Holding

The Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1966 is not repugnant to the Karnataka Rice Procurement (Levy) Order, 1984 because the two enactments deal with the same subject but occupy different fields, so there is no inconsistency or invalidation of the Marketing Act.

Summary

The appellants, rice millers and commission agents, challenged the levy of market fee on rice imposed by Marketing Committees under the Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1966, arguing that the Karnataka Rice Procurement (Levy) Order, 1984 (a Control Order issued under the Essential Commodities Act) occupied the same field and made the Marketing Act repugnant. The State of Karnataka contended that the two statutes dealt with the same subject but covered different fields, so no inconsistency existed. The Supreme Court examined whether the Control Order covered the entire marketing of rice and whether Section 6 of the Essential Commodities Act rendered the Marketing Act ineffective. It held that the Control Order only regulated compulsory acquisition of one‑third of the rice produced and did not govern the broader marketing activities covered by the Marketing Act. Consequently, there was no repugnancy or conflict between the statutes. The Court dismissed the appeals and the related writ petitions, leaving the levy of market fee intact.

Issues considered

Whether the Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1966 is repugnant to the Karnataka Rice Procurement (Levy) Order, 1984 under Section 6 of the Essential Commodities Act
Whether the sale of rice to the State under the Control Order constitutes a ‘sale’ within Section 65 of the Marketing Act
Whether market fee can be levied on rice that has been procured under the Control Order
Whether the Control Order occupies the entire field of rice marketing, rendering the Marketing Act ineffective

Legislation cited

Essential Commodities Act, 1955s. 3, s. 6

Subjects

repugnancyessential commodities actmarket feerice procurementagricultural produce marketingstatutory interpretationsection 6section 3Karnatakarice

Judgment

H.S. JAY ANNA AND BROS. AND ORS. A
v.
STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.

MARCH 6, 2002

[V.N. KHARE AND ASHOK BHAN, JJ.) B

Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1966:

Karnataka Rice Procurement (Levy) Order, 1984:
c
Scope of Order and Act-Object of Procurement Order explained--
Held, order and Act deal with same subject-But do not cover the same
field-Thus there is no inconsistency between the Act and the Order.

The appellants in these appeals were selling rice to respondent-
Government under Karnataka Rice Procurement (Levy) Order, 1984 (Control D
Order ). They successfully challenged before Karnataka High Court the
validity of market fee on rice by the Marketing Committees constituted under
the provisions of the Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation)
Act, 1966. Appeals preferred by respondent-State were allowed by the Division
Bench of the High Court which dismissed the writ petitions of the appellant. E
The question for consideration in these appeals is whether the provisions of
the Marketing Act are repugnant to the Control Order and if so what is its
effect. In the connected writ petitions same question is involved.

Dismissing the appeals and writ petitions, the Court
F
HELD: l. The Karnataka Rice Procurement (Levy) Order, 1984 and
the Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1966 do
•
deal with the same subject but do not cover the same field. There is no conflict
between them. They do not occ_upy the same field. [271-GJ

2. The Karnataka Rice Procurement (Levy) Order, 1984 has been issued G
with the object of procurement of rice and to see that rice is made available
for public distribution and no artificial scarcity is created and the people do
not suffer because of boarding by certain unreasonable elements. The entire
field of regulating the purchase and sale of paddy or the rice produced out of
the paddy is not covered under the Control Order. The provisions of the H
261
262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002) 2 S.C.R.

A Marketing Act do not trench upon the field covered by the Control order.
There is no inconsistency between the Control order and the Marketing Act.
They do not cover the same field and therefore the question of any
inconsistency, repugnancy or the Marketing Act being ineffectual in terms
of Section 6 of the Essential Commodities Act in view of the Control Order
issued under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act would not arise.
B [270-D; 271-B]

3. The Control Order deals with the compulsory acquisition of 113 of
rice of each variety produced by a miller at a purchase price fixed by the
Government. It requires the miller to supply to the Government or its and
C purchase agent and deliver the procured rice at a notified place. It does not
deal with the sale and purchase of the remaining 2/3rd rice except that the
miller is not permitted to remove the stock of rice from the mill premises
without delivery of rice to the Government or its purchase agent and without
obtaining a release certificate required to be taken under Clause 8 of the said
order. It does not deal with the marketing or the facilities to be provided to
D the grower, seller and purchaser of paddy in the market area or to the seller
or purchaser of the rice. The Control Order is thus limited in operation. The
Marketing Act provides for the regulation of marketing of agricultural
produce (which the rice is) and the establishment and administration of
markets for agricultural produce and matters connected therewith in the State
E of Kamataka. (271-C-E]

