Holding

A sale deed executed before an attachment confers rights that relate back to its date of execution, and attachment before judgment does not affect those pre‑existing rights.

Summary

The appellant purchased a suit‑property from the vendors by a sale deed executed on 9 September 1970 and registered it on 26 October 1970. Before the registration, the respondent filed a money suit on 13 September 1970 and obtained attachment before judgment of the property on 17 September 1970, later obtaining a decree in his favour. The appellant sued for specific performance and obtained a decree, which the High Court set aside. The Supreme Court examined whether an attachment before judgment could defeat the rights of a vendee when the sale deed had been executed before the attachment but registered later. Relying on Order 38 Rule 5 and Rule 10 of the CPC, Section 47 of the Registration Act, and the principle that a sale deed confers rights that relate back to its date of execution, the Court held that the attachment did not affect the vendee’s pre‑existing rights. Consequently, the appellant’s title prevailed over the attachment and the appeal was allowed.

Issues considered

The effect of attachment before judgment on the rights of a vendee where the sale deed was executed before the attachment but registered thereafter
Whether a sale deed confers enforceable rights prior to its registration under the Registration Act

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order 38 Rule 10, s. Order 38 Rule 5, s. Section 64
Indian Trusts Act, 1882s. Section 91
Registration Act, 1908s. Section 23, s. Section 47, s. Section 49, s. Section 60, s. Section 61
Specific Relief Act, 1877
Transfer of Property Act, 1882s. Section 40, s. Section 53, s. Section 54

Subjects

attachment before judgmentsale deedregistrationSection 47 Registration ActOrder 38 CPCrights of vendeeproperty lawcivil procedure

Judgment

A
HA MD A. AMMAL
v.
-
AVADIAPPA PATHAR AND 3 OTHERS
•
NOVEMBER 7. 1990

B [T.K. THOMMEN, K.N. SAIKIA AND N.M. KASLIWAL, JJ.]

Code of Civil Procedure~Order 38 rules 5 and JO-Attachment
before judgment of property after execution of sale deed but before its
registration effect on the rights of the vendee.

The appellant purchased the suit property from Govindraju
c Pathar, Muthulinga Asari and Gurusami Pathar-Respondents-ven·
dors by a sale deed executed in her favour on 9.9.1970 and got the sale
deed registered on 26.10.1970. Before registration of the sale deed,
respondent Avadiappa filed a money suit for the recovery of the amount
on 13.9.1970 against the said vendors and obtained attachment before
D judgment of the property in question on 17.9.1970. Later the said money
suit was decreed in his favour. The appellant claimed rights in the
property on the strength of the sale deed executed in her favour on
26.10. 70 by filing a snit and the question that arose for consideration in
the said snit was whether she was entitled to the property in question.
The suit was decreed in her favour but on appeal, the High Court
E reversed the order of the trial court. Hence this appeal by the plaintiff· •
appellant.

Allowing the appeal, this Court,

HELD: A transaction of sale having already taken place even
F prior to the institution of a suit cannot be said to have been made with '
the intention to obstruct or delay the execution of any decree.

The Legislature has provided in Section 47 of the Registration Act
that it shall operate from the time from which it would commence to
operate if no registration thereof had· been required or made and riot
G from the time of its registration. Thus the vendee gets rights which will
b~ related back on registration from the date of the execution of the sale
deed and such rights are protected under Order 38 rule 10, C.P.C. read
together with Section 47 of the Registration Act.

H
Ram Saran Lal and Ors. v. Mst. Domini Kuerand Ors., [1962] 2
S.C.R. 474; Hira/a/ Agrawal etc. v. Rampadarath Singh and Ors. etc.,

594
-
·- H. AMMAL v. P. PATHAR [KASLIWAL, J.] 595

[1969] 1 SCR 328; .Radhakishan L. Toshniwa/ v. Shridhar, (1961] 1
SCR 248 and Bishan Singh v. Khazan Singh, [1959] SCR 878 and
A
v.
Bishan Singh Khazan Singh, [1959] SCR 878, distinguished.

Vannarakka/ Kallalathil Sreedharan v. Chandramaath Ba/akrish-
11a11 and Anr., [1990] 3 SCC 291; Tilakdhari Singh v. Gour Narain,
AIR 1921 Pat. _150; Raja Ram v. Giraj Kishore and Anr., AIR 1964 B
All. 369; referred to.

