3 days whereafter he persuaded his daughter Jeeto to accompany the A
appellant to village Kheri. From his cross-examination, it appears that the
case sought to be made out at the Trial that the appellant was addicted to
liquor was not stated in the course of investigation. Similarly, Munshi Ram,
PW-2 had not stated in the course of investigation that the appellant had
complained that Jeeto was not good looking. It also appears that in the course B
of investigation he had not stated about Jeeto having told him that the accused
had been beating her.

Fateh Chand, PW-3 also deposed in favour of the prosecution and he
also alleged that the appellant was addicted to liquor and bhang and that he
...... had been told by Jeeto that the appellant did not want to keep her as he did C
not find her to be good looking. According to Fateh Chand, PW-3 whenever
Jeeto came to their house she used to complain about the treatment meted out
to her by the appellant. Even the appellant had told him that he did not like
Jeeto. PW-3 further deposed .that for about a year and a half after marriage
the appellant and Jeeto lived in harmony. In his statement before the police
in the course of investigation there is no mention about the fact that the D
appellant was addicted to liquor. PW-3 also admitted that in his statement
before the police he did not state that the accused had told him that his sister
was not good looking, nor did he state that his sister had told him that the
accused felt aggrieved because she was not good looking.

The case of the prosecution rests mainly on the evidence of these two
E
witnesses namely, Munshi Ram, PW-2 and Fateh Chand, PW-3. In his
examination under Section 31? Cr.P.C. the appellant stated that the case
against him was false. He had kept his wife Jeeto with love and affection and
had never proclaimed that she was not good looking. She had given birth to
a daughter but thereafter she had been keeping unwell because of some F
tension in her mind on account of birth of a daughter. Only four days prior
to her death she had come from her parents' house and thereafter she started
vomiting. Dr. Ram Gopal Sharma was called from Ismailabad and he gave
her an injection. Thereafter Jeeto was removed to the clinic of Dr. Ram
Gopal. Dr. Kaushal was also consulted but he did not give any hope. The
parents of Jeeto were thereafter informed through a messenger but by the G
time they came Jeeto had died.

The learned Additional Sessions Judge noticed the fact that Munshi
Ram, PW-2 had considerably improved his case at the trial. The allegations
that the appellant used to taunt Jeeto because she was not good looking, or H
682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] 2 S.C.R.

A that he was going to re-marry, or even regarding beatings to her, were all in
the nature of improvements. His statement at the trial that once the deceased
had come to his house in injured condition did not find mention in his
statement recorded by the police in the course of investigation. The allegation
that the appellant was addicted to liquor also did not find recorded in the
statement of the witnesses before the police. However, the Trial Court was
B greatly impressed by the fact that this was clearly a case of suicide and the
appellant had maintained complete silence as to what was the conversation
between him and the deceased immediately before the deceased was found ·
in a precarious condition. According to the Trial Court, Jaw enjoined upon
the husband an obligation to explain the circumstances in which his wife
C committed suicide. Reliance was placed on the presumption under Section
113-A of the Indian Evidence Act. It observed that in the absence of any
suitable answer from the defe_nce a presumption arose under Section 113-A
of the Indian Evidence Act. Therefore, the Court found that though there
were improvements in the statements of the prosecution witnesses, it could
not be disbelieved that the appellant treated his wife with cruelty. Taking the
D aid of Section 113-A the trial court concluded that a presumption of law
arose in the given circumstances. Since Jeeto was led to commit suicide, it
must have been due to the abetment on the part of the appellant, since the
story set up by the appellant in.his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was
totally unbelievable. Surprisingly, the Trial Court observed that the ·appellant's
E remark that his wife was not good looking and to his liking and that he was
going to re-marry was "a gravest of abetment on the part of the husband
leading to the wife to commit suicide". The trial court while recording this
conclusion completely lost sight of its own finding that this part of the story
was clearly an improvement and that no such allegation was made either in
the FIR or in the course of investigation. All that was stated in the FIR and
F in the course of investigation was that the appellant was aggrieved of the fact
that his sister Naro was not properly treated by Fateh Chand, PW-3 who was
the brother of Jeeto. The only other allegation found in the FIR is that the
appellant was addicted to 'Bhang' and whenever Jeeto objected to it, it
resulted in a quarrel and sometimes physical assault on Jeeto.
G Having gone through the evidence on record we are satisfied that the
prosecution has sought to improve its case at the trial by introducing new
facts and allegations which were never stated in the course of investigation.
All that appears to have been satisfactorily established is that the appellant
was addicted to 'Bhang' and that frequent quarrels took place when his wife
H Jeeto objected to his taking 'Bhang'. Though it is stated in the FIR that the
HANS RAJ v. STATE OF HARYANA [SINGH, J.] 683