The Marketing Act deals with the entire gamut of marketing of
agricultural produce starting from the establishment of the market
committees, markets, declaration of market area, market yard, market sub
yard, regulation of marketing of specified agricultural produce therein and
F for obtaining a licence under the Act. The process of appointment/electing
the market committees, the powers and duties of the market committee
(s.63(1)), the facilities to be provided by the market committee (s.63(2)) and ..
the levy of market fee (s. 65). The Marketing Act does not deal with any of
the provisions made in the Control Order. The Marketing Act deals with a
G cognate matter on the same subject but not the field which is already occupied
by the Control Order. (271-F)

Belsund Sugar Co. Ltd v. State of Bihar and Ors., (1999) 8 SCC 620,
explained and distinguished.

H Food Corporation ofIndia v. State ofKera/a, (1997) 3 SCC 410, referred
J

H.S.JAYANNAANDBROS. v. STATE [BHAN,J.) 263

to. A
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. I 859-64
of 2002.

From the Judgment and Order dated 17.4.98 of the Karnataka High
Court in W.P. Nos. 44450, 41335, 41334, 41346/93 37936 and 37937 of B
1995.

WITH

W.P.(C) Nos. 196; 194 and 437 of 1999.
c
S.S. Javali and Rakesh Dwivedi, E.C. Vidya Sagar, B.K. Choudhary,
B.R. Satenahalli, B.G. Sridharan, G.V. Chandrasekhar for P.P. Singh, N.
Ganpathy, Sanjay R. Hegde and Satya Mitra for the appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
D
BHAN J. Leave granted in the special leave petitions.

Rice millers and commission agents in the State of Karnataka having
licences under the provisions of the Rice Milling Industries (Regulation) Act,
1958 filed writ petitions challenging the validity of levy of market fee on rice
by the Marketing Committees constituted under the provisions of the Karnataka E
Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1966 (for short 'the
Marketing Act').

Writ petitions were filed, interalia, on the grounds as to whether the
sale ofrice by the rice millers to the State Government or its agents by virtue
of the Karnataka Rice Procurement (Levy) Order, 1984 (for short 'the Control F
Order') is a sale for the purpose of Section 65 of the Marketing Act; when
once paddy is subjected to levy of market fee, whether on sale ofrice, market
fee could be levied; whether the rice which is a processing commodity from
a paddy could be subjected to market fee; and as to whether the provisions
of the Marketing Act were repugnant to the Control Order framed under the G
Essential Commodities Act. The single Judge allowed the writ petition,
aggrieved against which the State of Karnataka .filed writ appeals. Few writ
petitions which were filed after the admission of the writ appeals were ordered
to be clubbed with the writ appeals. The writ appeals and the writ petitions
were thereafter taken up together and disposed of by passing a common
order. Before the Division Bench counsel for the parties addressed arguments H
264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R.

A on the following points:
(1) Whether sale of rice by the Riee Millers to the State Government
or its agent by virtue of procurement order is a sale for the purpose
of Section 65(2) of the Marketing Act.

B (2) When once paddy is subjected to levy of market fee, whether on
sale of rice, market fee can be levied or n •;.

(3) Whether the rice which is a processing commodity from a paddy
will be subjected to market fee or not.

c (4) Whether the provisions of the Marketing Act are repugnant to the
control order and if so what is its effect.

The Division Bench accepted the appeals and dismissed the writ petitions.
All the points raised in the appeals were decided against the rice millers and
the commission agents. The first point wad decided against the dealers relying
D upon the decision of this Court in Food Corporation of India v. State of
Kera/a, [ 1997) 3 SCC 410 wherein it has been held that sale of rice by the
rice millers to the State Government or its agents by virtue of procurement
order is a sale. On the second point it was held that paddy and rice being two
different commodities the market fee could be levied on paddy as well as
E rice. On the similar grounds question number 3 was decided against the
dealers. On question number 4 the High Court opined that the provisions of
the Marketing Act were not repugnant to the control order. For this reliance
was placed on certain decisions of the same High Court.