Faiyazauddin Khan v. Mst. Zahur Bibi, AIR 1938 Pat. 134;
Champa! Rao Mahadeo v. Mahadeo Baijirao Kunbi and Ors., AIR
1937 Nagpur 143; Ka/yanasundaram Pillai v. Karuppa Mooppa11a1•."nd
0 rs., !LR 50 Madras 193, Approved.
c
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 110
of 1984.

From the Judgment & Order dated 24.12.1982 of the Madras
High Court in S.A. No. 1644 of 1978. D

K.N. Bhat, S. Thananjayan and K.R. Choudhary for the
Appellant.
- C. Sitaramiah, A.T.M. Sampath and M. Raghuraman for the
Respondents. E

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

KASLIW AL, J. This Civil Appeal by special leave is directed
against the judgment of High Court of Judicature at Madras dated 24th
December, 1982. This case raises a short but an important question of F
law. We would narrate only such facts of the case which are necessary
for the disposal of the question of law raised in the case. The appellant
Hamda Ammal purchased the suit property from the respondents
Govindraju Pathar, Muthulinga Asari and Gurusami Pather (herein-
after referred to as the vendors) by a sale deed executed in her favour
on 9.9.1970. Hamda Ammal got the sale deed registered on G
26. lO. 1970. Before registration of the sale deed, respondent Avadi-
appa filed a money suit for the recovery of Rs.5,200 on 13.9.1970,
against the vendors and obtained attachment before judgment of the
':r- property in question on 17.9.1970. Subsequently the aforesaid money
suit filed by Avadiappa was also decreed in his favour. The question'
which calls for consideration is whether Hamda Ammal is entitled to H
596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

the property sold in her favour by virtue of sale deed dated 9.9. 1970
A
but registered subsequcnlly on 26.10.1970, or Avadiappa has a better
claim to the property on account of an attachment before judgment
made on 17.9. 1970 in the suit filed by him on 13.9.1970 i.e. prior to the
date of registration of sale deed in favour of Hamada Ammal.

B In order to decide the above controversy we would advert to
some relevant provisions. Order 38 Rule 5 C.P.C. whkh provides the
conditions for attachment before judgment reads as under:

0. 38 rr. 5:

(i) Where at any stage of a suit, the Court is satisfied, by
c affidavit or otherwise, that the defendant, with intent to
obstruct or delay the execution of any decree that may be
passed against him,-

(a) is. about to dispose of the whole or any part of his
D property, or

(b) is about to remove the whole or any part of his
property from the local limits of the jurisdiction of the
Courc.
•
E the Court may direct the defendant, within a time to be
fixed by it, either to furnish security, in such sum as may be
specified in the order, to produce and place at the disposal
of the Court, when required, the said properly or the value
of the same, or such portion thereof as may be sufficient to
·satisfy the decree, or to appear and show cause why he
F should not furnish security. '.

(2) The plaintiff shall, unless the Court otherwise directs,
specify the property required to be attached and the es-
timated value thereof.

G (3) The Court may also in the order direct the conditional
attachment of the whole or any portion of the property so
specified.

(4) If an order of attachment is made without complying
with the provisions of sub-rule (I) of this rule, such attach-
H ment shall be void.
H. AMMAL v. P. PATHAR IKASLIWAL, J.] 597

The above provision itself makes it clear that the attachment before
A
judgment would be made where the Court is satisfied that the
defendant is about to dispose of the whole or any part of his property
or is about to remove the whole or any part of his property from the
local limits of the jurisdiction of Court with the intention to obstruct or
delay the execution of any decree that may be passed against him.
Thus this provision would not apply where the sale deed has already B
been executed by the defendant in favour of a third person. A transac-
tion of sale having already taken place even prior to the institution of a
suit cannot be said to have been made with the intention to obstruct or
delay the execution of any decree. It would be a different case
altogether if a creditor wants to assail such transfer by sale under Sec.
53 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as the
act) on the ground of a fraudulent transfer. Such suit would be decided C
on totally different considerations in accordance with the provisions of
Sec. 53 of the Act. Order 38 Rule 10 C.P.C. reads as under:

"Attachment before judgment shall not affect the rights,
existing prior to the attachment, of persons not parties to D
the suit, nor bar any person holding a decree agai11st the
defendant from applying for the sale of the property under
attachment in execution of such decree."

