Holding

The appointment of a legal advisor as Enquiry Officer and the transfer of the disciplinary proceedings to the Board of Directors were valid, and the appellant’s failure to raise objection earlier barred her from challenging the dismissal.

Summary

The appellant, a Group A officer of Karnataka State Financial Corporation, was dismissed after a disciplinary enquiry conducted by a legal advisor appointed as Enquiry Officer. She challenged the validity of the appointment and the Managing Director’s transfer of the proceedings to the Board of Directors, arguing that Regulation 41(3) barred such appointment and that no rule akin to CCS (CCA) Rule 13 permitted the transfer. The Supreme Court held that the appellant had participated in the enquiry without objection, thereby waiving any right to contest the appointment, and that the Regulations allowed an outsider to be appointed as Enquiry Officer. The Court applied the doctrines of estoppel, acquiescence and prejudice, finding no procedural defect that warranted setting aside the dismissal. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the dismissal upheld.

Issues considered

Whether Regulation 41(3) of the Karnataka State Financial Corporation (Staff) Regulations, 1965 permits the appointment of a legal advisor as Enquiry Officer.
Whether the Managing Director could lawfully transfer the disciplinary proceedings to the Board of Directors in the absence of a specific rule like CCS (CCA) Rule 13.
Whether the appellant’s failure to raise an objection at the earliest opportunity bars her from invoking estoppel, acquiescence, or prejudice doctrines.
Whether the appointment of an incompetent or non‑officer Enquiry Officer vitiates the disciplinary proceeding.

Subjects

disciplinary enquiryappointment of enquiry officerestoppelacquiescenceprejudice doctrineRegulation 41(3)Karnataka State Financial Corporationdismissal from serviceprocedural fairnessjurisdiction

Judgment

[2008] 7 S.C.R. 1157

H.V. NIRMALA A
V.
KARNATAKA STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATION & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 3404 of 2008)

MAY 8, 2008
B
(S.B. SINHA AND P.P. NAOLEKAR, JJ.)

Karnataka State Financial Corporation (Staff)
Regulations, 1965:
Regulation 41 (3) - Appointment of Legal Advisor as C
Enquiry Officer - Disciplinary proceedings against a group'A'
Officer initiated by Managing Director - Board of Directors
being the appointing authority, findings of Enquiry Officer
placed before it - Dismissal of delinquent from service -
HELD: Delinquent did not raise any objection to appointment D
of Enqi1iry Officer- Where appointment of Enquiry Officer may
have something to do only with carrying out the procedural
aspect, strict adherence to Rules may not be insisted upon -
Superior Courts may not permit such a question to be raised
for the first time - Principles of Estoppel, acquiescence and E
doctrine of prejudice may also be applied in such a case -
Since Managing Director could not impose a major penalty,
he had incidental power to place findings of Enquiry Officer
before the Board - Proceedings cannot be said to have been
vitiated - Estoppel - Acquiescence - Doctrine of prejudice. F
Departmental proceedings were initiated by the
Managing Director of the respondent-Corporation against
the appellant, a Group A officer, on the charges of unlawful
sanction and disbursal of amounts of loan. The Enquiry
Officer recorded a finding of guilt against the appellant. The G
records of the disciplinary proceedings were placed before
the Board of Directors of the respondent-Corporation,
which was the appointing authority of the appellant.
Penalty of dismissal was imposed on the appellant. The
1157 H
1158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 7 S.C.R.

A delinquent remained unsuccessful in statutory remedy as
also in writ proceedings before the High Court.
In the instant appeal filed by the delinquent it was
contended for her that in view of the provisions of
Regulation 41 of the Karnataka State Financial
8 Corporation (Staff) Regulations, 1965, a Legal Advisor
could not have been appointed as the Enquiry Officer;
and that in absence of provisions in the Regulations like
Rule 13 of the Central Civil Service (Classification, Control
and Appeal) Rules, 1965, the Managing Director of the
C Corporation could not have transferred the proceedings
to the Board of Directors of the Corporation.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 Appellant did not raise any objection in
D regard to the appointment of the Enquiry Officer. He
participated in the enquiry proceedings without any
demur whatsoever. A large number of witnesses were
examined before the Enquiry Officer. They were cross-
examined. Appellant examined witnesses on her own
E behalf. The Single Judge as also the Division Bench of
the High Court have opined that the appellant has failed
to establish that any prejudice has been caused to her by
reason of appointment of a Legal Advisor as the Enquiry
Officer and as the appellant has participated in the enquiry
F proceedings, she could not be permitted to raise the said
contention. Appointment of an incompetent enquiry officer
may not vitiate the entire proceedings. Such a right can
be waived. In relation thereto even the principle of
Estoppel and Acquiescence would apply. [para 8-9] [1164-
G E-H; 1165-A]
Union of India vs. S. Vinodh Kumar (2007) 8 SCC 100
- relied on.·
State Bank of India vs. Ram Das (2003) 12 SCC 474;
H and Central Bank oflndia vs. C. Bernard (1991) 1 SCC 319
H.V. NIRMALA v. KARNATAKA STATE FINANCIAL 1159
CORPORATION & ORS.