Aggrieved by the judgment of the Division Bench the present appeals
p have been filed. Writ Petitions (Civil) Nos. 196, 194 and 437 of 1999, which
were filed in this Court, were ordered to be listed with these appeals. The
point being the· same, these writ petitions are taken up and disposed of with
the appeals. The facts are being referred from the appeals.

Counsel for the appellants addressed arguments on question number 4
G only. The other points were given up and no arguments were addressed.

, Relying upon the decision of this Court in Belsund Sugar Co. Ltd. v.
State of Bihar and Ors., [1999) 9 SCC 620, it was contended on behalf of
the appellants that since under the Control Order the entire field of marketing
of rice was covered, therefore, the Marketing Act could not be made applicable
H to the sale of rice. A parallel was sought to be raised with the transactions
H.S. JAY ANNA AND BROS. v. STATE [BHAN, J.] 265

concerning to sugarcane, sugar and mo]asses in Belsund Sugar Co. Ltd (supra) A
to contend that the Maiketing Act was not applicable in regulating the sale
and purchase of transactions concerning rice in view of the Control Order. To
fortify the submission reliance was placed on Section 6 of the Essential
Commodities Act which provides that any order made under Section 3 of the
Essential Commodities Act, 1955 would have effect notwithstanding anything B
inconsistent contained in any other enactment. The same reads as:

"6. Effect of orders inconsistent with other enactments:-Any Order
made under Section 3 shall have effect notwithstanding anything
inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other than this Act
or any instrument having effect by virtue of any enactment other than C
this Act."

As against this the counsel for the respondents contended that no parallel
could be drawn on the facts of this case with the sale and purchase of
transactions concerning sugarcane, sugar and molasses in Belsund Sugar Co.

- Ltd. case (supra). That in the said case the Constitution Bench was dealing D
with the legality of levy of market fee under the provisions of the Bihar
Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960 pertaining to different commodities,
i.e., Sugarcane, sugar, and molasses; wheat products-atta, maida, suji, bran
etc. vegetable oil; rice-milling; milk and milk products; and tea. The Bench
dealt with each of these commodities separately. Only in the case of purchase E
of Sugarcane, and sale of sugar and molasses by the sugar factories, it was
held that since the Bihar Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act,
1981 passed by the Bihar Legislature under Entry 33 of the Concurrent List
covered the entire field on the marketing of supply and purchase of Sugarcane
as well as the manufactured items therefrom the Bihar Agricultural Produce
Act, 1960 enacted under Entries 26, 27 of the State List read with Entry 28 F
therein would not be applicable. By referring to the different paragraphs of
this judgment it was contended that the provisions of the Bihar Sugarcane
(Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1981 covered the entire field on
the marketing of Sugarcane as well as the mmufactured items whereas in the
present case the Control Order did not cover the entire field of the marketing
of the rice. That the Marketing Act was not repugnant to the Control Order. G
That the Control Order did not cover the field which was sought to be
covered by the Marketing Act. It dealt with separate and distinct matters
which were not covered under the Control Order and therefore the question
of its being repugnant or inconsistent with the Control Order thereby making
it ineffectual in terms of Section 6 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 H
266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) 2 S.C.R.

A did not arise. That the Bench had passed the order regarding Sugarcane or
manufactured items therefrom on the peculiar provisions of the tWo Acts
involved in the said case whereas regarding all other products i.e., wheat
products-atta, maida, suji, bran etc. vegetable oil; rice-milling, milk and milk
products; and tea the levy of market fee was upheld. We find considerable
B force in the submissions made by the counsel for the respondents.

This Court while dealing with the sugar matters considered the
applicability of the Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960 to the
transactions of purchase of sugarcane and sale of sugar and molasses by the
sugar mills keeping in view the fact that regulation of these transactions was
C already affected by the Bihar Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) >\
Act, 1981 as well as by the Sugarcane (Control). Order, 1966 both issued
under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. It was held that the
Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960 had been enacted by the Bihar
Legislature as per the legislative powers vested in it by Entries 26, 27 and 28
of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, which read as under:
D
"26. Trade and commerce within the State subject to the provisions
of Entry 33 of List III.