This provision also makes it clear that attachment before judgment
shall not affect the rights, existing prior to the attachment, of persons E
not parties to the suit.

Sec. 64 C.P .C. prohibits private alienation of property after
attachment and reads as under:

"Where an attachment has been made, any private transfer F
or delivery of the property attached or of any interest
therein and any payment to the judgment-debtor of any
debt, dividend or other monies contrary to such attach-
ment, shall be void as against all claims enforceable under
the attachment."
G
Explanation-For the purposes of this section, claims
enforceable under an attachment include claims for the
rateable distribution of assets.

The above provision bans or prohibits a private transfer or delivery of
the property attached or of any interest therein contrary to such attach- H
598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1990] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

ment as void as against all claims enforceable under the attachment.
A
The order of attachment is issued on a prescribed from No. 24 in
Appendix-E to C.P.C. which prohibits and restrains defendant from
transferring or charging the property by sale, gift or otherwise. Thus
neither in Sec. 64 C.P.C. nor in the form prescribed for attachment
there is any prohibition for submitting the document of sale for regist-
B ration. The act of submitting the sale deed for registration which has
already been executed prior to an attachment is not an act of transfer
which is prohibited under the a_bove provisions.

Sec. 54 of the Act defines Sale as "a transfer of ownership in
exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-pro-
mised." Thus after the execution of the sale deed with consideration
c all the ingredients of sale are fulfilled except that in case of tangible
immovable property of the value of Rs. JOO and upwards it can be
made only by registered instrument. Nrw, if we read Sec. 47 of the
Registration Act, it clearly provides that a registered document shall
operate from the time from which it would have commenced to
D operate if no registration thereof had been required or made and not
from the time of its registration. This provision makes it clear that
after the registration it will relate back to the date of execution of the
sale deed. The act of registration is to be performed by the registering
authority. According to Sec. 23 of the Registraion Act a document of
the nature of sale deed shall be accepted for registration within four
E months from the date of its execution. Thus a statutory period of four
months has been provided for presenting the sale deed for registration
from the date of its execution. In case of dispute regarding the execu-
tion of the document an enquiry is permitted under Sec. 74(a) of the
Registration Act and that may also take sometime. The Legislature
being alive to such situations has already provided in Sec. 47 of the
F Registration Act that it shall operate from the time from which it
would commence to operate if no registration thereof had been
required or made and not from the time of its registration. Thus in our
view the vendee gets rights which will be related back on registration
from the date of the execution of the sale deed and rnch rights are
protected under Order 38 Rule JO C.P.C. read together with Sec. 47 of
G the Registration Act.

We cannot accept the CQntention of learned counsel for the

-
respondent that till registration, the execution ofthe sale deed does
not confer any rights whatsoever on the vendee. Even Sec. 49 of the
Registration Act in its proviso inserted by Sec. 10 of the Transfer of
H Property (Amendment) Supplementary Act, 1929, negatives the
H. AMMAL v. P. PATHAR [KASLIWAL, J.l 599

above contention of the learned counsel. The above proviSion lays
down that an unregistered document affecting immovable property A
and required by this Act or by the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, to
be registered may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for
specific performance under Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act,
1877, or as an evidence of part performance of a contract for the
purposes of Sec. 53-A of the Transfer pf Property Act, 1882, or as B
evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by
registered instrument. Thus even an unregistered document can be
received -as evidence for purposes mentioned in the proviso to Sec. 49 of
the Registration Act.

Learned counsel for the respondents also made the submission
that even if the sale deed which is executed e'1rlier to attachment C
before judgment and registered subsequently may be binding on the
vendors but it would not affect the rights of such respondent who is a
third party, in the sense that he was not a party to the sale deed ancj he
got the right in the property in a court sale having taken place after the
passing of final decree in the rnoney suit filed by Avadiappa. In other D
words the contention is that the respondent No. 5 Shri M.S.A. Kadar
got rights in the property in the court sale made in his favour after the
dec~ee passed in favour of Avadiappa in the money suit filed on
13.9.1970. We do not find any force at all in the above submission. The
property in question admittedly belonged to the defendant-judgment
debtors (vendors) and once it is held that a sale deed had already been E
executed by them in favour of Hamda Arnmal on 9. 9. .1970 and only its
registration remained, then neither the attachment before judgment
·nor a subsequent attachment or court sale in favour of respondent No.
5 can confer any title in his favour by preventing the relation back. The
fact that the document of sale had not been registered until after the
I attachment makes no difference. F