appellant had complained about the treatment meted out to his sister Naro by A
Fateh Chand, there is evidence of Fateh Chand, PW-3 himself that he was
living happily with Naro, his wife, who happened to be the sister of the
appellant. One fails to understand why the appellant should make such an
allegation when his sister was living happily with Fateh Chand, PW-3. As to
the frequent assaults on the deceased by the appellant and her reporting the B
matter to her father and brother, there appears to be no reason why, if these
facts were true, no such allegation was made in th{: course of investigation
by the prosecution witnesses PWs 2 and 3. We are, th'!refore, satisfied that
the prosecution has been able to establish its case only to the extent that the
appellant was addicted to 'Bhang' which was opposed by his wife Jeeto and
on account of such opposition there used to be frequent quarrels and may be C
on some occasions Jeeto was assaulted by the appellant. Beyond this we find
the other allegations made by the prosecution to be unacceptable.

The question then arises as to whether in the facts and circumstances
of the case the appellant can be convicted of the offence under Section 306
I.P.C. with the aid of the presumption under Section 113 A of the Indian D
Evidence Act. Any person who abets the commission of suicide is liable to
be punished under Section 306 I.P.C. Section 107 I.P.C. lays down the
ingredients of abetment which includes instigating any person to do a thing
or engaging with one or more person in any conspiracy for the doing of a
thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy E
and in order to the doing of that thing, or intentional aid by any act or illegal
omission to the doing of that thing. In the instant case there is no direct
evidence to establish that the appellant either aided or instigated the deceased
to commit suicide or entered into any conspiracy to aid her in committing
suicide. In the absence of direct evidence the prosecution has relied upon
Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act under which the Court may presume F
on proof of circumstances enumerated therein, and having regard to all the
other circumstances of the case, that the suicide had been abetted by the
accused. The explanation to Section 113-A further clarifies that cruelty shall
have the same meaning as in Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code which
means:-
G
"(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive
the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to
life, limb or hea1t4 (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or

(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view
to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful H
684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] 2 S.C.R.
--+-
A demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of
failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand".

Unlike Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, a statutory
presumption does not arise by operation of law merely on proof of the
circumstances enumerated in Section I 13-A of the Indian Evidence Act.
B Under Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act the prosecution has first to
establish that the· woman concerned committed suicide within a period of
seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband (in this case)
had subjected her to cruelty. Even if these facts are established the Court is
not bound to presume that the suicide had been abetted by her husband.
C Section 113-A gives a discretion to the Court to raise such a presumption,
having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, which means that
where the allegation is of cruelty it must consider the nature of cruelty to
which the woman was subjected, having regard to the meaning of word
cruelty in Section 498-A I.P.C. The mere fact that a woman committed suicide
within seven years of her marriage and that she had been subjected to cruelty
D by her husband, does not automatically give rise to the presumption that the
suicide had been abetted by her husband. The Court is required to look into
all the other circumstances of the case. One of the circumstances which has
to be considered by the Court is whether the alleged cruelty was of such
nature as was likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave
E injury or danger to life, limb or health of the woman. The law has been
succinctly stated in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, [2001] 9 SCC
618 wherein this Court observed :

"This provision was introduced by the Criminal Law (Second)
Amendment Act, 1983 with effect from 26-12-1983 to meet a social
F demand to resolve difficulty 0f proof where helpless married women
were eliminated by being forced to commit suicide by the husband or
in-laws and incriminating evidence was usually available within the
four comers of the matrimonial home and hence was not available to
anyone outside the occupants of the house. However, still it cannot
be lost sight of that the presumption is intended to operate against the
G accused in the field of criminal law. Before the presumption may be
raised, the foundation thereof must exist. A bare reading of Section
. 113-A shows that to attract applicability of Section 113-A, it must be
shown that (i) the woman has committed suicide, (ii) such suicide has
been committed within a period of seven years from the date of her
marriage, (iii) the husband or his relatives, who are charged had
H
HANS RAJ v. STATE OF HARYANA [SINGH. J.] 685

