H.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD LTD.versusMARESH DAHIYA

                        [2016) 9 S.C.R. 879


            H.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD LTD.                           A
                                 v.
                        MARESH DAHIYA
                  (CivilAppealNo.10913 of2016)
                       NOVEMBER 18, 2016                                B
         [S. A. BOBDE AND ASHOK BHUSHAN, JJ.]
      Service Law:
        Misconduct - Charges of willful absence from official duty
 and disobedience of orders of superiors - Disciplinary action -       c
 Respondent compulsorily retired from service - He filed writ petition
 - High Court set aside the order of compulsory retirement - On
 appeal, held: The delinquent employee has a right to receive a copy
 of the inquiry officer '.s report before the Disciplinary Authority
  arrives at its conclusions with regard to the guilt or innocence of
                                                                       D
  the employee with regard to the charges levelled against him - That
 right is a part of employee '.s right to defend himself - On facts,
  there was violatiOn of principle of natural justice at the level of
  Disciplinary authority when opinion was formed to punish the -
'-delinquent with dismissal without forwarding the inquiry report to
  him and before_ obtaining his comments on the inquiry report -       E
  Disciplinary Authority to proceed with the inquiry from the stage in
  which fault was noticed i.e. stage under r.15 of CCS (CCA) Rules,
  1965 - CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 - r. 14 and 15 -Administrative Law
  - Principles of Natural Justice.
       Partly allowing the appeal, the Court,                           F
         HELD: 1. Both the Single Judge and the Division Bench
 of High Court have heavily relied on the fact that before forwarding
  the copy of the report the Disciplinary Authority had already
  formed an opinion to punish the respondent with major penalty
. which is a clear violation of_ principle of natural justice. Before   G
  making opinion with regard to punishment which is to be imposed
  o.n a delinquent, the delinquent has to be given an opportunity to
  submit the representation/reply on the inquiry report which finds
  a charge proved against the delinquent. The opinion formed by
  the Disciplinary Authority was formed without there being benefit
                                                                        H
                                 ~79
880            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     · [2016] 9 S.C.R.


A     of comments of the respondent on the inquiry report. The
      respondent in his representation to the inquiry report is entitled
      to point out any defect in the procedure, a defect of substantial
      nature in appreciation of evidence, any misleading of evidence
      both oral or documentary. In his representation any inputs and
      explanation given by the delinquent are also entitled to be
B
      considered by the Disciplinary Authority before it embarks with
      further proceedings as per statutory rules. Th.us, there was
      violation of principle of natural justice at the level of Disciplinary
      Authority when opinion was formed to punish the respondent
      with dismissal without forwarding the inquiry report to the
c     delinquent and before obtaining his comments on the inquiry
      report. Thus, the order of the High Court setting aside the
      punishment order as well as the Appellate order has to be
      maintained. [Para 26][895-D-H]
          2. However, in the present case, the High Court while
b   quashing the punishment order as well as Appellate order ought
    to have permitted the Disciplinary Authority to have proceeded
    with the inquiry from the stage in which fault was noticed i.e. the
  · Stage under Rule 15 of Rules. Also, that sufficient time has
    elapsed during the pendency of the writ petition before Single
    Judge, Division Bench and before this Court, and no further steps
E have been taken regarding implementation o.( the order of the
    High Court. The ends of justice would be served in disposing of
    this appeal by fixing a time frame for completing the proceeding
    from the stage of Ruic 15 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. As the
    principles of natural justice have been violated after submission
F of the inquiry report, all proceedings taken by the Disciplinary
    Authority after submission of report have to be set aside and the
    Disciplinary Authority is directed to forward the copy of the
    inquiry report in· accordance with Rule 15(2) of Rules 1965 and
    further proceedings, if any, are to be taken thereafter. [Paras 27,
G 28][896-A-D)
            Union of India and others v. R. P. Singh 2014 AIR SCW
            3475; Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and Ors.
            v. B. Karunakar and Ors. (1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993
            (2) Suppl. SCR 576; Krushnakant B. Parmar v. Union
            of India and Anr. (2012) 3 SCC 178 : 2012 (3)
H            SCR 484; M. V. Bijlani v. Union of India and Ors.
H.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD LTD. v. MARESH DAHIYA 881



      (2006) 5 SCC 88: 2006 (3) SCR 896; B.C. Chaturvedi                         A
      v. Union of India and Ors. 1995 (6) SCC 749 : 1995
      (4) Suppl. SCR 644 - referred to.
                          Case Law Reference
      2014 AIR sew 3475                     referred to       Para 20
                                                                                 B
      1993 (2) Suppl. SCR 576               referred to       Para 21
      2012 (3) SCR 484                      referred to ·     Para 23
      2006 (3) SCR 896                      referred to       Para 24
      1995 (4) Suppl. SCR 644               referred to       Para 25
                                                                                 c
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 10913
of2016.
     From the Judgment and Order dated 09.04.2015 of the High Court
ofHimachal Pradesh at Shimla in LPA No. 340 of2012.
      Naresh K. Sharma, Adv., for the Appellant.                                 D