We shall now deal with some cases cited before us at the bar.
Ram Saran Lall & Ors. v. Mst. Domini Kuer & Ors., [1962] 2 SCR 47~
was a case relating to pre-emption based on Mohammedan Law of
pre-emption applied to the parties by custom. The only question for
consideration before the Court was whether the first demand called G
Talab-i-Mowasibat wiiich has to be mad'e after the completion of tfie
sale in order that the right may be enforced, was made before or after
such completion. The making ot'the demand was not in dispute but the
dispute was an to when the sale was complete. A majority of Judges
held (per Sinha, C.J., Sarkar and Mudholkar, JJ.) "that the sale was
completed only on February 9, 1946, when the registration was comp- H
600 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990) Supp. 2 S.C.R.

lete, that the talab was made prematurely and that the suit must fail,
A
Sec. 47 merely permitted a document when registered to operate from
a date which may be earlier than the date on which it was registered, it
did not say when the sale would be deemed to be complete. A sale
which was required to be registered was not completed until the regist-
ration of the deed was completed." Minority view was that "the sale
B was completed on the day of execution and the talab was made at the
right time. Sec. 61 had nothing to do with the time when the sale
evidence by the registered deed became complete; it refers merely to
the fact that the registering officer had completed his duty. Sec. 47
provided when a sale was deemed to be completed. There was no
difference between the time when a sale became effective and the time
it could be held to be completed. Under Sec. 47 the crucial test for
c determining the time from which the registered document was to have
effect or be deemed to be completed was the intention of the parties.
The sale deed shows that the parties intended that the deed should be
effective from the date of execution."

D The above case related to pre-emption based on customary law
of pre-emption of Mohammedans. The question for consideration in
the case was regarding the first demand called 'Talab-i-Mowasibat'
which was required to be made after the completion of the sale. In that
context the majority view was that the sal~ becomes complete when it
is copied out in the Registrar's !)ooks as provided in Sec. 61 of the
E Registration Act and Sec. 47 of the Registration Act cannot apply in
such a case to hold that the sale was completed on the date of its
execution. This case is not at all an authority for the controve.rsy raised
before us as it only dealt with the question as to when the sale became
complete for making the first demand called 'Talab-i-Mowasibat' un·
Jcr the Mohammedan law of pre-emption.
p
In Hirala/ Agrawal, etc. v. Rnmpadarath Singh & Ors. etc.,
[ 1969] 1 SCR 328 the controversy was about fixation of ceiling area and
acquisition of surplus land under the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of
Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act of 1962. In the
above case the facts were that by a deed of sale dated October 9, 1964
G one Prembati Devi sold 2.62 acres of land to respondent No. I for
Rs.2,000. The said deed was thereafter presented to the Sub-Registrar
for registration. On October 14, 1964 the appellant applied for a
certified coply of the said sale deed and on its being furnished to him
he filed an application dated November 26, 1964 under Sec. 16(3) of
the Aci before the Collector. He annexed to his application the said
H copy of the sale deed and a copy of the challan evidencing his having
.-. H. AMMAL v. P. PATHAR {KASLIWAL, J.J 601