-- subjected her to cruelty. On existence and availability of the abovesaid
circumstances, the court may presume that such suicide had been
A

abetted by her husband or by such relatives of her husband. Parliament
has chosen to sound a note of caution. Firstly, the presumption is not
mandatory; it is only permissive as the employment of expression
"may presume" suggests. Secondly, the existence and availability of B
the abovesaid three circumstances shall not, Uke a formula, enable
the presumption being drawn; before the presumption may be drawn
the court shall have to have regard to "all the other circumstances of
the case". A consideration of all the othc..:r circumstances of the case
may strengthen the presumption or may dictate the conscience of the
court to abstain from drawing the presumption. The expression - "the C
other circumstances of the case" used in Section 113-A suggests the
need to reach a cause-and-effect relationship between the cruelty and
the suicide for the purpose of raising a presumption. Last but not the
least, the presumption is not an irrebuttable one. In spite of a
presumption having been raised the evidence adduced in defence or
the facts and circumstances otherwise available on record may destroy D
the presumption. The phrase "may presume" used in Section 113-A
is defined in Section 4 of the Evidence Act, which says - "Whenever
it is provided by this Act that the court may presume a fact, it may
either regard such fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved, or
may call for proof of it". E
The same principle has been reiterated in Sanju Alias Sanjay Singh
Sengar V. State of MP., [2002] 5 sec 371.

In the State of West Bengal v. Ori/al Jaiswal and Anr., [1994] 1 SCC
73 this Court observed :
F
"We are not oblivious that in a criminal trial the degree of proof is
stricter than what is required in a civil proceedings. In a criminal trial
however intriguing may be facts and circumstances of the case, the
charges made against the accused must be proved beyond all
reasonable doubts and the requirement of proof cannot lie in the G
realm of surmises and conjectures. The requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt does not stand altered even after the introduction of
Section 498-A IPC and Section 113-A of Indian Evidence Act.
Although, the court's conscience must be satisfied that the accused is
not held guilty when there are reasonable doubts about the complicity
of the accused in respect of the offences alleged, it should be borne H
686

--
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] 2 S.C.R.

A in mind that there is no absolute standard for proof in a criminal trial
and the question whether the charges made against the accused have
been proved beyond all reasonable doubts must depend upon the
facts and circumstances of the case and the quality of the evidences
adduced in the case and the materials placed on record. Lord Denning
in Bater v. Bater, [1950] 2 All ER 458, 459 has observed that the
B doubt must be of a reasonable man and the standard adopted must be
a standard adopted by a reasonable and just man for coming to a
conclusion considering the particular subject-matter".

Having. regard to the principles aforesaid, we may now advert to the
C facts of this case. The learned Trial Judge took the view that since the wife
of the appellant committed suicide and since the appellant did not disclose as
to _what conversation preceded her committing suicide and that there were
allegations of cruelty against the appellant, it must be presumed under Section
113-A of the Indian Evidence Actthat the suicide had been abetted by him.
We do not find ourselves in agreement with the finding of the Trial Court,
D having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case and our finding that
the prosecution is guilty of improving its case from stage to stage. The
allegations that the appellant did not like to keep the deceased with him
because she was not good looking, or that he was addicted to liquor or that
the deceased had reported these matters to her parents and others, or that the
E appellant intended to re-marry and had told his wife Jeeto about it, or that the
deceased had once come to her father's house in an injured condition, or
even the allegations regarding beatings, do not find place in the statements
recorded by the police in the course of investigation. These allegations have
been made at the trial for the first time. All that was alleged in the FIR or
even at the stage of investigation was that there were frequent quarrels between
F the husband and wife sometimes resulting in physical assault, on account of
the husband being addicted to consumption of 'Bhang'-: The other allegation
that the appellant was aggrieved of the fact that his sister Naro was not being
properly treated by Fateh Chand, PW-3, brother of the deceased, also appears
tp be untrue because there is nothing on record to show that there was any
dishai-mony in the marital life of his sister Naro. In fact, Fateh Chand, PW-
G 3, he~ husband, himself stated on· oath that he ~as living happily with his
wife Naro, sister of the appellant. On such slender evidence therefore we are
not persuaded to invoke the presumption under Section 113-A of the Indian
Evidence Act to find the appellant guilty of the offence under Section 306 '·1
l.P.C.
H
HANS RAJ v. STATE OF HARY ANA [SINGH, J.] 687

The Trial Court found that there was material to support the charge A
under Section 498-A I.P.C. but did not pass a sentence under Section 498-
A 1.P.C. on a finding that the same will be overlapping, the appellant having
been found guilty of the offence under Section. 306 I.P.C. Having regard to
the facts of the case, we are satisfied that though the prosecution has failed
to establish the offence under Section 306 I.P.C., the evidence on record B
justifies the conviction of the appellant under SectiQll 498-A I.P.C.

We, therefore, set aside the conviction and sentence passed against the
appellant under Section 306 I.P.C. and acquit him of that charge, but we find
the appellant guilty of the offence under Section 498-A I.P.C and sentence
him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year on that count. This appeal C
is partly allowed. The appellant was admitted to bail by this Court. His bail
bonds are cancelled, and he must surrender to his sentence, subject to the
provisions of Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedur~.

N.J. Appeal partly allowed.