     A. Mariarputham, Adish C. Aggarwala, Sr. Advs., Ms. Anuradha ·
Arputham, Aditya Singh Advs., for the Respondent.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
      ASHOK BHUSHAN, J. I. Leave granted.                                        E
       2. This Appeal has been filed by H. P. State El'ectricity Board,
questioning the judgment of Division Bench ofHimachal Pradesh High
Court dated 09.04.2015 in LPA No. 340 of2012. Letters Patent Appeal
was filed by appellant against the judgment and order of learned Single
Judge dated 09.04.2012 in Writ Petition CWPNo.522 of2010 by which                F
judgment the writ petition filed by the respondent challenging the order
of punishment of compulsory retirement as well as order of the Appellate
Authority, dismissing the appeal were set-aside with direction to reinstate
the writ petitioner forthwith with all consequential benefits. Board was
also directed to open the sealed cover and promote the writ petitioner to
                                                                                 G
the post of Superintending Engineer, if he is found suitable by the
Departmental Promotion Committee. The brief facts necessary for
deciding this appeal are:
      The appellant shall be referred to hereinafter as 'Board' and the
respondent as the 'writ petitioner'. The writ petitioner, a native of District
                                                                                 H
882            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2016] 9 S.C.R.



A    Rohtak, Haryana was appointed as Assistant Engineer in the Corporation
     in the year 1983. He was promoted as Assistant Executive Engineer in
     1989. He was sent on deputation to the Rural Electrification Corporation
     of India and posted at Delhi. In the year 2005, writ petitioner was
     repatriated and posted at H.P. State Electricity Board, Shim la as Senior
     Executive Engineer. After repatriation, he remained on leave for I 03
B
     days. On 0406.2005, writ petitioner was admitted in IGMC Hospital,
     Shimla from where, he was discharged on 16.06.2005. Writ petitioner
     obtained fitness certificate on 23.07 .2005 from lGMC Hospital and joined
     his duties on 25.07.2005. After joining, he submitted leave application
     upto 23.07.2005 for post-facto sanction which was granted. On
c 30.07.2005, writ petitioner submitted a leave application on medical
     ground with permission to leave station. Without awaiting for sanction of
     the leave, writ petitioner left the station. With reference to leave
  . application dated 30.07.2005 submitted by the writ petitioner, he was
     advised vi de letter dated 25 .08.2005 of the Chief Engineer to appear
     before the Medical Board. The Chief Medical Officer D.D.U. Hospital,
D
     Shimla was requested to constitute a Medical Board to examine and
     confirm about the illness. Writ petitioner was advised that joining will be
     accepted only on production of the medical certificate of the Medical
     Board. The letter was sent to his hometown Rohtak. When nothing was
     heard from writ petitioner, telegrams were further sent on 07.09.2005,
E 30.09.2005 and 21.10.2005, asking the writ petitioner to appear before
     the Medical Board. On 30.09.2005, writ petitioner was also given warning
     that disobedience will invite the disciplinary action. Lastly, on 02.12.2005,
     writ petitioner was again directed to appear before Medical Board, Shim la
     otherwise disciplinary action will be initiated and the matter has been
     viewed seriously by Board authorities. Writ petitioner did not appear
F
     before the Board, and consequently, he was placed under suspension by
   . order dated 21.01.2006. The writ petitioner obtained a Medical-cum- ·
     Fitness Certificate from Rohtak and he visited lGMC Shimla on
      18.02.2006 for obtaining a Medical Certificate. lGMC Shimla issued a
     medical certificate on 18.02.2006. Joining report dated 20.02.2006 was
G submitted before the Superintending Engineer (Op.) Circle, HPSEB.
     Writ petitioner on.27 .02.2006 submitted a representation for revocation
     ofhis suspension.
             3. The Board decided to hold a disciplinary proceeding against
      the writ petitioner under Rule 14 ofCCS(CCA),Rules, 1965 (hereinafter
 H    referred to as 'Rules'). A Memo and Article of Charge dated 21.09.2006
H.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD LTD. v. MAHESH DAHIYA 883
                [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