27. Production, supply and distribution of goods subject .to the
provisions of Entry 33 of List III.
E
28. Markets and fairs."

That if location of markets and fairs simpliciter and the management and
maintenance only were contemplated by the Bihar Agricultural Produce
Markets Act, 1960 then they. would fall within the topic of legislative power
F envisaged by Entry 28 of List IL But since ·the Bihar Agricultural Produce
Markets Act, 1969 dealt with supply and distribution of goods as well as
trade and commerce therein to regulate the sale and purchase of agricultural
produce to be carried on in the specified markets under the Act; to that extent
the provisions of Entry 33 of List III would override the legislative powers
G of the State Legislature in connection with legislations dealing with trade and
commerce in, and the production, supply and distribution of goods. Under
Entry 33 of the Concurrent List, the topic of trade at)d commerce in and the
production, supply and distribution of goods enumerated therein at sub-clause
(b), were listed as items of foodstuffs, including edible oilseeds and oils. It
was concluded that to the extent the Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act,
H 1960 sought to regul~te the transactions of sale and purchase of sugarcane
. H.S. JAY ANNA AND BROS. v. STATE [BHAN, J.] 267

and sugar which were foodstuffs and trade and commerce therein, it had to A
be held that the Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960 being enacted
under the topics of legislative powers under Entries 26, 27 and 28 of List II
would be subject to any other legislation under Entry 33 of the Concurrent
List. Since the Bihar Suagarcane {Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act,
1981 had been enacted in exercise of its legislative powers under Entry 33 B
of the Concurrent List therefore the field covered by the Bihar Suagrcane
{Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1981 would obviously remain
exclusively governed by the Bihar Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and
Purchase) Act, 1981 and to the extent the latter Act carves out an independent
field for its operation, the sweep of the general field covered by the Bihar
Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960 which covered all types of agricultural C
produce, would pro tanto get excluded qua sugarcane and the products prepared
out of it.

After considering the provisions of the Bihar Sugarcane (Regulation of
Supply and Purchase) Act, 1981 in extenso from paragraphs 18 to 45 it was
concluded: D
"The aforesaid provisions of the Sugarcane Act leave no room for
doubt that the Bihar Legislature in its wisdom has enacted a special
machinery for regulating the purchase and sale of sugarcane to be
supplied to sugar factories for manufacturing sugar out of the sugarcane E
produced for them in the reserved area. The relevant provisions of
the Act project as well-knit and exhaustive machinery for regulating
the production, purchase and sale of sugarcane for being supplied as
appropriate raw material to the factories manufacturing sugar and
molasses out of them."
F
After considering the Rul.es framed under the Bihar Sugarcane
(Regulation of Supply and· Purchase) Act, 1981 in paras 46 and 47 it was
again concluded as under:

"The aforesaid provisions, therefore, clearly indicate that the need for
r~gulating the purchase, sale, storage and processing of sugarcane, G
being an "agricultural produce", is completely met by the
comprehensive machinery provided by the Sugarcane Act enacted by
the very same legislature which enacted the general Act being the
Market Act."

After reaching this conclusion on the provisions of the Bihar Sugarcane H
268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002) 2 S.C.R.

A (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1981 it was observed in para 48,
as under:

"Once that conclusion is reached, it becomes obvious that the Market
Act which is an enabling Act empowering the State authorities· to
extend the regulatory net of the said Act to notified agricultural produce
B as per Section 3 (I) will get its general sweep curtailed to the extent
the special Act being the Sugarcane Act enacted by the very same
legislature carves out a special field and provides special machinery
for regulating the purchase and _sale of the specified "agricultural
produce," namely sugarcane."
c By a notification issued under Section 42 of the Bihar Agricultural Produce >\
!