deposited the sale price of Rs.2,000 and an additional sum of IO per
cent thereof as required by the proviso to Sec. 16(3)(i) and Rule 19 of
A
the Bihar Land Reforms Rules, 1963. On November 30, 1964, the
Registrar completed registration by endorsing his certificate on the
said sale deed under Sec. 60( I) and copying out the endorsement and
the certificate in the relevant register under Sec. 61( 1) of the Registra-
tion Act, 1908. The appellant had in his said application claimed to be B
entitled as a co-sharer to the right of re-conveyance of the said land
under Sec. 16(3) of the Act. On November 30, 1964 the Collector, on
being satisfied that the application was proper, ordered possession to
be given to the appellant under Sec. 16(3)(ii) pending its disposal. In
the above case an argument was raised on behalf of the respondents
that the application was premature as the registration of the sale deed
was not completed on November 26, 1964 when the appellant pre- c
sented the application and, therefore, it was not a case of completed
transfer and the Collector had no jurisdiction to enterain such applica-
tion as his jurisdiction was dependent on a transfer having taken place.
On the other hand argument was raised on behalf of the appellant that
under Sec. 47 of the Registration Act once registration is effected. The D
title under the sale deed .relates back to the date of its execution and,
therefore, though registration was completed on November 30, 1964
the transferee's title under the sale deed related back to the date of its
execution i.e. October 9, 1964. Assuming, therefore, that the applica-
tion was presented on November 26, 1964, transferee's title having
related back to the date of the execution of the sale deed, the transfer E
must be deemed to be complete on that date and, therefore, it was not
correct that the right of re-conveyance had not accrued to the appel-
!ant on November 26, 1964 or that the Collector had no jurisdiction on
that date to accept the said application. This contention made on
behalf of the appellant was negatived by placing reliance on Ram
... Saran Lall & Ors. v. Mst. Domini Kuer &Ors. (supra), Radhakishan F
L. Toshniwal v. Shridhar, [1961] I SCR 248 and Bishan Singh v.
Khazan Singh, [1959] SCR 878. The Court further observed in the
above case that the question whether the right of re-conveyance had
accrued to the appellani or not on November 26, 1964 appeared to be
academic. It was observed in this regard that a mere presentation of
the application or having handed it over to some subordinate in the G
Collector's office cannot mean its having been entertained by the Col-
lector on that date. There was no merit in the contention that the
Collector had entertained the application either on 26th when it was
taken by the appellant to the Collector's office or on 28th when some
)....
subordinate in the office made an endorsement on it that it should be
placed before the Collector. The endorseme.nt on the contrary shows H
602 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] Supp. 2 S.C.R. ,__·

that the Collector had not even seen it much less, accepted it. The
A
Collector took cognizance of it on November 30, 1964 only when it was
placed before him and when on being satisfied with the conditions of
Sec. 16 he passed his order for handing over the possession from the
transferee to the appellant. The Court further held that the fact that a
copy of the registered deed was not furnished alongwith the applica-
B tion was, therefore not fatal to the application nor did such omission
deprive the Collector of his jurisdiction to entertain it nor did it vitiate
the proceedings before him or the order thereon made by him. The
Court in view oflhe above findings allowed the appeal.

The Court itself in the above case had observed that the question
whether the right of re-conveyance had accrued to the appellant or not
c on November 26, 1964 appeared to be academic as it was held that the
Collector took cognizance of the application on November 30, 1964
only when it was placed before him. The earlier cases cited before the
Court were all relating to the law of pre-emption. This case also as
such is no authority for the controversy raised before us and is totally
D distinguishable on its own facts.

In Vannarakkal Kallalathil Sreedharan v. Chandramaath Bala-
krishnan & Anr., •[ 1990l 3 SCC 291 a Bench of two Judges considered a
question identical to the question raised before us. The question was
whether the sale prevailed over the attachment. The facts were that 80
E cents of land were agreed to be sold in favour of the appellant under an
agreement dated October 9, 1978. Before the sale deed was executed,
a third party in execution of a decree got the property attached on
November 16, 1978. The sale deed was executed on November 23,
1978. On the above facts it was held as under:

F "We may first draw attention to some of the relevant
statutory provisions bearing on the question. Order XXX-
VIII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that
attachment before judgment shall not affect the rights
existing prior to the attachment of persons not parties to
the suit. Under Sec. 40 of the Transfer of Property Act, a
G purchaser under a contract of sale of land is entitled to the
benefit of an obligation arising out of that contract and it
provides that that obligation may be enforced inter alia
against a transferee with notice. Sec. 91 of the Trusts Act
also recognises this principle that the transferee with notice
of an existing contract of which specific performance can be
H enforced must hold the property for the benefit of the party
f H. AMMAL v. P. PATHAR {KASLIWAL, J.] 603

to the contract. These are equitable rights though not
amounting to interest in immovable property within the A
meaning of Sec. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act which
declares that a contract of sale does not create an interest in
the property. On this line of reasoning it has been held by
the Madras High C<?_urt that the purchaser of (sic under) an
antecedent agreement gets good title despite attachment." B

Their Lordships then considered that the same view has been taken by
- ·' the Bombay and Calcutta High Courts. The view taken by Punjab &
Haryana High Court in Mohinder Singh v. Nanak Singh, AIR 1971 P
& H, 381 was overruled. It was observed as under:

"In our opinion, the view taken by the High Courts of c
Madras, Bombay, Calcutta and Travancore Cochin in tlie
aforesaid cases appears to be reasonable and could be ac-
cepted as correct. The agreement for sale indeed creates an
obligation attached to the ownership of property and since
the attaching creditor is entitled to attach only the right; D
title and interest of the judgment-debtor, the attachment
cannot be free from the obligations incurred under the con-
tract for sale. Sec. 64 C.P ;C. no doubt was intended to
protect the attaching creditor, but if the subsequent con-
veyance is in pursuance of an agreement for sale which was
before the attachment, the contractual obligation arising E
therefrom must be allowed to prevail over the rights of the
attaching creditor. The rights of the attaching creditor shall

- not be allowed to override the contractual obligation aris-
ing from an antecedent agreement for sale of the attached
property. The attaching creditor cannot ignore that obliga-
tion and proceed to bring the property to sale as if it re- f
mained the absolute property of the judgment-debtor. We
cannot, therefore, agree with the vie,Naken by the Punjab
& Haryana High Court in Mohinder Singh's case.."

In the above case this Court has gone even to the extent that not
only a sale deed but even an agreement of sale will.prevail over attach- G
ment before judgment made subsequent to such agreement for sale.
We do not want to express any opinion with regard to the case of an
agreement for sale, but we are of the confirmed opinion that a sale
deed having been executed prior to attachment beore judgment,
though registered subsequently will prevail over attachment before
judgment. H
604 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

A Learned counsel for the respondent also placed reliance on
Ti/akdhari Singh v. Gour Narain, AIR 1921 Patna, 150 and Raja Ram
v. Girraj Kishore and Another, AIR 1964 All. 369 in support of his
contention. The above authorities no doubt support the contention of
the learned counsel for the respondent but the above Patna case has
been dissented in a later Patna case Faiyazuddin Khan v. Mst. Zahur
B
Bibi, AIR 1938 Patna, 134. In the later case the facts were that a deed
of baimokasa in respect of certain property was executed which
required registration, but before the deed was registered, the property
was attached and the document was subsequently registered. It was
held that the document prevailed against the attachment as the docu-
ment when registered took effect from the date of execution.
c
The only reason given in the above cases relied on by the counsel
for the respondent was that the right to have the sale deed registered is
a benefit which could not in law be availed of after the attachment
order has been made. Any act done after the attachment order for the
purposes of giving effect to the transfer sought to be made must be
D
held to be ineffective in Jaw. The sale deed could not be operative
unless it was registered and the right to have it registered was a right
denied to the parties to the sale by reason of attachment. We have
already given detailed reasons for the view taken by us and the above
cases taking a contrary view do not lay down the correct Jaw.
E It may also be mentioned that apart from the later Patna view,
Nagpur High ourt in Champa! Rao Mahadeo v. Mahadeo Bajirao
Kunbi and Others, AIR 1937 Nagpur, 143 also have taken the view
now taken by us.

We, do not want to burden this judgment by referring to some
F other cases of the High Courts which have been cited by the learned
counsel for the respondent as the same do not deal with the question
directly raised in the case before us. Those are cases .either under the
Provincial Insolvency Act or Mohammedan Law of Pre-emption. We
may, however, make a mention of the case of Privy Council in
Kalyanasundaram Pillai v. Karuppa Mooppanar and Ors., !LR 50
G Madras, 193 which supports the view taken by us. Jn the above case a
Hindu executed a deed of gift of part of his immovable property and
delivered it to the donee. On the following day he adopted a son.
Three days later the deed was registered. It was held, that the gift was
valid against the adopted son. On delivery of the deed to the donee
there was an acceptance of the transfer within Sec. 122 of the Transfer
H
- H. AMMAL v. P. PATHAR {KASLIWAL,.J.] 605

of Property Act, 1882, and thereupon the gift became final. subject to A
its registration as required by Sec. 123.

In the result we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High
Court dated 24th December. 1982 and confirm the decision of the
Subordinate Judge dated 14.10.1977, decreeing the suit of the plaintiff.
B
In the facts and circumstan"ces of ·the case we direct that the
parties shall bear their own costs.

Y. Lal Appeal allowed.

-

'·
'