was served on the writ petitioner. Writ petitioner submitted a reply to the   A
charges on 15.10.2006. An Inquiry Officer was appointed by Disciplinary
Authority who conducted the inquiry. In the inquiry the department has
produced oral evidence of two witnesses, namely, Mr. S. D. Rattan,
Director (Comm.) (PW-I) and Shri Brij Lal Kiashta Section Officer
(PW-2). writ petitioner produced P.C. Sardana, retired Chief Engineer
                                                                              B
as defence witness. Various documents were produced by the
department and the Inquiry Officer after holding eight hearings submitted
an inquiry report dated 29.12.2007. Inquiry Officer in his report after
considering the evidence held the charge proved by stating the following:
        "Therefore, in my opinion Delinquent Officer failed
      to comply with the direction of his superiors for                       c
      appearing before the Medical Board. As such the charge
      leveled against Er. Dahiya stands proved that he has
      willfully absented himself from official duties and has
      disobeyed the directions of his superiors.
        Charge No. I Proved. "                                                D

       4. The Disciplinary Authority-cum-Whole Time Members of the
Board considered the inquiry report on 25.02.2008 and took following
decision:
      "The findings of the Enquiry Report were accepted by
      the WTM and it was decided toaward major penalty of
      removal from service after following proper coda!
      formalities. "
       5. By letter dated 02.04.2009, a copy of the ii1quil)'. report was
forwarded to the writ petitioner, asking him to submit his representation
                                                                             F
within fifteen days. Writ petitioner SIJ_bmitted a reply dated· 15 .04.2008.
Apart from other pleas, it was also stated that writ petitioner had been
supplied the decision of Whole Time Members of the Board where
findings of the inquiry report have been accepted and it was decided to
award major penalty of removal from service. The Disciplinary Authority
considered his explanation dated 15.04.2008 and came to the opinion          G
that charges against the writ petitioner are proved, and a penalty of
rerimval be imposed. However, before imposing the penalty an opportunity
was provided to make a representation within fifteen days by order dated··
06.07 .2009. Writ petitioner submitted a representation on 21.07 .2009.
Disciplinary Authority passed an order dated 21.08.2009. Disciplinary
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884             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2016] 9 S.C.R.



A   Authority considered the representation_dated 21 .07 .2009 and took a
    decision to compulsory retire the writ petitioner and his period of absence
    was to be treated as dies 11011. Against the order communicated vide
    order dated 25.08.2009, writ petitioner filed an appeal on 09.09.2009
    which appeal was dismissed by the Appellate Authority vide its order
    dated 13.12.2009. Aggrieved by the order dated 25 .08.2009 and
B
    09.09.2009, writ petitioner filed the writ petition before learned Single
    Judge which writ petition had been allowed by Single Judge by order
    dated 09.04.2012, challenging the said judgment Letters Patent Appeal
    was filed which too has been dismissed. Division Bench, while dismissing
    the appeal came to the conclusion that Inquiry Officer and the Disciplinary
c Authority have violated the principle ofnaturaljustice, hence, the appeal
    deserved to be dismissed. Appellate Court had further observed that
    Inquiry Officer, while submitting his report has not discussed the
  · statement of the defence witnesses who supported the case of the writ
    petitioner.
D            6. Learned Single Judge and the Division Bench both came to the
      conclusion that copy of the inquiry report was supplied to the writ
      petitioner on 02.04.2Q08 whereas Disciplinary Authority-cum-Whole
      Time Members of the Board had already made up their mind to impose
      a major penalty on the writ petitioner even without supplying the copy of
      the inquiry report which has prejudiced the writ petitioner. The learned
 E    Single Judge has also held tl:iat Disciplinary Authority failed to prove that
      absence from the duty wa~ willful nor any such findings have been
      recorded by the Inquiry Officer, whereas, the writ petitioner has submitted
      the medical certificate to prove that he was suffering from
      Tuberculosis(T.B.). Learned Single Judge had also issued notice to Doctor
 F    Sharma of Rohtak who had issued the certificate to the writ petitioner
      who appeared before the learned Single Judge and proved his certificate.
            7. This court issued notice on 31.08.2015 and has also stayed
      operation of the judgment dated 09.04.2015-:
              .8. Learned counsel forthe appellant in support ofappeal contends
 G    that Article of Charge against writ petitioner consisted two parts ofcharge
      i.e. (i) Willful absentation from official duty and (ii) disobeying the
      directions of the superiors. He submitted that even if it is assumed for
      the arguments sake that writ petitioner was absent from his official duties
      on account of the illness, there is no answer to the second charge of
H     disobedience of the directions of the superiors. He contends that writ
H.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD LTD. v. MAHESH DAHIYA 885
                [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