Markets Act, 1960 the State of Bihar exempted all sugar mills from the
provisions of the Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960 with regard
to their sale and purchase of agricultural produce notified under sub-section
(I) of Section 4 of the said Act.
D
The said Notification read as under:

"S.O. 550 dated 22-3-1976 Published in Bihar Gazette (Extra-
Ordinary) dated 23-3-1976. In exercise of the powers conferred under
Section 42 of the Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960, the
E Governor of Bihar js pleased to exempt all sugar mills from the
provisions of Section 15 of the Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets
Act, I 960 with regard to their sale and purchase of agricultural produce
notified under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the said Act ."
-~

Section I 5 was described to be the heart of the Bihar Agricultural
F Produce Markets Act, 1960 and since the sugarcane mills were exempted
from applicability of the provisions of Section 15 it was held:

" ....... that the State Government had given up its erstwhile intention
of regulating the ·sale and purchase of sugarcane as per Section 3 (I)
G of_ the Market Act which could not survive any further after the
issuance of the aforesaid exemption notification ...... "

Thereafter, the Bench considered the effect of Sugarcane Order, 1966 issued
by the Central Government under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities
Act. After referring to the provisions of the Control Order in extenso from
H paras 50 to 60 it was concluded in para 64:
H.S. JAY ANNA AND BROS. v. STATE [BHAN, J.] 269

......."the facts of the present case project even a stronger situation, so A
far as the appellants are concerned. Whatever shortfall is found in the
Sugar (Control) Order has been supplemented by the Sugarcane Act
by the Bihar legif.~1tion itself. The reasoning which appealed to the
Karnataka High Court in the above judgment rendered in the absence
of a separate complementary legislation by the Kamataka Legislature B
gets further strengthened in the light of the Sugarcane Act in the
present case. Consequently on a conjoint reading of the Sugarcane
Order as well as the Sugarcane Act, an inevitable conclusion has to
be reached that the regulation of sale and purchase of sugarcane in
the entire market area for which the general Act, namely, the Market
Act is enacted, is fully governed and highlighted by these two special C
provisions harmoniously operating in the very same field. Therefore,
there would remain no occasion for the State authorities to rationalise
and reasonably visualise any need for regulating the purchase, sale as
well storage of sugarcane in the market area concerned. The wide
sweep of the general notification of Section 3 of the Market Act,
therefore, will have to be read down by excluding from its general D
sweep sugarcane and its products as the definition of "agricultural
produce" as noted earlier would otherwise inch.. de not only the primary
produce of agriculture but also any other commodity processed or
manufactured out of such primary agricultural produce. That is
precisely the reason why the State of Bihar having realised the futility E
of the need about controlling and regulating the sale and purchase of
sugarcane in the market area by the sugar factories excluded the
operation of Section 15 of the Act, which noted earlier is the soul of
the Act. It is easy to visualise that if transactions concerning an
·"agricultural produce" are excluded from the operation of Section 15
of the Act, the entire machinery available to the Market Committee F
to regulate such transactions would get out of the picture and there
would be no room for the Market Committee to supply and
infrastructural facility or other benefits to the seller of such agricultural
produce on the one hand and the purchaser thereof on the other."

It would be seen from the above discussion that the Bench came to conclusion G
that the Bihar Legislature had by enacting the Bihar Sugarcane (Regulation
of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1981 created a special machinery for regulating
the purchase and sale of sugarcane to be supplied to sugar factories for
manufacturing sugar out of the sugarcane produced for them in the reserved
area and coupled with the fact that the sugar mills were exempted from the H
270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R.

A applicability of Section 15 of the Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act,
1960 the entire field was covered under the Bihar Sugarcane (Regulation of
Supply and Purchase) Act, 1981, the Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets
Act, 1960 would have no applicability.