- distinguished. A
1.2 Jurisdictional issue should be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity. A disciplinary proceeding
is not a judicial proceeding. There exists a distinction
between a domestic tribunal and a· court. It is not the case
8
of the appellant that any procedure in holding the enquiry
has been violated or that there was no compliance of
principles of natural justice. [para 11] [1166-G,G]
Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs. International Airport
Authority (1979) 3 SCC 489 - referred to. c
Vitarel/i vs. Seaton (1959) 359 US 535 - referred to.
1.3 In terms of Regulation 41(3) of the Karnataka State
Financial Corporation (Staff) Regulations, 1965, as was
stated to have been prevalent at the relevant point of time, 0
an outsider could have been appointed as the Enquiry
Officer. [para 15] [1170-A]
1.4 In a case of this nature where appointment of the
Enquiry Officer may have something to do only for
carrying out the procedural aspect of the mater, strict E
adherence to the Rules may not be insisted upon.
Superior courts in a case of this nature may not permit
such a question to be raised for the first time. Prejudice
doctrine may also be applied in such a contingency. [para
17-18] [1170-D-F] F
Sohan Singh and others vs. The General Manager,
Ordnance Factory, Khamaraia, Jabalpur and others AIR 1981
SC 1862 - relied on.
Union of India vs. Tulsiram Patel (1985) 3 SCC; Rattan G
Lal Sharma vs. Maf]aging Committee, Or. Hari Ram (Co-
education) Higher Secondary School (1993) 4 SCC 10 - held
inapplicable.
2.2 Managing Director of the Corporation initiated the
H
1160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 7 S.C.R.

A proceedings but he could not impose a major penalty, as
the appointing authority of Class 'A' Officers is the Board
of Directors, and in that view of the matter he will have· the
incidental power to place the findings of the Enquiry
Officer before th~ Board of Directors. Such an incidental
B power must be held to be existing with all the statutory
authorities. For the said purpose ari express provision in
the Regulation was not imperative. Absence of any Rule
as is obtaining in Rule 13 of the CCS (CCA) Rules would
not vitiate the proceeding. [para 19-20] [1171-B; 1170-G,
C 1171-B-C]
Indian Airlines Ltd. vs. Prabha D. Kanan (2006} 11 SC
67 - relied on.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDCTION : Civil Appeal No.
D 3404 of 2008.
From the Judgment & Order dated 22.2.2006 of the High
Court of Karnataka at Bangalore In W.A. No. 3087/2005 (S-
DIS).
Basava S. Patil, V.N. Raghupathy and B. Subrahmanya
.E Prasad for the Appellant.

Kiran Suri for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

F S.B. SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. Respondent-Corporation was constituted under the
State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 (1951 Act). Appellant
was appointed as Trainee Assistant Manager in the Corporation
in June 1983. She was promoted and posted as Branch
G Manager at Chikkaballapur Branch. A disciplinary proceeding
was initiated against her in April, 1996. The imputation of charges
against her pertained to sanction and disbursal of amount of
loan in four cases. As many as four charges were framed against
her. The disciplinary proceeding was initiated by the Managing·
H Director of Corporation, wherein one Sri B. Rudregowda, a legal
H.V. NIRMALA v. KARNATAKA STATE FINANCIAL 1161
CORPORATION & ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

advisor of the company, was appointed as an Enquiry Officer - A .t"
on 4th July, 1996.