petitioner submitted an application on 30.07.2005 for grant of medical        A
leave with seeking permission to leave station and without awaiting
sanction of the leave had left Shimla and continued to be absent for
more than six months without leave having been sanctioned and in spite,
of written order from the Chief Engineer dated 25.08.2005, 07.09.2005,
30.9.2005, 21.10.2005 and 02.12.2005 failed to appear before the Medical
                                                                              B
Board disobeying the orders.
        9. He submitted that the charge regarding disobedience oforders
of superiors having been proved in the inquiry, there is no error in the
punishment awarded on the writ petitioner. He submitted that entire
proceeding before the Inquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority
were conducted in accordance with principle of natural justice. A copy
                                                                              c
of the inquiry report was duly served to the writ petitioner and he was
give~ opportunity to represent against the inquiry report. He submitted
that the mis-conduct on behalf of such senior officer cannot be condoned
and both the Courts below committed error in setting-aside the orders <;>f
the punishment and directing the reinstatement with all consequential         D
ben,:Jfits.
        I 0. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the-re being
 ample material on record to i1ndicate that writ petitioner was suffering
 from tuberculosis, his absence from duty cannot be said to be willful and
"such absence is not mis-conduct on which punishment can be awarded.          E
 He further submitted that writ petitioner could not appear before the
 Medical Board due to his continued illness, which cannot be taken as
 factor against writ petitioner. He submitted that there was violation of
principle of natural justice in the proceeding as have found by courts
 below. Present is not the case in which this Court may interfere with the
judgment of High Court.                                                       F

       11. We have considered the submission of the learned counsel.for
the parties and perused the records.
       12. The Division Bench after referring to several judgments of
this court, which we shall notice hereinafter recorded its conclusion in      G
paragraph 33, 34, 36 and 3 7 which are to the following effect:
       "33. Applying th.e test to the instant case, admittedly,
       the Inquiry Officer has not discussed the evidence of
       the defence witness, who though· was a senior officer
       of the writ respondent-appellant. "
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886             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [20 I 6] 9 S.C.R.



A           ·. "'34. The specific case of the writ petitioner is that the
              .Inquiry Officer!WTM and the Disciplinary Authority
               have violated the principles of natural justice and had
               made up a mind to remove the writ petitioner-respondent
               herein from service and to throw him out, even without
               hearing him. Meaning thereby prejudice has been
B
               caused to the writ petitioner-respondent herein. "
              ""36. Applying the test to the instant case, one comes
             to an inescapable conclusion that the Inquiry Officer
             and the Disciplinary Authority have violated the
             principle of natural justice. "
c
             '"3 7. In view of the discussions made hereinabove, no
             case for .interference is made out. Accordingly, the
             appeal is dismissed and the impugned judgment is
             upheld for the reasons recorded hereinabove. Pending
             applications, if any, are also dispose(Tof"
D
             13. The learned Single Judge heavily relied on the fact that the
      copy of the inquiry report was sent along-with letter dated 02.04.2008,
      whereas Disciplinary Authority-cum-Whole Time Members had already
      made up their mind to impose a major penalty. It shall be useful to refer
      to following observations of learned Single Judge made in para 18 and
 E    19:
              "I 8. The facts do disclose that WTM had made up a
             mind to pass removal order without hearing the writ
             petitioner. The grounds (G/ ·and (H) contained in the
             writ petition have not been denied by the writ
 F           respondent-appellant herein specifically.thus, admitted.
             It stand s corroborated and proved by the statement of
             Dr. Brij Sharma. Abovesaid facts read with order, dated
             03. l.20Jl, passed by the learned Single Judge are
             factors leading to the conclusion that the absence of
G            the writ petitioner was not deliberate or willjitl, b u t
             was beyond his control. "
             '' 19. The writ petitioner has filed rejoinder and has
             explained all circumstances which have been taken as
             grounds by the appellant-writ respondent in the reply
             for conducting the inquiry and imposing the penalty
H
H.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD LTD: v. MAHESH DAHIYA 887
                [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