Similarly, for sale of sugar it was held that in view of the Sugarcane
B (Control) Order, 1966; Sugar (Packing and Marking) Order, 1970; Sugar
(Restriction on Movement) Order, 1970 and Levy Sugar Supply (Control)
Order, 1979 the market fee could not be levied under the Bihar Agricultural
Produce Markets Act, 1960 as this field was covered under the four orders
framed under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act pertaining to sugar.
c Thereafter, the Bench considered the levy of market fee on Vegetable
Oils from paras 122 to 124; Rice-Milling Industries from paras 125 to 134;
Mille and Milk Products from paras 135 to 140 and Tea matters from paras
141 onwards and held that the market fee could be levied under the Bihar
· Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960 because the Control orders issued
D under the Essential Commodities Act did not cover the entire field.
Adverting to the facts of the present case we find that the Kamataica
Rice Procurement (Levy) Order, 1984 has been issued with the object of
procurement of rice is to see that rice is made available for public distribution
and no artificial scarcity is created and the people do not suffer because of
E hoarding by certain unreasonable elements. It provides that every miller would
sell everyday beginning with the date of commencement of the Order to the
State Government' or the purchase agent at the purchase price specified in
Schedule I, 33-1/3% of the total quantity of rice conforming to specifications
obtained by milling paddy owned by it in its rice mill everyday. The rice
F required to be sold to the State Government or the purchase agent was required
to be delivered by the miller to purchase agent or to such other persons as
may be authorised by the State Government or the purchase agent to take
such delivery. No stock of rice is to be removed from the mill premises
without delivery of the rice to the State Government or its agP,nts to the
extent of 33-1/3% of the total production and obtaining a release certificate.
G Clause 7 provides that delivery of rice is to be made by the miller to the State
Government or the purchase agent as the case may be in such lots, in such
manner, at such place and at such time as per the directions of the State
Government or the purchase agent. This Order does not enact a special
machinery covering the entire field regulating the marketing, sale and purchase
H of rice as was done in the case of sugarcane by the Bihar Sugarcane (Regulation
H.S.JAYANNAANDBROS. v. STATE [BHAN,J.] 271

of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1981 or the four orders framed under Section A
3 of the Essential Commodities Act pertaining to sugar. A notification similar
to the one issued by the State of Bihar exempting the millers from the
provisions similar to the provisions of Section 15 of the Bihar Agricultural
Produce Markets Act, 1960 has not been issued in the present case.

We have no hesitation in concluding that the entire field of regulating B
the purchase and sale of paddy or the rice produced out of the paddy is not
covered under the Control Order. The provisions of the Marketing Act do not
trench upon the field covered by the Control Order. There is no inconsistency
between the Control Order and the Marketing Act. They do not cover the
same field and therefore the question of any inconsistency, repugnancy or the C
Marketing Act being ineffectual in terms of Section 6 of the Essential
Commodities Act in view of the Control Order issued under Section 3 of the
Essential Commodities Act would not arise. The Control Order deals with the
compulsory acquisition of 1/3 of rice of each variety produced by a miller at
a purchase price fixed by the Government. It requires the miller to supply to
the Government or its purchase agent and deliver the procured rice at a D
notified place. It does not deal with the sale and purchase of the remaining
2/3rd rice except that the mill is not permitted to remove the stock of rice
from· the mill premises without delivery of rice to the Government or its
purchase agent and without obtaining a release certificate required to be
taken under Clause 8 of the said order. It does not deal with the marketing E
or the facilities to be provided to the growner, seller and purchaser of paddy
in the market area or to the seller or purchaser of the rice. The Control Order
is thus limited in operation. The Marketing Act provides for the regulation
of marketing of agricultural produce (which the rice is) and the establishment
and administration of markets for agricultural produce and matters connected
therewith in the State of Karnataka. The Marketing Act deals with the entire F
gamut of marketing of agricultural produce starting from the establishment of
the market committees, markets, declaration of market area, market yard,
market sub yard, regulation of marketing of specified agricultural produce
therein and for obtaining a licence under the A~1. The process of appointment/
electing the market committees, the powers and duties of the market committee G
(Section 63(1 )}, the facilities to be provided by the market committee (Section
63(2)) and the levy of market fee (Section 65). The Marketing Act does not
deal with any of the provisions made in the Control Order. The Control Order
and the Marketing Act do deal with the same subject but do not cover the
same field. There is no conflict between them. They do not occupy the same
field. The Marketing Act deals with a cognate matter on the same subject but H
272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R.

A not the field which is already occupied by the Control Order. Under the
circumstances the reliance placed by the counsel for the appellants on Belsund
Sugar Co. Ltd. (supra) is totally misplaced, on the contrary on the facts of the
present case, the said judgment supports the case of the respondents.

For the reasons stated above, we do not find any merit in these appeals
B and writ petitions consequently the same are dismissed with no orders as to
costs.

T.N.A Appeals and Petitions dismissed.

..