A finding of guilt was arrived at by the said Enquiry Officer,
a copy whereof was made available to the appellant. The records
of the disciplinary proceeding were placed before the Board of
j,. Directors of the Corporation. By an order dated 9th June, 1998 B
a penalty of dismissal from services was imposed upon her.·
Appellant preferred an appeal thereagainst before the Board
. itself on or about 4th December, 1998. The said appeal was
treated to be a petition for review which by reason of an order
dated 2nd March, 1999 was dismissed. Aggrieved by and C
dissatisfied therewith, the appellant filed a writ petition before
the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore. By reason of a
judgment and order dated 23rd June, 2005 a learned Single
Judge of the said Court dismissed the writ petition. An intra
,. court appeal was preferred thereagainst which has been D
dismissed by a Division Bench of the said High Court by reason
of the impugned judgment and order dated 22nd February, 2006.
3. Mr. Basava Prabhu S. Patil, learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the appellant, principally raised two contentions E
before us:-
i) Having regard to clause (3) of Regulation 41 of
Karnataka State Financial Corporation (Staff)
Regulations, 1965 a Legal Advisor could not have
been appointed as an Enquiry Officer; and F
ii) In the absence of any provision in the Regulations
unlike Rule 13 of the Central Civil Service
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules; 1965, the
Managing Director of the Corporation could not have
transferred the proceeding to the Board of Directors. G
1
i 4. Ms. Kiran Suri, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the respondents, on the other hand, urged :-
i) Appointment of a Legal Advisor is permissible under
H
1162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 7 S.C.R.

A clause (3) of Regulation 41 of the Regulations; and
ii) As a major penalty was proposed to be imposed,
the Board of Directors only was the competent
authority therefore in terms of the Regulations.
B 5. Before adverting to the rival contentions of the parties ,.,
as noticed hereinbefore, we may notice that the terms and
conditions of appointment and service of the staff of the
Corporation are governed by the 1951 Act and the Regulations
framed thereunder known as Karnataka State Financial
c Corporation (Staff) Regulations, 1965 (for short the
Regulations).
6. Officers of the Corporation are classified in three groups,
namely Class A; Class Band Class C. Appellant was a Category
'A' officer. Chapter IV of the Regulations deals with conduct,
D discipline and appeals. Regulation 26 deals with the liability of 1
?'l employee to abide by the Regulatiors and the orders.
Regulation 28 enjoins a duty upon the employee to promote the
interest of the Corporation. Regulation 41 deals with penalties
which reads as under;- '
E
"Without prejudice to the provisions of other Regulations,
an employee who commits a breach of the rules or
Regulations of the Corporation or who display negligence,
inefficiency or indolence, or who knowingly does anything
detrimental to the interests of the Corporation or in conflict
F with its instructions, or commits a breach of discipline or
is guilty of any other act of misconduct, shall be liable to
the following penalties ;
(a) censure;
G (b) delay or stoppage of increments or promotion
including stoppage at an efficiency bar, if any;
(c) reduction to a lower post or grade or to a lower stage
in the time scale;
H
H.V. NIRMALA v. KARNATAKA STATE FINANCIAL 1163
CORPORATION & ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

(d) recovery from pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary A
loss caused to the Corporation by negligence or
breach of orders;
(e) dismissal.
(2) No employee shall be subjected to the penalties (a), B
(b), (c), (d)or (e) of sub-regulation (1) except by an order
in writing signed by an appropriate disciplinary authority
and no such order of the disciplinary authority shall be
passed without the charge or charges being formulated in
writing and given to the said employees so that he shall c
have reasonable opportunity to answer them in writing or
in person, as he prefers, and in the latter case his defence
shall be taken down in writing and read to him. For this
purpose the disciplinary authorities will be as indicated at
Appendix Ill of the (Staff) Regulations, 1965 of KSFC.
D
Provided that the requirements of thi~ sub-regulation may
be waived if the facts on the basis of which action is to be
taken have been established in a Court of Law or Court
Martial or where the employee has absconded or where
it is for any other reason impracticable to communicate E
with him or where there is difficulty in observing them and
the requirements can be waived without causing injustice
to the employee in every case, where all or any of the
requirements of this sub-regulation are waived, the
reasons therefor shall be recorded in writing. ·F
(3) The enquiry under this sub-regulation and the
procedure with the exception of the final order may be
delegated to an officer of the Corporation of a rank above
that of the employee against whom the charges have been
framed. G
We may, however, note that according to the respondents,
clause (3) of Regulation 41 in fact reads as under :-
"41 (3). For the purpose of holding an enquiry into Articles
of charges, Disciplinary Authority may itself hold an enquiry H
1164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 7 S.C.R.