      upon the writ writ petitioner-respondent. "                                 A
       14. The charge against the writ petitioner as framed was to the
following effect:
      "That the said Er. Mahesh Dahiya while functioning as
      Sr. Executive Engineer [Elect] in the office of the Chief
      Engineer (Comm.} HPSEB, Shimla-4 during           t h e                     B
      period fiwn 2005-06 proceeded on leave on 30.07.2005
      on medical ground. Er. Dahiya was repeatedly directed
      vide Chief Engineer [Comm.} HPSEB, Shimla-4 letter
      dated 25.08.2005, 07.09.2005, 26.10.2005 and
      02.12.2005 to appear before the Medical Board but                           c
      Respondent failed to do so. Thus, Dr. Dahiya has
      willfully absented himself ji-om official duties and has
      disobeyed the directions of his superiors. Respondent
      has therefore acted in a manner which is unbecoming
      of an officer of his status. The said Er. Mahesh Dahiya,
      Sr. Executive Engineer [Elect.} has thus violated the                       D
      provisions of Rule-3[1j(i)(ii)(iii) of CCS Conduct Rules,
      1964 and which made him liable for disciplinary action
      under Rule-14 of CCS[CCA} Rules-1965."
       15. From the facts of the present case, it is clear thai'disciplinary
proceedings w1ere initiated against the writ petitioner, after he has submitted   E
an application on 30.07.2005 for grant of medical leave with permission
to leave the station. According to Rule 7 of Central Civil Services Leave
Rules, leave cannot be claimed as of right Rule 7 is as to the following
effect:
       "7.Right to leave                                                          F
       (I) Leave cannot be claimed as of right.
       (2) When the exigencies of public service so require,
       leave of any kilid may be refused or revoked by the
       authority competent to grant of it, but it shall not be
                                                                                  G
       open to that authority to alter the kind of leave due
       and applied for except at the written request of the
       Government servant to. "
      16. It has also come on rec01rd that application for leave on medical
ground datted 30.07 .2005 was not supported by any medical certificate-·
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888            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2016] 9 S.C.R.



A   and medical certificates from Rohtak and IGMC Shimla which have
    been claimed by the writ petitioner, were claimed tC!_ have been submitted
    after 20.02.2006, after the writ petitioner was placed under the
    suspension. The writ petitioner who was a senior officer in the H. P.
  · Electricity Board was asked to appear before the Medical Board in
    reference to his leave application dated 30.07.2005. The sequence of
B
    events indicates that first letter was written by the Chief Engineer directing
    writ petitioner to appear before the Medical Board on 25.08.2005 and
    thereafter there have been repeated telegrams and directions to appear
    before the Medical Board and warning was also issued on 30.09.2005
    that disobedience will invite disciplinary action.
c          17. The charges, which have been leveled against the writ
    petitioner were in two parts, as noted above i.e. willful absence from
    duties and disobedience of the orders of the superiors. Learned counsel
   for appellant confined his submission only to second charge that is willful
   disobedience of superior officers. He submitted that, even if, on account
D of illness of the writ petitioner, his absence is nottreated as willful, the
    second part of the charge is fully proved in the inquiry. During the
    inquiry, writ petitioner was also asked, as to whether, at any point of time
    he has requested for constitution of a Medical Board at Rohtak which
    suggestion was replied in negative by him. As noted above, the Division
    Bench in para 31 to 33 has come to the conclusion that the Inquiry
E Officer has not discussed the evidence of defence witnesses. The report
    of the Inquiry Officer has been brought on record as annexure P-7, only
    one defence witness appeared, namely, Engineer P. C. Sardana. In the
  . inquiry report, the statement of P. C. Sardana was specifically noted in
    following words:
 F          "Defence witness Er.P. C. Sardana Retd. Chief Engineer
            intimated that Er. Dahiya was suffering from
            Tuberculosis during June/July, 2005. Er. Sardana was
            also intimated that Er. Dahiya showed his inability to
            attend his superannuation, farewell party as he had to
 G          rush to hospital for check up. "
             I 8. Having noticed by the Inquiry Officer the statement of defence
      witness, the Division Bench was not correct in its conclusion that defence·
      was not considered. The Inquiry Officer in his report has extracted entire
      statement of Er. P.C. Sardana. The defence witness has only stated that
 H    30'h July was his last day in the office on which date the writ petitioner
H.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD LTD. v. MAHESH DAHIYA 889
                [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

has expressed his inability to attend farewell party since the writ petitioner   A
had to go to Hospital for check up. The charges against the writ petitioner
were all based on events subsequent to making leave application on 30th
July, 2005. We, thus, do not find any infirmity in the Inquiry Officer's
report in respect to consideration of evidence of defence witness Er.
P.C. Sardana.
       19. The Division Bench further in para_36, as noted above has
come to the conclusion that Inquiry Officer/Disciplinary Authority has
violated the principle of natural justice, but nothing has been referred to
in the judgment, either of the Division Bench or learned Single Judge
that how the principle of natural justice have been violated by the Inquiry
Officer. Before Inquiry Officer, both parties led oral and documentary           c
evidence and were heard. The observation of the Division Bench that
natural justice has been violated by the Inquiry Officer is based on no
materials.
       20. The basis of coming to the conclusion by both learned Single
Judge and the Division Bench that Disciplinary Authority has violated            D
the principle of natural justice is based on the fact that although the
inquiry report was sent to the writ petitioner by letter dated 02.04.2008,
the Disciplinary Authority-cum-Whole Time Members have already came
to the opinion on 25.2.2008 that writ petitioner be punished with major
penalty. The Division Bench of the High Court has placed reliance on             E
Union of India and others v. R. P. Singh 2014 AIR SCW 3475.
       21. In the above case the issue was, as to whether non-supply of
the copy of advise ofU .P.S.C. to delinquent officer at pre-decision stage
violates the principle ofnaturaljustice. This Court placed reliance on the
Constitution Bench judgment in Managing Director, ECIL,                          F
HYDERABAD AND OTHERS Versus B. KARUNAKAR AND
OTHERS (1993) 4 SCC 727 and laid down following in para 23:
       "23. At this juncture, we would like to give our reasons
       for our respectful concurrence with S.K. Kapoor
       (supra). There is no cavil over the proposition that the                  G
       language engrafted iii Article 320(3)(c) does not make
       the said Article mandatory. As we find, in the T. V.Patel :S
       case, the Court has based its finding on the language
       employed in Rule 32 of the Rules. It is not in dispute
       that the said Rule from the ve1·y inception is a part of
       the 1965 Rules. With the efflux of time, there has been a                 H
890            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2016] 9 S.C.R.