A or appoint an Inquiring Authority for the purpose from
amongst the offices of the Corporation of rank above that
of the employee against whom the charges have been
framed or any authority as listed in the panel approved for
the purpose."
B 7. Before proceeding further we may also notice the
relevant portions of Appendix Ill enumerating the functions of

ead :-

c Name of Appointing Disciplinary Penalty Appellate
Office Authority Authority that can be Authority
imposed
I.

D II.
Ill.
IV. Managing a.b. Board
roup 'A Boar Director c.d.e. Board
Board
E
8. Appellant did not raise any objection in regard to the
appointment of the Enquiry Officer. He participated in the enquiry
proceeding without any demur whatsoever. A large number of
witnesses were examined before the Enquiry Officer. They were
F cross-examined. Appellant examined witnesses on her own
behalf.
Learned Single Judge as also the Division Bench of the
High Court opined that the appellant has failed to "establish that
any prejudice has been caused to her by reason of appointment
G of a Legal Advisor as an Enquiry Officer and as the appellant
has participated in the enquiry proceeding, she could not be
permitted to raise the said contention. ... ·
9. Mr. Patil, however, would submit that such a contention
H which goes to the root of jurisdiction can be urged at any stage.
H.V NIRMALA v. KARNATAKA STATE FINANCIAL 1165
CORPORATION & ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

We do not agree. Appointment of an incompetent enquiry A
officer may not vitiate the entire proceeding. Such a right can
be waived. In relation thereto even the principle of Estoppel and
Acquiescence would apply.

10. In State Bank of India vs. Ram Das: (2003) 12 SCC
474 this Court held : B
A

"It is an established view of law that where a party despite
knowledge of the.defect in the jurisdiction or bias or malice
of an arbitrator participated in the proceedings without
any kind of objection, by his conduct it disentitles itself c
from raising such a question in the subsequent
proceedings. What we find is that the appellant despite
numerous opportunities made available to it, although it
was aware of the defect in the award of the umpire, at no
stage made out any case of bias against the umpire. We,
D
therefore, find that the appellant cannot be. permitted to
raise the question of bias for t;··1e first time before this
Court."

11. There are questions and questions in regard to the
jurisdictional issues. An authority may lack inherent jurisdiction E
in which case the order passed would be a nullity but he may
commit a jurisdictional error while exercising jurisdiction. The
legal rights conferred upon the employees in this behalf may be
different under different statutes. A legal admission under the
common law is not debarred for acting as an enquiry officer. F
Even in relation to applicability of the principles of natural justice,
breaches whereof would ordinarily render the decision nullity,
the courts have been applying the prejudice doctrine to uphold
the validity thereof.
We are, however, not unmindful of the legal principle laid G
down in Vitarelli vs. Seaton : (1959) 359 US 535 which has
.. been noticed in Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs. International
Airport Authority : (1979) 3 SCC 489 stating :-
"10. Now, there can be no doubt that what para ( 1) of the
H
1166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 7 S.C.R

~

A notice prescribed was a condition of eligibility which was
required to be satisfied by every person submitting a
tender. The condition of eligibility was that the person
submitting a tender must be conducting or running a
registered llnd Class hotel or restaurant and he must have
B at least 5 years' experience as such and if he did not
satisfy this condition of eligibility, his tender would not be ~