A           change of perception as regards the applicability of the
            principles of natural justice. An inquiry report in a
            disciplinary proceeding is required to be furnished to
            the delinquent employee so that he can make an adequate
            representation explaining his own stand/stance. That is
            what precisely has been laid down in the
B
            B.Karnukara 's(AJR 1994 SC 1074) case. We may
            reproduce the relevant passage with profit: -
             "Hence it has to be held that when the enquiry officer
            is not the disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee
            has a right to receive a copy of the enquily officer's
 c          report before the disciplinary authority arrives at its
            conclusions with regard to the guilt or innocence of the
            employee with regard to the charges levelled against
            him. That right is a part of the employees right to defend
            himself against the charges levelled against him. A
 D          denial of the enquiry officer's report ut?jore. the
            disciplinary authority takes its decision on the charges,
            is a denial of reasonable opportunity to the employee
            to prove his innocence and is a breach of the principles
            of natural justice. ""
 E           There can be no dispute to the above preposition. The Constitution
      Bench in Ma11agi11g Director, ECIL, HYDERABAD AND OTHERS
      Versus B. KARUNAKAR AND OTHERS (1993) 4 SCC 727 after
      elaborately considering the principle of natural justice in the context of
      the disciplinary inquiry laid down following in para 29, 30 (iv)(v):

 F            "29. He11ce it has to be held that when the enquiry
            officer is not the Disciplinary Authority, the delinquent
            employee has a right to receive a copy of the enquiry
            officers report before the Disciplinary Authority arrives
            at its conclusions with regard to the guilt or innocence
            of the employee with regard to the charges levelled
 G          against him. That right is a par t of the employee :S
            right to defend himself against the charges levelled
            against him. A denial of the enquiry officers report
            before the Disciplinary Authority takes its decision on
            the charges, is a denial of reasonable opportunity to
 H          the employee to prove his innocence and is a breach of
H.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD LTD. v. MAHESH DAHIYA 891
                [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

    the priflciples of natural justice."                            A
    "30. ••(iv). In the vie11: that we have taken, viz., that the
    right to make representation to the disciplinary authority
    against the findings recorded in the enquiry report is
    an integral part of the opportunity of defence against
    the charges and is a breach of principles of natural            .B
    justice to deny the said right. it is only appropriate that
    the law laid down in Mohd. Ramzan case should apply
    to employees in all establishments whether Government
    or non-Government, public or private. This will be the
    case whether there are rules governi11g the disciplinary
    proceeding or 11ot and whether they expressly prohibit          c
    the furnishing of the copy of the report or are silent on
    the s11bject. Whatever the nature of punishment, further,
    whenever the rules require an inquiry to be held, for
    inflicting the punishment in question, the delinquent
    employee should have the benefit of the report of the           D
    enquiry officer before the disciplinary authority records
    its findings on the charges levelled against him. Hence
    question (iv) is answered accordingly."
    "(v). The next question to be answered is what is the
    effect on the order of punishment when the report of            E
    the enquiry officer·is not furnished to the employee and
    what relief should be granted to him in such cases. The
    answer to this question has to be relative to the
    punishment awarded. When the employee is dism(ssed
    or removed from service and the inquiry is set aside
    because the report is not furnished to him, in some cases        F
    the no11-furnishing of the report may have prejudiced
    him gravely while in other cases it may have made no
    difference to the ultimate punishment awarded to him.
    Hence to direct reinstatement of the employee with back-
    wages in all cases is to reduce the rules of justice to a       G
    mechanical ritual. The theory of reasonable opportunity
    and the principles of natural justice have been evolved
    to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to
    vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to
    be invoked nor rites to be pe1for111ed on all and sundry
                                                                    H
892             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2016] 9 S.C.R.



A           occasions. Whether in fact, .prejudice has been caused
            to the employee or not on account of the denial to him
            of the report, has to be considered on the facts and
            circumstances of each case. Where, therefore, even after
            the furnishing of the report, no different consequence
            would have followed, it would be a perversion ofjustice
B
            to permit the employee to resume duty and to get all the
            consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the
            dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the
            concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits.
            It amounts to an "unnatural expansion of natural
 c          justice" which in itself is antithetical to justice"
             22. Present is not a case of not serving the inquiry report before
      awarding the punishment rather the complaint has been made that before
      sending the inquiry report to the delinquent officer, Disciplinary Authority
      has already made up its mind to accept the findings of the inquiry ~eport
D     and decided to award punishment of dismissal. Both the learned Single
      Judge and the Division Bench on the aforesaid premise came to the
      conclusion that principle of natural justice have been violated by the
      Disciplinary Authority. The Division Bench itself was conscious of the
      issue, as. to whether, inquiry is to be quashed from the stage where the
      Inquiry Officer\Discipfinary Authority has committed fault i.e. from the
 E    stage of Rule 15 of the CCS (CCA) Rules as non-supply of the report.
      Following observations have been made in the impugned judgment by
      Division Bench in para 21:
              "Haying said so, the core question is - whether the
             inquiry is to be quashed from the stage where the Inquiry
 F           Officer/Disciplinary Authority has committed fault, i.e.
             from the stage of Rule 15 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, i.e.
             non-supply of inquiry report, findings and other material
             relied upon by the Inquiry Officer/Disciplinary
             Authority to the writ writ petitioner-respondent herein
 G           to explain the circumstances, which were made basis ·
             for making foundation of inquiry report or is it a case
             for closure of the inquiry in view of the fact that there
             is not even a single iota of evidence, prima facie, not to
             speak of proving by preponderance of probabilities,
             that the writ petitioner has ubsented himself willfully
 H           and he has disobeyed the directions?"
H.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD LTD. v. MAHESH DAHIYA 893
                [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

      23: The above observation clearly indicates that Division Bench           A
was well aware that fault has occurred on the stage of Rule 15 of the
CCS (CCA) Rules. The Division Bench had also relied on the judgment
of this Court in KRUSHNAKANT B. PARMAR Versus UNION OF
INDIAAND ANOTHER (2012) 3 SCC 178 where this Court had laid
down that absence from duty without any application on prior permission
                                                                                B
may amount to unauthorised absence but it does not always mean willful.
Learned counsel for the appellant, as noted above, has confined his
submission ~n the proof of the second part of the charge and he has not
invited us to enter into the issue as to whether absence ofthewrit petitioner
was willful or not.
       24. As noted above, the Division Bench, having posed the question,
                                                                                c
as to whether, inquiry is to be quashed from the stage whether the
Disciplinary Authority committed fault i.e. from the Rule 15, has not
"further dwelt upon the question nor has given any reason as to why the
opportunity for holding the inquiry from the stage fault was found be not
given. On the scope of judicial review, the Division Bench itself has           D
referred to judgment of this Court reported in M. V. BIJLANI VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS (2006) 5 SCC 88. This Court,
noticing the scope ofjudicial review in context of disciplinary proceeding
made following observations in para 25:
        "It is true that the jurisdiction of the court in judicial              E
        review is limited. Disciplinary proceedings, however,
        being quasi-criminal in nature, there should be some.
        evidence to prove the charge. Although the charges in
        a departmental proceeding are not required to be proved
        like a criminal trial i.e. beyond all reasonable doubt,
        we cannot lose sight of the fact that the enquiry officer               F
        pe1forms a quasi-judicial function, who upon analysing
        the documents must arrive at a conclusion that there
        had been a preponderance of probability to prove the
        charges on the basis of materials on record. While doing
        so, he cannot take into consideration any irrelevant fact.              G
      · He cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts. He ·
        cannot shift the burden of proof He cannot reject the
        relevant (estimony of the witnesses only on the basis of
        surmises and conjectures. He cannot enquire into the
        allegations with which the delinquent officer had not
                                                                                H
894            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2016] 9 S.C.R. ·