eligible for consideration. This was the standard or norm
of eligibility laid down by Respondent 1 and since the
Respondents 4 did not satisfy this standard or norm, it
c was not competent to Respondent 1 to entertain the tender
of Respondents 4. It is a well-settled rule of administrative
law that an executive authority must be rigorously held to
the standards by which it professes its actions to be judged
and it must scrupulously observe those standards on pain
of invalidation of an act in violation of them. This rule was
D
enunciated by Mr Justice Frankfurter in Vitera/Ii v. Saton1 "1
where the learned Judge said:
"An executive agency must be rigorously held to the
standards by which it professes its action to be judged ....
E Accordingly, if dismissal from employment is based on a
defined procedure, even though generous beyond the
requirements that bind such agency, that procedure must
be scrupulously observed .... This judicially evolved rule of
administrative law is now firmly established and, if I may
F add, rightly so. He that takes the procedural sword shall
perish with the sword."
But in the said decisions, applicability of the prejudice
doctrine was not considered being not necessary to do so.
Jurisdictional issue should be raised at the earliest possible
G opportunity. A disciplinary proceeding is not a judicial
a
proceeding. It is a domestic tribunal. There exists distinction
between a domestic tribunal and a court. Appellant does not ,..
contend that any procedure in holding the enquiry has been
violated or that there was no compliance of principles of natural
H
H.V. NIRMALA v. KARNATAKA STATE FINANCIAL 1167
CORPORATION & ORS. [S.S. SINHA, J.)

justice. A
12. This Court in Union of India vs. S. Vinodh Kumar :
(2007) 8 sec 100 has held:-
"18. It is also well settled that those candidates who had
taken part in the selection process knowing fully well the B
procedure laid down therein were not entitled to question
the same."

13. Reliance has been placed by Mr. Patil on Central Bank
of India vs. C. Bernard: (1991) 1 SCC 319 wherein this Court
in a case of disciplinary enquiry allowed the plea of C
incompetence on the part of the disciplinary authority to be
raised for the first time before the High Court, stating :-
"9. Lastly, Shri Shetye submitted that in any event the
respondent succeeded in getting the order of punishment
0
quashed on a mere technicality and that too on the
contention belatedly raised before the High Court for the
first time and, therefore, the High Court was in error in
directing payment of all consequential benefits. We think
there is merit in this contention. If the objection was raised E
at the earliest possible opportunity before the Enquiry
Officer the appellant could have taken steps to remedy
the situation by appointing a competent officer to enquire
into the charges before the respondent's retirement from
service. It is equally true that the penalty has not been
quashed on merits. On the contrary, if one were to go by F
the charge levelled against the respondent and the reply
thereto one may carry the impression that the respondent
had made the claim on the basis of the fake receipt; whether
the respondent himself was duped or not would be a
different matter. The fact, however, remains that the G
impugned order of punishment has to be quashed not
because the merits of the case so demand but because
the technical plea of incompetence succeeds."
(Emphasis supplied) H
1168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 7 S.C.R.

A However, therein also all consequential benefits were not
given. In that case the Enquiry Officer had no jurisdiction at all.
Even the defecto doctrine could not be applied as he was not
the holder of the office but merely an ex-employee, who could
not have been appointed as an Enquiry Officer.
B 14. We may at this stage also notice two other decisions
of this Court whereupon reliance has been placed by Mr. Patil.
In Union of India vs. Tulsiram Patel : (1985) 3 SCC 398
this Court held :
c "57. The question came to be reconsidered by a larger
Bench of seven Judges in Moti Ram Deka case. While
referring to the judgment of the majority in Babu Ram
Upadhya case the Court observed as follows (at pp. 731-
2):
D
"What the said judgment has held is that while Article 310
provides for a tenure at pleasure of the President or the
Governor, Article 309 enables the Legislature or the
executive, as the case may be, to make any law or rule in
regard, inter alia, to conditions of service without impinging
E
upon the overriding power recognised under Article 310.
In other words, in exercising the power conferred by Article
309, the extent of the pleasure recognised by Article 310
cannot be affected, or impaired. In faet, while stating the
conclusions in the form of propositions, the said judgment
F has observed that the Parliament or the Legislature can
make a law regulating the conditions of service without
affecting the powers of the President or the Governor under
Article 310 read with Article 311 . It has also been stated
at the same place that the power to dismiss a public
G servant at pleasure is outside the scope of Article 154
and, therefore, cannot be delegated by the Governor to a
subordinate officer and can be exercised by him only in
the manner prescribed by the Constitution. In the context,
it would be clear that this latter observation is not intended
H to lay down that a law cannot be made under Article 309
H.V. NIRMALA v. KARNATAKA STATE FINANCIAL 1169
CORPORATION & ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

or a rule cannot be framed under the proviso to the said A
article prescribing the procedure by which, and the authority
by whom, the said pleasure can be exercised. This
observation which is mentioned as proposition number
(2) must be read along with the subsequent propositions
specified as (3), (4), (5) and (6). The only point made is B
that whatever is done under Article 309 must be subject to
the pleasure prescribed by Article 310."