A           been charged with. ''
            25. The three Judge Bench of this Court in B.C. CHATURVEDI
      VERSUS UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS 1995 (6) sec 749
      had noticed the scope of judicial review with regard to disciplinary
      proceeding. Following observations have been made in paras 12 and 13:
B            "12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision
            but a review ofthe manner in which the decision is made.
            Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the
            individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that
            the conclusion which the authority reaches is
c           necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an
            inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a
            public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to
            determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent
            officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied
            with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based
D           on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the
            power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and
            authority to reach a finding of/act or conclusion. But
            that finding must be based on some evidenc~. Neither
            the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact
E           or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary
            proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence
            and conclusion receives support therefrom, the
            disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the
            delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/
            Tribunal in its power ofjudicial review does not act as
F           appellate authority to re-appreciate the evidence and
            to arrive at its own independent findings on the
            evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the
            authority held the proceedings against the delinquent
            officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of
G           natural ju-stice or in violation of statutory rules
            prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion
            or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based
            on no evidence. 1f the conclusion or finding be such as
            no reasonable person would have ever reached, the -
            Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the
H           finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate
H.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD LTD. v. MAHESH DAHIYA 895
                [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

      to the facts of each case. "                                            A
      "13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge offacts.
      Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has
      coextensive power to re-appreciate the evidence or the
      nature ofpunishment. In a discipli1iary inquiry, the strict
      proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence                   B
      are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of
      evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before
      the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India V. HC. Goel this
      Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon .
      consideration of the evidence reached by the
      disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent              c
      error on the face of the record or based on no evidence
      at all, a writ of certiorari could issued. "
       26. Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have
heavily relied on the fact that before forwarding the copy of the report
by letter dated 02.04.2008 the Disciplinary Authority-cum-Whole Time          D
Members have already formed an opinion on 25.02.2008 to punish the
writ petitioner with major penalty which is a clear violation of principle
of natural justice. We are of the view that before making opinion with
regard to punishment which is to be imposed on a delinquent, the delinquent
has to be given an opportunity to submit the representation/reply on the      E
inquiry report which finds a charge proved against the delinquent. The
opinion formed by the Disciplinary Authority-cum-Whole Time Members
on 25.02.2008 was formed without there being benefit of comments of
the writ petitioner on the inquiry report. The writ petitioner in his
representation to the inquiry report is entitled to point out any defect in
the procedure, a defect of substantial nature in appreciation of evidence,    F
any misleading of evidence both oral or documentary. In his representation
any inputs and explanation given by the delinquent are also entitled to be
considered by the Disciplinary Authority before it embarks with further
proceedings as per statutory rules. We are, thus, of the view that there
was violation of principle of natural justice at the level of Disciplinary    G
Authority when opinion was fonned to punish the writ petitioner with
dismissal without forwarding the inquiry report to the delinquent and
before obtaining his comments on the inquiry report. We are, thus, of the
view that the order of the High Court setting aside the punishment order
as well as the Appellate order has to be maintained.
                                                                              H
896                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2016] 9 S.C .R.



A           27. In view of the above discussion, we are of the view that present
    is the case where the High Court while quashing the punishment order
    as well as Appellate order ought to have permitted the Disciplinary
  · Authority to have proceeded with the inquiry from the stage in which
    fault was noticed i.e. the Stage under Rule 15 of Rules. We are conscious
    that sufficient time has elapsed during the pendency of the writ petition
B
    before learned Single Judge, Division Bench and before this Court,
    however, in view of the interim order passed by this Court dated
    31.08.2015 no further steps have been taken regarding implementation
    ofthe orderofthe High Court. The ends ofjustice be served in disposing
    of this appeal by fixing a time frame for completing the proceeding-from
c the stage of Rule 15.
             28. We having found that principl~s of natural justice have been
      violated after submission of the inquiry report dated 29.12.2007 all
      proceedings taken by the Disciplinary Authority after 29.12.2007 have
      to be set aside and the Disciplinary Authority is to be directed to forward
D     the copy of the inquiry report in accordance with Rule 15(2) of Rules
      1965 and further proceedings, if any, are to be taken thereafter.
            29. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed, the judgment of the .
      High Court is modified in the following manner:
             (1) All proceedings of Disciplinary Authority after submission of
E     the inquiry report dated 29.12.2007 including punishment order dated
      25.8.2009 and Appellate order dated 10.12.2009 are set aside.
             (2) The Disciplinary Authority shall forward the inquiry report as
      per Rule 15(2) of 1965 Rules. The writ petitioner be allowed 15 days'
      time to submit his representation to the inquiry report.
F
             (3) After receipt of representation of the writ petitioner to the
      inquiry report, the Disciplinary Authority may proceed and take a decision
      in accordance with Rule 15 of 1965 Rules.
            (4) The Disciplinary Authority shall complete the proceedings and
G     pass appropriate orders within a period of three months from the date of
      receipt of representation of the writ petitioner to the inquiry report.
      Ankit Gyan                                              Appeal partly allowed.