In Rattan Lal Sharma vs. Managing Committee, Dr Hari
Ram (Co-education) Higher Secondary School: (1993) 4 SCC
10 it was held: C

"But if the plea though not specifically raised before the
subordinate tribunals or the adr:ninistrative and quasi-
judicial bodies, is raised before the High Court in the writ
proceeding for the first time and the plea gqes to the root
0
of the question and is based on admitted and
uncontroverted facts and does not require any further
investigation into a question of tact, the High Court is not
only justified in entertaining the plea but in the anxiety to
do justice which is the paramount consideration of the .
court, it is only desirable that a litigant should not be shut E
out from raising such plea which goes to the root of the lis
involved."

The said decisions, to our mind, are not applicable to the
fact of the present case. · F

15. Appellant himself has quoted the said Regulation which
was corrected merely upto 31st October, 1991. On the other
hand, Ms. Suri has produced the Regulation which is said to be
applicable at the relevant point of time, in terms whereof not
only an officer of the Corporation but also any authority as listed G
in the panel approved for the purpose could have been
-1 appointed as an Enquiry Officer.
I
However, the Regulation, which was produced by Ms. Suri
is corrected upto 1st April, 2002, but it is not clear as to whether H
1170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 7 S.C.R.

A the necessary amendment has been carried out prior to 14th
July, 1996 or not. We hope that the said assertion of the learned
counsel is correct. We are, however, in this case proceed on
the basis that Regulation 41 (3) remained unchanged and
according to learned counsel in terms of the Regulation which
B was prevalent at the relevant point of time, an outsider could
have been appointed as the Enquiry Officer. '

16. In Central Bank of India (supra) also this Court held
that an Enquiry Officer need not be an officer of the Bank as
even a third party can be appointed an Enquiry Officer to enquire
C into the conduct of an employee. What was, however,
emphasised was that a non-official cannot act as a disciplinary
authority and pass an order of punishment against the delinquent
employee. It is in that view of the matter it was held that a retired
employee could not act as a disciplinary authority.
D
17. We may, however, notice that in a case of this nature
where appointrnent of the Enquiry Officer may have somt::thing
to do only for carrying out the procedural aspect of the mater,
strict adherence to the Rules may not be insisted upon. Superior
E courts in a case of this nature may not permit such a question to
be raised for the first time. (See - Sohan Singh and others vs.
The General Manager, Ordnance Factory, Khamaraia,
Jabalpur ancf others: AIR 1981 SC 1862).

18. Prejudice doctrine, in our opinion, may also be applied
F in such a contingency. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the
first contention of Mr. Patil has no merit.
19. Submission of Mr. Patil that the Managing Director
could not have directed the proceeding to be placed before the
Board, in our opinion, has equally no merit. Appointirig authority
G of Class 'A' Officers is the Board. Managing Director is the
disciplinary authority only in respect of minor punishments. When
a major punishment is proposed to be imposed. the Board of
Directors alone will have the jurisdiction to consider the gravity
of the alleged misconduct so as to enable it to pass an
H appropriate order. It is idle to contend that had Managing
H.V. NIRMALA v. KARNATAKA STATE FINANCIAL 1171
CORPORATION & ORS. [S.S. SINHA, J.]

Director passed an order, an appeal could have been preferred A
thereagainst. If the entire Board is the appropriate authority for
taking a decision, it is only that authority which was required to
take decision and not any other. (See Indian Airlines Ltd. vs.
Prabha D, Kanan : (2006) 11 SC 67).
20. For the said purpose an express provision in the 8
Regulation was not imperative. Managing Director of the
Corporation initiated a proceeding but he could not impose a
major penalty and in that view of the matter he will have the
incidental power to place the findings of the Enquiry Officer
before the Board. Such an incidental power must be held to be C
existing with all the statutory authorities. Absence of any Rule
as is obtaining in Rule 13 of the CCS (CCA) Rules would not, in
our opinion, vitiate the proceeding.

r- 21. For the reasons aforementioned the impugned D
judgment does not warrant any interference. The appeal fails
and is dismisseu accordingly. There shall, however, be no order
as to costs.
R.P. Appeal dismissed.